Emotivism and genetic fallacies

[JetLeg]

If emotivism is true, I think that then genetic fallacies become real arguments.

Emotivism is the non-cognitivist meta-ethical theory that ethical judgments are primarily expressions of one's own attitude and imperatives meant to change the attitudes and actions of another

If the above is true, then one's ethical judgement is merely an expression of himself.

Phrasing it another way - claiming that genetic fallacies are fallacies assumes that the meaning of propositions is (1) objective and (2) universal. It probably is true with math, physics and so on. But with ethical statement this is disputable. It follows from moral realism, but does not follow - to the contrary - from emotivism. If emotivism is true, then the meaning of propositions is neither objective nor universal. And therefore genetic fallacies cease to be fallacies,

Do you agree?

[Cosmo]

Please define 'genetic fallacy'.

[JetLeg]

Genetic fallacies are arguments which do not consider propositions on their own merit, but evaluate them on the basis of the person that says them.

For example, "ad hominem" is a genetic fallacy, which claims that a certain argument is incorrect based on the person that said it.

Specifically to the OP, the most relevant genetic fallacy is "ad psychologicum" (I invented the name myself).

It happens in casual speech when person A and B talk, person A makes a claim and person B says

"Oh, you just say it because you had a bad relationship with your parents \ you are a man \ you have some bias in favour of the result \ you are just jealous \ et cetera ".


Though the name is my invention, I think it is a recognizable pattern. Person B says that the psychological reasons for which person A says the claim is important to judging the merit of the claim.

[Furi]

I see you have listed wikipedia as a source for your definition of emotivism, Wikipedia has been noted for its unreliability as a factual source :p

ETA not so much a genetic fallacy more an amino acid substitution

[Earthborn]

Furi, maybe you can tell us what in the Wikipedia article is wrong?

There is the article for Emotivism and Genetic fallacy. I just don't understand how JetLeg's conclusion follows from combining the two. The way I see it, they seem quite unrelated.

[JetLeg]

I see you have listed wikipedia as a source for your definition of emotivism, Wikipedia has been noted for its unreliability as a factual source :p


(1) If the definition of wiki is correct, do you think that my argument holds water?

(2) Okay, from a more credible source.

Emotivists think moral terms in grammatically assertive utterances function primarily to express emotion and perhaps also to elicit similar emotions in others

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/#Emo

[Cosmo]

I'm not sure I understand how you're deriving morality from emotion (or is it the other way around?)

[Hokulele]

This sounds like JetLeg is trying to claim that "What I feel is true because I am the one that feels this. Anyone who dismisses what I feel to be true is wrong because they cannot dismiss the fact that I feel this."

Kind of a bizarre argument if my interpretation is correct.

[JetLeg]

This sounds like JetLeg is trying to claim that "What I feel is true because I am the one that feels this. Anyone who dismisses what I feel to be true is wrong because they cannot dismiss the fact that I feel this."

Kind of a bizarre argument if my interpretation is correct.

No, this has nothing to do with the OP at all.

For example, read on Ayer's emotivism :



Ayer argues that moral judgments cannot be translated into non-ethical, empirical terms and thus cannot be verified; in this he agrees with ethical intuitionists. But he differs from intuitionists by discarding appeals to intuition as "worthless" for determining moral truths,[17] since the intuition of one person often contradicts that of another. Instead, Ayer concludes that ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts":

The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. … If now I generalise my previous statement and say, "Stealing money is wrong," I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. … I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.[18]

Ayer agrees with subjectivists in saying that ethical statements are necessarily related to individual attitudes, but he says they lack truth value because they cannot be properly understood as propositions about those attitudes; Ayer thinks ethical sentences are expressions, not assertions, of approval. While an assertion of approval may always be accompanied by an expression of approval, expressions can be made without making assertions; Ayer's example is boredom, which can be expressed through the stated assertion "I am bored" or through non-assertions including tone of voice, body language, and various other verbal statements. He sees ethical statements as expressions of the latter sort, so the phrase "Theft is wrong" is a non-proposition which is an expression of disapproval but is not equivalent to the proposition "I disapprove of theft".

To me it seems that if it is true, then it follows that genetic arguments can be used in ethical discussions.

[Zarathustra]

If morality is subjective and in situational transitory status, then therefore it is not universal, and we would then be all moral once this fact is realized.
If however, morality is universally constant, by measure of ignorance and human fallibility, we are all then inherently amoral.

On the other hand, if morality is purely a construction of the human psyche, then it is moot altogether.

[Furi]

(1) If the definition of wiki is correct, do you think that my argument holds water?

