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EeneyMinnieMoe
9th December 2007, 12:17 PM
I took a look at this way back when QG and I first started doing this but couldn't find a mention of the case apart from The Montel Williams Show. QG didn't have any more luck with it when I passed it on to him.

I came across it again and tried again and think it's fair to call it wrong. It's from the May 14, 2003 show, the same one John Slayton's daughter and granddaughter appeared on.

...

WILLIAMS: Well, my next guest wants to know more about the murder of her son. Take a look at this.

(Excerpt from videotape)

WILLIAMS: It was on Mother's Day of 2000 when Robert Hassett allegedly murdered his stepmother, Sherry, by stabbing her 27 times. A superior court jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison plus 20 years. Although Hassett was sentenced for this crime, others believe he wasn't the only one involved.

DEBBIE: I believe that my son did not stab his stepmother. But he has paid for the part of the crime he committed. I feel there are others involved, and the real killer needs to be brought to justice.

(End of excerpt)

WILLIAMS: Please welcome Debbie to the show. And I said the murder of her son--but the murder her son was convicted of.

Ms. BROWNE: Exactly.

WILLIAMS: Yes, Debbie, what--what did you want to ask Sylvia?

DEBBIE: Sylvia, I want to know if DNA and new fingerprinting would help convict another person?

Ms. BROWNE: A female.

WILLIAMS: Well, you know what? Now I'll tell you, what's very odd about this is that the stepmother was stabbed 27 times?

DEBBIE: Yeah.

WILLIAMS: But they also found semen, as if she had either been raped or had had sex, and that DNA doesn't match anybody involved.

Ms. BROWNE: Match his. That's right, right.

DEBBIE: That's what I was gonna ask. Was there coercion or intent...

Ms. BROWNE: Yeah, it was a female.

DEBBIE: ...to set my son up or...

Ms. BROWNE: Yeah. Now, I agree--'cause I'm a mother, too. I agree that you said--which I would say, too, as a mother, as much as it hurt me--my son has paid for his part. The other person has not paid for their part.

DEBBIE: Right.

Ms. BROWNE: That's karmically wrong.

DEBBIE: OK.

Ms. BROWNE: But I'm telling you, there was a dark-haired female, young, that was involved with this that had some kind of hatred going for this stepmother. I mean, this is so convoluted. You and I could take hours. It was an older male playing around with another female, and the stepmother was involved. The son was pulled into this. I mean, this could make a Lifetime movie thing. Do you see what I'm saying?

DEBBIE: Right.

WILLIAMS: Will this crime be--will the additional people be brought to justice?

Ms. BROWNE: Yeah, this one female, I think--How many times has this ha--this happened?--gets such guilt that she goes and finally opens up. 'Cause I don't think it's fair that your son has to take this on his own. But didn't he try to tell you that there was a female involved in this?

DEBBIE: No.

Ms. BROWNE: Will you ask him? I don't know why he's protecting her.

DEBBIE: That's what I don't understand.

Ms. BROWNE: He's got mis--mis--what we call misplaced loyalty.

DEBBIE: Mm-hmm.

WILLIAMS: Yes, ma'am.

Unidentified Woman #21: Sylvia, could you tell me who's in my living room? My dog sits in a trance, looks at the doorway, and my husband and I feel somebody in our house.

...

Here's a brief article about the boy's arrest:



The Associated Press State & Local Wire
May 14, 2000, Sunday, BC cycle
Police arrest suspect in Seaford stabbing

SECTION: State and Regional

LENGTH: 73 words

DATELINE: FELTON, Del.



A 19-year-old man was arrested in the fatal stabbing of his stepmother in Seaford, Delaware State Police said Sunday.

Robert Hassett was arrested around 11 a.m., in his birth mother's home at the Peach Tree apartments, police said.
Hassett will be charged with second-degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon in the death early Sunday of Sherri Hassett, 30.
Bail information was not immediately released by police.

...

Robert Hassett is still in prison for the murder of Sherri Hassett. As of 2007, no one else has has been charged for the crime.

