The Hard Problem of Consciousness

[Ichneumonwasp]

But also that the logic of the step that says "my only access to knowledge is through perception, therefore all that can exist is perception". Or to put it another way "the only thing that can possibly exist is my mechanism for perceiving that which exists".

Yes, yes, exactly.


And also, as I say, the idea that a computationally complex process like consciousness might contain no subsets of lesser complexity.

So really, I see quite a few ways of differentiating Idealism and Materialism.

Well, I would say that is true from the way we view materialism, but in idealism there is the postulate of a dreamer (or pure consciousness) who performs the very complex task of creating reality, though it is not clear if the dreamer is complex in the same way that material beings who think are. I have no way of understanding how such a "thing" could work, but my impression is that idealists do not propose a complex entity as God. They seem to view this 'pure consciousness' as a unity, so not complex.

Now, our consciousness requires complexity -- which is (or should be) one more clue that our consciousness shares nothing much in common with this putative 'pure consciousness'.

Actually I don't see how dualism or pluralism make free will possible. If it is a logical possibility at all, then why not under Idealism or Materialism?

I don't see how either. Really, the only answer I think they can offer is "magic". We can't even ask, "what's the mechanism?" because mechanism implies material interaction, and their "mind" doesn't obey such laws, supposedly. It looks like complete gibberish to me when examined closely. But I could never get Plumjam (who is clearly a dualist) or JustGeoff (who sounds like he is, but he was always slippery about it) to delve very deeply into the matter. Hammy was always the most consistent.

[Robin]

Yeah ok that is what I was getting at. Thanks for everyone who phrased it more elegantly! (thats why I come here!).
Elegantly phrased, but not the case.

[Robin]

Sure, but it could just as well be pure lemon jello.
Just so long as by "lemon jello" you meant "substance capable of rationality and intention"

[Robin]

Reposted for emphasis.

If a materialist and an idealist were to flesh out their proprosals so that they explained everything we see in the world around us, the two ontologies would be equivalent modulo terminology.

~~ Paul
I cannot think of any Materialist who would claim that an intelligent, intentional process was responsible for the continuity between two observations of Halleys comet, 75 years apart.

Can you?

[rocketdodger]

Elegantly phrased, but not the case.

Why not?

If you define the material as "anything that can be mathematically modeled" and they define the ideal as "anything that can be mathematically modeled," then your assertion that everything is material and their assertion that everything is ideal is equivalent -- simply different terms for the same thing.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I cannot think of any Materialist who would claim that an intelligent, intentional process was responsible for the continuity between two observations of Halleys comet, 75 years apart.

Can you?

No, but the reason is because that idea is dualist, not idealist.

[Robin]

Why not?

If you define the material as "anything that can be mathematically modeled" and they define the ideal as "anything that can be mathematically modeled," then your assertion that everything is material and their assertion that everything is ideal is equivalent -- simply different terms for the same thing.
Is there an Idealist somewhere that defines the ideal as "anything that can be mathematically modelled"? I have not heard of one. An Idealist believes that mathematical regularity is something that is imposed on certain ideas for certain purposes, but that it is not necessarily a property of ideas.

Here is another difference. If there is a painting on a wall and four people standing looking at it. A Materialist would say there are four ideas of a painting based on information collected via the optic nerves about a painting that exists independently of their four minds. An (Berkeleyan) Idealist would say there is only one idea of a painting and nothing existing independently of their four minds.

[PixyMisa]

Is there an Idealist somewhere that defines the ideal as "anything that can be mathematically modelled"? I have not heard of one. An Idealist believes that mathematical regularity is something that is imposed on certain ideas for certain purposes, but that it is not necessarily a property of ideas.

Here is another difference. If there is a painting on a wall and four people standing looking at it. A Materialist would say there are four ideas of a painting based on information collected via the optic nerves about a painting that exists independently of their four minds. An (Berkeleyan) Idealist would say there is only one idea of a painting and nothing existing independently of their four minds.
Sure. The problem is - as I said earlier - things simply don't work that way.

As rocketdodger said, you can construct a logical, consistent, immaterialist metaphysics, that coincides neatly with all our observations. But you can't base it on consciousness; or at least, you can't base it on consciousness and then claim that this explains the observed properties and mechanisms of consciousness, because consciousness behaves like a physical process and not a universal property.

If you assume that consciousness is the fundamental nature of the universe, you need to explain not only where our perceptions come from, but why consciousness is localised in specific structures and generates specific patterns of activity within those structures.

Idealism is either indistinguishable from materialism, or wrong. Berkeley is the latter.

[RandFan]

The reality of the physical world is inferred from the continuity Paul spoke of, or from the fact that imagining we are eating does not keep us alive. In idealism there must be two different mental states. I can dream of eating but awake hungry. A dream within a dream, right?

[Darat]

That is what Nick claims, but he has no evidence for this as opposed to any other hypothesis. The only thing he has direct evidence for is his personal consciousness.

~~ Paul

Actually he doesn't, and this is a flaw that solipsism makes and many of the self-labelled idealist we've had on the Forum make. They have no reason to believe in what they think/perceive is "direct evidence" since given their metaphysics they could just be an "imagined" construct of the actual solipsist or in the case of Nick an imagining of this underlying and filtered consciousness.

(From what I've read of Nick's stuff he seems to have at times almost articulated the idea that he is an imagining however the problem with that is of course it leads to circular reasoning.)

I've also argued strongly that whether the monism is "material" or "thought" makes not the slightest bit of difference and there is no way to distinguish between them anyway if monism is correct*. However recently I've found myself thinking more that the idealist monism would require additional assumptions over the materialist monism so why go down the route of multiplying entities when there is no requirement to do so?



*I pragmatically accept monism however I am not a monist or a materialist.

[westprog]

I don't need to - it is a point I have made frequently for a number of years on this forum. I usually quote Ernst Mach who says that science would operate the same way even if the whole world was a dream.

I have made this point every time someone claims that science requires a materialist assumption. People like Interesting Ian, Lifegazer, JustGeoff, Plumjam and even some people here who should know better make this claim.

I used to have a whole bunch of quotes from Mach, Einstein and Hawking ready to throw at people every time they claimed (and they do with monotonous regularity) that science operates with a Materialist assumption.


Can you expand on this? It's my understanding that science has no interest or belief in the underlying state of the universe, but treats it as if it were materialistic. I'm quite happy to have the legs knocked from under this understanding.

