Brain processes and individual experience [Archive]

Yahweh

23rd September 2003, 04:50 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I have a problem with the idea that experiences are brain processes. If we consider any particular experience existing in the universe or set of experiences and the claim that they only have an objective existence in the form of a brain process then one fundamental question poses itself - where does the "self" come from ? In other words, why do "I" only experience certain brain processes that exist in the universe and not others ? The other brain processes that objectively exist such as Bob's or Jane's brain processes are not experienced by me, yet I see no logical reason for this segregation to exist. I only say this because the idea that experiences are brain processes gives no hint as to why my experiences are bound to my particular brain processes but not someone elses.
"Self" is not a tangible substance that exists objectively, it is at its most simplistic just another word that describes "I am I who I am" (correct me if I'm wrong, Ian).

It would be absurd to believe Bob and Jane do not exist because you cant know if they experience reality (welcome to Solipism).

Assuming Bob and Jane have no medical or psycological conditions, it would be absurd to believe there perception of reality isnt the same as yours (from there own frame-of-reference of course). Human brains are designed to work and function in the same fashion, for practical purposes I just say they are exactly alike.

Experiences are not entirely limited to brain processes (Note: Nobody take my words out of context in one way or another, please dont waste everybody's time by citing every what-if scenario that comes to mind, practice Yahweh's "No-S**t" form of rationality), they stem from reality. Otherwise, we might as well say experience can be described with the "brain in a vat" scenario or the "it could just be a dream" postulate. (Assuming no medical or psychological functions) If you are having a conversation with someone in front of you, you can rationally conclude "Yes, the person I am talking with exists, he is not a figment of my imagination".

Mercutio

23rd September 2003, 05:27 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
In other words, why do "I" only experience certain brain processes that exist in the universe and not others ? The other brain processes that objectively exist such as Bob's or Jane's brain processes are not experienced by me, yet I see no logical reason for this segregation to exist. I always wondered why I couldn't digest the food Bob and Jane had chewed and swallowed...

davidsmith73

24th September 2003, 03:26 AM

Originally posted by Commander Cool
I think your disagreement is with Materialism. If all of our emotions and thoughts are generated by physical processes (chemicals in the brain, etc.), then there is no "mind", no "consciousness". Those words may describe concepts, but they do not describe actual things. You cannot dissect a person and extract their mind, as it exists only in the conceptual realm, within the physical boundaries of the brain. In short: you have no "self".

Under that line of thinking, your individual experiences are no more than your own brain's reaction to the stimuli around you. The reason that your reactions and thoughts may be different than Bob's or Jane's is that your brain has been exposed to a unique set of stimuli: i.e., the things that have happened to you in your life. No one else has done everything you have done; has been exposed to every set of circumstances at the exact same time and in the exact same order as you.

Thoughts? Some might recall from Franko's brief return that my jury is still out on Materialism, I'm just trying to see if I understand it better.

I was refering to the "self" merely in the sense that I do not experience someone elses brain processes. In order for my point to be valid I don't think that I need to think of the self in terms of an actual "thing" in its own right. Lets call the self ("I") a set of experiences correlated with a particular individual person's brain processes.

I may not be articulating my point very well here. If you say that your individual experiences are no more than your own brain's reaction to the stimuli around you, this creates a problem thus. Someone elses individual experiences are no more than their own brain's reaction to the stimuli around them. So the question is:

Why should "I" (illusionary or not) be me and not you ? Both sets of brain processes from me and you that manifest our respective "I" qualify as existing as an experience yet "I" finds itself locallised to me rather than you. To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be your "I" instead of my "I" ?

davidsmith73

24th September 2003, 03:37 AM

Originally posted by RichardR
Bob and Jane's brains are separate from your brain. Couldn't that be a logical reason why you don't experience Bob and Jane's brain processes?

To put it crudely, why am "I" me and not you. Both brain processes from me and you manifest as experiences yet my experiences somehow have been "selected" to manifest to one particular physical loci. (By the word "selected" I'm not implying any intervention by any god or higher force or such notions)

davidsmith73

24th September 2003, 03:39 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
I always wondered why I couldn't digest the food Bob and Jane had chewed and swallowed...

Whats your point ?

Samus

24th September 2003, 05:59 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be our "I" instead of my "I" ? Because you have been exposed to different things than I have. Because your "self" (however you define that) has had a different set of stimuli thrust at it.

RichardR

24th September 2003, 08:15 PM

ImpyTimpy

24th September 2003, 08:36 PM

David, I just sent you a pm about it.

ImpyTimpy

24th September 2003, 08:42 PM

Ok, so why is your brain your brain and my brain my brain?

Originally posted by RichardR
Because your brain is in you and mine is in me. Pretty simple, really.

ImpyTimpy

24th September 2003, 08:45 PM

Ok, let's go back for a second. You're just getting born and you have no experiences as of yet. What causes these particular cells to form into your brain and not say mine... Or better still, taking all experiences away, just leaving the conciousness behind, why is your conciousness yours and my conciousness mine in the first place?

Originally posted by Commander Cool
Because you have been exposed to different things than I have. Because your "self" (however you define that) has had a different set of stimuli thrust at it.

Suezoled

24th September 2003, 09:01 PM

As I understand it, in order for you, as an independent multi cell ogranism to exist and flourish, a self operating regulatory mechanism or set of mechanisms must exist. In this case, brain and spinal cord. From before conception, DNA to produce these mechanisms in a viable body (self-defeating mutations not taken into account) is present. Life, simplified, comes in two flavors: self preservation and self replication. It is easier and far more conducive for Bob and Jane to have their own brains each. If they shared a brain and consciousness, if the mutual brain were damaged, at least 2 otherwise healthy people (present psychological and physical disorders not withstanding) would be lost/damaged at the same time. At the least, if Jane suffered some sort of concussion, wouldn't it traumatize Bob?

People simply aren't connected on a conscious brain-to-brain level. They are results from their own X and Y chromosomes, self contained units of DNA that developed independently of other humans, even twins.

Dang it's late. Night folks!

ImpyTimpy

24th September 2003, 11:42 PM

Suez, that's not even beginning to address the question. :p

Mercutio

25th September 2003, 06:00 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Whats your point ? Same point others have made here, essentially--the separate "selves" develop quite simply as a function of 2 separate bodies--I don't experience your brain's function any more than I experience your stomach's.
I may not be articulating my point very well here. If you say that your individual experiences are no more than your own brain's reaction to the stimuli around you, this creates a problem thus. Someone elses individual experiences are no more than their own brain's reaction to the stimuli around them. So the question is:

Why should "I" (illusionary or not) be me and not you ? Both sets of brain processes from me and you that manifest our respective "I" qualify as existing as an experience yet "I" finds itself locallised to me rather than you. To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be your "I" instead of my "I" ? Let's make it even more difficult, or easier,depending...Say that we have conjoined twins. Same genetics, same in utero environment, very similar environment out in the world. You can't find people with more similarities in genetics and environment; still, a mechanistic viewpoint will demand that they will develop separate "selves". Why? If our thinking (and our "minds" or "selves") is developed through interaction with the environment (probably the best explanation of this is in behaviorism, although other views will also make this claim), then any difference in environment may have an effect on thinking. The slightest difference may eventually have enormous effects (think "butterfly effect" in chaos theory). Our conjoined twins do have differences in what they see. As they walk along, one head looks left, the other right, at a particular moment. As a result, one sees a smile that the other has missed, or any visual stimulus you can imagine. The association of that smile with that walk down the pathway is a difference between the two twins; one we cannot undo. Our two paths diverge, to paraphrase Frost, and that has made all the difference.

By simple virtue of two separate sets of eyes, we guarantee separate individuals.

RichardR

25th September 2003, 05:34 PM

Originally posted by ImpyTimpy
Ok, so why is your brain your brain and my brain my brain?Well, if my brain wasn't my brain, it wouldn't be my brain. Would it?

Pyrian

25th September 2003, 05:41 PM

Why should "I" (illusionary or not) be me and not you ? Both sets of brain processes from me and you that manifest our respective "I" qualify as existing as an experience yet "I" finds itself locallised to me rather than you. To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be your "I" instead of my "I" ?This question works only when applied subjectively to your own self. Trying to express it in any sort of objective fashion results in very simple answers, since there is no objective reason why you should be anybody but you.

RichardR

25th September 2003, 05:41 PM

Originally posted by ImpyTimpy
why is your conciousness yours and my conciousness mine in the first place?Perhaps because your consciousness arises in your brain.

Is this going anywhere?

ImpyTimpy

25th September 2003, 06:56 PM

The problem is this becomes a circular discussion. It's a great philosophical concept, it's just a b**ch to describe it... :p For example, I know my conciousness comes from my brain, but the question is why is it mine? The best possible answer to that particular question would be that you're the only thing that exists... Of course, that is absurd, but if you can understand why that answer makes sense in the context of this question, you'll understand the actual meaning behind the question :)

Sorry, I can't put it any better then that...

Originally posted by RichardR
Perhaps because your consciousness arises in your brain.

Is this going anywhere?

Dancing David

25th September 2003, 07:04 PM

I think that from the materialist or nihist the question boggles the mind. Why am I I and not you?

factoid one: there are a trillion neurons(1,000,000,000) in the brain they do not grom in any thing other than a somewhat chaotic one. Influenced by reverberations and esperience. each brain is unique.

factoid two: if the 'self'(illusiory construct like temperature) is created through the interaction of genetics and enviroment, then each self is going to be unique, in that each experience is unique.

I think that the question is a good one because it points out the guld between a mechanistic materialism and idealism. I think that the better question is:
Why under an idealist system would there be individual self, if we are all embedded in a great mind?

I don't really understand why a materialist would even think that two brains would be the same, they aren't. They are all similar and convergant, but unique.

Yahzi

25th September 2003, 10:13 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
yet my experiences somehow have been "selected" to manifest to one particular physical loci.
Like, for instance, your brain. Your expierences are local to your brain. Why wouldn't they be? Why did you read "brain process" and then somehow think that could be separate from a particular brain to process in?

What is so difficult about this?

:confused:

ImpyTimpy

25th September 2003, 10:59 PM

Yahzi, that's not what he's asking. I'm not sure how to put the question in more simple terms (or more complex) then what David has written up... Here goes though..

I know my experiences exists in my brain, but why are they in my brain in the first place. The word "select" is the key here, that is, why was my brain selected as the creator of my conciousness. Why am I me?

Yes, I realise the above sounds a bit woo-woo but I can't convey this philosophical problem any better...

Originally posted by Yahzi

Like, for instance, your brain. Your expierences are local to your brain. Why wouldn't they be? Why did you read "brain process" and then somehow think that could be separate from a particular brain to process in?

What is so difficult about this?

:confused:

crocodile deathroll

25th September 2003, 11:22 PM

I am of the view that davidsmith73 is not so much the consciousness of an individual person but the consciousness of the universe at the phase it achieved a critical level of complexity for consciousness to be possible, the big wow. All the other expressions of consciousness have been temporarily masked out until davidsmith73 plays out his/her life.

All the other people that davidsmith73 observes are just expressions of davidsmith73. When davidsmith73 dies he/she will just regress back to that phase when to function of consciousness in the universe first flashed into existence. Then a gestalt will switch davidsmith73 to someone else's brain and will only experiences the life through the eyes of that person.

CDR

Pyrian

26th September 2003, 01:05 AM

ImpyTimpy:
Yahzi, that's not what he's asking. I'm not sure how to put the question in more simple terms (or more complex) then what David has written up... Here goes though..

I know my experiences exists in my brain, but why are they in my brain in the first place. The word "select" is the key here, that is, why was my brain selected as the creator of my conciousness. Why am I me?

Yes, I realise the above sounds a bit woo-woo but I can't convey this philosophical problem any better...I believe I know what you're trying to express, and I believe that it in fact cannot be sufficiently expressed, since expression relies on common experience, and the experience of being oneself is uniquely singular.

crocodile deathroll

26th September 2003, 04:25 AM

Originally posted by Pyrian
I believe I know what you're trying to express, and I believe that it in fact cannot be sufficiently expressed, since expression relies on common experience, and the experience of being oneself is uniquely singular.