EeneyMinnieMoe
9th December 2007, 01:00 PM
You can read part of The State of Delaware vs. Robert W. Hassett III online. Just type "Robert Hassett" into google and when it comes up, click "View as HTML".

There's a description of the crime that reveals that there was indeed an accessory, a male friend that hepled Hassett remove the body from the scene of the crime and that the boy's defense in the trial is that the friend killed the woman. The jury did not find his story credible and neither did the Supreme Court of Delaware when they denied his appeal in June 2005.

Sorry for the messy copy and paste, it couldn't be helped.





First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a
Felony. Hassett was sentenced on the first conviction to life imprisonment and on
the second conviction to 20 years imprisonment at Level V. Hassett’s convictions
and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.
2
(3) The evidence at trial established that, in May 2000, Hassett lived in an
apartment adjoining his father’s mobile home near Seaford, Delaware. There was
friction between Hassett and his father because of Hassett’s loud music and
partying. One evening, bothered by the noise from the apartment, Hassett’s father
told him he would have to move out. Hassett’s friend, Jason Coggin, was with
Hassett in the apartment at the time. According to Coggin, Hassett became angry
with his father and stabbed the wall between the apartment and the mobile home
with a steak knife. Later, Hassett, who had been drinking heavily and smoking
marijuana, met his stepmother outside the apartment. Shortly thereafter, there
were screams. Hassett returned to the apartment and told Coggin that he had killed
his stepmother. The two of them carried her body into the apartment. Hassett then

ineffective assistance. The Superior Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing and, on October 19,
2004, filed its report following remand. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the
Superior Court found no merit to Hassett’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The parties
then filed supplemental memoranda in this Court, which addressed the Superior Court’s findings
on remand.
2
Hassett v. State, Del. Supr., No. 420, 2001, Steele, J. (May 15, 2002).
Page 3
-3-
went into the mobile home to get some money. After threatening his father with a
knife, Hassett drove away in his stepmother’s car. Hassett’s father called 911 and
told the officer dispatched to the scene what had happened. Hassett testified at trial
that it was Coggin who had killed his stepmother, but the jury did not find his story
to be credible.

(4) In this appeal, Hassett claims that the Superior Court abused its
discretion by denying his motions for a new trial and for postconviction relief. In
his motion for a new trial, Hassett alleged that the Superior Court should have
scheduled an evidentiary hearing regarding a post-trial affidavit submitted by
Coggin, which stated that he had lied on the witness stand due to coercion from the
prosecutor. In his postconviction motion, Hassett alleged that the prosecutor’s
closing argument was improper, the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings,
the police engaged in misconduct and his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
3
(5) The standard for determining whether a new trial should be granted
based on recanted testimony is whether: a) the court is reasonably well-satisfied
that the testimony given by a material witness is false; b) without the testimony the
jury might have reached a different conclusion; and c) the party seeking the new
3
Hassett reasserts this argument in his supplemental memorandum filed in this Court in
response to the Superior Court’s findings on remand.
Page 4
-4-
trial was surprised when the testimony was given or did not know it was false until
after the trial.
4
Such a motion is generally decided without an evidentiary hearing
unless there are exceptional circumstances such as factually specific allegations of
jury tampering, third-party confessions or prosecutorial misconduct.
5
(6) While Coggin’s affidavit states that the prosecutor coerced him into
lying on the witness stand, it is not specific as to either the nature of the coercion
or the nature of his alleged lies on the witness stand. It merely states that the
prosecutor told him what to say and coerced him with the threat of prison and that
“everything” he said at trial about the murder was a lie. Under these
circumstances, the Superior Court was within its discretion to summarily reject the
affidavit as unreliable and to deny Hassett’s motion for a new trial.

