Scientists prove that free will is an illusion!

[andyandy]

Well, maybe not proof but certainly an interesting finding. :)



You might think you just decided to read this story on a passing whim – but your brain actually decided to do it up to ten seconds ago, a new study claims.

In tests, researchers tracked people's thoughts by using a brain scan called functional magnetic resonance imaging.

Each volunteer was then asked to view a screen and decide which of two buttons to press and when to press it.

Neural activity in parts of the brain called the prefrontal and parietal cortex showed people made decisions long before they carried them out.

Prof John-Dylan Haynes, who lead the research in Leipzig, Germany, said: 'We found the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity up to ten seconds before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness.'

He added: 'The impression that we are able to freely choose between different possible courses of action is fundamental to our mental life.

'However, the findings suggest our subjective experience of freedom is no more than an illusion and our actions are initiated by unconscious mental processes long before we become aware of our intention to act.'

The research, carried out by the Max Planck Institute, is published online in Nature Neuroscience.http://www.metro.co.uk/news/article.html?in_article_id=142594&in_page_id=34

if people are interested in the philosophical side of things the thread can stay here, otherwise it might be best off in the science section. Either way I think that it is pretty fascinating stuff :)

[volatile]

This doesn't undermine free will. It just shows that our awareness of our will comes some time after the will is generated.

In order to prove that free will is an illusion, you'd need to show that these impulses didn't happen at all... :-D

[Rufo]

Besides agreeing with volatile, I think that the scientists are simplifying the concept. Free will has been vastly differently defined by different philosophies/philosophers, proving that is 'no more than an illusion' is not going to be as simple as they seem to think.

But ten seconds?! I've seen scientific findings of this before, but not with those mariginals. Worth a thought, regardless of its effect on free will.

[Irony]

Prof John-Dylan Haynes, who lead the research in Leipzig, Germany, said: 'We found the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity up to ten seconds before it enters awareness.

Is that the case, or is it the case that the person, instructed to chose which button to press and when to press it, decided "I'll press the left button in ten seconds"?

Not that their conclusions are entirely implausible, but I just don't see how they got from time between decision and action to time between decision and realization.

[andyandy]

Besides agreeing with volatile, I think that the scientists are simplifying the concept. Free will has been vastly differently defined by different philosophies/philosophers, proving that is 'no more than an illusion' is not going to be as simple as they seem to think.

But ten seconds?! I've seen scientific findings of this before, but not with those mariginals. Worth a thought, regardless of its effect on free will.

Yes I would be interested to see the full scientific report, and not just what has been reported in the Metro, I expect they go into it in a little more detail than the Metro :)

I agree the really interesting part is the 10 second delay. I had previously heard of split-second delays.... but 10 seconds doesn't seem to be explained by just synapses firing (or whatever happens ;))

[Magic 9-Ball]

It just can't be in all cases. That's a yes/no left/right decision. I can believe people would have a predisposition to choose one over another. That decision might be made more than 10 seconds in advance.

What about deciding to swing at a baseball pitch coming at 95 mph? That's certainly a split second decision.

[bokonon]

If the decision to brake or steer to avoid a child darting into the street is being made 10 seconds in advance, that doesn't nullify free will, it demonstrates precognition.

I suspect this paper is nothing more than a flawed experimental setup and overreaching conclusions.

[plumjam]

What about deciding to swing at a baseball pitch coming at 95 mph? That's certainly a split second decision.

Very good point. Same in cricket. A batsman can choose to play one of 15 - 20 or more types of shot, and typically has about a third of a second in which to choose.

[slingblade]

That was the first thing I thought of: precog.

10 seconds before I read the first line of the article, I didn't know the article existed. There's simply no way my brain could have made the decision to read what it didn't yet know existed.

[Rufo]

*ehem*

'We found the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity up to ten seconds before it enters awareness.

It's never implied by the scientists that this applies to anything but situations where the subject where already aware of the coming choice/situation ten seconds before it taking place. The writers of the article had some fun and tried to make it more interesting by writing that this applies to all choices, including the act of reading their article, without thinking too much about whether or not it really did. They are at fault, not necessarily the scientists.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As Volatile said, this has nothing to do with free will, even libertarian free will. I don't believe there is a requirement under libertarian free will that decisions be made consciously. The only requirement is that they be something more than just predetermined or random. Of course, that requirement is incoherent, but that's a separate problem.

~~ Paul

[the PC apeman]

It does deflate the utility for which many trot out the idea of libertarian free will. If my decisions are made prior to (read without) my awareness, how can the aware me be held responsible for them?

[Robin]

Well, maybe not proof but certainly an interesting finding. :)

http://www.metro.co.uk/news/article.html?in_article_id=142594&in_page_id=34

if people are interested in the philosophical side of things the thread can stay here, otherwise it might be best off in the science section. Either way I think that it is pretty fascinating stuff :)
It would be a true statement to say that I am drinking the illusion of coffee from the illusion of a coffee cup, since my mind has created a mental model of these things for me.

On the other hand it is the Idealist fallacy to say that this implies that there is no actual coffee or coffee cup besides this illusion.

I would say the same goes for free will.

[Robin]

As Volatile said, this has nothing to do with free will, even libertarian free will. I don't believe there is a requirement under libertarian free will that decisions be made consciously. The only requirement is that they be something more than just predetermined or random. Of course, that requirement is incoherent, but that's a separate problem.

~~ Paul
I would have thought that the very concept of "will" implied consciousness. We do not normally call unconscious actions "voluntary".

[3bz]

I would have thought that the very concept of "will" implied consciousness. We do not normally call unconscious actions "voluntary".

If you are talking about libertarian free will it only requires freedom from antecedent conditions, a causal vaccum so to speak.

The causal efficacy of consciousness is another matter, Daniel Wegner (one of his articles is referenced in the article from the op) makes a good case against it in The Illusion of Conscious Will. (http://www.amazon.com/Illusion-Conscious-Will-Bradford-Books/dp/0262232227) Then of course the problem of the adaptive value of consciousness arises...

[rwp]

Each volunteer was then asked to view a screen and decide which of two buttons to press and when to press it ... people made decisions long before they carried them out.


Why is this exciting? This research doesn't really show us much.

[3bz]

Why is this exciting? This research doesn't really show us much.

I think you have misunderstood what the study says, the general idea is that some specfic cortical activation up to 10 seconds prior to an action can be used as an indicator of a motor decision that the subject is not consciously aware of.

[Robin]

If you are talking about libertarian free will it only requires freedom from antecedent conditions, a causal vaccum so to speak.
It does? So when people say "libertarian free will" they don't mean free will at all, they just mean "libertarian free neural activity"?

As I said before the concept "will" does not make any sense when applied to unconscious actions.

[devnull]

I think theyre stretching terms here. You probably didnt decide to read that particular article 10 seconds before you saw it, but your intent when coming to the forum was to read some articles........

If their study shows that people enter a situation with a pre-determined plan, well, duuuuuuuuh.

[Robin]

This is a more interesting article:

http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v5/n4/full/nn827.html

Which makes the mechanism by which the brain creates the illusion of free will more explicit:

A second research tradition has asked subjects to report the perceived time of their own intentions or actions relating these subjective events to objective physiological events, such as the onset of EEG readiness potentials (RPs) or muscle activity. This tradition focuses on timing as a crucial aspect of conscious experience. When subjects use a clock hand to estimate the time at which they first experienced the conscious intention that led to a voluntary action, conscious awareness of intention lags the onset of RP, raising a challenge for the traditional Cartesian concept of conscious free will.
...
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that the brain contains a specific cognitive module that binds intentional actions to their effects to construct a coherent conscious experience of our own agency.

[NonCleverName]

If the decision to brake or steer to avoid a child darting into the street is being made 10 seconds in advance, that doesn't nullify free will, it demonstrates precognition.

I suspect this paper is nothing more than a flawed experimental setup and overreaching conclusions.

Anytime I have come close to hitting a person or property, I automatically steer out of the way. I do not think ''I see an obstacle I must steer away from''. My action comes before my thought. Not before identification, but before I think about it.

Same with swinging at an incoming baseball. If someone throws a punch at me, I will automatically attempt to block/duck before I can think about it. I think these examples of split-second choices actually work against the idea of free will.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I would have thought that the very concept of "will" implied consciousness. We do not normally call unconscious actions "voluntary".
Indeed, but is there a compelling reason why this has to be the case?


