An Evolutionary Understanding of Ontology?

[Ichneumonwasp]

I hope this is not too long.

These comments are occasioned by BDZ’s (who I do not think is completely out in left field) recent threads since I think I know what he is trying to say. I hope to place some of those ideas in a slightly different context and try to make sense of them, hopefully without completely destroying them. I know some of this is going to sound thoroughly post-modern, but I also hope the pragmatism shines through. None of this is new, nor is it earth-shattering.

I begin with monism. The universe consists in a single substance that we variably describe as quantum/space-time with matter and energy and space-time somehow being thoroughly ‘dependent’ on one another because ultimately they are all the same ‘thing’. But whatever that ‘thing’ is we just can’t know completely. We can describe it – possibly very well – but we can’t ‘get it’ in any ultimate sense. Here is why:

We are contingent creatures created by evolutionary forces (of course, to some degree this is metaphor, but let that pass). Our view of the universe depends critically on the way our brains work and the language we use to describe that universe. The way our brains seem to work is that we form concepts of what is out there so as to navigate the world. Our nervous system keep us from becoming lion lunch, helps us navigate social relations so we can maximize resources, and gets the buxome-blonde-at-the-end-of-the-bar’s phone number for a wild night of hot steamy passion (substitute 6’2” hulking muscular hunk of sensitive, intelligent but ultimately truly manly man if it works better for you). In other words, we are not set up to discover some ultimate reality ‘out there’ but to figure out how to stay alive and hopefully reproduce.

Our best ‘tools’ for understanding the world are language and science (and they are tied together). Language is essentially a bag of metaphors, some alive – some dead, for dealing with the world (including each other). Science is a means of testing what we see and keeping descriptions of the world that work while rejecting those that don’t. Our conceptions of how the world works change over time based on alterations in what we find works best. So, for instance, we adopted a slightly new way of speaking about the world after Galileo. We threw aside the old Aristotelian vocabulary for this new way of speaking (and thinking) because Galileo’s way of talking about how the world works functioned better than Aristotle’s vocabulary. Same with Newton and Einstein. That is the nature of big changes in physics, though smaller changes also occur with simple experiments that also change the way we relate to what is out there.

There is a view of science (legacy of the Enlightenment) as a tool for uncovering the Truth – it uncovers for us what *is* really out there. But, if you approach this from a monistic ontology there is no ‘us’ separate from ‘out there’, properly speaking. Language and science are not mediators between the inside and outside worlds (language as a mediator between inside and outside worlds is a legacy of the Enlightenment). Instead, language and science are tools that help us describe what works best. I think part of what BDZ argues against is this view of science (as that which uncovers Truth). Now whether or not his interlocutors actually believe this view of science I am not completely certain, so that may be where some of the problem lies.

Part of the problem we have in discussing the supposedly ‘deep issues’ in philosophy is that our language carries a lot of old baggage from earlier ages. We speak of ‘souls’ and ‘mind’ as though they are actual entities – which implies that they are built of a separate substance or have a different property. Those older metaphors interfere with our ability to discuss the world at large and are part of the earlier view that there is an outside world that has an absolutely definite form, some ‘intrinsic nature’ that was created by the mind of God and that we can discover as an absolute. One of the big dangers in discussing this topic is that people generally jump to the conclusion at this point that if we say that there is no ‘intrinsic nature’ to the outside world that we are really saying that there is no outside world to begin with. But that is not the point at all. There really is something ‘out there’ – the issue is that we cannot discover its ‘intrinsic nature’ because we are part and parcel of its ‘intrinsic nature’ (whatever that means, and the phrase is really empty since we cannot approach it very well) and discuss it using a language that works, not one that we discover *is* the ultimate tool for uncovering reality.

If we jettison the whole notion that science (and language) uncovers The Truth and replace it with the notion that it is a tool for describing the world in a way that works best (evolutionary thinking), then we can hopefully begin to jettison some of the other baggage that has followed us through the ages and creates the ‘philosophical mysteries’ that aren’t mysteries at all. Rather, they are just mistakenly applied language from a different time. We need to rid ourselves of this notion that there is an ‘us’ that is separate in some final sense from what is ‘out there’. Now, clearly, I do not mean that we do not have bodies with a particular topology that can be described as inside and outside, but that there are not completely separate worlds – inside and outside – implying different substances and/or properties. That language is steeped in dualism and creates problems that don’t even exist.

The benefit? We can remove all the pseudo-divinities that surround us. In past times we worshipped something that we felt lay beyond the visible world. In the Enlightenment we substituted Truth for God, treating the world described by science as a sort of divinity (that we can uncover the absolute Truth by means of science). The Romantics (and German idealists) turned inward and deified Consciousness/Imagination. We could press onward and realize that everything is one, that it is all the same, and stop privileging different aspects of the universe. This requires that we view science in a slightly different way from the mainstream – I think this is a view that many here already share (science as a description of the world that works, because it is a natural outgrowth of evolutionary thought), so it wouldn’t be that big a change for many of us.

I don’t know if that helps along any of the discussion or if it sounds like complete blather, but there it is.