[Robin]

Can you expand on this? It's my understanding that science has no interest or belief in the underlying state of the universe, but treats it as if it were materialistic. I'm quite happy to have the legs knocked from under this understanding.
You are quite right - science has no interest or beliefs about the underlying state of the universe.

However treating it as if it were materialistic would be a belief about the underlying state of the universe. Science is, as I said, metaphysically neutral. It requires no metaphysical assumptions - not even materialism.

Naturally not all scientists agree with this. Planck, for example, was an unapologetic realist.

[Robin]

In idealism there must be two different mental states. I can dream of eating but awake hungry. A dream within a dream, right?
Yes, I seem to remember Berkeley tied himself in knots explaining the difference between a dreamed object and a real object.

[Robin]

Idealism is either indistinguishable from materialism, or wrong. Berkeley is the latter.
Well, what I would say is that Idealism collapses into Materialism as soon as you start to explain every single detail with it.

I think Dualism collapses into Materialism too, just a very messy and unnecessarily complicated Materialism.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Just so long as by "lemon jello" you meant "substance capable of rationality and intention"
Why? All that is required is a substance that can somehow maintain the continuity of his backyard. Does that require rationality and intention?


I cannot think of any Materialist who would claim that an intelligent, intentional process was responsible for the continuity between two observations of Halleys comet, 75 years apart.
I'm claiming that any fully-formed monism would be equivalent to any other. In that I include that idealism would be forced to drop the high-level intentionality of the fundamental existent as untenable.

I may be wrong, of course. :D

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Actually he doesn't, and this is a flaw that solipsism makes and many of the self-labelled idealist we've had on the Forum make. They have no reason to believe in what they think/perceive is "direct evidence" since given their metaphysics they could just be an "imagined" construct of the actual solipsist or in the case of Nick an imagining of this underlying and filtered consciousness.
Agreed. The solipsist has to account for the fact that he could be the real solipsist or a virtual solipsist. I guess he just assumes he is the real one.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, what I would say is that Idealism collapses into Materialism as soon as you start to explain every single detail with it.
Interesting. I would say they both collapse into some sort of neutral monism with a minimal, axiomatic set of attributes of the fundamental existent. But, you have an interesting point ... I wonder if those attributes would look awfully materialistic?

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

I wonder if those attributes would look awfully materialistic?

~~ PaulWell, of course they would. Unless you are hammy or Ian, in which case they would look awfully idealistic.

[PixyMisa]

Well, what I would say is that Idealism collapses into Materialism as soon as you start to explain every single detail with it.
Yes, that's a good way of putting it. Some forms of Idealism achieve popularity because they seem to be a convenient explanation for something (consciousness, perception, something like that) but once you try to explain all the details of said something, you quickly find it's not all that convenient after all.

I think Dualism collapses into Materialism too, just a very messy and unnecessarily complicated Materialism.
You can collapse a consistent Dualism. Dualism asserts that there are two fundamentally different, non-interacting bases for reality. Except that they do interact, otherwise there would be no way of knowing that the other basis existed. If this is intended as a consistent metaphysics, then the two fundamental thingies can be grouped together as one more broadly defined thingy, and collapsed into Materialism. If it's not intended as a consistent metaphysics - or if it's a consistent metaphysics for an inconsistent reality - then we have a bit of a problem. ;)

[Darat]

An article from the 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia may interest people reading this: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Mind

....

"On the other hand, the idealistic monist denies altogether the existence of any extra-mental, independent material world. So far from mind being a mere aspect or epiphenomenon attached to matter, the material universe is a creation of the mind and entirely dependent on it. Its esse is percipi. It exists only in and for the mind. Our ideas are the only things of which we can be truly certain. And, indeed, if we were compelled to embrace monism, it seems to us there can be little doubt as to the logical superiority of the idealistic position. But there is no philosophical compulsion to adopt either a materialistic or an idealistic monism. The conviction of the common sense of mankind, and the assumption of physical science that there are two orders of being in the universe, mind and matter, distinct from each other yet interacting and influencing each other, and the assurance that the human mind can obtain a limited yet true knowledge of the material world which really exists outside and independently of it occupying a space of three dimensions, this view, which is the common teaching of the Scholastic philosophy and Catholic thinkers, can be abundantly justified (see DUALISM; ENERGY, CONSERVATION OF)."

...........


Sadly a hundred years has almost passed by and they still not got around to producing those abundant justifications! ;)

[Dancing David]

Can you expand on this? It's my understanding that science has no interest or belief in the underlying state of the universe, but treats it as if it were materialistic. I'm quite happy to have the legs knocked from under this understanding.


The ideas of science only require that events be consistent across space and time. So events can be reduced to a relationship between parts and forces.

So if the underlying nature of reality is MIND or STUFF does not really make a difference.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, of course they would. Unless you are hammy or Ian, in which case they would look awfully idealistic.
I wonder. I wonder if the idealists would have to force-fit some sort of mentalistic attributes to the fundamental existent, or whether such attributes would naturally fall out of a deep analysis.

The interesting question is whether a deep analysis could go either way, ending up with either mechanistic or mentalistic attributes of the fundamental existent, or whether it would come down to one or the other.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

I wonder. I wonder if the idealists would have to force-fit some sort of mentalistic attributes to the fundamental existent, or whether such attributes would naturally fall out of a deep analysis.

The interesting question is whether a deep analysis could go either way, ending up with either mechanistic or mentalistic attributes of the fundamental existent, or whether it would come down to one or the other.

~~ PaulPaul, you really ought to find a library willing to dig up the Mary Calkins piece I wrote of earlier ("philosophical credo of an absolutistic personalist", I think); for her, there is no question but what it falls out ideally. For me, I think that if you accept her first premise, she has you through to the end... but I do not accept her first premise (if memory serves, it is "that mental entities exist"; I have never had a student not--at least initially--refuse to accept that, though).

I keep looking, and it is entirely possible that I have some unacknowledged blinders that prevent me from seeing it, but I have yet to find anything to distinguish between the monisms, nor anything that makes dualism coherent.

[Piscivore]

I do not accept her first premise (if memory serves, it is "that mental entities exist";

She's talking about independent, objectively existing mental entities, right?

[Darat]

She's talking about independent, objectively existing mental entities, right?

I've only ever read extracts but that's how I've understood her (however you are trying to explain her viewpoint using "materialist" words so it doesn't quite work); an analogy to the "materialist" approach - where they have "atoms" she would have "itoms".

