Materialism 101 [Archive]

Kawphy

28th April 2008, 02:02 PM

Does materialism preclude an afterlife?

Does materialism preclude other universes?

Does materialism preclude faeries?

Does materialism preclude anything that a human can properly frame an idea of?

I identify my belief system as materialism, but mine is not a dogmatic materialism.

It's certainly possible to start with the assumption that all there is is physical substance, and then 'reject' any arguments or evidence in favor of non-physical substance. That would be a dogmatic approach.

I, however, look at the observable universe, and consider which possible worlds are consistent with the observable universe. Certainly, a world where God exists *is* consistent with the observable universe, but only if God prefers to hide. Nonetheless, the observable world is also consistent with a possible world where no non-physical substance exists.

This makes it appear to be a burden-of-proof argument, and I generally reject that as a reason to accept one belief or another (I actually view Occham's razor as a heuristic device that works best in retrospect, rarely offering insight between two competing explanations of observable phenomena). But, as an atheist, I have no difficulty saying 'Yeah, the observable universe is *also* consistent with one where a very shy God exists.' A theist is wholly uncomfortable admitting the observable universe is consistent with a possible world where God does NOT exist.

So materialists do not believe in those things, but it is not a dogmatic preclusion. It is precisely the lack of evidence for those things that leads one to materialism.

And so it moves logically from epistemology & metaphysics to philosophy of mind.

I grew up Catholic. I was a true believer. I applied to seminary out of high school - and was told to get a BA in Philosophy first. Huge miscalculation by that bishop ;). I double-majored in Philosophy and Psychology. What drew me in? I was convinced that Consciousness could not be a physical process. Discount all miracles, ghosts, angels, creation - all of those can be explained in terms of physical substance, or mass hysteria, or hallucination, or simply bad research... but The Mind *had* to be non-physical. That was the one thing I knew, and my faith was staked on it.

But I couldn't prove it. So I went looking for proof.

My first effort led me to Descartes. He said, essentially, that if you have two sets of descriptors, and those descriptions are contradictory to each other, they cannot be describing the same object. The mind is indivisible, cannot be located in space, and so on... whereas the body/brain can be divided, can be located in space, and so on. Ah-HA! That was easy, I thought, as I left my freshman-level intro to philosophy course to go see The Matrix at the new Cineplex on opening night...

And the next semester, I took Abnormal Psych, British Empiricism, and Philosophy of Mind.

I studied Hume, and his 'empricist criteria.' Basically, he says that we have to look at the observable universe to really come to any meaningful conclusions *about* our universe. Introspecting cannot lead us to a priori synthetic truths - in fact, there can be no such thing as an a priori synthetic truth (you can argue that point, if you believe that Mathematical truths are not analytic).

Over time, I came to recognize that the brain is nothing more than a Pattern Recognizing Machine. In fact, that's all Science does too - and so it's no coincidence that Science was discovered/invented by creatures with Brains.

I think I'll post this meandering text so I don't risk losing it if I lose power. My next post I'll go over Gilbert Ryle's 'category mistake' argument, Searle's Chinese room argument, Dennett's response, Jackson's (and Nagel's) Qualia argument(s), Dennett and Paul Churchland's responses, the significance of Donald Davidson's Radical Translation, and I may touch on Chalmers' twin-earths p-zombie ******** (though I confess I know a lot less about that line of argument).

Oh, and I'll explain why reductionism is impossible (because both type and token identity theories are absurd), as is non-reductive physicalism/anomalous monism (I love Davidson, but not *that* much...), epiphenomenalism, and interactionist dualism.

Which seems to leave us with two choices: Berkeley's Idealism or Churchland's Eliminativism. Both are seemingly consistent with the observable universe. Both fly in the face of the beliefs most humans have about the nature of the universe. But there is a crushing refutation of Berkeley, and Dennett's 'real patterns' argument makes Eliminativism *much* easier to swallow (though Churchland and Dennett insist that their views are incompatible).

Robin

28th April 2008, 02:52 PM

I identify my belief system as materialism, but mine is not a dogmatic materialism.
Nor is anybody else's Materialism dogmatic. Or if it is, they just haven't understood the concept.
It's certainly possible to start with the assumption that all there is is physical substance, and then 'reject' any arguments or evidence in favor of non-physical substance. That would be a dogmatic approach.
I am not aware of any Materialist philosopher who has ever argued that "all there is is physical substance".
I, however, look at the observable universe, and consider which possible worlds are consistent with the observable universe. Certainly, a world where God exists *is* consistent with the observable universe, but only if God prefers to hide. Nonetheless, the observable world is also consistent with a possible world where no non-physical substance exists.
In what respect would a "non-physical substance" differ from a "physical substance"?
But, as an atheist, I have no difficulty saying 'Yeah, the observable universe is *also* consistent with one where a very shy God exists.'
It is certainly inconsistent with a God who requires humans to believe in Him.

But more generally, the idea of a God would entail that something as utterly complex as a conscious thought, purpose or intention could be metaphysically simple.
Oh, and I'll explain why reductionism is impossible ...
As pointed out in a recent thread, the idea of reductionism in the Empiricist tradition was gently dispatched more than 50 years ago by Quine, so re-refuting it would seem superfluous to say the least.
Which seems to leave us with two choices: Berkeley's Idealism or Churchland's Eliminativism. Both are seemingly consistent with the observable universe. Both fly in the face of the beliefs most humans have about the nature of the universe. But there is a crushing refutation of Berkeley, and Dennett's 'real patterns' argument makes Eliminativism *much* easier to swallow (though Churchland and Dennett insist that their views are incompatible).
The refutation of Berkeley is implicit in his original statement of Idealism.

And in fact if you put all the quibbling to one side there is not much difference in general between Churchland, Dennett and even Searle (who even denies that he is a Materialist).

And as I said earlier they are not saying much that is very different from what d'Holbach said two centuries earlier. In fact in many ways d'Holbach put it better.

Kawphy

28th April 2008, 04:26 PM

I can't say I'm familiar with d'Holbach, but I'll look into him. You're right, though, Churchland and Dennett's ideas aren't really as novel as they seem. Even Hereclitus, solving the 'problem of personal identity', said "You can never step in the same river twice", and Hume referred to consciousness as a "bundle of perceptions." Searle, however, I don't believe to be consistent with Dennett & Churchland. Searle, like Chalmers, believes in the existence of a 'hard problem of consciousness.' My take on this is as follows:
Either consciousness is made of substance or it is not.
If it is composed of physical substance, it is real and consistent with materialism.
If it is composed of non-physical substance, it is real and consistent with idealism & dualism.
If it is not composed of substance, it - doesn't exist.

Dennett, Churchland, Jackson, Chalmers, Davidson, Searle et al all concede that the third condition must be true - that 'consciousness' is not composed of substance. But Jackson, Chalmers, and Searle are all bothered by that fact, can't wrap their heads around it, and therefore think 'there must be something wrong.' That's their 'hard problem.' Dennett and Churchland concede that fact, and say 'And that makes perfect sense.'

(oops, I'm a liar. I said my next post would go into all that stuff, and it didn't. I will be posting that though. And I really welcome your feedback, I can't say I'm all-knowing, and it seems you're knowledgeable of the topics, so yeah :) )

Silentknight

28th April 2008, 04:53 PM

I was hoping for hecklers - but no takers. I can only assume that this answers ACS's question to his satisfaction.

Ooh, I've got a question then. If certain people object to materialism, like plumjam or ACS, then it implies that they are anti-materialists. So if they're anti-materialists, does that mean they deny the existence of matter?

Dummy! Look around you! There's matter everywhere! How can you possibly be so blind?!

One stupid strawman deserves another. :D

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

28th April 2008, 06:10 PM

And why would we think this is the best interpretation? Well one good reason is that the scientific method has been so spectacularly successful in gaining knowledge about our universe and that other epistemologies have been such abysmal failures.
But materialism is not an epistemology, it is a metaphysic. I agree that scientific epistemology has been quite sucessful. Let's stick with it and dump all the ontological nonsense. How can we know what stuff actually is?

As an aside, I don't think anyone goes for materialism now. I think it's physicalism.

~~ Paul

Robin

28th April 2008, 07:03 PM

Ooh, I've got a question then. If certain people object to materialism, like plumjam or ACS, then it implies that they are anti-materialists. So if they're anti-materialists, does that mean they deny the existence of matter?

Dummy! Look around you! There's matter everywhere! How can you possibly be so blind?!

One stupid strawman deserves another. :D
I am not sure what you are suggesting here. What exactly are you saying is a stupid straw man? Be more precise.

There is nothing in anything that I have said that remotely suggests that an anti-materialist denies the existence of matter (although many do).

So please be a little more clear.

Robin

28th April 2008, 07:12 PM

But materialism is not an epistemology, it is a metaphysic. I agree that scientific epistemology has been quite sucessful. Let's stick with it and dump all the ontological nonsense. How can we know what stuff actually is?

As an aside, I don't think anyone goes for materialism now. I think it's physicalism.

~~ Paul
Well most people these days use Physicalism as a synonym for Materialism. Actual Physicalism, as in Neurath and Carnap, died in the 1950's.

But where have I said or even remotely implied that we can know what stuff is? In fact I have often quoted d'Holbach very explicitly saying we can't know what stuff is.

Can you name me a Materialist philosopher that says we can know what stuff is?

That is not what Materialism is about, read my OP.

Robin

28th April 2008, 07:21 PM

Searle, like Chalmers, believes in the existence of a 'hard problem of consciousness.'
You will have to cite this, as far as I know Searle does not believe in the existence of the hard problem of consciousness. His paper "The Problem of Consciousness" refers to what Pinker and Chalmers call "the easy problem of consciousness". Searle certainly believes that there is an easy solution to the "mind/body" problem.
My take on this is as follows:
Either consciousness is made of substance or it is not.
If it is composed of physical substance, it is real and consistent with materialism.
If it is composed of non-physical substance, it is real and consistent with idealism & dualism.
If it is not composed of substance, it - doesn't exist.
In order for this to make sense, you would have to answer my earlier question - in what respect would a "non-physical substance" differ from a "physical substance"?

Kawphy

28th April 2008, 08:05 PM

So Descartes says any two sets of properties can't be describing the same object if, in fact, the properties are contradictory. Ryle drew an analogy:
Suppose I visit you at a University campus and ask you to show me the 'University.' You take me around and show me the buildings, the grounds, the students, faculty, staff, the sports teams (and their records), the financial records, and so on. At the end of the day, I say to you: "Well you've shown me the grounds, and the people, and the records... now can you show me The University?" Descartes argument "proves" that the university is not identical with the sum of the things that compose it. Thus, Descartes proves too much - in essence, missing the forest for the trees.

But a University is not a conscious entity. In fact, the 'useful fiction' argument applies to it - it provides predictive value and explanatory power to refer to that group of independent things as 'The University', but that's not to say any non-physical 'University' exists, ensouling all the sum of the components. Does that analogy hold up for humans too?

It seems almost instinctual to say that 'The Mind' and 'A University' are fundamentally different kinds of things: Namely, a University can't think. Thus, it's perfectly reasonable to acknowledge that a University is, ultimately, composed of physical substance, while insisting that a Person (body + mind) is somehow more.

Searle betrays this prejudice in his chinese room argument.
Suppose, he says, someone wrote an instruction book on how to manipulate tiles with strange symbols on them. They then sit you in a box (with two holes), with the instruction book and a light. Then they feed you tiles through the first hole, and you output tiles through the second hold according to the instruction set. Perfectly plausible scenario, right?
Suppose that the tiles being fed in are actually the text of a chinese novel, and the tiles you feed out are a review of that novel - which demonstrates a rich, in-depth understanding and appreciation of the novel. This should still be plausible (keep in mind it's been proven that any computational function can be emulated on a turing machine), though you must realize it would be an insanely large book.
Searle then asks the question: Do you understand Chinese?
Dennett-types might respond, 'No, but the SYSTEM does!' To which Searle proposes a new thought-experiment:
Suppose you memorize the instruction set. Do away with the box, do away with the tiles... you just have the chinese book and a ream of paper to write your output onto. Now it's just you reading a chinese book and writing a review of it. Do you know chinese now? Searle and Dennett both seem to accept the possibility of this scenario, and both agree that the individual does not 'know' chinese (not in the same way a native speaker does). But they disagree on the significance of this.
To Searle, if materialism is true, then consciousness is merely a function of a neural network. Neural networks, as I mentioned earlier, can (in theory) be emulated on a Universal Turing machine - a serial processor. If we assume conscious behavior is accounted for strictly via material substance (and the laws of physics), then, logically, it must be possible to emulate it through a serial instruction set like the one in this thought experiment. If there is an example of a human behavior that cannot be emulated on a Turing machine, then consciousness must be more than just a physical process.

But Searle doesn't prove that it's impossible to program a computer to understand Chinese. He simply proves that the thought experiment he describes is not isomorphic with a chinese-speaking person (or computer). A swing and a miss.

So Jackson comes up with his 'What Mary Didn't Know' argument. He says...
Imagine there's this woman named Mary. When she was born, goggles were affixed to her head so she would see the world in black and white. She can see perfectly fine, she just can't see color. As she's raised, she's taught all about optics, about neuroscience, about rods and cones. She learns all about the retinal ganglion cells splitting at the optich chiasm, feeding into the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, then to the primary visual cortex She gets a doctorate degree, mastering every aspect of human vision. She becomes the world's leading expert on color vision. Suppose she has complete knowledge of the physical description of colorvision.

Now suppose she gets fed up, runs outside into a large field, and tears the goggles off. She sees colors for the first time - does she gain any new information? If yes, Jackson argues, that proves there is non-physical information, as she already had all physical information.

Dennett and Churchland address this argument differently, but both effectively destroy it.

Dennett suggests that, instead of running out into a green field, she's led into a black and white room with a purple banana in it, and is told to remove her goggles. Can you imagine if she took the googles off, looked at the banana, and said 'You jerks are trying to trick me! this banana is purple, and it's supposed to be yellow!' Now, granted, we assume this wouldn't happen, but nowhere in the argument is there proof it couldn't happen. Since the definition of a valid argument is that it's impossible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true, and this is an example of a possible case where the premises are true and the conclusion is false, the argument proves nothing - except that a prejudice exists.

Churchland says the argument proves too much. Suppose, she says, the same situation is true - except she's raised in a world where we've solved the 'hard problem.' She's not only taught all the physical facts about color vision, but all the metaphysical facts as well. She understands how the light reacts with the phlogiston or ecto plasm or whatever. Again, she runs outside and takes off her goggles. Does she learn something new? If so, then it proves the existence of meta-metaphysical substance.

Well, my shift's ending, so those oversimplified arguments will have to do for tonight.

Robin

28th April 2008, 08:14 PM

Kawphy,

In what respect would a "non-physical substance" differ from a "physical substance"?

Kawphy

28th April 2008, 08:14 PM

You will have to cite this, as far as I know Searle does not believe in the existence of the hard problem of consciousness. His paper "The Problem of Consciousness" refers to what Pinker and Chalmers call "the easy problem of consciousness". Searle certainly believes that there is an easy solution to the "mind/body" problem.

In order for this to make sense, you would have to answer my earlier question - in what respect would a "non-physical substance" differ from a "physical substance"?

I may very well have misinterpreted Searle. It's been a long time since I've read him. A big reason I like to post things like this is to get criticism from people that know about the subjects, so I can figure out what I've got wrong and get it right. I just know I finally 'understood' Dennett when I was reading a series of exchanges between Searle and Dennett. Searle was responding to a letter by Dennett on a topic I've since forgotten, but in Searle's criticism I realized that Dennett had it right... I'unno, that's awfully vague. I'll look into it.

I'd certainly discourage anybody from taking anything I write as authoritative.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

29th April 2008, 10:42 AM

But where have I said or even remotely implied that we can know what stuff is? In fact I have often quoted d'Holbach very explicitly saying we can't know what stuff is.

Can you name me a Materialist philosopher that says we can know what stuff is?

Your statement "Materialism is the position that everything is explainable in terms of physical processes" implies the assumption that stuff is physical. If you only mean to make an epistemological claim, then you could just as well say "... in terms of mental processes" or "... in terms of jello-like processes." Materialism is a metaphysic that holds that only physical things exist.

I know what you're trying to say, and I'm sure we agree, but I think it's better if we talk about "scientific epistemology" or some such term.

In what respect would a "non-physical substance" differ from a "physical substance"?
Precisely! And in what respect would a physical process differ from a mental one?

~~ Paul

Silentknight

29th April 2008, 04:32 PM

I am not sure what you are suggesting here. What exactly are you saying is a stupid straw man? Be more precise.

There is nothing in anything that I have said that remotely suggests that an anti-materialist denies the existence of matter (although many do).

So please be a little more clear.

No, it was a joke. I was going to save it for when either of those two happened to show up in this thread, but they haven't yet. It wasn't intended to be directed at you, and besides, I agree with most of what you've said so far.

Robin

29th April 2008, 04:43 PM

Your statement "Materialism is the position that everything is explainable in terms of physical processes" implies the assumption that stuff is physical. If you only mean to make an epistemological claim, then you could just as well say "... in terms of mental processes" or "... in terms of jello-like processes."
Except that you left off the very next sentence where I define what I mean by physical.

I could have said jello-like if by jello-like I had meant "can be described in terms of a mathematical model."
Materialism is a metaphysic that holds that only physical things exist.
Please quote the Materialist philosopher who holds this position
I know what you're trying to say, and I'm sure we agree, but I think it's better if we talk about "scientific epistemology" or some such term.
Empiricism is the word I think you are looking for, or perhaps Positivism. I described myself as a Positivist until only recently. Ironically it was the very first post I read of yours that led me to believe that there was at least one metaphysical proposition which could be described as true, or at least meaningful.
Precisely! And in what respect would a physical process differ from a mental one?
None that I know of, other than that there is a level of complexity below which it would be meaningless to call a process "mental".