[Phaedrus74]

You have succeeded in captured precisely (though maybe not very concisely ;)) my ideas on the matter...

Great post!!

:clap::clap::clap:

[Ichneumonwasp]

Thank you. It was a bit scattered, though, wasn't it? Maybe next time.....

[Phaedrus74]

No, actually I was pulling your leg a bit, I think it would be hard to be any clearer or more concise...

[PixyMisa]

Our best ‘tools’ for understanding the world are language and science (and they are tied together). Language is essentially a bag of metaphors, some alive – some dead, for dealing with the world (including each other). Science is a means of testing what we see and keeping descriptions of the world that work while rejecting those that don’t. Our conceptions of how the world works change over time based on alterations in what we find works best. So, for instance, we adopted a slightly new way of speaking about the world after Galileo. We threw aside the old Aristotelian vocabulary for this new way of speaking (and thinking) because Galileo’s way of talking about how the world works functioned better than Aristotle’s vocabulary.
You say two different things here, one I fully agree with, and one I disagree with. Yes, the discoveries of Galileo and his contemporaries changed the way we think of the Universe and hence the way we talk about it. But we didn't "throw aside" the old vocabulary; we adapted it to fit our new understanding. It's just an overstatement, but it gives a false impression of how these changes occur. The sentence before that one is just fine.

(Though if you'd referred to Plato instead of Aristotle, I would have largely agreed. Plato was just plain wrong on physical stuff.)

There is a view of science (legacy of the Enlightenment) as a tool for uncovering the Truth – it uncovers for us what *is* really out there. But, if you approach this from a monistic ontology there is no ‘us’ separate from ‘out there’, properly speaking.
Yep. But that doesn't make that view wrong. It just clarifies what the definition of "is" is.

Language and science are not mediators between the inside and outside worlds (language as a mediator between inside and outside worlds is a legacy of the Enlightenment). Instead, language and science are tools that help us describe what works best.
But then what is the difference between what works and what is? If we successfully describe what it does, and what it does is all we can ever know, then is it not reasonable to say that it is what it does, and thus, what it does is what it is?

If there is no is, then does is is.

That's what we mean when we say quarks are matter, for example.

Part of the problem we have in discussing the supposedly ‘deep issues’ in philosophy is that our language carries a lot of old baggage from earlier ages.
Definitely agree here. And that's why scientists define their terms operationally.

We speak of ‘souls’ and ‘mind’ as though they are actual entities – which implies that they are built of a separate substance or have a different property.
Well, I don't!

One of the big dangers in discussing this topic is that people generally jump to the conclusion at this point that if we say that there is no ‘intrinsic nature’ to the outside world that we are really saying that there is no outside world to begin with.
A bigger danger is that there are people who believe that to be literally true.

But that is not the point at all. There really is something ‘out there’ – the issue is that we cannot discover its ‘intrinsic nature’ because we are part and parcel of its ‘intrinsic nature’ (whatever that means, and the phrase is really empty since we cannot approach it very well) and discuss it using a language that works, not one that we discover *is* the ultimate tool for uncovering reality.
I'm not convinced that being part of the system is part of the problem. Is it possible to define an intrinsic nature of any system, other than operationally?

[Phaedrus74]

Hey Pixy,

First off, I realize that I haven't responded to you in BDZ's thread (regarding your reasons for believing his notions are wrong). Considering BDZ had responded by the time I became aware of your response I felt I would be speaking out of place...

But enough of that, and onto current affairs...
Most of my objections are semantic (in a sense), I believe that on the whole we are in agreement.


Yep. But that doesn't make that view wrong. It just clarifies what the definition of "is" is.


The view that there exists a transcendant Truth is a gross misapplication of the concept "truth" and is very wrong because of the simple fact that is does nothing to clarify the "is" it actually confuses this notion and leads to all manner of philosophical afflictions like for instance platonism. There is no truth independent of concepts and their relation to the environment/objective reality.


But then what is the difference between what works and what is? If we successfully describe what it does, and what it does is all we can ever know, then is it not reasonable to say that it is what it does, and thus, what it does is what it is?

If there is no is, then does is is.


The problem with this (and the pragmatic theory of truth (true is what works) and the correspondence theory of truth) is that it relies (if I remember correctly) on the possibility of defining everything in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for membership of a given class. While this might work for some classes of objects, as soon as human beings start using these objects (and the "using" becomes part of the "doing" so to speak) things become rather intractable.

Also work done by Searle and Putnam (not to mention my favorite oddball Wittgenstein) appear to point to the conclusion that defining (classes of) objects in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is, in general, impossible.

And a last question: when have you seen everything an object does? (And therefore know (under your definition) what it is.)


That's what we mean when we say quarks are matter, for example.


Not sure about this, don't know enough physics, are you sure about this?
I thought that they abandoned the original instrumentalist formulation of QM in favor of the (flawed?) ontological interpretation of the Kopenhagen interpretation.


Definitely agree here. And that's why scientists define their terms operationally.