It does? So when people say "libertarian free will" they don't mean free will at all, they just mean "libertarian free neural activity"?
I think it's a question of whether it can mean "libertarian free nonconscious will." Whether it's purely neural processes is a different question.

~~ Paul

[volatile]

I agree, Paul. As I said in response to the OP, "you", as an entity, are still deciding to make an essentially free decision entirely absent of outside influence. Even if the conscious part of your brain is not instantly aware of which decision has been taken (and physically or neurochemically, could it even be instant?), that doesn't mean that will is undermined, except maybe in a semantic way.

[volatile]

A thought: wasn't there another study that was the polar opposite of this one, showing that fighter pilots were "seeing the future" in deciding to respond to events before they happened.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If the definition of free will requires the decision to be a conscious one, then the vast majority of the decisions we make each day are not free. Furthermore, most of the conscious decisions we make are only slightly free, because many of our decisions are a quick choice from among alternatives, made in haste, with nonconscious precursors.

~~ Paul

[bokonon]

Anytime I have come close to hitting a person or property, I automatically steer out of the way. I do not think ''I see an obstacle I must steer away from''. My action comes before my thought. Not before identification, but before I think about it.
That's nonsense. How do you know where "out of the way" is without thinking about it?

[Mercutio]

I agree with Robin on this, thus far. "Free will" was assumed to be a conscious causality for long before neural studies started showing up. Even the [introspective] early years of scientific psychology defined "consciousness" as the subject matter, and not really until Freud was unconscious motivation a big deal (and Freud was a determinist, clearly--his complex unconscious mechanisms were <i>mechanisms</i>, not causes; they showed how your experiences allegedly caused your actions).

The only way "free will" has remained a topic, even in this thread, has been through a free-will-of-the-gaps and shrinking role. Seriously--how can one even put out a hypothesis of an unconscious free will? It would be, as Paul says, negatively defined by being neither determined nor random, and relies on an assumed trichotomy that leaves out other options (for instance, "determined" means, typically, by the environment--which includes genetics, which is environment writ long--and not "determined by self". What about "determined by a deity"? Other cultures have included that one--and it is every bit as useful as an unconscious free will... that is to say, not at all.).

[Darat]

I knew Merc would make that post when I first started reading this thread therefore Merc has no free will! I'm going to start a campaign "Free Merc's Will!" - perhaps get a film deal out of it.

Seriously can anyone explain to me what could possibly be meant by "unconscious free will"? Surely either "I" make a decision or "I" doesn't?

"Unconscious free will" would seem to mean that there is an "uberI" that consists of a conscious decision maker 'I' plus an unconscious decision maker 'unI' but this "uberI" is by this definition not accessible to the "I" that I would usually associate with my me so how can we claim that this uberI is me making a free will decision?

(To make it clear I do not believe we have free will in the classical meaning.)

[Beth]

Haynes and colleagues now show that brain activity predicts -- even up to 7 seconds ahead of time -- how a person is going to decide. But they also warn that the study does not finally rule out free will: "Our study shows that decisions are unconsciously prepared much longer ahead than previously thought. But we do not know yet where the final decision is made. We need to investigate whether a decision prepared by these brain areas can still be reversed."

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080414145705.htm

[Darat]

That's nonsense. How do you know where "out of the way" is without thinking about it?


Haven't you ever experienced that "step aside" mix-up?

I.e. when you move to pass to one side of someone and they move the same way so you both block each other and then you both without any "conscious" thought move the opposite way only to again block each other? It's only after that shuffle that your "conscious perception" feels as if it has caught up; then we usually laugh or smile at one another and one will step out of the way.

I would say there is no "conscious" decision making going on during the initial shuffle.

[GreyICE]

If the decision to brake or steer to avoid a child darting into the street is being made 10 seconds in advance, that doesn't nullify free will, it demonstrates precognition.

I suspect this paper is nothing more than a flawed experimental setup and overreaching conclusions.

Yeah, what he said.

Basically the experimental methodology seems flawed here. I mean I often consider decisions for 10 seconds and then go with my initial gut. I'm frequently just developing the logic to explain that gut.

[hammegk]

On the other hand it is the Idealist fallacy to say that this implies that there is no actual coffee or coffee cup besides this illusion.
That sounds more like a materialist's fantasy of idealism.

[Nick227]

Besides agreeing with volatile, I think that the scientists are simplifying the concept. Free will has been vastly differently defined by different philosophies/philosophers, proving that is 'no more than an illusion' is not going to be as simple as they seem to think.

Well, if neurologists could locate a single brain process or combination of brain processes which are absolutely shown to be responsible for the experience of personal identity, then this would seem to cover quite a lot of ground towards it.

Without a sense of individuality or personal identity, does free will still exist? Not sure, actually.

Nick

[Nick227]

Seriously can anyone explain to me what could possibly be meant by "unconscious free will"? Surely either "I" make a decision or "I" doesn't?

It could mean that the agency which is causing thoughts to be acted on is non-deterministic in function. Free will does not necessarily have to infer personal selfhood.

"Unconscious free will" would seem to mean that there is an "uberI" that consists of a conscious decision maker 'I' plus an unconscious decision maker 'unI' but this "uberI" is by this definition not accessible to the "I" that I would usually associate with my me so how can we claim that this uberI is me making a free will decision?

Well, the first question I would ask would be "who is claiming?" In addition, the self-awareness of an individual can deepen and people become capable of taking new choices in situations where previously they perceived no choice. Thus, I figure, the sense of personal selfhood can shift in apparent depth.

Nick

[NonCleverName]

That's nonsense. How do you know where "out of the way" is without thinking about it?

Once I sense something in front of me, I will automatically swurve to miss it. This happens before I can make a choice about what to do. It's impluse. I sense danger in front of me, and I attempt to avoid it.

[mumblethrax]

I fight desperately against the conclusion that volition is illusory (a losing battle, it seems to me), but I have to agree with Robin. Positing a so far inaccessible non-conscious 'free will' looks very much like a face-saving maneuver to me, and has nothing to do with the intuitive sense that consciousness has causal efficacy that led to its proposal in the first place. If we abandon conscious causation, we give up the game--we can then talk about non-deterministic decision-making in the brain (which I think doesn't exist), but it has nothing to do with us, and we're still strapped to a handcar, thinking about how we'd like to turn left right after track switches. Nothing of value is preserved by doing this.

[Ryokan]

Scientists prove that free will is an illusion!

Yes. They had no choice about it.

[Darat]

It could mean that the agency which is causing thoughts to be acted on is non-deterministic in function. Free will does not necessarily have to infer personal selfhood.


If it doesn't infer "personal self-hood" then free will has nothing to do with me anymore than the half-life decay of a radioactive element does.



Well, the first question I would ask would be "who is claiming?" In addition, the self-awareness of an individual can deepen and people become capable of taking new choices in situations where previously they perceived no choice. Thus, I figure, the sense of personal selfhood can shift in apparent depth.

Nick

This doesn't address my point at all.

[Robin]

Indeed, but is there a compelling reason why this has to be the case?
I don't know. It seems from the Nature article I posted that the difference between a voluntary and an involuntary action is in the order that our brains tell us about it.

[Robin]

That sounds more like a materialist's fantasy of idealism.
You are free to be more forthcoming on the subject than you usually are, but from what you guys say, that is what it sounds like.

You say, for example, that "thought exists" is the only thing we can know to be true, but you seem to deduce that thought is the only thing that can exist.

[NeilC]

That's nonsense. How do you know where "out of the way" is without thinking about it?

What difference does that make? It can be explained by straight cause and effect. A parent is programmed to think about a child's safety almost all the time and will act without thinking in such matter. Why is free will required here?

I think the research does have some bearing on free will although what that bearing is depends exactly how you define free will. Most people seem to think free will is consciously making a decision rather than purely reacting to the sum of causes. This research shows that even when they think they are doing this that they may not be.

[NeilC]

I notice that the Wikipedia entry for free will mentions an experiment by Benjamin Libet done in the 80s which is somewhat similar.

[Nick227]

If it doesn't infer "personal self-hood" then free will has nothing to do with me anymore than the half-life decay of a radioactive element does.

Fair enough. So, would you say for example that autonomous functions of your body are equally nothing to do with you?

"Unconscious free will" would seem to mean that there is an "uberI" that consists of a conscious decision maker 'I' plus an unconscious decision maker 'unI' but this "uberI" is by this definition not accessible to the "I" that I would usually associate with my me so how can we claim that this uberI is me making a free will decision?