Robin

29th April 2008, 04:48 PM

No, it was a joke. I was going to save it for when either of those two happened to show up in this thread, but they haven't yet. It wasn't intended to be directed at you, and besides, I agree with most of what you've said so far.
Sorry, I leapt to a conclusion about what you meant. I realised this afterwards, but did not have access to the internet to fix my post.

Kawphy

29th April 2008, 06:08 PM

Kawphy,

In what respect would a "non-physical substance" differ from a "physical substance"?

Sorry I didn't get a chance to answer this last night, I was rushing to leave work.

A non-physical substance is a hypothetical substance that exists, but has properties distinct from that of matter/energy. I get what you're saying by asking that question, and to someone that understand the problem of interractionism, that question is a very concise refutation of the possibility of non-physical substance. But to those reading this thread not blessed with that level of understanding, it won't persuade.

In metaphysics, a classic question is 'can another physical universe exist?' By which they mean, can there be a physical point X, and a physical point Y, such that there is no possible concievable way to move from point X to point Y. There's a lot of creative answers to the question. The fact is, if you are in a universe where you can describe your relation to point X, you would be unable to describe your relation to point Y, so as creates that exist IN a universe, TO US it is impossible, and it would be impossible to provide any detectable or observable evidence that the other universe exists. But we can't refute that it exists.

Suppose that is the case. Suppose there is Universe 1 and Universe 2. Our bodies exist in Universe 1. But in Universe two, the substance that composes that universe has slightly different laws of physics - that is, the 'laws' of that universe are identical to the mental 'laws' of folk psychology. There are centers of consciousnesses, beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, perceptions, sensations and so on.

I think that description is a great point to illustrate the flaws of any non-materialist viewpoint. In cartesian dualism, this is the case, and there's 'interraction' between the minds in Universe 2 and the physical bodies of people in Universe 1. Obviously, such interraction is impossible! Nothing can cross from one universe to the other.

Epiphenomenalism is an interesting concept, but with the problem described like this, it provides no further support - as it still requires a link (albeit one way) between universe 1 and universe 2.

The 'synchronized clocks' theory supposes that both universe were set into motion at the beginning of time by God, and they happen to correlate perfectly without any interraction.

But this leads logically to Berkeley's idealism, where you just 'cut out the physical universe altogether.' Since we percieve, we must be in the mental universe - where perceptions exist. Why suppose a corresponding physical universe exists at all?

Idealism, via the 'problem of other minds' leads to Solopsism - that is, you can't perceive my mind. All you perceive is the physical matter of my body, and its physical behavior. Thus, if you are an idealist, and accept only that your mind is inputing perceptions, I cannot be assumed to be anything more than a series of perceptions to you. So all that exists is You and God. This position is very difficult to refute, but its absurdity makes it so nobody ever defends it - if you really believe you are the only conscious entity besides God, who would you bother persuading?

So if we reject the mental universe, we're left with a physical one. But those 'mental laws' which we took to be the 'laws of physics' in universe 2 still exist. So what are they? Well, for one, they're not really 'laws' at all... they're merely observable patterns of behavior that are capable of predicting behavior at better-than-chance. For two, there's no direct reduction of 'mental things' to physical matter - you can't say 'belief X corresponds to neural state Y.' You will always be able to find an additional neural state that exhibits behavior consistent with belief X, and if you put 'neural state Y' in a new context (a different brain), it won't imply that belief at all.

So Dualism doesn't work. Idealism doesn't work. Reductionism doesn't work. Any approach that treats folk psychology as 'perfectly lawful' (the way physics is) fails. But folk psychology *does* provide predictive value and explanatory power, at greater than chance. So it's an observable pattern of behavior. And human brains are nothing more than pattern recognizing machines. Conscious entities are those which are capable of recognizing that pattern - that is, capable of interpreting from the intentional stance. But they must also therefore be capable of BEING interpreted from the intentional stance. That's the 'strange loop.'

And the objection to this point of view? The Qualia argument, which boils down to a simple assertion of a prejudice: "But dammit, I'm not just a robot, a p-zombie! I have a MIND!"

Let me explain. The p-zombie argument is, to simplify, this. Suppose we had a twin universe; a strictly physical universe. No minds at all. The laws of physics are exactly the same, and the matter is all arranged exactly the same way. Wouldn't everything appear exactly the same? There'd be nobody to observe, nobody to percieve it, because we'd all be robots just going through the motions (as determined by physical law), but it seems logical that all physical aspects of the universe would be identical to our universe.

If, Chalmers says, there is any difference between that hypothetical universe and our universe, it proves that Qualia is real, and that there 'must be something more' (although qualia-freaks still claim to be materialists, if I'm not mistaken... cognitive dissonance? They're not 'dualists', anyway...). But the argument is flawed. Because the argument's existence itself is supposed to be evidence of qualia. But suppose we had only one universe, and it was the p-zombie universe. In that universe, the matter would ebb and flow over time and continue to physically resemble ours exactly. And when it got to that point of time in history where p-zombie Chalmers is sitting at his desk penning his book, p-zombie Chalmers would have made the very same physical marks on the paper. When p-zombie Chalmers lectured, he'd have made the very same exhalations, leading to the very same vibrations of airwaves that, to non-zombies, sound like english words. Would this be a tree falling in the woods with nobody hearing it? Or... is that just a description of our universe?
Ultimately, the argument doesn't prove it either way. It just explains the two possibilities, then insists 'I believe there's a difference, and thus there's a hard problem as to what that difference is.'

Well I don't believe there's a difference, and your prejudice isn't evidence of something non-physical.

Robin

29th April 2008, 09:43 PM

A non-physical substance is a hypothetical substance that exists, but has properties distinct from that of matter/energy.
So, not so much a non-physical substance as an "alternate-physical" substance.
So Dualism doesn't work. Idealism doesn't work. Reductionism doesn't work. Any approach that treats folk psychology as 'perfectly lawful' (the way physics is) fails.
I have missed something in your explanation. In what way is folk psychology inconsistent with the laws of physics?
And the objection to this point of view? The Qualia argument, which boils down to a simple assertion of a prejudice: "But dammit, I'm not just a robot, a p-zombie! I have a MIND!"
And there is nothing in Materialism that suggests they don't have a mind.
Suppose we had a twin universe; a strictly physical universe. No minds at all.
Stop right here. This is where all p-zombie arguments fail. This build-in assumption that minds are not physical.
but it seems logical that all physical aspects of the universe would be identical to our universe.
Except that it seems and is utterly illogical.

But really all of this is over-complicating the matter. If we simply hypothesise that the mind behaves according to the laws of physics (as it appears to do) we have no inconsistency, no "hard problem".

JoeEllison

29th April 2008, 09:54 PM

I have suggested before, and will again here suggest, that the whole "hard problem" nonsense is based on philosophers being basically lazy people who are also becoming more and more obsolete as the number of problems available for them to navel gaze about shrinks. So, they've created the "hard problem" out of whole cloth, ignoring logic and evidence in the process. The entire argument is based in a series of seemingly intentional fallacies, in order to justify the continued employment and publishing royalties of a mostly useless subsection of the population. I guess it beats them going on unemployment and moving their idiocy to the local Starbucks...

BjornTheCyborg

30th April 2008, 02:52 AM

And the objection to this point of view? The Qualia argument, which boils down to a simple assertion of a prejudice: "But dammit, I'm not just a robot, a p-zombie! I have a MIND!"

My Friend, our own qualitative experiences are the foundation of our knowledge. It is our objective view of the universe which is imaginary, since you and I are purely subjective beings. It is more than a "prejudice".

Let me explain. The p-zombie argument is, to simplify, this. Suppose we had a twin universe; a strictly physical universe. No minds at all. The laws of physics are exactly the same, and the matter is all arranged exactly the same way. Wouldn't everything appear exactly the same? There'd be nobody to observe, nobody to percieve it, because we'd all be robots just going through the motions (as determined by physical law), but it seems logical that all physical aspects of the universe would be identical to our universe.

I see. Basically, in this imaginary universe of yours, qualitative experience does not exist. How convenient.

If, Chalmers says, there is any difference between that hypothetical universe and our universe, it proves that Qualia is real, and that there 'must be something more' (although qualia-freaks still claim to be materialists, if I'm not mistaken... cognitive dissonance? They're not 'dualists', anyway...). But the argument is flawed. Because the argument's existence itself is supposed to be evidence of qualia. But suppose we had only one universe, and it was the p-zombie universe. In that universe, the matter would ebb and flow over time and continue to physically resemble ours exactly. And when it got to that point of time in history where p-zombie Chalmers is sitting at his desk penning his book, p-zombie Chalmers would have made the very same physical marks on the paper. When p-zombie Chalmers lectured, he'd have made the very same exhalations, leading to the very same vibrations of airwaves that, to non-zombies, sound like english words. Would this be a tree falling in the woods with nobody hearing it? Or... is that just a description of our universe?
Ultimately, the argument doesn't prove it either way. It just explains the two possibilities, then insists 'I believe there's a difference, and thus there's a hard problem as to what that difference is.'

The difference between your imaginary universe and ours is that in our universe, purely qualitative properties of reality exist. I know this to be true because I and you are both experiencing them right now. Any universe which resembles ours exactly also includes the property of being subjectively experienced.

Well I don't believe there's a difference, and your prejudice isn't evidence of something non-physical.

To deny there is a difference is to deny your own subjective experience. You cannot escape the problem of qualia by asserting that they do not exist.

BjornTheCyborg

30th April 2008, 02:55 AM

UnrepentantSinner

30th April 2008, 03:04 AM

I am trying to dispell the notion, strawman-d onto this forum by people like plumjam, that materialism implies a cold, dull, robotic universe.

I've never understood that "cold, dull, robotic universe" idea. I think materialism has been confused with clinical depression. I don't particularly cold or hopeless because I don't beleive in gods, fairies, ghosts or santa claus. I have more important things to worry about.

And more importantly, our robotic universe is absolutely fascinating (throw out dull), and while much of it is very cold, there's some heat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_microwave_background_radiation) everywhere (at least for now).

History channel's The Universe series doesn't add deities or metaphysics, I think you'd be hard pressed to find anyone who viewed it who wasn't filled with a sense of awe at least once per episode. And Cosmos is one of the most lyrical and poetic science documentaries ever made.

The "cold, dull, robotic universe" folks just don't know how to appreciate scientific discoveries.

Robin

30th April 2008, 04:59 AM

Robin

30th April 2008, 05:03 AM

To deny there is a difference is to deny your own subjective experience. You cannot escape the problem of qualia by asserting that they do not exist.
Sure qualia exist, but in what sense are they a problem?

JoeEllison

30th April 2008, 05:44 AM

I have always said that if they would only state this "hard problem" clearly and rigorously then it would evaporate.

Even so, every time it is stated with any coherence whatsoever, serious flaws emerge that torpedo the concept before it even gets started. I'm not a philosopher, I'm not an expert on the field, and even I can see some of the places where it all falls down. Part of the problem is that most of the statements of the "hard problem" are too obviously similar to the creationists' starting point of "there MUST be something more, or else...", and then all sorts of special pleading and logical fallacies follow.

JoeEllison

30th April 2008, 06:05 AM

Sure qualia exist, but in what sense are they a problem?

I think using a term like "qualia" is part of the incoherence you mentioned earlier. "Qualia" is another psuedo-something that can't really be pinned down in a way that doesn't leave bunches of wiggle room for the "hard problem" proponents. It also seems to me to be a very cleverly crafted sort of circular argument/begging the question fallacy bundle along with plenty of argument from incredulity.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

30th April 2008, 09:59 AM

Please quote the Materialist philosopher who holds this position [that only physical things exist]
I'm not sure there are any materialist philosophers left, because the idea that only physical things exist is obsolete.

Nevertheless, here are a bunch of definitions of materialism that talk about physical matter:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

http://www.filosofia.net/materiales/rec/glosaen.htm

http://www.abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/guide/glossary.shtml

http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/intro/odop.html

http://www.li.suu.edu/library/humtxt/glossary/glossary.htm

Talking about physical processes helps, but still seems to exclude energy. I think this is why the term physicalism was invented.

Empiricism is the word I think you are looking for, or perhaps Positivism. I described myself as a Positivist until only recently. Ironically it was the very first post I read of yours that led me to believe that there was at least one metaphysical proposition which could be described as true, or at least meaningful.
I don't like those terms. I'll stick with scientific epistemology.

And please, let's not get started about eliminative materialism. :D

~~ Paul

Dancing David

30th April 2008, 12:47 PM

My Friend, our own qualitative experiences are the foundation of our knowledge. It is our objective view of the universe which is imaginary, since you and I are purely subjective beings. It is more than a "prejudice".

I see. Basically, in this imaginary universe of yours, qualitative experience does not exist. How convenient.

The difference between your imaginary universe and ours is that in our universe, purely qualitative properties of reality exist. I know this to be true because I and you are both experiencing them right now. Any universe which resembles ours exactly also includes the property of being subjectively experienced.

To deny there is a difference is to deny your own subjective experience. You cannot escape the problem of qualia by asserting that they do not exist.

You can not say that qualia are something special, they do not exist in a vacum, remove the optic fiber and the visual qualia disappera.

So qualia are the process of sensation and perception. No evidence that they stand alone.

Dancing David

30th April 2008, 12:49 PM

And more importantly, our robotic universe is absolutely fascinating (throw out dull), and while much of it is very cold, there's some heat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_microwave_background_radiation) everywhere (at least for now).

History channel's The Universe series doesn't add deities or metaphysics, I think you'd be hard pressed to find anyone who viewed it who wasn't filled with a sense of awe at least once per episode. And Cosmos is one of the most lyrical and poetic science documentaries ever made.

The "cold, dull, robotic universe" folks just don't know how to appreciate scientific discoveries.

They should just go lay out in the backyard for a while.

BjornTheCyborg

30th April 2008, 02:32 PM

Sure qualia exist, but in what sense are they a problem?

In your original post you state:

Materialism is the position that everything is explainable in terms of physical processes. Physical processes are processes which can be described in terms of a mathematical model.

The existence of qualia can be used to disprove this claim because qualia cannot be explained in terms of a "mathematical model". That is, the objective definition of the phenomena cannot convey the subjective experience which is the essence of the phenomena. An example of this would be trying to explain the experience of red and green to someone who is red-green colorblind by telling them that the sensation of red and green is nothing more than neuron impulses caused by the collision of photons and photo-pigments. Though the colorblind individual can gain an understanding of the process behind the experience, it will not recreate for them the subjective experience of seeing red and green.

BjornTheCyborg

30th April 2008, 02:41 PM

You can not say that qualia are something special, they do not exist in a vacum, remove the optic fiber and the visual qualia disappera.

So qualia are the process of sensation and perception. No evidence that they stand alone.

I did not argue that they "stand alone", only that they obviously exist.

BjornTheCyborg

30th April 2008, 02:51 PM

I think using a term like "qualia" is part of the incoherence you mentioned earlier. "Qualia" is another psuedo-something that can't really be pinned down in a way that doesn't leave bunches of wiggle room for the "hard problem" proponents. It also seems to me to be a very cleverly crafted sort of circular argument/begging the question fallacy bundle along with plenty of argument from incredulity.

I see, so your entire subjective experience is nothing more than a "psuedo-something". Maybe you should start asking yourself why this concept is so difficult to pin down.

rocketdodger

30th April 2008, 04:30 PM

rocketdodger

30th April 2008, 04:32 PM

I see, so your entire subjective experience is nothing more than a "psuedo-something". Maybe you should start asking yourself why this concept is so difficult to pin down.

He told you why -- because it gives "hard problem" proponents wiggle room.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

30th April 2008, 05:22 PM

Robin

30th April 2008, 05:37 PM

I'm not sure there are any materialist philosophers left, because the idea that only physical things exist is obsolete.
It could only have been obsolete if it had ever been proposed in the first place. Name me a Materialist philosopher that has ever proposed the idea.

(Oh and by the way, there are probably more Materialist philosophers around now than in there were 100 years ago)
Nevertheless, here are a bunch of definitions of materialism that talk about physical matter:
I did not ask for a bunch of definitions, I asked for a philosopher who had proposed the idea.
Talking about physical processes helps, but still seems to exclude energy.
Er... why? Can energy not be modelled using mathematics?

In fact energy is nothing more than an element in the mathematical model we use to describe and predict empirical observations.
I don't like those terms. I'll stick with scientific epistemology.
You say tom-ay-to, I say tom-ah-to.
And please, let's not get started about eliminative materialism. :D
Why not, the basic idea is pretty sound, that there is only one set of physical laws, so all scientific models could eventually be eliminated in favour of a single physical model.

Robin

30th April 2008, 05:41 PM

I think using a term like "qualia" is part of the incoherence you mentioned earlier. "Qualia" is another psuedo-something that can't really be pinned down in a way that doesn't leave bunches of wiggle room for the "hard problem" proponents. It also seems to me to be a very cleverly crafted sort of circular argument/begging the question fallacy bundle along with plenty of argument from incredulity.
Really "qualia" is no more a problem than, say "flame". Flame is a description of something we experience and yet we can adequately model the phenomenon without reference to the concept of flame.

Robin

30th April 2008, 05:57 PM

The existence of qualia can be used to disprove this claim because qualia cannot be explained in terms of a "mathematical model". That is, the objective definition of the phenomena cannot convey the subjective experience which is the essence of the phenomena. An example of this would be trying to explain the experience of red and green to someone who is red-green colorblind by telling them that the sensation of red and green is nothing more than neuron impulses caused by the collision of photons and photo-pigments. Though the colorblind individual can gain an understanding of the process behind the experience, it will not recreate for them the subjective experience of seeing red and green.
And the mathematical model of a washing machine will not get my clothes clean.

Look, I have been saying in the forum for years, the mathematical description of the neurology of eating a peach does not convey the information of what it is like to eat a peach. Why would we expect it to?

But this does not mean that qualia are non-physical, it simply means that we should not, as Einstein says, confuse the mathematical model with the thing it is describing.

We can create mathematical models that predict purely subjective experience. We can manipulate purely subjective experience by manipulating the brain. We can observe with increasing accuracy what Steve Pinker calls the neurological correlates of subjective experience. Subjective experience exists in a well defined cause-effect relationship with other things that we have no problem in describing as physical.