Unfortunately, some of the people arguing the stance of science appear unaware of this (even proper scientist sometimes appear to forget this :))


A bigger danger is that there are people who believe that to be literally true.


I don't think that you will find many people (outside mental institutions) that truly believe this, even if some seem to argue this point their overt actions betray their true beliefs.


I'm not convinced that being part of the system is part of the problem. Is it possible to define an intrinsic nature of any system, other than operationally?


The fact that you are supplying an operational definition precludes the possibility of it describing "intrinsic" properties. At least given my understanding of the notion "intrinsic".

But I believe the point Wasp was trying to make was that we have no detached position from which to compare our language/beliefs to the world to determine their adequacy. The only thing we have to go on is whether they help us "cope" or not.

[Ichneumonwasp]

You say two different things here, one I fully agree with, and one I disagree with. Yes, the discoveries of Galileo and his contemporaries changed the way we think of the Universe and hence the way we talk about it. But we didn't "throw aside" the old vocabulary; we adapted it to fit our new understanding. It's just an overstatement, but it gives a false impression of how these changes occur. The sentence before that one is just fine.

I think the issue is one of different use of words, so it is likely to sow confusion. I agree fully that it sounds like an overstatement, so let me try to explain...... The way Rorty (and I used him primarily in that screed) uses the word 'vocabulary' refers not to the words that are replaced but to all the new connotations those words assume. So, Galileo did not create a whole slew of new words and jettison the old. He created new meanings for some very old words and invested them with these new meanings. Language often changes not by replacing words themselves but by replacing the sense those words convey. The new connotations then provide a new way of speaking.

So, in this instance, Rorty replaces an old use of the word 'vocabulary' with a new one that we could view as more expansive (really it's just a way of speaking that works for him). Now, some people will simply say -- why don't you use the word the way I use it? But that is part of the issue with language and discussion. Words are fluid. We will stick with the definitions that work best.


Yep. But that doesn't make that view wrong. It just clarifies what the definition of "is" is.

Yes, that is one way of stating it. But, it amounts to the same thing. What we want is a way of looking at (and speaking about) the world that helps us along. So, it depends a bit on what works best for you. If realigning what you mean by "is" helps best, then that's fine. If viewing the world initially as not completely approachable -- there is no absolute TRUTH that we can arrive at underneath it all -- works best, then that is also fine. The point being that we understand our limitation in this regard and how we are stuck in our own perspective and our own language so that we don't fall into the dualist traps that surround us. Dualism is so prevalent in our language that we must always be on guard against it. Since we define truth as a language condition, it doesn't make much sense to speak of it as 'out there'.


But then what is the difference between what works and what is? If we successfully describe what it does, and what it does is all we can ever know, then is it not reasonable to say that it is what it does, and thus, what it does is what it is?

As a useful fiction, sure. We will necessarily act as though it is Truth, but when we fall into the trap of 'us'/'out there' and think that we are completely sure of 'out there', then we are liable to fall right back into the dualism trap. And Plato rises from his grave. It's really just a slight shift in the way we talk about things that rids us of ontology since we can't really know the precise nature of 'out there'. Because, in some sense, the idea that there is an unfixable intrinsic nature to 'out there' that can be uncovered, depends on the idea that it was created by some mind, defined/scripted in some way. The other view is that it just *is* and we, being a part of it, can try to describe it as best we can, but that's it -- that's what science is for. We can't *know* that we got it right because we can't stand outside it and look at it. We will always define *what* it is based on if our description works. If we take a step back and realize that really we are just providing a description that works and not uncovering absolute truth we can drink a beer, play some backgammon, and laugh at all the freshman philosophy students who think they finally 'get it'.

If there is no is, then does is is.

Or, what about.....if we can't know absolutely "is", then "does" is its proper replacement? So we can stop talking about 'is' and move on to more important matters.

I'm not convinced that being part of the system is part of the problem. Is it possible to define an intrinsic nature of any system, other than operationally?

Don't think so. That's why we need to jettison all this 'is' talk and speak of 'does' -- realize that we must define it operationally.

The end result being this -- we've spent 2500 years hashing all this out, and the whole thing is just a linguistic fiasco. Aristotle, boring as he is to read, began a real service by examining language. If he had stuck right there and taken it farther than he did (instead of wallowing in teleological thinking - his one big mistake) then the whole course of Western philosophy might have been very different. We've basically returned to where he left off -- realizing that all this ontology talk is sound and fury signifying who know's what. Maybe nothing. Maybe something. Who cares? We can only define it operationally.

[Ichneumonwasp]

The view that there exists a transcendant Truth is a gross misapplication of the concept "truth" and is very wrong because of the simple fact that is does nothing to clarify the "is" it actually confuses this notion and leads to all manner of philosophical afflictions like for instance platonism. There is no truth independent of concepts and their relation to the environment/objective reality.

A much better way, as is the rest of your post, of stating what I tried to re-formulate in a different way above. Very good.

[Darat]

...snip...