Well, the first question I would ask would be "who is claiming?" In addition, the self-awareness of an individual can deepen and people become capable of taking new choices in situations where previously they perceived no choice. Thus, I figure, the sense of personal selfhood can shift in apparent depth.

This doesn't address my point at all.

Well, I was trying to point out what I considered to be a non-sequitur in your statement "but this "uberI" is by this definition not accessible to the "I" that I would usually associate with my me", ergo - who is associating? Are you saying you are consciously associating with one aspect of personal identity? If so, then what's to stop you associating with a deeper aspect, an uberI?

Or perhaps I am misunderstanding you.

Nick

[Darat]

Fair enough. So, would you say for example that autonomous functions of your body are equally nothing to do with you?

We need to be careful here with the use of "you" and so on. As far as I am concerned I am the doughnut shape bag filled with water and a few other chemicals. However when we are discussing the usual meaning of "free will" the "me" I was referring to is the set of behaviours that we label with that historically loaded word "mind".

So as I said if the decision that is meant to be a "free will" decision does not involve that me then it has nothing to do with me and therefore has nothing to do with any traditional meaning of the term "free will".



Well, I was trying to point out what I considered to be a non-sequitur in your statement "but this "uberI" is by this definition not accessible to the "I" that I would usually associate with my me", ergo - who is associating? Are you saying you are consciously associating with one aspect of personal identity? If so, then what's to stop you associating with a deeper aspect, an uberI?

Or perhaps I am misunderstanding you.

Nick

Yes you are misundertsanding me.

In this thread I am talking about the traditional meaning of "free will" and as I point out the idea that there is some aspect of the bag of chemicals that is labelled "Darat" makes a decision that is meant to be "free will" but is not accessible to the "mind of Darat" (Merc will be very displeased I used such phrase) is not compatible with the traditional meaning of "free will".

If you wish to provide a non-standard definition of free will that relates to the opening post I'll be happy to discuss that.

[Ichneumonwasp]

(Merc will be very displeased I used such phrase)

Why do you think he would mind Darat?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

In this thread I am talking about the traditional meaning of "free will" ...
Hang on. What is this traditional meaning of which you speak? Is it libertarian free will or some form of compatibilist free will?

Whenever we have these free will discussions, people throw the term around without agreeing which flavor they mean. This causes us to talk past one another.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

Hang on. What is this traditional meaning of which you speak? Is it libertarian free will or some form of compatibilist free will?

Whenever we have these free will discussions, people throw the term around without agreeing which flavor they mean. This causes us to talk past one another.

~~ PaulI have been reading an uncharacteristically large number of papers (both student and peer-reviewed journal article varieties) on free will lately, and I have yet to see a "form of compatibilist free will" that was coherent. The compatibilist visions are either hopelessly circular or precisely the free-will-of-the-gaps deals I complained about earlier.

I think Darat's use of the term is consistent with, say, a Wittgensteinian or other functional analysis of language; in other words, "free will" is defined by how we use the term in real life, and that is what Darat is using. It is, of course, an inconsistent and incoherent definition, but in ordinary use it does not have to stand up to logical scrutiny. The definitions that attempt to stand up to such scrutiny are artificial, gap-filling definitions, the purpose of which is to do whatever is needed not to be forced to abandon a useless concept.

BTW, I don't know how the ghost of hammegk posted here, but for what it is worth, his ~materialist view was always logically consistent. Why he chose that over materialism (or why one would choose materialism over his) was never quite explained, but IMHO it was one of two perfectly logical and adequate positions, neither of which I take.

I knew Darat would know that I would post what I did in my first post. He is so predictable. Hell, if I had realized it was physically possible, I might have predicted the second coming of hammy.

[Robin]

If the definition of free will requires the decision to be a conscious one, then the vast majority of the decisions we make each day are not free. Furthermore, most of the conscious decisions we make are only slightly free, because many of our decisions are a quick choice from among alternatives, made in haste, with nonconscious precursors.

~~ Paul
I would agree that, but I think most people strongly suspect this anyway without the benefit of neuroscience.

[Robin]

In this thread I am talking about the traditional meaning of "free will" and as I point out the idea that there is some aspect of the bag of chemicals that is labelled "Darat" makes a decision that is meant to be "free will" but is not accessible to the "mind of Darat" (Merc will be very displeased I used such phrase) is not compatible with the traditional meaning of "free will".

If you wish to provide a non-standard definition of free will that relates to the opening post I'll be happy to discuss that.
Traditional meaning, as in "not actually having a gun to my head or knife to my throat"?

Or the traditional meaning that Hume demonstrated to be incoherent more than two centuries ago?

[Darat]

Why do you think he would mind Darat?

Oh the usual reasons - the universe and mindless jealousy.

(I'm assuming of course you were being humorous with your question?)

Hang on. What is this traditional meaning of which you speak? Is it libertarian free will or some form of compatibilist free will?

Whenever we have these free will discussions, people throw the term around without agreeing which flavor they mean. This causes us to talk past one another.

~~ Paul

Merc summed it up quite well. And I think I explained the problem with your initial post which implied that the decision process does not need to be accessible to "me" (see the definition for me I used earlier in the thread) to be free will in terms of "folk free-will" doesn't make any sense.

And since no one has yet come up with a coherent definition of "free will" I tend to use the folk definition as that is all we have available!

Traditional meaning, as in "not actually having a gun to my head or knife to my throat"?

Or the traditional meaning that Hume demonstrated to be incoherent more than two centuries ago?

I think it would be fair to characterize the folk definition as a combination of the two.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Oh the usual reasons - the universe and mindless jealousy.

(I'm assuming of course you were being humorous with your question?)



Who, me? The comma that should have been in that sentence was left out on purpose for ambiguity's sake.

On the humor scale it was a one at best, but some things just have to be said when they're lying out there for the taking.:)

[andyandy]

That sounds more like a materialist's fantasy of idealism.

Not even been banned can stop hammy from posting on a thread on free will...........

How did that happen? :boxedin:

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I have been reading an uncharacteristically large number of papers (both student and peer-reviewed journal article varieties) on free will lately, and I have yet to see a "form of compatibilist free will" that was coherent. The compatibilist visions are either hopelessly circular or precisely the free-will-of-the-gaps deals I complained about earlier.
Huh? Are you sure you're not talking about libertarian free will here? Compatibilist free will is simply some variant of the ability to make decisions without being coerced, brainwashed, or edited.


I think it would be fair to characterize the folk definition as a combination of the two.
Like a sort of semi-libertarian more-or-less compatibilist version of free will?

No wonder I'm always confused. With a definition like this, a statement such as "I make that decision of my own free will" is meaningless.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

Huh? Are you sure you're not talking about libertarian free will here? Compatibilist free will is simply some variant of the ability to make decisions without being coerced, brainwashed, or edited.

~~ Paul
Give me a compatibilist free will that is not a free-will-of-the-gaps, and I can answer you. While you are at it, define "coerced, brainwashed, or edited" in a manner which does not allow for some sort of "no true free-will-man".

To answer your question straightforwardly, though... yes, I am sure I am not talking about libertarian free will. That would be why I used the term "compatibilist free will" in the sentence you quoted. I would be tremendously happy to congratulate you on being the first to present a coherent compatibilist position... but only if you do so.

[Darat]

Huh? Are you sure you're not talking about libertarian free will here? Compatibilist free will is simply some variant of the ability to make decisions without being coerced, brainwashed, or edited.




You mean you've found the holy grail of free-will and decided not to share it with us? Come on out with your coherent definition! :p


Like a sort of semi-libertarian more-or-less compatibilist version of free will?



Sounds sort of right :)




No wonder I'm always confused. With a definition like this, a statement such as "I make that decision of my own free will" is meaningless.

~~ Paul

Most of the time I do come down on the side of it being a pretty meaningless term, but it can be interesting to discuss what the implications of such a premise are. I often wonder if someone should invent a subject that would be all about these types of questions and what they would mean if they had meaning or were true. That would be an interesting subject.

[Darat]

Not even been banned can stop hammy from posting on a thread on free will...........

How did that happen? :boxedin:

To stop a derail - a sock-puppet, and then the accounts were merged - see cowpoke in the Public Notices section

[Kaylee]

Haynes and colleagues now show that brain activity predicts -- even up to 7 seconds ahead of time -- how a person is going to decide. But they also warn that the study does not finally rule out free will: "Our study shows that decisions are unconsciously prepared much longer ahead than previously thought. But we do not know yet where the final decision is made. We need to investigate whether a decision prepared by these brain areas can still be reversed."