IMHO it is acquired our memories that make us feel unique but our initial first person experience is not so unique as it all obeys the same genetic programming.

If we all emerge from one unified principle for consciousness and it works then why the need to complicate it any further by trillions of possible individual sources for contingent personal consciousness? Individuality can come later as we acquire things like language ability when brains develop little further beyond the fetal phase.

CDR

davidsmith73

27th September 2003, 08:11 AM

Originally posted by RichardR
Because your brain is in you and mine is in me. Pretty simple, really.

Originally posted by Commander Cool
Because you have been exposed to different things than I have. Because your "self" (however you define that) has had a different set of stimuli thrust at it. [/B]

I don't think this addresses the issue. I can understand that if an individual brain and its associated physical processes that correspond to experiences is physically separate from another brain, each brain will be expected to produce a set of experiences that can be regarded as separate from the other set although I'm not sure in what sense.

However if we have two brains that are physically separate and therefore produce two sets of conscious experiences locallised respectively to each brain, then we still have the problem that I posed in my original post:

Why do I experience only one particular set of physical brain processes and why that particular one rather than the other ?

Both brains in a sense are equivalent in their capacity to manifest these things we call experiences. The materialistic notion that certain physical processes in the brain are the same thing (in a fundamental ontological sense) as the experience they are correlated with, does not provide us with a logical reason why the above question should be posed in the first place. As ImpyTimpy has said, this is a hard concept to put across. Does anybody else understand what I am trying to say ? Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ?

davidsmith73

27th September 2003, 08:13 AM

Originally posted by RichardR
Well, if my brain wasn't my brain, it wouldn't be my brain. Would it?

seems like circular reasoning to me. "My brain is mine because it is"

davidsmith73

27th September 2003, 08:42 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
Same point others have made here, essentially--the separate "selves" develop quite simply as a function of 2 separate bodies--I don't experience your brain's function any more than I experience your stomach's.

I can see why you would get two separate "selves" if construction of the self is dependent on a physical process, because we have two seprate physical processes. However, that does not give us an explanation for why my partcular brain should be selected to expose itself to the my realm of experience rather than yours. Why am I me and not you ? Again, I am fustrated by the difficulty in expressing what I am trying to say. I hope you can understand.

Let's make it even more difficult, or easier,depending...Say that we have conjoined twins. Same genetics, same in utero environment, very similar environment out in the world. You can't find people with more similarities in genetics and environment; still, a mechanistic viewpoint will demand that they will develop separate "selves". Why? If our thinking (and our "minds" or "selves") is developed through interaction with the environment (probably the best explanation of this is in behaviorism, although other views will also make this claim), then any difference in environment may have an effect on thinking. The slightest difference may eventually have enormous effects (think "butterfly effect" in chaos theory). Our conjoined twins do have differences in what they see. As they walk along, one head looks left, the other right, at a particular moment. As a result, one sees a smile that the other has missed, or any visual stimulus you can imagine. The association of that smile with that walk down the pathway is a difference between the two twins; one we cannot undo. Our two paths diverge, to paraphrase Frost, and that has made all the difference.

By simple virtue of two separate sets of eyes, we guarantee separate individuals.

But this is not the point of my question. A little bit of introspection will reveal the problem which is why each twins conscious experience will find itself correlated with one particular brain and not the other.

One can at least imagine actually being someone else and having their experiences rather than yours. This thread reminds me of the film "Being John Malkavich", if that helps!

Mercutio

27th September 2003, 09:24 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Both brains in a sense are equivalent in their capacity to manifest these things we call experiences. The materialistic notion that certain physical processes in the brain are the same thing (in a fundamental ontological sense) as the experience they are correlated with, does not provide us with a logical reason why the above question should be posed in the first place. As ImpyTimpy has said, this is a hard concept to put across. Does anybody else understand what I am trying to say ? Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ? But both brains are not equivalent (in any sense) in terms of their perspective. Certainly, each person can imagine, and there is no reason to think that the imagined experiences are different (no reason to think they are the same, either)...but much more importantly, the experiences that the brain `manifests` are tied directly to its sensory apparatus. Our personalities, our sense of self, comes about through interaction with our environment, and this interaction must take place through our senses. Even if the hardware (brain) is identical in its capacity to manifest these things we call experiences, the programming (learning) cannot be identical. (I hate computer analogies to the brain, but it works in this case.)

I think you are underestimating the extent to which our environments influence us, and overestimating our common elements (brain structure, nonspecific environment).I can see why you would get two separate "selves" if construction of the self is dependent on a physical process, because we have two seprate physical processes. However, that does not give us an explanation for why my partcular brain should be selected to expose itself to the my realm of experience rather than yours. Why am I me and not you ? Again, I am fustrated by the difficulty in expressing what I am trying to say. I hope you can understand.
Why my brain gets my experiences? My retina is directly attached, through the optic nerve. My basilar membrane, olfactory bulb, taste buds...all feed into my brain, not yours. I think you are embracing some dualistic view of experience that creates problems where there are none...

davidsmith73

27th September 2003, 09:39 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
But both brains are not equivalent (in any sense) in terms of their perspective.

Of course, they are not physically indistinguishable, but they are equivalent in the sense that they are capable of producing experiences. Each brain process of two people can be described in terms of an equivalent objective reality which is the respective experience, if we are to believe materialism.

I think you are underestimating the extent to which our environments influence us, and overestimating our common elements (brain structure, nonspecific environment). Why my brain gets my experiences? My retina is directly attached, through the optic nerve. My basilar membrane, olfactory bulb, taste buds...all feed into my brain, not yours. I think you are embracing some dualistic view of experience that creates problems where there are none...

I'm actually posing this question from the perspective of materialistic monism. Of course, two peoples brains will produce different processes and that is what you say leads to separate sets of experiences. That I understand, but the problem remains that we do not have any logical reason as to why your own experiential existence happens to be you and not someone else. I can after all imagine being you. Both "selves" from me and you are the product of the respective brain processes so why do I experience the "self" from my brain rather then yours ?

Mercutio

27th September 2003, 09:59 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

I'm actually posing this question from the perspective of materialistic monism. Of course, two peoples brains will produce different processes and that is what you say leads to separate sets of experiences. That I understand, but the problem remains that we do not have any logical reason as to why your own experiential existence happens to be you and not someone else. I can after all imagine being you. Both "selves" from me and you are the product of the respective brain processes so why do I experience the "self" from my brain rather then yours ? You can imagine being me, but you cannot duplicate my experience; the two processes are entirely different. I can imagine being my dog, but all my inferences are based on my own experience, not hers. The physical separation of my brain (and associated sensory inputs) from yours is all that is required, logically, to insure a personal experiential existence. For you to think otherwise, you would need to demonstrate the functional equivalence of imagining and experiencing. Moreover, you would have to have person 1 imagining he or she was person 2 for an entire lifetime...On top of that, you would need to somehow make sure that person 1 did not know that what was happening was imagination... I think we have no logical reason to think that we could experience someone else`s reality.

Dancing David

27th September 2003, 03:12 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

I don't think this addresses the issue. I can understand that if an individual brain and its associated physical processes that correspond to experiences is physically separate from another brain, each brain will be expected to produce a set of experiences that can be regarded as separate from the other set although I'm not sure in what sense.

However if we have two brains that are physically separate and therefore produce two sets of conscious experiences locallised respectively to each brain, then we still have the problem that I posed in my original post:

Why do I experience only one particular set of physical brain processes and why that particular one rather than the other ?

Both brains in a sense are equivalent in their capacity to manifest these things we call experiences. The materialistic notion that certain physical processes in the brain are the same thing (in a fundamental ontological sense) as the experience they are correlated with, does not provide us with a logical reason why the above question should be posed in the first place. As ImpyTimpy has said, this is a hard concept to put across. Does anybody else understand what I am trying to say ? Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ?

As I tried to say earlier, each brain is different, from the atomic, through the moelcular and the cellulaur. Each brain forms different sets of associations.

To a materialist your question doesn't make sense, because each brain is unique.

The question I would ash is why under Idealsim would brains be different.

Try using an analogy,maybe that will hope convey your questions. In another post i compared brains to boat and minds to wakes.

csense

27th September 2003, 03:58 PM

Originally posted by Dancing David

"...because each brain is unique."

I would think that materialism could not logically posit this. If each brain were to be unique, then the physical processes would also have to be unique, and if physical processes are what we know as consciousness, then each consciousness is unique.

The only fundamental principle you could posit from here is just mere form and mere substance of the brain itself.
You could not say that this or that is consciousness since in each instance, it could only be potentially true of only one particualr consciousness.

If there is identity in the physical process, then how can it produce that which is unique

hammegk

27th September 2003, 04:56 PM

Originally posted by Mercutio
... I think we have no logical reason to think that we could experience someone else`s reality. Welcome to the world of qualia. :D

Dancing David

28th September 2003, 09:33 AM

Originally posted by csense

I would think that materialism could not logically posit this. If each brain were to be unique, then the physical processes would also have to be unique, and if physical processes are what we know as consciousness, then each consciousness is unique.
Yes, similar but unique.Materialism is not a logical stance it is an observational stance, my POV

The only fundamental principle you could posit from here is just mere form and mere substance of the brain itself.
You could not say that this or that is consciousness since in each instance, it could only be potentially true of only one particualr consciousness.

Most likely true, which is why psychology studies the similarities and the differences, we can discuss what c-word looks like. But as each tree is different yet similar, each c-word will be different yet similar.

If there is identity in the physical process, then how can it produce that which is unique
Could you clarify that statement, I am not sure which identity you are reffering to?

Well , C-sense I am not sure that Ican explain my beliefs in a way that will change yours. Please understand that this is different from saying that everyones stomach is different. Each stomach is different, the cells are different, the size of the cells is different, the molecular composition of the cells is different. But the function is the same. Just as avery ones bones are different, yet similar.

What I am stating is that the brain developes and grows and creates the associative netweorks that create the 'brain events'. Even though each person who is not color blind can point to a color and say that they are red. There is not going to be an exact mapping of the process the way thier would be in a computer.

Each brain develops along certain structures but the way that those structures relate in process to each other is going to vary from person to person. So while the visual cortex is going to respond to the stimulation from the optic nerves, the exact location of a specific visual response in the visual cortex is going to vary from individual to individual.

Each process is unique but convergant, the structures of the brain are designed to grow in certain paths and then develop in response to the continuing flow of stimuli. So there is an underlying purpose to the whole thing, they are similar in structure but unique.

The brain has certain tasks that it can preform, say recognise patterns and store patterns. Each brain can preform those functions and sort out which area of the brain will do what during developement. But while we all use the left motor strip area to deal with language, how and where I store the word "red" is likely to be similar to yours but in different areas and with different patterns.

So while it does lend itself to the idea that qualia are irreduible, our brains develop in response to the perceptions we have. So if exposed to the same perception, our brains will learn to recognise them in similar but unique fashions.

Qualia are learned and developed in the neural networks. We have them because we are exposed to them.

Clear as mud right?

Yahzi

28th September 2003, 12:47 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ?
I believe several people have explained why. Under materialism, brain processes are attached to brains, and since experiences (including the expierence of self) are brain processes, they are attached to specific brains.

Your question can only be asked in some other framework than materialism. But if you start to illuminate that framework, we'll probably object to its validity or soundness, and never get to the question itself.

It's like asking why is 1 = 1: the question only makes sense in maths that don't have identity as an axiom. But any math without identity is probably so confusing that we'll far more important problems with it long before we get around to your specific problem.

Suggestologist

28th September 2003, 01:25 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
To put it crudely, why am "I" me and not you. Both brain processes from me and you manifest as experiences yet my experiences somehow have been "selected" to manifest to one particular physical loci. (By the word "selected" I'm not implying any intervention by any god or higher force or such notions)

Personal evolution seems to act as selector here. Materialism is irrelevant to the question. Everything changes over time.

csense

28th September 2003, 04:08 PM

[similarities and differences] we can discuss what c-word looks like. But as each tree is different yet similar, each c-word will be different yet similar.