(7) Hassett next claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by
determining that the claims made in his motion for postconviction relief were
procedurally barred
6
and by denying the motion on that basis. In support of this
claim, he contends, first, that it was improper for the prosecutor to insinuate in
4
Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 433-34 (Del. 1982).
5
Id. at 435.
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).
Page 5
-5-
closing argument that he lied and to imply that the State had superior knowledge of
the facts.
7
(8) The prosecutor is entitled to argue all legitimate inferences of guilt
that flow from the evidence presented at trial.
8
We have reviewed the closing
argument of the prosecution in this case and find nothing in it that contravenes this
general principle or that constitutes improper “vouching.”
9
Hassett has failed to
show that a miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the Superior Court in finding this claim to be procedurally
barred or in denying Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on this ground.

(9) Hassett next contends that the Superior Court should have granted his
motion for postconviction relief based on the trial judge’s erroneous rulings. In
particular, he alleges that the trial judge erred by failing to dismiss a juror who was
contacted by the victim’s family during trial, by denying his request for the
appointment of co-counsel, and by denying his request to dismiss his counsel.
10
(10) We have reviewed the record in this case and find no error on the part
of the trial judge in not dismissing one of the jurors. The record reflects that a trial
7
Hassett made this claim for the first time in his postconviction motion. Super. Ct. Crim.
R. 61(i) (3).
8
Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 567 (Del. 1981).
9
Saunders v. State, 602 A.2d 623, 624 (Del. 1984).
10
Hassett made this claim for the first time in his postconviction motion. Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
Page 6
-6-

spectator reported to the judge that one of the jurors had been contacted by the
victim’s family. The judge questioned the juror and found no evidence of any
contact with the victim’s family. The issue was never raised again. We, likewise,
find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying
Hassett’s requests for the appointment of co-counsel and new counsel. There is no
evidence in the record suggesting that Hassett’s counsel needed the assistance of
co-counsel. There is likewise no factual support for Hassett’s claim that the trial
judge should have appointed new counsel for him. The record reflects that, prior
to trial, Hassett voiced a concern that his counsel was not communicating with
him. The record further reflects, however, that, once the trial judge forwarded the
concern to counsel, there was no further mention of it. Hassett has failed to show
that a miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the Superior Court in finding these claims to be
procedurally barred or in denying Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on
these grounds.

(11) Hassett also contends that the Superior Court should have granted his
motion for postconviction relief because the trial judge failed to properly instruct
the jury concerning “vouching” by the prosecutor during closing argument.
11
The
11
This claim was raised in Hassett’s direct appeal and was decided against him. Super.
Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
Page 7
-7-