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080414145705.htm

Thanks for the link Beth. I bet the science daily article probably gives a good idea of what the Max Planck Institute study discussed.


Contrary to what most of us would like to believe, decision-making may be a process handled to a large extent by unconscious mental activity. A team of scientists has unraveled how the brain actually unconsciously prepares our decisions. Even several seconds before we consciously make a decision its outcome can be predicted from unconscious activity in the brain.

I wonder if the initial brain activity is reading stored data about our past similar decisions and relevant experiences -- to borrow an idea from computer programming. That would also nicely support determinism, which, if my understanding is correct, says that our present and future decisions are shaped by our past. It would also nicely explain why it is so difficult to break a habit or to move beyond our initial childhood experiences even if we very much want to do so. This experiment could be physically demonstrating how our past stored experiences are influencing us in our present decision making even before we are aware of the fact that we are making a decison.


What about deciding to swing at a baseball pitch coming at 95 mph? That's certainly a split second decision.
I think this is where muscle memory comes into play and why practice and even the visualization technique can help.

[Mercutio]

I wonder if the initial brain activity is reading stored data about our past similar decisions and relevant experiences -- to borrow an idea from computer programming. That would also nicely support determinism, which, if my understanding is correct, says that our present and future decisions are shaped by our past. It would also nicely explain why it is so difficult to break a habit or to move beyond our initial childhood experiences even if we very much want to do so. This experiment could be physically demonstrating how our past stored experiences are influencing us in our present decision making even before we are aware of the fact that we are making a decison.Be careful on this--your ponderings here are an excellent example of how our metaphors shape what we look for. We have, for so long, had desktop and filing cabinet and computer metaphors for the process of remembering (note that even reifying it as the noun "memory" brings with it certain implications) that we have a tough time thinking of it any other way. Remember, Descartes's view was rather like a steam engine, and as such he saw the brain's sinuses as more important than the grey matter, and the nerves as hollow tubes. Our high technology is computers and internet, so we see interconnected parallel processors sending packets of thoughts or memories...

Remember that the experiential part of thinking and remembering is not at all a reliable gauge of what the neurological part is. Any metaphor we use will be inadequate. "Reading stored data" sounds good, but we have no way of knowing if that metaphor helps or obfuscates. When we exercise, we change our bodies--are we "storing" experiences somehow in our muscles? In my opinion, not in any meaningful way. When we experience, we change our bodies as well (yes, mostly our brains, but not only our brains); the same question can be asked--is it helpful to think of "storing the data" from these experiences? For decades, cognitive psychologists have spoken of memory errors in terms of errors in either encoding, storage, or retrieval. I have a very tough time seeing how that is anything but the metaphor taking over the observation. Our present experience is very different on a neurological level than on a phenomenological level--how can "a" memory be anything but a phenomenological, and metaphorical, partial and necessarily incomplete shorthand for the physical process?

[Nick227]

We need to be careful here with the use of "you" and so on. As far as I am concerned I am the doughnut shape bag filled with water and a few other chemicals. However when we are discussing the usual meaning of "free will" the "me" I was referring to is the set of behaviours that we label with that historically loaded word "mind".

So as I said if the decision that is meant to be a "free will" decision does not involve that me then it has nothing to do with me and therefore has nothing to do with any traditional meaning of the term "free will".




Yes you are misundertsanding me.

In this thread I am talking about the traditional meaning of "free will" and as I point out the idea that there is some aspect of the bag of chemicals that is labelled "Darat" makes a decision that is meant to be "free will" but is not accessible to the "mind of Darat" (Merc will be very displeased I used such phrase) is not compatible with the traditional meaning of "free will".

If you wish to provide a non-standard definition of free will that relates to the opening post I'll be happy to discuss that.

Relating to all the above, what interested me in the OP is this... my personal experience is that the sensation of personal identity, and thus the "libertarian" free will, arises with the experience of picking one of a choice of thoughts to act upon. The experience is that one of a range of actable thoughts, of choices, is more "mine" and thus gets acted upon, apparently reinforcing the experience of personal identity and free will.

One of a range of thoughts has a quality of being mine applied to it by some unconscious process. Acting upon this thought seems to reinforce the illusion that this body-mind has a personal identity.

Thus to me, this feeling of free will does seem to be created as a side-effect of pre-determined unconscious processing.

Nick

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Give me a compatibilist free will that is not a free-will-of-the-gaps, and I can answer you. While you are at it, define "coerced, brainwashed, or edited" in a manner which does not allow for some sort of "no true free-will-man".

To answer your question straightforwardly, though... yes, I am sure I am not talking about libertarian free will. That would be why I used the term "compatibilist free will" in the sentence you quoted. I would be tremendously happy to congratulate you on being the first to present a coherent compatibilist position... but only if you do so.
I'm really quite confused here. I can't give a good definition of compatibilist free will, but at least we could agree on one if we worked on it. We could simply list the things that must be absent in order for a decision to be considered a free one. Sure, we can pick nits about the definition of brainwash, but then we could list specific aspects of brainwashing that must be absent. It's a never-ending process, but at least it's a coherent one. There is no mysterious non-determined, non-random process as required by libertarian free will. And it doesn't require some undefinable self or agent of will. It's just an adjective to describe a subset of possible decision-making processes.

Were your students trying to describe a compatibilist version of libertarian free will?


You mean you've found the holy grail of free-will and decided not to share it with us? Come on out with your coherent definition!
But compatibilist free will isn't interesting! We all agree that our decisions fall on a spectrum from "forced" to "arbitrary."

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

I wonder if the initial brain activity is reading stored data about our past similar decisions and relevant experiences -- to borrow an idea from computer programming. That would also nicely support determinism, which, if my understanding is correct, says that our present and future decisions are shaped by our past. It would also nicely explain why it is so difficult to break a habit or to move beyond our initial childhood experiences even if we very much want to do so. This experiment could be physically demonstrating how our past stored experiences are influencing us in our present decision making even before we are aware of the fact that we are making a decison.

Personally, I think it is similar to what you describe but slightly more complex. Selecting which choice to go for in key decisions - choice of partner, job, etc - seems to me to be more governed by an innate desire for the psyche to gain self-awareness. We are attracted subconsciously to the places where there is the possibility for self-confrontation. The girlfriend who unconsciously reminds one of their mother becomes attractive because there is the possibility to resolve an underlying issue there. The society we live in does not really act to facilitate the confrontation, so it does not so often occur and people get locked into patterns of behaviour with the unconscious mind fighting the conscious.

Nick

[Kaylee]

Be careful on this--your ponderings here are an excellent example of how our metaphors shape what we look for.

I had thought that between the various sciences it was pretty much locked up how our memories work -- -but I just did a quick search and I see that it's not so. I also see why you mentioned Descartes. It's fascinating that his metaphor may be more appropriate than the more recent one of computer processing.

[Kaylee]

Personally, I think it is similar to what you describe but slightly more complex. Selecting which choice to go for in key decisions - choice of partner, job, etc - seems to me to be more governed by an innate desire for the psyche to gain self-awareness. We are attracted subconsciously to the places where there is the possibility for self-confrontation. The girlfriend who unconsciously reminds one of their mother becomes attractive because there is the possibility to resolve an underlying issue there. The society we live in does not really act to facilitate the confrontation, so it does not so often occur and people get locked into patterns of behaviour with the unconscious mind fighting the conscious.

Nick

So, in a nut shell, you are suggesting that most people are actually looking for a fight (or at least a resolution) than for the path of least resistance?

That is a very interesting thought!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

To answer your question straightforwardly, though... yes, I am sure I am not talking about libertarian free will. That would be why I used the term "compatibilist free will" in the sentence you quoted. I would be tremendously happy to congratulate you on being the first to present a coherent compatibilist position... but only if you do so.
Perhaps you are looking for a single, universal compatibilist position. I agree that's impossible. In fact, I think any attempt to find a universal metaphysical compatibilist position would probably be tantamount to trying to find a libertarian position, since it would have to be metaphysically neutral.

We can still try to define a compatibilist position relative to various fields of inquiry, no? A psychologist's definition would be different from a legal definition. In fact, no matter how difficult, we have to come up with a definition for the law.

Ah, but perhaps by chucking the possibility of a universal compatibilist position, I'm agreeing with what you are saying. Is that it?

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

So, in a nut shell, you are suggesting that most people are actually looking for a fight (or at least a resolution) than for the path of least resistance?

That is a very interesting thought!