The view that there exists a transcendant Truth is a gross misapplication of the concept "truth" and is very wrong because of the simple fact that is does nothing to clarify the "is" it actually confuses this notion and leads to all manner of philosophical afflictions like for instance platonism. There is no truth independent of concepts and their relation to the environment/objective reality.

...snip...

I agree with this for all practical purposes but to nit-pick I do think it is a strong statement and it isn't one that we actually need to make and I like to keep my assumptions as lean as possible.

After all we don't know that there isn't "transcendent Truth"; we certainly shouldn't discount the idea that there might be because we can't conceive (at least at the current time) what that may be or even what that would mean or on the grounds that in the past it's lead to erroneous conclusions.

[Phaedrus74]

I agree with this for all practical purposes but to nit-pick I do think it is a strong statement and it isn't one that we actually need to make and I like to keep my assumptions as lean as possible.

After all we don't know that there isn't "transcendent Truth"; we certainly shouldn't discount the idea that there might be because we can't conceive (at least at the current time) what that may be or even what that would mean or on the grounds that in the past it's lead to erroneous conclusions.

I don't believe it is a statement that needs to be made under most circumstances either.

[RANT....]
Under some circumstances I do feel that a statement to this effect needs to be made, especially in light of the second paragraph of your response: (I believe that) We don't know that there isn't [a] "transcendent Truth" in precisely the same manner that we don't know there isn't a God. In other words it is a notion that has severe theological connotations (for me?). I have no problem with people speaking about God overtly or overtly testifying their faith, when this is done covertly however I tend to get a bit let us say "irrational"... When it is done by self-styled atheists the cognitive dissonance becomes unbearable.

It is not the assumption that "transcendant Truth" does not exist that violates Occam's razor, it is the assumption that it does exist that is in violation.
[/RANT...]

Sorry about the rant, but I really get worked up about these things, they bring out the Nietzsche in me. And not in a good way I'm afraid.

I do agree that the notion can be useful as a carrot on the end of a stick...

[Ichneumonwasp]

I agree with this for all practical purposes but to nit-pick I do think it is a strong statement and it isn't one that we actually need to make and I like to keep my assumptions as lean as possible.

After all we don't know that there isn't "transcendent Truth"; we certainly shouldn't discount the idea that there might be because we can't conceive (at least at the current time) what that may be or even what that would mean or on the grounds that in the past it's lead to erroneous conclusions.

But the way we use the word "truth" depends on our language (obvious), so the supposed Transcendent Truth 'out there' is necessarily a projection on our part. That is not to say that there is not something 'out there' but that we can't get to it.

I can't recall who recently made this point in another thread, but his point was that to speak of this Truth as known requires that there be an outside observer. We are obviously not an outside observer, so any attempt we make to 'create' this sort of truth is necessarily a projection. If there is no outside observer, then in some sense there is no Transcendent Truth (truth being a manifestation of language).

Again, there is something out there. It may even have an absolute fixed form in some sense. But absent an observer, that fixed form is essentially an empty notion.

[AkuManiMani]

The OP is what BDZ should have come right out and said from the get go. Woulda saved us all some heavy typing :p

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Good thread... it is late now but as I just answer a couple of posts in the old threads I didn't want to let this go. I will comment more later, just want to point out that it is interesting how and idea can be well received, or fiercely attacked, mainly because the way it is presented, not for what it says.

Good night!

[PixyMisa]

What I am saying is that since the only possible truth is based on observations of behaviour, any other definition for truth as related to reality (as opposed to abstract systems) is necessarily incoherent.

I'm not saying that there is absolute truth, I'm saying (as you are) that there isn't, but that we need to recognise that the shorthand we are using in everyday language can only ever refer to empirical observations and inductive conclusions.


In short, It is what it does.

[Ichneumonwasp]

What I am saying is that since the only possible truth is based on observations of behaviour, any other definition for truth as related to reality (as opposed to abstract systems) is necessarily incoherent.

I'm not saying that there is absolute truth, I'm saying (as you are) that there isn't, but that we need to recognise that the shorthand we are using in everyday language can only ever refer to empirical observations and inductive conclusions.


In short, It is what it does.

Exactly. The only change, really, is in the way that it is expressed to try and rid us of the dualistic notions that seem to be inherent in much of our language. Told ya' we were saying the same thing only in slightly different ways.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Good thread... it is late now but as I just answer a couple of posts in the old threads I didn't want to let this go. I will comment more later, just want to point out that it is interesting how and idea can be well received, or fiercely attacked, mainly because the way it is presented, not for what it says.

Good night!

Exactly. The reason that I chastised you in the other thread is because Rorty's program is all about how things are presented. There is a sense in which the mode of presentation is the message. Because langauge is our vehicle it also what holds us back.

I didn't want anyone to get caught up on the way that you started the presentation in the other threads, since we are also saying the same thing.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

These comments are occasioned by BDZ’s (who I do not think is completely out in left field) recent threads since I think I know what he is trying to say. I hope to place some of those ideas in a slightly different context and try to make sense of them, hopefully without completely destroying them. I know some of this is going to sound thoroughly post-modern, but I also hope the pragmatism shines through. None of this is new, nor is it earth-shattering.