By tree I assume you mean what you refer to as associative pathways within the brain. Each branch might be considered a particular physical process, with the tree representing a set of these processes.
If it is true then that we each have a different tree to code an objective event, then differences in structure are irrelevent to differences in conscious experiences. Uniqueness must equal something other than structural differences.

davidsmith73

29th September 2003, 04:05 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
You can imagine being me, but you cannot duplicate my experience; the two processes are entirely different.

That is not really what I am describing. I am trying to conceive of the notion that I could actually be you and have your experiences.

I can imagine being my dog, but all my inferences are based on my own experience, not hers. The physical separation of my brain (and associated sensory inputs) from yours is all that is required, logically, to insure a personal experiential existence.

The physical separation of brain is all that is required to describe a separate experiential existence but why am I any particular one of the separated experiential existences rather than the other. Why am I not actually you instead of me ?

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 04:42 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I have a problem with the idea that experiences are brain processes. If we consider any particular experience existing in the universe or set of experiences and the claim that they only have an objective existence in the form of a brain process then one fundamental question poses itself - where does the "self" come from ? In other words, why do "I" only experience certain brain processes that exist in the universe and not others ? The other brain processes that objectively exist such as Bob's or Jane's brain processes are not experienced by me, yet I see no logical reason for this segregation to exist. I only say this because the idea that experiences are brain processes gives no hint as to why my experiences are bound to my particular brain processes but not someone Else's.

David,

Let's suppose materialism is correct. Now imagine if someone were to create a "matter duplicator", and made a precise copy of a person's body. So what we have here is a bit like something such as the transporter in star trex, except the original doesn't get destroyed. Now after making a duplicate of someone's body, would they then exist 2 streams of consciousnesses, although (at least initially) with identical personalities? Or alternatively would they just continue to be one stream of consciousness which simultaneously experiences out of both the original body and the duplicates body, so that the person sees simultaneously out of 4 eyes etc? Or some other possibility?

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 05:06 AM

Originally posted by LW

Locality. You experience only your own brain processes because your mind also is a brain process that resides in the very same brain. Or at least, this if materialism is correct.

But that's just meaningless. You're saying that I am associated with certain brain processes because I am those brain processes rather than other brain processes. But what sort of an answer is that? What logically necessitates I am certain brain processes but not other brain processes? What is it about brain processes occurring in my head which makes them special?

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 05:08 AM

Originally posted by RichardR
Bob and Jane's brains are separate from your brain. Couldn't that be a logical reason why you don't experience Bob and Jane's brain processes?

No I don't see how. Could you elaborate on this Richard?

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 05:12 AM

Originally posted by ImpyTimpy
[B]Materialism? That's so old people. Last time I checked we abandoned those outdated philosophies in favour of naturalism. Your mind (or concious self) is a by-product of your individual brain processes.

That's materialism/physicalism or epiphenomenalism, not naturalism.

Jane and John's mind is a by-product of their individual brain processes.

But why isn't David a by-product of their brain processes?

Mercutio

29th September 2003, 05:13 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

That is not really what I am describing. I am trying to conceive of the notion that I could actually be you and have your experiences.

The physical separation of brain is all that is required to describe a separate experiential existence but why am I any particular one of the separated experiential existences rather than the other. Why am I not actually you instead of me ? Because you are asking the question from the perspective of where you are now. Any of a billion slightly different life experiences and you are a different person from who you are now. It's a bit like asking "why did life arise on earth and perhaps not anywhere else?" The only way we get to ask the question is if life has, in fact, already developed. We're not asking this question on Mars, not because it couldn't have happened, but because it [/i]didn't[/i]. You could have had my personality, but you didn't. And if you had, you'd be (perhaps) asking the same question as now, wondering why you didn't have yet a different personality. Another example; evolution. We did not have to end up where we are; we are just an ape that got lucky. But because of the accidents that happened to put us in the position of being able to ask the question...well...we ask the question. Again, nothing special, nothing predestined; you did not have to be you. You could have been me. No reason, other than our different histories.

...And regarding Ian's "matter duplicator" post just above, the thread "transmogrified zombies" in the science forum presents that scenario, if you want to see what some people's reactions were...

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 05:18 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

I was refering to the "self" merely in the sense that I do not experience someone elses brain processes. In order for my point to be valid I don't think that I need to think of the self in terms of an actual "thing" in its own right. Lets call the self ("I") a set of experiences correlated with a particular individual person's brain processes.

I may not be articulating my point very well here. If you say that your individual experiences are no more than your own brain's reaction to the stimuli around you, this creates a problem thus. Someone elses individual experiences are no more than their own brain's reaction to the stimuli around them. So the question is:

Why should "I" (illusionary or not) be me and not you ? Both sets of brain processes from me and you that manifest our respective "I" qualify as existing as an experience yet "I" finds itself locallised to me rather than you. To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be your "I" instead of my "I" ?

I think I understood your first post and I think it's a huge problem for materialism. I haven't seen any relevant replies to your question at all yet. Saying things like the mind doesn't exist is obviously irrelvant because then it just shifts to the question of the illusionary mind or self. Makes no difference to your point.

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 05:20 AM

Originally posted by RichardR
Because your brain is in you and mine is in me. Pretty simple, really.

Richard, that's not an answer and I suspect you know it. Do you acknowledge there's a huge problem for materialism here?

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 05:24 AM

Originally posted by Suezoled
As I understand it, in order for you, as an independent multi cell ogranism to exist and flourish, a self operating regulatory mechanism or set of mechanisms must exist. In this case, brain and spinal cord. From before conception, DNA to produce these mechanisms in a viable body (self-defeating mutations not taken into account) is present. Life, simplified, comes in two flavors: self preservation and self replication. It is easier and far more conducive for Bob and Jane to have their own brains each. If they shared a brain and consciousness, if the mutual brain were damaged, at least 2 otherwise healthy people (present psychological and physical disorders not withstanding) would be lost/damaged at the same time. At the least, if Jane suffered some sort of concussion, wouldn't it traumatize Bob?

People simply aren't connected on a conscious brain-to-brain level. They are results from their own X and Y chromosomes, self contained units of DNA that developed independently of other humans, even twins.

Dang it's late. Night folks!

Well that was completely irrelevant! A hint: science doesn't help you here. It's a problem with materialism.

Interesting Ian

29th September 2003, 05:29 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
Whats your point ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Same point others have made here, essentially--the separate "selves" develop quite simply as a function of 2 separate bodies--I don't experience your brain's function any more than I experience your stomach's.

No you don't. But the question is why don't you?

Let's make it even more difficult, or easier,depending...Say that we have conjoined twins. Same genetics, same in utero environment, very similar environment out in the world. You can't find people with more similarities in genetics and environment; still, a mechanistic viewpoint will demand that they will develop separate "selves". Why? If our thinking (and our "minds" or "selves") is developed through interaction with the environment (probably the best explanation of this is in behaviorism, although other views will also make this claim), then any difference in environment may have an effect on thinking. The slightest difference may eventually have enormous effects (think "butterfly effect" in chaos theory). Our conjoined twins do have differences in what they see. As they walk along, one head looks left, the other right, at a particular moment. As a result, one sees a smile that the other has missed, or any visual stimulus you can imagine. The association of that smile with that walk down the pathway is a difference between the two twins; one we cannot undo. Our two paths diverge, to paraphrase Frost, and that has made all the difference.

I would say that different experiences do not alter the self one iota. It only affects our personality.

davidsmith73

29th September 2003, 05:59 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
Because you are asking the question from the perspective of where you are now. Any of a billion slightly different life experiences and you are a different person from who you are now. It's a bit like asking "why did life arise on earth and perhaps not anywhere else?" The only way we get to ask the question is if life has, in fact, already developed.

The only way we get to ask any question is from the fact that consciousness exists. But I still don't think this addresses the issue.

Remeber that I am asking this question from the perspective of materialism which states that any experience is the same thing as a brain process. So if this is true then any brain process that exists in the universe has an equivalent ontological existence which seems to me to suggest that every brain process in the universe should simply express an experience regardless of its spatial location. In other words there should not be any reason for a segregation of experiences into these closed units we call "selves".

Think about it. The physical universe is cannot really be composed of truly separate entities in the same sense as individual experience is. Matter is always connected, never separate. So why, when experience is matter, do we conceive of these separate and closed experiential consciousnesses that depend on the history of only a subset of the connected physical universe ?

Mercutio

29th September 2003, 06:29 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Remember that I am asking this question from the perspective of materialism which states that any experience is the same thing as a brain process. So if this is true then any brain process that exists in the universe has an equivalent ontological existence which seems to me to suggest that every brain process in the universe should simply express an experience regardless of its spatial location. In other words there should not be any reason for a segregation of experiences into these closed units we call "selves".

Think about it. The physical universe is cannot really be composed of truly separate entities in the same sense as individual experience is. Matter is always connected, never separate. So why, when experience is matter, do we conceive of these separate and closed experiential consciousnesses that depend on the history of only a subset of the connected physical universe ? You say you are asking this from a materialist perspective, but you still speak of conscious experience as if it is different. If "any experience is the same thing as a brain process", then it is tied to the brain that is processing. There is no need to suggest that this local process produce some free-floating "experience" which is accessible to all. Matter may all be connected, but right now the gravitational pull of my brain on yours is infinitessimally small. The electrochemical signals hopping from one neuron to another in my brain cannot make the leap out of it to your brain. Seriously, if you are asking this from a materialist perspective, why not switch it to digestion, to get rid of the mentalistic baggage you have unintentionally left in. If all matter is connected, why can you not digest the food in my stomach? When you figure out the connection between the process of digestion and the separate location of stomachs, that will be a nice materialist metaphor for the process of thinking and the separate location of brains.

Dancing David

29th September 2003, 07:06 AM

Originally posted by csense
[similarities and differences] we can discuss what c-word looks like. But as each tree is different yet similar, each c-word will be different yet similar.

By tree I assume you mean what you refer to as associative pathways within the brain. Each branch might be considered a particular physical process, with the tree representing a set of these processes.
Actualy I meant a tree with bark and leaves, but the analogy would work.
If it is true then that we each have a different tree to code an objective event, then differences in structure are irrelevent to differences in conscious experiences. Uniqueness must equal something other than structural differences.

I am afraid that I don't follow your second statement, can you elucidate how you reach that conclusion. Differences in structure would mean that we do actualy percieve the same event differently. Unique yet convergant.

Dancing David

29th September 2003, 07:18 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

But that's just meaningless. You're saying that I am associated with certain brain processes because I am those brain processes rather than other brain processes. But what sort of an answer is that? What logically necessitates I am certain brain processes but not other brain processes? What is it about brain processes occurring in my head which makes them special?

That's correct, from the materialist POV, your c-word is the physical process in your brain.

Your question is like asking why your emissions from your car are not the emissions from another car, or why your poop is not someone else's poop.

The mind is the product of the brain, just as emissions are the product of the engine in the car.

As to what necessitates why you are linked to a single brain:
from the materialist POV
1. We develop the ability to percieve based upon brain development in exposure to stimuli.
2. We develop the ability to form associations from a similar process, as we develop we can learn to move our muscles, there is a sloppy feedback process that allows children to learn to coordinate thier bodies.
3. Through the magic of cognition, the brain creates associations between external events and the internal event of cognition.
4. Through the magic of memory our brains develop associative patterns that allow for recognition of events that are similar to prior events.
5. As the brain continues to develop throughout life it will be shaped by, genetic encoding, exposure to events, associative patterns that organise events and the results of aging and trauma.

So: in essence you are you because of the history of development of the neural pathways and association. While 'you' is a fiction imposed by thought on seperate events, the answer is that you are you because of the history of exposure to external and internal events that your brain has experienced.