record reflects that the judge advised the jury that “vouching” by counsel was
improper and cautioned them to disregard any personal opinion or belief offered by
counsel during opening or closing statements or at any other time during trial. We
find no impropriety in this instruction. Hassett has failed to show that a
miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion
on the part of the Superior Court in finding this claim to be procedurally barred or
in denying Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on this ground.
(12) Hassett next contends that the Superior Court should have granted
his motion for postconviction relief because the police engaged in misconduct.
12
The record reflects that the police acknowledged that they did not seize certain
items of Coggin’s clothing during their investigation of the murder and that they
did not take hair samples, fingerprints or fingernail scrapings from Coggin. This,
in and of itself, does not constitute misconduct. Moreover, given that the victim’s
blood was found on Hassett’s shirt and that her DNA was found in Hassett’s
fingernail scrapings, Hassett has failed to show that a miscarriage of justice
occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
12
Hassett made this claim for the first time in his postconviction motion. Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
Page 8
-8-
Superior Court in finding this claim to be procedurally barred or in denying
Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on this ground.
(13) Hassett’s final contention is that the Superior Court should have
granted his motion for postconviction relief on the basis that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Hassett alleges that his counsel failed to investigate his
mental health status, investigate the backgrounds of the prosecution witnesses,
obtain the opinion of an expert on the effects of drugs and alcohol on his behavior
at the time of the murder, call appropriate witnesses and meet with him in order to
fully discuss the case.
(14) Following remand of this matter to the Superior Court for further
proceedings on Hassett’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Superior
Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Superior Court heard
testimony from Hassett’s trial counsel and Dr. Allen Weiss, the prison psychiatrist
who treated Hassett during the period prior to his trial. The State also placed
Hassett’s prison medical record into evidence. On the basis of the evidence
presented, the Superior Court found that Hassett was competent to stand trial and
remained competent throughout the trial, that Hassett’s attorney had no obligation
to order a mental health evaluation for Hassett because there was no indication at
any time that Hassett was not competent, and that Hassett’s attorney appropriately
Page 9
-9-
did not pursue the defenses of extreme emotional distress, diminished mental
capacity or temporary insanity because to do so would have required Hassett to
admit to the crime, which he refused to do. The Superior Court also found no
factual support for Hassett’s claims that his attorney failed to investigate and
interview possible defense witnesses.
(15) In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Hassett must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different.
13
Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was
professionally reasonable.”
14
(16) The record reflects that Hassett’s defense at trial was that Coggin, and
not he, had murdered his stepmother. The state of Hassett’s mental health and the
effect of the drugs and alcohol he had ingested were simply not relevant to that
defense. There was no error on the part of Hassett’s counsel in that respect. As for
Hassett’s other contentions, we agree with the Superior Court that there is no
13
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
14
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
Page 10
-10-
evidence that any alleged error on the part of his counsel resulted in prejudice to
him.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
15
BY THE COURT:
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice
15
On February 22, 2005, Hassett filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing in this Court.
The grounds for the motion were that the Superior Court’s report following remand did not
accurately reflect the testimony at the hearing. The hearing testimony has since been transcribed
and this Court has reviewed the transcript in detail. We conclude that there is no reason for an
evidentiary hearing in this Court and Hassett’s motion is, therefore, hereby denied.
apartment adjoining his father’s mobile home near Seaford, Delaware. There was
friction between Hassett and his father because of Hassett’s loud music and
partying. One evening, bothered by the noise from the apartment, Hassett’s father
told him he would have to move out. Hassett’s friend, Jason Coggin, was with
Hassett in the apartment at the time. According to Coggin, Hassett became angry
with his father and stabbed the wall between the apartment and the mobile home
with a steak knife. Later, Hassett, who had been drinking heavily and smoking
marijuana, met his stepmother outside the apartment. Shortly thereafter, there
were screams. Hassett returned to the apartment and told Coggin that he had killed
his stepmother. The two of them carried her body into the apartment. Hassett then
ineffective assistance. The Superior Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing and, on October 19,
2004, filed its report following remand. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the
Superior Court found no merit to Hassett’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The parties
then filed supplemental memoranda in this Court, which addressed the Superior Court’s findings
on remand.
2
Hassett v. State, Del. Supr., No. 420, 2001, Steele, J. (May 15, 2002).
Page 3
-3-
went into the mobile home to get some money. After threatening his father with a
knife, Hassett drove away in his stepmother’s car. Hassett’s father called 911 and
told the officer dispatched to the scene what had happened. Hassett testified at trial
that it was Coggin who had killed his stepmother, but the jury did not find his story
to be credible.
(4) In this appeal, Hassett claims that the Superior Court abused its
discretion by denying his motions for a new trial and for postconviction relief. In
his motion for a new trial, Hassett alleged that the Superior Court should have
scheduled an evidentiary hearing regarding a post-trial affidavit submitted by
Coggin, which stated that he had lied on the witness stand due to coercion from the
prosecutor. In his postconviction motion, Hassett alleged that the prosecutor’s
closing argument was improper, the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings,
the police engaged in misconduct and his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
3
(5) The standard for determining whether a new trial should be granted
based on recanted testimony is whether: a) the court is reasonably well-satisfied
that the testimony given by a material witness is false; b) without the testimony the
jury might have reached a different conclusion; and c) the party seeking the new
3
Hassett reasserts this argument in his supplemental memorandum filed in this Court in
response to the Superior Court’s findings on remand.
Page 4
-4-
trial was surprised when the testimony was given or did not know it was false until
after the trial.
4
Such a motion is generally decided without an evidentiary hearing
unless there are exceptional circumstances such as factually specific allegations of
jury tampering, third-party confessions or prosecutorial misconduct.
5
(6) While Coggin’s affidavit states that the prosecutor coerced him into
lying on the witness stand, it is not specific as to either the nature of the coercion
or the nature of his alleged lies on the witness stand. It merely states that the
prosecutor told him what to say and coerced him with the threat of prison and that
“everything” he said at trial about the murder was a lie. Under these
circumstances, the Superior Court was within its discretion to summarily reject the