[Piscivore]

I've only ever read extracts but that's how I've understood her (however you are trying to explain her viewpoint using "materialist" words so it doesn't quite work); an analogy to the "materialist" approach - where they have "atoms" she would have "itoms".

I gotcha. Still basically a dualist sort of thing then? I dreamed up something almost exactly like that in junior college, only to do with the soul and the bits of which I imagined it consisted. That first semester of Philosophy is like a loaded gun. :)

[Nick227]

How, then, do you know it is the truth? Or do you simply define it as truth?

When one knows, one knows. When very little doubt seems to come up, either from yourself or from your interactions with others, then you are either experiencing gnosis, or psychosis! Like I said, it can be a fine line.

I do not. I am a pragmatist; "truth" is not something that can be demonstrated, so I will settle for practical use and explanatory value. All of reality may well be material, or ideal, and it would not bother me a bit. On the other hand, dualism (both flavors that Ich-Wasp spoke of) is a fatally flawed bit of hand-waving and assuming of conclusions.
Fascinating. Do you realize that it also cannot be demonstrated to yourself? Or, again, do you simply define your perception as truth, thus making it trivially true?

I'm saying the other forms of knowing are great, there is also another level. I am also a pragmatist. It's not simply that all perception should be considered true, rather that one investigates for oneself and sees what happens. You can't really define gnosis. The model I use is hard to prove or disprove, which to many would make it of limited validity. For me I'm fine with it, because it best fits all data in my personal experience of being alive.

That's to say...Reality is a priori monistic and non-dual. The experience of duality arises within it, and must be examined deeply in order to be overcome. It cannot be overcome with beliefs.

I would simply call it "private", but recognize that even the access that I have is not the full picture. It cannot be.
That is the nature of private experience--but of course, we can compare with other forms of experience, and greatly increase our own self-knowledge. There may be no "objective", but of course that does not matter unless one is a dualist.

One is inevitably dualist anyway. Whilst there is the experience of limited selfhood there will be the experience of dualism. I don't see how you can get around it. Monists argue with dualists - that's duality.

We change constantly; feeling different about pretty much anything is a safe bet. Oh--did you mean I might come to agree with you? I think I know too much about our sensory, perceptual, cognitive and memory systems to take that big a step back. You can't unring a bell...

Well, time will tell, I guess.

Nick

[Nick227]

You can't assume human consciousness as the fundamental nature of the universe, because that's simply not what we observe. You can talk of something else, immaterial, as the basis for reality, but you can't use the word consciousness for it, because we've seen that, and that ain't it.

So what have you experienced, that you have not experienced as human consciousness?

Nick

[Nick227]

I still maintain that the presence of the unfiltered consciousness and the filter that is created by the unfiltered consciousness admits property dualism at the very least.

Well, in any theory of how reality is there is inevitably dualism at an experiential level. In the very act of assuming that there can be a point of relative isolation from which to make objective assessments about how things are...there is inevitably dualism.

It is one thing to make a theory monistic. It is another to account for all one's experiences of myriad duality through this theory.

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

Nick,

I would submit that whether you define it as gnosis or psychosis is irrelevant for, well, ”the truth.” The problem is of course that you say that you simply know, and also submit that it’s not simply a belief, which seem to be a rather odd statement to say the least. Gnosis or psychosis is not necessarily the only distinction one could make – they seem to be somewhat arbitrarily chosen.

In the end, it’s simply your interpretation of what happened. There’s not much more to say about that. It’s perfectly possible (or more like probable) that the “direct sensation” you base your assertion on is a brain state like the one where the phenomenal self is regarded as being present.

[Nick227]

Nick,

I would submit that whether you define it as gnosis or psychosis is irrelevant for, well, ”the truth.” The problem is of course that you say that you simply know, and also submit that it’s not simply a belief, which seem to be a rather odd statement to say the least. Gnosis or psychosis is not necessarily the only distinction one could make – they seem to be somewhat arbitrarily chosen.

In the end, it’s simply your interpretation of what happened. There’s not much more to say about that. It’s perfectly possible (or more like probable) that the “direct sensation” you base your assertion on is a brain state like the one where the phenomenal self is regarded as being present.

Well, I would say that "gnosis" and "psychosis" are the two main mental states where the individual's belief appears unshakeable. It's pretty much a defining characteristic of both.

Personally, I must admit I feel less attached to my beliefs these day, so it is a little fake of me to claim my interpretation as a gnosis really. It is actually more what fits my own personal experience of being alive. I also think the Gnostics - that's to say the mystical group - were largely right in their worldview, so that's also where the word partially comes from.

It is finally the best explanation I've personally come across to fit the varied experiences of my life. That's about it.

Nick

[Nick227]

I agree but Dodger has a point. If I come over to your house and look into your back yard am I likely to observe the same objective reality as you?

You have pretty much the same brain, the same filter.

Nick

[Ichneumonwasp]

You know, if Dave Barry were reading this thread, I would guess that he would think "Gnostic Psychos" would be a great name for a rock band.

[Nick227]

I used to think I could. Not so certain any more.

Under either monism, the world appears to behave lawfully. In either case, I would agree that free will is not possible. The flawed logic of the dualist starts with two givens--that there is a real (objective) material world, and a real (subjective) ideal world, which are by definition non-overlapping domains. The reality of the mental world is unquestioned--we think, therefore we are. The reality of the physical world is inferred from the continuity Paul spoke of, or from the fact that imagining we are eating does not keep us alive.

Oddly, though, these two non-overlapping domains are synchronized, when there is no reason that they should be. There needs to be some sort of connection between the two unconnected domains. Different dualists posit different connections--the pineal gland, microtubules, God, or will. Rather than challenging and discarding the assumptions of two domains, the domains are taken axiomatically, and some connector must be inferred. The solution to "why does it feel as if I am choosing my actions?" cannot be "it's an illusion", since the mental reality is axiomatic.

I didn't say it was *good* logic. Garbage in, garbage out. And if someone can speak for Penrose's microtubules in a more coherent manner, please speak up. I have done battle with his book, and this is as close as I can come to it.

As I see it, the experience of free will requires only that thoughts be present, and that there be some process creating identification with some of those thoughts. This is all. Without thoughts there is no free will. I don't see that it really relates to the connection between subjectivity and objectivity.

Nick

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As I see it, the experience of free will requires only that thoughts be present, and that there be some process creating identification with some of those thoughts. This is all. Without thoughts there is no free will. I don't see that it really relates to the connection between subjectivity and objectivity.
That can result in the feeling of willing an action, yes. But free will is usually associated with something more: the idea that the action was selected by "my self" in some way that is neither deterministic nor random. What sort of free will are you talking about?