I appreciate your post in here. I do not fully understand your disclosure, sure, I wrote my posts in a controversial way, but that doesn't change the fact that they have been misunderstood because of the wording. Those post were attacked because they sounded "woo".

You say that you hope you are not destroying them? Can't see how, you are quite intelligent.

I begin with monism. The universe consists in a single substance that we variably describe as quantum/space-time with matter and energy and space-time somehow being thoroughly ‘dependent’ on one another because ultimately they are all the same ‘thing’. But whatever that ‘thing’ is we just can’t know completely. We can describe it – possibly very well – but we can’t ‘get it’ in any ultimate sense. Here is why:

Monism is attractive, agreed. Why? I'm somehow surprised noticing that the same ideas have been in our heads from who knows when. Monism, dualism. Old stuff. Is it because we can't think in other terms? What about "multiple substancialism"? how about "unknown". :)

Anyway, lets tick with monism, there are good reasons, main one being economy and this, sensation, about that the Ockham razor rule applies to our descriptions of the universe.

Our view of the universe depends critically on the way our brains work and the language we use to describe that universe. The way our brains seem to work is that we form concepts of what is out there so as to navigate the world. In other words, we are not set up to discover some ultimate reality ‘out there’ but to figure out how to stay alive and hopefully reproduce.

(I edited the wonderful examples) ;) Yes. Agreed, our worldviews are influenced by our biology and our culture. How deeply? I believe it would be a good research field. Are we determined to think in objects, cause and effect? Do thinking in relationships, processes, information, is more difficult... less "intuitive"?

Our best ‘tools’ for understanding the world are language and science (and they are tied together). Language is essentially a bag of metaphors, some alive – some dead, for dealing with the world (including each other).

Agreed. When we study the proto-language of some monkeys or other animals we can see that the concept of "meaning" is central to language, we are symbolic animals and we tend to see "meanings" in the most unexpected relations, volcanoes and some god's will... even skeptics, for example refusing to wear the clothes of a serial killer.

Science is a means of testing what we see and keeping descriptions of the world that work while rejecting those that don’t. Our conceptions of how the world works change over time based on alterations in what we find works best. So, for instance, we adopted a slightly new way of speaking about the world after Galileo. That is the nature of big changes in physics, though smaller changes also occur with simple experiments that also change the way we relate to what is out there.

Absolutely. Now, science work from certain assumptions, and these are drawn from theoretical frameworks, from world views. We tend to ascribe to one of them and we also tend to defend it at ALL COSTS. This is an interesting human pattern, somehow, our worldview is so important that it has to be defended no matter what.

This is why reasoning abilities are in a second place when we are discussing what we believe, this is why some woos or religious people will resort to anything in order to keep their model about reality "working".

There is a view of science (legacy of the Enlightenment) as a tool for uncovering the Truth – it uncovers for us what *is* really out there.

Agreed. Hidden assumption, there is "a Truth" and we can uncover it. Another way to put it (right in the appropriate context for the thread):

Our maps are about the territory. Complex assumption.

But, if you approach this from a monistic ontology there is no ‘us’ separate from ‘out there’, properly speaking.

Absolutely!! Introspectively, there is a "state of consciousness" in which this the exact feeling experienced. Note that I'm not claiming that it is because this state is "more real", or "put you in contact with another reality" nor anything like that. I believe the experience is interesting, to say the least. It be argued that it "is more fundamental state of consciousness", at least that is implied by some ancient philosophies, I could not argue in favor nor against this, as ultimately, it is irrelevant for the ones who still see the world "divided". Note that this is not about conceptions, its about living it.

Instead, language and science are tools that help us describe what works best. I think part of what BDZ argues against is this view of science (as that which uncovers Truth).

Absolutely! The notion that our maps are about the territory. What puzzled me for years was the implications, if our maps are not about a territory, why do we call them maps? What do they map?

I once asked Pixy about the length of a coast (it was left unanswered) but such questions clearly illustrate my point.

Now whether or not his interlocutors actually believe this view of science I am not completely certain, so that may be where some of the problem lies.

There are some indications. But let's see if, this time, we can talk without appealing to emotions. Discuss the ideas, not the people ;)

Part of the problem we have in discussing the supposedly ‘deep issues’ in philosophy is that our language carries a lot of old baggage from earlier ages. We speak of ‘souls’ and ‘mind’ as though they are actual entities – which implies that they are built of a separate substance or have a different property.

Agreed. What I find even more interesting is that some skeptics (from another forum, none of them are known here, they are simply "other skeptics") are fighting those ghosts by ascribing, wholeheartedly, to the "opposing theory", this is materialism.

I believe that, in a way, (some forms of) materialism are only understood in the context of "immaterialism". In other words, in a way, talking about materialism is like talking about an inside without an outside.

Those older metaphors interfere with our ability to discuss the world at large and are part of the earlier view that there is an outside world that has an absolutely definite form, some ‘intrinsic nature’ that was created by the mind of God and that we can discover as an absolute.