But logical nessecity, sorry....

davidsmith73

29th September 2003, 08:07 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio

Matter may all be connected, but right now the gravitational pull of my brain on yours is infinitessimally small. The electrochemical signals hopping from one neuron to another in my brain cannot make the leap out of it to your brain.

But they do. The electrochemical signals in your brain will affect mine to a very small degree in various ways. Experiences are said to have an objective existence in the form of a brain process. But we have just established that a physical brain process is not a truly separate thing because all matter is connected. Yet, experiences are said to be a closed system as evidenced from our individual experiences.

Seriously, if you are asking this from a materialist perspective, why not switch it to digestion, to get rid of the mentalistic baggage you have unintentionally left in. If all matter is connected, why can you not digest the food in my stomach? When you figure out the connection between the process of digestion and the separate location of stomachs, that will be a nice materialist metaphor for the process of thinking and the separate location of brains.

Do you view digestion to be the same thing as the physical processes of the stomach in exactly the same way that experiences are the same thing as the processes of the brain ?

Dancing David

29th September 2003, 08:47 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

But they do. The electrochemical signals in your brain will affect mine to a very small degree in various ways.

Uh, dude, check your facts, the electrical part of the signal is not anything like a radio or anything. It is a potential created by sodium, calcium and potasium. It is not an electrical signal like emr or electrons in a power line. It is more like a biological osmotic filter driven by the very small charges associated with the ions. The actual signal is at the synapse and it is totaly chemical.
So your statement is like saying that a reaction in a vessel in a lab will have an effect on the chemicals in another vessel.

Experiences are said to have an objective existence in the form of a brain process. But we have just established that a physical brain process is not a truly separate thing because all matter is connected.
That is true all matter is connected in different ways, the burden would be to demonstrate that there is a significant or meaningful effect. So do quazars at the edge of the unverse effect your behavior? They are connected to you through gravity and entropy, how do they effect you?

Yet, experiences are said to be a closed system as evidenced from our individual experiences.

They are closed in the sense that they do not have meaningful impact on others except through our actions.

Do you view digestion to be the same thing as the physical processes of the stomach in exactly the same way that experiences are the same thing as the processes of the brain ?
It would be silly to say exact because you are talking about two seperate organs with two different forms and function. But , duh, the brain events are similar to stomach events , in that they are tied to the organ that produces them.

This is more of the c-word as privileged 'event', there is nothing anymore special about the c-word than there is to digestion. A plant makes sugar from sunlight, can you? Do a plant require some special realm of 'photosyntesis' to do this thing.

In materialism there are no 'special' or privileged events, you seem to elevate human awareness to some special realm, it is not special, it is as important as farting. It is a product of biological existance.

Loki

29th September 2003, 05:02 PM

davidsmith73,

But they do. The electrochemical signals in your brain will affect mine to a very small degree in various ways. Experiences are said to have an objective existence in the form of a brain process. But we have just established that a physical brain process is not a truly separate thing because all matter is connected.
If I put my ear close enough to your head I can hear you thinking?

There seems to be at least three potential problems with your theory here.

First, the "leakage" is extremely local. You phrase it as "to a very small degree". A very very small degree in deed! In fact, so small that the word "negligible" is probably appropriate.

Second, you seem to be confusing the cause with the effect. If you and I are sitting at the edge of a still pond, but out of sight of each other, then you will see ripples in the water if I throw something into the pond - but you will have no idea what I threw in. A boot? A rock? Even if the (negligible) ripples are actually detectable, they aren't the same thing as the object that caused
them.

Third, the interpreter is different. Your brain has been trained, adapted, and modified overtime by your experiences. As you eye deteriorate physically, the brain adapts and learns to "fill in the gaps" of the raw experience. So even if you could transfer the physical processes that generate my experiences into your head somehow, you wouldn't necessarily interpret them the same way.

ImpyTimpy

29th September 2003, 07:03 PM

Actually the answer to that is very simple. They would be two very seperate entities upon the completion of duplication process. You'd still experience yourself as the original, but you'd then have a clone of yourself standing right before you, now experiencing new things. :)

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

David,

Let's suppose materialism is correct. Now imagine if someone were to create a "matter duplicator", and made a precise copy of a person's body. So what we have here is a bit like something such as the transporter in star trex, except the original doesn't get destroyed. Now after making a duplicate of someone's body, would they then exist 2 streams of consciousnesses, although (at least initially) with identical personalities? Or alternatively would they just continue to be one stream of consciousness which simultaneously experiences out of both the original body and the duplicates body, so that the person sees simultaneously out of 4 eyes etc? Or some other possibility?

ImpyTimpy

29th September 2003, 07:08 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

That's materialism/physicalism or epiphenomenalism, not naturalism.

But why isn't David a by-product of their brain processes?

And that is something I simply can not answer no matter what methodology or line of thought I try to subscribe to. If I was to go with dualist view and say the mind, or my conciousness is what creates the me illusion, I still can not answer how my mind ended up inside my current body and not somewhere else. If I introduce a "selector" into the picture (Occam's going to have a heart attack soon) such as a God entity or something capable of performing the mind/body selection process, I am left with why is the selector the selector and not me the selector. :eek:

Not only that but I'm introducing fantasy elements with no evidence...

Mercutio

29th September 2003, 07:43 PM

Originally posted by ImpyTimpy
Actually the answer to that is very simple. They would be two very seperate entities upon the completion of duplication process. You'd still experience yourself as the original, but you'd then have a clone of yourself standing right before you, now experiencing new things. :)

...and fully believing that he was the original, since he has a lifetime worth of memories...(assuming the reproduction was instantaneous, the memories would be identical, since the memory of being replicated--an instantaneous process--would not exist). Of course, the two would diverge from that moment on with their unique experiences...

...you say "very simple"...you have read the other similar threads, no?:D

Mercutio

29th September 2003, 07:53 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
But they do. The electrochemical signals in your brain will affect mine to a very small degree in various ways. Experiences are said to have an objective existence in the form of a brain process. But we have just established that a physical brain process is not a truly separate thing because all matter is connected. Yet, experiences are said to be a closed system as evidenced from our individual experiences.

We have established this? All matter is connected means that all connections are meaningful? You have quite a ways to go before you get from "connection" to real influence. But then, DD and Loki have already explained that, so I'll just agree with them.

Do you view digestion to be the same thing as the physical processes of the stomach in exactly the same way that experiences are the same thing as the processes of the brain ? They don't have to be exactly--they just have to be the processes of that particular stomach, and that particular brain. It is enough that neither of them is a shared, community experience. Certainly, all matter being connected, my stomach exerts a greater gravitational attraction after a huge meal than before, but oddly enough, that is not the way my wife finds me more attractive. There's influence, and then there's influence.

uruk

29th September 2003, 09:30 PM

Pot head 1: ffffffffffffffpptt...cough!...cough! Dude, why am I "me"
and not "you"?

Pot head 2: ffffffffffffffpptt. cough!...I dunno, could it be that what
we call the self is derived form the unique
combinations of interconnections in the billions of
neurons in our brains shaped by the individual
experiances we have in our lives. Much like how
the nucleaic acids combine in different orders
to produce a unique individual. There is anecdotal
evidence to support this supposition in people
who have suffered brain damage and have lost large
amounts of their memory. The loved ones claim that
the victims have, in essence, become a "different"
person. I remember once I had an art teacher
who used to be super strict, ultra-conservative
extrovert "type A" personality. After a bad car
accident in which he suffered brain trauma, his
personnality did a 180. He became this quiet,
softspoken, mild, ultra-conservative introvert
"type B" person. I know, dude it could have been
psychological. But WOW!!! It was like he was
a different person, man. Unless of course you
believe that the "self" is not derived from biological
physicality, but from ....uh..then....uh...Man, what
were we talkin' about?...

Pot head 1: Huh?.....what did you say?

Pot head 2: Huh?........was I say'n somethin'?

Pot head 1: Man, am I hungry.

Pot head 2: Yea, let's go to Taco Bell.

davidsmith73

30th September 2003, 05:25 AM

Originally posted by Dancing David

Uh, dude, check your facts, the electrical part of the signal is not anything like a radio or anything. It is a potential created by sodium, calcium and potasium. It is not an electrical signal like emr or electrons in a power line. It is more like a biological osmotic filter driven by the very small charges associated with the ions. The actual signal is at the synapse and it is totaly chemical.
So your statement is like saying that a reaction in a vessel in a lab will have an effect on the chemicals in another vessel.

I am well aware of how the nervous system works. I am also well aware that any physical process will have an effect on another physical process wherever it is located in space. The size of the interaction in not the point at hand.

That is true all matter is connected in different ways, the burden would be to demonstrate that there is a significant or meaningful effect. So do quazars at the edge of the unverse effect your behavior? They are connected to you through gravity and entropy, how do they effect you?

This is not the issue. The issue is the inconsistency between what is proposed to be physically true but not true in terms of experience. Materialism proposes that an experience is the same thing as a physical process and has an objective existence as such. Yet materialism views the physical aspect and experiential aspect in different ways. The physical aspect is not truly separate from the rest of the universe. This means that any physical process is not a separate entity. If we treat the experiential aspect of a brain process in exactly the same way as we treat the physical aspect, which we should if they are one and the same thing, then the experiential aspect is not a separate entity either. This would seem to negate the fact that we have separate experiences.

They are closed in the sense that they do not have meaningful impact on others except through our actions.

But they must have at least some impact. So where does individual experience come from ? (in a philosophical sense)

This is more of the c-word as privileged 'event', there is nothing anymore special about the c-word than there is to digestion. A plant makes sugar from sunlight, can you? Do a plant require some special realm of 'photosyntesis' to do this thing.

In materialism there are no 'special' or privileged events, you seem to elevate human awareness to some special realm, it is not special, it is as important as farting. It is a product of biological existance.

Exactly my point ! Materialism holds that there is no such thing as a truly separate physical process. Experiences are said to be the same thing as a physical process yet we have an individual experience which is tied to a particular physical process.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding the materialistic notion that an experience is the same thing as a physical process.

By the way I don't get what you mean by c-word ? Consciousness ?

davidsmith73

30th September 2003, 05:34 AM

Originally posted by Loki
davidsmith73,

First, the "leakage" is extremely local. You phrase it as "to a very small degree". A very very small degree in deed! In fact, so small that the word "negligible" is probably appropriate.

The size of the effect is irrelavent. The fact that all physical processes are connected seems to negate the idea that a subset of the physical universe can be regarded as separate in an experiential sense of existence (ie, individual experience)

Second, you seem to be confusing the cause with the effect. If you and I are sitting at the edge of a still pond, but out of sight of each other, then you will see ripples in the water if I throw something into the pond - but you will have no idea what I threw in. A boot? A rock? Even if the (negligible) ripples are actually detectable, they aren't the same thing as the object that caused
them.

I don't see how this is relevant to the argument :confused:

Objects existing as separate things is not a valid concept according to materialism.

Third, the interpreter is different. Your brain has been trained, adapted, and modified overtime by your experiences. As you eye deteriorate physically, the brain adapts and learns to "fill in the gaps" of the raw experience. So even if you could transfer the physical processes that generate my experiences into your head somehow, you wouldn't necessarily interpret them the same way.

Again I am confused by the relevance :confused:

davidsmith73

30th September 2003, 05:41 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio

We have established this? All matter is connected means that all connections are meaningful? You have quite a ways to go before you get from "connection" to real influence. But then, DD and Loki have already explained that, so I'll just agree with them. [/B]

As I said to them, the size of the effect is not relevant to the argument. Why does the effect have to be "meaningful" in degree ? The fact that materialism holds that the physical universe does not contain any truly separate processes means that experiences cannot be separate either since they are the same thing as a physical process. Individuality should not exist.

They don't have to be exactly--they just have to be the processes of that particular stomach, and that particular brain. It is enough that neither of them is a shared, community experience. Certainly, all matter being connected, my stomach exerts a greater gravitational attraction after a huge meal than before, but oddly enough, that is not the way my wife finds me more attractive. There's influence, and then there's influence.