So in what sense are qualia non-physical?

Robin

30th April 2008, 05:58 PM

I see, so your entire subjective experience is nothing more than a "psuedo-something". Maybe you should start asking yourself why this concept is so difficult to pin down.
I can't think of anything in this universe that is easy to pin down. Can you?

arthwollipot

30th April 2008, 08:25 PM

And please, let's not get started about eliminative materialism. :D

~~ PaulTell me about eliminative materialism, Paul.

BjornTheCyborg

1st May 2008, 01:31 AM

First you need to show that a "subjective experience" is something that can't be modeled mathematically. Round and round the merry-go-round!

Robin and Joe are right about this -- the "hard problem" evaporates as soon as it is defined properly.

So you're one of those people that likes to delude themselves into thinking that something which can only be apprehended subjectively can be conveyed via objective description. Can I describe the sensation of pain using language/math to someone who has not experienced it? No.

Maybe you can suggest a way in which it is possible to model qualia using math.

He told you why -- because it gives "hard problem" proponents wiggle room.

It's the inadequacy of materialism/physicalism which gives us "wiggle room".

Can the objective description of meteorology convey the weather? Yes, but only with great effort. Why do you assume the same won't eventually be true of subjective experience?

~~ Paul

I should be more specific. When I say subjective experience, I mean qualitative aspects of reality; colors, sounds, etc. These things, though tied to events which can be objectively explained can only really be known subjectively. They are the essence of subjectivity. In order to communicate ideas about something using math and science, that something must have an objective quality to it, meaning it must be viewed from the outside. Qualia do not have this property as they are purely subjective. For this reason they defy, and always will defy, objective explanation.

And the mathematical model of a washing machine will not get my clothes clean.

Look, I have been saying in the forum for years, the mathematical description of the neurology of eating a peach does not convey the information of what it is like to eat a peach. Why would we expect it to?

But this does not mean that qualia are non-physical, it simply means that we should not, as Einstein says, confuse the mathematical model with the thing it is describing.

We can create mathematical models that predict purely subjective experience. We can manipulate purely subjective experience by manipulating the brain. We can observe with increasing accuracy what Steve Pinker calls the neurological correlates of subjective experience. Subjective experience exists in a well defined cause-effect relationship with other things that we have no problem in describing as physical.

So in what sense are qualia non-physical?

In the same sense that the information flowing through your computer is non-physical. Though the physical thing is necessary for the existence of the information, it is not the same thing as the information. The information has properties beyond that which manifests it.

westprog

1st May 2008, 01:49 AM

First you need to show that a "subjective experience" is something that can't be modeled mathematically. Round and round the merry-go-round!

A subjective experience can't even be clearly defined. How can it possibly be mathematically modelled?

Robin and Joe are right about this -- the "hard problem" evaporates as soon as it is defined properly.

It evaporates as soon as it's ignored.

Consciousness is an entirely unnecessary concept if you want to explain the universe in scientific terms. Compare a person with an identical humanoid robot without consciousness. Is there any way to differentiate between their behaviours?

We don't even have any idea whether someone else's experience of consciousness is in any way comparable to our own. For all I know, every different person experiences "red" and "sad" in an entirely different way.

westprog

1st May 2008, 02:01 AM

Can the objective description of meteorology convey the weather? Yes, but only with great effort. Why do you assume the same won't eventually be true of subjective experience?

~~ Paul

"The weather" is a summary of a number of physical processes. We have no idea what subjective experience actually is. It doesn't equate to any physical process as far as we know.

Naturally, proponents of a purely physical universe would rather ignore subjective experience, or else just assume that somehow it will be figured out eventually. As things stand, there's no theory that explains consciousness, and no insights into what it is.

We don't need to plant electrodes into the brain to realise that consciousness interacts with the "real" world. We know that when we look at light with a particular wavelength, a chemical reaction occurs in the retina, an electrical impulse is sent to the brain, and we "see red". But we know nothing about what the experience of redness is or means.

Robin

1st May 2008, 03:30 AM

In the same sense that the information flowing through your computer is non-physical.
On the contrary, if it can be described by mathematics it is physical. What do you think it is if not physical?

Robin

1st May 2008, 04:45 AM

It evaporates as soon as it's ignored.
So who is ignoring it?
Consciousness is an entirely unnecessary concept if you want to explain the universe in scientific terms.
Any chance you might explain that absurd statement?
Compare a person with an identical humanoid robot without consciousness. Is there any way to differentiate between their behaviours?
It might be possible with some future technology to create something that externally mimics a human well enough to fool people into thinking it was conscious. It's brain, of course, would not resemble a human brain in any way.

But what is the point? Are you saying the fact that we might be able to create a behavioural facsimile of conscious behaviour indicates that consciousness is not physical? Why? What is the connection?
We don't even have any idea whether someone else's experience of consciousness is in any way comparable to our own. For all I know, every different person experiences "red" and "sad" in an entirely different way.
Not entirely true, we know that sad is unpleasant in others and we know that happy is pleasant in others. My red might be different from your red, certainly.

But so what? What relevance do these observations have on the question of whether consciousness is physical or not?

Robin

1st May 2008, 04:48 AM

A subjective experience can't even be clearly defined. How can it possibly be mathematically modelled?
Are you suggesting that no mathematical model could ever make predictions about subjective experience?

Robin

1st May 2008, 04:58 AM

"The weather" is a summary of a number of physical processes. We have no idea what subjective experience actually is. It doesn't equate to any physical process as far as we know.
You are simply assuming that subjective experience is not a physical process. What is it then?
Naturally, proponents of a purely physical universe would rather ignore subjective experience, or else just assume that somehow it will be figured out eventually.
I see. So I must simply be imagining all those books over the last 30 or so years by proponents of a purely physical universe going into detail about subjective experience.

Name me one such person who ignores subjective experience.
As things stand, there's no theory that explains consciousness, and no insights into what it is.
Sure. But as I said there are many, many "don't knows" in science. Why is this particular one special?
We don't need to plant electrodes into the brain to realise that consciousness interacts with the "real" world. We know that when we look at light with a particular wavelength, a chemical reaction occurs in the retina, an electrical impulse is sent to the brain, and we "see red". But we know nothing about what the experience of redness is or means.
Actually we don't know what anything in the universe is or means. Name me one thing.

But certainly we have a good deal to learn about conciousness. We are only at the very start of this field. But why does that make it non-physical?

westprog

1st May 2008, 05:26 AM

On the contrary, if it can be described by mathematics it is physical. What do you think it is if not physical?

A totally random set of bits on the computer will be physically identical with bits containing information.

Admittedly, the status of information is not clearly identical with the status of consciousness. Information is not a "thing" is the same way as matter and energy, but it can be dealt with, up to a point, by science. There are theories of information.

westprog

1st May 2008, 05:36 AM

On the contrary, if it can be described by mathematics it is physical. What do you think it is if not physical?

A very simple answer - we don't know.

How one thinks of this problem depends on the point of view. If one thinks of consciousness as something that individuals claim to experience when certain phenomena occur, then one might well decide that it is probably a physical process.

If, however, on deals with consciousness as the means by which one apprehends the supposed physical universe, and the conduit through which all information about the physical universe passes to us, then dismissing consciousness as a mere byproduct of that universe by some as yet not understood physical process might seem an assumption too far.

rocketdodger

1st May 2008, 07:57 AM

So you're one of those people that likes to delude themselves into thinking that something which can only be apprehended subjectively can be conveyed via objective description. Can I describe the sensation of pain using language/math to someone who has not experienced it? No.

Wrong. It is quite simple. For instance, I could describe to them the exact states of every molecule, and interaction between those molecules, during the time I experienced the pain.

If they could actually understand all that information, then they would know exactly how I felt. In fact, they would in effect "be" me during that period of understanding.

Maybe you can suggest a way in which it is possible to model qualia using math.

I just did. It is quite simple. Your problem seems to be that you are making the incorrect assumption that a model must be fully understood by a single human for it to be valid, which is clearly nonsense. It is quite clear that if one were to model an entire human brain, no single human could fully understand it (which means it could never be understood, given our current brains) because to do so would entail becoming that other mind.

It's the inadequacy of materialism/physicalism which gives us "wiggle room".

No, it is your inability to see the forest through the trees (or, to be specific, understand how simple mathematics can lead to an emergent consciousness).

In the same sense that the information flowing through your computer is non-physical. Though the physical thing is necessary for the existence of the information, it is not the same thing as the information. The information has properties beyond that which manifests it.

Yet, all of those emergent properties can be modeled by the mathematics the underlying physical components depend on. Otherwise, those properties would not exist.

I wish I could have written on one of my computer science exams "the structures and properties that emerge from this system are beyond mathematical description, so this whole test is bullsh**."

JoeEllison

1st May 2008, 07:59 AM

I see, so your entire subjective experience is nothing more than a "psuedo-something". Maybe you should start asking yourself why this concept is so difficult to pin down.

It is hard to pin down because it is philosophical nonsense designed to keep failed coffee shop poets gainfully employed? :D

rocketdodger

1st May 2008, 08:04 AM

A subjective experience can't even be clearly defined. How can it possibly be mathematically modelled?

Subjective experience -- the interaction between information from external stimuli and the information from one's internal consciousness. There, that is an exact definition. How is it not clear?

Do you consider the definition of the natural numbers to be "unclear" just because you can't picture the entire set in your head at once?

Compare a person with an identical humanoid robot without consciousness. Is there any way to differentiate between their behaviours?

Compare a person with an identical humanoid robot without consciousness yet thinks it is conscious. Is there any way to differentiate between their behaviours?

We don't even have any idea whether someone else's experience of consciousness is in any way comparable to our own. For all I know, every different person experiences "red" and "sad" in an entirely different way.

Which is why defining a subjective experience in a subjective way is doomed to fail -- yet all hard-problem proponents do so.

Robin

1st May 2008, 08:36 AM

A totally random set of bits on the computer will be physically identical with bits containing information.
Yes. So how do you get from there to "information is not physical"?
Admittedly, the status of information is not clearly identical with the status of consciousness. Information is not a "thing" is the same way as matter and energy, but it can be dealt with, up to a point, by science. There are theories of information.
Which suggests to me that it is physical.

Incidentally, I have no way of being sure that matter and energy are "things". Their status at the moment is that they are elements of a mathematical model that describes observational data.

Robin

1st May 2008, 08:45 AM

A very simple answer - we don't know.

How one thinks of this problem depends on the point of view. If one thinks of consciousness as something that individuals claim to experience when certain phenomena occur, then one might well decide that it is probably a physical process.

If, however, on deals with consciousness as the means by which one apprehends the supposed physical universe, and the conduit through which all information about the physical universe passes to us, then dismissing consciousness as a mere byproduct of that universe by some as yet not understood physical process might seem an assumption too far.
I don't think anybody is dismissing consciousness as a mere by-product.

See you are saying that suggesting that consciousness is a not yet understood physical process is an assumption too far.

But in that case your own suggestion that consciousness is a not yet understood non-physical process must be two assumptions to far.

To be a non-physical process consciousness could not follow the laws of physics (otherwise it would be, by definition, physical).

But it is clearly not random, so it would have to follow some other set of laws. But it interacts with the physical so there would have to be some transitionary set of rules to translate between your conjectured non-physical laws and the laws of physics.

A much simpler hypothesis is that it follows the rules of physics as it appears to do.

Robin

1st May 2008, 08:57 AM

Maybe you can suggest a way in which it is possible to model qualia using math.
That is not too difficult. In order for there to be a scientific model of something it must be at least indirectly observable and it must be possible to make testable predictions about it.

A physical model of something generally requires a hypothesis, predictions about observational data that could be expected if the hypothesis was true, predictions about observational data that could be expected if the hypothesis was false and a set of experiments that could test these predictions.

I can't see why that would be impossible with subjective experience. If fact science already deals with subjective experience in the same way it deals with anything else.

Take for example clinical trials of a depression treatment. There you will have a prediction about the reported subjective experiences of a population undergoing a pharmacological regimen as compared to the reported subjective experiences of a control group. There will be problems in subjectivity and misreporting but these can be controlled for using proper experimental design.

So although we are a long way from having a theory of consciousness, we can see already how such models can be tested.
It's the inadequacy of materialism/physicalism which gives us "wiggle room".
So please, specify the inadequacy and present your feasible alternative.
I should be more specific. When I say subjective experience, I mean qualitative aspects of reality; colors, sounds, etc. These things, though tied to events which can be objectively explained can only really be known subjectively. They are the essence of subjectivity. In order to communicate ideas about something using math and science, that something must have an objective quality to it, meaning it must be viewed from the outside. Qualia do not have this property as they are purely subjective. For this reason they defy, and always will defy, objective explanation.
Nonsense, as long as they can be indirectly observed and as long as we can make testable predictions about them (as we already do) why should there be a problem with objective explanations.

There are practical difficulties in obtaining objective observational data about subjective experiences, but that does not mean they exist in some separate metaphysical domain.

These difficulties pale into insignificance compared to the difficulties obtaining observational data about conditions during the big bang, or on Earth at the time life began.

JoeEllison

1st May 2008, 09:10 AM

There are practical difficulties in obtaining objective observational data about subjective experiences, but that does not mean they exist in some separate metaphysical domain.

Here's where a large part of the problem lies: when faced with a practical difficulty in observation, it is usually considered illogical to appeal to a higher level of difficulty in observation to "explain" it. Basically, the claim seems to appear like so:

1)I have observed something that I call "subjective experience."

2)It is exceedingly difficult to objectively measure the process behind "subjective experience."

3)Therefore, there MUST exist some unobserved and potentially unobservable "higher plane", where the processes behind "subjective experience" take place.

Somewhere between #2 and #3, there has been a complete breakdown of logic.

Dr. Fascism

1st May 2008, 12:50 PM

I'm not sure there are any materialist philosophers left, because the idea that only physical things exist is obsolete.

Nevertheless, here are a bunch of definitions of materialism that talk about physical matter:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

http://www.filosofia.net/materiales/rec/glosaen.htm

http://www.abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/guide/glossary.shtml

http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/intro/odop.html

http://www.li.suu.edu/library/humtxt/glossary/glossary.htm

Talking about physical processes helps, but still seems to exclude energy. I think this is why the term physicalism was invented.

Semantics. Materialism essentially means physicalism today. I mean, even a cursory reading on this subject would reveal this to you--and hell, let's look at wikipedia (the first source you cite):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

However, by itself materialism says nothing about how material substance should be characterized. In practice it is frequently assimilated to one variety of physicalism or another.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

Physicalism is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it has evolved with the physical sciences to incorporate far more sophisticated notions of physicality than matter, for example wave/particle relationships and non-material forces produced by particles. Some philosophers use the term "materialism" to denote descriptions based on the motions of matter and "physicalism" for descriptions based on matter and world geometry (see: Stoljar 2001).

Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

Physicalism is sometimes known as materialism. Historically, materialists held that everything was matter -- where matter was conceived as "an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist" (Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, par. 9). The reason for speaking of physicalism rather than materialism is to abstract away from this historical notion, which is usually thought of as too restrictive -- for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense (Dijksterhuis 1961, Yolton 1983). It is also to emphasize a connection to physics and the physical sciences. Indeed, physicalism is unusual among metaphysical doctrines in being associated historically with a commitment both to the sciences and to a particular branch of science, namely physics.

Sure, some distinction is sometimes made, but if you think you're clever because you're engaging in semantic quibbling--you're not.

I don't like those terms. I'll stick with scientific epistemology.

You think the two aren't related? While a vast amount of metaphysics is hogwash, it seems to me that much metaphysics also stems from epistemology and that often the two are very much related. Metaphysics is, I think it's fair to summarize as, "What *is* the world?", while epistemology is "How can we *know* the world?"

I found this portion of an outline for a class on google that nonetheless seems helpful:

http://faculty.deanza.edu/burkelarry/stories/storyReader$48

Epistemology is the part of philosophy that refers to a critical study of human knowledge and its limits. It asks questions like: what does it mean to know? how many kinds of knowing can we identify? what are the limits to knowing clearly? Is clear knowing all there is to knowing? how should we understand the human mind? what do we know when we know? what makes knowledge of any kind possible? what kind of reasoning is usable in metaphysics? is this form of reasoning unclear or vague? why? what is consciousness? what is experience and what does being "experimental" mean? These questions from epistemology were faced by philosophers over the whole long course of the history of philosophy, but in the modern west (c. 16th cent. ace.) they were faced with increasing attention. At that time, metaphysics and epistemology became intertwined with one another because the realm of metaphysical ideas seemed, in a scientific age, especially difficult to understand. Nevertheless, philosophers found the realm of the metaphysical could be explained once we understood the limits of human understanding.

And please, let's not get started about eliminative materialism. :D

Oh, I know this tactic. Trying to somehow preemptively shame or embarrass the other side into not arguing their case...? :D

BjornTheCyborg

1st May 2008, 02:59 PM

Wrong. It is quite simple. For instance, I could describe to them the exact states of every molecule, and interaction between those molecules, during the time I experienced the pain.

If they could actually understand all that information, then they would know exactly how I felt. In fact, they would in effect "be" me during that period of understanding.

This is untrue. You either know this or do not understand the concept of qualia. I suggest you go read about it.

I just did. It is quite simple. Your problem seems to be that you are making the incorrect assumption that a model must be fully understood by a single human for it to be valid, which is clearly nonsense. It is quite clear that if one were to model an entire human brain, no single human could fully understand it (which means it could never be understood, given our current brains) because to do so would entail becoming that other mind.

Your statements:

"If they could actually understand all that information, then they would know exactly how I felt. In fact, they would in effect "be" me during that period of understanding."

seem to contradict your previous statements of:

"no single human could fully understand it (which means it could never be understood, given our current brains) because to do so would entail becoming that other mind."

No, it is your inability to see the forest through the trees (or, to be specific, understand how simple mathematics can lead to an emergent consciousness).

Simple mathematics eh? Go repeat this claim to an AI researcher.

