The Hard Problem of Consciousness

[Robin]

The Hard Problem, on the other hand, is why it feels like something to have a conscious process going on in one’s head–why there is first-person, subjective experience. Not only does a green thing look different from a red thing, remind us of other green things and inspire us to say, “That’s green” (the Easy Problem), but it also actually looks green: it produces an experience of sheer greenness that isn’t reducible to anything else. As Louis Armstrong said in response to a request to define jazz, “When you got to ask what it is, you never get to know.”

The Hard Problem is explaining how subjective experience arises from neural computation. The problem is hard because no one knows what a solution might look like or even whether it is a genuine scientific problem in the first place. And not surprisingly, everyone agrees that the hard problem (if it is a problem) remains a mystery.
...
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one.
So there you have the "Hard Problem of Consciousness". A "why" question and a "how" question:

1. Why do some organisms have subjective experience?
2. How does subjective experience arise from physical processing?

I think the short answer to both is "we don't know". But there are a multitude of questions in science for which we don't know the answer. What is special about these questions - why are these ones treated as though they ought to trigger some unspecified metaphysical crisis?

Why is it "objectively unreasonable" that physical processing should produce subjective states?

Whatever consciousness is, it is an inescapable fact that such a complex thing as a conscious thought could not just arise out of thin air, it would require some complex mechanism to achieve it.

And the components of that mechanism would not, in themselves be conscious.

So in fact it is objectively unreasonable that conscious could not be the result of non-conscious processes.

[Puppycow]

The word "objectively" is the key I think. Really, it doesn't make any sense to use the word "objectively" with regard to experience, because experience is only subjective, never objective, which is why I don't experience your experiences and you don't experience mine.

This is a little odd to me, however, because I wonder why I (whoever "I" am) should happen to be locked into this particular person's experience. I doubt that my brain is the only one that has an experience, but it is the only one that I can experience. Somehow I must be tied to the physical matter of my particular brain. But, the atoms that compose my particular brain are, according to theory anyway, just like any other atoms and could all be replaced without making any difference (in the course of one's lifetime, the atoms supposedly are gradually replaced by biological processes).

It is a hard problem. Maybe the mind is some sort of other-dimensional structure? Maybe there are non-physical dimensions and the mind exists in such dimensions? Maybe we'll never know or never be able to devise any experiment that would give us a clue.

[Robin]

Somehow I must be tied to the physical matter of my particular brain. But, the atoms that compose my particular brain are, according to theory anyway, just like any other atoms and could all be replaced without making any difference (in the course of one's lifetime, the atoms supposedly are gradually replaced by biological processes).
As are our experiences. Why should the replacement of atoms affect our understanding of the process, as long as the new ones behave in the same way as the old ones?
It is a hard problem. Maybe the mind is some sort of other-dimensional structure? Maybe there are non-physical dimensions and the mind exists in such dimensions? Maybe we'll never know or never be able to devise any experiment that would give us a clue.
But is it a harder problem than any other unsolved problem in science? What is special about these questions?

What problems does positing other dimensions solve? Doesn't that just increase complexity without solving any problem?

[RandFan]

...why are these ones treated as though they ought to trigger some unspecified metaphysical crisis?Arrogance, the illusion of self and a lot of other evolutionary mental baggage.

Whatever consciousness is, it is an inescapable fact that such a complex thing as a conscious thought could not just arise out of thin air, it would require some complex mechanism to achieve it. No materialist I know believes that consciousness arose out of thin air.

So in fact it is objectively unreasonable that conscious could not be the result of non-conscious processes.Perhaps it is just me but this seems to contradict the previous paragraph.

There is no evidence that consciousness is the result of a conscious process. Nothing in your post would support the thesis that consciousness must be the result of a conscious process.

[Dragoonster]

What is special about these questions - why are these ones treated as though they ought to trigger some unspecified metaphysical crisis?

What is special about the self? Literally everything.

Science is a luxury, everything beyond a self-nonself distinction is a luxury. It explains the current Universe but that Universe could change at any moment rendering all previous explanation irrelevant. There is no possible way to prove that it couldn't.

It's useful to describe the Universe, but only because after umpteen years each of us has experienced an apparently binding Universe. Routine has become proof. I'm a bit drunk btw.

[westprog]

What is special about the self? Literally everything.

Science is a luxury, everything beyond a self-nonself distinction is a luxury. It explains the current Universe but that Universe could change at any moment rendering all previous explanation irrelevant. There is no possible way to prove that it couldn't.

It's useful to describe the Universe, but only because after umpteen years each of us has experienced an apparently binding Universe. Routine has become proof. I'm a bit drunk btw.

Science is a way to describe patterns in a succession of subjective experiences. The patterns can seem to be predictable enough that the assumption is made that they reflect some kind of "real world".

The next stage is to assume that the "real world" and its patterns are more valid than the subjective experiences which interpret them.

[Scazon]

Without predictability, there could be no pattern, no learning, no consciousness and therefore no subjectivity. One of the best arguments for the existence of an objective world is that we have got so far as to talk about it. Without a degree of long- term stability, galaxies, stars, planets, organisms could never have formed.

You could of course argue that it's all subjectivity, that what our senses deliver does not reflect the external world in any meaningful way. In which case, you have to explain, in a non- solipsistic way, why you are reading this. If all is illusion, so is your consciousness.

And if you believe in pure consciousness existing independently of matter, why does it bother attaching itself to matter, and why can't it remember what it was doing in the half-eternity before that matter+consciousness got it's botty smacked for pooing on the carpet?

[Robin]

No materialist I know believes that consciousness arose out of thin air.
Nor any one that I know. However Chalmers clearly considers it unreasonable that it arose from physical processes. But what else could it arise from?
Perhaps it is just me but this seems to contradict the previous paragraph.
On consideration it is not the clearest paragraph I have written, but I don't think it contradicts the previous.
There is no evidence that consciousness is the result of a conscious process. Nothing in your post would support the thesis that consciousness must be the result of a conscious process.
I should certainly hope nothing in my post supports that thesis! I should hope that it demonstrates the opposite.

[Robin]

What is special about the self? Literally everything.
I agree, but what is special about those questions?
Science is a luxury, everything beyond a self-nonself distinction is a luxury.
Necessity for our civilisation at its present stage I would have thought
t explains the current Universe but that Universe could change at any moment rendering all previous explanation irrelevant. There is no possible way to prove that it couldn't.
On the other hand I am not holding my breath.

[Nick227]

...

So there you have the "Hard Problem of Consciousness". A "why" question and a "how" question:

1. Why do some organisms have subjective experience?
2. How does subjective experience arise from physical processing?

I think the short answer to both is "we don't know". But there are a multitude of questions in science for which we don't know the answer. What is special about these questions - why are these ones treated as though they ought to trigger some unspecified metaphysical crisis?

Why is it "objectively unreasonable" that physical processing should produce subjective states?

Whatever consciousness is, it is an inescapable fact that such a complex thing as a conscious thought could not just arise out of thin air, it would require some complex mechanism to achieve it.

And the components of that mechanism would not, in themselves be conscious.

So in fact it is objectively unreasonable that conscious could not be the result of non-conscious processes.

Personally, I figure the researchers proceed from too many assumptions. Selfhood is not innate to consciousness. It is merely constructed by the mind. Imo subjective awareness, and later objective awareness, arises as the mind constructs a notion of limited selfhood from the non-dual reality of experience.

The phenomena of selfhood arises, as any decent mystic will tell you, primarily with identification with thought - an autonomous mental process that creates in consciousness the sensation that it has a limited self, that it is bordered by the body and that it possesses thoughts and feelings. None of this is a priori true. It is all constructed. Without identification with thought there is no limited self.

In my experience, materialists can usually appreciate that the sensation of subjectivity, of selfhood, is just the result of neural processes, that it's not innate. They usually struggle, ime, to move forward to the realisation that actually, without identification with thought, there is no experiencer at all.

Nick

[westprog]

Without predictability, there could be no pattern, no learning, no consciousness and therefore no subjectivity. One of the best arguments for the existence of an objective world is that we have got so far as to talk about it. Without a degree of long- term stability, galaxies, stars, planets, organisms could never have formed.

You could of course argue that it's all subjectivity, that what our senses deliver does not reflect the external world in any meaningful way. In which case, you have to explain, in a non- solipsistic way, why you are reading this. If all is illusion, so is your consciousness.

And if you believe in pure consciousness existing independently of matter, why does it bother attaching itself to matter, and why can't it remember what it was doing in the half-eternity before that matter+consciousness got it's botty smacked for pooing on the carpet?

I've never accepted the pure consciousness argument. If there were nothing there but thought, then it would not be able to produce external data. The sensations must come from somewhere.

However, what we can confidently deduce about the source of such sensations must have less certainty than what we know by direct experience of our own consciousness. We have things we know indirectly, and a very small number of things we know directly - our own thoughts and feelings. We know for sure that our own thoughts and feelings exist. Everything else, from our right knee to the Andromeda galaxy, is mediated via our thoughts and feelings. Hence it seems strange to prioritize indirect over direct experience, and to say that the Andromeda galaxy is objectively a fact, while our perception of it is an illusion.

[Nick227]

I've never accepted the pure consciousness argument. If there were nothing there but thought, then it would not be able to produce external data. The sensations must come from somewhere.

However, what we can confidently deduce about the source of such sensations must have less certainty than what we know by direct experience of our own consciousness. We have things we know indirectly, and a very small number of things we know directly - our own thoughts and feelings. We know for sure that our own thoughts and feelings exist. Everything else, from our right knee to the Andromeda galaxy, is mediated via our thoughts and feelings. Hence it seems strange to prioritize indirect over direct experience, and to say that the Andromeda galaxy is objectively a fact, while our perception of it is an illusion.

Personally, I don't agree with this. For a start not everything exists via the mediation of thoughts and feelings. Thoughts only allow reflection on something, they do not facilitate direct experience. You could sit looking at the Andromeda galaxy all day and not have a single thought about it. Now, if you wanted to communicate about the experience, or reflect upon it, then that would require thoughts.

In fact, experience is invariably far more direct without thoughts occurring. There is of course then no sense of selfhood present, but this is not necessary for experience.

I do not think personally that you are scratching the surface of Chalmers' core issue - can consciousness arise from a purely physical process? Personally, I doubt it severely.

The issue of subjectivity, or of selfhood, is not complicated, I think. It is simply that the mind of the consciousness-researcher, in most cases, is simply too identified with thought to see what is in front of it. The issue with how consciousness arises from material processes - now that's a real issue!

Nick

[Nick227]

And if you believe in pure consciousness existing independently of matter, why does it bother attaching itself to matter, and why can't it remember what it was doing in the half-eternity before that matter+consciousness got it's botty smacked for pooing on the carpet?

The question of "why" does not relate to consciousness itself, merely consciousness identified with thought and creating for itself the illusion of selfhood. That's to say, it doesn't of itself need a "why." Only in the identified state does the "why" arise.

Thus, to me, your question does nothing to resolve the issue of how consciousness might emerge from material. It can be constrained by forces to experience itself as material but I see nothing to suggest that it arises from material.

Nick

[Nick227]

Nor any one that I know. However Chalmers clearly considers it unreasonable that it arose from physical processes. But what else could it arise from?

Again, the experience of causality only arises from consciousness constraining itself through identification with form. Causality is a construct. Consciousness is innate. It is a priori. It does not need a reason to be or a process to create it, no matter how much, in the identified state, it might believe that it does!

A person trying to figure out how consciousness arises from the material of the brain is akin a wave trying to puzzle out how it gave birth to the ocean.

Nick

[westprog]

I do not think personally that you are scratching the surface of Chalmers' core issue -


I don't suppose I am. I'm happy enough to confirm that it's a hard problem.

can consciousness arise from a purely physical process? Personally, I doubt it severely.


I have coincidentally placed my little library of consciousness just next to the keyboard. I had actually typed out a quote from John Searle which then got lost. Penrose I'm familiar with - though he's not really part of the philosophical or scientific mainstream on the subject. So I will make a judgement on the PPP origin of consciousness in a short while.

[JoeEllison]

he problem is hard because no one knows what a solution might look like or even whether it is a genuine scientific problem in the first place.

I've never heard a reasonable and compelling argument for the idea that there really is a "hard problem" at all. Ever. I've heard all sorts of arguments containing ridiculous logical fallacies from people who really should know better, but get tripped up by their initial unfounded premise: consciousness is somehow "different", and therefore the normal rules of logic don't apply. From there it is all non sequiturs, tautologies, special pleading, and argument from incredulity.

[JoeEllison]

Again, the experience of causality only arises from consciousness constraining itself through identification with form. Causality is a construct. Consciousness is innate. It is a priori. It does not need a reason to be or a process to create it, no matter how much, in the identified state, it might believe that it does!

A person trying to figure out how consciousness arises from the material of the brain is akin a wave trying to puzzle out how it gave birth to the ocean.

NickHere, for instance, is a case of a jumble of unfounded assertions treated as fact.

[Nick227]

I don't suppose I am. I'm happy enough to confirm that it's a hard problem.

Yes. It sure is that!

I have coincidentally placed my little library of consciousness just next to the keyboard. I had actually typed out a quote from John Searle which then got lost. Penrose I'm familiar with - though he's not really part of the philosophical or scientific mainstream on the subject. So I will make a judgement on the PPP origin of consciousness in a short while.

I think you will find that there is a far more useful source a lot closer to home.

Nick

[reverebison]

I have heard all my life of how atoms in our body are completely replaced by others. Can anyone give me the proof of this. I am not doubting it as much as I just want to see where the proof of this comes from.

[JoeEllison]

I have heard all my life of how atoms in our body are completely replaced by others. Can anyone give me the proof of this. I am not doubting it as much as I just want to see where the proof of this comes from.