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

That can result in the feeling of willing an action, yes. But free will is usually associated with something more: the idea that the action was selected by "my self" in some way that is neither deterministic nor random. What sort of free will are you talking about?

~~ Paul

Can you give me an example of free will that is not mediated by thought?

eta: To me this is a case of people seeking to make something unneccessarily complex. The experience of free will, I submit, occurs only with the experience of thought, and with the experience of identification with thought. Thus it is only necessary to examine, from the materialist perspective, the neurological process by which thoughts arise, and the process which causes thoughts to be acted upon.

To get a little more specific...there is an issue requiring action which faces us. There is the experience of choices in how to act, coming about through different thoughts arising. The experience of free will is no so much created by the conscious process of choosing which thought to act upon, but rather on acting through unconscious motivation. Because we are not fully aware of what it is that makes us choose one way over another, it gets attributed to free will.

Nick

[cyborg]

The experience of free will, I submit, occurs only with the experience of thought, and with the experience of identification with thought. Thus it is only necessary to examine, from the materialist perspective, the neurological process by which thoughts arise, and the process which causes thoughts to be acted upon.

The problem is what you mean by "free" since it is necessary that if "free" means "not determined by anything else," then the neurological processes by which thoughts arise cannot be bound to any other physical process and hence must behave with out determinance with respect to anything else - i.e. be random.

As such if the processes by which thoughts arise are bound to some other physical process - such as environmental stimuli - then the thoughts are not "free" by the above definition and hence the "will" part is bound to these physical processes.

Because we are not fully aware of what it is that makes us choose one way over another, it gets attributed to free will.

That's free will of the gaps - fine for an everyday trundle through life, not fine for a hard analysis.

[Robin]

So what have you experienced, that you have not experienced as human consciousness?
In effect you are asking, "what have you experienced that you have not experienced?".

Yes?

[Robin]

Well, in any theory of how reality is there is inevitably dualism at an experiential level. In the very act of assuming that there can be a point of relative isolation from which to make objective assessments about how things are...there is inevitably dualism.
Not so. I can write a program that can detect and act upon patterns in data, even though the program itself is just a pattern in the data.

It is easy to conclude from this that I am probably just another pattern in the data myself.

[westprog]

You are quite right - science has no interest or beliefs about the underlying state of the universe.

However treating it as if it were materialistic would be a belief about the underlying state of the universe. Science is, as I said, metaphysically neutral. It requires no metaphysical assumptions - not even materialism.

Naturally not all scientists agree with this. Planck, for example, was an unapologetic realist.

However - bear with me for a while - science makes certain assumptions about the way the universe works. It assumes repeatability, for example. If you do the same thing twice, you will get the same result. The assumptions science makes on an ad hoc basis in order to make things work are similar to the philosophical beliefs of materialism - however, in the field of science, they are not beliefs but just a way of working.

I'm quite ready to have this picked apart, should you feel like doing so.

[RandFan]

You have pretty much the same brain, the same filter. What is your basis for this?

[RandFan]

It is finally the best explanation I've personally come across to fit the varied experiences of my life. That's about it. I can't argue with that. I don't have any basis to agree since it is at best a very poor explanation to fit the varied experiences of my life but I can't argue that your experiences are the same as mine. The logical conclusion then leads me to seriously doubt that we have the same filter.

[Robin]

However - bear with me for a while - science makes certain assumptions about the way the universe works. It assumes repeatability, for example. If you do the same thing twice, you will get the same result.
Quite the opposite. Science does not assume repeatability, it hypothesises repeatability and tests it endlessly. Something cannot be an assumption if you have to test it.
The assumptions science makes on an ad hoc basis in order to make things work are similar to the philosophical beliefs of materialism - however, in the field of science, they are not beliefs but just a way of working.
"ad hoc" is the operative phrase. Here is Mach on the subject:
It may easily become a disturbing element in unprejudiced scientific theorising when a conception which is adapted to a particular and strictly limited purpose is promoted in advance to be the foundation of all investigation. This happens, for example, when all experiences are regarded as " effects " of an external world extending into consciousness. This conception gives us a tangle of metaphysical difficulties which it seems impossible to unravel. But the spectre vanishes at once when we look at the matter as it were in a mathematical light, and make it clear to ourselves that all that is valuable to us is the discovery of functional relations, and that what we want to know is merely the dependence of experiences or one another. It then becomes obvious that the reference to unknown fundamental variables which are not given (things-in-themselves) is purely fictitious and superfluous. But even when we allow this fiction, uneconomical though it be, to stand at first, we can still easily distinguish different classes of the mutual dependence of the elements of " the facts of consciousness "; and this alone is important for us.

Ernst Mach - Analysis of Sensation
So they are ways of working only in a limited and temporary sense and, as Mach points out, counter-productive when scientists start to treat them as assumptions.

Mach's ideas were highly influential, almost seminal, in the philosophy of science as it unfolded in the twentieth century. Not all agreed, as I have said. Planck despised Mach's ideas. Einstein helped develop these ideas without ever subscribing to strict positivism himself.

(Incidentally it has happened more than once that scientists have made Idealist assumptions on an ad-hoc basis)

[Robin]

This might all be summed up more concisely by Bohr's famous "Don't tell God what to do". In other words, never make current scientific thinking an assumption about the basis of reality.

[Robin]

You have pretty much the same brain, the same filter.

Nick
So tell me what I dreamed about last night.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Can you give me an example of free will that is not mediated by thought?
That depends entirely on your definition of free will, which is why I asked you what sort of free will you were talking about.

A libertarian free willie might claim that a free choice arises from something that is not thought.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Quite the opposite. Science does not assume repeatability, it hypothesises repeatability and tests it endlessly. Something cannot be an assumption if you have to test it.
Indeed.

Another approach is to say that it's axiomatic that the natural laws are consistent, but that the axiom is falsifiable in the face of further evidence. I suppose we could insist that a falsifiable axiom is precisely a hypothesis.


(Incidentally it has happened more than once that scientists have made Idealist assumptions on an ad-hoc basis)
Ooh, fun. Can you give an example?

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

Well, in any theory of how reality is there is inevitably dualism at an experiential level. In the very act of assuming that there can be a point of relative isolation from which to make objective assessments about how things are...there is inevitably dualism.

It is one thing to make a theory monistic. It is another to account for all one's experiences of myriad duality through this theory.