You can eliminate god from your sentence and there are still some preconceived notions left. Emphasis added.

One of the big dangers in discussing this topic is that people generally jump to the conclusion at this point that if we say that there is no ‘intrinsic nature’ to the outside world that we are really saying that there is no outside world to begin with. But that is not the point at all.

It is a complex issue, I agree. But what is the point of keeping this notion about an "outside world" if we have agreed in that the "internal" and "external" boundaries are drawn by our cognitive processes? We are continue and homogeneous with the rest of nature, in your words, there is not "us" separated from "out there".

Ok, please help me if I'm wrong here, but for me, the separation, the "boundary" between "me" and "the world" is an illusion, and now for the interesting part... if this is correct, then our interpretation of one parcel (the outside) is necessarily wrong.

I tried to work around the problem by separating "our world" this is, our phenomenological illusion, from what causes it, leaving outside this phenomenological bubble "reality beyond us" (so to speak) and avoiding taking any ontological commitment about "what it is" when we are not watching.

There really is something ‘out there’ – the issue is that we cannot discover its ‘intrinsic nature’ because we are part and parcel of its ‘intrinsic nature’ (whatever that means, and the phrase is really empty since we cannot approach it very well) and discuss it using a language that works, not one that we discover *is* the ultimate tool for uncovering reality.

Yes, it is difficult to express ourself clearly about it. Some eastern traditions have deal with this issue for centuries.

If we jettison the whole notion that science (and language) uncovers The Truth and replace it with the notion that it is a tool for describing the world in a way that works best (evolutionary thinking), then we can hopefully begin to jettison some of the other baggage that has followed us through the ages and creates the ‘philosophical mysteries’ that aren’t mysteries at all.

Agreed! Wittgenstein as it best. Philosophy as a way to clean up the "language (and conceptual) mess".

Rather, they are just mistakenly applied language from a different time. We need to rid ourselves of this notion that there is an ‘us’ that is separate in some final sense from what is ‘out there’. Now, clearly, I do not mean that we do not have bodies with a particular topology that can be described as inside and outside, but that there are not completely separate worlds – inside and outside – implying different substances and/or properties. That language is steeped in dualism and creates problems that don’t even exist.

Completely agree!! Emphasis mine.

We could press onward and realize that everything is one, that it is all the same, and stop privileging different aspects of the universe. This requires that we view science in a slightly different way from the mainstream – I think this is a view that many here already share (science as a description of the world that works, because it is a natural outgrowth of evolutionary thought), so it wouldn’t be that big a change for many of us.

Not sure about that, I do believe that some JREF members are deeply tied with this notion about using science to describe "the real world", who believe that our maps are about the territory.

I don’t know if that helps along any of the discussion or if it sounds like complete blather, but there it is.

I have told you this before, but I wish I could write in such a clear way. Good job.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

What I am saying is that since the only possible truth is based on observations of behaviour, any other definition for truth as related to reality (as opposed to abstract systems) is necessarily incoherent.

I'm not saying that there is absolute truth, I'm saying (as you are) that there isn't, but that we need to recognise that the shorthand we are using in everyday language can only ever refer to empirical observations and inductive conclusions.

In short, It is what it does.

WOW :jaw-dropp

If I understood, this is VERY surprising... (in a pleasant way :)) I would have believed that your ultimate answer was:

(the ultimate truth about the world is,) "In short, (that) It is material" Or something among those lines.

What puzzles me, is that you (and others) have spent a lot of time trying to "prove" that I was "wrong".. all I wanted to say is what you posted in here...

Now, (and PLEASE Pixy, forget about past discussions, I'm asking here straightforward questions and not trying to offend you in any possible way) what is the difference between claiming that a Quark is a description (which IMO is what you stating with "it is what it does") and claiming that it is a clear and distinct material object, with a clear ontological status (if this is what you have said of course!).

Are you holding an ontological commitment with "matter" or open to the possibility that matter is a description and not "a substance"?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The OP is what BDZ should have come right out and said from the get go. Woulda saved us all some heavy typing :p

Yes.. but what about the fun? it would be lost! :D

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Exactly. The reason that I chastised you in the other thread is because Rorty's program is all about how things are presented. There is a sense in which the mode of presentation is the message. Because langauge is our vehicle it also what holds us back.

I didn't want anyone to get caught up on the way that you started the presentation in the other threads, since we are also saying the same thing.