affidavit as unreliable and to deny Hassett’s motion for a new trial.
(7) Hassett next claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by
determining that the claims made in his motion for postconviction relief were
procedurally barred
6
and by denying the motion on that basis. In support of this
claim, he contends, first, that it was improper for the prosecutor to insinuate in
4
Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 433-34 (Del. 1982).
5
Id. at 435.
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).
Page 5
-5-
closing argument that he lied and to imply that the State had superior knowledge of
the facts.
7
(8) The prosecutor is entitled to argue all legitimate inferences of guilt
that flow from the evidence presented at trial.
8
We have reviewed the closing
argument of the prosecution in this case and find nothing in it that contravenes this
general principle or that constitutes improper “vouching.”
9
Hassett has failed to
show that a miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the Superior Court in finding this claim to be procedurally
barred or in denying Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on this ground.
(9) Hassett next contends that the Superior Court should have granted his
motion for postconviction relief based on the trial judge’s erroneous rulings. In
particular, he alleges that the trial judge erred by failing to dismiss a juror who was
contacted by the victim’s family during trial, by denying his request for the
appointment of co-counsel, and by denying his request to dismiss his counsel.
10
(10) We have reviewed the record in this case and find no error on the part
of the trial judge in not dismissing one of the jurors. The record reflects that a trial
7
Hassett made this claim for the first time in his postconviction motion. Super. Ct. Crim.
R. 61(i) (3).
8
Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 567 (Del. 1981).
9
Saunders v. State, 602 A.2d 623, 624 (Del. 1984).
10
Hassett made this claim for the first time in his postconviction motion. Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
Page 6
-6-
spectator reported to the judge that one of the jurors had been contacted by the
victim’s family. The judge questioned the juror and found no evidence of any
contact with the victim’s family. The issue was never raised again. We, likewise,
find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying
Hassett’s requests for the appointment of co-counsel and new counsel. There is no
evidence in the record suggesting that Hassett’s counsel needed the assistance of
co-counsel. There is likewise no factual support for Hassett’s claim that the trial
judge should have appointed new counsel for him. The record reflects that, prior
to trial, Hassett voiced a concern that his counsel was not communicating with
him. The record further reflects, however, that, once the trial judge forwarded the
concern to counsel, there was no further mention of it. Hassett has failed to show
that a miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the Superior Court in finding these claims to be
procedurally barred or in denying Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on
these grounds.
(11) Hassett also contends that the Superior Court should have granted his
motion for postconviction relief because the trial judge failed to properly instruct
the jury concerning “vouching” by the prosecutor during closing argument.
11
The
11
This claim was raised in Hassett’s direct appeal and was decided against him. Super.
Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
Page 7
-7-
record reflects that the judge advised the jury that “vouching” by counsel was
improper and cautioned them to disregard any personal opinion or belief offered by
counsel during opening or closing statements or at any other time during trial. We
find no impropriety in this instruction. Hassett has failed to show that a
miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion
on the part of the Superior Court in finding this claim to be procedurally barred or
in denying Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on this ground.
(12) Hassett next contends that the Superior Court should have granted
his motion for postconviction relief because the police engaged in misconduct.
12
The record reflects that the police acknowledged that they did not seize certain
items of Coggin’s clothing during their investigation of the murder and that they
did not take hair samples, fingerprints or fingernail scrapings from Coggin. This,
in and of itself, does not constitute misconduct. Moreover, given that the victim’s
blood was found on Hassett’s shirt and that her DNA was found in Hassett’s
fingernail scrapings, Hassett has failed to show that a miscarriage of justice
occurred at trial. We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
12
Hassett made this claim for the first time in his postconviction motion. Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
Page 8
-8-
Superior Court in finding this claim to be procedurally barred or in denying
Hassett’s motion for postconviction relief on this ground.
(13) Hassett’s final contention is that the Superior Court should have
granted his motion for postconviction relief on the basis that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Hassett alleges that his counsel failed to investigate his
mental health status, investigate the backgrounds of the prosecution witnesses,
obtain the opinion of an expert on the effects of drugs and alcohol on his behavior
at the time of the murder, call appropriate witnesses and meet with him in order to
fully discuss the case.
(14) Following remand of this matter to the Superior Court for further
proceedings on Hassett’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Superior
Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Superior Court heard
testimony from Hassett’s trial counsel and Dr. Allen Weiss, the prison psychiatrist
who treated Hassett during the period prior to his trial. The State also placed
Hassett’s prison medical record into evidence. On the basis of the evidence
presented, the Superior Court found that Hassett was competent to stand trial and
remained competent throughout the trial, that Hassett’s attorney had no obligation
to order a mental health evaluation for Hassett because there was no indication at
any time that Hassett was not competent, and that Hassett’s attorney appropriately
Page 9
-9-
did not pursue the defenses of extreme emotional distress, diminished mental
capacity or temporary insanity because to do so would have required Hassett to
admit to the crime, which he refused to do. The Superior Court also found no
factual support for Hassett’s claims that his attorney failed to investigate and
interview possible defense witnesses.
(15) In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Hassett must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different.
13
Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was
professionally reasonable.”
14
(16) The record reflects that Hassett’s defense at trial was that Coggin, and
not he, had murdered his stepmother. The state of Hassett’s mental health and the
effect of the drugs and alcohol he had ingested were simply not relevant to that
defense. There was no error on the part of Hassett’s counsel in that respect. As for
Hassett’s other contentions, we agree with the Superior Court that there is no
13
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
14
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
Page 10
-10-
evidence that any alleged error on the part of his counsel resulted in prejudice to
him.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
15
BY THE COURT:
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice
15
On February 22, 2005, Hassett filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing in this Court.
The grounds for the motion were that the Superior Court’s report following remand did not
accurately reflect the testimony at the hearing. The hearing testimony has since been transcribed
and this Court has reviewed the transcript in detail. We conclude that there is no reason for an
evidentiary hearing in this Court and Hassett’s motion is, therefore, hereby denied.