Nick

False dichotomy, objectivity does not require seperation...

It requires that all actions and events are equal across space and time. That is about it. All things are unique and interdependant, objectivism doesn't require seperation, it is about underlying connections and the apparent consistancy of experience.

Objective is that which is true across space and time.

[Dancing David]

Well, I would say that "gnosis" and "psychosis" are the two main mental states where the individual's belief appears unshakeable. It's pretty much a defining characteristic of both.



Point of order, that is not the defintion of psychosis, unless you are using some really outdated one.

It is the nature of belief that it is strongly held regardless of it's shake-ability (And regardless of the mental state of the believer). Psychosis is the state of 'knowing' or 'believing' that which is not 'known' or believed' by others. Having cognitive distortions/thought disorders and internal stimuli is also present in psychosis. Magical thinking and religiosity are much more hallmarks of psychosis and gnosis than beliefs being unshake-able. Basically everyones beliefs are unshakeable.
(Opinion is usually that which is easily shaken, I would have a very hard time convincing you the sun rises in the west. Even if everyone agreed with me.)

[Robin]

Ooh, fun. Can you give an example?
~~ Paul
The participatory anthropic principle for example.

Here is a transcript from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's Science Show, not normally known for it's toleration of woo:

http://www.abc.net.au/rn/scienceshow/stories/2007/1810057.htm

[Piscivore]

Basically everyones beliefs are unshakeable.
(Opinion is usually that which is easily shaken, I would have a very hard time convincing you the sun rises in the west. Even if everyone agreed with me.)

Are you sure about that? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asch_conformity_experiments)

[RandFan]

Robin,

Great posts. Along with Mercutio and Paul this has been a really great thread. BTW, I will attest that you have enlightened me about Mach and Idealism and I think we debated and I stubbornly held out against the idea of not being able to prove that the sensation of sight is the same for different people. I think. Whatever the debate was I don't hold that position anymore.

In any event, if it wasn't you. Never mind.

[PixyMisa]

So what have you experienced, that you have not experienced as human consciousness?
Well, either everything or nothing, depending on what your poorly-phrased question is supposed to mean.

I am a human consciousness, so everything I experience is the experience of a human consciousness.

The flip side of that is that everything I experience is not a human consciousness.

None of which is in any way relevant to the point I was making, which is that an assumption of consciousness as the fundamental existent does not in any way explain human consciousness.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The participatory anthropic principle for example.
Eek, yes.

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

Are you sure about that? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asch_conformity_experiments)

:)

Well it comes down to the use of definitions, as usual on the JREF, I am making a distinction between at least three things:
1. Stated opinions.
2. Thoughts about the world.
3. The belief or 'knowledge' of experience.

This does get confusing because of the common usage of all words in this discussion. Having worked with delusional people is where I am coming from, and hallucinating people.

They are not imagining the voices nor are they having an opinion about their delusions.

They experience the voices as though they are external to them, the beliefs they have are of the 'what I remember happened yesterday' variety. They really have the experience that they are napoleon, they don't just think they are Napoleon, they don't just have the opinion they are napoleon.

They have the experience of being Napoleon, they have the memories that they have experienced the events of Napoleon.

Now why do I make this distinction? Because it gets to the nature of that experience and the difference between that belief and an opinion.

Our reality is largely conditioned, we perceive what we sense because of conditioning. We have a set of notions about what the world is that comes from the reinforcement of memory, conditioning and the way memory is reconstructed (it is not like a photograph it is a recreation from limited data).

So when you say "I know the sun rises in the east" it get to a much deeper level of being/experience than "Capitalism is good/bad" , the sun rising in the east is part of your conditioned existence and experience.

In delusion it is as though you woke up and the sun is rising in the 'west', it is coming up over the house on the other side of your house. Even though you remember it always coming up in the 'east'. You remember sitting in your dining room watching it rise, and now you see it rising while you sit in your bedroom on the other side of the house. Then when you talk to people they will tell you that they have never sat in your dining room and watched the sun rise, they have always seen it from the bedroom.

That is what makes what I call belief something 'unshakeable' and what makes delusions so persistent. They have the experience of reconstructed memories and events that are different from ours. That is why delusions are defined as 'beliefs not held by others' and it points to a very deep level of what people call experience and consciousness and self-identity that is biological and capable of being 'corrupted' or 'spurious' in computer terms.

The beliefs as I am defining them are not "That man is fat" but the actual knowledge and memory of that man as having a very large cross section in the visual field. Say a person is delusional, and they tell you that they flew to your house and knocked on your door after landing on the porch. You say that you have video tapes that you just took because you were doing a bird count in your yard and that these tapes show them walking up the side walk and turning up the path and stepping onto the porch. They will react the same way you would if you believed that you had ridden a bike to their house and they showed you a tape that you had ridden up on an elephant.

You would say that the tape was faked and that you 'know' you rode a bike to the house, even in they showed you the tape, you would say it was faked, even if everybody said you rose the elephant and your beloved spouse showed you the elephant, you would say something like "I know I have an elephant but this time I know I rode a bike". And as most people would you would get really agitated if people kept insisting you rode an elephant.

The things I am labeling as beliefs follow this pattern, they are not subject to social pressure and persuasion, people may cover, hide and deny them, but they are deeply held at the level of "what makes me who I am".

Just as people with Alzheimer’s will insist that you stole their wallet or never paid them back the money you owed them. They get really pissed at you, even when you show them the wallet in their pocket and the receipt for the pay back. "You planted it on me, you faked it".

[Piscivore]

:)

Well it comes down to the use of definitions, as usual on the JREF, I am making a distinction between at least three things:
1. Stated opinions.
2. Thoughts about the world.
3. The belief or 'knowledge' of experience.

This does get confusing because of the common usage of all words in this discussion. Having worked with delusional people is where I am coming from, and hallucinating people.

They are not imagining the voices nor are they having an opinion about their delusions.

They experience the voices as though they are external to them, the beliefs they have are of the 'what I remember happened yesterday' variety. They really have the experience that they are napoleon, they don't just think they are Napoleon, they don't just have the opinion they are napoleon.

They have the experience of being Napoleon, they have the memories that they have experienced the events of Napoleon.

Now why do I make this distinction? Because it gets to the nature of that experience and the difference between that belief and an opinion.

Our reality is largely conditioned, we perceive what we sense because of conditioning. We have a set of notions about what the world is that comes from the reinforcement of memory, conditioning and the way memory is reconstructed (it is not like a photograph it is a recreation from limited data).