Good points. I really hope we all can keep this thread on course. :)

[Soapy Sam]

I'm having difficulty finding the meaning in this thread.
I don't know the formal names of philosophies , so dunno if I'm monist, dualist or trinitarian:
(Lightning summary of SoapySamism):-
There really exists (at least one) universe, which contains stuff & operates along rules with high consistency. Among the things therein are humans, one of whom (Soapy Sam, hereinafter "SS", "me" or "I") has a POV at variance with all the rest, from his POV. ie POV is a variable.
SS has arrived , fully formed from the forehead of a 3 billion year (or so) long continuous chemical process (life), equipped with senses and an operating system which, far from being either random or quirky, are finely tuned to recognise reality and to take actions consistent with same. (ie until proven otherwise, SS takes it as given that the way he perceives stuff is damn near exactly the way stuff actually is, allowing for conversion errors at the small, big, fast and hot ends of the many sided spectrum. This view is supported by the otherwise inexplicable coincidence of 6 billion or so other systems coming to suspiciously similar conclusions.)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++

I have no idea what the universe is made of, as the only way that question can be answered is by physical research and explanation at smaller and smaller scales, while the question itself is endlessly recursive. (ie what are quarks made of? Boondoggles. What are Boondoggles made of? usw.) While the actual universe may / may not have an ultimate grain, the question does not recognise a limit. Language is not quantum, thank Xerxes. This is just one example of language failing at a fundamental level, to match reality, which is a jolly good reason to lump all philosophy as an exercise in wordplay. But that, as BDZ says, would remove the fun.

Where was I? Gods. Senile dementia.

Right- what in the sam heck is "transcendent truth" and does it end -ent or -ant?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sounds to me like you got it just fine.

Or, to sum up the entire OP much more succinctly....

In the immortal words of Mercutio -- Metaphysics is largely a pantload.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Sounds to me like you got it just fine.

Indeed, and it is a great post. Still, I changed just a tiny bit to make it, well, more esthetically beautiful. IMO granted, IMO.

... SS takes it as given that the way he perceives stuff is damn near exactly the way stuff actually is, allowing for conversion errors at the small, big, fast and hot ends of the many sided spectrum. This view is supported by the otherwise inexplicable coincidence of 6 billion or so other systems coming to suspiciously similar conclusions.)

My take of it "SS takes it as given that the way he perceives stuff is damn near exactly what is needed in order for SS and the other 6billion to survive, and basically nothing more".

[cyborg]

Language gives us the ability to describe what "is not".

We cannot be what is not - that is impossible. We can, however, decide that what "is not" "is" - i.e. be in error.

The basic problem is that most people think that the labels for the things we describe as, "is" and "is not" are where the meaning lie. Hence people get all worked up about things like "god", saying things such as "existence is god," as if it has meaning.

Meaning comes from the relationships between things. There simply cannot be any meaning in what you choose to call the "it" of monism.

Some people come to the conclusion that it is a failing of the language of choice that there is no meaning to the "it", rather than a failure to understand that meaning is contingent upon pattern and there is no pattern in that that simply "is".

[Ichneumonwasp]

Meaning comes from the relationships between things. There simply cannot be any meaning in what you choose to call the "it" of monism.

Yes. We cannot describe it in language at a fundamental level. What is 'energy'?

Some people come to the conclusion that it is a failing of the language of choice that there is no meaning to the "it", rather than a failure to understand that meaning is contingent upon pattern and there is no pattern in that that simply "is".

Again, yes, and well-put.

The move that Rorty tries to make, and which I chose not to correct Soapy Sam because of all the qualifiers in his post, is to try and dismantle the enterprise that searches to describe *is* (or *it*) and substitute what we really do -- describe what works best. Hence, *does* instead of *is*.

[Soapy Sam]

My take of it "SS takes it as given that the way he perceives stuff is damn near exactly what is needed in order for SS and the other 6billion to survive, and basically nothing more".
I wouldn't object to that interpretation. I'd just add that I have no reason to suppose there is much more.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Absolutely! The notion that our maps are about the territory. What puzzled me for years was the implications, if our maps are not about a territory, why do we call them maps? What do they map?

Good question. Perhaps map, being a metaphor, is incorrect. But it's the best we can do since we have to pull ourselves up by the bootstraps, so to speak -- we begin and end in language when it comes to the descriptions and we are at the mercy of our metaphors.


I believe that, in a way, (some forms of) materialism are only understood in the context of "immaterialism". In other words, in a way, talking about materialism is like talking about an inside without an outside.

Interesting observation. Yes. I think so.



It is a complex issue, I agree. But what is the point of keeping this notion about an "outside world" if we have agreed in that the "internal" and "external" boundaries are drawn by our cognitive processes? We are continue and homogeneous with the rest of nature, in your words, there is not "us" separated from "out there".

Yep. You caught me with baggage in hand. It is almost impossible to talk about this stuff without recourse to the old metaphors. The idea I was trying to address is that there is some kind of substance, probably, that we perceive. Of course, almost everything in that last sentence at some level is a lie -- there being no "I" or "we" or "out there" in the way that we formerly thought of such categories.

Ok, please help me if I'm wrong here, but for me, the separation, the "boundary" between "me" and "the world" is an illusion, and now for the interesting part... if this is correct, then our interpretation of one parcel (the outside) is necessarily wrong.

You're not wrong. I was merely imprecise.

I tried to work around the problem by separating "our world" this is, our phenomenological illusion, from what causes it, leaving outside this phenomenological bubble "reality beyond us" (so to speak) and avoiding taking any ontological commitment about "what it is" when we are not watching.

That may be part of the issue. I still don't know how to speak of it consistently -- as should be evident from the above.