(2) Okay, from a more credible source.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/#Emo

I was just stating that as wiki is commonly viewed as a not too reliable source, I was hoping to see if I had understood the definition of the genetic fallacy correctly, and never stated directly that your definition was incorrect or that wiki was incorrect, just that it gene stock could be viewed in a bad light.

Sorry it was a fail post attempt at humour :boxedin:,

[Robin]

If emotivism is true, I think that then genetic fallacies become real arguments.



If the above is true, then one's ethical judgement is merely an expression of himself.

Phrasing it another way - claiming that genetic fallacies are fallacies assumes that the meaning of propositions is (1) objective and (2) universal. It probably is true with math, physics and so on. But with ethical statement this is disputable. It follows from moral realism, but does not follow - to the contrary - from emotivism. If emotivism is true, then the meaning of propositions is neither objective nor universal. And therefore genetic fallacies cease to be fallacies,

Do you agree?
No. I can't even see why you think this should be so.

[Robin]

Genetic fallacies are arguments which do not consider propositions on their own merit, but evaluate them on the basis of the person that says them.

For example, "ad hominem" is a genetic fallacy, which claims that a certain argument is incorrect based on the person that said it.

Specifically to the OP, the most relevant genetic fallacy is "ad psychologicum" (I invented the name myself).

It happens in casual speech when person A and B talk, person A makes a claim and person B says

"Oh, you just say it because you had a bad relationship with your parents \ you are a man \ you have some bias in favour of the result \ you are just jealous \ et cetera ".


Though the name is my invention, I think it is a recognizable pattern. Person B says that the psychological reasons for which person A says the claim is important to judging the merit of the claim.
How could that ever be a valid argument? Would person B ever have enough information and psychological expertise to make such a call?

I suppose you could book the person into an institution and have a team of qualified psychologists make a detailed assessment of their life, attitudes and psychological profile and then relate this to their statement and even then this would have dubious value and would say nothing whatsoever about the truth or otherwise of their statement.

It would seem so much simpler just to evaluate their argument on its own merits. What is your problem with that? Is it just too simple?

[JetLeg]

No. I can't even see why you think this should be so.

Eh... I would not like to repeat myself, so I am not sure what can I add.

Have you read the quoted paragraph of A.J. Ayer?

It seems that what I am thinking of as emotivism is mainly Ayer's version of emotivism, actually.



(1) Expressions cannot be disconnected from the person (unlike assertions)
(2) Therefore ad psychologicum holds with regards to expressions
(2.1) example of (3) - you are bored because you had a bad sleep. This can be an analogy to "you only feel that it is immoral because you had a bad sleep".

(3) Moral statements are merely expressions and are not assertions (read Ayer's paragraph)

(c) ad psychologicum holds with regards to moral statements,
(c.1) example of the conclusion - you only feel that it is immoral because you had a bad sleep is a valid statement and not a fallacy.

[JetLeg]

How could that ever be a valid argument? Would person B ever have enough information and psychological expertise to make such a call?

I suppose you could book the person into an institution and have a team of qualified psychologists make a detailed assessment of their life, attitudes and psychological profile and then relate this to their statement and even then this would have dubious value and would say nothing whatsoever about the truth or otherwise of their statement.

It would seem so much simpler just to evaluate their argument on its own merits. What is your problem with that? Is it just too simple?

In the paragraphs above you are challenging the soundness of the argument - not its validity.

What do you think of the argument's validity?

[Robin]

In the paragraphs above you are challenging the soundness of the argument - not its validity.

What do you think of the argument's validity?
I look up "valid" in the dictionary and the first entry says "sound".

[Robin]

Eh... I would not like to repeat myself, so I am not sure what can I add.
Not asking you to repeat yourself, I am asking you to explain yourself.
Have you read the quoted paragraph of A.J. Ayer?

It seems that what I am thinking of as emotivism is mainly Ayer's version of emotivism, actually.
Well it is not actually Ayer's version, he is only explaining what the term means when others use it.
(1) Expressions cannot be disconnected from the person (unlike assertions)
(2) Therefore ad psychologicum holds with regards to expressions
(2.1) example of (3) - you are bored because you had a bad sleep. This can be an analogy to "you only feel that it is immoral because you had a bad sleep".

(3) Moral statements are merely expressions and are not assertions (read Ayer's paragraph)

(c) ad psychologicum holds with regards to moral statements,
(c.1) example of the conclusion - you only feel that it is immoral because you had a bad sleep is a valid statement and not a fallacy.