I think there is a near-constant dynamic between the unconscious desire for greater self-awareness and the conscious desire for stability and self-definition.

The thoughts being identified with, and thus acted on, are determined by the unconscious. Through acting on the thoughts the sensation of personal identity and free will is created and sustained. But the conscious mind is unaware of this process and will occasionally reflect on its apparent powerlessness to change its position on many important decisions which it believes it is taking.

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

I think there is a near-constant dynamic between the unconscious desire for greater self-awareness and the conscious desire for stability and self-definition. Nick

I don’t necessary disagree with you in the sense that when the focus is pointed at one’s own thoughts, then awareness of them obviously grows (that’s common sense). However, whether there’s an underlying “desire” for more awareness seems to me more like an unnecessary anthropomorphism. I’m not so sure there’s an ‘unconscious desire’; more like a post hoc conscious interpretation of increasing awareness translated into “unconscious desire”. For there to be desire, there has to be someone having that desire, and I’m not so sure there’s anyone there at that level of cognition.

This is possibly just a nitpick, I don't know? Perhaps you can expand on the desire point you made?

[Nick227]

I don’t necessary disagree with you in the sense that when the focus is pointed at one’s own thoughts, then awareness of them obviously grows (that’s common sense). However, whether there’s an underlying “desire” for more awareness seems to me more like an unnecessary anthropomorphism. I’m not so sure there’s an ‘unconscious desire’; more like a post hoc conscious interpretation of increasing awareness translated into “unconscious desire”. For there to be desire, there has to be someone having that desire, and I’m not so sure there’s anyone there at that level of cognition.

This is possibly just a nitpick, I don't know? Perhaps you can expand on the desire point you made?

In examining the thought we pick to act on, in certain important decisions to be made, what is very often evident is the lack of rational judgment. We are led by unconscious beliefs about who we are and it appears that the reason we follow these beliefs in decision-making is to try and uncover them.

The means by which the unconscious mind tries to facilitate this need to encourage greater self-awareness is through assigning to certain thoughts a sense that they are more "my thoughts." Thus the person acts upon these thoughts, which both reinforces the sense of personal selfhood, and sets into play the possibility that through acting on the unconscious dynamic it may be uncovered.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Perhaps you are looking for a single, universal compatibilist position. I agree that's impossible. In fact, I think any attempt to find a universal metaphysical compatibilist position would probably be tantamount to trying to find a libertarian position, since it would have to be metaphysically neutral.

We can still try to define a compatibilist position relative to various fields of inquiry, no? A psychologist's definition would be different from a legal definition. In fact, no matter how difficult, we have to come up with a definition for the law.

Ah, but perhaps by chucking the possibility of a universal compatibilist position, I'm agreeing with what you are saying. Is that it?

~~ PaulI am honestly not certain what you are saying here. To the best of my knowledge, the legal system, requiring mens rea, is not compatibilist, but anti-determinist. (Yes, some--like Staddon--make the argument that any punishment that is intended to prevent future actions is necessarily deterministic, but the counter to that is that our system is not concerned with prevention but with justice, for which reason moral responsibility and free choice are required.) Different schools of thought in psychology are, when boiled down, either determinist or not, and not compatibilist (other than in the sense of "this illusion feels like free will, but is in fact not", which is not compatibilist at all).

I have read quite a few attempts at compatibilism, and (so far) to a one they have presupposed both that determinism exists and that free will exists, and then work from these [what should be] conclusions to deduce the actions of some entity (god, microtubules, quantum woo) that is somehow able to influence the material world and yet not be part of it. As I said before, hopelessly circular--it begins by presupposing two incompatible things, then deduces a compatibilizer. It is as if the logic teacher suddenly said "A) Socrates is a man. B) Socrates is not a man. Given both A and B are true, we can deduce that there is a god (or microtubules, quantum consciousness, or many-worlds woo) able to stand outside of our world and make them both true." The thing that made them both true, of course, is a shoddy setup and circular reasoning.

I suspect that the only reason people continue to seek a compatibilist position is the naive dualism in our language and culture, and the failure of people to actually examine the logical consequences of their views. And of course, the language works just fine for most communication. As I have said here many times, we all know what a sunrise is, and it would only be a bad phrase if you were to charge an astronomer with explaining how, literally, the sun climbs in the sky over a stationary earth. Which is what we are doing when we look for a compatibilist free will.

[athon]

Great thread.

I admit, though, in my limited understanding of the philosophies and psychologies being discussed, that I find it impossible to relate 'free will' with 'unconscious choice'. To me, (this could be simply a layman's view of the field) free will implies actively choosing with conscious consideration, not simply actions undertaken by my brain. For all practical outcomes, it would be like insinuating a robot with pre-programmed instructions has free will. This might be arguable philosophically, but right now I can't see how.

As for people suggesting that the paper insinuates all decisions are made at least 10 sec in advance, I don't see it saying that. Some decisions which have the information at hand could be made as far as 7 - 10 seconds in advance of awareness. It would be silly to think all choices could have such a delay.

Lastly, I don't think this paper dismisses free will entirely. We can all prepare consciously for decisions we don't consciously make, even if it's simply through conditioning ourselves in some way.

Athon

[pchams]

I have a pretty good idea how you will react to this post.

[pchams]

In other words, the study has stated the obvious.

[pchams]

People will at times resist their first feelings.
Mostly to the detriment.
But at this pont, I probably should have resisted to post.
Who's with me ;)

[Dragoonster]

Goodness. I've always seen the (important) free will question as purely philosophical, independent of a materialistically causal explanation or a soul or whatever.

The perception of free will means one has free will. I fail to see how that could be an illusion no matter its source.

In other words, if you find out it's "an illusion" or determinative do you suddenly have an altered perception of what you always term or experienced as "free will"? Do you suddenly stop making apparently free decisions? How can someone think themselves or their free will out of existence?

Even if something/one accurately predicted my every future thought, my perception that as a self I have decision-making powers is not going to be affected. People seem to be supposing an explanation would affect the experience; not so.

[Nick227]

The perception of free will means one has free will. I fail to see how that could be an illusion no matter its source.

In other words, if you find out it's "an illusion" or determinative do you suddenly have an altered perception of what you always term or experienced as "free will"? Do you suddenly stop making apparently free decisions? How can someone think themselves or their free will out of existence?

If it is possible to increase self-awareness I believe you will hit a point where you become aware of the process that is generating the experience of personal identity. This is what I'm endeavouring to articulate - An unconscious process which applies a heightened sense of personal identity to certain thoughts would, to my mind, model the human experience of having personal identity.

This is not necessarily to state that thinking is deterministic in nature, merely that the creating of the sensation of free will can be passively observed.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Goodness. I've always seen the (important) free will question as purely philosophical, independent of a materialistically causal explanation or a soul or whatever.
Now, that is interesting. On first thought...of course it started that way, at least. All sciences (that I know of) began in philosophy. It was when the questions began to have empirical answers that they left pure philosophy and entered science. The questions surrounding free will, if they are to be answered empirically, are addressed by science. But... the empirical answers in any science are never quite the answers to the exact same questions in philosophy. The questions have to be different, in order to render them empirical. So perhaps an argument can be made to keep this question purely philosophical.

Cool! You have given me something new to think about on this topic after I thought I had seen it all a thousand times over!

The perception of free will means one has free will. I fail to see how that could be an illusion no matter its source.
It depends, of course. We have studied perception scientifically for over a century, and when it is phrased in the empirical sense, the "illusion" is quite a meaningful explanation. It does not deny the perception, of course, but explains it in terms other than what it may "feel like".

In other words, if you find out it's "an illusion" or determinative do you suddenly have an altered perception of what you always term or experienced as "free will"? Do you suddenly stop making apparently free decisions? How can someone think themselves or their free will out of existence?
Susan Blackmore claims that she no longer feels free will. Students in my class have defined free choice as "awareness of what controls you". We still make choices all the time. That we no longer attach the word "free" to them is not the biggest change. Perhaps the greater awareness of our connections to our environment, and of the things that do cause (both in an eliciting and in a selecting sense) our choices. Such an awareness could be an extremely useful thing! (The metaphor I have used here before is--when we ceased thinking that a sunrise meant that the sun was climbing in the sky over a stationary earth, we gained the knowledge that eventually allowed us to land on the moon, send satellites to Mercury and Pluto, and more efficiently kill one another.)