Not sure about that, I do believe that some JREF members are deeply tied with this notion about using science to describe "the real world", who believe that our maps are about the territory.

Could be. I'm willing to give many the benefit of the doubt. For instance, I don't think Pixy or Piggy or Volatile or Phaedrus fit into that category. And Cyborg seems absolutely committed to monism, which is why I think some people here have a hard time understanding him based on their responses and he ends up trying to patiently explain what 'random' means from his perspective.

I have told you this before, but I wish I could write in such a clear way. Good job.

Well, thank you. If I tried to write in Spanish it would be utter gibberish. Personally, I'm amazed at how well you write in English. I wish I could write half so well in Spanish or French.

[cyborg]

And Cyborg seems absolutely committed to monism, which is why I think some people here have a hard time understanding him based on their responses and he ends up trying to patiently explain what 'random' means from his perspective.

As I said that which has no pattern simply is. That which is random has no pattern. It simply is - and it is so without meaning. It's a simple tautology really.

It does, however, in the finite spaces sometimes take on the illusion of meaning and as such fool us.

[Phaedrus74]

What I am saying is that since the only possible truth is based on observations of behaviour, any other definition for truth as related to reality (as opposed to abstract systems) is necessarily incoherent.

I'm not saying that there is absolute truth, I'm saying (as you are) that there isn't, but that we need to recognise that the shorthand we are using in everyday language can only ever refer to empirical observations and inductive conclusions.


In short, It is what it does.

I am not sure I understand you completely, but I think I agree (make no mistake I do like your slogan "It is what it does.")

Could you clarify what you mean with the first sentence, specifically the phrase "the only possible truth": truth in what sense? Do you mean the truth of a belief, or sentence, or something different? I'm having trouble grasping your meaning in the second clause of this sentence since they seem to be referring to different aspects of the concept "truth" (especially the phrases "the only possible truth" and "any other definition for truth" are confusing to me).

Thanks in advance...

[Phaedrus74]

<snip>

Right- what in the sam heck is "transcendent truth" and does it end -ent or -ant?

Since I am guilty of introducing the term I guess the responsibility for explicating it falls to me.... (sometimes I am tempted to kick myself :))
(Pretty sure it ends in -ent by the way...)

Basically the notion is the idea that Truth (or the Truth) exists independently of language or thought.

This usage tends to slip unnoticed into debates because of the fact that there exists an innocent version that is generally used to refer to "the actual state of affairs" (Think Jack Nickelson: "You can't handle the truth!!"). This use is unproblematic since it refers to the fact that beliefs of a person are false due to a lack of information (in other words if the person in question had had access to all information the belief held would be the belief referred to as "the truth"). Crucially in this context the concept "truth" retains it's ties with the notion of belief.

The next step towards abuse of the phrase "the truth" results from it's generalization. What is referred to under those circumstances is "the total actual state of affairs (in the universe)" or formulated differently "the set of all beliefs we would hold true if we had perfect information (and a perfect language to express this information)". Again this use of the phrase is not yet problematic since it retains it's ties with the notion of belief.

The abusive notion now arises if these ties are abandoned (as is most explicit in different forms of Platonism), under this notion "the Truth" refers to an ideal (in the technical sense (cf. idealism)) state of affairs that exists above and beyond the (material) universe and our beliefs about it and is independent of both (or ontologically prior). In other words it transcends reality (which is but a pale projection of it), hence my term transcendent truth. As such it leads, if I am not mistaken, to a multiplication of objects and is in violation of Occam's razor (this is the sense in which I mean it is "wrong").

Now this all seems rather academic, mostly people mean the generalized version of the truth when they say "the Truth", and there is no problem with that (my apologies to those I have mistakenly accused of applying the "abusive" concept). But platonism is still rather prevalent (mathematicians are prone to fall prey to it often for apparently good reasons), consider for instance the following hypothetical:

When all human beings (or entities with similar conceptual powers) are gone from the universe, is the (mathematical) sentence "2 + 2 = 4" true?

The answer is, in my opinion, "not applicable". Since the constituents of the sentence are under those circumstances meaningless the sentence "2 + 2 = 4" is meaningless (or worse: not a well-formed sentence) and therefore not a candidate for truth or false-hood.

It is tempting however to answer "yes" to this question. This leads to the question: "How is this possible?" Or to put it differently: "What must the universe be like for concepts to retain their meaning long after the beings (capable of) using them ceased to exist?"

And to this question there are, to my knowledge, only two possible answers:

Either
1) the universe has a dualistic nature in which matter and ideas (or concepts) exist independently of each other (are "equiprimordial") and in which we humans consist of both these substances,

or
2)the universe is idealistic in nature and ideas (or concepts) are ontologically prior to matter and give rise to them.

Both these ontologies I reject because they do not constitute viable alternatives to materialism (in the non-dogmatic sense put forward by BDZ, I-Wasp and others).

[Jeez, this turned out way longer than I intended, my apologies...]


P.S.
The "proof" that, despite the points made above, truth is transcendental I leave to the reader as an exercise, since I have no margin in which to fit it. ;)