Well, there might be some that are relocated, and a few that stay more or less in the same spot. But, think about it like this: is your skin the same skin you were born with? Of course not. Skin cells die off and are replaced. It is a constant process throughout the body, that bits die and are repaired or replaced by new bits.

[Robin]

Consciousness is innate. It is a priori.
And you know this - how?
It does not need a reason to be or a process to create it, no matter how much, in the identified state, it might believe that it does!
And you know this - how?
A person trying to figure out how consciousness arises from the material of the brain is akin a wave trying to puzzle out how it gave birth to the ocean.
Even the ocean requires some sort of underlying order. And the ocean is a rather simple system compared to consciousness

[Robin]

I've never heard a reasonable and compelling argument for the idea that there really is a "hard problem" at all. Ever. I've heard all sorts of arguments containing ridiculous logical fallacies from people who really should know better, but get tripped up by their initial unfounded premise: consciousness is somehow "different", and therefore the normal rules of logic don't apply. From there it is all non sequiturs, tautologies, special pleading, and argument from incredulity.
Well there may be a hard problem. I would just like to hear someone state precisely what it is.

[JoeEllison]

Well there may be a hard problem. I would just like to hear someone state precisely what it is.Yes, and there might also be a teacup in orbit, but until we establish that there is, speculating on what color it is seems a bit hasty... which is what you're getting at. :D

[Robin]

I do not think personally that you are scratching the surface of Chalmers' core issue - can consciousness arise from a purely physical process? Personally, I doubt it severely.
So what is the alternative? That consciousness is a completely different kind of stuff that does not follow the rules of physics? But clearly it is not random, so it must follow some different set of rules right?

But it also interacts with the brain, so there must be some intermediate translation rules, right?

So we have this extravagant conjecture of two different sets of rules to augment the laws of nature - so does this now answer the so-called "hard problem"? Not that I can see.

Does it answer any questions? No. Does it give us any new insights into the mind? No.

All it does is add unnecessary complication.

[Robin]

Yes, and there might also be a teacup in orbit, but until we establish that there is, speculating on what color it is seems a bit hasty... which is what you're getting at. :D

Pretty much, yes.

[Silentknight]

The only ways I've heard the "hard problem" justified are by way of the same presuppositions and special pleading that form the basis of apologist arguments for, you guessed it, the existence of God, intelligent design, or the human soul. These assumptions include, but are not limited to the following: No effect can be greater than its cause. Life is somehow "special" or "apart" from the mechanisms of the universe. Humans are somehow special, sacred, are the only creatures with souls, made in God's image, etc. Ideas, forms, and subjective values (the workings of the brain) are somehow immaterial.

It is interesting to note that certain Eastern religions have spent a far greater deal of time delving into the matter of consciousness than the theology of Abrahamic religions has. You tend not to find any profound assessments of consciousness in books such as the Bible or Qu'ran, because they simply don't bother. When it comes to examining the human mind, the concept is so novel to the theological way of thinking that people governed by this mindset quickly fall into the same trap of incredulity.

[NeilC]

Would the consciousness of a human raised with no contact with other humans or other animals differ much from ours? I'm wondering if, without any need to use a language or otherwise communicate, that person would have the same conscious experience. How would they reflect or think about matters of self with no language.

Also are any of the higher animals considered to be conscious?

[westprog]

And you know this - how?


That consciousness is a priori is the one thing we do know for certain. At least I know it about me. I don't know it about anyone else.

Even the ocean requires some sort of underlying order. And the ocean is a rather simple system compared to consciousness

We have no idea whether consciousness is simple or complex. Whatever produces self-awareness might be very simple indeed.

[Robin]

That consciousness is a priori is the one thing we do know for certain. At least I know it about me. I don't know it about anyone else.
So you should find it easy to answer the question. You know this - how?
We have no idea whether consciousness is simple or complex. Whatever produces self-awareness might be very simple indeed.
Oh please - just think about that for a moment. Just examine your consciousness right now. Don't you think it requires any complex calculations to produce that fine-tuned, dynamic, 3D + t model of your environment that you are currently experiencing?

Your ability to translate symbols into concepts that relate to that model?

That could be produced by something simple?

[Nick227]

And you know this - how?

Personal experience. I appreciate that this will not satisfy the identified mind, but it's the best I can do.

And you know this - how?

As above.

Even the ocean requires some sort of underlying order. And the ocean is a rather simple system compared to consciousness

Now you're talking about something which is often referred to as God.

The issue you are raising, to me, is that of consciousness trying to examine its own nature through a veil it has constructed to hide its own nature from itself. This is inevitably a somewhat fraught endeavour.

Nick

[JoeEllison]

Personal experience. I appreciate that this will not satisfy the identified mind, but it's the best I can do.



As above.



Now you're talking about something which is often referred to as God.

The issue you are raising, to me, is that of consciousness trying to examine its own nature through a veil it has constructed to hide its own nature from itself. This is inevitably a somewhat fraught endeavour.

NickSo, you've avoided dealing with that "fraught endeavour' by making unfounded assertions, and by doing so placing the entire process outside of logic and reason? I mean, it IS a strategy, one that seems to make you happy, but by definition also leaves you permanently ignorant.

[Nick227]

So what is the alternative? That consciousness is a completely different kind of stuff that does not follow the rules of physics? But clearly it is not random, so it must follow some different set of rules right?

What is there that is not consciousness? What experience, what object, what thought, what feeling? How are you going to examine something from which you cannot escape, from which there is no isolated point to observe it?

But it also interacts with the brain, so there must be some intermediate translation rules, right?

It certainly filters and then re-experiences itself through what it perceives as a material brain, yes. The rules are those which it has created for itself in creating a vessel by which it can experience itself as limited in nature.

So we have this extravagant conjecture of two different sets of rules to augment the laws of nature - so does this now answer the so-called "hard problem"? Not that I can see.

Does it answer any questions? No. Does it give us any new insights into the mind? No.

All it does is add unnecessary complication.

As I mentioned, consciousness trying to examine itself through a vessel it has constructed to hide from itself is unlikely to be uncomplicated.

But, of course, we are not really examining the core of Chalmers' argument here, as you point out. He is trying to point out conceptual flaws in the materialist belief. It's not that materialists have created a model for the creation of consciousness, simply that they believe such a thing is possible. He is apparently trying to save them some effort.

Nick

[Nick227]

We have no idea whether consciousness is simple or complex. Whatever produces self-awareness might be very simple indeed.

Well, the "self" bit is relatively straightforward, I think. A sense of selfhood arises with the largely autonomous process of identification with thought. The truth of this is directly observable, in that when there are no thoughts for a while, there is no longer an experience of selfhood. Awareness, or consciousness, is definitely much more complex.

Nick

[Nick227]

So, you've avoided dealing with that "fraught endeavour' by making unfounded assertions, and by doing so placing the entire process outside of logic and reason? I mean, it IS a strategy, one that seems to make you happy, but by definition also leaves you permanently ignorant.

Well, as Socrates pointed out, the source of wisdom is rooted in the realisation that you know nothing. I would personally rather be aware of my limitations than dwelling in delusion.

However, of course, the actual question still remains unanswered. Are there actual flaws in the belief that consciousness can be materially created?

Nick

[Dancing David]

Is there a ghost in the machine, is there a problem explaining the ghost is the machine? Might as well be the Hard Problem of the Ghost is the Machine.

:D

[Dancing David]

Well, as Socrates pointed out, the source of wisdom is rooted in the realisation that you know nothing. I would personally rather be aware of my limitations than dwelling in delusion.

However, of course, the actual question still remains unanswered. Are there actual flaws in the belief that consciousness can be materially created?

Nick

Is there any evidence that supports it not being materially created. Or is this just speculation?

[Nick227]

So you should find it easy to answer the question. You know this - how?

Oh please - just think about that for a moment. Just examine your consciousness right now. Don't you think it requires any complex calculations to produce that fine-tuned, dynamic, 3D + t model of your environment that you are currently experiencing?

Your ability to translate symbols into concepts that relate to that model?

That could be produced by something simple?

It is almost certainly not at all simple. To create a vessel through which consciousness can give itself the experience of believing it is a limited entity, and make this belief so strong that it will actually insist that it is creating consciousness - this is no easy feat. Of course, at the point of physical death, there will be a few seconds at least of realisation - "ah, sure got that wrong!"

Nick

[JoeEllison]

It is almost certainly not at all simple. To create a vessel through which consciousness can give itself the experience of believing it is a limited entity, and make this belief so strong that it will actually insist that it is creating consciousness - this is no easy feat. Of course, at the point of physical death, there will be a few seconds at least of realisation - "ah, sure got that wrong!"

Nick

Where is your evidence for the idea that "consciousness"(which is itself an incoherent concept) exists outside of a physical "vessel"? You can keep asserting things without evidence, but it doesn't make you look particularly bright.

[Nick227]

Is there any evidence that supports it not being materially created.

Not that I'm aware of, but then I don't research these things so much. You'd have to read Chalmers work, but I've heard it's disputed.

Or is this just speculation?

It's just gnosis.

Personally, I support what I perceive Chalmers as trying to do - stop people wasting their time. But I also like it that they continue. It's nice having people research things, even if it's only out of a desperate desire to believe something.

Nick

[Nick227]

Where is your evidence for the idea that "consciousness"(which is itself an incoherent concept) exists outside of a physical "vessel"? You can keep asserting things without evidence, but it doesn't make you look particularly bright.

Well, I'm not trying to look particularly bright. Though I suppose it's always nice in some ways. I'd rather look sexy, given the choice.

BTW, I'm not saying it exists "outside" a physical vessel. I'm saying it is experiencing itself through a physical vessel.

Nick

[Nick227]

Is there a ghost in the machine, is there a problem explaining the ghost is the machine? Might as well be the Hard Problem of the Ghost is the Machine.

:D

I don't think there's much problem with this aspect. It's pretty basic. Sit down. Observe. You can witness the construction of selfhood through this largely autonomous process of thoughts being identified with. The process of identification creates the sense of selfhood and, wah-hay, here I am! It's not rocket science.

Nick

[Nick227]

Well there may be a hard problem. I would just like to hear someone state precisely what it is.

Could I ask you what you think of the well-known problem called Mary's Room? If Mary, being a colour scientist, has all the physical information available about the colour red but has not experienced red, then, the idea goes, she must learn something on first experiencing red, and this thing that she has learned must be non-physical, since she already had all the physical stuff.

Thus, it is argued, that non-physical things exist, leading to the question of how can a physical process create something which is not physical? Or, how can an objective process create something, such as a colour sensation, which is solely subjective, something which can only be experienced, and cannot be conveyed through objective information?

I think another issue for me with the idea of consciousness being materially created is verification. How can you know directly what any system, aside of your own head, is actually creating? How can you verify objectively the creation of consciousness?

What are your thoughts?

Nick

[JoeEllison]

Could I ask you what you think of the well-known problem called Mary's Room?
I'll tell you what I think of it... it is stupid, and whoever came up with it should be embarrassed, and fired from whatever university they waste their time at. :D

[Nick227]

I'll tell you what I think of it... it is stupid, and whoever came up with it should be embarrassed, and fired from whatever university they waste their time at. :D

Can you explain to me your reasoning here?

Would you agree that there is an aspect to the experience of the colour red that is purely subjective - that cannot be rendered objectively?

Nick

[JoeEllison]

Can you explain to me your reasoning here?

Would you agree that there is an aspect to the experience of the colour red that is purely subjective - that cannot be rendered objectively?

Nick

'Subjective" doesn't mean "non-physical". Seeing light of a certain color is a transmission of INFORMATION by a physical process, so the premise that "Mary" already had all the information is clearly wrong. The whole thing is based on a false premise. It makes the same stupid mistake as every other one of these claims, which is that illogical leap of faith that allows people to pretend that the "non-physical" can be shown to exist.

[Piscivore]

...

So there you have the "Hard Problem of Consciousness". A "why" question and a "how" question:

1. Why do some organisms have subjective experience?
Limited perceptual ability.

2. How does subjective experience arise from physical processing?
Memory to retain a record of subjective experiences, and a feedback mechanism to access and process those memories.

I think the short answer to both is "we don't know".
It's a short answer, for sure. I don't think it is the correct answer. :)

But there are a multitude of questions in science for which we don't know the answer. What is special about these questions - why are these ones treated as though they ought to trigger some unspecified metaphysical crisis?

1. Humans think they, as a species, are special,
2. Humans think they, as inividuals, are special,
3. Questions without answers (and very little evidence) can be wildly speculated upon- and as they cannot as yet be disproved the speculations sometimes sound "plausible" or "intelligent".

Why is it "objectively unreasonable" that physical processing should produce subjective states?
Because that would make his wild-ass speculations incorrect.

Whatever consciousness is, it is an inescapable fact that such a complex thing as a conscious thought could not just arise out of thin air, it would require some complex mechanism to achieve it.
Brain activity not complex enough for you? :)

And the components of that mechanism would not, in themselves be conscious.
They don't have to be. The fuel injectors alone won't make my Bus go, that doesn't make my bus magical.

[rocketdodger]

Can you explain to me your reasoning here?

Would you agree that there is an aspect to the experience of the colour red that is purely subjective - that cannot be rendered objectively?

Nick

Do you agree that there is an aspect to the experience of being a water molecule that is purely subjective - that cannot be rendered objectively?

Because when you get down to it, that is all the hard problem is saying. "Why is it so hard to convey exactly what it is like to be electron # 9859875987457752752875 in the universe, at location <353953.34255, 23526698.265326, 32396626.36664>, at time t = 38596239879687923.3957239876928783 ???" Clearly it is hard because it is also impossible -- you can't know exactly what is like to be something unless you are exactly that thing.

I could explain precisely what "red" is like if I were able to discern the exact state of my brain during the sensation. For someone else to understand it, they would need to understand that brain state to the point of actually becoming it. This is clearly impossible for a mere human to do (in our current form) which is probably why nobody has been able to do it.