Yet, all of those emergent properties can be modeled by the mathematics the underlying physical components depend on. Otherwise, those properties would not exist.

There is a distinction to be made between the qualia and the particular state which is correlated with it. This is because information of the same kind can be stored different ways in different mediums.

That is not too difficult. In order for there to be a scientific model of something it must be at least indirectly observable and it must be possible to make testable predictions about it.

Not too difficult? Find a blind person, someone who has been blind form birth, and explain to them what you see when you see the color green using your mathematical model. At the end of your description them must know what green looks like, not simply have an objective description of the process behind perceiving green. Qualia is a valid philosophical problem whether or not your choose to admit it.

A physical model of something generally requires a hypothesis, predictions about observational data that could be expected if the hypothesis was true, predictions about observational data that could be expected if the hypothesis was false and a set of experiments that could test these predictions.

I can't see why that would be impossible with subjective experience. If fact science already deals with subjective experience in the same way it deals with anything else.

Take for example clinical trials of a depression treatment. There you will have a prediction about the reported subjective experiences of a population undergoing a pharmacological regimen as compared to the reported subjective experiences of a control group. There will be problems in subjectivity and misreporting but these can be controlled for using proper experimental design.

So although we are a long way from having a theory of consciousness, we can see already how such models can be tested.

Look, I understand that there are certain brain-states that correlate with the perception of certain qualitative aspects of reality and that we can model these brain-states using math. The question I'm posing is whether or not these brain-states are the qualitative aspects themselves. You seem to think that they are. I do not. The reason I do not think this is because information can have multiple forms, that is, it can be represented differently depending on the medium in which it exists.

Does understanding the brain-state correlated with red give you an understanding of what red is?

There are practical difficulties in obtaining objective observational data about subjective experiences, but that does not mean they exist in some separate metaphysical domain.

Where do they exist then? In the brain? On your computer hard-drive? In outside reality?

rocketdodger

1st May 2008, 04:35 PM

This is untrue. You either know this or do not understand the concept of qualia. I suggest you go read about it.

Why is it untrue?

It is quite simple, and if you are reading the other thread on this issue, you might see that. For another human to understand my description, there would need to be some mapping from my reference frame to theirs that allows for an analog of the experience in question.

Your statements:

"If they could actually understand all that information, then they would know exactly how I felt. In fact, they would in effect "be" me during that period of understanding."

seem to contradict your previous statements of:

"no single human could fully understand it (which means it could never be understood, given our current brains) because to do so would entail becoming that other mind."

Why? Those statements taken together entail "if they could, then X would happen, but because X clearly cannot happen, then they can't."

Simple mathematics eh? Go repeat this claim to an AI researcher.

That claim was made by an AI "researcher."

This is exactly what I am talking about -- you don't seem to realize that all emergent systems are simply the mathematical result of their very simple components. Kind of like how all AI is founded upon (and can be derived from) the simple axioms of number theory.

There is a distinction to be made between the qualia and the particular state which is correlated with it. This is because information of the same kind can be stored different ways in different mediums.

The only necessary distinction that I can see is uniqueness (this is being discussed in the other thread). Aside from that, no distinction is implicit.

Does understanding the brain-state correlated with red give you an understanding of what red is?

If the mapping between the sampled brain and your own is good enough, then yes.

BjornTheCyborg

1st May 2008, 07:52 PM

Why is it untrue?

It is quite simple, and if you are reading the other thread on this issue, you might see that. For another human to understand my description, there would need to be some mapping from my reference frame to theirs that allows for an analog of the experience in question.

So all you need to do to describe the sensation of the color green to someone is to describe your total brain-state when you sense green and then they're supposed to somehow change their own brain-state to match yours and they too will sense green? And this is all simple?

Why? Those statements taken together entail "if they could, then X would happen, but because X clearly cannot happen, then they can't."

First you propose a hypothetical situation where you basically say that if you describe your total brain-state to an individual then they should be able to replicate that brain-state in their own brains thus replicating the sensation you are experiencing. You use this to argue against my position that one cannot describe purely subjective sensations.

Then you go on state you that this hypothetical situation cannot happen, because no one person can totally understand the human brain/mind because then they would be that brain/mind. Does this not contradict your original argument?

That claim was made by an AI "researcher."

This is exactly what I am talking about -- you don't seem to realize that all emergent systems are simply the mathematical result of their very simple components. Kind of like how all AI is founded upon (and can be derived from) the simple axioms of number theory.

You talk like AI has already been invented and that it works the way you say it does.

The only necessary distinction that I can see is uniqueness (this is being discussed in the other thread). Aside from that, no distinction is implicit.

Here in lies the problem. You do not understand my argument so I will elaborate. I agree that if someone could discover the exact brain-state
that correlates to red, model it with mathematics, and then replicate it in the brain of someone who has never seen red, they will then see red. This is obvious. However, simply modeling the brain-state that gives rise to the color red does not answer questions about what red is. What is it's essence? Why is it red and not some other color? What is it made of? Where does it come from? These are the aspects of qualia that cannot be objectively defined because doing so only describes the physical form which contains them. They can be contained in many forms and in different ways, without losing their essence. This would seem to indicate that though they rely on a physical form to exist, they have properties which are separate from those of the physical form and and that it is possible that these properties are not necessarily physical.

Ask yourself, what is the substance of thought and information?

Robin

1st May 2008, 09:34 PM

Semantics. Materialism essentially means physicalism today.
You have it the wrong way round - Physicalism has come to mean Materialism today. Originally Physicalism was a stridently anti-metaphysical position
I mean, even a cursory reading on this subject would reveal this to you--and hell, let's look at wikipedia (the first source you cite):
Oh, good choice. Wikipedia has the metaphysical definition of Physicalism and then cites Neurath!!!

Neurath would be spinning in his grave at being called a metaphysician :)

And Stanford. Well, it is not too bad but in their article on Neutral Monism they identify Mach and Carnap as Neutral Monists for crying out loud!

See A.J Ayer's "Philosophy in the 20th Century" which has a whole chapter on the real Physicalism.

Oh and the real nail in the coffin from the Stanford article:

Physicalism is sometimes known as materialism. Historically, materialists held that everything was matter -- where matter was conceived as "an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist (Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, par. 9).
Err... citing Berkeley as an authority on the Materialist definition of matter!!!

Calling that stupid would land me a class action from stupid people.

Historically, Materialist have actually held that:
Thus, relatively to us, matter is all that affects our senses in any manner
whatever; the various properties we attribute to matter, by which we
discriminate its diversity, are founded on the different impressions we
receive on the changes they produce in us.

The System of Nature, Vol. 1 Baron D'Holbach

I doubt any Materialist since D'Holbach has even used the term.

arthwollipot

1st May 2008, 09:36 PM

I really shouldn't read threads like this.

rocketdodger

1st May 2008, 09:38 PM

So all you need to do to describe the sensation of the color green to someone is to describe your total brain-state when you sense green and then they're supposed to somehow change their own brain-state to match yours and they too will sense green? And this is all simple?
Yeah. You were able to describe the process in a single sentence -- that seems pretty simple to me. Simple to understand, that is.

First you propose a hypothetical situation where you basically say that if you describe your total brain-state to an individual then they should be able to replicate that brain-state in their own brains thus replicating the sensation you are experiencing. You use this to argue against my position that one cannot describe purely subjective sensations.

Then you go on state you that this hypothetical situation cannot happen, because no one person can totally understand the human brain/mind because then they would be that brain/mind. Does this not contradict your original argument?

I was under the impression that you were claiming qualia can't be objectively defined because of something intrinsic to qualia, not because of limitations of the current human brain. So I gave an example of how to objectively define qualia so that another person (who might happen to be a more advanced human of the future, whatever) could understand it if they were capable of handling that much information.

Furthermore, I was under the impression that you were claiming the inability to objectively define qualia so that others can understand it is proof that qualia in general cannot be objectively defined. So I gave an example of why it isn't -- namely, that the current human brain just can't process all the information needed to understand such an objective definition.

If, on the other hand, you are merely claiming that qualia can't be objectively defined/modeled now, by our meager human brains, then I would certainly agree, and we have nothing to argue about anymore.

You talk like AI has already been invented and that it works the way you say it does.
If it hasn't been invented hen how can it be a research field? How could I spend 8 hours a day programming them?

I take it you mean a conscious AI, what purists call a "true" AI. Well, I am confident that whatever structures and algorithms lead to such an entity will be just as dependent upon the simple axioms of mathematics as everything else in the known universe.

However, simply modeling the brain-state that gives rise to the color red does not answer questions about what red is.
I think it does. Prove me wrong!

What is it's essence? Why is it red and not some other color?
Because the photoreceptors of your retina give a pretty consistent response to the tint you consider red, which means that if you look at an apple each day for a year, most likely it will be red each time rather than a random color of the rainbow.

Because when you think of red, the intermediate neural structures in your visual cortex are activated in an identical way, eliciting the sensation of red even though there is nothing red in front of you.

Because the neural structures created from constant excitement of those visual cortex neurons are linked with a huge number of other structures that represent anything having to do with what you consider red, including the word "red," apples, fire engines, blood, mars, soviet russia, whatever.

What is it made of?
Neurons, the signals the propagate, and the structures they form, and the interactions between them.

Where does it come from?
Repetitive exposure to stimuli that have something "red" in common. Remember the old cognitive science jingle "neurons that fire together wire together?" That is all you need, really. You see an apple and a fire engine. Hey, those two have something in common! You see a childrens book with RED at the top of the page and a swatch of paint tinted red. Hey, that elicits the same sensation as the apple and the fire engine, so they must be RED as well!

These are the aspects of qualia that cannot be objectively defined because doing so only describes the physical form which contains them.
Well I kind of just did.

They can be contained in many forms and in different ways, without losing their essence. This would seem to indicate that though they rely on a physical form to exist, they have properties which are separate from those of the physical form and and that it is possible that these properties are not necessarily physical.
Or, it could indicate that they are nothing but derived information. As in,

RED = FindCommonAttributes( {apple, fire engine, blood, mars, soviet russia, lipstick, rubies, hot, clown's nose, most abused qualia } );

Ask yourself, what is the substance of thought and information?
Material.

Robin

1st May 2008, 09:41 PM

I really shouldn't read threads like this.
I really shouldn't start threads like this.

Robin

1st May 2008, 10:28 PM

Not too difficult? Find a blind person, someone who has been blind form birth, and explain to them what you see when you see the color green using your mathematical model. At the end of your description them must know what green looks like, not simply have an objective description of the process behind perceiving green.
Why?

A scientific model of an ocean is not wet.
A scientific model of weight is not heavy.
A scientific model of light intensity is not bright.

So why are you insisting that a scientific model of greenness should be green?

But scientists may well be able to make a blind person see green one day by recreating the brain states they say cause green.
Qualia is a valid philosophical problem whether or not your choose to admit it.
If Qualia is a valid philosophical problem then please state the problem, as I have been asking you guys to do.

Oh, and please state how conjecturing that qualia do not obey the laws of physics answers the problem.
Look, I understand that there are certain brain-states that correlate with the perception of certain qualitative aspects of reality and that we can model these brain-states using math.
You didn't read the example. The predictions were not about brain states, the predictions were about qualia. So they were not modelling brain states they were modelling qualia.

Second point is that this is no mere correlation. If scientists can say that qualia will change in a specific way under a specific pharmalogical regimen then they have not just demonstrated correlation. They have demonstrated causality. So we can see that qualia exist in a causal relationship with things that we all call physical.

And yet, somehow, we are expected to accept the conjecture that qualia is a thing in itself that does obey the laws of physics.
The question I'm posing is whether or not these brain-states are the qualitative aspects themselves. You seem to think that they are. I do not.
Please quote where I have said so. I don't think I have ever claimed to know more about this subject than neuroscientists or tried to second-guess them in any way. My understanding of the current thinking is that consciousness is a higher level feature of the brain, somewhat analogous to the sense in which fluidity is a higher level function of large collections of H2O molecules in certain conditions. A neuron firing is not a qualititative aspect any more than an H2O molecule is a wave breaking on the sand.
Does understanding the brain-state correlated with red give you an understanding of what red is?
Indeed the current understanding of the neurological events that cause red have given us quite a profound understanding of what red is, well beyond our mere experience of it. See Ramachandran's articles on Synasthesia.
Where do they exist then? In the brain? On your computer hard-drive? In outside reality?
How would I know? In the brain would be my guess, but I am happy to go along with what science tells us about this. I make no assumptions - some theoretical physicists conjecture that time and space may turn out to be useful concept only under certain conditions.

So I don't try to second guess science.

But why should my lack of knowledge of "where" subjective states are lead me to conjecture an entirely separate universe with different laws? That only creates a whole set of new problems without answering the original question.

Robin

1st May 2008, 10:57 PM

I agree that if someone could discover the exact brain-state that correlates to red, model it with mathematics, and then replicate it in the brain of someone who has never seen red, they will then see red.
So in other words the brain state does not just correlate with red, it causes red. Which very strongly suggests that whatever it is, it obeys the laws of physics.
However, simply modeling the brain-state that gives rise to the color red does not answer questions about what red is. What is it's essence? Why is it red and not some other color? What is it made of? Where does it come from?
Seems to me you are asking science to provide us with the noumena. Science does not provide us with the noumena for anything else. What is energy made of? What is it's essence? Where does it come from?
Ask yourself, what is the substance of thought and information?
What is the substance of energy? what is the substance of anything at all? Nobody knows and that is why Materialism is traditionally expressed in terms of physical laws, rather than substances.

BjornTheCyborg

2nd May 2008, 01:59 AM

Yeah. You were able to describe the process in a single sentence -- that seems pretty simple to me. Simple to understand, that is.

OK. Now that I know what you are talking about, let me ask you this: If the you use the ''red" brain-state model to invoke the red sensation in an individual, are they obtaining the sensation of "red" from the objective definition of "red" as being the brain-state or from the subjective experience of red that they are now experiencing?

I was under the impression that you were claiming qualia can't be objectively defined because of something intrinsic to qualia, not because of limitations of the current human brain. So I gave an example of how to objectively define qualia so that another person (who might happen to be a more advanced human of the future, whatever) could understand it if they were capable of handling that much information.

Furthermore, I was under the impression that you were claiming the inability to objectively define qualia so that others can understand it is proof that qualia in general cannot be objectively defined. So I gave an example of why it isn't -- namely, that the current human brain just can't process all the information needed to understand such an objective definition.

If, on the other hand, you are merely claiming that qualia can't be objectively defined/modeled now, by our meager human brains, then I would certainly agree, and we have nothing to argue about anymore.

Lets stop arguing about it then.

If it hasn't been invented hen how can it be a research field? How could I spend 8 hours a day programming them?

I take it you mean a conscious AI, what purists call a "true" AI. Well, I am confident that whatever structures and algorithms lead to such an entity will be just as dependent upon the simple axioms of mathematics as everything else in the known universe.

Of course I mean a true AI. I don't consider chess-playing algorithms as being intelligent in the same sense we are.

I am not disagreeing that mathematics can be used to model a mind/brain, only that this model, though it can be used to create the sensation of red, is not itself the sensation!

Because the photoreceptors of your retina give a pretty consistent response to the tint you consider red, which means that if you look at an apple each day for a year, most likely it will be red each time rather than a random color of the rainbow.

Because when you think of red, the intermediate neural structures in your visual cortex are activated in an identical way, eliciting the sensation of red even though there is nothing red in front of you.

Because the neural structures created from constant excitement of those visual cortex neurons are linked with a huge number of other structures that represent anything having to do with what you consider red, including the word "red," apples, fire engines, blood, mars, soviet russia, whatever.

Neurons, the signals the propagate, and the structures they form, and the interactions between them.

Repetitive exposure to stimuli that have something "red" in common. Remember the old cognitive science jingle "neurons that fire together wire together?" That is all you need, really. You see an apple and a fire engine. Hey, those two have something in common! You see a childrens book with RED at the top of the page and a swatch of paint tinted red. Hey, that elicits the same sensation as the apple and the fire engine, so they must be RED as well!

I think all we can do at this point is agree to disagree as you insist on claiming that information contained in a physical form is the same-thing as the physical form itself.

Or, it could indicate that they are nothing but derived information. As in,

RED = FindCommonAttributes( {apple, fire engine, blood, mars, soviet russia, lipstick, rubies, hot, clown's nose, most abused qualia } );

Derived from what?

Why?

A scientific model of an ocean is not wet.
A scientific model of weight is not heavy.
A scientific model of light intensity is not bright.

So why are you insisting that a scientific model of greenness should be green?

I'm not. I'm claiming that the scientific model of the brain-state of greenness is not the same thing as green itself and that the true mathematical essence of green cannot be obtained by humans due to it's strictly subjective nature.

But scientists may well be able to make a blind person see green one day by recreating the brain states they say cause green.

I'm not disputing this.

If Qualia is a valid philosophical problem then please state the problem, as I have been asking you guys to do.

Look it up on Wikipedia.

Oh, and please state how conjecturing that qualia do not obey the laws of physics answers the problem.

All I wish to show is that, not everything can be explained in terms of mathematical models and physical processes.

You didn't read the example. The predictions were not about brain states, the predictions were about qualia. So they were not modelling brain states they were modelling qualia.

The only way that you can model quaila in the brain is to use a mathematical model that describes that brain-state. So when they model qualia, they are in effect modeling brain-states.

Second point is that this is no mere correlation. If scientists can say that qualia will change in a specific way under a specific pharmalogical regimen then they have not just demonstrated correlation. They have demonstrated causality. So we can see that qualia exist in a causal relationship with things that we all call physical.

Yes, they do. But does that mean they are that physical thing? If a telephone wire is carrying an audio transmission and you blast that telephone wire with high-frequency electromagnetic radiation, it will cause alterations in the molecules which constitute the wire and garble the transmission. Does this mean that transmission is the wire?

And yet, somehow, we are expected to accept the conjecture that qualia is a thing in itself that does obey the laws of physics.

You are only expected to consider that perhaps, maybe, a strictly materialist/physicalist philosophy can't explain everything in terms of mathematical models.