I think the problem with your metaphor is the fact that digestion is defined by logical and quantifiable physical relationships whereas experiences cannot be defined this way. Digestion does not exist in the same sense as experiences do. I think even materialism has to ackowledge this.

Dancing David

30th September 2003, 05:53 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

I am well aware of how the nervous system works. I am also well aware that any physical process will have an effect on another physical process wherever it is located in space. The size of the interaction in not the point at hand.

the size of the interaction would be part of signal transimssion. Do you feel that a reaction in one vessel will effect the reaction in another vessel in your chemistry lab.(When they are side by side but not intermingled)

This is not the issue. The issue is the inconsistency between what is proposed to be physically true but not true in terms of experience. Materialism proposes that an experience is the same thing as a physical process and has an objective existence as such. Yet materialism views the physical aspect and experiential aspect in different ways. The physical aspect is not truly separate from the rest of the universe. This means that any physical process is not a separate entity. If we treat the experiential aspect of a brain process in exactly the same way as we treat the physical aspect, which we should if they are one and the same thing, then the experiential aspect is not a separate entity either. This would seem to negate the fact that we have separate experiences.
From the materialist viewpoint they may be connected , but you can still have locality of events. It is not irrelavant to ask if quazars at the edge of the universe effect your behavior! You are tied to them by gravity.

And materialism views the experient as equivalent to the physical process, it is immaterialist who seperates them. Again does chemical reaction in vessel A have a detectable effect on vessel B when the two are not intermingled?

But they must have at least some impact. So where does individual experience come from ? (in a philosophical sense)
Imapct is sperate from signal or meaning-ful interaction. The impact is through the action of the corpse.

Exactly my point ! Materialism holds that there is no such thing as a truly separate physical process. Experiences are said to be the same thing as a physical process yet we have an individual experience which is tied to a particular physical process.
Dude materialism does hold that there are discrete processes limited by the effects of forces in local space time. Things may be connected but that does not mean there is a meaningful transmission of energy or force

Perhaps I am misunderstanding the materialistic notion that an experience is the same thing as a physical process.

By the way I don't get what you mean by c-word ? Consciousness ?

When I have trouble spelling I use c-word, it also takes away some of the special feelings about the the c-word.

davidsmith73

30th September 2003, 06:26 AM

Originally posted by Dancing David

the size of the interaction would be part of signal transimssion. Do you feel that a reaction in one vessel will effect the reaction in another vessel in your chemistry lab? (When they are side by side but not intermingled)

Yes.

From the materialist viewpoint they may be connected , but you can still have locality of events. It is not irrelavant to ask if quazars at the edge of the universe effect your behavior! You are tied to them by gravity.

Its not behaviour we are talking about, its experience. The locality of physical events does not make them separate from the rest of the universe. So why should individual experience exist if the physical universe does not contatin any truly separate processes ?

And materialism views the experient as equivalent to the physical process, it is immaterialist who seperates them. Again does chemical reaction in vessel A have a detectable effect on vessel B when the two are not intermingled?

Detectable perhaps not but the effect is there according to materialism.

DanishDynamite

30th September 2003, 06:53 AM

davidsmith73:Its not behaviour we are talking about, its experience. The locality of physical events does not make them separate from the rest of the universe. So why should individual experience exist if the physical universe does not contatin any truly separate processes ?I don't quite follow your argument. You are a physical process of your brain. Yes, your brain is affected by the environment (and itself affects the environment) but so what? Your brain is only located at one given place at a given time. That makes it "seperate" and individual.

Mercutio

30th September 2003, 07:05 AM

not detectable, but the effect is there...I'm gonna have to disagree, for good reason. But we'll keep it simple. A nerve sends info in three manners--synaptic transmission, local potentials, and action potentials. The first two are graded--that is, a small stimulus will elicit a small response. The action potential, on the other hand, is an all-or-nothing event. Any stimulus below threshold does not elicit an action potential; any stimulus above (by a lot or a little) will produce an action potential. There are no "big" or "small" action potentials.

So, while gravity may have continuous effects, declining with the square of the distance away, there is perfectly good reason to suggest that a small stimulus will have absolutely no effect on consciousness. That would give you your "truly separate processes" you desire in order to show separate consciousnesses. Since no action of your brain has enough effect (directly) on my brain to cross that threshold, it makes no difference to say "there is a connection". As I said above, there's influence, and then there's influence.

hammegk

30th September 2003, 08:33 AM

Mercutio, why do you feel your comments above escape the circularity of assuming-materialism-is-True to then providing an argument "proving" materialism is true?

Dancing David

30th September 2003, 10:13 AM

Not speaking for Mercutio:

I think that at this point we can drop into the does materialism have a valid basis for being reality.

Yet the original question and the thread are about how materialism leads to a conclusion. therefore the methods of materialsim would be used to defend assumption based on the material model.

I still think that this more of an issue for idealists.:P

Mercutio

30th September 2003, 10:20 AM

Originally posted by hammegk
Mercutio, why do you feel your comments above escape the circularity of assuming-materialism-is-True to then providing an argument "proving" materialism is true? I thought the question being addressed was along the lines of "if materialism is true, why are experiences localized, when materialism posits the interconnectedness of all matter?" The truth of materialism is assumed for the purpose of the problem, not proven.

I really hope I didn't post in the wrong thread or something...

hammegk

30th September 2003, 11:07 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio

I really hope I didn't post in the wrong thread or something...

Oops, my bad.:( Sorry. In my defense, the OP did not so postulate imo, but that is where the thread has gone.

It's just that "postulating materialism true" for any purpose seems to me like postulating "grandma would fly if she had wings". :D

Mercutio

30th September 2003, 01:16 PM

Originally posted by hammegk

Oops, my bad.:( Sorry. In my defense, the OP did not so postulate imo, but that is where the thread has gone.just don't ask me to diagram it...what a long strange trip...and all that...

It's just that "postulating materialism true" for any purpose seems to me like postulating "grandma would fly if she had wings". :D But given that she had wings, we could reasonably argue about her preferences regarding climate...(mine would fly south...) :p

jan

30th September 2003, 01:21 PM

I had some trouble trying to find out what davidsmith73 was talking about, but I think Interesting Ian explained it quite clearly:

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I would say that different experiences do not alter the self one iota. It only affects our personality.

I think davidsmith73 assumes three different layers where all the others see only two. First, we have all this matter (your body with your brain). Next, we have the experiences (including qualia, feelings, memories, and so on). And finaly, we have the Self which is experiencing alls these experiences.

What davidsmith73 is asking (if I got it right) is something like: according to materialism, it is obvious that my experiences must be attached to my body and my brain (they are caused by my brain, according to materialism). But why is it that my self is experiencing just this set of experiences and not just any other?

This problem gets even worser if we concede that there are no separate physical processes, just one big universe. If consciousness is a brain process, then there can't be two consciousnesses that are completly seperated. But two Selfes are (by definition, I would guess) perfectly separated.

The assumption of a third layer, the immutable self (explicit in the case of Interesting Ian, supposed in the case of davidsmith73 (hope it is not just a strawman I am attacking)) seems to be very troublesome to me. You would have to explain how it is possible for the Self to experience some experiences (perhaps by having some second-degree-experiences?). Also, what evidence do you have that there is indeed such a Self? Maybe you think this is the thing you couldn't have more evidence: isn't it clear that a Self does exist? I am thinking, therefore is it not obvious that I must exist?

But all I know about it is that there are some experiences. I have no idea who is having all those experiences. And few materialists would agree that there is an immutable Self that stays unchanged , regardless of what ever happens (just the personality changes, according to Interesting Ian). By the way, all this was explained long ago by David Hume, if anyone is interested.

Originally posted by davidsmith73
The fact that materialism holds that the physical universe does not contain any truly separate processes means that experiences cannot be separate either since they are the same thing as a physical process. Individuality should not exist.

I think the idea that two consciousnesses (what's the proper plural?) are completely separate and can't interfere is quite absurd. What are we supposed to do here? I am moving my fingers on my keybord to fiddle with your consciousness. Well, but only I am experiencing my qualias, right? So even if somebody else is typing some words to transfer her thoughts, ideas or emotions into my brain, my qualias are unique, and so am I, right?

Maybe a photon that arives in your eye doesn't trigger a spark in your brain, but due to some unlikely, but possible quantum effect causes a spark in my brain. Maybe a neuron firing in my brain causes something to happen in your brain due to some weird and completly unlikely quantum process. But such effects are so unlikely that it is impossible to notice them at all. So for all practical reasons, my brain processes are seperate from your brain processes, as long as we do not communicate. But this is completly sufficient to explain why your experiences seem to be seperate from my experiences: because they are, for every practical reason. If my eyes see something red, your brain will not experience a red impression. And this is sufficient to be able to speak about "my" experiences and "your" experiences.

To reuse the stomach example once again, how can you define on an atmostic level where one digestions ends and another starts? You can imagine examples where the difference between two digestions becomes some grey-in-grey. But usually, we know quite well where one digestion ends and another one starts.

From a materialistic point of view, you could imagine some kind of Siamese twins with connected brains. Depending on how their brains are connected or separate, maybe they would claim "we are two different selves" or "I am only one self" or some bizzar states in between, like "I feel like having only one immutable self, but two completly different personalities, sharing the same memory" or "I feel like having only one immutable self, but two completly different personalities, each one having its one separate memory", or "I feel like one person in the morning, but like two in the afternoon" and so on.

After all, the idea of a self sounds a bit like a little homunculi sitting in my head, experiencing my experiences. How does he do this? Is there a little homunculi inside the head of my homunculi experiencing the experiences the homunculi makes? And so on. Just drop the self and stick to the experiences.

* * *

Maybe a bit off-topic:

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Materialism proposes that an experience is the same thing as a physical process and has an objective existence as such.

No, it doesn't. Some Materialists say that experiences are physical processes. Others say they are caused by physical processes.

Yahzi

30th September 2003, 08:38 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
The size of the interaction in not the point at hand.
The entire lesson of quantum mechanics is that size really does matter.

The size of the interaction always matters in the real world. Noise is like the Planck lenght: any signal under the noise level doesn't exist.

davidsmith73

1st October 2003, 09:11 AM

Originally posted by DanishDynamite
davidsmith73:I don't quite follow your argument. You are a physical process of your brain. Yes, your brain is affected by the environment (and itself affects the environment) but so what? Your brain is only located at one given place at a given time. That makes it "seperate" and individual.

This locality of matter to a "given space and time" is a notion i'm not so sure about. Can matter occupy an absolute spatial and temporal location ? Perhaps someone versed on relativity can give us an answer.

My argument is that materialism attributes an experience as having an objective existence but only an objective existence corresponding to a subset of the physical universe. But the physical universe cannot be truly broken up into separate processes. In other words, my brain is not truly separate from yours. This seems to me to produce a contradiction as to why individual experience exists at all, if we assume that experiences are objective physical processes.

davidsmith73

1st October 2003, 09:39 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
not detectable, but the effect is there...I'm gonna have to disagree, for good reason. But we'll keep it simple. A nerve sends info in three manners--synaptic transmission, local potentials, and action potentials. The first two are graded--that is, a small stimulus will elicit a small response. The action potential, on the other hand, is an all-or-nothing event. Any stimulus below threshold does not elicit an action potential; any stimulus above (by a lot or a little) will produce an action potential. There are no "big" or "small" action potentials.

So, while gravity may have continuous effects, declining with the square of the distance away, there is perfectly good reason to suggest that a small stimulus will have absolutely no effect on consciousness. That would give you your "truly separate processes" you desire in order to show separate consciousnesses. Since no action of your brain has enough effect (directly) on my brain to cross that threshold, it makes no difference to say "there is a connection". As I said above, there's influence, and then there's influence.

You are saying that the physical process that is an experience can have a range of possible states with a truly defined border between being that experience or not. If I'm not mistaken, such a border cannot exist according to materialism.