JoeTheJuggler
9th December 2007, 01:02 PM
WILLIAMS: But they also found semen, as if she had either been raped or had had sex, and that DNA doesn't match anybody involved.

Ms. BROWNE: Match his. That's right, right.

DEBBIE: That's what I was gonna ask. Was there coercion or intent...

Ms. BROWNE: Yeah, it was a female.


So Sylvia thinks the semen was from a female.

Yeah, somehow I'd feel safe calling that particular reading a definite "miss".

RSLancastr
9th December 2007, 01:03 PM
Thanks, Eeney. But why do you say that Browne is wrong? Based on what you have quoted, it looks like yet another for the Unknown category.

And is the last sentence in your post a quote, or is it you? If it is you, are you just assuming nobody else has been charged because you can't find mention of it, or did you find some mention of that?

But even if you are correct in that, it would still seem to go into the Unknown pile from what I am seeing.

RSLancastr
9th December 2007, 01:05 PM
So Sylvia thinks the semen was from a female.

Yeah, somehow I'd feel safe calling that particular reading a definite "miss".Yes, but after the semen was mentioned, she brought in another man into the story.

Eeney, your second post and mine crossed in the ether. I will read it now and see if it changes what I said in my previous opst.

EeneyMinnieMoe
9th December 2007, 01:16 PM
I think it's safe to call it wrong because there is no mention of a female- or anyone besides Hassett and his friend- involved in his 2005 appeal.

If the man was appealing a life sentence and had a one-time shot at a retrial before the state's Supreme Court and he wasn't the only one responsible you'd think he'd say something, wouldn't you?

Edit: Here's a tribute to the victim:

http://www.newszap.com/articles/2007/12/08/dm/remembrances/delaware/hassetts2.txt