Please quote where I have said so. I don't think I have ever claimed to know more about this subject than neuroscientists or tried to second-guess them in any way. My understanding of the current thinking is that consciousness is a higher level feature of the brain, somewhat analogous to the sense in which fluidity is a higher level function of large collections of H2O molecules in certain conditions. A neuron firing is not a qualititative aspect any more than an H2O molecule is a wave breaking on the sand.

Though you have not stated it directly your materialistic view implies this. In order to claim that qualia can be mathematically modeled you must model that physical process or "brain-state". That model only tells us how to make the brain experience green and not what green actually is. Since this is the only way you can define green materialistically, it effectively makes green and all other qualia, undefinable it terms of a physical process.

Indeed the current understanding of the neurological events that cause red have given us quite a profound understanding of what red is, well beyond our mere experience of it. See Ramachandran's articles on Synasthesia.

But they still can't explain what the essence of red is.

How would I know? In the brain would be my guess, but I am happy to go along with what science tells us about this. I make no assumptions - some theoretical physicists conjecture that time and space may turn out to be useful concept only under certain conditions.

So I don't try to second guess science.

But why should my lack of knowledge of "where" subjective states are lead me to conjecture an entirely separate universe with different laws? That only creates a whole set of new problems without answering the original question.

Sorry I thought were having a philosophical discussion in a forum devoted to philosophy!

So in other words the brain state does not just correlate with red, it causes red. Which very strongly suggests that whatever it is, it obeys the laws of physics.

Only insofar as the physical medium that contains it obeys the laws of physics.

Seems to me you are asking science to provide us with the noumena. Science does not provide us with the noumena for anything else. What is energy made of? What is it's essence? Where does it come from?

What is the substance of energy? what is the substance of anything at all? Nobody knows and that is why Materialism is traditionally expressed in terms of physical laws, rather than substances.

I am asking science to provide us with qualia, which it can't.

Robin

2nd May 2008, 04:26 AM

I'm not. I'm claiming that the scientific model of the brain-state of greenness is not the same thing as green itself and that the true mathematical essence of green cannot be obtained by humans due to it's strictly subjective nature.
We cannot obtain the true mathematical essence of anything so green does not differ from any other physical thing. Name me one thing for which we have the true mathematical essence.
Look it up on Wikipedia.
Wikipedia is rubbish on philosophy. I take it then that you don't know what this problem is that you accuse me of ignoring.
All I wish to show is that, not everything can be explained in terms of mathematical models and physical processes.
Possibly - mathematics has its limitations, science has its limitations. On the other hand we don't have any other epistemology that can come close to providing us with the information that science can.
The only way that you can model quaila in the brain is to use a mathematical model that describes that brain-state. So when they model qualia, they are in effect modeling brain-states.
But I thought you said qualia and brain states were not the same thing. So how can you say that a hypothesis is modelling brain states when it is making testable predictions about qualia?
Yes, they do. But does that mean they are that physical thing? If a telephone wire is carrying an audio transmission and you blast that telephone wire with high-frequency electromagnetic radiation, it will cause alterations in the molecules which constitute the wire and garble the transmission. Does this mean that transmission is the wire?
No, it means they are all physical things following the same physical laws.
You are only expected to consider that perhaps, maybe, a strictly materialist/physicalist philosophy can't explain everything in terms of mathematical models.
Again, possibly not. But then again neither can anything else. I would only consider Materialism mistaken if some other epistemology could fill in the blanks. None can.

All it means is that perhaps there are some things we can never know.
Though you have not stated it directly your materialistic view implies this. In order to claim that qualia can be mathematically modeled you must model that physical process or "brain-state". That model only tells us how to make the brain experience green and not what green actually is. Since this is the only way you can define green materialistically, it effectively makes green and all other qualia, undefinable it terms of a physical process.
But it is definable in terms of a physical process since we can make testable predictions about it. Now remember we cannot tell what energy, matter or space time actually are, so if it turns out we cannot say what qualia are, that does not differentiate it from other physical things, does it?
But they still can't explain what the essence of red is.
Or what the essence of energy is, or what the essence of matter is, or what the essence of space time is. So you have not differentiated qualia from anything else we term physical.
Sorry I thought were having a philosophical discussion in a forum devoted to philosophy!
What is your point. Should I be able to determine things in a philosophy forum which the best scientists in the world cannot determine?
Only insofar as the physical medium that contains it obeys the laws of physics.
And you are totally unable to identify any other set of laws it might obey, or any reason whatsoever to think so...
I am asking science to provide us with qualia, which it can't.
Nor can it provide us with energy, nor matter, nor space time. All it can provide us with are models with which we can make testable predictions about empirical observations. It can do this as well for qualia as it can for anything else that we could call physical.

I cannot understand why you are asking science to do for qualia what it cannot do for anything else and when it fails you say "well - it can't be physical, can it"

By that logic then nothing is physical. Actually saying everything is physical and saying nothing is physical amounts to exactly the same thing.

rocketdodger

2nd May 2008, 07:45 AM

I am not disagreeing that mathematics can be used to model a mind/brain, only that this model, though it can be used to create the sensation of red, is not itself the sensation!
Yes but as I have said, the only difference between a nearly-perfect model and the actual thing being modeled is uniqueness. Robin is now pointing this out to you as well. It is impossible to model anything absolutely perfectly (what Robin calls "the essence") because of the identity axiom. No matter how much like X we make something, it still isn't X, and that applies to everything, not just qualia.

I think all we can do at this point is agree to disagree as you insist on claiming that information contained in a physical form is the same-thing as the physical form itself.
No, I am claiming that if the physical form can be modeled then so can the information. And once the information is modeled, you are done, because information and a near-perfect model of that information are the same thing, except for uniqueness. Which brings us to this:

OK. Now that I know what you are talking about, let me ask you this: If the you use the ''red" brain-state model to invoke the red sensation in an individual, are they obtaining the sensation of "red" from the objective definition of "red" as being the brain-state or from the subjective experience of red that they are now experiencing?
The subjective experience of red is nothing more than being the objective experience of red. subjective = objective + uniqueness. That is the only difference. So the answer is "both," because you can't have subjective without the objective as a base.

Derived from what?

Other information.

Kawphy

2nd May 2008, 05:11 PM

Tell me about eliminative materialism, Paul.

The best approach, in my view, is to contrast Eliminativist Materialism with Dennett's epistemology/metaphysics (which is, arguably, a form of instrumentalism). The key to this contast is the demarcation problem.

'What is the key difference between Science and Pseudo-Science? Is there a litmus test we can perform to determine if a given explanation or model is one or the other?'

In a proper understanding of science, there is no demarcation problem. Every explanation of observable phenomena is scientifically testable - and 'pseudoscience' is essentially any such explanation which, despite failing the tests of science, continues to have strong proponents.

But there's two seemingly inconsistent explanations of the scientific process.

The first view is that any hypothesis (or model, or explanation, or theory-with-a-lower-case-t, or conjecture, etc) which implies a prediction which is falsified, through empirical research, is itself falsified.

The second view is that any hypothesis (etc) which produces predictions at rates of *better than chance* is valid (as invalid predictions should be right no more often then flipping a coin).

'Folk Psychology' is the theory (lower-case t) that an agent holds propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, intentions) which can be used to predict and explain behaviors. For example, if you hold the belief that Indianapolis is the capital of Indiana, and the desire to go to the Capital of Indiana, you'll for the intention to go to Indianapolis, and act accordingly. We can predict from your belief and your desire what your intention will be, and predict from your intention what your behavior will be. We all use folk psychology for understanding one another, and we use it to predict peoples' behaviors. If a guy behaves a particular way towards a girl you know, you might form the hypothesis that he holds the desire to be with that girl, and that effects your predictions of his behavior - and if those predictions are proven false, you re-consider your hypothesis.

The problem of reductionism is that there's no way to correlate 1:1 brain-states with propositional attitudes. This inability to reduce one to the other while both 'clearly' exist is what led to Dualism.

So Dennett looks at folk psychology and says 'Hey, it works!' He's a materialist, he doesn't believe in non-physical substance, and he believes everything that can be perceived is ultimately caused by physical processes. He also, like most contemporary philosophers, rejects reductionism. And he describes his viewpoint of 'heterophenomenology' as regarding human behavior as raw data, but not as authoritative statements of truth. Allow me to explain:
Suppose you talk to your friend, and he says 'I had a dream last night that I was chasing a rabbit.' As a non-scientist, you'll assume that he is reporting a true event - that in some mind-space, his mind-self was chasing a mind-rabbit.
Similarly, if your dog is sleeping on the rug and starts tossing, turning, moving its legs, and so on you might say 'He's dreaming that he's chasing a rabbit!'
Both are descriptions of physical behaviors from which we infer some mental state.
In the second example, a scientist would be critical and say 'Let's not anthropomorphize; the dog is laying down, eyes closed, and is moving its legs. That's all the data we have, don't invent data.'
A serious scientist doing research in psychology should use the same criteria. You can't say 'person X had a dream Y', but rather 'person X reported the dream Y.' When we anthropomorphize people, we allow the qualia-bias to enter into our scientific explanation of the world (unjustifiably).

But suppose I give you a photograph of an Elephant, and super-impose a 10% random noise filter ('snow') over it. You'll form the hypothesis that the image is of an Elephant. This produces a number of predictions - that it will have a trunk, 4 legs, big ears (we'll assume African elephant), and so on. But if you take it further, you can create a prediction for what each pixel will look like - and every 'noise' pixel obscuring the image will 'falsify' your hypothesis. Does that mean the hypothesis is false? No - the prediction is correct at better-than-chance. If, for example, I put the random noise filter at 100%, the pixel predictions based on the hypothesis that the image is an elephant will be correct at no better than chance.

Similarly, when you employ folk psychology, there is noise. There are predictions you make that turn out false. Even with self-reporting, it's not hard to find someone that reports belief X and desire Y, such that X and Y imply intention Z, and who behave inconsistently with intention Z (psychologists usually call that cognitive dissonance ;) ). And a person who, self-reporting their beliefs and desires, produce predictions (via folk psychology) at chance will probably be regarded as mentally deficient or insane.

So Dennett calls consciousness a 'real pattern.' He rejects qualia, he rejects dualism, he rejects reductionism, but he beliefs there's a 'real pattern' of conscious behavior.

Churchland takes a much tougher stance. He states that any scientific theory that can be falsified ought to be rejected and replaced with a new theory. Newtonian physics is a scientific Theory, and it can be falsified (with, for example, the prediction of the orbit of mercury). It has therefore been replaced with Relativity (and/or Quantum Mechanics). Similarly, Alchemy gave way to Chemistry and Astrology gave way to Astronomy. Churchland argues that Folk Psychology should give way to Neurology. He argues that a complete account of neurology should predict human behavior *perfectly*, without the need to hypothesize anything about propositional attitudes (or any non-physical causes). Therefore, he argues, Folk Psychology should be 'eliminated' from the scientific lexicon. He goes so far to draw a thought experiment where we create a language that has no room for propositional attitudes. Imagine, for example, that we all have radio transmitters and receivers built directly into our brains which merely transmit raw data on the neurological behavior of our brains - similar to how the hemispheres of our brains communicate via the corpus callosum. Human beings would still be capable of functioning as social organisms, of cooperating, of competing, and so on without anybody attributing propositional attitudes to eachother.

Dennett might concede that point, but the brain is, after all, a pattern recognizing machine - and as long as there is a pattern of Folk Psychology present, the brain will continue to identify it and use it. That does not imply anything about qualia, non-physical substance, or anything metaphysical. And the p-zombie argument PROVES that qualia is not necessary for the Folk Psychology pattern to exist and be detectable.

edit - Churchland has a valid criticism of Dennett: If you accept that any theory that produces predictions at better-than-chance is valid, then you must regard Newtonian Physics as valid - along with a number of falsified 'pseudo-scientific' explanations of the universe which make thousands of false predictions, but nonetheless are capable of predicting and explaining some things at better-than-chance.

Where Churchland and Dennett agree -
If you suppose we have a p-zombie world where we are all merely physical machines acting exactly as we do (even exhibiting behaviors like reporting dreams or claiming to hold propositional attitudes), adding the existence of 'qualia' does not improve our ability to predict or describe any observable phenomena. In twin-earths, one where qualia exists and one where it does not, science is *equally* capable of accounting for human behavior. Thus, the only reason to insist qualia exists is a non-scientific bias.

Robin

3rd May 2008, 03:34 AM

Where Churchland and Dennett agree -
If you suppose we have a p-zombie world where we are all merely physical machines acting exactly as we do (even exhibiting behaviors like reporting dreams or claiming to hold propositional attitudes), adding the existence of 'qualia' does not improve our ability to predict or describe any observable phenomena. In twin-earths, one where qualia exists and one where it does not, science is *equally* capable of accounting for human behavior. Thus, the only reason to insist qualia exists is a non-scientific bias.
Hmmm... I don't think this is quite Dennett's position though - Dennett rejects the p-zombie as a useful philosophic concept except that he regards it as an example of his opponents shooting themselves in the foot:
Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that I think is wrong with current thinking about consciousness.

Daniel C Dennett - The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/unzombie.htm
I liked your summation of Eliminative Materialism btw

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

3rd May 2008, 09:41 AM

It could only have been obsolete if it had ever been proposed in the first place. Name me a Materialist philosopher that has ever proposed the idea.
All I'm saying is that the definition of materialism has changed over the centuries as we've come to understand the physical world better. Back when people thought that the physical world was a simple collection of matter, philosophers invented the term materialism. As our understanding grew, they invented the term physicalism to encompass the new concepts such as energy and forces. There are no strict materialists left because the original definition of the term is obsolete in the face of scientific progress.

I suppose that we could simply say now that materialism = physicalism.

Er... why? Can energy not be modelled using mathematics?
Yes, it can, but is energy a "physical process"?

Why not, the basic idea [eliminative materialism] is pretty sound, that there is only one set of physical laws, so all scientific models could eventually be eliminated in favour of a single physical model.
Sure, but that won't help people accept the idea that our folk understanding of the mind is deeply flawed.

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

3rd May 2008, 09:48 AM

Kawphy

3rd May 2008, 01:04 PM

What is the metaphysical context for this thought experiment? If it is materialism/physicalism, then it is not possible to have two Earths, one with qualia and one without. Whatever subset of brain processes we call qualia, that subset would exist in both worlds. If the subset is empty, it is empty in both worlds.

The problem with the p-zombie argument is that the p-zombie is an incoherent concept under materialism.

~~ Paul
No, the problem with the p-zombie argument is that the p-zombie is an incoherent concept under alternatives to materialism. If you believe there's EVIDENCE for the existence of qualia, then qualia must have a causal role (something with no causal role is undetectable). If qualia has a causal role, the idea of a physically-identical-but-mentally-different universe is imposible.

But that would seemingly be a dualistic concept of the universe. If dualism is false, then all causes are physical. If qualia has a causal role, and all causes are physical, qualia must be physical - but this can't be, as reductionism fails!

Qualia-freaks really write themselves into a corner by insisting they're not dualists. By doing so, they 'prove' that the twin-earths scenario is a real possibility. The fact that it is not - the fact that the twin earths are completely indistinguishable, utterly identical* - proves the qualia freaks wrong.

This is what Dennett means when he says they clutch to an idea and fall off a cliff. There's also a quote in 'Consciousness Explained' where he says that we all ARE p-zombies (followed by a parenthetal threatening to curse anyone who quotes that out-of-context).

*the only way to argue it is different is to resort to epiphenomenalism - but that's still a form of dualism.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

3rd May 2008, 02:25 PM

No, the problem with the p-zombie argument is that the p-zombie is an incoherent concept under alternatives to materialism. If you believe there's EVIDENCE for the existence of qualia, then qualia must have a causal role (something with no causal role is undetectable). If qualia has a causal role, the idea of a physically-identical-but-mentally-different universe is imposible.
Under materialism, yes. Under some form of dualism, I could make a copy of a dualistic universe in which the mental component of the physical/mental dual is empty. Then I would have the physical attributes without the qualia. As long as qualia had no causal effect on the physical, we're all set.

But that would seemingly be a dualistic concept of the universe. If dualism is false, then all causes are physical. If qualia has a causal role, and all causes are physical, qualia must be physical - but this can't be, as reductionism fails!
Why would reductionism fail? Qualia would simply be a name given to a subset of brain functions. Do we have to assume that the notion is a dualistic one?

This is what Dennett means when he says they clutch to an idea and fall off a cliff. There's also a quote in 'Consciousness Explained' where he says that we all ARE p-zombies (followed by a parenthetal threatening to curse anyone who quotes that out-of-context).
We are p-zombies if qualia are required to be defined dualistically. Is it?

*the only way to argue it is different is to resort to epiphenomenalism - but that's still a form of dualism.
The only way that epiphenomenalism can possibly work is so extraordinarily improbable that I think we can dismiss it out of hand.

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

3rd May 2008, 02:33 PM

Kawphy

3rd May 2008, 07:27 PM

Aha! The improbability of epiphenomenalism is precisely the same thing as the improbability of a dualism in which the mental has no causal effect on the physical. So you are right, Kawphy, p-zombies are nearly incoherent under dualism. And incoherent under physicalism.

That leaves idealism. How do they fare under idealism?

~~ Paul

I'm glad you asked ;)

Ultimately, the 'hard problem' of consciousness (which materialists/physicalists 'have to account for') is just a re-statement of the Problem of Other Minds. I assume I have a mind. I report that I have direct access to it*. Then, I assume other people I see have minds. But that gets to be a leap of logic - as all I have direct access to is the observable physical data of your body. How can I therefore reasonably conclude that there is more to you than your physical body?