Lets consider the range of physical states where we are just crossing the threshold depolarisation value that will trigger an action potential which will cause a neuron to fire and consequently a certain activity pattern will "become" an experience. Does such a threshold value have an absolute demarkation ?

DanishDynamite

1st October 2003, 09:51 AM

davidsmith73:This locality of matter to a "given space and time" is a notion i'm not so sure about. Can matter occupy an absolute spatial and temporal location ? Perhaps someone versed on relativity can give us an answer.Are you saying you aren't sure where your brain is? ;)

In the context of this discussion, I don't see how relativity (or quantum uncertainty for that matter) is relevant.
My argument is that materialism attributes an experience as having an objective existence but only an objective existence corresponding to a subset of the physical universe. But the physical universe cannot be truly broken up into separate processes. In other words, my brain is not truly separate from yours. This seems to me to produce a contradiction as to why individual experience exists at all, if we assume that experiences are objective physical processes. I still don't see the problem. Let us for arguments sake say that the physical processes of other brains did affect my brain in a direct and significant way. So what? The experience that my brain is having is what I experience, no matter what external factors are affecting my brain.

Dancing David

1st October 2003, 10:19 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

This locality of matter to a "given space and time" is a notion i'm not so sure about. Can matter occupy an absolute spatial and temporal location ? Perhaps someone versed on relativity can give us an answer.

My argument is that materialism attributes an experience as having an objective existence but only an objective existence corresponding to a subset of the physical universe. But the physical universe cannot be truly broken up into separate processes. In other words, my brain is not truly separate from yours. This seems to me to produce a contradiction as to why individual experience exists at all, if we assume that experiences are objective physical processes.

Mr. Smith,
it is interesting how you come to these conclusions, perhaps a trip to the library would help.

First off, just because things are connected does not mean that they have a discernable effect upon each other.

Locality is determined by the ability of a force or action to propagate an effect.
Force: usualy travels close to the speed of light.
Action: limited by the vectors adding up.

So turning on a light bulb will create EMR that propagates at the speed of light. But that does not mean it will light a room on the other side of the wall , does it? It might create a very slight magnetic field that propagates through the wall. As well as Feynman's electrons traveling over there.
A catapult fires off a set of encyclopdie, they land in different spots, impact various objects. Are objects not struck by the volumes actualy effected by the catapult?

Materialsim allows for discrete events happening as limited by the speed of light, you are proposing simultaenity, a big no-no-

Events do not propagate in a meaningful way across the universe, there is gravity, but not information.

You are being really vauge, polease give me an example of how you see the quazars at the edge of space time effecting your current behavior.
Does my dog, here in Illinois really have an impact on you wherever you are. The gravity is slight, his magnetic field is marginal, his nuclear power is non existant.
How does my dog effect you?

uruk

1st October 2003, 11:13 AM

This locality of matter to a "given space and time" is a notion i'm not so sure about. Can matter occupy an absolute spatial and temporal location ? Perhaps someone versed on relativity can give us an answer.

I'm not too well versed on relativity, but I think the answer would be no because we are in constant motion. WE stand on the surface of the earth, which is rotating. The earth is orbiting the Sun. the sun is orbiting the galactic center, the galaxy is moving with our local cluster. Our cluster is moving with...well you get the picture. Also Space/time is constantly expanding.

So I guess absolute spatial position would be relative. Could Herr Plank and Hiesenberg help us out?

Events do not propagate in a meaningful way across the universe, there is gravity, but not information.

Just to be a devil's advocate, How about quantum intanglement?
But how could something that affects the particular state of an individual particle affect an entire system?

Mercutio

1st October 2003, 12:55 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
You are saying that the physical process that is an experience can have a range of possible states with a truly defined border between being that experience or not. If I'm not mistaken, such a border cannot exist according to materialism. Unless you can support this, I gotta go with "mistaken". First, "the physical process that is an experience" is an oversimplification. Absolute sensory thresholds reflect the fact that not all physical processes are experienced, although (the assumption is that) all experiences are physical processes.

Lets consider the range of physical states where we are just crossing the threshold depolarisation value that will trigger an action potential which will cause a neuron to fire and consequently a certain activity pattern will "become" an experience. Does such a threshold value have an absolute demarkation ?
no, let's not consider the threshold range--let's consider the range that is well below threshold. It is enough that those do not have an experienced effect. They have an effect on the dendrite; the effect dies there. If I point a rifle at a target, and squeeze the trigger--but not to the point of actually firing the rifle--does my finger have an effect on the trigger? Certainly. Does it have an effect on the target? No. Even accorging to materialism.

davidsmith73

2nd October 2003, 05:47 AM

Originally posted by Mercutio
Unless you can support this, I gotta go with "mistaken". First, "the physical process that is an experience" is an oversimplification. Absolute sensory thresholds reflect the fact that not all physical processes are experienced, although (the assumption is that) all experiences are physical processes.
[/B]

Which bit am I supposed to be supporting ? That 1) the physical process that is an experience can have a range of possible states with a truly defined border between being that experience or not or 2) that such a border cannot exist according to materialism ?

As for number 1), this assertion is actually yours because I inferred it from your post. The very idea that a pattern of neural activity can either be experiential or not infers that there must be a border between two such states. We may describe such borders as existing in various terms such as spatial location or energy levels, but materialism posits that physical processes do not have such borders in objective reality. Yet we have this process we call individual experience.

no, let's not consider the threshold range--let's consider the range that is well below threshold. It is enough that those do not have an experienced effect. They have an effect on the dendrite; the effect dies there. If I point a rifle at a target, and squeeze the trigger--but not to the point of actually firing the rifle--does my finger have an effect on the trigger? Certainly. Does it have an effect on the target? No. Even accorging to materialism.

Yes, but we are addressing whether its appropriate to view the target as existing at all. You have assumed that the target is separate from your finger, the rifle and the surrounding air. But in an objective sense, there is no such true demarkation. The separateness exists only as a function of your subjective perception (according to materialism remember). So saying your finger does not have an effect on the target if the rifle is not fired is not strictly true. This is the cruical point.

Depolarizations at the dendrites that are too small to trigger action potentials will still have a physical effect on the cell. Those that are large enough will trigger the action potential. In limiting experiences to one of the two processes you have inferred that there is an objective separation between an experiential process and otherwise. But we know that such a separation does not objectively exist with regards to physical processes.

Perhaps I am completely wrong on this materialistic point. Is there a situation whereby a physical process has absolutely no physical effect on another process occuring in the same universe ? Someone mentioned Plank's constant and minimum packets of energy and all that.

Dancing David

2nd October 2003, 06:13 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

-snip-
As for number 1), this assertion is actually yours because I inferred it from your post. The very idea that a pattern of neural activity can either be experiential or not infers that there must be a border between two such states. We may describe such borders as existing in various terms such as spatial location or energy levels, but materialism posits that physical processes do not have such borders in objective reality. Yet we have this process we call individual experience.

I think that the issue can not be reduced to a dualistic on/off situation. The neural networks in the brain are more like a nation with democratic sub units like states, counties and cities. You may like to draw a border and say that, here is the threshold for an experience, but that can be very difficult to do.

Seriously, for an event to occur there has to be agreement between many different channels that the event is occuring and this include 'negative' events as well. To percieve the color red means that there are a number of receptors that say they are sensing red, then there are a number of receptors that say they are not percieving green.

So there has to be a large number of the democracies voting yes or no for the sensation to occur, and so on up the line.

-snip-

"but materialism posits that physical processes do not have such borders in objective reality. "

I would really like to see you prove this contention!

There are many different kinds of borders,

First off the HIP does not say that all particles are every where at different times, it says that there is a level of knowledge that can not be gathered on the level of very samll particles. Just because you don't know the vector , or the position to a certainty, does not mena that particles are everywhere at the same time.

Second, the speed of light is a real threshold for the transmission of force and action. While Feynman's electrons can be viewed as being everywhere in the space bounded by the speed of light, they can not break out of that bound. Most of the interactions in the universe occur at a much slower pace.

Third, and the issue that you seem to be refusing to address, is that a level of interaction may be meaningless.
1. Do quazars at the edge of space time have an effect on your behavior?
2. Does my dog have an effect on you behavior?

You seem to be trying to make some sort of metaphysical point and sticking it into materialism.

Yes materialism says that there are forces that are bounded by the speed of light, but that does not mean that if my dog eats a chili pepper, you will have indigestion.

Please point me in the direction of where materialists say that all inetractions have an impact on all other interactions.

Loki

2nd October 2003, 06:22 AM

But we know that such a separation does not objectively exist with regards to physical processes.
But it does exist - the border/separation is draw by the limits of the observing process. You know a physical interaction has triggered an "experience" because you have an experience. You can deduce that a physical interaction has not triggered an "experience" because you don't. The "border" may be different for each person, and may change over time. What's the issue here?

davidsmith73

4th October 2003, 07:41 AM

Originally posted by Dancing David

I think that the issue can not be reduced to a dualistic on/off situation. The neural networks in the brain are more like a nation with democratic sub units like states, counties and cities. You may like to draw a border and say that, here is the threshold for an experience, but that can be very difficult to do.

I'm not saying that it could be done in any practical sense, but it must follow that if one type of physical process is experiential and another is not then there is a boundary between the two. The problem is that objective physical boundaries do not exist according to materialism. Everything is connected.

materialism posits that physical processes do not have such borders in objective reality.

I would really like to see you prove this contention!

You can prove it to yourself quite easily. I'm sure, like me, you were first taught to think about electrons as being made of some substance, like little balls that fly around the nucleus. But of course as you grow older and learn a little more about sophisticated concepts like probability densities you realise that matter is not made of any "substance" like the macroscopic world seems to be to our senses. Suddenly a whole new meaning to physical reality is presented, one in which there are no "little balls" that lie at the heart of matter, but one in which only fundamental forces acting within fields are at work. Fields do not have any real boundaries and extend to infinity.

There are many different kinds of borders,

But no objective ones. Thats my point.

First off the HIP does not say that all particles are every where at different times, it says that there is a level of knowledge that can not be gathered on the level of very samll particles. Just because you don't know the vector , or the position to a certainty, does not mena that particles are everywhere at the same time.

The question is of the objective nature of the particle. How can you sustain the notion that measuring the position and momentum of something means that there is an objective boundary between that thing and the rest of the universe ?
We are used to dissolving the illusion of boundaries between macroscopic things so why is it so hard to apply the same logic to a smaller scale ?

Third, and the issue that you seem to be refusing to address, is that a level of interaction may be meaningless.
1. Do quazars at the edge of space time have an effect on your behavior?
2. Does my dog have an effect on you behavior?

I haven't addressed this issue because its irrelavent.

You seem to be trying to make some sort of metaphysical point and sticking it into materialism.

I think the metaphysical point I'm making is implicit in materialism.

Yes materialism says that there are forces that are bounded by the speed of light, but that does not mean that if my dog eats a chili pepper, you will have indigestion.

Of course, but again, I don't think the level of "meaningful" interactions are the issue. The issue is the supposed objective nature of experiences.

Please point me in the direction of where materialists say that all inetractions have an impact on all other interactions.

Forces and fields.

davidsmith73

4th October 2003, 07:49 AM

Originally posted by Loki

But it does exist - the border/separation is draw by the limits of the observing process.

Which makes the border objectively real ? According to materialism, I don't think so. If you answer yes to this question you effectively believe in psychokinesis. In other words the act of observation has an effect on objective reality.

You know a physical interaction has triggered an "experience" because you have an experience. You can deduce that a physical interaction has not triggered an "experience" because you don't. The "border" may be different for each person, and may change over time. What's the issue here?

The issue is that physical "borders" do not objectively exist according to materialism. This creates a problem when attempting to say that experiences are the same thing as objective physical processes, but only a subset of physical processes that exist in the universe. I don't really know how to put the problem across more coherently than I've already done :(

Dancing David

4th October 2003, 09:16 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

I'm not saying that it could be done in any practical sense, but it must follow that if one type of physical process is experiential and another is not then there is a boundary between the two. The problem is that objective physical boundaries do not exist according to materialism. Everything is connected.