So when you say "I know the sun rises in the east" it get to a much deeper level of being/experience than "Capitalism is good/bad" , the sun rising in the east is part of your conditioned existence and experience.

In delusion it is as though you woke up and the sun is rising in the 'west', it is coming up over the house on the other side of your house. Even though you remember it always coming up in the 'east'. You remember sitting in your dining room watching it rise, and now you see it rising while you sit in your bedroom on the other side of the house. Then when you talk to people they will tell you that they have never sat in your dining room and watched the sun rise, they have always seen it from the bedroom.

That is what makes what I call belief something 'unshakeable' and what makes delusions so persistent. They have the experience of reconstructed memories and events that are different from ours. That is why delusions are defined as 'beliefs not held by others' and it points to a very deep level of what people call experience and consciousness and self-identity that is biological and capable of being 'corrupted' or 'spurious' in computer terms.

The beliefs as I am defining them are not "That man is fat" but the actual knowledge and memory of that man as having a very large cross section in the visual field. Say a person is delusional, and they tell you that they flew to your house and knocked on your door after landing on the porch. You say that you have video tapes that you just took because you were doing a bird count in your yard and that these tapes show them walking up the side walk and turning up the path and stepping onto the porch. They will react the same way you would if you believed that you had ridden a bike to their house and they showed you a tape that you had ridden up on an elephant.

You would say that the tape was faked and that you 'know' you rode a bike to the house, even in they showed you the tape, you would say it was faked, even if everybody said you rose the elephant and your beloved spouse showed you the elephant, you would say something like "I know I have an elephant but this time I know I rode a bike". And as most people would you would get really agitated if people kept insisting you rode an elephant.

The things I am labeling as beliefs follow this pattern, they are not subject to social pressure and persuasion, people may cover, hide and deny them, but they are deeply held at the level of "what makes me who I am".

Just as people with Alzheimer’s will insist that you stole their wallet or never paid them back the money you owed them. They get really pissed at you, even when you show them the wallet in their pocket and the receipt for the pay back. "You planted it on me, you faked it".

Interesting post, David. Do you see "normal" people having people having this strength of conviction, or in your experience is it more or less confined to the mentally ill?

[Ichneumonwasp]

So tell me what I dreamed about last night.

Twin leopard cubs crocheting the Congolese flag over the decaying corpse of the hyena god and discussing Michelangelo over tea and crumpets while the myriad throngs bow in obeisance and throw small rubber ducks at their feet?

[Darat]

Close - but the leopards weren't twins just litter-mates.

Oh and there was no Congolese flag




and no decaying hyena gods





or discussions of Michelangelo over tea




or any throngs doing anything



or rubber ducks



or come to think of any leopards.


But apart from that spot on!

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, at least I was close.

Why am I the only one who has that dream?

[Piscivore]

Well, at least I was close.

Why am I the only one who has that dream?

It all goes back to how you feel about der Mutter

[Ichneumonwasp]

It all goes back to how you feel about der Mutter

I see, I see.

So, what you're saying is that the Congolese flag represents the mother figure being created whole cloth from the two increasingly hostile and irreconcilable sides of my warped personality while the dead hyena god represents the father figure I so desperately want to replace, the crochet needles being obvious phallic representations held in an act of creation to cover through repression and displacement the very obvious maleficent intent I hold toward all authority figures.

But what about the rubber ducks?


ETA:

Does this mean that I have unresolved Berklean idealist issues at my core? How horrible.

[Darat]

They just mean you're quackers.

[Ichneumonwasp]

That would explain it.

[Dancing David]

Interesting post, David. Do you see "normal" people having people having this strength of conviction, or in your experience is it more or less confined to the mentally ill?

Hi, when it comes to inante knowledge, ie experience, i think most people get very upset when you disagree with them. try an experiement with a friend, tell a story about something you two did in common but change a major detail, they will usually argue.

tell people that GW Bush is not president but George McGovern is, you will see an interesting response.

[Piscivore]

Hi, when it comes to inante knowledge, ie experience, i think most people get very upset when you disagree with them. try an experiement with a friend, tell a story about something you two did in common but change a major detail, they will usually argue. Sure, they might get upset or argue, but you can usually make them at least doubt themselves. I've done this before, with my kids, to demonstrate to them that perceptions and recollections can be flawed.

It's not that difficult to get someone to change their behaviour to something contrary to what they "think"- look at Asch (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asch_conformity_experiments), Milgram (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment), Stanford (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment). A lot of how successful it wil be depends on how strong your own conviction seems to the other person.

Used for less than ethical reasons, it even has its own name (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaslighting).

People are a lot more willing to relinquish responsibility for their behaviour to someone else more often than I think you realise. It seems to me from your account that one of the primary reasons the mentally ill you describe dealing with are under care is precisely the strength of their convictions- if they were more easily influenced to "change their minds" they'd "respond to treatment", yeah?

tell people that GW Bush is not president but George McGovern is, you will see an interesting response.

That depends a lot on the depth and breadth of their education, doesn't it?

[Dancing David]

Sure, they might get upset or argue, but you can usually make them at least doubt themselves. I've done this before, with my kids, to demonstrate to them that perceptions and recollections can be flawed.

It's not that difficult to get someone to change their behaviour to something contrary to what they "think"- look at Asch (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asch_conformity_experiments), Milgram (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment), Stanford (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment). A lot of how successful it wil be depends on how strong your own conviction seems to the other person.

Used for less than ethical reasons, it even has its own name (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaslighting).

People are a lot more willing to relinquish responsibility for their behaviour to someone else more often than I think you realise. It seems to me from your account that one of the primary reasons the mentally ill you describe dealing with are under care is precisely the strength of their convictions- if they were more easily influenced to "change their minds" they'd "respond to treatment", yeah?



That depends a lot on the depth and breadth of their education, doesn't it?

Not really, I worked with delusional people for years, you can't get them toi change their delusions anymore that you could convince another person that George Carlin is presisdent. Most people who you told George Carlin is president would disagree with you. Changing delusional beliefs is not part of mental health treatment. You can encourage people to identify the beliefs that bother other people and encourage them to not talk about it. But unless they respond to medication (and even when they do) the delusions will not change. Any body who argues with a delusional person is a fool and not a good professional. At best you hope for the day they say "I know you don't share my beliefs Dave..." You can ot rely on delusional beliefs as a matter of response to treatment, levels of sleep , appetite, ability to interact socially are much better indicators. Only a severely bad clinician would argue with a delusional person. In fact Fred Freese encourages you to say "How interesting , tell me more"

What adult have you tried to convince that Bill Cosby is the Queen of England? Get back to me on that, will you. :D

Now I agree that people are very often willing to change their behavior in response to all sorts of stuff, but that does not mean they think George Carlin is President.(Even if they do things that are contrary to their mores, as in Milgrom) So again we have 'observable' behaviors, internal behaviors and the expression of beliefs.