Even if something/one accurately predicted my every future thought, my perception that as a self I have decision-making powers is not going to be affected. People seem to be supposing an explanation would affect the experience; not so.BTW, both Interesting Ian and hammegk would agree with you, and so do I. Knowing that a rainbow is caused by refracting light does not make a rainbow suddenly monochromatic (or any less beautiful). Explaining something is not "explaining it away". An illusion is something that is not what it appears to be, not something that does not have any existence at all.

[Darat]

...snip...

An illusion is something that is not what it appears to be, not something that does not have any existence at all.

I think this is a very important point and one that some people really do not be able to understand and probably should be mentioned more often. You mentioned both II & Hammy and I've seen both of them tie themselves in knots because when they read the word "illusion" they treated it as someone saying "not real". Remember II and the chequerboard optical illusion? How he could not accept that the squares were all the same colour because he could 'see' that they were not?

In regards to free-will, I'd say there is no doubt that we all (I just don't believe Susan Blackmore :p) feel we have free-will or rather we believe that not all of our actions are determined. However I'd say that is an illusion (given the type of evidence we see in the opening post and logic).

I speculate that if we ever do come up with a working explanation of "I" it will be as "counter intuitive" as say something like quantum mechanics is to the "real world" and the explanation will not feel right to many of us.

[Mercutio]

I speculate that if we ever do come up with a working explanation of "I" it will be as "counter intuitive" as say something like quantum mechanics is to the "real world" and the explanation will not feel right to many of us.

There is no reason to suspect that it could feel right; we have no sensory neurons in our brains, so we have no access to the process, only to [some of] the outcome. Imagine, if we had no perception of the process of walking, but just found ourselves at point A, then suddenly at point B. It would feel like magic, perhaps like the result of an intentional process, but if someone told us about our actual walking, it would sound utterly trivial and inadequate to explain our perceptual experience.

[Mercutio]

I think this is a very important point and one that some people really do not be able to understand and probably should be mentioned more often. You mentioned both II & Hammy and I've seen both of them tie themselves in knots because when they read the word "illusion" they treated it as someone saying "not real". Remember II and the chequerboard optical illusion? How he could not accept that the squares were all the same colour because he could 'see' that they were not?


Actually, II was quite consistent with that. He just asserted a primacy of experience instead of a primacy of measurement. The colors were different; it would be the job of science to figure out why the same measured stimulus was in fact different on some occasions. In truth, it is the exact same question when we put the "objectively measured colour" as the "real"; in both cases, the job of research is to take two disagreeing observations and see how they map onto each other.

Much of the grief that II got over that was completely undeserved, and was because people dismissed his rational stuff by lumping it in with the irrational (and offensive and aggressive). It did not help that his buttons were so easily pressed; if he had been more patient, and others had been more understanding... and we all got ponies from the government...

[Darat]

Actually, II was quite consistent with that. He just asserted a primacy of experience instead of a primacy of measurement. The colors were different; it would be the job of science to figure out why the same measured stimulus was in fact different on some occasions. In truth, it is the exact same question when we put the "objectively measured colour" as the "real"; in both cases, the job of research is to take two disagreeing observations and see how they map onto each other.

Much of the grief that II got over that was completely undeserved, and was because people dismissed his rational stuff by lumping it in with the irrational (and offensive and aggressive). It did not help that his buttons were so easily pressed; if he had been more patient, and others had been more understanding... and we all got ponies from the government...

I'm going to have to disagree with you regarding this view of his point about the colour(s ;) ) of the squares, several people, several times tried to explain the very points that you are mentioning (mismatch & primacy) and he denied that had anything to do with the colour of the squares. But I'm probably going to end up being reported for this derail so I'll leave it there!

ETA: I can't help it but I had to go back and check on this - I agree with your comment that "He just asserted a primacy of experience instead of a primacy of measurement." and he was consistent with this but I stand by my perception that this tied him in knots and he could never understand what it meant to say something is an illusion. For anyone interested and of a masochistic bent of a flavour of what Merc and me reminiscing about like two too old farts - see this thread from 2003: http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=310465#post310465 .

[Darat]

There is no reason to suspect that it could feel right; we have no sensory neurons in our brains, so we have no access to the process, only to [some of] the outcome. Imagine, if we had no perception of the process of walking, but just found ourselves at point A, then suddenly at point B. It would feel like magic, perhaps like the result of an intentional process, but if someone told us about our actual walking, it would sound utterly trivial and inadequate to explain our perceptual experience.

That's a good way of putting it - expect to see that analogy stolen and reappear in future discussions.

[Nick227]

In regards to free-will, I'd say there is no doubt that we all (I just don't believe Susan Blackmore :p) feel we have free-will or rather we believe that not all of our actions are determined. However I'd say that is an illusion (given the type of evidence we see in the opening post and logic).


I believe Susan Blackmore. I think that all she is saying is that she no longer experiences personal selfhood in decision-making. She is aware of an automated process of evaluation going on inside of her. This is what I understand from what she writes.

I mean, this is completely consistent with vast amounts of spiritual and meditative tradition...and science. The evidence for free will is virtually all experiential, not theoretical. Neuroscientists are hoping to determine some brain process which creates the experience, but even if they do so (and according to those at the forefront they are only "scratching the surface"**), this does nothing to undermine the notion that the experience of free will can be overcome.

Nick

added: ** if you ask me the neurologists are still not looking in the right place, from what I can gather from reading SciAmmind. I experience the sensation of allowing the construction of my personal "I" as feeling good. So I figure that a good chunk of it is dopaminergic. Acting upon certain thoughts, identifying with certain thoughts, feels good. Thus I assume that an unconscious process creates a dopamine-mediated reaction to the identification with certain thoughts. For example this line of reasoning feels good to me. Accompanied as well by an underlying sensation that I could let go of it.

[Mercutio]

ETA: I can't help it but I had to go back and check on this - I agree with your comment that "He just asserted a primacy of experience instead of a primacy of measurement." and he was consistent with this but I stand by my perception that this tied him in knots and he could never understand what it meant to say something is an illusion. For anyone interested and of a masochistic bent of a flavour of what Merc and me reminiscing about like two too old farts - see this thread from 2003: http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=310465#post310465 .
There were knots, I agree--but most were a function of his utter disagreement with ... well, pretty much everyone else. The knots were not just his, but of the materialist observers, some of whom really did not understand materialism. After an initial nastiness, Ian and I understood each other well enough to catch each other in our mistakes (he called me on making materialist arguments when I am not a materialist; I called him on treating pragmatists as materialists). I firmly believe that his philosophy was at least as consistent as the majority of those who derided him (Stimpy, though, was a level above all this).

And he would not have been able to explain a perceptual illusion-- such things do not exist if perception is your bedrock. Would you be able to explain measurement illusion--the fact that two different things might show the same measurement, or that one singular thing might show two different measurements? Certainly II was not coherent from the materialist view, but materialism was just as inconsistent from his (internally consistent) view.

[Darat]

...snip... Certainly II was not coherent from the materialist view, but materialism was just as inconsistent from his (internally consistent) view.

This is where we certainly disagree because II's "perception as primacy" standpoint means his viewpoint was internally inconsistent/incoherent since it was flummoxed by personal experience (which was (is?) his version of empiricism).

[Richard Masters]

I was wanting to start a thread on free will, and whether it was an illusion.

If the body and the mind are one, and all physical events are preceded causally by another physical event (or set of events), then aren't our thoughts and actions the result or consequence of these previous events?

It sounds counter-intuitive and possibly fatalistic to think about it this way, but with millions of variables that affect us every passing nanosecond, there is no way we can be aware of all such variables.

That it appears that we can exercise our thoughts and wants actually begs the question. Did we have any say in our thoughts and wants? Or are the very processes that we perceive as our very own determined by subtle external, physical events?

[INRM]

I believe Susan Blackmore. I think that all she is saying is that she no longer experiences personal selfhood in decision-making. She is aware of an automated process of evaluation going on inside of her. This is what I understand from what she writes.

Personal selfhood? How could a person not feel personal self-hood -- I don't get it.


I would have to assume this 10-second figure would kind of be an "Up to 10 seconds"

Because I switched over to the main page from the science math medicine and tech page by accident, and saw the page, and clicked it.

From the time the page popped up to when I saw the entry was about 3 seconds. From then to when I clicked it was about 1 or 2 seconds.