That otherwise intelligent people fail to glimpse this trivial insight boggles my mind. Where is the "problem" here?

[rocketdodger]

...
1. Why do some organisms have subjective experience?
2. How does subjective experience arise from physical processing?

I think the short answer to both is "we don't know".

Speak for yourself, Robin :)

I have a very good idea of both answers.

[Piscivore]

Do you agree that there is an aspect to the experience of being a water molecule that is purely subjective - that cannot be rendered objectively?

Because when you get down to it, that is all the hard problem is saying. "Why is it so hard to convey exactly what it is like to be electron # 9859875987457752752875 in the universe, at location <353953.34255, 23526698.265326, 32396626.36664>, at time t = 38596239879687923.3957239876928783 ???" Clearly it is hard because it is also impossible -- you can't know exactly what is like to be something unless you are exactly that thing.

I could explain precisely what "red" is like if I were able to discern the exact state of my brain during the sensation. For someone else to understand it, they would need to understand that brain state to the point of actually becoming it. This is clearly impossible for a mere human to do (in our current form) which is probably why nobody has been able to do it.

That otherwise intelligent people fail to glimpse this trivial insight boggles my mind. Where is the "problem" here?

Do you understand the trivial insight that an electron or a water molecule are not concious, and therefore do not "experience" things in the same was a human does, that when a human does "experience" things the same way an electron or water molecule does it neither requires nor even often involves concoiusness, and that to equate the two kinds of experience is an error of equivocation?

I have a very good idea of both answers.

One hesitates to quote one's self, but:
3. Questions without answers (and very little evidence) can be wildly speculated upon- and as they cannot as yet be disproved the speculations sometimes sound "plausible" or "intelligent".

[Nick227]

'Subjective" doesn't mean "non-physical". Seeing light of a certain color is a transmission of INFORMATION by a physical process, so the premise that "Mary" already had all the information is clearly wrong. The whole thing is based on a false premise. It makes the same stupid mistake as every other one of these claims, which is that illogical leap of faith that allows people to pretend that the "non-physical" can be shown to exist.

Is it really information if it can only be transported in one form? I'm a bit skeptical. Can you explain more?

Nick

[Nick227]

Do you agree that there is an aspect to the experience of being a water molecule that is purely subjective - that cannot be rendered objectively?

I have no idea what the experience of being a water molecule is like. Do you?

Because when you get down to it, that is all the hard problem is saying. "Why is it so hard to convey exactly what it is like to be electron # 9859875987457752752875 in the universe, at location <353953.34255, 23526698.265326, 32396626.36664>, at time t = 38596239879687923.3957239876928783 ???" Clearly it is hard because it is also impossible -- you can't know exactly what is like to be something unless you are exactly that thing.

I'm really not a researcher here, and certainly do not claim to be up on all the various debates and issues.

However, despite these limitations, I really do not understand what it has to do with "conveying exactly what something is like." What I understand is that it is not an argument against the phenomena of individuality, or uniqueness. Rather it is that there are certain phenomena, which are not restrained by spatial or temporal uniqueness, and which do have purely subjective aspects to them.

Nick

[JoeEllison]

Is it really information if it can only be transported in one form? I'm a bit skeptical. Can you explain more?

Nick

I don't know if you are capable or willing to attempt to understand anything, so I don't know if I should waste my time.

[Mercutio]

Could I ask you what you think of the well-known problem called Mary's Room? If Mary, being a colour scientist, has all the physical information available about the colour red but has not experienced red, then, the idea goes, she must learn something on first experiencing red, and this thing that she has learned must be non-physical, since she already had all the physical stuff.

Thus, it is argued, that non-physical things exist, leading to the question of how can a physical process create something which is not physical? Or, how can an objective process create something, such as a colour sensation, which is solely subjective, something which can only be experienced, and cannot be conveyed through objective information?

I think another issue for me with the idea of consciousness being materially created is verification. How can you know directly what any system, aside of your own head, is actually creating? How can you verify objectively the creation of consciousness?

What are your thoughts?

Nick Um... How can you know what your own head is actually creating? How did you learn to label "red", given that no other person can tell what you are experiencing? How do you know that your "subjective experience" is properly labeled?

Read this pdf (http://www.behavior.org/journals_BP/2005/3_RachlinFinal.pdf); it addresses the notion of subjective versus public referents for consciousness. A bit of slogging to get through it, but if you want to try to answer your question, it is an appropriate place to start.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Is it really information if it can only be transported in one form? I'm a bit skeptical. Can you explain more?

Nick

The description of a process is not the process itself. So, Mary's understanding of all there is to know in describing color vision is not the experience of color vision itself. But there is nothing magical in the experience. It is simply the experience. No description of an experience or event or thing is ever the experience/event/thing itself. No description of a television will show you Britney Spear's fake breasts. Only the thing-itself is capable of doing that.

[Piscivore]

Rather it is that there are certain phenomena, which are not restrained by spatial or temporal uniqueness, and which do have purely subjective aspects to them.

Nick
Like what? Give me an example.

[Nick227]

I don't know if you are capable or willing to attempt to understand anything, so I don't know if I should waste my time.

Well, I am certainly willing. Perhaps your understanding is beyond me. However, I cannot really see the validity in your position. Surely it is a fundamental aspect to information that uniqueness of conveyance is not present? Otherwise it is not information but subjective phenomena.

I could well be wrong, but it seems to me that both you and Rocketdodger languish in the idyllic realm of not grasping the issue to such a degree that you actually believe you have dismissed it.

Am I wrong? Can you demonstrate this?

Nick

[Dancing David]

Could I ask you what you think of the well-known problem called Mary's Room? If Mary, being a colour scientist, has all the physical information available about the colour red but has not experienced red, then, the idea goes, she must learn something on first experiencing red, and this thing that she has learned must be non-physical, since she already had all the physical stuff.

Um, sorry your hypothetical has a huge boo-boo in it.

If mary has never experienced exposure to the color red past the age when the visual development is over, then there is aproblem.

She is not going to see the red, she is going to see it as a color similar to a cross section of the values that her brain has been exposed to.

However, she will not have the qualia red. That is why Mary in the BW room makes a problem for qualia. A critter not exposed to the stimulus during development will not sense it.

Thus, it is argued, that non-physical things exist, leading to the question of how can a physical process create something which is not physical?

I am sorry but what?

Or, how can an objective process create something, such as a colour sensation, which is solely subjective, something which can only be experienced, and cannot be conveyed through objective information?

Cut your optic nerves and tell me what you see, okay, how many visual qualia?


I think another issue for me with the idea of consciousness being materially created is verification. How can you know directly what any system, aside of your own head, is actually creating? How can you verify objectively the creation of consciousness?

How can you in your own head?

Same:Same.


What are your thoughts?

Nick


Philosophy is walk on slippery rocks, religion is a smile on a dog.

[Nick227]

Like what? Give me an example.

The colour red.

Nick

[Dancing David]

Can you explain to me your reasoning here?

Would you agree that there is an aspect to the experience of the colour red that is purely subjective - that cannot be rendered objectively?

Nick
No.

You can induce it with electrodes if you wish.

Mary will not have the qualia red. Ooops.

[lupus_in_fabula]

Is there any evidence that supports it not being materially created. Or is this just speculation? It's just gnosis.

…so it’s just speculation then? :D

[JoeEllison]

Well, I am certainly willing. Perhaps your understanding is beyond me. However, I cannot really see the validity in your position. Surely it is a fundamental aspect to information that uniqueness of conveyance is not present? Otherwise it is not information but subjective phenomena.

I could well be wrong, but it seems to me that both you and Rocketdodger languish in the idyllic realm of not actually grasping the issue to such a degree that you believe you have dismissed it.

Am I wrong? Can you demonstrate this?

Nick

Are you right? Can you demonstrate this? If I poke your eyes out with a rusty spoon, you stop seeing. Thus, I can demonstrate that sight depends on the physical structure of your body. Can you at all demonstrate that sight depends on something besides the physical, for instance by continuing to be able to see AFTER I poke your eyes out with a rusty spoon?

You seem to have conceded that you're just making things up without evidence or reason. How can I reason you out of a position that you didn't reason yourself into?

[Nick227]

Um, sorry your hypothetical has a huge boo-boo in it.

If mary has never experienced exposure to the color red past the age when the visual development is over, then there is aproblem.

She is not going to see the red, syhe is going to see it as a clor similar to a cross section of the values that her brain has been exposed to.

However, she will not have the qualia red. that is why Mary in the BW room makes a problem for qualia. A critter not exposed to the stimulus during development will not sense it.

This sounds valid to me, in the sense that it is likely true for the scenario presented. However, do you think it invalidates the core of the proposition? I'm not so convinced.

Cut your optic nerve and tell me whaat you see, okay, how many visual qualia?

I don't understand what this has to do with it.

Nick

[JoeEllison]

…so it’s just speculation then? :D

It is just speculation, which means it is just imaginary, and useless for gaining additional knowledge about the universe.

[Piscivore]

The colour red.

Nick

How is red "not restrained by spatial or temporal uniqueness"? Without someone to percieve it and call it red, it's just reflected light in a specific wavelength frequency.

ETA: Red is a classification, a category- not an entity unto itself. I think that's where you are making your mistake.

[Nick227]

Are you right? Can you demonstrate this? If I poke your eyes out with a rusty spoon, you stop seeing. Thus, I can demonstrate that sight depends on the physical structure of your body. Can you at all demonstrate that sight depends on something besides the physical, for instance by continuing to be able to see AFTER I poke your eyes out with a rusty spoon?

You seem to have conceded that you're just making things up without evidence or reason. How can I reason you out of a position that you didn't reason yourself into?

Joe,

You are just ranting now. I ask you a straight question. You answer with an answer that sounds to me acutely suspect and when I put this to you, you rant. Surely there must be someone on this list who grasps the issues, at least slightly.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

Do you understand the trivial insight that an electron or a water molecule are not concious, and therefore do not "experience" things in the same was a human does, that when a human does "experience" things the same way an electron or water molecule does it neither requires nor even often involves concoiusness, and that to equate the two kinds of experience is an error of equivocation?

Well, it would be an error of equivocation if you could somehow prove that the processes which underly the behavior of a water molecule are intrinsically different from the processes which underly the behavior of a conscious being.

But since you can't ... I am perfectly justified in defining a subjective experience as nothing more than beingan objective aggregation of tons of material processes that model the experience being described in an objective way. And since it is clear that you can mathematically model "being" something completely (because it is possible to perfectly model my brain state at any given time), *poof* there is no longer any problem.

Strange loops FTW.

One hesitates to quote one's self, but:

Fair point, but that applies to all knowledge, so what is your point?

I don't know for sure that I understand thunderhead formation, but I am fairly confident. Same goes for a CPU, for an internal combustion engine, and the human mind.

[Nick227]

How is red "not restrained by spatial or temporal uniqueness"? Without someone to percieve it and call it red, it's just reflected light in a specific wavelength frequency.

If there was only one human alive, perhaps one might say this was true. Indeed, one could also say that I have only a priori a singular experience of the colour red. Seems fair to me. But really I was just commenting on Rocketdodger's notion that the colour red was analogous to a single molecule of water, which I submit it is not. I apologise if I didn't express that well.

What do you think of the issue with Mary's room?

eta: actually, if I think about it, your critique of red above could be applied to any phenomena so it seems to me not so valid a criteria to distinguish with.

Nick

[Nick227]

ETA: Red is a classification, a category- not an entity unto itself. I think that's where you are making your mistake.

Fair enough.

eta: though checking back I did use the word phenomena, not thing.

eta: thinking about it a little more it seems to me that red is not really just a category. "Small" I would consider a category. But I cannot experience "small." I can experience something that is small, but not small itself. Red I can experience, but cannot directly transmit to anyone else, save by painting myself red.

Nick

[Mercutio]

How is red "not restrained by spatial or temporal uniqueness"? Without someone to percieve it and call it red, it's just reflected light in a specific wavelength frequency.

ETA: Red is a classification, a category- not an entity unto itself. I think that's where you are making your mistake.

To elaborate just a bit (and the pdf I link specifically looks at seeing red, btw), "red" can be any number of mixed wavelengths, including some that will only look red under some circumstances and not under others. There is no wavelength that humans will perceive as uniquely red--reddish orange is as close as we get on one end of the spectrum, and reddish violet on the other. So red is a wonderful example--it cannot have a specific physical definition. Interestingly, it also cannot be defined by "a qualia", as Dancing David referred to; because we cannot have access to one another's sensations, we cannot know if what you experience as red is the same qualia that I would call green. The qualia itself is an inferred entity, and the "redness" an inference along an unknown and probably unknowable dimension or dimensions. It cannot serve as a constant, as "what red is".

The "classification, a category" definition fits. The category is in the public domain--the class of things our language community refers to as "red". That is how we learn it, whether or not the qualia you experience when you look at a stop sign is the same one I experience when I look at a pine tree. We associate whatever our experience is (which, as ich-wasp said, simply is) with a publicly available category of items, from which we generalize whatever works in order to correctly get the right item when someone asks you to pick the red one. (fwiw, I know that my retinal pigmentation is a bit different from normal folks, although I am not colorblind. I can pretty much guarantee that we will agree on better than 99% of "red items", but I can trivially demonstrate (with the appropriate testing) that we are not having the same qualia experience of those red items.)

The "hard problem" is hard because it presupposes an impossible answer in the form of the question itself. "Gives rise to" tells us that we are looking for an answer in a different form...

[Piscivore]

Well, it would be an error of equivocation if you could somehow prove that the processes which underly the behavior of a water molecule are intrinsically different from the processes which underly the behavior of a conscious being.
You need to read what I wrote again.

If you are considering the processes which underly the behaviour of water molecules as "experience", then this kind of "experience" does not require or involve conciousness in a human. There are other, emergent processes resulting from the processes of which you speak that occur in human brains and do not occur in or effect water molecules or electrons, processes that are described when one speaks of "experience" in the usual sense.