Turn the problem on yourself, you have the 'hard problem.' Ultimately, we only have access to physical data about ourselves. But we assume we DO have minds. How do we justify that assumption? We can't. And the 'hard problem' insists that there must be a way, rather than accepting something like instrumentalism or eliminativism. [In a sense, we recognize the problem of other minds, are faced with the difficulty of proving to OTHERS that WE have minds (and are not, in essence, p-zombies), realize that there is absolutely no possible way to do this, and then say 'And that's a problem!' Well, it's not if we just assume there's no difference between a p-zombie and a non-p-zombie ;)]

In the case of idealism, the problem of other minds persists. We assume all that exists is non-physical substance; that the 'real world' is, essentially, a virtual world created by God for us to interface with eachother in. The consistency and coherency of our perceptions - from this point of view - becomes PROOF of God's existence (as only something with the unlimited power of God could create a virtual world for all our minds to play in where there are no contradictions or inconsistencies). But even if we assume this to be the case, we still have no access to direct knowledge of other minds - rather, I have access to direct knowledge (perceptions and sensations) of you having a physical representation in the mental virtual world. You could just as easily be a creation of God's as you are a real human with a mind like mine.
This instantly collapses into solipsism, where you believe only you and God exists. As far as refuting that goes, I'm not sure I'm able to. But I've never met anyone who seriously is a solipsist, and if they were, they would keep it to themselves - as they don't believe there's anybody else to convince.

*frankly, there's plenty of reasons to reject this idea, including the phi effect, and how the multiple drafts model applies to memory, personality, and so on

===========
As for the impossibility of qualia reducing to specific physical processes...
there's two possible ways this could happen.
The first is to say that a specific arrangement of physical matter correlates 1:1, in a strictly lawful way, with a specific mental event or quality of experience. For example, 'happiness' would correlate with a specific neural state, as would 'the belief that indianapolis is indiana', so that every happy person would have the first neural state in their brain, and everyone with that belief would have the second neural state, and anybody with the first neural state is happy, and everyone with the second believes that indianapolis is the capital of indiana.

That form of reduction clearly breaks down. For one thing, it implies that only human brains are capable of possessing actual propositional attitudes or experiencing qualia, and that no matter how close a physical system comes to simulating the function or behavior, it has to possess the actual neural state to experience qualia. So even theoretically, this viewpoint is incredibly limited.

Further, it's pretty easy to prove empirically that there's no neural state that all happy people have, that no unhappy people have, and that only conscious beings have. Neural nets are messy, with overlapping patterns, and the way the pattern is formed directly affects the pattern itself. You and I might know the same person, and recognize their face, but entirely different parts of our visual system might be responsible for the recognition, and the actual part of my network directly responsible for the recognition probably won't resemble the part of your network that performs the same task.

Now, the second possibility for reduction is that each individual quality of experience or propositional attitude reduces to some physical state, but NOT in a strictly lawful way. In this sense, there is a part of my brain that represents a belief, and there's a part of your brain that represents the SAME belief, but each instance is unique and independent. My happiness is a physical state, but it's completely independent of the physical state identical to your happiness. This sounds like a reasonable take on it, except it completely removes any usefulness of the concept of reduction. I can no longer hope to design a machine that will scan the physical makeup of your brain and tell me if you're happy or not - because each person's happiness may correlate to a different physical state. Further, you can't deduct from my report that I'm happy anything about my brain's physical state, unless you already know both.

Type Identity Theory and Token Identity Theory are both incoherent. I believe they are exhaustive of reductionism, and therefore reject identity theory and reductionism altogether.

This isn't getting into the extremely-popular-but-largely-undefined 'functionalism.' But I think Dennett and Churchland, between them, account for the 'hard problem' to a degree that further efforts to solve it are ill-advised.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

4th May 2008, 09:53 AM

This instantly collapses into solipsism, where you believe only you and God exists. As far as refuting that goes, I'm not sure I'm able to. But I've never met anyone who seriously is a solipsist, and if they were, they would keep it to themselves - as they don't believe there's anybody else to convince.
I refute it thus: What is it that maintains the consistency of the solipsist's backyard between the times that he is paying attention to it?

Wait. You and God? I thought it was only you. If we introduce an undefined placeholder for everything we can't explain, solipsism isn't interesting anymore!

That form of reduction clearly breaks down. For one thing, it implies that only human brains are capable of possessing actual propositional attitudes or experiencing qualia, and that no matter how close a physical system comes to simulating the function or behavior, it has to possess the actual neural state to experience qualia. So even theoretically, this viewpoint is incredibly limited.
Why does it imply that only human brains are capable of qualia? Why does it imply that similar neural states couldn't experience similar qualia?

Further, it's pretty easy to prove empirically that there's no neural state that all happy people have, that no unhappy people have, and that only conscious beings have. Neural nets are messy, with overlapping patterns, and the way the pattern is formed directly affects the pattern itself. You and I might know the same person, and recognize their face, but entirely different parts of our visual system might be responsible for the recognition, and the actual part of my network directly responsible for the recognition probably won't resemble the part of your network that performs the same task.
I'm not sure why you're being so strict in your requirement for the exact state of the neural net.

Aha ...

Now, the second possibility for reduction is that each individual quality of experience or propositional attitude reduces to some physical state, but NOT in a strictly lawful way.
Even if strictly lawful, we might end up with different neural nets, because they need not be representating identical "happinesses." And if the laws include some randomness, we might also end up with different nets. (Or does the word "law" preclude random factors?)

I can no longer hope to design a machine that will scan the physical makeup of your brain and tell me if you're happy or not - because each person's happiness may correlate to a different physical state.
That doesn't mean that a machine couldn't deduce happiness from two different physical states. Every tree is different, yet we know they are trees.

Taking another approach, what if the machine could describe the exact behavior of the person, yet not assign the word "happiness" to it? Would that count?

Happiness is not a quale. It's a name given to a huge family of behaviors.

Type Identity Theory and Token Identity Theory are both incoherent. I believe they are exhaustive of reductionism, and therefore reject identity theory and reductionism altogether.
I don't even understand what philosophical reductionism means. Am I supposed to be able to account for the weather by describing the state of every atom in the atmosphere, in such a way that another person would identify the weather the same way I would?

~~ Paul

rocketdodger

4th May 2008, 09:59 AM

Now, the second possibility for reduction is that each individual quality of experience or propositional attitude reduces to some physical state, but NOT in a strictly lawful way. In this sense, there is a part of my brain that represents a belief, and there's a part of your brain that represents the SAME belief, but each instance is unique and independent. My happiness is a physical state, but it's completely independent of the physical state identical to your happiness. This sounds like a reasonable take on it, except it completely removes any usefulness of the concept of reduction. I can no longer hope to design a machine that will scan the physical makeup of your brain and tell me if you're happy or not - because each person's happiness may correlate to a different physical state. Further, you can't deduct from my report that I'm happy anything about my brain's physical state, unless you already know both.

... um, what about a third possibility, where each individual quality of experience or propositional attitude reduces to some physical state, in a strictly lawful way, such that similar states may be unique between individuals? Then you could still have a machine that deduces happiness and you can still deduce what one's brain state might look like if they are happy.

Frankly I don't understand how you could have missed this third option...

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

4th May 2008, 10:20 AM

... um, what about a third possibility, where each individual quality of experience or propositional attitude reduces to some physical state, in a strictly lawful way, such that similar states may be unique between individuals?
I'm not sure what you mean here.

Brain state is formed by the interaction of a person with his environment, and by subsequent brain processes that reform the brain state. Since no two people have identical lives, no two brain states are expected to be identical, even if the processes governing the formation of brain state are lawful.

What this has to do with reductionism I do not know.

~~ Paul

HasKey

4th May 2008, 12:33 PM

Oh I am so disappointed with this thread.

Here I thought it was going to be a thread of about being materialistic in a Madonna way. (You know, as in "Material Girl")

I wanted to read about digital toasters, or vacuum cleaners that tell the weather outside. Or combination toenail clippers/TV Remote Control, or LCD comic books, or Guitars with a keyboard built in, or Combination Kitty Litter Box/Microwave Oven.

I just thought I would get to read about some nifty cool MATERIAL things. :D

Haskey

p.s. If you think these things shouldn't exist, well, just don't make me get out my photoshop and show you how they could. ;)

rocketdodger

4th May 2008, 02:15 PM

I'm not sure what you mean here.
I mean exactly what you said in your response -- qualia should be reducible to brain state in a "stricly lawful" way (by which I take it kawphy meant according to the same underlying rules every time), yet since
Brain state is formed by the interaction of a person with his environment, and by subsequent brain processes that reform the brain state. Since no two people have identical lives, no two brain states are expected to be identical, even if the processes governing the formation of brain state are lawful.
, which isn't accounted for in either of Kawphy's options, we need a third option.

billydkid

4th May 2008, 02:52 PM

I hate the term materialism. It suggests that "materialism" on par with and equal in credibility to spiritualism - which I use for convenience sake in the same way that using the term atheism suggests that not believing in a supernatural sky daddy is the equal opposite of being a theist or using the term evolutionist which suggests there is an equally credible opposing viewpoint. Materialism and atheism should be the default positions. The onus is only on the those who claim there is another dimension/an immaterial dimension to reality the give evidence and reasons for believing such things. Materialism is NOT the equal opposite of dualism (or whatever). There is nothing in our existence that suggests anything other than materialism.

Robin

4th May 2008, 08:23 PM

All I'm saying is that the definition of materialism has changed over the centuries as we've come to understand the physical world better. Back when people thought that the physical world was a simple collection of matter, philosophers invented the term materialism. As our understanding grew, they invented the term physicalism to encompass the new concepts such as energy and forces. There are no strict materialists left because the original definition of the term is obsolete in the face of scientific progress.
And by "original definition" you mean, I suppose, this straw man definition of yours.

But you still are assiduously avoiding my question of just who these mysterious "original definition" materialists are or were. Just one single name will do.

Or are you talking about ancient Greek Materialists? But that is not what I am talking about.

When I mean Materialism I mean (as I keep specifying) modern Materialism, since the 18th century - for example d'Holbach. For example the Churchlands. For example Dennett.

As I point out, Materialism has not changed in a broad brush sense from D'Holbach to the Churchlands.
I suppose that we could simply say now that materialism = physicalism.
I wish you would tell me what you think the difference is. The last real Physicalist - Carnap - died in the 1950's. These days the term has been revived as a vague synonym for Materialism. Just why we needed a synonym for Materialism is not clear to me.
Yes, it can, but is energy a "physical process"?
You just answered your own question. Or are you asking what energy is made of - what is the "thing in itself". Nobody even knows if the question is meaningful. It is something that can be modelled mathematically then that is all the definition of physical I have. I don't know any other sense in which something could be physical.

And remember - energy is still nothing more than an element of a mathematical model that predicts observational data.

MattusMaximus

4th May 2008, 08:41 PM

It could only have been obsolete if it had ever been proposed in the first place. Name me a Materialist philosopher that has ever proposed the idea.

(Oh and by the way, there are probably more Materialist philosophers around now than in there were 100 years ago)

I did not ask for a bunch of definitions, I asked for a philosopher who had proposed the idea.

I've been lurking here, utterly fascinated by the discussion. I'm no philosopher, but wasn't Epicurus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicurus) an example of an early materialist?

After all, Epicurus taught that all was either atoms or void. Seems to fit the definition of materialism that you're proposing.

MattusMaximus

4th May 2008, 08:46 PM

Really "qualia" is no more a problem than, say "flame". Flame is a description of something we experience and yet we can adequately model the phenomenon without reference to the concept of flame.

All this discussion of "qualia" reminds me of what I've read concerning Plato's Theory of Forms. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms)

Am I very far off the mark?

Robin

4th May 2008, 10:37 PM

I've been lurking here, utterly fascinated by the discussion. I'm no philosopher, but wasn't Epicurus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicurus) an example of an early materialist?

After all, Epicurus taught that all was either atoms or void. Seems to fit the definition of materialism that you're proposing.
Not that I am proposing, but that Paul is proposing.

But that is why in my OP I specified that I was specifically referring to Materialism as it has been proposed from the 18th century to today.

You will see my response to Paul:
Or are you talking about ancient Greek Materialists? But that is not what I am talking about.

When I mean Materialism I mean (as I keep specifying) modern Materialism, since the 18th century - for example d'Holbach. For example the Churchlands. For example Dennett.
If he does mean people like Democritus and Epicurus who wrote more than two millenia before the start of the time frame I specified then he should say so.

And even then, those guys were not as naive as his characterisation suggests.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

5th May 2008, 05:42 AM

When I mean Materialism I mean (as I keep specifying) modern Materialism, since the 18th century - for example d'Holbach. For example the Churchlands. For example Dennett.
Ah, you mean physicalists then. :D

I wish you would tell me what you think the difference is. The last real Physicalist - Carnap - died in the 1950's. These days the term has been revived as a vague synonym for Materialism. Just why we needed a synonym for Materialism is not clear to me.
Oh, in my readings, it seems materialism has become a synonym for physicalism. Physicalism was introduced as a clarification of the naive materialism of old, and now they have become synonyms.

I see that the Princeton philosophy dictionary has them as synonyms.

So synonyms they are.

You just answered your own question. Or are you asking what energy is made of - what is the "thing in itself". Nobody even knows if the question is meaningful. It is something that can be modelled mathematically then that is all the definition of physical I have. I don't know any other sense in which something could be physical.
I don't see how I answered my question "Is energy a physical process?" merely by asking it.

This is a fairly long argument considering that we agree with each other. :D

And even then, those guys were not as naive as his characterisation suggests.
Of course not, since they were Greek.

~~ Paul

Robin

5th May 2008, 04:53 PM

Oh, in my readings, it seems materialism has become a synonym for physicalism. Physicalism was introduced as a clarification of the naive materialism of old, and now they have become synonyms.
Nope, Physicalism was introduced as a stridently, dogmatically anti-materialist position.

Apparently Neurath would sit in the Vienna Circle meetings and yell out "Metaphysics!" every time he detected a metaphysical line of reasoning creeping in.

If there were life after death Otto Neurath would have come back and strangled Daniel Stoljar.

Physicalism was an outgrowth of Logical Positivism and ultimately the Empirical tradition from Locke and Hume onwards.

And you still won't specify who these naive materialists of old were. How many times have I asked you to?

At the very least please supply me with a cast of a footprint or a fuzzy film of one running through the woods.
I see that the Princeton philosophy dictionary has them as synonyms.

So synonyms they are.
Presumably you mean Stanford?

Ah and I suppose poor old Mach, Russell and Carnap are Neutral Monists then? (Which, as I have said, is like saying James Randi and Richard Dawkins are prayerful Marian Roman Catholics).

If you are going to do argument from authority at least find an authority.

A.J. Ayer is a major figure in philosophy and he knew and debated the Physicalists over many years and the chapter on Physicalism in his book Philosophy in the Twentieth Century ought to set you straight.
I don't see how I answered my question "Is energy a physical process?" merely by asking it.
You didn't. You answered it with the phrase "Yes, it can", ie it can be modelled mathematically. So it is physical by the only definition I know. Is it a process? Mathematically yes. Ontologically I don't know and I don't know any Materialist who claimed to know.
This is a fairly long argument considering that we agree with each other. :D
Well you are the one who won't name those mysterious naive Materialists. Ball in your court.

But you may have trouble. In spite of what people seem to think Materialist philosophers are a very, very rare specimen before, say, 50 years ago.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

6th May 2008, 05:50 AM

And you still won't specify who these naive materialists of old were. How many times have I asked you to?

At the very least please supply me with a cast of a footprint or a fuzzy film of one running through the woods.
I give up. There weren't any.

If you are going to do argument from authority at least find an authority.
The only distinction I can find between materialism and physicalism is as follows: Materialism holds that everything is material. Physicalism holds that everything is, in some sense, physical. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Physicalism is sometimes known as materialism. Historically, materialists held that everything was matter -- where matter was conceived as "an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist" (Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, par. 9). The reason for speaking of physicalism rather than materialism is to abstract away from this historical notion, which is usually thought of as too restrictive -- for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense (Dijksterhuis 1961, Yolton 1983).
If this is incorrect, could you give a correct historical summary?

A.J. Ayer is a major figure in philosophy and he knew and debated the Physicalists over many years and the chapter on Physicalism in his book Philosophy in the Twentieth Century ought to set you straight.
Could you summarize the debate?

~~ Paul

Robin

7th May 2008, 05:37 AM

The only distinction I can find between materialism and physicalism is as follows: Materialism holds that everything is material.
Well a big distinction is that Materialism is a metaphysical position and Physicalism is an anti-metaphysical position.

Physicalism holds that everything is, in some sense, physical. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

If this is incorrect, could you give a correct historical summary?
Well the fact that the writer has given Berkeley (of all people) as a source for what Materialists believe should be evidence enough that this article is utterly unreliable on both Materialism and Physicalism.
Could you summarize the debate?
Maybe I will start a thread on it. Essentially the Logical Positive movement were extreme Empiricists who held that the only meaningful statements referred to sense data. They held that any statement about 'real' or 'material' objects, processes, entities or substances was simply meaningless.

Physicalism was a sub-movement within Logical Positivism devised by Mathematician Otto Neurath who I mentioned earlier. He defined Physicalism in his essay of the same name:

What matters is that all statements contain references to the spatio-temporal order, the order that we know from physics. Therefore this view is to be called ‘physicalism’ ... Unified science contains only physicalist formulations. The fate of physics in the narrower sense thus becomes the fate of all the sciences. ... For ‘physicalism’ it is essential that one kind of order is the foundation of all laws, whichever science is concerned, geology, chemistry or sociology.

Otto Neurath - Physicalism
and:
Language is essential for science; within language all transformations take place, not by confrontation of language with a ‘world’, a totality of ‘things’ whose variety language is supposed to reflect. An attempt like that would be metaphysics.

Otto Neurath - Physicalism
I believe the essay came out in the 1930's, although I can't lay my hands to a source at the moment. Neurath was a member of the Vienna Circle in the 1920's and 30's and collaborated with people like Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr on the philosophy of science.

The next most famous proponent of Physicalism was Rudolf Carnap. Physicalism died out in the 1950's with the death of Carnap and Quine's famous essay Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

7th May 2008, 12:32 PM

Well a big distinction is that Materialism is a metaphysical position and Physicalism is an anti-metaphysical position.
Cool, I like that. However, the term has clearly been co-opted to indicate a metaphysical position. I'll try to use it correctly.