Also, there have been cases when I was driving and a car cut in front of me the decision was made to evasively move out of the way in a second or two tops, with the first reactions being reflexive occuring probably a fraction of a second after I saw the car change direction abruptly. Of course I'm pretty sure that the neurological activity which underlied the choice to evade the person cutting in front of me came before I became conscious of the choice. But it certainly was not ten seconds. If it took that long I would have probably crashed into him/her (I'm not really sure of the drivers gender, I can just tell you it was a blue thunderbird).


INRM

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I am honestly not certain what you are saying here. To the best of my knowledge, the legal system, requiring mens rea, is not compatibilist, but anti-determinist. (Yes, some--like Staddon--make the argument that any punishment that is intended to prevent future actions is necessarily deterministic, but the counter to that is that our system is not concerned with prevention but with justice, for which reason moral responsibility and free choice are required.) Different schools of thought in psychology are, when boiled down, either determinist or not, and not compatibilist (other than in the sense of "this illusion feels like free will, but is in fact not", which is not compatibilist at all).
I guess I don't understand your definition of compatibilist free will. Defining free will in a way that is compatible with determinism is a form of compatibilist free will.


I have read quite a few attempts at compatibilism, and (so far) to a one they have presupposed both that determinism exists and that free will exists, ...
Yes, a sort of free will that is compatible with determinism, such as saying that my action is free as long as I could have made another decision based on my own mental state (that is, I was not physically coerced).

We definitely have differing definitions of compatibilist free will.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The perception of free will means one has free will. I fail to see how that could be an illusion no matter its source.

In other words, if you find out it's "an illusion" or determinative do you suddenly have an altered perception of what you always term or experienced as "free will"?
You might, indeed. For example, you might decide that the purpose of punishment under the law is to remove dangerous people from society and/or alter behavior, rather than to administer some kind of retribution (as if god).

You might chill out a little.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And he would not have been able to explain a perceptual illusion-- such things do not exist if perception is your bedrock. Would you be able to explain measurement illusion--the fact that two different things might show the same measurement, or that one singular thing might show two different measurements? Certainly II was not coherent from the materialist view, but materialism was just as inconsistent from his (internally consistent) view.
I'm carrying on a conversation with Ian on another forum right now. I think you give him a bit too much credit on being internally consistent, but he's not as utterly incoherent as many here believed. For example, he used to think he had a proof against materialism, but it has morphed over the years into a proof of free will, for a very strange definition of free will. If he reads this he will, of course, claim that I misunderstand him. We spent about a month discussing his proof and got nowhere. Now we can't even agree on whether he's talking about a libertarian form of free will.

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=39846

On a similar note, people think that solipsism in internally consistent, but it is not.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

added: ** if you ask me the neurologists are still not looking in the right place, from what I can gather from reading SciAmmind. I experience the sensation of allowing the construction of my personal "I" as feeling good. So I figure that a good chunk of it is dopaminergic. Acting upon certain thoughts, identifying with certain thoughts, feels good. Thus I assume that an unconscious process creates a dopamine-mediated reaction to the identification with certain thoughts. For example this line of reasoning feels good to me. Accompanied as well by an underlying sensation that I could let go of it.
I suspect another important reason for evolving a feeling of will is that it helps me think that I "own" my actions. This feeds forward to future actions by making me try harder to plan my behavior under similar circumstances, so that I get better results. If I had no feeling of owning my actions, I wouldn't think that I could improve them.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

I guess I don't understand your definition of compatibilist free will. Defining free will in a way that is compatible with determinism is a form of compatibilist free will.
Now my brain hurts. Defining free will as illusory is "compatibilist free will"? Would they be comfortable calling it "fake free will"?

Yes, a sort of free will that is compatible with determinism, such as saying that my action is free as long as I could have made another decision based on my own mental state (that is, I was not physically coerced).
Which is utterly unprovable. How do you know you could have made another decision? This is Iacchian in its circularity! Recall, he argued (for example) that a bird could not fly unless it first had the ability to fly. This "ability" was supposed to be meaningful, and yet only inferred from the subsequent flight that allegedly could not have occurred without it. Your example of compatibilism takes the opposite fork, saying that we can somehow know that, although action X was taken, we can look back and say actions A-W and Y-Z could have been chosen, therefore X was freely chosen. By what evidence can one assert that anything other than X could have occurred? After X occurs, without additional evidence it is as impossible to say that only X could have occurred as to say that many other things could have happened. We simply do not know; either assumption presupposes either predestination (Iacchus) or free will (compatibilism). I don't like the circularity either way.

We definitely have differing definitions of compatibilist free will.

~~ PaulOn that I fear I agree.

[Mercutio]

I'm carrying on a conversation with Ian on another forum right now.

[snip]

~~ Paul

Please say hi for me! Let him know I would still love to meet him some day, and argue the ontology of several pints of Stella.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Now my brain hurts. Defining free will as illusory is "compatibilist free will"? Would they be comfortable calling it "fake free will"?
Defining it as illusory is a neurophysiology-centric definition. As I said, there are others. For example, in the law, it is defined as being free from coercion, brainwashing, etc. From Wikipedia:

Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. A common strategy employed by "classical compatibilists", such as Thomas Hobbes, is to claim that a person acts freely only when the person willed the act and the person could have done otherwise, if the person had decided to.
...
To illustrate their position, compatibilists point to clear-cut cases of someone's free will being denied, through rape, murder, theft, or other forms of constraint.


Which is utterly unprovable. How do you know you could have made another decision?
Ah, sorry, I was unclear. I didn't mean a different decision from the same mental state. Let me reword what I said:

Yes, a sort of free will that is compatible with determinism, such as saying that my action is free as long as I could have made another decision had my own mental state been different, without being forced to a particular decision regardless of my own state (as with coercion or brainwashing).

I do agree that it is difficult to specify when coercion or brainwashing are relevant.


Please say hi for me! Let him know I would still love to meet him some day, and argue the ontology of several pints of Stella.
I will post your greeting right now.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

Defining it as illusory is a neurophysiology-centric definition. As I said, there are others. For example, in the law, it is defined as being free from coercion, brainwashing, etc. From Wikipedia:
Ah... and given that one man's brainwashing is another's education, that is a worthless distinction. As for Wiki... there is a reason I don't allow my students to cite it as a source. I do thank you for quoting it, as it precisely illustrates the circularity I spoke of previously. Given that the analysis is performed post hoc, the "if the person had decided to" is utterly worthless. We do not walk around with control groups.

Ah, sorry, I was unclear. I didn't mean a different decision from the same mental state. Let me reword what I said:

Yes, a sort of free will that is compatible with determinism, such as saying that my action is free as long as I could have made another decision had my own mental state been different, without being forced to a particular decision regardless of my own state (as with coercion or brainwashing).
Um... to the extent that "mental state" means anything at all, it is a caused, rather than a causal thing. This distinction does absolutely nothing to alleviate the circularity problem. Although, I suppose, by explicitly referring to mentalistic terms, it perhaps is at least honestly dualistic. No less incoherent, though.

I do agree that it is difficult to specify when coercion or brainwashing are relevant.
"Difficult" is an understatement. I have had arguments with friends who claimed that virtually all other religions brainwashed their flocks, but that they had freely chosen to blindly follow their own religion. Cults are always brainwashing... which is why some fundamentalist protestant churches call Catholicism a cult. Perhaps vice versa, too, I don't know.


I will post your greeting right now.

~~ Paul
Thanks!

[Dragoonster]

You might, indeed. For example, you might decide that the purpose of punishment under the law is to remove dangerous people from society and/or alter behavior, rather than to administer some kind of retribution (as if god).

You might chill out a little.

~~ Paul

I may not have been clear--I meant an internal altered perception, that the knowledge would somehow alter. Not a perception of what that would mean for how we view other's (or our own) actions.

I'm busy digesting this thread and other readings; but my initial thoughts on Susan Blackmore is that her belief may be born of psychological conditioning instead of a greater understanding of an underlying truth about free will. A kind of introspective behaviorism aimed at a goal, like meditation. I wonder if someone who desired to increase their belief that decisions were indeterminate would begin to perceive that they were making more "self-driven" decisions by focusing, or slowly conditioning themselves to have a truly different experience.