To confuse those two is the equivocation, not postulating two differenct sets of physical laws for water and for consciouness. Although that is an error too, it is not the one of which I was speaking.

But since you can't ... I am perfectly justified in defining a subjective experience as nothing more than being an objective aggregation of tons of material processes that model the experience being described in an objective way.
What?

And since it is clear that you can mathematically model "being" something completely (because it is possible to perfectly model my brain state at any given time),
Yours, maybe. :)

It is not possible to "perfectly model" a human brain state, let alone completely. The best we can do is a gross approximation.

Fair point, but that applies to all knowledge, so what is your point?
Just a friendly dig at the certainty in your tone. :)

I don't know for sure that I understand thunderhead formation, but I am fairly confident. Were only confidence a test for truth.

I understand (I think) a good bit about internal combustion engines (particularly VW's). I certainly don't know everything, and it is when I feel the most confident about a repair I've done or a concept I've learned that I double check my self. YMMV.

[Piscivore]

If there was only one human alive, perhaps one might say this was true.
It is true, any time something "red" is unobserved by a human.

Indeed, one could also say that I have only a priori a singular experience of the colour red.
One could say that. It will be wrong, but one can say it. :)

What do you think of the issue with Mary's room?
DD and Merc summed it up pretty well.

[Nick227]

It is true, any time something "red" is unobserved by a human.

But you could say this of any phenomenon. It doesn't seem to me to be a very good means to distinguish between things.

DD and Merc summed it up pretty well.

Well, I'm not sure yet, but it is definitely beginning to dawn on me that none of you actually grasp the issue. You seem to be merely seeking to dismiss it out of hand without really examining it. I haven't read Merc's post yet, but it would be cool to see someone who did seem to actually appreciate the issue here.

Nick

[Piscivore]

Fair enough.

eta: though checking back I did use the word phenomena, not thing.
But your useage suggests you think of it as an enity, including what you post below.

eta: thinking about it a little more it seems to me that red is not really just a category. "Small" I would consider a category. But I cannot experience "small." I can experience something that is small, but not small itself. Red I can experience, but cannot directly transmit to anyone else, save by painting myself red.

You are changing gears here, talking about "small" and "red" in two or three different ways and calling it a comparison.

Removing this error, you should see why it doesn't hold up:
""Small" I would consider a category. But I cannot experience "small." I can experience something that is small, but not small itself. small I can experience, but cannot directly transmit to anyone else, save by making myself small."

You said you do not consider "red" a category. Can you experience "red" itself with out "something that is red"?

You make a further nest of errors in thinking that by painting yourself red you can communicate your experience of "red" to another. What you are actually doing is creating a subject of which they have their own experience, of which a part may be an experience of "red", but it won't be your experience of "red".

Further, you seem to be confusing "you painted red" with "red".

[Nick227]

To elaborate just a bit (and the pdf I link specifically looks at seeing red, btw), "red" can be any number of mixed wavelengths, including some that will only look red under some circumstances and not under others. There is no wavelength that humans will perceive as uniquely red--reddish orange is as close as we get on one end of the spectrum, and reddish violet on the other. So red is a wonderful example--it cannot have a specific physical definition. Interestingly, it also cannot be defined by "a qualia", as Dancing David referred to; because we cannot have access to one another's sensations, we cannot know if what you experience as red is the same qualia that I would call green. The qualia itself is an inferred entity, and the "redness" an inference along an unknown and probably unknowable dimension or dimensions. It cannot serve as a constant, as "what red is".

Is it really a meaningful critique of the phenomena of qualia to consider that not having "access to one another's sensations" dismisses them? Surely qualia are by definition ephemeral?

The "classification, a category" definition fits. The category is in the public domain--the class of things our language community refers to as "red". That is how we learn it, whether or not the qualia you experience when you look at a stop sign is the same one I experience when I look at a pine tree. We associate whatever our experience is (which, as ich-wasp said, simply is) with a publicly available category of items, from which we generalize whatever works in order to correctly get the right item when someone asks you to pick the red one. (fwiw, I know that my retinal pigmentation is a bit different from normal folks, although I am not colorblind. I can pretty much guarantee that we will agree on better than 99% of "red items", but I can trivially demonstrate (with the appropriate testing) that we are not having the same qualia experience of those red items.)

Yet there is a considerable difference between "red" and a category such as perhaps "small", is there not? Red can be directly experienced. Small can only be indirectly experienced.

Nick

[JoeEllison]

Joe,

You are just ranting now. I ask you a straight question. You answer with an answer that sounds to me acutely suspect and when I put this to you, you rant. Surely there must be someone on this list who grasps the issues, at least slightly.

Nick

Look, everyone, when I point out his flaws, he insults. He is unwilling to have an honest discussion... but is he also incapable?

[JoeEllison]

Yet there is a considerable difference between "red" and a category such as perhaps "small", is there not? Red can be directly experienced. Small can only be indirectly experienced.

Yes, because "red" is a physical property, and "small" is a comparison with other sizes. Note that "small" is much more subjective than "red". "Small" is something you "experience", "red" is something that exists independent of your observation.

[Piscivore]

But you could say this of any phenomenon. It doesn't seem to me to be a very good means to distinguish between things.
No. If a tree falls in the forest it still falls. It will still disturb air molecules as it falls and cause vibrational resonances in the ground it strikes, creating wave patterns in the local atmosphere.

But those wave patterns in the air won't be a "sound" unless the wave patterns move an eardrum which sends a signal to a brain, and it won't be "loud" unless that brain has a frame of reference for relative (subjective) scale with which to compare it. Similarly, it takes a human to judge that the tree struck a "B flat in such and such octave" (or whatever) when it hit the ground.

"Sound" is a subjective experience, just like "colour". "Volume of sound" and "pitch" are subjective classifications of "sound", just like "red" is a subjective classification of "colour".

Well, I'm not sure yet, but it is definitely beginning to dawn on me that none of you actually grasp the issue.
Only if by "grasp the issue" you mean "agree with me". ;)

You seem to be merely seeking to dismiss it out of hand without really examining it.
What part of our posts suggest we have not examined this issue in depth and merely wish to dismiss it?

I haven't read Merc's post yet, but it would be cool to see someone who did seem to actually appreciate the issue here.
Don't be that guy.

[Nick227]

Removing this error, you should see why it doesn't hold up:
""Small" I would consider a category. But I cannot experience "small." I can experience something that is small, but not small itself. small I can experience, but cannot directly transmit to anyone else, save by making myself small."

You said you do not consider "red" a category. Can you experience "red" itself with out "something that is red"?

This seems to be so, yet red does not subjectively require "something that is red" to be red. Common sense dictates that there must be something there there that is red, yet it is not necessarily subjectively evident.

I do consider red a category also, but not one like small.

You make a further nest of errors in thinking that by painting yourself red you can communicate your experience of "red" to another. What you are actually doing is creating a subject of which they have their own experience, of which a part may be an experience of "red", but it won't be your experience of "red".

Further, you seem to be confusing "you painted red" with "red".

I do not this see as specifically relevant, given that by definition these phenomena are subjective. There is inevitably some grey area in the transaction, and it is not necessarily the case that this area is significant. At least you have not demonstrated a significance here to me....yet. I'm happy to be further corrected. This is interesting.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

I have no idea what the experience of being a water molecule is like. Do you?

No. How can I? I am not a water molecule -- that is the point. Kind of like a blind man is not a man with sight, so why would you expect him to be able to understand what the experience of sight is like?



What I understand is that it is not an argument against the phenomena of individuality, or uniqueness. Rather it is that there are certain phenomena, which are not restrained by spatial or temporal uniqueness, and which do have purely subjective aspects to them.

But the "subjective aspect" is nothing more than a uniqueness of being. I think you really need to try and define these terms as specifically as possible. If you can define "subjective" well, perhaps you will start to see what the hard-problem opponents are saying.

[Nick227]

No. If a tree falls in the forest it still falls. It will still disturb air molecules as it falls and cause vibrational resonances in the ground it strikes, creating wave patterns in the local atmosphere.

But without someone to experience any of this.....

I don't see that it's any different at all.

But those wave patterns in the air won't be a "sound" unless the wave patterns move an eardrum which sends a signal to a brain, and it won't be "loud" unless that brain has a frame of reference for relative (subjective) scale with which to compare it.

I think you are attributing a degree of separation to sensory phenomena on the basis that it suits your case, as opposed to creating a valid separation.


What part of our posts suggest we have not examined this issue in depth and merely wish to dismiss it?

Thus far, all of them. I am also happy to admit that I have not had so much time to chew over these things, or rather allow some autonomous mental process to proceed, but I am by no means personally convinced so far that anyone who has dialogued here today on this issue actually grasps it.

Perhaps I am deluding myself.

Nick

[Nick227]

But the "subjective aspect" is nothing more than a uniqueness of being. I think you really need to try and define these terms as specifically as possible. If you can define "subjective" well, perhaps you will start to see what the hard-problem opponents are saying.

I read some of Dennet's issues and they did seem to me to relate more to defining the phenomena. I also did by no means thoroughly examine the material so I could be off-track here. However, I must point out that anything can be defined away, should you wish to do so. It would be a lousy philosopher indeed who could not define his or her way out of any argument. The question for me is...is the issue actually being grasped, or rather is it being thrown out of awareness by a subconscious need not to examine it.

Nick

[Piscivore]

This seems to be so, yet red does not subjectively require "something that is red" to be red.
No. A stop sign could be painted blue. This is beside the point. Where can you experience "red" without there being "something that is red"?

Common sense dictates that there must be something there there that is red, yet it is not necessarily subjectively evident.
Huh? Are you saying that you cannot think of any way you can experience red independantly, but there must be a way nonetheless?

I do consider red a category also, but not one like small.
Why not?

I do not this see as specifically relevant, given that by definition these phenomena are subjective. There is inevitably some grey area in the transaction, and it is not necessarily the case that this area is significant. At least you have demonstrated a significance here to me....yet. I'm happy to be further corrected. This is interesting.
It isn't relevant to the present discussion, and I meant to say so. It was just an error I saw.

[Nick227]

No. A stop sign could be painted blue. This is beside the point. Where can you experience "red" without there being "something that is red"?

Yet there can be the experience of red, without the experience of something that is red. To the rational mind it might not make sense, yet it is, I submit, a priori valid. You can experience red without seeing what it is that is red. Remember we are specifically dealing with direct, subjective phenomena here, not rationalisations.

Huh? Are you saying that you cannot think of any way you can experience red independantly, but there must be a way nonetheless?

Not exactly. For sure, I cannot think of any way to experience red without there being something that is red. Yet, red can easily be experienced without awareness of what it is that is red. You seem to me to be discussing rational thought processes, whereas I am dealing with simple direct, sensory experience.

Rationally, we cannot imagine seeing red without there being something that is red. Yet, subjectively, this can easily be experienced.

Why not?

Because it is not possible to have a subjective experience of small without something that is small. Yet it is possible to have a subjective experience of red without seeing what it is that is red. Small is not a priori. Red is.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

You need to read what I wrote again.

If you are considering the processes which underly the behaviour of water molecules as "experience", then this kind of "experience" does not require or involve conciousness in a human. There are other, emergent processes resulting from the processes of which you speak that occur in human brains and do not occur in or effect water molecules or electrons, processes that are described when one speaks of "experience" in the usual sense.

To confuse those two is the equivocation, not postulating two differenct sets of physical laws for water and for consciouness. Although that is an error too, it is not the one of which I was speaking.

Hmmm... On the one hand, I think you might be right, but on the other hand, my point still stands.

I see that you can draw an exact line when it comes to self-referent information structures -- our mind has them, the minds of water molecules do not.

The gist of that argument, though, was to show that one cannot expect to convey subjective experiences to a consciousness that isn't equipped to understand the information. Would you agree with that?


What?


I am saying that a good definition of a subjective experience is "the act of being the objective model of the experience in question."



It is not possible to "perfectly model" a human brain state, let alone completely. The best we can do is a gross approximation.

Well "perfect model" is an oxymoron right. Other than the problem of uniqueness, though, I don't see why one couldn't come up with pretty accurate model of the human brain, down to individual particles and their states. Given the resources to generate and handle that model, of course.

and it is when I feel the most confident about a repair I've done or a concept I've learned that I double check my self. YMMV.

When semiconductor manufacturing techniques will allow it, trust me I plan to :)

[Piscivore]

But without someone to experience any of this.....

I don't see that it's any different at all.
All those phenomena (ETA: except sound) occur whether a human witnesses them or not. A hiker can come along and see the tree on the ground, see the broken off stump, see the ground where it was disturbed, and infer that the tree fell. He cannot infer what it sounded like. He can create an approximation that might be more or less accurate according to the number of other, similar sounds he has experienced, but he will never know for sure what that particular movement of air sounded like.

I think you are attributing a degree of separation to sensory phenomena on the basis that it suits your case, as opposed to creating a valid separation.
Read Merc's article.

Thus far, all of them. I am also happy to admit that I have not had so much time to chew over these things, or rather allow some autonomous mental process to proceed, but I am by no means personally convinced so far that anyone who has dialogued here today on this issue actually grasps it.

Perhaps I am deluding myself.
If you are thinking that because even though you have admittedly limited information on the subject, but have formed an opinion nonetheless, that anyone who disagrees with you must have less, then that is possible. :)

[rocketdodger]

I read some of Dennet's issues and they did seem to me to relate more to defining the phenomena. I also did by no means thoroughly examine the material so I could be off-track here. However, I must point out that anything can be defined away, should you wish to do so. It would be a lousy philosopher indeed who could not define his or her way out of any argument. The question for me is...is the issue actually being grasped, or rather is it being thrown out of awareness by a subconscious need not to examine it.

Nick

...but that is the question -- what is the issue?

You don't need to define your way out of this argument, you need to define your way in.

What is the definition of "subjective?" How does "subjective" differ from "objective" ?