Well the fact that the writer has given Berkeley (of all people) as a source for what Materialists believe should be evidence enough that this article is utterly unreliable on both Materialism and Physicalism.
I am enlightened.

The next most famous proponent of Physicalism was Rudolf Carnap. Physicalism died out in the 1950's with the death of Carnap and Quine's famous essay Two Dogmas of Empiricism.
Aha! Then I daresay the term truly has been co-opted and that is why so many definitions equate it (more or less) with materialism. I'm a victim of terminological reuse!

And so I submit that scientific epistemology is a good term. What do physicalists call themselves these days?

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

7th May 2008, 05:50 PM

But you may have trouble. In spite of what people seem to think Materialist philosophers are a very, very rare specimen before, say, 50 years ago.
I realize now that I'm still confused. Are we talking about two unrelated forms of materialism? Weren't guys like Thales, Epicurus, and Democritus materialists?

~~ Paul

Robin

7th May 2008, 09:13 PM

I realize now that I'm still confused. Are we talking about two unrelated forms of materialism? Weren't guys like Thales, Epicurus, and Democritus materialists?

~~ Paul
Well I did specify the time frame in the OP as 18th century until now and later that I wasn't talking about the ancient Greeks who were later termed materialists.

But still, you had to go back two and a half millenia to find three. You don't call that rare?

Who else? D'Holbach, Diderot, Hobbes?

And Democritus, well... He did say that either there was no such thing as truth or we had no access to it.

Robin

7th May 2008, 09:19 PM

What do physicalists call themselves these days?

I should imagine there are no real Physicalists left. Those who understood the period will have learned the lesson and moved on.

The danger of burying old philosphical movements is that it all gets forgotten and people start having those arguments all over again.

On the other hand it may be on purpose. I have a book with an early draft of "Monty Python and the Holy Grail". In it the knights set off from Camelot on their quest for the Holy Grail with much grandeur, pomp and panolply.

Then someone yells out "Found it!"

Afterwards they discuss getting someone to hide it again - maybe that is what is happening here.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

8th May 2008, 05:38 AM

Well I did specify the time frame in the OP as 18th century until now and later that I wasn't talking about the ancient Greeks who were later termed materialists.
Yes, you did. I guess we need to distinguish ancient materialists from modern materialists. What's the difference, other than the modern ones knowing more science?

But still, you had to go back two and a half millenia to find three. You don't call that rare?
I daresay the farther back we go the rarer they become, due to the fact that historical recordings become thinner. And the population smaller.

I should imagine there are no real Physicalists left. Those who understood the period will have learned the lesson and moved on.
What was the lesson?

The danger of burying old philosphical movements is that it all gets forgotten and people start having those arguments all over again.
That's why the philosophy department is the cheapest department to run at a university. :D

~~ Paul

Robin

9th May 2008, 05:04 AM

Yes, you did. I guess we need to distinguish ancient materialists from modern materialists. What's the difference, other than the modern ones knowing more science?
As I read more about Democritus I am thinking the difference is less and less. But the thing that made the difference was, I suppose, the scientific method. The ancients did not have an idea of the laws of nature since they did not have the concept of making mathematical models to explain observations.
What was the lesson?
For a start the difficulty of defining the term 'physical'.

Also that the concept of reductionism didn't work. And that if you insisted that statements were only meaningful if they were about physical things, where did that leave statements about, for example, integers and real numbers? In the end they found out that they could not make a rule for languages that allowed abstract mathematical concepts but disallowed gods and monsters.

Overall the Physicalists tried to create a precise language of science, or at least some rules about how to construct a language for science. In the end it was just too big and messy a task.

Also, they forgot to take into account that scientists don't work in algorithms - they work using creativity, fantasy, guesswork and so on along the way to making any theory rigorous.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

10th May 2008, 05:45 PM

Can you name me a Materialist philosopher that says we can know what stuff is? That is not what Materialism is about, read my OP.

Actually, Robin, thats not what "your" materialism is about. And I put it this way because most of the self called materialists in the forum actually defend that the world IS MADE OF MATTER.

As for "your" materialism, I consider (and you are aware of it) that it is only the name what is wrong. Why call it "material-ism" when matter has slipped away a long time ago!

The naturalistic approach to describe nature is, naturally, the best method we have ever developed. But there is no "final substance", no "matter" behind it, and I do believe this is a common assumption (to believe the world is made of matter) among "naive materialists".

BTW, interesting thread.

Kawphy

10th May 2008, 06:13 PM

Actually, Robin, thats not what "your" materialism is about. And I put it this way because most of the self called materialists in the forum actually defend that the world IS MADE OF MATTER.

As for "your" materialism, I consider (and you are aware of it) that it is only the name what is wrong. Why call it "material-ism" when matter has slipped away a long time ago!

The naturalistic approach to describe nature is, naturally, the best method we have ever developed. But there is no "final substance", no "matter" behind it, and I do believe this is a common assumption (to believe the world is made of matter) among "naive materialists".

BTW, interesting thread.

I... don't know what you're talking about, and it may simply because I havn't read much on this materialism/physicalism distinction (seems like an artifact from early modernism that's irrelevent with contemporary philosophy of science)...
But I thought 'substance' was, by definition, 'final.' 'Matter', whatever it may be, is 'made up' of 'substance.' So is energy. So is anything real (or 'substantial'/'substantive'). The question then is 1) how many kinds of substance are there, and 2) how does each of those kinds of substance behave.

A materialist believes there is one kind of substance, and that substance behaves in a lawful way. The 'laws of physics' refers to our best model, based on reason and observation, of how that substance behaves. Anything not composed of physical substance is non-existent. Nothing violates the laws of physics (though our model of the laws can be adjusted when we discover anomalies that don't fit our current model). All patterns of behavior of anything composed of substance are, ultimately, consequences of the laws of physics.

Robin

10th May 2008, 09:40 PM

Actually, Robin, thats not what "your" materialism is about. And I put it this way because most of the self called materialists in the forum actually defend that the world IS MADE OF MATTER.
Err.. yes I know your opinion that Materialism ought to be defined in terms of what some unspecified posters on JREF allegedly said.

Call me old-fashioned, I prefer to define in in term of what actual known Materialist philosopher have argued in great detail in published works a number of centuries.
As for "your" materialism, I consider (and you are aware of it) that it is only the name what is wrong. Why call it "material-ism" when matter has slipped away a long time ago!
My Materialism? Do you say that I invented d'Holbach? The Churchlands? Er, no, not my Materialism.. it is just as I said in the OP.
The naturalistic approach to describe nature is, naturally, the best method we have ever developed. But there is no "final substance", no "matter" behind it, and I do believe this is a common assumption (to believe the world is made of matter) among "naive materialists".
It may be, but I am talking about the philosophy of Materialism as expressed by known philosophers and I have explicitly said so.

I have already pointed out to you that d'Holbach explicitly said that we can no nothing of the final substance, only how things appear to our senses.

And even Democritus, two and a half thousand years ago, said that either there is no truth or we don't have access to it.

So if you want to have a debate about this certain poster in JREF who you regard as materialists, go and find them. If you want to debate actual Materialism as a philosophic movement quit trying to change the definition to suit yourself.

Robin

10th May 2008, 09:47 PM

I... don't know what you're talking about, and it may simply because I havn't read much on this materialism/physicalism distinction (seems like an artifact from early modernism that's irrelevent with contemporary philosophy of science)...
But I thought 'substance' was, by definition, 'final.' 'Matter', whatever it may be, is 'made up' of 'substance.' So is energy. So is anything real (or 'substantial'/'substantive'). The question then is 1) how many kinds of substance are there, and 2) how does each of those kinds of substance behave.

A materialist believes there is one kind of substance, and that substance behaves in a lawful way. The 'laws of physics' refers to our best model, based on reason and observation, of how that substance behaves. Anything not composed of physical substance is non-existent. Nothing violates the laws of physics (though our model of the laws can be adjusted when we discover anomalies that don't fit our current model). All patterns of behavior of anything composed of substance are, ultimately, consequences of the laws of physics.
Except I can't think of any Materialist philosopher who talks in terms of "substances".

Bodhi Dharma Zen

11th May 2008, 07:14 AM

Except I can't think of any Materialist philosopher who talks in terms of "substances".

:D There you go, easy confirmation.

And BTW, I didn't labeled "your materialism" in a derogatory way, I was simply saying that some (self called) materialists in this forum do not even have an idea of what you are talking about. Its easy to claim "Im a materialist" and then make fun (or even insult) every woo that arrives to the forum... when they are being as woo as the ones they criticizes in the first place!

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

11th May 2008, 11:23 AM

Except I can't think of any Materialist philosopher who talks in terms of "substances".
I presume you are talking about modern materialism again.

Are you saying that none of the philosophers chit-chatting about substances and fundamental existents are materialists? I'll certainly grant you that the notion of substance suffers from some serious pretzel logic.

Another messed-up article on materialism:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html

In the GARBER lecture announced here, the materialists are going to be confused:

http://class.georgiasouthern.edu/litphi/

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

11th May 2008, 11:30 AM

Any interesting entry on philosophical terminology in Victor Reppert's blog:

http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2006/06/mapping-dualism-and-materialism.html

~~ Paul

Kawphy

11th May 2008, 12:44 PM

Except I can't think of any Materialist philosopher who talks in terms of "substances".

No, you're right, and it occurred to me when I posted it that I should add a clarification, but I tend to be wordy enough already, and I knew you'd clarify it ;)

Contemporary philosophers do not spend much (if any) time on 'substance,' and it is generally accepted that we cannot have access to knowledge of 'things in and of themselves.' The prejudice against 'doing metaphysics' is, in my opinion, well-founded.

But where this supposed physicalist/materialist distinction seems to be, as I said, an artifact of now irrelevant early modern philosophy, I don't think talking about substance is an irrelevant artifact.

The *concept* of substance is what drove modern metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Understanding the various metaphysical systems that emerged from the idea of 'substance' actually accounts for why metaphysics is now unpopular and why materialism is en vogue.

When discussing philosophy of mind or metaphysics with contemporary philosophers, you would never, ever waste eachother's time with discussions of the distinction between physicalism and materialism, nor with discussion of substance.
But here, we are discussing it with laymen and amateur philosophers. The physicalist/materialist distinction is still not a particularly useful starting point. The substance debate, while no longer considered 'valid', is a useful starting point.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

11th May 2008, 05:20 PM

When discussing philosophy of mind or metaphysics with contemporary philosophers, you would never, ever waste eachother's time with discussions of the distinction between physicalism and materialism, nor with discussion of substance.
Instead they talk about the attributes of the fundamental substance, or they deny there is any fundamental substance at all and only talk about attributes. There's even a name for this latter idea ... what is it ... bundle theory. Are all modern monists bundle theorists?

You appear to be equating physicalism and materialism, whereas Robin does not.

~~ Paul

Bodhi Dharma Zen

11th May 2008, 06:15 PM

I should be more specific. When I say subjective experience, I mean qualitative aspects of reality; colors, sounds, etc. These things, though tied to events which can be objectively explained can only really be known subjectively. They are the essence of subjectivity. In order to communicate ideas about something using math and science, that something must have an objective quality to it, meaning it must be viewed from the outside. Qualia do not have this property as they are purely subjective. For this reason they defy, and always will defy, objective explanation.

The world we know, the very same that naive materialists (not like Robin and the materialists philosophers he talks about) claim is made of matter, is nothing but a collection of descriptions drawn from subjectivity.

Sure, its nature resides beyond subjectivity. Of course, its reality does not need subjectivity to exists. Yet, the world we live in (the world we experience, with objects, light, sounds, smells, etc) is subjective.

A metaphor can be useful, in a computer game like a FPS (first person shooter for those not in to gaming), everything we perceive is one thing, another very different what causes it. The world you see is yours only, and another player in the same map, appears to be seeing the "same things", when in reality is seeing another bunch of photons that only share the same cause. That which is beyond subjectivity is (and using "is" in the context is tricky) when seen just appearance, but "in itself" is something completely different.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

11th May 2008, 06:17 PM

The substance debate, while no longer considered 'valid', is a useful starting point.

For what?

lupus_in_fabula

11th May 2008, 10:40 PM

For what?

Perhaps for finding out how many here actually believe in “the world is made of matter” assertion you like so much to throw around? :D

Maybe we should see if someone here actually does believe they have some kind of knowledga about the final substance?

Robin

12th May 2008, 05:02 AM

Instead they talk about the attributes of the fundamental substance, or they deny there is any fundamental substance at all and only talk about attributes. There's even a name for this latter idea ... what is it ... bundle theory. Are all modern monists bundle theorists?

You appear to be equating physicalism and materialism, whereas Robin does not.

~~ Paul
Well it does seem to be popular these days to use physicalism to mean materialism.

I will be close to the library tomorrow, so I will see if I can borrow A.J Ayer's book and bone up on the chapter on Physicalism, maybe summarise it.

One interesting thing I remember from it was that Ayer regarded Broad as a forerunner to the Physicalists. Broad was at one time president of the Society for Psychical Research.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

12th May 2008, 11:29 AM

Perhaps for finding out how many here actually believe in “the world is made of matter” assertion you like so much to throw around? :D

If you don't believe that the world is material, then congrats! And it is not that I like it, it is a hidden assumption that I have seen others commit. If anything, I'm merely pointing it to them.

I just tried a search in the forum but it is not working. Still, using Google I found THIS (http://www.google.com/custom?hl=en&cof=S%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fforums.randi.org%3BL%3Ahttp%3 A%2F%2Fforums.randi.org%2Fimages%2Fmisc%2Fsearchlo go.gif%3BLH%3A75%3BLW%3A849%3B&domains=forums.randi.org&q=%22is+material%22&btnG=Search&sitesearch=forums.randi.org). While I'm not in the mood, nor I have the time to do an extensive and detailed search, it is my bet that when people uses the "X is material" kind of postulates, the implicit ontological claim is that "X it is made of matter". The use of "is" is critical here.

Furthermore, in another thread I posted an extensive search that I did on encyclopedias an dictionaries and, sorry to inform you, the overall conclusion something like this:

ma·te·ri·al·ism (mə-tîr'ē-ə-lĭz'əm) http://content.answers.com/main/content/img/pron.gif
n.
Philosophy. The theory that physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena.In other words, people in general use it to describe their ontology. Now, what is "matter" according to this dictionary?:

mat·ter (măt'ər) http://content.answers.com/main/content/img/pron.gif
n.

Something that occupies space and can be perceived by one or more senses; a physical body, a physical substance, or the universe as a whole.
Physics. Something that has mass and exists as a solid, liquid, gas, or plasma. So, these are general knowledge assumptions, not what I say, and certainly not what it is said by the (we can call it professional) materialism that Robin is talking about.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

12th May 2008, 11:39 AM

Well it does seem to be popular these days to use physicalism to mean materialism.

Indeed, and this is without talking about how people, in general, uses such terms, or what do they think they imply. In the context of the JREF, "material"

ma·te·ri·al (mə-tîr'ē-əl) http://content.answers.com/main/content/img/pron.gif
n.
The substance or substances out of which a thing is or can be made.is often only used to have something that opposes "immaterial"

im·ma·te·ri·al (ĭm'ə-tîr'ē-əl) http://content.answers.com/main/content/img/pron.gif
adj.
Having no material body or form.and, sadly, mostly in "dark ages" style. By this I mean that they are still discussing ghosts against rocks, or souls against brains. In a different context we would be able to talk about science without having to have an ontological commitment (my stance), and this would not be "suspicious" in what one then, is trying to "explain things" appealing to magic, supernatural "stuff" or aberrations of such sort.

Kawphy

12th May 2008, 05:42 PM

The world we know, the very same that naive materialists (not like Robin and the materialists philosophers he talks about) claim is made of matter, is nothing but a collection of descriptions drawn from subjectivity.

Sure, its nature resides beyond subjectivity. Of course, its reality does not need subjectivity to exists. Yet, the world we live in (the world we experience, with objects, light, sounds, smells, etc) is subjective.

Subjectivity is a major, major point in both epistemology and philosophy of mind. In truth, they form a strange loop -
Philosophy of Science (epistemology) tries to explain how a subjective mind can attain knowledge of the objective universe.
Philosophy of Mind tries to explain how an objective universe can produce a subjective 'mind.'

Now, you can't start from this point - too many assumptions that, if not defended, will call into question all of your conclusions. But I do believe that this is a fair characterization, having spent a great deal of time studying both. But you're embracing mysticism without justifying it if you wave your hand and say 'Subjectivity means science can't talk about consciousness!' That's not true. Subjectivity is a core concept that runs through both philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, and are dealt with *very* thoroughly. I strongly recommend some of Donald Davidson's work on radical interpretation for this.

edit:
I *do* use materialism and physicalism inter-changeably. I can't think of a meaningful or useful distinction between the terms (even if, historically, they were not synonymous). If you can present a difference that's relevent to contemporary conversations in philosophy of mind, I'd be happy to clarify from that point forward. I don't believe my usage causes any real confusion.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

13th May 2008, 07:58 PM

Subjectivity is a major, major point in both epistemology and philosophy of mind. In truth, they form a strange loop -
Philosophy of Science (epistemology) tries to explain how a subjective mind can attain knowledge of the objective universe.
Philosophy of Mind tries to explain how an objective universe can produce a subjective 'mind.'

Interesting way to putting it. Both are among my hobbies. :) And I believe both are far from giving satisfactory answers. We are advancing and it looks promising, neurophysiology, and analytic philosophy (sadly not every "mind philosopher" adheres to AP) help a lot.

Now, you can't start from this point - too many assumptions that, if not defended, will call into question all of your conclusions. But I do believe that this is a fair characterization, having spent a great deal of time studying both.

Thanks.

But you're embracing mysticism without justifying it if you wave your hand and say 'Subjectivity means science can't talk about consciousness!' That's not true. Subjectivity is a core concept that runs through both philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, and are dealt with *very* thoroughly. I strongly recommend some of Donald Davidson's work on radical interpretation for this.