I will get back to you on this. You are aware though, aren't you, that Ayer is talking from a linguistic/analytic framework?

[thaiboxerken]

Trying to teach Jetleg logic is like teaching dogs to read.

[Kopji]

Sure, but this sounds more like an argument that emotivsm is not true.
If a consequence is that fallacies are promoted to truth, that does not seem to recommend it.

[drkitten]

If emotivism is true, I think that then genetic fallacies become real arguments.

Phrasing it another way - claiming that genetic fallacies are fallacies assumes that the meaning of propositions is (1) objective and (2) universal. It probably is true with math, physics and so on. But with ethical statement this is disputable. It follows from moral realism, but does not follow - to the contrary - from emotivism. If emotivism is true, then the meaning of propositions is neither objective nor universal. And therefore genetic fallacies cease to be fallacies,

Do you agree?

No. Once again, you've got the wrong end of the stick.

First, "emotivism" does not require the sort of radical relativism that you describe. SInce emotivism only applies to statements about "morality," it is perfectly legitimate, for example, to state that moral propositions are in a different epistemological world than declarative proposition -- the statement "Cats are scary" is different and would require a different form of support than the statement "Cats are mammals." (This is C.S. Lewis' argument from "Men Without Chests.")

Second, "emotivism" does not require relativism at all; even if a moral statement describes only my own attitude, my attitude may simply be wrong. For example, the statement "Cats are scary" may accurately reflect the attitude of an aliurophobe, but it is without basis, and upon presentation of evidence (e.g. confrontation therapy), the patient will learn that the attitude is simply wrong. That's why confrontation therapy works at all, and it's actually a very effective therapy for attitude disorders.

Third, even if emotivism did necessitate the sort of relativism you propose, it would create more fallacies, not fewer. Basically, it would open up a whole new slew of posible worlds under which the premises of any given argument could be true while the conclusion were false. For example, our old friend Barbara;

All homosexuals are evil
All evil people should be punished
Therefore, all homosexuals should be punished

could be rendered fallacious simply by pointing out a person such as Haggard or Craig, who has gone on record as agreeing with the first two statements, but disagreeing with the third (when it applies to themselves). If you wish to justify such hypocracy as "reasoning," then Barbara is now fallacious.

But the same argument that makes Barbara fallacious will not render any previously fallacious argument non-fallacious.

And fourth, even if I couldn't directly disprove your claim, it's still a non-sequitor, because your argument FOR it is, well, not compelling. (In the specialist meaning of "not compelling" that includes "complete gibberish.")

---

Oh, and your "argumentam ad psychologicum"? Well-known fallacy. Read C.S. Lewis' Pilgrim's Regress for a devastating critique.

[Robin]

(1) Expressions cannot be disconnected from the person (unlike assertions)
(2) Therefore ad psychologicum holds with regards to expressions
(2.1) example of (3) - you are bored because you had a bad sleep. This can be an analogy to "you only feel that it is immoral because you had a bad sleep".

(3) Moral statements are merely expressions and are not assertions (read Ayer's paragraph)

(c) ad psychologicum holds with regards to moral statements,
(c.1) example of the conclusion - you only feel that it is immoral because you had a bad sleep is a valid statement and not a fallacy.
I don't know if you are still interested, but as I said I would get back I will.

I like this question because it allows us to think about why fallacies are fallacies.

Let us say person A argues "X is wrong because of Y".
Person B, who subscribes to emotivism says "That statement is an expression about your emotional states".

So in other words person B has not addressed the argument, rather made a general comment about the class of argument to which he believes it belongs.

Presumably person A does not subscribe to emotivism, otherwise why did he make the argument? So person B's fallacy is arguing from a different or unstated premise.

Person B should now state and justify the premise. If person A accepts this then the argument can continue with person A now a stated entity within the argument, thus there is no ad hominem. If person A does not accept the argument then they will just have to agree to disagree.

In general you should note that within the philosophical tradition that Ayer represents the "person" is always a part of the discourse, though not a specific person.

A positivist stance includes the position that every meaningful statement reduces to a statement about subjective experience, thus any meaningful statement can potentially be empirically verified. So every statement in the Positivist tradition is, in a way, an expression of your own mental states, that can be verified by corroboration from the mental states of others.

If person A was a positivist but not an emotivist he could well have argued that a statement about ethics could be a statement about how certain behaviours can be said to be conducive to certain states in a society. For example an ethical statement can be entirely descriptive rather than prescriptive.

Do you distinguish between a moral statement and a statement about morals? An ethical statement and a statement about ethics?