My claim is that every experience of ours is objective in the sense that our brain state can be completely described, and the only thing that makes them "subjective" to us is the fact that it is we who are experiencing them. This implies that the hard-problem is just a complex smoke and mirrors rewording of the identity axiom -- something that is neither "hard" nor a "problem." It just is.

[Piscivore]

Hmmm... On the one hand, I think you might be right, but on the other hand, my point still stands.

I see that you can draw an exact line when it comes to self-referent information structures -- our mind has them, the minds of water molecules do not.
Okay, we are in accord with that.

The gist of that argument, though, was to show that one cannot expect to convey subjective experiences to a consciousness that isn't equipped to understand the information. Would you agree with that?
I think so. I don't see how it would be possible to accurately convey subjective experiences to any conciousness- and believe me, as a fiction writer, this is foremost in my mind.

I am saying that a good definition of a subjective experience is "the act of being the objective model of the experience in question."
Are you saying that when I look at a tree, I'm objectively modeling the act of looking at the tree and that act of modelling is the subjective experience? That's still not making a lot of sense to me.

I see "subjective experience" as being the immediate, flawed, raw sensory data gathered by our imperfact sensory equipment.

Well "perfect model" is an oxymoron right. Other than the problem of uniqueness, though, I don't see why one couldn't come up with pretty accurate model of the human brain, down to individual particles and their states. Given the resources to generate and handle that model, of course.
Isn't Heisenberg going to come into play there somewhere? Not to mention the fact that there are way too many variables going on to track at one time, let alone replicate.

This is so unlikely to me that I specifically eschewed the possibility when creating my futuristic robot prostitute.

When semiconductor manufacturing techniques will allow it, trust me I plan to :)
But will it still be "you"? :)

[Nick227]

All those phenomena occure whether a human witnesses them or not. A hiker can come along and see the tree on the ground, see the broken off stump, see the ground where it was disturbed, and infer that the tree fell. He cannot infer what it sounded like. He can create an approximation that might be more or less accurate according to the number of other, similar sounds he has experienced, but he will never know for sure what that particular movement of air sounded like.


Read Merc's article.

Well, it seems we are now nearly taking opposing sides to ourselves in alternate posts!

However, if you cast your mind back to post 64 you will see that your opposition to my point about red being a subjective phenomena not restrained by the criteria for individuality was essentially... that it is individual in that it needs a person to experience it. This was how I understood it anyway.

Is this right because I must admit I am no longer clear exactly how the above relates to the matter in question. You seem to be discussing subjectivity as it relates to individuality. I am discussing a more universal subjective phenomenon - red.


If you are thinking that because even though you have admittedly limited information on the subject, but have formed an opinion nonetheless, that anyone who disagrees with you must have less, then that is possible. :)

Well, I am very happy to admit I'm wrong, when I can see that I am. Well, if not exactly happy, I still make a point of doing it as I feel it's right.

What I must confess I do not understand is why you cannot see these issues about the colour red as pretty much self-evident. You ask questions which seem to me to indicate that you just cannot grasp it. Like I say, I could well be wrong, but that is how it looks to me...subjectively of course!

Nick

[Nick227]

...but that is the question -- what is the issue?

You mean an issue that's being avoided?

You don't need to define your way out of this argument, you need to define your way in.

Sounds like the same thing to me!

What is the definition of "subjective?" How does "subjective" differ from "objective" ?

I would say, I guess, that subjective is uniquely experienced, whereas objective is universally, or potentially universally, experienced.



My claim is that every experience of ours is objective in the sense that our brain state can be completely described,

But description is firstly, not the thing, and secondly subjective.

and the only thing that makes them "subjective" to us is the fact that it is we who are experiencing them. This implies that the hard-problem is just a complex smoke and mirrors rewording of the identity axiom -- something that is neither "hard" nor a "problem." It just is.

Well, if the first part were true it would certainly make the issue incredibly simple.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

Are you saying that when I look at a tree, I'm objectively modeling the act of looking at the tree and that act of modelling is the subjective experience? That's still not making a lot of sense to me.


Err, close.

I am saying that the act of looking at a tree can be objectively modeled (with the constraints we just discussed, E.G. uncertainty, etc.) and that the act of being what is modeled (in this case, the act of looking at a tree) is the subjective experience.

Or to put it simply, the act of being what is in the act of looking at the tree.

[rocketdodger]

You mean an issue that's being avoided?

Nothing is being avoided -- our stance is that it isn't an issue to begin with.

I would say, I guess, that subjective is uniquely experienced, whereas objective is universally, or potentially universally, experienced.

Well there you go -- you can't fully describe a subjective experience because to be subjective it must be uniquely experienced (or "the original," as it were). The identity axiom implies that uniqueness can't be shared. Like we said... *poof* no more hard-problem.

But description is firstly, not the thing,

Yes, that is the whole point! One cannot perfectly convey a subjective experience to others because doing so would imply that the model and thing being modeled are one and the same.

Now, one can convey "what it is like" to have a certain subjective experience, as long as the data structures in our minds map fairly well. Hence when someone talks about the experience of "red" I can guess what they mean. You could extrapolate this to a case of two humans having identical neural connections, in which case they could literally share neural impulses, and actually share "seemingly" subjective experiences, but the experience between them would still not be the same (because of the identity axiom).

and secondly subjective

Irrelevant. What matters is that the information contained in my description accurately maps to an analog in the reference frame of someone else.

Well, if the first part were true it would certainly make the issue incredibly simple.

I think it is. Hence my dismissal of the hard-problem.

[Mercutio]

I am discussing a more universal subjective phenomenon - red.
You have not yet read the paper, have you?

Well, I am very happy to admit I'm wrong, when I can see that I am.
Nick
We shall see.

Let me ask, not hypothetically at all: How do you know that red is a universal subjective phenomenon? How do you even know how to label your own experience that you call red? When you learn "red", do you learn it separate from red things? Or do you generalize from red things?

[Dancing David]

This sounds valid to me, in the sense that it is likely true for the scenario presented. However, do you think it invalidates the core of the proposition? I'm not so convinced.



I don't understand what this has to do with it.

Nick

Qualia as known appear to be associated with the biological processes of sensation and perception.

[Dancing David]

Joe,

You are just ranting now. I ask you a straight question. You answer with an answer that sounds to me acutely suspect and when I put this to you, you rant. Surely there must be someone on this list who grasps the issues, at least slightly.

Nick

May be you need to explain agian, if you can't frame it again, then perhaps you don't know what you are trying to say.

Try again, it may be that you will be able to explain your thougts to us.

Sorry, my mother taught Englush and writing for years. She was much harsher.

"Well dear, if you can't write clearly, you can't think clearly. If you can't write it so others can understand it, maybe you don't know what you think."

[Dancing David]

But you could say this of any phenomenon. It doesn't seem to me to be a very good means to distinguish between things.



Well, I'm not sure yet, but it is definitely beginning to dawn on me that none of you actually grasp the issue. You seem to be merely seeking to dismiss it out of hand without really examining it. I haven't read Merc's post yet, but it would be cool to see someone who did seem to actually appreciate the issue here.

Nick

And perhaps most wonderfull human, you are the one who does not know what you are trying to express. Perhaps it is not our unwillingness to just agree with you (this is a sceptics forum after all). Perhaps the explanation is not making sense to us. please try again.

So try again, you will learn and we will learn. I learn a lot about how I think what i think by trying to express myself. It is frustrating but that is what the forum is about. I have many notions that have been fleshed out and deliniated and some that I have discarded, that is the nature of critical thought. I try again and I learn.

If you don't want people to critque your thoughts, this might not be the place for you. But please try again. I don't undertand why the fact that we can not directly share perceptions with another critter is such a big deal. I most likely do not see red the way you do, I have talked with my best friend about colors and I really believe that he sees more red and less blue than i do.

[Dancing David]

This seems to be so, yet red does not subjectively require "something that is red" to be red. Common sense dictates that there must be something there there that is red, yet it is not necessarily subjectively evident.

Actually it does, it is only 'red' because of the consensus idiomatic symbol applied to it.

It is not 'red' to an ossiliscope, it is 'frequency x'


I do consider red a category also, but not one like small.



I do not this see as specifically relevant, given that by definition these phenomena are subjective. There is inevitably some grey area in the transaction, and it is not necessarily the case that this area is significant. At least you have not demonstrated a significance here to me....yet. I'm happy to be further corrected. This is interesting.

Nick

Well, I would point out that we all learn language through comparitive symbolic exchange. There is the very high probability that while we can agree to call that color 'red' that we do not perceive the same anyhow. It is all about the chemical transference of information in an organic netwrok.

It is always significant, they grey area is huge, we just tend to ignore it. that is what is cool about living in another culture and speaking another language. You learn that most of what w ecall reality is just a convention of symbolic communication. reality is there, what we think about reality. That is another matter.

[Dancing David]

Yet there can be the experience of red, without the experience of something that is red. To the rational mind it might not make sense, yet it is, I submit, a priori valid. You can experience red without seeing what it is that is red. Remember we are specifically dealing with direct, subjective phenomena here, not rationalisations.

HUH?

That seems like a huge rationalization to me.

If you are not exposed to a stimulus of red, then how do experience red?

I will wait until the morning to ponder this post again.

Buenas noches.




Not exactly. For sure, I cannot think of any way to experience red without there being something that is red. Yet, red can easily be experienced without awareness of what it is that is red. You seem to me to be discussing rational thought processes, whereas I am dealing with simple direct, sensory experience.

Rationally, we cannot imagine seeing red without there being something that is red. Yet, subjectively, this can easily be experienced.

How?




Because it is not possible to have a subjective experience of small without something that is small. Yet it is possible to have a subjective experience of red without seeing what it is that is red. Small is not a priori. Red is.

Nick

OOOOK?

[Robin]

Speak for yourself, Robin :)

I have a very good idea of both answers.
Hmmm... In 2004 V.S. Ramachandran said:

And now, thanks once again partly to Crick, we are poised for the greatest revolution of all—understanding consciousness—understanding the very mechanism that made those earlier revolutions possible!
Just 'poised' 4 years ago. Has the revolution happened in 4 years? Is there something you know that you should tell Mr Ramachandran? :)

[Robin]

What is there that is not consciousness?
Nearly everything
What experience, what object, what thought, what feeling?
Are you claiming to be a figment of my imagination?

Assuming no, how is it that you think your words are going from your consciousness into my consciousness?

Imagine an astronomer observing a comet. He makes calculations and concludes it will return in 75 years.

Then he dies and another astronomer, not born when the first astronomer died observes the comet returns just as predicted. If there is nothing but consciousness, who's consciousness contained the comet? What accounts for the consistency between the two (according to you) purely imaginary comets?
How are you going to examine something from which you cannot escape, from which there is no isolated point to observe it?
It's called the scientific method.
But, of course, we are not really examining the core of Chalmers' argument here, as you point out. He is trying to point out conceptual flaws in the materialist belief. It's not that materialists have created a model for the creation of consciousness, simply that they believe such a thing is possible. He is apparently trying to save them some effort.
You havent read the article, have you?

Why do you close your eyes so comprehensively to the mountain of evidence from science that shows the brain to be the seat of consciousness? Why is it that administering chemicals to the brain affects consciousness so severly? Why is it that an immature brain has an immature consciousness? Why is it that an old decaying brain has a damaged consciousness. How is it that someone can be in love with another, and then feel indifferent about them after suffering brain damage?

And are you going to answer my question about your conjectured "non-physical" realm? What are the laws of this new realm? What is the mechanism that translates these laws to the physical laws?

[rocketdodger]

Just 'poised' 4 years ago. Has the revolution happened in 4 years? Is there something you know that you should tell Mr Ramachandran? :)

Eh, its not so much any novel ideas as it is my refusal to use the typical proactive "anti-flame" disclaimers. I think many people here have a pretty good idea about the two answers as well, but they are reluctant to say so because of the inevitable flaming and stupidity that follows any sort of commitment on this forum.

In the words of the Protoss zealot, though, "I long for combat," and I am more than happy to get in a flame war with anyone who crosses my path.

[Robin]

Could I ask you what you think of the well-known problem called Mary's Room? If Mary, being a colour scientist, has all the physical information available about the colour red but has not experienced red, then, the idea goes, she must learn something on first experiencing red, and this thing that she has learned must be non-physical, since she already had all the physical stuff.
That is called "assuming the conclusion". If they say she has had all the physical information but has not experienced red, then they have simply assumed that the experience of red is not physical.
Thus, it is argued, that non-physical things exist,
OK, let's assume that as you say, the mind does not follow the laws of physics and instead follows the laws of some other realm - let us call it the metaphysical realm.

Could I ask you what you think of the well-known problem called Mary's Room? If Mary, being a colour scientist, has all the physical and metaphysical information available about the colour red but has not experienced red, then, the idea goes, she must learn something on first experiencing red, and this thing that she has learned must be non-physical and non-metaphysical, since she already had all the physical and metaphysical stuff.

Thus it is argued that some things are neither physical nor metaphysical. Meta-meta-physical in fact. At which point we start over again....

What are your thoughts?

[Robin]

It's a short answer, for sure. I don't think it is the correct answer. :)
As I point out to rocketdodger, perhaps you should call up your local neuroscientist and tell him/her the good news. They are about to waste a massive amount of time and resources trying to find out the thing you guys apparently already know!
Brain activity not complex enough for you? :)
Complex enough for me. I cannot see for the life of me why we need to invent entire new universes with entirely different sets of laws to account for consciousness.

All that would mean is that the brand new universe would contain something like a brain to generate the consciousness and we would have the HPC all over again.
They don't have to be.
Of course they don't have to be, no more than H2O molecules need to be wet.

[PixyMisa]

Limited perceptual ability.
Yep.

Memory to retain a record of subjective experiences, and a feedback mechanism to access and process those memories.
Precisely.