Well, that is not my point, BjornTheCyborg made that comment. I'm familiar with Davidson's work, but I do not particularly love it, specially his account of truth and meaning.

Robin

14th May 2008, 05:45 AM

Indeed, and this is without talking about how people, in general, uses such terms, or what do they think they imply. In the context of the JREF, "material"

ma·te·ri·al (m?-tîr'?-?l) http://content.answers.com/main/content/img/pron.gif
n.
The substance or substances out of which a thing is or can be made.

And according to the etymology online dictionary "from L. materia "matter, stuff, wood, timber"

So the term does not remotely imply noumena or ultimate substance, it refers quite simply to what things are made of - like wood, metal etc, in other words phenomena

Robin

14th May 2008, 05:50 AM

I *do* use materialism and physicalism inter-changeably. I can't think of a meaningful or useful distinction between the terms (even if, historically, they were not synonymous). If you can present a difference that's relevent to contemporary conversations in philosophy of mind, I'd be happy to clarify from that point forward. I don't believe my usage causes any real confusion.
Well, as I pointed out before, Materialism is a metaphysical position, Physicalism was defined as a strongly anti-metaphysical position. That would appear to be a pretty important (and useful) distinction. Why on earth do we need a synonym for Materialism?

Bodhi Dharma Zen

14th May 2008, 06:53 AM

Why on earth do we need a synonym for Materialism?

Because "matter" (a word with a changing definition for more than 2,000 years) finally left the building at least 200 years ago.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

14th May 2008, 06:55 AM

And according to the etymology online dictionary "from L. materia "matter, stuff, wood, timber"

So the term does not remotely imply noumena or ultimate substance, it refers quite simply to what things are made of - like wood, metal etc, in other words phenomena

Well.. OF COURSE!!! But it isn't me the one who uses "matter" to imply the noumena, the "real world". Matter is a working definition for phenomena, thats correct, and the only proper use of the word.

What gives origin to phenomena is not a concern for modern materialism, as you brilliantly exposed in the OP, only to describe the "laws" (processes) behind it with mathematical models.

arthwollipot

14th May 2008, 05:00 PM

Because "matter" (a word with a changing definition for more than 2,000 years) finally left the building at least 200 years ago.Really?

Bodhi Dharma Zen

14th May 2008, 05:08 PM

Really?

Really.

arthwollipot

14th May 2008, 06:57 PM

Really.So the idea of "matter" doesn't exist any more, and hasn't for 200 years - is that what you're saying?

Bodhi Dharma Zen

14th May 2008, 08:03 PM

So the idea of "matter" doesn't exist any more, and hasn't for 200 years - is that what you're saying?

Nope. What I say is that the meaning of the word "matter" have changed quite a bit in our history, so much, IMO, that it is ridiculous to continue to call it "matter".

Do a small search, read every encyclopedia and dictionary you can find, and you will know where I'm coming from.

The definition of matter that Robin gives in the OP is not at all the same you find in such places, and certainly it has NOTHING TO DO with the original meaning of the word.

Now, if by "matter" we are referring to "a way to designate phenomena" then I accept the definition, but in the context of this thread there is no ontological claim about "matter" being, I insist, what historically has been nor what encyclopedias or dictionaries say.

arthwollipot

14th May 2008, 08:21 PM

Bodhi Dharma Zen

14th May 2008, 09:37 PM

Except I can't think of any Materialist philosopher who talks in terms of "substances".

There you go, another fresh example right here in the JREF. Remember that you talk about professional philosophers and I deal with what some materialists in the forum believe.

... but as far as I can tell, the word "matter" means physical substance. Stuff that's made from atoms. I've never heard of the term "matter" being used to refer to phenomena. Just things. Stuff that can be handled.

Indeed, I believe it is a confusion. Read the OP definition of matter. Let me quote and explain:

Materialism is the position that everything is explainable in terms of physical processes. Physical processes are processes which can be described in terms of a mathematical model.There is not a "subtance" anymore, it leads to several problems and internal contradictions, The "subtances" are common sense constructs to deal with observations. Currently, naturalism (reading my previous posts it should be obvious that I believe it is a much better term than materialism) deals with mathematically modeled descriptions of behavior about the observable, not substances. That's why I argue that matter have left the building. It is absurd to insist in giving the name "materialism" to such position.

arthwollipot

14th May 2008, 09:40 PM

There is not a "subtance" anymore, it leads to several problems and internal contradictions, The "subtances" are common sense constructs to deal with observations. Currently, naturalism (reading my previous posts it should be obvious that I believe it is a much better therm than materialism) deals with mathematically modeled descriptions of behavior about the observable, not substances. That's why I argue that matter have left the building. It is absurd to insist in giving the name "materialism" to such position.Fair, but you're not talking about "matter", you're talking about "materialism". It's fine to say that "materialism" has left the building, but not "matter".

Oh, and I agree that "naturalism" is a better term.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

15th May 2008, 10:24 AM

Fair, but you're not talking about "matter", you're talking about "materialism". It's fine to say that "materialism" has left the building, but not "matter".

Oh, and I agree that "naturalism" is a better term.

Matter in the sense you described it: the word "matter" means physical substance thats the one it is gone. I was going to point you to the relevant thread, but allow me to paste it here:

(I'm talking here about the opinions I have seen reflected by materialism in the JREF, not about what professional philosophers think):

It is often thought that materialism is a single, unified theory. It should be clear that those who claim to be materialists must have a clear understanding of what, exactly, materialism is.

Materialists in the JREF claim, for example, that “no opposing theory has even defied materialism” This leads to assume that it is a clear set of axioms that are shared by every other materialist.

But I have seen none (for the materialists in the forum this is); for example, if I claim something they agreed with the instantly claim "thats materialism"... but heck, I'm not a materialist, To be clear,I don't like any "ism". Besides, I have not yet seen a clear, coherent exposition about what materialism is and what it is not. (yes it is a question)

Yet, some of the materialists in the forum accuses me of playing strawman without giving me THEIR definition of materialism (now Robin did it, but this was before). That's why I conducted a small search on google. Lets see some definitions about what materialism is (please tell me which is the correct one):

“They believe physical matter is the only ultimate reality. They suppose that everything in the cosmos, including life, can be explained in terms of interacting matter.”

“Philosophical materialism is the metaphysical view that there is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.”

“Materialism refers to the theory that physical matter is all there is.”

“Materialism as a philosophy is held by those who maintain that existence is explainable solely in material terms, with no accounting of spirit or consciousness.”

These are portions of texts that I found with google, not encyclopedia definitions, but lets see the Encyclopedia Britannica:

“The doctrine that all of reality is essentially of the nature of matter.”

Form a philosophical dictionary:

“In philosophy, the view that the world is entirely composed of matter.”

From the Columbia Encyclopedia:

“in philosophy, a widely held system of thought that explains the nature of the world as entirely dependent on matter, the fundamental and final reality beyond which nothing need be sought.”

From Wikipedia:

“In philosophy, materialism is that form of physicalism which holds that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions; that matter is the only substance.”

So there, it appears as if all of these clearly point to one common thing. Matter as being the nature of reality, its fundamental subtance, the only thing that exists. So, when I state that materialists believe in matter as the “ultimate substance” I believe it is a valid statement.

(Interestingly, now some materialists in the forum are denying this “ultimate substance” claiming that materialism is not about “final substances” and that it is correct, and has never been defeated. (guys/girls it is not a war as far as I can see) but in any case.. what has never being defeated, exactly?) But nevermind, let's continue:

The next obvious question is to see what matter is (again, I encourage you to illustrate which is the correct one:

From the dictionary:

“ 1. Something that occupies space and can be perceived by one or more senses; a physical body, a physical substance, or the universe as a whole.

2. Physics. Something that has mass and exists as a solid, liquid, gas, or plasma.”

Nope, this doesn't work.

From the SciTech Encyclopedia:

“A term that traditionally refers to the substance of which all bodies consist. Matter in classical mechanics is closely identified with mass.”

Nope, that doesn't do the trick.

Theasurus:

“ 1. That which occupies space and can be perceived by the senses: materiality, substance. See body/spirit.

2. That from which things are or can be made: material, stuff, substance. Idioms: grist for one's mill. See matter.”

Redundant. Ok, lets see what an encyclopedia can say:

Encyclopedia Britannica:

“Material substance that constitutes the observable universe and, together with energy, forms the basis of all objective phenomena.”

Ahh interesting... as it energy where not material... (please dont... I didn't say it!!! don't attack the messenger!!!)

Philosophy dictionary:

“That which occupies space, possessing size and shape, mass, movability, and solidity (which may be the same as impenetrability). Its nature was historically one of the great subjects of philosophy, now largely pursued through the philosophy of physics.”

Interesting. Yes, we all know that the meaning of the word MATTER has changed historically (note that I don't necessarily want us to discuss all the different meanings and how they have changed, but nevertheless it is important to notice it, specially when people (somehow) holds that materialism is a concrete theory, as if has not changed a lot since it was incepted.

As for the properties, this is "occupies space", possess size, mass and etc... well, I believe it is obvious that at some point, none of these are true (at a subatomic level).

Columbia Encyclopedia:

“anything that has mass and occupies space.”

Science Dictionary:

“In physics, something that has mass and is distinct from energy. (See phases of matter.)”

Wikipedia:

“In chemistry and physics, matter is commonly defined as the substance of which physical objects are composed, not counting the contribution of various energy or force-fields, which are not usually considered to be matter per se (though they may contribute to the mass of objects).

Matter constitutes much of the observable universe, although again, light is not ordinarily considered matter. Unfortunately, for scientific purposes, "matter" is somewhat loosely defined.”

I have no problems with that statement :wink:

Anyway... I could, of course, paste a lot more, but I believe this should be enough. Now, again, it appears that materialism do claim that the universe is made of matter, as I originally posted in the OP. But enough of google…

I believe it is now clear that I’m not trying to impose anything “immaterial” to offer a theory different than materialism (whatever it is). It should be clear that I do not claim that materialism (whatever it is) is wrong.

All I want is to know why do we need to state that the world “is made of matter” and whats the value of such statement.

James Fox

15th May 2008, 04:21 PM

All I want is to know why do we need to state that the world “is made of matter” and whats the value of such statement.

Perhaps as some sort of bulwark or posturing against those who clam otherwise, or as a an a priori stance against supernaturalisms.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

15th May 2008, 04:28 PM

Perhaps as some sort of bulwark or posturing against those who clam otherwise, or as a an a priori stance against supernaturalisms.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH!! thats absolutely correct! :) Thing is... some people in the forum read (when somebody states anything that it is not mainstream) that you want to insert some "supernatural stuff". Well, nope, I'm dealing with the meaning of the word and its implications, not attempting to "prove" that materialism "is wrong" and my own (supernatural)ism is correct.

Sadly, not everyone is capable of exterminating their own internal ghosts and give a clear answer like yours. Again, thanks.

Robin

16th May 2008, 07:53 AM

Anyway... I could, of course, paste a lot more, but I believe this should be enough. Now, again, it appears that materialism do claim that the universe is made of matter, as I originally posted in the OP. But enough of google…
Again the same question. What Materialist philosopher has stated this? It should be a simple enough matter (if you will pardon the expression) to answer this, if all your sources are correct. Why is it so difficult? As I said to Paul, at least give me a few seconds of fuzzy footage of one of these beasts running through the woods.

Encyclopedia Britannica: in philosophy, the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind and will and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical processes, or even reducible to them.

And I have already stated examples of actual philosophers who have held this position.
All I want is to know why do we need to state that the world “is made of matter” and whats the value of such statement.
In order to answer that question you would have to cite the philosopher who said this. So if this is really what you want to know, then cite away.

(oh and excuse me, you did not post in the OP, this is my thread)

Bodhi Dharma Zen

16th May 2008, 08:13 AM

Again the same question. What Materialist philosopher has stated this?

(I'm talking here about the opinions I have seen reflected by materialism in the JREF, not about what professional philosophers think):

(oh and excuse me, you did not post in the OP, this is my thread)

I was going to point you to the relevant thread, but allow me to paste it here:

Guess you missed those two points.

Robin

16th May 2008, 08:14 AM

Not sure what you're trying to claim here. I've followed this thread pretty lightly so far, but as far as I can tell, the word "matter" means physical substance. Stuff that's made from atoms. I've never heard of the term "matter" being used to refer to phenomena. Just things. Stuff that can be handled.

So yeah. I suppose I'm just confused.
Possibly you don't understand the sense in which "phenomena" is used here. We perceive everything as sense data, so when I look at the keyboard I am looking at a mental representation my brain has created of a keyboard using sense data. In this sense everything we have access to is phenomena. Even atoms or subatomic entities are phenomena in this sense.

Phenomena is used as distinct from Noumena - this "thing in itself". It has long been agreed that we have no access to this - how could we know what something is like unperceived?

This is why the 18th century Materialist d'Holbach defined matter as: "matter is all that affects our senses in any manner whatever; the various properties we attribute to matter, by which we

discriminate its diversity, are founded on the different impressions we receive on the changes they produce in us."

So "material" is used to refer to the phenomena - that which we see and feel. These days "matter" also has a more precise scientific meaning.

Robin

16th May 2008, 08:20 AM

Guess you missed those two points.
I missed that you had pasted it from another thread, it is not that clear.

So what is the point of posting those quotes again then?

Bodhi Dharma Zen

16th May 2008, 09:06 AM

I missed that you had pasted it from another thread, it is not that clear.

So what is the point of posting those quotes again then?

You are right, it is not clear. Sorry about that.

I was pointing out that there is a difference between "professional materialism" and "common sense materialism". I have seen several members of the JREF using materialism to oppose it to "wooism" without noticing that their materialism is based on the, again, "common sense" use of the word matter. Something solid, concrete, measurable, objectively real (in contrast to a "spirit", "minds" or maybe "supernatural" forces that are not measurable, not solid).

The definition in the OP is a lot more elegant than that.

James Fox

16th May 2008, 10:22 AM

The definition in the OP is a lot more elegant than that.

Now that little word is the most revealing piece of self disclosure I’ve read in this thread!

lupus_in_fabula

16th May 2008, 11:34 AM

Bodhi Dharma Zen

16th May 2008, 03:03 PM

The problem is of course that, at least I haven’t witnessed too much about this so called naïve materialism on this board. Sure, if someone claims to have some absolute knowledge about the ultimate substance, then by all means come forward. On the other hand, I’m afraid; this crusade about naïve materialism is somewhat misplaced. Maybe I’m wrong, but that’s my impression.

As it is my impression (in about four years of experience discussing in the forums) that some of the self called "materialists" are merely people adhering to it to have a "proud flag" to wave at every woo they find.

I also find disgusting the condescending attitude and even the open aggression towards some woos, and have found that some of the most aggressive "defenders" of skepticism are, in a way, woos in their beliefs. Like "ontological solid matter" against "imaginary mental stuff" (not that people have said this phrases, but it is the feeling I get). Oh, and I could be wrong too. It might be that I'm seeing a bit of witch hunt instead of reasonable people patiently explaining a better view of the world.

lupus_in_fabula

16th May 2008, 03:15 PM

Why don’t you show some examples then? Ultimately, you brought the issue to the surface with “some people on this board…” Who are these people?

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

16th May 2008, 04:31 PM

I happen to be typesetting a philosophy book for Harvard University Press, so I asked the author about this materialism vs. physicalism thing. He said that they have become synonyms in spite of the separate history of the terms. He gave the usual reason: The term materialism was too restrictive, so physicalism was coopted as a generalization and clarification.

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

16th May 2008, 04:39 PM

I also find disgusting the condescending attitude and even the open aggression towards some woos, and have found that some of the most aggressive "defenders" of skepticism are, in a way, woos in their beliefs. Like "ontological solid matter" against "imaginary mental stuff" (not that people have said this phrases, but it is the feeling I get). Oh, and I could be wrong too. It might be that I'm seeing a bit of witch hunt instead of reasonable people patiently explaining a better view of the world.
I admit I am sometimes condescending toward "idealist woos." The reason is because they use idealism as a god of the gaps argument to explain consciousness, which they are certain cannot possibly be a product of brain function. That's fine, but you don't get to finesse the problem simply by declaring consciousness in all its glory to be a basic attribute of the fundamental existent(s). If there is some sort of basic mental attribute, it is surely something simple from which full-blown minds are built via other fundamental attributes and their interaction laws, just as with the rest of physics. At least, the idealist should be obliged to assume this until evidence to the contrary is found.

If you can't imagine how consciousness comes out of physical interactions, then how is it you can imagine it comes poof! out of nothing?

~~ Paul

Bodhi Dharma Zen

16th May 2008, 04:59 PM

I admit I am sometimes condescending toward "idealist woos." The reason is because they use idealism as a god of the gaps argument to explain consciousness, which they are certain cannot possibly be a product of brain function. That's fine, but you don't get to finesse the problem simply by declaring consciousness in all its glory to be a basic attribute of the fundamental existent(s). If there is some sort of basic mental attribute, it is surely something simple from which full-blown minds are built via other fundamental attributes and their interaction laws, just as with the rest of physics. At least, the idealist should be obliged to assume this until evidence to the contrary is found.

If you can't imagine how consciousness comes out of physical interactions, then how is it you can imagine it comes poof! out of nothing?

~~ Paul

Agreed! And yes, it is sometimes really tiring to explain, again and again, why some (badly defined) "stuff" needs another (more understood) "stuff" to work. IMO, the thing is that we will never be able to convince someone by showing him/her logical arguments. Why? Because our views are also based on personal history, as I have argued in another thread, we do not "choose" what to believe. We simply believe what we can, based on logic, feelings, "guts", social pressure and so on.

World-views are pervasive, difficult to change (and at the same times always changing). Some of what Robin says in the OP (I have to say that I do not agree with the whole post) is beyond what most people (for instance the people we interact with in our daily lifes) believe. For them, matter is, well, "that physical, concrete, real stuff that its outside me", and this is very different from what it is stated in the OP, or my own take:

a system of thought holding that phenomena is describable in terms of sets of relational rules