I sincerely think that people will become upset if you say that Bill Cosby is the Queen of England. I am again talking about here solely about the basis of experience that makes up 'knowledge', not mores, morals, conventions, opinions or other things commonly labeled beliefs.

[Piscivore]

Not really, I worked with delusional people for years, you can't get them toi change their delusions anymore that you could convince another person that George Carlin is presisdent. Most people who you told George Carlin is president would disagree with you. Changing delusional beliefs is not part of mental health treatment. You can encourage people to identify the beliefs that bother other people and encourage them to not talk about it. But unless they respond to medication (and even when they do) the delusions will not change. Any body who argues with a delusional person is a fool and not a good professional. At best you hope for the day they say "I know you don't share my beliefs Dave..." You can ot rely on delusional beliefs as a matter of response to treatment, levels of sleep , appetite, ability to interact socially are much better indicators. Only a severely bad clinician would argue with a delusional person. In fact Fred Freese encourages you to say "How interesting , tell me more"
Well, again, you're just reiterating that strength of conviction is a symptom of mental illness. If someone held a "delusion" that they could be persuaded from, does that indicate that they are not mentally ill?

It seems to me you are asserting that these "unshakable delusions" are evidence that people who are not mentally ill hold similar "unshakeable knowledge". How does that follow? You do realise that "unshakeable conviction" is not a test for truth, and does not make the conviction "knowledge", right?

What adult have you tried to convince that Bill Cosby is the Queen of England? Get back to me on that, will you. :D
Going for extremes? It may be diffcult, but that does not make it impossible. especially for someone who does not know much about either of them. I could probably sell that over in Africa or Polynesia or somewhere with not much effort (you've never seen them together have you? look at all the black actors (Eddie Murphy, Tyler Perry) that like to dress up as completely different people- even women). I'd have a much more difficult time in England, but that doesn't mean that with the right techniques it couldn't be done. Especailly if the victim were isolated and there were confederates agreeing with me.

And even if that specific instance failed, it does not create a special class of knowledge of one fact that extends to all other "facts".

Now I agree that people are very often willing to change their behavior in response to all sorts of stuff, but that does not mean they think George Carlin is President.(Even if they do things that are contrary to their mores, as in Milgrom) So again we have 'observable' behaviors, internal behaviors and the expression of beliefs.

I sincerely think that people will become upset if you say that Bill Cosby is the Queen of England.
So what? "Upset" does not mean "unshakeable". Parents get "upset" when the neighbors tell them little Suzy is a hooligan, that doesn't mean they'll never change their minds about their child. Especially when Suzy comes home in the back of a police car.

I am again talking about here solely about the basis of experience that makes up 'knowledge', not mores, morals, conventions, opinions or other things commonly labeled beliefs.
I think you are inventing entities beyond necessity. How does one determine which kinds of "knowledge" go into your special category. Is there anything beyond just strength of conviction?

[Mercutio]

Dude, I am the Queen of England. So it can't be Bill Cosby.

Unless...

Maybe I am also Bill Cosby.

That explains so much.






...




Jello Pudding...

[Robin]

Eek, yes.

~~ Paul
Rereading, it does appear to be utter nonsense. The way an "almost as if" suddenly becomes "that's a fact" and on to "If it is true of tables and chairs it must be true of stars and galaxies too".

And then "If it were true we wouldn't need any other explanation for the whole creation of the universe." No need to explain where the observers or their intelligence or their supernatural powers of creation came from or what is making it all consistent.

All to explain something we don't understand about the behaviour of particles.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All to explain something we don't understand about the behaviour of particles.
Beware the physicist who thinks he's found god.

~~ Paul

[Robin]

Twin leopard cubs crocheting the Congolese flag over the decaying corpse of the hyena god and discussing Michelangelo over tea and crumpets while the myriad throngs bow in obeisance and throw small rubber ducks at their feet?
Wow, exactly right! I think our filters need cleaning.

[westprog]

Quite the opposite. Science does not assume repeatability, it hypothesises repeatability and tests it endlessly. Something cannot be an assumption if you have to test it.
...
Mach's ideas were highly influential, almost seminal, in the philosophy of science as it unfolded in the twentieth century. Not all agreed, as I have said. Planck despised Mach's ideas. Einstein helped develop these ideas without ever subscribing to strict positivism himself.


I think Mach lost a lot of 'em when he refused to accept atoms as anything other than symbolic placeholders.

Of course, if repeatability is not taken as assumed, then all scientific law is inevitably subject to rebuttal, which accords with Popper.

The precise distinction between a hypothesis and an assumption is something that I imagine concerns philosophers of science more than scientists. (Though perhaps it should concern them more).

(Incidentally it has happened more than once that scientists have made Idealist assumptions on an ad-hoc basis)

[Robin]

I think Mach lost a lot of 'em when he refused to accept atoms as anything other than symbolic placeholders.

Of course, if repeatability is not taken as assumed, then all scientific law is inevitably subject to rebuttal, which accords with Popper.

The precise distinction between a hypothesis and an assumption is something that I imagine concerns philosophers of science more than scientists. (Though perhaps it should concern them more).
Some scientists are better philosophers than philosophers. But you are right that scientists very often forget the distinction. Often they are up front about it. I recall one of the top proponents of string theory saying that ST was in many ways like a religion. He then said that as an old scientist some little idea comes up and he says "that is not important", but it may very well be important. That struck me as very honest and humble.

Hopefully the overall process will overcome the inevitable shortcomings of individual scientists.

[westprog]

Some scientists are better philosophers than philosophers. But you are right that scientists very often forget the distinction. Often they are up front about it.

I think that a lot of science is just about doing it. What it means and how valid it is is not top of the agenda.

I recall one of the top proponents of string theory saying that ST was in many ways like a religion. He then said that as an old scientist some little idea comes up and he says "that is not important", but it may very well be important. That struck me as very honest and humble.


String theory now seems to be getting the same kind of objections that Mach had about atomic theory - we can never know, etc. When Mach queried atoms, it really seemed implausible that atoms could ever be detected. Now scientists move them around one by one.