Input, reference, self-reference, output. You can do that with a hundred or so transistors; you can certainly do it with a hundred billion neurons.

The problem with hard-problem consciousness is the unstated major premise that consciousness is magical. Throw out that assumption and viola, no hard problem.

[Robin]

Yep.


Precisely.
Well as I said don't tell me, tell Ramachandran that you have saved him decades of work by answering in two vague and grammatically incomplete sentences the questions to which he was going to devote a major research effort.

I am sure he will be very impressed.
Input, reference, self-reference, output. You can do that with a hundred or so transistors; you can certainly do it with a hundred billion neurons.
You could use a hundred billion transistors and you still would not have produced consciousness.
The problem with hard-problem consciousness is the unstated major premise that consciousness is magical. Throw out that assumption and viola, no hard problem.
Actually Pinker and Chalmers appear to be Materialists.

[PixyMisa]

Well as I said don't tell me, tell Ramachandran that you have saved him decades of work by answering in two vague and grammatically incomplete sentences the questions to which he was going to devote a major research effort.

I am sure he will be very impressed.
Not at all. Ramachandran is working to explain how the human brain functions. All I did is point out that hard problem consciousness is baloney, which is much, much easier.

You could use a hundred billion transistors and you still would not have produced consciousness.Not easily. Wire them up at random and you're statistically guaranteed to get consciousness.

Actually Pinker and Chalmers appear to be Materialists.Perhaps. They are also deeply confused.

We are feedback loops. Subjective experience is what it is like to be a feedback loop.

And feedback loops are neither complex nor uncommon.

[RandFan]

Nor any one that I know. However Chalmers clearly considers it unreasonable that it arose from physical processes. But what else could it arise from?

On consideration it is not the clearest paragraph I have written, but I don't think it contradicts the previous.

I should certainly hope nothing in my post supports that thesis! I should hope that it demonstrates the opposite.Cool then. I think we are square... or, perhaps we are round... or perhaps red. :)

[Robin]

Not at all. Ramachandran is working to explain how the human brain functions.
I see. So he was just a bit confused when he made that quote earlier? Didn't know what he was working on? You had better tell him about that too.
All I did is point out that hard problem consciousness is baloney, which is much, much easier.
No, you claimed to know how subjective experiences arise from physical processing. I am very sure he would want to know that.
Not easily. Wire them up at random and you're statistically guaranteed to get consciousness.
Statistically guaranteed. I see. One hundred billions silicon devices propogating discrete signals is guaranteed produce the same effect as one hundred billion carbon devices propogating analog signals.

And you know this - how?
We are feedback loops. Subjective experience is what it is like to be a feedback loop.

And feedback loops are neither complex nor uncommon.
And very, very few of them have subjective experiences.

[Robin]

Cool then. I think we are square... or, perhaps we are round... or perhaps red. :)
Well anyway, I have learned not to write a new thread in a hurry.

[RandFan]

Not at all. Ramachandran is working to explain how the human brain functions. All I did is point out that hard problem consciousness is baloney, which is much, much easier.

The problem with hard-problem consciousness is the unstated major premise that consciousness is magical. Throw out that assumption and viola, no hard problem. Pinker doesn't posit the premise that consciousness is magical.

I'm a materialist but I used to be a dualist. HPC doesn't contradict materialism though I used to think it does. We still don't know why we have a sense of experiencing.

Let's be clear. Consciousness is no doubt the result of evolution. It is something that emerges from our physical brain. However, we don't have an answer to how exactly or why, also, it (consciousness) presents some unique and interesting problems.

For the record, along with Pinker, Susan Blackmore also (Consciousness: An Introduction (http://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-Introduction-Susan-Blackmore/dp/019515343X))doesn't dismiss HPC as baloney.

I think we will solve the problem of consciousness. I have little doubt about that but I can't simply pretend that it isn't a problem. That doesn't really solve anything. It's kinda like saying "god did it". It's vacuous.

Oh, BTW, Dennett also agrees that understanding consciousness is a problem but he does criticize Chalmers for separating HPC as something unique to other scientific questions. I have no doubt whatsoever that Pinker and Blackmore agree with Dennett. As do I.

[RandFan]

Well anyway, I have learned not to write a new thread in a hurry.Been there done that.

[PixyMisa]

I see. So he was just a bit confused when he made that quote earlier? Didn't know what he was working on? You had better tell him about that too.
He's talking about human consciousness, which is complex and messy and generated by the human brain.

That's quite distinct from consciousness as a general phenomenon, which is what Chalmers is trying to pin a magic tail on.

Dennett ascribes consciousness to devices as simple as thermostats. I mostly agree, though I consider that it is better illustrated by something slightly more complex. That's where my "hundred or so" transistors comes in. A thermostat is aware, but not self-aware. You need about four times as much logic for self-awareness.

No, you claimed to know how subjective experiences arise from physical processing. I am very sure he would want to know that.
In extremely broad terms, yes. In the specific, no. Extremely broad terms are easy, particularly where others have gone before. (Which is why I have no respect for Chalmers.)

Statistically guaranteed. I see. One hundred billions silicon devices propogating discrete signals is guaranteed produce the same effect as one hundred billion carbon devices propogating analog signals.
Did I say that? Let me see... No.

I said that wiring up a hundred billion transistors at random is statistically guaranteed to produce consciousness. Of some sort. Somewhere in the mess.

Not a useful consciousness. Not an interesting consciousness. Most certainly not human consciousness. But consciousness nonetheless. Because consciousness

And you know this - how?
Because all you need is input, memory, self-reference, and output.

And very, very few of them have subjective experiences.
Really? Why do you say that?

Because they don't mirror human experience? Irrelevant.
Because they can't describe their experience? Irrelevant.

Consciousness is a self-referential information process. You can do that on the simplest of microprocessors, like an Intel 4004. You can do it with even less than that: My hundred transistors suffices.

[RandFan]

Dennett ascribes consciousness to devices as simple as thermostats. No. Dennett says that thermostats are aware. He has also said that thermostats are not aware that they are aware which is something that separates humans from thermostats.

[PixyMisa]

Pinker doesn't posit the premise that consciousness is magical.
No, but Chalmers appears to. I should been more careful with my response there.

It's really HPC as Chalmers frames it that I dismiss. And if you don't frame it that way, it's just another scientific puzzle, not anything particularly distinct from any other difficult question.

I'm a materialist but I used to be a dualist. HPC doesn't contradict materialism though I used to think it does. We still don't know why we have a sense of experiencing.
What do you mean by "why", though? Why evolutionarily? Because it's useful. Why biologically? Because you can't get the necessary behaviours without it. Why philosophically? Because the notion of p-zombies is incoherent.

I think we will solve the problem of consciousness. I have little doubt about that but I can't simply pretend that it isn't a problem. That doesn't really solve anything. It's kinda like saying "god did it". It's vacuous.
I'm not saying that there are no unanswered questions about consciousness. I'm saying that "hard problem consciousness" is a non-problem.

[PixyMisa]

No. Dennett says that thermostats are aware. He has also said that thermostats are not aware that they are aware which is something that separates humans from thermostats.
Good, yes, aware but not self-aware, which is the point I was making.

With a hundred transistors, you can make a circuit that is aware and self-aware.

[RandFan]

What do you mean by "why", though? Why evolutionarily? Because it's useful. Why biologically? Because you can't get the necessary behaviours without it. Why philosophically? Because the notion of p-zombies is incoherent. I'm not hung up on "why" but I'm not convinced that consciousness is anymore useful than religion. It might be. It intuitively feels like it should be but then again it might just be a by-product of something else.


I'm not saying that there are no unanswered questions about consciousness. I'm saying that "hard problem consciousness" is a non-problem.You mean, "non-problem" as Chalmers frames it.

[RandFan]

Good, yes, aware but not self-aware, which is the point I was making.

With a hundred transistors, you can make a circuit that is aware and self-aware. I'm trying to track down Dennet's quote and having failed to do so I beg his forgiveness if I get it wrong.

"The thermostat doesn't ponder why it is aware."

Will your hundred transistors ponder why they (collectively it) are/is aware?

[PixyMisa]

I'm trying to track down Dennet's quote and having failed to do so I beg his forgiveness if I get it wrong.

"The thermostat doesn't ponder why it is aware."

Will your hundred transistors ponder why they (collectively it) are/is aware?
That's a good question.

And the answer is yes.

But not very much.

That's why you need a hundred transistors instead of a dozen. But while a hundred transistors can ponder their own awareness, they're not going to come up with any special insights.

Once you have the self-referential loops in place, it's all just details. But the details are what's important, and that's where all the hard work is.

Self-referential loops are an explanation for consciousness the same way that the Theory of Evolution is an explanation for, say, the blood clotting cascade. It's technically correct and gives you an idea of where this thing comes from, but it doesn't tell you what its properties are or any of the details of how those properties arise. It's an explanation, when what Ramachandran (and others like him) are building is a theory.

[PixyMisa]

I'm not hung up on "why" but I'm not convinced that consciousness is anymore useful than religion. It might be. It intuitively feels like it should be but then again it might just be a by-product of something else.
That's quite plausible, that the behaviours evolved, and we got consciousness because there's no other way - or just that it's the simplest way - to get those advantageous behaviours. I have no problems with that position.

You mean, "non-problem" as Chalmers frames it.
Well, as soon as anyone starts talking about "Hard Problem Consciousness" specifically, I assume they're talking Chalmeresque rubbish unless they make a very clear distinction. If they just talk about consciousness, fine, no problems there.

[RandFan]

That's a good question.

And the answer is yes.

But not very much.

That's why you need a hundred transistors instead of a dozen. But while a hundred transistors can ponder their own awareness, they're not going to come up with any special insights.

Once you have the self-referential loops in place, it's all just details. But the details are what's important, and that's where all the hard work is.

Self-referential loops are an explanation for consciousness the same way that the Theory of Evolution is an explanation for, say, the blood clotting cascade. It's technically correct and gives you an idea of where this thing comes from, but it doesn't tell you what its properties are or any of the details of how those properties arise. It's an explanation, when what Ramachandran (and others like him) are building is a theory. I seriously doubt that one hundred transistors can "ponder" anything. I'm perfectly fine with you thinking so. I've no emotional hang-ups about it. It seems a pointless thing to argue about.

I would however give Blue Brain (http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/) odds on having the possibility to "ponder" but I'm less than 100% convinced that it will.

[Nick227]

The description of a process is not the process itself. So, Mary's understanding of all there is to know in describing color vision is not the experience of color vision itself. But there is nothing magical in the experience. It is simply the experience. No description of an experience or event or thing is ever the experience/event/thing itself. No description of a television will show you Britney Spear's fake breasts. Only the thing-itself is capable of doing that.

Thanks.

I agree that a thing-itself provides direct subjective experience. What do you think about classes of phenomena, like colours or feelings, that subjectively do not require things in order to be experienced? Or, perhaps better, that appear to have characteristics that exist aside of the physical circumstances that create them?

What do neurologists, or other researchers, assert as the neurological foundation of feelings or colour-experiences?

Nick

[westprog]

I read some of Dennet's issues and they did seem to me to relate more to defining the phenomena. I also did by no means thoroughly examine the material so I could be off-track here. However, I must point out that anything can be defined away, should you wish to do so. It would be a lousy philosopher indeed who could not define his or her way out of any argument. The question for me is...is the issue actually being grasped, or rather is it being thrown out of awareness by a subconscious need not to examine it.

Nick



Many authors bite the bullet and accept dualism...But in contemporary philosophy the the most common move is to insist that materialism must be right and that we must eliminate consciousness by reducing it to something else. Daniel C. Dennett is an obvious example of a philosopher who adopts this position. Favourite candidates for the phenomena to which consciousness must be reduced are brain states described in purely "physical" terms and computer programs. ...all of these reductionist attempts to eliminate consciousness are as hopeless as the dualism they were designed to supplant. In a way they are worse, because they deny the real existence of the conscious states they were supposed to explain. The end up denying the obvious fact that we all have inner, qualitative subjective states such as our pains and joys, memories and perceptions, thoughts and feelings, moods, regrets and hungers.


Which seems sound enough to me, though I'm not familiar (yet) with Dennett.

[amb]

I for the life of me can't see what the problem is about consciousness.
It's a product of the brain's millions of neurons. It's a simple explanation.
The moment the brain is dead, so is consciousness.
You can paint as many pictures as possible of the phenomenon, it does not change the fact that as I said; it's a function of been human. It has evolved over many millions of years to assure our survival and to enable us to sit at the keyboard and write this kind of nonsense I'm writing. The only mystery to me is, how much consciousness have our animal friends?

[westprog]

Because it is not possible to have a subjective experience of small without something that is small. Yet it is possible to have a subjective experience of red without seeing what it is that is red. Small is not a priori. Red is.


A reductionist view might be that there is a pre-programmed brain function that is triggered when a certain wavelength is seen. Certainly it is possible to imagine the colour red without seeing it. I suppose it would need the testimony of someone blind since birth to say whether he experienced red before seeing it on the restoration of sight.

[Robin]

Which seems sound enough to me, though I'm not familiar (yet) with Dennett.
I agree, I very much like Searle's approach to consciousness - no nonsense:
Conscious states are caused by lower level neurobiological processes in the brain and are themselves higher level features of the brain. The key notions here are those of cause and feature. As far as we know anything about how the world works, variable rates of neuron firings in different neuronal architectures cause all the enormous variety of our conscious life. All the stimuli we receive from the external world are converted by the nervous system into one medium, namely, variable rates of neuron firings at synapses. And equally remarkably, these variable rates of neuron firings cause all of the colour and variety of our conscious life. The smell of the flower, the sound of the symphony, the thoughts of theorems in Euclidian geometry -- all are caused by lower level biological processes in the brain; and as far as we know, the crucial functional elements are neurons and synapses.

John Searle - The Problem of Consciousness

[westprog]

He's talking about human consciousness, which is complex and messy and generated by the human brain.