What a tough subject! A physical process seems determinative to some (most?) of our thoughts or perceptions, but then there's the psychology factor, and the philosophy factor. And even the quantum mechanics factor. I'll try to choose an emoticon: :faint:

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ah... and given that one man's brainwashing is another's education, that is a worthless distinction. As for Wiki... there is a reason I don't allow my students to cite it as a source. I do thank you for quoting it, as it precisely illustrates the circularity I spoke of previously. Given that the analysis is performed post hoc, the "if the person had decided to" is utterly worthless. We do not walk around with control groups.
Do you let them cite the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosopy? At http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/:

Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem. This philosophical problem concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed in terms of a compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

Your objection to "if the person had decided to" is based on the idea that the person's decision might be wholly determined and therefore he might not have been able to decide anything else. That is acknowledged by compatibilism, but is not the point. For ethics and the law, we need to decide whether a person's decision, determined or otherwise, was based on a voluntary mental/brain state and current circumstances, or forced on him by other parties. As we agree, there is a spectrum here.


Um... to the extent that "mental state" means anything at all, it is a caused, rather than a causal thing. This distinction does absolutely nothing to alleviate the circularity problem. Although, I suppose, by explicitly referring to mentalistic terms, it perhaps is at least honestly dualistic. No less incoherent, though.
Please stop assuming I mean something dualistic when I say "mental state." It's tiresome. We're been around this many times and you know that I don't. Read "brain state" when I say "mental state," although mental state is obviously a subset of brain state.


"Difficult" is an understatement. I have had arguments with friends who claimed that virtually all other religions brainwashed their flocks, but that they had freely chosen to blindly follow their own religion. Cults are always brainwashing... which is why some fundamentalist protestant churches call Catholicism a cult. Perhaps vice versa, too, I don't know.
The law needs to decide, even over your objection. :D But might it be possible to assign an objective number to the level of coercion that a person has undergone in his life? I think you would agree that such a thing should be amenable to scientific inquiry.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I may not have been clear--I meant an internal altered perception, that the knowledge would somehow alter. Not a perception of what that would mean for how we view other's (or our own) actions.
Ah, you're asking whether my internal feeling of will might be changed or lost. I think it could end up being filtered by a different appreciation of free will.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Merc! If you hurry you can catch Ian in Trader Jacks in Stockton-on-Tees. He's there right now.

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

Personal selfhood? How could a person not feel personal self-hood -- I don't get it.

I guess she means that she is sufficiently aware of her thinking processes to experience they are autonomous. There's no little "I" ghostie in there making decisions. But of course, it would be much better to ask her.

I figure that whilst portions of our decision making facilities are unconscious there remains the sensation of free will.

Nick

[Nick227]

I suspect another important reason for evolving a feeling of will is that it helps me think that I "own" my actions. This feeds forward to future actions by making me try harder to plan my behavior under similar circumstances, so that I get better results. If I had no feeling of owning my actions, I wouldn't think that I could improve them.

~~ Paul

Yes, makes sense.

This whole question interests me. Why should an evolving primate need an artificial sense of free will, of personal identity? What function does it serve?

I imagine a primate, starting to experience thoughts that are not directly related to its drives - survival, procreation, etc. Why would it act on these new thoughts? Why bother if they don't relate to anything that its instincts are telling it that it needs?

Nick

[Mercutio]

Do you let them cite the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosopy? At http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/:
As it happens, no. I specifically bring that site up in order to highlight the differences between a philosopher's caricature of radical behaviorism, and the radical behaviorism actually informing the work of behaviorists. The journal Behavior and Philosophy (http://www.behavior.org/journals_bp/), on the other hand, would be considered a good source. (parenthetically... three of my students this year are in various philosophy classes, where their profs took it upon themselves to deliver death-blows to radical behaviorism based on their understanding of it. They were so wrong as to be laughable.)

Your objection to "if the person had decided to" is based on the idea that the person's decision might be wholly determined and therefore he might not have been able to decide anything else. That is acknowledged by compatibilism, but is not the point. For ethics and the law, we need to decide whether a person's decision, determined or otherwise, was based on a voluntary mental/brain state and current circumstances, or forced on him by other parties. As we agree, there is a spectrum here.
Ah. I see your point. I was indeed missing it before. You are less concerned with, say, mens rea, than with the culpability of other individuals. Of course, even here our understanding of "forced" gets us into trouble. We recognize aversive attempts to force us, but with positive attempts (all but the most blatant bribery or non-aversive "brainwashing") we deny that we are controlled. ("I am never affected by ads...")

Please stop assuming I mean something dualistic when I say "mental state." It's tiresome. We're been around this many times and you know that I don't. Read "brain state" when I say "mental state," although mental state is obviously a subset of brain state.
My point stands; you are employing a de facto dualism. No, it is not a substance dualism, but if you are speaking of brain state as causal but uncaused (which was the implication), controlling the body, then all you have done is to imbue part of the body with the same magic Descartes saw in the mind.

The law needs to decide, even over your objection. :D But might it be possible to assign an objective number to the level of coercion that a person has undergone in his life? I think you would agree that such a thing should be amenable to scientific inquiry.

~~ PaulAnd here again, I see that I was under the same misunderstanding as above. Even if the person's actions are 100% determined (impossible to prove, of course, so it is an "if"), the question you raise is to what extent their actions are attributable to specific, culpable others. (whose actions were also determined... but the law does not care. What was it Dickens said about the law?)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As it happens, no. I specifically bring that site up in order to highlight the differences between a philosopher's caricature of radical behaviorism, and the radical behaviorism actually informing the work of behaviorists. The journal Behavior and Philosophy, on the other hand, would be considered a good source. (parenthetically... three of my students this year are in various philosophy classes, where their profs took it upon themselves to deliver death-blows to radical behaviorism based on their understanding of it. They were so wrong as to be laughable.)
So I'm not sure what you're saying. It appears you think that behaviorism needs a different definition of compatibilist free will from philosophy, or perhaps no definition at all. I have no problem with that. As I said, I think the definition of compatibilist free will varies with discipline.


Ah. I see your point. I was indeed missing it before. You are less concerned with, say, mens rea, than with the culpability of other individuals. Of course, even here our understanding of "forced" gets us into trouble. We recognize aversive attempts to force us, but with positive attempts (all but the most blatant bribery or non-aversive "brainwashing") we deny that we are controlled. ("I am never affected by ads...")
Yes, I agree completely. I'd chuck the entire topic of free will if I had the chance, but the law requires something. The legal definition will never be crisp.


My point stands; you are employing a de facto dualism. No, it is not a substance dualism, but if you are speaking of brain state as causal but uncaused (which was the implication), controlling the body, then all you have done is to imbue part of the body with the same magic Descartes saw in the mind.
Oh no, sorry, I did not mean to imply that there is some subset of brain function that causes behavior but is uncaused. It's all a complex causal chain. I just think the term "mental state" is a vagueness useful to refer to those brain functions that result in conscious decisions, even though those brain functions are no different than any other.


And here again, I see that I was under the same misunderstanding as above. Even if the person's actions are 100% determined (impossible to prove, of course, so it is an "if"), the question you raise is to what extent their actions are attributable to specific, culpable others. (whose actions were also determined... but the law does not care. What was it Dickens said about the law?)
That's a good way of putting it. Can we determine to what degree others are culpable because they "coerced" me into performing the act in question? All perfectly deterministic/random, of course. The law has to decide, making it a ass.

~~ Paul

[INRM]

I guess she means that she is sufficiently aware of her thinking processes to experience they are autonomous. There's no little "I" ghostie in there making decisions. But of course, it would be much better to ask her.

Is this 'no "I Ghostie" thing' related only to decision making or does she not feel one-ness at all?[/QUOTE]


INRM

[SirPhilip]

Well, maybe not proof but certainly an interesting finding. :) Not really, human cognition operates by logic at a higher level and abstractual at a lower level, the exact reverse interestingly of how machines 'think'. Systems operating on pure mechanical logic can only make determinations with a limited set of variables. We don't have those constraints, and can make up as nonsensical, fantastically absurd constructs as we wish. This occurs because organisms are self-arising thermodynamic systems, not machines, so asking the question is the same as asking if chaotic systems (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_paradox) actually truly exist or not in nature.

:bunpan

[INRM]

There was a post, perhaps the first in this thread about neuroethics and personal responsibility in regards to this particular finding.

I'm wondering if they included automatism and even black-outs (not induced by alcohol, and situations in which the person had no awareness of their actions) -- because a person really should not be punished for something they had no awareness of doing.


INRM
I'd have to state though that I think that these findings have to be very carefully dealt with, because a clever individual could argue that they're not responsible for anything.

[volatile]

INRM
I'd have to state though that I think that these findings have to be very carefully dealt with, because a clever individual could argue that they're not responsible for anything.

Many deterministic philosophers have argued exactly that, at length. The technical term for this sub-set of determinism is called "hard incompatibilism".