Well I would say that this is an example of overgenralization. There are only a certain set of processes that lead to perception and they are entrained and limited. And they do invove objective events.
a. there is the stimulous to the receptor.
b. there is the tansmission by the nerve.
c. there is the process of the brain.
d. there is the perception of the event.
The physical boundary does exist, it starts with the stimulous interacting with the receptor, and through the line.

You can prove it to yourself quite easily. I'm sure, like me, you were first taught to think about electrons as being made of some substance, like little balls that fly around the nucleus. But of course as you grow older and learn a little more about sophisticated concepts like probability densities you realise that matter is not made of any "substance" like the macroscopic world seems to be to our senses. Suddenly a whole new meaning to physical reality is presented, one in which there are no "little balls" that lie at the heart of matter, but one in which only fundamental forces acting within fields are at work. Fields do not have any real boundaries and extend to infinity.

That is a definite yes and no! They propagate at the speed of light so they are bounded by the speed of light and the time interval studied.
Then there is the whole issue of interaction, while a proton in my dog may repel a proton in your body, they are limited by the interaction at the speed of light and the compensating force of the accompaning electrons.

And again;
And you seems to be ignoring this point or calling it irrelevant, there may be an interaction at a distance, electro magnetic, gravitational, etc.. But does that interaction actual cause an observable change in the sysytem being studied?

Just because my dog drinks water does not mean I am not thirsty.

-snip-

The question is of the objective nature of the particle. How can you sustain the notion that measuring the position and momentum of something means that there is an objective boundary between that thing and the rest of the universe ?
We are used to dissolving the illusion of boundaries between macroscopic things so why is it so hard to apply the same logic to a smaller scale ?

Uh, dude, I think that if you just said what I think you said then all particles would exist at all times in all spaces, I am not sure that that is what you ment, is it?

A particle is still located in a fuzzy area bounded by the speed of light and the HIP. You don't need certainty for the thing to work. Just approximation.

I haven't addressed this issue because its irrelavent.

No you aren't answering the question because it points to the flaw in your logic and if you answer it, then you can convince me of what you are saying.

Does a quazar at the edge of the universe effect your behavior?

If my dog eats a chili pepper will I have indigestion?

I think the metaphysical point I'm making is implicit in materialism.

I think that you are imposing a metaphysical construct onto materialism, when I ask you questions from the materialist POV you just say they are irrelevant, they aren't.

Of course, but again, I don't think the level of "meaningful" interactions are the issue. The issue is the supposed objective nature of experiences.

There is an objective nature to experince, if you remove your eye will you still see?

-snip-

I think that if you point out an inherent flaw in materialism you might have to answer the material questions.

How does the quazar effect your behavior? You are the one saying that it should, you are the one who is maintaining that there are no boundaries in the material world. I am saying that there are boundaries. And I am asking the question because it points out that there is a boundary bewteen you and the quazar. It is not irrelavant. Convonce me that the quazar effects your behavior and then you have made your point about there not being seperation under materialism.

Peace

DanishDynamite

5th October 2003, 07:21 AM

davidsmith73:The issue is that physical "borders" do not objectively exist according to materialism. This creates a problem when attempting to say that experiences are the same thing as objective physical processes, but only a subset of physical processes that exist in the universe. Physical borders do exist. It is my understanding that the weak and strong nuclear forces (http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/forces/funfor.html), for example, aren't infinite in range, even in theory. The speed of light is likewise a border.

What I don't understand is why the existence or non-existence of "borders" matters. You are only a subset of the physical processes occuring in the Universe because you are the subset which occurs in your brain. The sum total of influences of the Universe on the part of the Universe where your brain is located, is what you experience. Your experience is seperate and individual because it is determined by what is going on in that part of the Universe whose borders are your skull. I really don't know how to make this any clearer.

hammegk

5th October 2003, 08:19 AM

Originally posted by DanishDynamite

What I don't understand is why the existence or non-existence of "borders" matters. You are only a subset of the physical processes occuring in the Universe because you are the subset which occurs in your brain. The sum total of influences of the Universe on the part of the Universe where your brain is located, is what you experience. Your experience is seperate and individual because it is determined by what is going on in that part of the Universe whose borders are your skull. I really don't know how to make this any clearer.

The answer is, "the above statements are true IF materialism/atheism is correct". :)

davidsmith73

20th October 2003, 03:55 AM

Originally posted by Dancing David

Well I would say that this is an example of overgenralization. There are only a certain set of processes that lead to perception and they are entrained and limited. And they do invove objective events.
a. there is the stimulous to the receptor.
b. there is the tansmission by the nerve.
c. there is the process of the brain.
d. there is the perception of the event.
The physical boundary does exist, it starts with the stimulous interacting with the receptor, and through the line.

You have missed the point. The boundaries you have just pointed out exist subjectively. The issue I am raising is the objective existence of such boundaries. As I have pointed out before, all these processes, a-d, mentioned above, do not exist as truly independent objective events. Their interactions will theoretically "leak" into adjacent matter thus obscuring the precise demarkation of where process X ends and process Y begins.

.

That is a definite yes and no! They propagate at the speed of light so they are bounded by the speed of light and the time interval studied.

But all physical process are bound by the speed of light! There is still no justification for attributing an objective boundary between any two processes.

Then there is the whole issue of interaction, while a proton in my dog may repel a proton in your body, they are limited by the interaction at the speed of light and the compensating force of the accompaning electrons.

How does this address the issue of objective boundaries ?

And again;
And you seems to be ignoring this point or calling it irrelevant, there may be an interaction at a distance, electro magnetic, gravitational, etc..

indeed, I am saying there is a theorectical interaction between all matter across the universe. Is this not correct ?

But does that interaction actual cause an observable change in the sysytem being studied? Just because my dog drinks water does not mean I am not thirsty.

Completely irrelavent to my point. The materialist posits that an experience has an objective reality in the form of a physical process. However, if there indeed is no such thing as two truly independent objective events and all matter is connected, then there seems no logical reason why experience should be attributable to a subset of physical processes occuring in the universe. Indeed the materialistic interpretation gets more confused when we realise that it views the separation of physical processes as a subjective phenomena but then goes on to attribute this separation to an objective reality (experience) !

Uh, dude, I think that if you just said what I think you said then all particles would exist at all times in all spaces, I am not sure that that is what you ment, is it?

In a sense perhaps. There is already one physicist I know of who takes this notion seriously anyway.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0195145925/104-9664988-2675106?v=glance

A particle is still located in a fuzzy area bounded by the speed of light and the HIP. You don't need certainty for the thing to work. Just approximation.

Does the HIP impose an objective limitation on physical processes ? I don't think materialism would say yes to that.

No you aren't answering the question because it points to the flaw in your logic and if you answer it, then you can convince me of what you are saying.

[QUOTE][B]
Does a quazar at the edge of the universe effect your behavior?

(I shall answer these questions from the perspective of materialism)

no. But it will effect the objective nature of the interactions that are supposed to correspond to an experience. Hence, it is difficult to justify the objective separation between processes that are experiential and those that are not.

If my dog eats a chili pepper will I have indigestion?

No. But see above reply.

I think that you are imposing a metaphysical construct onto materialism, when I ask you questions from the materialist POV you just say they are irrelevant, they aren't.

Which metaphysical construct I am imposing ?

There is an objective nature to experince, if you remove your eye will you still see?

Of course materialsim posits an objective nature to experience ! That is the implicit subject of this thread ! There are problems with this view which I have tried to put across.

How does the quazar effect your behavior? You are the one saying that it should, you are the one who is maintaining that there are no boundaries in the material world.

I am in no way saying that a quasar should effect "your behaviour" because "your behaviour" is not a statement about the objective reality of the situation. "Your behaviour" imposes a subjective boundary which is not the issue. Unless I am mistaken, the quazar will effect the objective processes in your brain to a degree that is undetectable but theoretically should happen. The quazar will not effect "your behaviour" because this is an arbitrary subjective boundary.

I am saying that there are boundaries.

Objective or subjective ? This is a very important distinction David.

sorgoth

20th October 2003, 05:20 AM

Originally posted by Upchurch
Right. If this were true, then a significant blow or trama to the head could cause a change in the mind or consciousness and obviously that never happens. Further, if consciousness were to change, there would be a change in the brain itself. Has anything like that been observed?

Yes. Brain activity goes up when observing certain events, certain smells, ect. (If you were being sarcastic, then never mind.)

And don`t forget mind influencing drugs. How could those work if the mind wasn`t physical?

davidsmith73

20th October 2003, 06:43 AM

Originally posted by sorgoth

And don`t forget mind influencing drugs. How could those work if the mind wasn`t physical?

If the drugs themselves are not really physical! What we call the physical world is known only through observation after all.

Dancing David

20th October 2003, 04:53 PM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

You have missed the point. The boundaries you have just pointed out exist subjectively. The issue I am raising is the objective existence of such boundaries. As I have pointed out before, all these processes, a-d, mentioned above, do not exist as truly independent objective events. Their interactions will theoretically "leak" into adjacent matter thus obscuring the precise demarkation of where process X ends and process Y begins.
Wow, I do enjoy these chats but dude, either stop arguing from the materialist perspective or just say that you don't like it. The event of the photon reacting with the receptor does not leak anywhere.
I would be very grateful if you would explain that to me because I think that it shows your lack of belief in the material system. There is no theoretical leak into the interactions with the nearby receptors. the photon has a number of possibilities.
a. it interacts with space/time but not a receptor in the eye.
b.it interacts with the receptor in the eye, this bifurcates
i. it could be that it triggers a receptor response.
ii. it could be that it does not trigger a receptor response.
c. it interacts with the eye but not a receptor, say it strikes the sclera and raises its temperature.

In the case where the photon interacts with the recptor and triggers the receptor response, how does it leak? the photon does not cause other receptors to give a response. The photon briefly interacts with one receptor, please show me where there is leakage. Thanks, it sounds really cool.
.

But all physical process are bound by the speed of light! There is still no justification for attributing an objective boundary between any two processes.

There certainly is, just because gravity is a pervasive force doesn't mean that there is a meaningful change when a reaction occurs in one beaker across the room from another beaker. Say i have some cations in solution in two seperate beakers. And I add some dogions to one of the beakers. While the dogs(anions) and cats react with each other to produce a more neutral state in the first beaker. How do they effect the second beaker? You saif earlier that they do, but how does that effect take place? Does it have a meaning, or is it just some abstract thingy ma bob?

How does this address the issue of objective boundaries ?

They exist, take planets there is a point in space where we can say that the atoms associated with Jupiter end, they do not flow over into the atoms of the asteroids. Some may be knocked out of Jupiters atmosphere but they are not like just hoppin over to the asteroids all the time. there has to be an influence that moves them.

indeed, I am saying there is a theorectical interaction between all matter across the universe. Is this not correct ?

Uh, dude you brought it up, why don't you explain it. As far as I understand it, no not all the particles in the universe are interacting with all the other particles in the universe. They can interact through forces and fiels which are commonly theorised to be further particles.
There is a gravitational interaction bounded by the speed of light, just as there is magnetic repulsion and elctro static forces.

Completely irrelavent to my point. The materialist posits that an experience has an objective reality in the form of a physical process. However, if there indeed is no such thing as two truly independent objective events and all matter is connected, then there seems no logical reason why experience should be attributable to a subset of physical processes occuring in the universe.

Could you show me where this majority of scientists say that physical boundaries don't exist. You are doing some sort of mish mash here, is this in the textbooks in the enginering labs? This is just

argument by assertion

and it earns you a Dull Dian point. This is your assertion it is not a materialist assertion.

Indeed the materialistic interpretation gets more confused when we realise that it views the separation of physical processes as a subjective phenomena but then goes on to attribute this separation to an objective reality (experience) !