That's quite distinct from consciousness as a general phenomenon, which is what Chalmers is trying to pin a magic tail on.

Dennett ascribes consciousness to devices as simple as thermostats. I mostly agree, though I consider that it is better illustrated by something slightly more complex. That's where my "hundred or so" transistors comes in. A thermostat is aware, but not self-aware. You need about four times as much logic for self-awareness.


In extremely broad terms, yes. In the specific, no. Extremely broad terms are easy, particularly where others have gone before. (Which is why I have no respect for Chalmers.)


Did I say that? Let me see... No.

I said that wiring up a hundred billion transistors at random is statistically guaranteed to produce consciousness. Of some sort. Somewhere in the mess.

Not a useful consciousness. Not an interesting consciousness. Most certainly not human consciousness. But consciousness nonetheless. Because consciousness


Because all you need is input, memory, self-reference, and output.


Really? Why do you say that?

Because they don't mirror human experience? Irrelevant.
Because they can't describe their experience? Irrelevant.

Consciousness is a self-referential information process. You can do that on the simplest of microprocessors, like an Intel 4004. You can do it with even less than that: My hundred transistors suffices.

As far as I can see from this theory (which I've encountered before) it seems to be defining a property of mechanisms and calling it consciousness. This is assumed to be the same thing as human consciousness. How we know this beyond simple assertion I don't know.

At what point a thermostat, or Intel 4004, or massive superbrain with a really complicated algorithm, will experience "red" is left unclear.

[Dancing David]

No. Dennett says that thermostats are aware. He has also said that thermostats are not aware that they are aware which is something that separates humans from thermostats.


Which seems to beg the question again.

If there is one process, like verbal cogntion, that labels the other process, or memory which is a comparative process, then all we have are the processes.

So still a bunch of thermostats, no super thermostat.

:)

[Robin]

He's talking about human consciousness, which is complex and messy and generated by the human brain.

That's quite distinct from consciousness as a general phenomenon, which is what Chalmers is trying to pin a magic tail on.
I think not. When Chalmers, Pinker, Searle and Ramachandran talk of consiousness they mean animal consciousness.

Information systems with "this" properties are pretty trivial and well understood.
Because all you need is input, memory, self-reference, and output.
No, that is called a computer program, not consciousness.
Really? Why do you say that?

Because they don't mirror human experience? Irrelevant.
Because they can't describe their experience? Irrelevant.

No, I say it because neuroscientists agree that subjective experience is a feature of animal brains and they have gone a long way to identifying the neural architecture that produces these subjective states.

Transistors and suchlike have none of these features and nothing remotely analogous to them, so it is extravagantly unreasonable to hypothesise that they have some kind of inner life.

[Ichneumonwasp]

As far as I can see from this theory (which I've encountered before) it seems to be defining a property of mechanisms and calling it consciousness. This is assumed to be the same thing as human consciousness. How we know this beyond simple assertion I don't know.

At what point a thermostat, or Intel 4004, or massive superbrain with a really complicated algorithm, will experience "red" is left unclear.

I don't think it should be left all that unclear. Simply break down the issue of what we mean when we say "experience". To me it seems to be some combination of a feeling and a perception. Both of these appear to have completely trivial explanations in neurochemistry. We have already made great strides in understanding how the brain "creates" perceptions. We have not delved into the murky realm of emotion/feeling/the passions to any great degree as of yet. That is why that side of the equation seems so "woo-woo" and is the last recourse for dualists.

Just looking at it from a simplistic stance, it appears to me that "feelings" are a combination of several "things" largely including motivational states that tag perceptions with particular values. They seem to serve the purpose of "pay attention to that" or "stay away from that" to varying degrees. If we were to design a system of "self-motivated" creatures, they would require some way of "deciding" internally how to order occurrences in the world for importance.

Computers don't experience in the same way we do because we don't want them to decide on their own what is important.

[Piscivore]

At what point a thermostat, or Intel 4004, or massive superbrain with a really complicated algorithm, will experience "red" is left unclear.
No it isn't- The moment they can distinguish one wavelength of light from another. And be aware they are doing it. It won't be your experience of "red", but...


Thanks, Pixy. I knew someone here could explain it better than me.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Thanks.

I agree that a thing-itself provides direct subjective experience. What do you think about classes of phenomena, like colours or feelings, that subjectively do not require things in order to be experienced? Or, perhaps better, that appear to have characteristics that exist aside of the physical circumstances that create them?

What do neurologists, or other researchers, assert as the neurological foundation of feelings or colour-experiences?

Nick

I'm not sure I understand the question. To experience red from the "real world" we must see red. Whether or not we recognize the object that is red doesn't matter. The same is true for all "categories". I don't need to recognize something that is small to experience that it is smaller than something else relationally -- I can experience only the difference in size without knowing what the things are that I am perceiving.

I would postulate that the feelings of color-experiences are tags that tell us what is important in our environment. The experience of red is simply a value that accompanies the perception of interest/no-interest, etc. We must have some simple means of assigning values for things to motivate behavior or we would not have any behavior. I don't think this is mysterious in any way. I'm not really sure why people are so caught up in the fact that experiences have some sort of "feeling" -- of course they do. If they didn't then everything would be the same (as far as value is concerned) and we would be mere computers. "Feelings" are our built-in value system. The "tags" must show up in some way. They happen to show up as "feelings". I see no mystery.

[Nick227]

I'm not sure I understand the question. To experience red from the "real world" we must see red. Whether or not we recognize the object that is red doesn't matter. The same is true for all "categories". I don't need to recognize something that is small to experience that it is smaller than something else relationally -- I can experience only the difference in size without knowing what the things are that I am perceiving.


Yes. Though you still need something to be small relationally. To experience red you don't need, subjectively, to experience something red. However, I am not sure of the significance of this!


I would postulate that the feelings of color-experiences are tags that tell us what is important in our environment. The experience of red is simply a value that accompanies the perception of interest/no-interest, etc. We must have some simple means of assigning values for things to motivate behavior or we would not have any behavior. I don't think this is mysterious in any way. I'm not really sure why people are so caught up in the fact that experiences have some sort of "feeling" -- of course they do. If they didn't then everything would be the same (as far as value is concerned) and we would be mere computers. "Feelings" are our built-in value system. The "tags" must show up in some way. They happen to show up as "feelings". I see no mystery.

How do neurologists say that the experience of feelings is created in the brain or body? It sounds interesting.

Nick

[JoeEllison]

Yes. Though you still need something to be small relationally. To experience red you don't need, subjectively, to experience something red. However, I am not sure of the significance of this!There's no "significance", because you're completely wrong, still. There's no "red" without some THING that is red. Starting from an incorrect premise, as you insist on doing, leads to your incorrect conclusions.




How do neurologists say that the experience of feelings is created in the brain or body? It sounds interesting.

Nick
Why do you propose that "feelings" aren't enough, and that there has to be a "feeling of feelings"... and, if that is explained, will you suggest a "feeling about the feeling of feelings" in order to maintain your incorrect conclusions?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes. Though you still need something to be small relationally. To experience red you don't need, subjectively, to experience something red. However, I am not sure of the significance of this!

Sure you do. You may simply not be used to thinking of that "thing" as red. Red light is a "thing" as far as the material universe is concerned.




How do neurologists say that the experience of feelings is created in the brain or body? It sounds interesting.

Nick

We don't know much about it yet. It clearly has a neural basis, since we can re-create it by stimulating certain neurons or by plopping certain neurotransmitters in the right place, but the wiring diagrams are not yet known.

I think it is important to keep in mind that there are several different "programs" that comprise all those processes that we call "consciousness" and they are not the same "thing". There are many different "contents of consciousness" that are experienced as a unity because they have no choice but to be experienced as a unity -- just as a flashlight sees that everything is lit.

There is this "thing" we call "awareness" or "attention" that is distributed in the parietal and frontal lobes (different types of "attention"). There is the distributed function of "feeling", which probably comprise numerous different types of inputs -- many of them may have a common source in the dopaminergic system in the forebrain, though. There is language. There is calculation ability. Etc. And there is a system to watch what is going on so that we can alter behavior to fit changing circumstances -- a relay loop that samples the environment and our response to the environment and changes responses based on some desired outcome. Our entire nervous system is based on this idea of relay loops, in fact.

We already know of one such system -- mirror neurons -- that permit us to feel what others are doing. We likely have many other such relay systems and all of these systems are tied into valuation programs ("is that good or bad") so that it has a particular feeling. That is what allows us to act in the world and change behavior.

We know what happens when there is a problem in the "valuation system" (called "executive functions"). People seem smart and funny, etc. but they can't actually function in the real world. They can't generated steps and follow them properly because nothing has more value than anything else when it comes to crunch time (time to act).

There is much weirdness in our brains.

[Nick227]

Nearly everything

Are you claiming to be a figment of my imagination?

Assuming no, how is it that you think your words are going from your consciousness into my consciousness?

A phrase arises in my awareness. There is identification with the phrase. There is rationalisation. There is expression. You read the phrase. You interpret it. Something like this.

Imagine an astronomer observing a comet. He makes calculations and concludes it will return in 75 years.

Then he dies and another astronomer, not born when the first astronomer died observes the comet returns just as predicted. If there is nothing but consciousness, who's consciousness contained the comet? What accounts for the consistency between the two (according to you) purely imaginary comets?

I'm not saying they are imaginary. I don't really understand your point.

It's called the scientific method.

What is the value of scientific method in a non-dual system?

You havent read the article, have you?

I read the OP. I've been reading the pdf Merc forwarded.

Why do you close your eyes so comprehensively to the mountain of evidence from science that shows the brain to be the seat of consciousness? Why is it that administering chemicals to the brain affects consciousness so severly? Why is it that an immature brain has an immature consciousness? Why is it that an old decaying brain has a damaged consciousness. How is it that someone can be in love with another, and then feel indifferent about them after suffering brain damage?

I am not for a moment disputing that the organ we experience as the brain, arising in consciousness, experienced by the mind, is affecting consciousness. I'm saying it is fundamentally restraining and filtering consciousness to create seeming individual forms and diverse expressions out of an implicate whole. It first creates multiplicity, as a non-duality. It then creates the subject-object experience through identification with thought.

To me, what you are saying is analogous to saying that if water is flowing through a pipe and the pipe breaks then this is evidence that water is created by the pipe. I'm saying the brain is filtering and restraining consciousness.

And are you going to answer my question about your conjectured "non-physical" realm? What are the laws of this new realm? What is the mechanism that translates these laws to the physical laws?

I have not conjectured a non-physical realm, have I? Not in this thread I don't think, anyway! This isn't Platonism, is it?

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

I am not for a moment disputing that the organ we experience as the brain, arising in consciousness, experienced by the mind, is affecting consciousness. I'm saying it is fundamentally restraining and filtering consciousness to create seeming individual forms and diverse expressions out of an implicate whole. It first creates multiplicity, as a non-duality. It then creates the subject-object experience through identification with thought.

To me, what you are saying is analogous to saying that if water is flowing through a pipe and the pipe breaks then this is evidence that water is created by the pipe. I'm saying the brain is filtering and restraining consciousness.

I see a problem with this – both in the initial premise as well as in the metaphor. You seem to imply that the brain is a kind of function of consciousness and not the other way around. If so, then why do you assume that? It’s contrary to what empirical evidence seems to suggest. I.e., change the brain and consciousness is altered; change brain chemistry enough (general anaesthesia) and the lights go off completely.

The metaphor is just a continuation of your assertion which seems to be suspect in the light of evidence we have about brain function. I suppose the underlying problem here is that you seem to regard consciousness as a kind of entity in its own right.

[RandFan]

I for the life of me can't see what the problem is about consciousness.
It's a product of the brain's millions of neurons. It's a simple explanation.
The moment the brain is dead, so is consciousness.
You can paint as many pictures as possible of the phenomenon, it does not change the fact that as I said; it's a function of been human. It has evolved over many millions of years to assure our survival and to enable us to sit at the keyboard and write this kind of nonsense I'm writing. The only mystery to me is, how much consciousness have our animal friends?

Meh~

That's like saying flight is a function of being a bird. The moment the bird dies it ceases to fly. That tells us precisely nothing.

Of course, I should be careful here. I'm not sure what you are critisizing so maybe it's just the Chalmers version of HPC which is fine. HPC is clearly a function of the brain but that doesn't really tell us what consciousness is anymore than telling us flight is a function of wings and feathers tells us what flight is.

[Dancing David]

Yes. Though you still need something to be small relationally. To experience red you don't need, subjectively, to experience something red. However, I am not sure of the significance of this!




How do neurologists say that the experience of feelings is created in the brain or body? It sounds interesting.

Nick

Interesting and very complex.

First off, all human behavior is learned. There are the stimuli and the response to stimuli and the consequences but it takes time for things to happen and connect during growth.

There are a lot of cool things about emotions, we have cues to our emotion, 'feelings' which can represent of bodies state of arousal and sensations. "Feelings' can also be part of memory and pattern recognition, and the labels we apply to them through verbal cognition.

They are all learned and conditioned. And the context of the 'emotion' or feeling' can be crucial to the interpretation of it. There is little difference between excitation from 'anger', 'really happy', 'suprised', 'scared' and 'sexually aroused'. It seems counter inuitive but it is fiten the context that tell us 'what' we are 'feeling'. Internal memory, pattern association, verbal cognition and external enviroment all play a part in the label we apply to a 'feeling'.

Strange but true. So when you talk about the neurology of emotion there are many layers and sites to examine like the adrenal glands, insulin levels, lactic acid and other waste products, the PNS (peripheral nervous system, which monitors a lot of sites in our bodies), the lower portions of the CNS are crucial to the 'autonomic' system and are often part of circadian cycles, lelevls or arousal and attention, memeory and concentration, then you get into the upper and mid cortical functions like pattern recognition, memory and cognitive framing.