That doesn't mean that it will happen, though. There are plenty of theories that turned out to be true. Other theories were true to a point, but were then overtaken by a deeper understanding. Other theories were just completely wrong.

Hopefully the overall process will overcome the inevitable shortcomings of individual scientists.

I think that "trust the science, not the scientist" is the right approach. Einstein and Newton are perhaps the two most outstanding scientists whoever lived. They were wrong about more things than they were right about.

[Dancing David]

Well, again, you're just reiterating that strength of conviction is a symptom of mental illness. If someone held a "delusion" that they could be persuaded from, does that indicate that they are not mentally ill?

It seems to me you are asserting that these "unshakable delusions" are evidence that people who are not mentally ill hold similar "unshakeable knowledge". How does that follow? You do realise that "unshakeable conviction" is not a test for truth, and does not make the conviction "knowledge", right?


Going for extremes? It may be diffcult, but that does not make it impossible. especially for someone who does not know much about either of them. I could probably sell that over in Africa or Polynesia or somewhere with not much effort (you've never seen them together have you? look at all the black actors (Eddie Murphy, Tyler Perry) that like to dress up as completely different people- even women). I'd have a much more difficult time in England, but that doesn't mean that with the right techniques it couldn't be done. Especailly if the victim were isolated and there were confederates agreeing with me.

And even if that specific instance failed, it does not create a special class of knowledge of one fact that extends to all other "facts".




So what? "Upset" does not mean "unshakeable". Parents get "upset" when the neighbors tell them little Suzy is a hooligan, that doesn't mean they'll never change their minds about their child. Especially when Suzy comes home in the back of a police car.


I think you are inventing entities beyond necessity. How does one determine which kinds of "knowledge" go into your special category. Is there anything beyond just strength of conviction?

I think that there is something I should have continued to express here, I am not talking about a broad spectrum of the use of the word 'belief' nor am I trying to extend it to a general rule.

Delusional people are not more convinced of their beliefs than every body else.

I again refer you to the fact that I am using a specific narrow definition which I should label with another term for clarification. When you bring up indirect knowledge of the Queen of England in someone it shows that we are not talking about the same thing.

So I shall fabricate some thing from belief, knowledge, experience and memory and we have beknexmem. This will do away with the misrepresentation o idea between the two of us and get back to the nature of what I am saying is the same for mentally ill people and not mentally ill people. Since many of your counters are things I agree with completely and I think it is the divergence of our usage of language which is at odds.

Beknexmem is the direct experience of ‘experience’, it is comprised of the perceptions generated from sensations and the memory of them. So while there is the idea that someone has heard the phrase “Elizabeth Saxe-Coburg Windsor is the Queen of England” there are two (actually many) levels ate which this information exists.

The beknexmem is the event of perception and the memory of that perception, so it is the events of being in school and hearing, watch Chuck and Di’s wedding, seeing the pant suit incident on TV, reading a history text : the perception by the human brain of these events and the memory thereof.

So in short the beknexmem is the perceptual event and the memory of the event, which to me , is a biologically driven event in the brain, CNS and PNS.

So while we have a beknexmem of a friend saying that “Elizabeth II is a relic of the despotic origins of England”, the information is not the beknexmem. The perception of our friend making the statement and the memory is the beknexmem.

Which is why I chose the example of the sunrise and the elephant.

What people will usually (not always, especially if they are older) hold onto unshakably is that they have truthful beknexmem and that they are beknexmem. I have seen people fight over just such foolish things as whether Uncle Joe wore the red suit to the wedding. Because two people have different beknexmem of the event. So too in confabulated memories after head trauma, many people will defend the incorrect memory vigorously.

What I think is the point is that the beknexmem often labeled as qualia make up something that gets to the nature of what we conceptualize as ourselves. If you told me that my wife was a seven foot tall person I would argue with you, even if you showed me photos and probably even if this woman came in and said she was my wife, I have that memory of the perceptual event that my wife is five ft. four and would be very upset. It is exactly that reconstructed memory that is the basis of delusion or the agitated Alzheimer’s patient.

So I am being very narrow in what I am trying to present and I am in agreement with almost all you have said.

[lupus_in_fabula]

I think that "trust the science, not the scientist" is the right approach. Einstein and Newton are perhaps the two most outstanding scientists whoever lived. They were wrong about more things than they were right about.

Being wrong and being shown to be absolutely and utterly wrong is a splendid way for scientific knowledge to evolve. But it’s the showing which is the key, thus we cannot rely on subjective hearsay.

[westprog]

[SIZE=2][FONT=Verdana]Being wrong and being shown to be absolutely and utterly wrong is a splendid way for scientific knowledge to evolve. But it’s the showing which is the key, thus we cannot rely on subjective hearsay.

Einstein was entirely wrong about Quantum theory, but his objections, very carefully thought out, did a lot to test and strengthen the theory, and to establish a lot of what it really meant.

Newton's astrology/alchemy/etc, however, was a complete dead end and waste of time for all concerned.

[amb]

Einstein was entirely wrong about Quantum theory, but his objections, very carefully thought out, did a lot to test and strengthen the theory, and to establish a lot of what it really meant.

Newton's astrology/alchemy/etc, however, was a complete dead end and waste of time for all concerned.Agreed, but he was and is still regarded as a genius up there with the best. Goes to show that the greatest minds can sometimes veer off the main course into cuckooland.

[Nick227]

That depends entirely on your definition of free will, which is why I asked you what sort of free will you were talking about.

A libertarian free willie might claim that a free choice arises from something that is not thought.



Something that is not mediated by thought? Can you give me any example of an actual experience of free will that is not mediated by thought?

Nick

[Nick227]

Well, either everything or nothing, depending on what your poorly-phrased question is supposed to mean.

I am a human consciousness, so everything I experience is the experience of a human consciousness.

The flip side of that is that everything I experience is not a human consciousness.

None of which is in any way relevant to the point I was making, which is that an assumption of consciousness as the fundamental existent does not in any way explain human consciousness.

What you wrote was...

You can't assume human consciousness as the fundamental nature of the universe, because that's simply not what we observe. You can talk of something else, immaterial, as the basis for reality, but you can't use the word consciousness for it, because we've seen that, and that ain't it.

The first part I would consider fair enough, but your comment that the reason the word consciousness can't be used in this context is that "we've seen that," presumably "already" I do not follow. That is what I'm asking you what you have experienced that is not a human experience. How do you substantiate your position?

Nick