Nyet, that is just your idealist assertion about materialism, is is unfounded, undemostrated and unproved. I await the place where you show this to be a materialsit assumption. It is your assertion! Another Dull Dian point.

In a sense perhaps. There is already one physicist I know of who takes this notion seriously anyway.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0195145925/104-9664988-2675106?v=glance

I shall read and see, one you say?

Does the HIP impose an objective limitation on physical processes ? I don't think materialism would say yes to that.
Then you either don't talk to materialists or don't understand them. HIP sets a limit to the location of subatomic particle.

You don't think that materialism would say that? Then you aren't a materialist or you don't know what HIP really is as a construct. The fact that there is a negative reciprocal bewteen the certainty of vector and position does not give the particle free rein to roam the universe. It bounds the location of the particle.

(I shall answer these questions from the perspective of materialism)

no. But it will effect the objective nature of the interactions that are supposed to correspond to an experience. Hence, it is difficult to justify the objective separation between processes that are experiential and those that are not.
Only if you assert it, only the organic processes that lead to perception lead to an experience.
So are you saying that the photons that hit somebody else eye cause you to see?

snip

Of course materialsim posits an objective nature to experience ! That is the implicit subject of this thread ! There are problems with this view which I have tried to put across.
So far I would like to say that they are a misrepresentation of materialism. respectfully tendered.

I am in no way saying that a quasar should effect "your behaviour" because "your behaviour" is not a statement about the objective reality of the situation. "Your behaviour" imposes a subjective boundary which is not the issue. Unless I am mistaken, the quazar will effect the objective processes in your brain to a degree that is undetectable but theoretically should happen. The quazar will not effect "your behaviour" because this is an arbitrary subjective boundary.

No it will not effect my behavior because the weak gravitational, magnetic fields will not alter my brain chemistry.

Objective or subjective ? This is a very important distinction David.

I understand it is important but I claim that there is no magic subjective and that boundaries exist for physical processes, feel free to change your tactic.

Respectfuly, materialism does belive in the boundaries.

I again ask you, how does the idealist create boundaries when all is one mind?

My dog says you are cool by the way, but the fact that he jumped in a swamp last week is not going to effect you, except through our communication.

Peace and Respect

davidsmith73

21st October 2003, 04:34 AM

Originally posted by Dancing David

You have missed the point. The boundaries you have just pointed out exist subjectively. The issue I am raising is the objective existence of such boundaries. As I have pointed out before, all these processes, a-d, mentioned above, do not exist as truly independent objective events. Their interactions will theoretically "leak" into adjacent matter thus obscuring the precise demarkation of where process X ends and process Y begins.
------------------------------------------------------------------

Wow, I do enjoy these chats but dude, either stop arguing from the materialist perspective or just say that you don't like it. The event of the photon reacting with the receptor does not leak anywhere.
I would be very grateful if you would explain that to me because I think that it shows your lack of belief in the material system. There is no theoretical leak into the interactions with the nearby receptors. the photon has a number of possibilities.
a. it interacts with space/time but not a receptor in the eye.
b.it interacts with the receptor in the eye, this bifurcates
i. it could be that it triggers a receptor response.
ii. it could be that it does not trigger a receptor response.
c. it interacts with the eye but not a receptor, say it strikes the sclera and raises its temperature.

In the case where the photon interacts with the recptor and triggers the receptor response, how does it leak? the photon does not cause other receptors to give a response. The photon briefly interacts with one receptor, please show me where there is leakage. Thanks, it sounds really cool.

Perhaps I should have digressed. The photon, or whatever, will interact with the various processes you described above. That is the "leakage" I was meaning. The fact that an interaction takes place, which causes another interaction to take place, and so on and so forth, means that interactions never cease. So, when conceiving of a particle or wave reacting with another, where does process X end and process Y begin in an objective sense ? This is the question that materialism is posed with. I think that materialism cannot logically demarkate an objective boundary between any two physical processes. You don't need to make any observations to demonstrate this to yourself. Any boundary that is demarkated (as you have done above) is subjective and therefore, according to materialism, does not exist.

But all physical process are bound by the speed of light! There is still no justification for attributing an objective boundary between any two processes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
There certainly is, just because gravity is a pervasive force doesn't mean that there is a meaningful change when a reaction occurs in one beaker across the room from another beaker.

A "meaningful" change is subjective! A change per se, which must happen according to materialism, is objective. The extent or meaning of change matters not in materialist objective reality.

How does this address the issue of objective boundaries ?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
They exist, take planets there is a point in space where we can say that the atoms associated with Jupiter end, they do not flow over into the atoms of the asteroids.

I absolutely disagree. Materialism posits that there is no such thing as atoms that objectively belong to Jupiter or asteroids. That is a subjective boundary you have drawn which does not exist in objective reality according to materialism.

Some may be knocked out of Jupiters atmosphere but they are not like just hoppin over to the asteroids all the time. there has to be an influence that moves them.

Of course. I am not contending that. I am contending that we have no logical reason to suppose that there are truly separate physical entities in the materialist view of objective reality. We may point to various parts of the universe but are they really of themselves or parts of the whole ?

indeed, I am saying there is a theorectical interaction between all matter across the universe. Is this not correct ?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Uh, dude you brought it up, why don't you explain it.

I thought I had already :(

As far as I understand it, no not all the particles in the universe are interacting with all the other particles in the universe. They can interact through forces and fiels which are commonly theorised to be further particles.
There is a gravitational interaction bounded by the speed of light, just as there is magnetic repulsion and elctro static forces.

My point is, can we draw objective boundaries between these particles or waves and the rest of the universe ? I don't think materialism can logically do this. Since these particles or waves are constantly interacting with the rest of the universe we cannot draw a line and say "here!" thats where particle X objectively ends and the rest of the universe begins.

Completely irrelavent to my point. The materialist posits that an experience has an objective reality in the form of a physical process. However, if there indeed is no such thing as two truly independent objective events and all matter is connected, then there seems no logical reason why experience should be attributable to a subset of physical processes occuring in the universe.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Could you show me where this majority of scientists say that physical boundaries don't exist. You are doing some sort of mish mash here, is this in the textbooks in the enginering labs? This is just argument by assertion and it earns you a Dull Dian point. This is your assertion it is not a materialist assertion.

No I can't point you to a texbook that will explicitly say that. It is implicit in the materialistic framework. All matter is connected. The rest follows from that. I really don't think you need any complex maths to figure it out. I mean you just have to think about the nature of any individual physical process and realise that all processes lead on to others. Motion never ceases in the physical world.

Does the HIP impose an objective limitation on physical processes ? I don't think materialism would say yes to that.
Then you either don't talk to materialists or don't understand them. HIP sets a limit to the location of subatomic particle.

You don't think that materialism would say that? Then you aren't a materialist or you don't know what HIP really is as a construct. The fact that there is a negative reciprocal bewteen the certainty of vector and position does not give the particle free rein to roam the universe. It bounds the location of the particle.

I shall read more on this.

I understand it is important but I claim that there is no magic subjective and that boundaries exist for physical processes, feel free to change your tactic.

I cannot see how this could be. Could you explain how ? I materialism is truly a monistic philosophy then objective boundaries would imply a dual (or multiple) nature of reality.

I again ask you, how does the idealist create boundaries when all is one mind?

The boundaries do not exist in a monistic idealism for the same reasons as monistic materialsim. I don't know how the appearance of boundaries would be created under idealism.

Dancing David

27th October 2003, 10:14 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Perhaps I should have digressed. The photon, or whatever, will interact with the various processes you described above. That is the "leakage" I was meaning. The fact that an interaction takes place, which causes another interaction to take place, and so on and so forth, means that interactions never cease. So, when conceiving of a particle or wave reacting with another, where does process X end and process Y begin in an objective sense ? This is the question that materialism is posed with. I think that materialism cannot logically demarkate an objective boundary between any two physical processes. You don't need to make any observations to demonstrate this to yourself. Any boundary that is demarkated (as you have done above) is subjective and therefore, according to materialism, does not exist.

Well said, I don't really want o get into the epistomolgy of the word meaning ful.

But take the example of the photon being generated in a start traversing space and then interacting with the receptor in the eye and helping create the perception of a color.

It ends with the brain generating the perception of the color. Or in the material sense the photon's interaction ends when it interacts with the photochemicals in the receptor. While the receptor creates a potential which then triggers a neuron, those are caused events. At the level of physics the photon creates a potential , which then causes the receptor to cause a neuron to fire. but the photon's energy has already craeted a change in the photochemical, it is the diffenence in the chemical that creates the potential, not the photons.

The nail, the horse, the battle, the war, the country. they are all seperate although they effect each other.

A "meaningful" change is subjective! A change per se, which must happen according to materialism, is objective. The extent or meaning of change matters not in materialist objective reality.

It is objective only in that it can be observed, that is one of the axioms of science/materialism, the effects must be observed. So while there may be undetected effects, they are not part of science until they can be observed. And that it just an axiom, I can not defend or offend it's objectivity.
The meaning of the change in a materialist objective reality is that it can be observed.
A change that can occur in materialism must have an observable trait or secondary trait that can be observed. That is the subjective definition of the 'objective' in the scientific sense.
There is no objective/subjective barrier in science there are theories and observations. The rest is speculation and at best can rise to being an inferred observation of theory.

I absolutely disagree. Materialism posits that there is no such thing as atoms that objectively belong to Jupiter or asteroids. That is a subjective boundary you have drawn which does not exist in objective reality according to materialism.

Materialism as a philosophy does not, but materialism as a tool certainly does, it gets into the probablist nature of reality. At the center of Jupiters core are atoms that are not going anywhere unless some event rips Jupiter apart, these particles have a 99.9999999999% chance of being a particle we define as Jupiter's at a future time. There are those that are higher in the atmosphere and they have a smaller cahnce of staying in Jupiter's atmosphere, and up and up, until we reach an area that iIwould call the boundary, where particles have an aqual chance of staying with Jupiter or leaving.
the particles of asteroids have a very high probability of being associated with an asteroid.
So while the boundary is one that i chose, I can set in higher or lower, but the chances that a particle at Jupiters core will migrate to an asteroid are very low.
And again the boundary is an ex-planation of behavior, of course it in not a thing in and of itself. It is a theory which can be verified.

Of course. I am not contending that. I am contending that we have no logical reason to suppose that there are truly separate physical entities in the materialist view of objective reality. We may point to various parts of the universe but are they really of themselves or parts of the whole ?
Materialism operates on many levels so it depends on the scale and the question, and again materialism is an explanation for the way that the 'physical' world behaves, and observation will show that the boundaries do exist. Philsophicaly materialism is a tool for analyzing the behavior of the 'physical' world.

I thought I had already :(

My point is, can we draw objective boundaries between these particles or waves and the rest of the universe ? I don't think materialism can logically do this. Since these particles or waves are constantly interacting with the rest of the universe we cannot draw a line and say "here!" thats where particle X objectively ends and the rest of the universe begins.
Philosphicaly you can say that, scientificaly you can say, this particle has a probability of being in this space, at some point the probability approaches zero, and the boundary is defined by the particle itself.

No I can't point you to a texbook that will explicitly say that. It is implicit in the materialistic framework. All matter is connected. The rest follows from that. I really don't think you need any complex maths to figure it out. I mean you just have to think about the nature of any individual physical process and realise that all processes lead on to others. Motion never ceases in the physical world.

But that does not mean that all events have an observable impact on all other events.

I shall read more on this.

I cannot see how this could be. Could you explain how ? I materialism is truly a monistic philosophy then objective boundaries would imply a dual (or multiple) nature of reality.

Monism, schmonism, physical reality is not monistic, it is pluralistic, so materialism would be pluralistic shmuralistic.

The boundaries do not exist in a monistic idealism for the same reasons as monistic materialsim. I don't know how the appearance of boundaries would be created under idealism.

Sorry , montheism ain't my bag, the last i heard the said the universe has like 10 to the seventieth particles in it. that could not encompass monism of particles, except for bosons at low temperatures.

Peace