So the neurology of emeotion is about as comples a system as you can get, especialy when you consider the role of conditioning and cognitive framing.

[Nick227]

I for the life of me can't see what the problem is about consciousness.
It's a product of the brain's millions of neurons. It's a simple explanation.
The moment the brain is dead, so is consciousness.

It would certainly be useful to be able to ratify that. I'm not much convinced.

You can paint as many pictures as possible of the phenomenon, it does not change the fact that as I said; it's a function of been human. It has evolved over many millions of years to assure our survival and to enable us to sit at the keyboard and write this kind of nonsense I'm writing. The only mystery to me is, how much consciousness have our animal friends?

That the brain, or what we experience as a brain, affects consciousness I would say is pretty much indisputable. Whether it creates it is a different question entirely.

Nick

[JoeEllison]

I'm not much convinced.
That seems to be a fundamental failing on your part, since you accept much less evidence-based ideas as convincing.

[RandFan]

Which seems to beg the question again.

If there is one process, like verbal cogntion, that labels the other process, or memory which is a comparative process, then all we have are the processes.

So still a bunch of thermostats, no super thermostat.

:)I think it quite appropriate to avoid the temptation to think that consciousness is something metaphysical or supernatural. Of course cognition is something that emerges from a lot of processes. It's the result of a physical brain processing information.

That said it doesn't tell us how it works anymore than deducing that flight emerges from the physics of a birds biology. Da Vinci knew that in the 16th century but he did not understand aerodynamics. He did not have an accurate theory of how a bird achieved flight and he couldn't reproduce it.

FWIW, how many computers are connected to the WWW? Is there anything special about all of those processes going on at once? Simply saying that cognition is a lot of processes tells us next to nothing.

[Nick227]

I see a problem with this – both in the initial premise as well as in the metaphor. You seem to imply that the brain is a kind of function of consciousness and not the other way around. If so, then why do you assume that? It’s contrary to what empirical evidence seems to suggest. I.e., change the brain and consciousness is altered; change brain chemistry enough (general anaesthesia) and the lights go off completely.

The metaphor is just a continuation of your assertion which seems to be suspect in the light of evidence we have about brain function. I suppose the underlying problem here is that you seem to regard consciousness as a kind of entity in its own right.

I don't regard consciousness as an entity. Perhaps in attempting to discuss it it can appear that way. I am saying that the brain is in some manner filtering pure consciousness and creating the experience of multiplicity. You don't really know what you are experiencing under anaesthesia. It is by no means clear that consciousness is entirely switched off.

Nick

[Ichneumonwasp]

FWIW, how many computers are connected to the WWW? Is there anything special about all of those processes going on at once? Simply saying that cognition is a lot of processes tells us next to nothing.

Yes, very true. It isn't the number of neurons, per se, but the ways they are connected that determine how we think. Computers connected through the web or more concretely through a network won't get us any closer to consciousness than a single computer. This isn't simply mass action, but precise action.

I think we could have computers with consciousness, but it would require an entirely new type of programming because we currently do not program computers to have "will" or to examine their own function in the same way that our brains do; and we do not program them to be motivated by anything in the outside or inside world. We could, but then they would no longer be tools, but independent thinking entities.

The mass action analogy (we don't work off simply a large number of neurons, but by precise localization) should be obvious when looking at recovery of function. Sever the spinal cord and people can't walk. Throw in a bunch of neurons and they still can't walk. Why? Because what really matters is the way the neurons link up to effector cells so that we can control movement. The same is true with recovery of function following a stroke -- we now know that we have a limited ability to grow new neurons, but strokes are still devastating. Why? Neurons are only going to grow locally. The situation in which they course along long distances (as in early development) is no longer possible -- there is too much stuff in the way and the signals for growth can't get from one place to the other very easily.

[Nick227]

I see a problem with this – both in the initial premise as well as in the metaphor. You seem to imply that the brain is a kind of function of consciousness and not the other way around. If so, then why do you assume that? It’s contrary to what empirical evidence seems to suggest. I.e., change the brain and consciousness is altered; change brain chemistry enough (general anaesthesia) and the lights go off completely.

What is your opinion of subjective evidence gathered from drug states? In my experience there are certain drugs that reinforce the materialist theory to a degree and others which challenge it.

The tryptamines, such as LSD, certainly appear to alter our day-to-day perception, presumably through changing brain chemistry. But dissociatives, as you're mentioning anaesthetics, seem to me to be significantly different. The well-known dissociative anaesthetic, ketamine, used as a recreational drug and as a clinical anaesthetic for children, seems for example to actually shift the whole locus of awareness to outside of the physical body. This is a commonly noted effect. How would the materialist theory account for this experience?

Nick

[Ichneumonwasp]

What is your opinion of subjective evidence gathered from drug states? In my experience there are certain drugs that reinforce the materialist theory to a degree and others which challenge it.

The tryptamines, such as LSD, certainly appear to alter our day-to-day perception, presumably through changing brain chemistry. But dissociatives, as you're mentioning anaesthetics, seem to me to be significantly different. The well-known dissociative anaesthetic, ketamine, used as a recreational drug and as a clinical anaesthetic for children, seems for example to actually shift the whole locus of awareness to outside of the physical body. This is a commonly noted effect. How would the materialist theory account for this experience?

Nick

I know I wasn't asked, so I hope you and Lupus don't mind my interjection, but there seems to me to be an issue between two different data points.

There is the issue of an altered state of awareness due to drug use, which can be used as evidence for states of awareness resulting from brain action (which is perturbed by the drug). And then there is the content of the altered state of awareness. I don't know that many people who think we can trust the content of these states of awareness relating to actual reality. They might, but they very well might not. If we were to trust the content of all altered states of awareness then pigs can fly, faces can melt, and there are an unaccountably large number of Napoleons and Jesuses running around this world.

As an analogy, we often say that people in the first and second century made up stories about Jesus. If one does not accept this -- say a biblical literalist who wants to believe that everything biblical is absolutely true -- then they must accept every word of the gospels of Thomas, Peter, Judas, the infancy gospel, etc. It is trivially true that people made up stories about Jesus in the first few centuries. There is, therefore, no way that we can be sure that the content of the four gospels in the New Testament are unimpeachable sources of information.

[Nick227]

I know I wasn't asked, so I hope you and Lupus don't mind my interjection, but there seems to me to be an issue between two different data points.

There is the issue of an altered state of awareness due to drug use, which can be used as evidence for states of awareness resulting from brain action (which is perturbed by the drug). And then there is the content of the altered state of awareness. I don't know that many people who think we can trust the content of these states of awareness relating to actual reality. They might, but they very well might not. If we were to trust the content of all altered states of awareness then pigs can fly, faces can melt, and there are an unaccountably large number of Napoleons and Jesuses running around this world.


Well, I don't know that there is such a disconnection here. The effects of many psychoactive substances do seem consistent with a combination of accessing subconsciousness and altering conscious awareness, frequently a mixing of the two. Thus the experience of many psychoactive substances does to me appear to reinforce the notion that consciousness either arises in the brain or is affected by the brain.

But the dissociative, ketamine, is intriguingly different. I'm not saying that what is experienced in a drug state is necessarily useful data, clearly it's more suspect than data gathered in more normal awareness, but it is nevertheless interesting. To experience the actual locus of your awareness apparently shift into objects in your vicinity is quite intriguing. There was an interesting paper on the drug I seem to recall, written by Dr Karl Jansen, a well-respected psychiatrist in London - Ketamine and the Near-Death Experience, or a title like that.

Nick

[Dancing David]

What is your opinion of subjective evidence gathered from drug states? In my experience there are certain drugs that reinforce the materialist theory to a degree and others which challenge it.

The tryptamines, such as LSD, certainly appear to alter our day-to-day perception, presumably through changing brain chemistry. But dissociatives, as you're mentioning anaesthetics, seem to me to be significantly different. The well-known dissociative anaesthetic, ketamine, used as a recreational drug and as a clinical anaesthetic for children, seems for example to actually shift the whole locus of awareness to outside of the physical body. This is a commonly noted effect. How would the materialist theory account for this experience?

Nick

I would first want to know how you determine the locus of awareness is no longer in the body.

Have people seen through walls or objects? In a double blind test.

[westprog]

There's no "significance", because you're completely wrong, still. There's no "red" without some THING that is red. Starting from an incorrect premise, as you insist on doing, leads to your incorrect conclusions.


I find it quite easy to imagine "red".


Why do you propose that "feelings" aren't enough, and that there has to be a "feeling of feelings"... and, if that is explained, will you suggest a "feeling about the feeling of feelings" in order to maintain your incorrect conclusions?

[westprog]

There's no "significance", because you're completely wrong, still. There's no "red" without some THING that is red. Starting from an incorrect premise, as you insist on doing, leads to your incorrect conclusions.


I find it quite easy to imagine "red".


Why do you propose that "feelings" aren't enough, and that there has to be a "feeling of feelings"... and, if that is explained, will you suggest a "feeling about the feeling of feelings" in order to maintain your incorrect conclusions?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, I don't know that there is such a disconnection here. The effects of many psychoactive substances do seem consistent with a combination of accessing subconsciousness and altering conscious awareness, frequently a mixing of the two. Thus the experience of many psychoactive substances does to me appear to reinforce the notion that consciousness either arises in the brain or is affected by the brain.

But the dissociative, ketamine, is intriguingly different. I'm not saying that what is experienced in a drug state is necessarily useful data, clearly it's more suspect than data gathered in more normal awareness, but it is nevertheless interesting. To experience the actual locus of your awareness apparently shift into objects in your vicinity is quite intriguing. There was an interesting paper on the drug I seem to recall, written by Dr Karl Jansen, a well-respected psychiatrist in London - Ketamine and the Near-Death Experience, or a title like that.

Nick

Sure, it's interesting, but I don't think we can take it much further than that. Other NMDA blockers produce similar effects, though there are differences amongst them all. Kids who take large doses of Dextromethorophan can feel dissociation, and we've all heard about the wildness that PCP can cause. It may be a pure NMDA effect, or (like almost everything else with the brain) there may be many inputs resulting in that experience.

Other glutamate blockers that act on different receptors -- like Topamax, which seems to act on AMPA receptors -- can produce a slightly different flavor. At least 30% of people who try Topamax have cognitive difficulties. And we've seen one person who had a bizzare hallucinogenic experience of being chased by the Hamburgler down I-75 on his way back from the Cleveland Clinic.


ETA:

I guess I should add (in relation to near-death experiences) that the neurons most sensitive to hypoxia are located in the cerebellum, layers 3 and 5 of the cortex, and the hippocampus (specifically Sommer's sector). There is a huge concentration of NMDA receptors in the hippocampus -- related to its role in converting short-term into long-term memory. We know that we can reproduce near-death experiences in centrifuges where blood flow is decreased presumably in these areas and Persinger can re-create some of these types of effects with magnetic stimulation of the temporal lobes, so I don't find it suprising that NMDA blockers produce that type of effect.

[Nick227]

I guess I should add (in relation to near-death experiences) that the neurons most sensitive to hypoxia are located in the cerebellum, layers 3 and 5 of the cortex, and the hippocampus (specifically Sommer's sector). There is a huge concentration of NMDA receptors in the hippocampus -- related to its role in converting short-term into long-term memory. We know that we can reproduce near-death experiences in centrifuges where blood flow is decreased presumably in these areas and Persinger can re-create some of these types of effects with magnetic stimulation of the temporal lobes, so I don't find it suprising that NMDA blockers produce that type of effect.

Yes, from what I've gathered the relationship between NMDA and these experiences is pretty well documented. I'm still intrigued as to how this receptor site activity creates such personalised effects. This is particularly noticeable with another NMDA antagonist, ibogaine. When I took it a few times 10 odd years ago, I re-experienced portions of my early childhood, literally like watching it on a TV screen. Quite amazing. This is now a well-documented effect of the substance. Either you re-witness your childhood seemingly as it was, or elements of it play out in symbolic form. Presumably the drug is somehow accessing stored memories, but I've no idea how such a thing would be possible.

Nick

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, from what I've gathered the relationship between NMDA and these experiences is pretty well documented. I'm still intrigued as to how this receptor site activity creates such personalised effects. This is particularly noticeable with another NMDA antagonist, ibogaine. When I took it a few times 10 odd years ago, I re-experienced portions of my early childhood, literally like watching it on a TV screen. Quite amazing. This is now a well-documented effect of the substance. Either you re-witness your childhood seemingly as it was, or elements of it play out in symbolic form. Presumably the drug is somehow accessing stored memories, but I've no idea how such a thing would be possible.

Nick

I don't know either. Mongo only pawn in game of life.

[RandFan]

Yes, very true. It isn't the number of neurons, per se, but the ways they are connected that determine how we think. Computers connected through the web or more concretely through a network won't get us any closer to consciousness than a single computer. This isn't simply mass action, but precise action.

I think we could have computers with consciousness, but it would require an entirely new type of programming because we currently do not program computers to have "will" or to examine their own function in the same way that our brains do; and we do not program them to be motivated by anything in the outside or inside world. We could, but then they would no longer be tools, but independent thinking entities.

The mass action analogy (we don't work off simply a large number of neurons, but by precise localization) should be obvious when looking at recovery of function. Sever the spinal cord and people can't walk. Throw in a bunch of neurons and they still can't walk. Why? Because what really matters is the way the neurons link up to effector cells so that we can control movement. The same is true with recovery of function following a stroke -- we now know that we have a limited ability to grow new neurons, but strokes are still devastating. Why? Neurons are only going to grow locally. The situation in which they course along long distances (as in early development) is no longer possible -- there is too much stuff in the way and the signals for growth can't get from one place to the other very easily.Good post.

I think we are near some exciting breakthroughs as they relate to AI. I hope I'm here when they happen.

[lupus_in_fabula]

What is your opinion of subjective evidence gathered from drug states? In my experience there are certain drugs that reinforce the materialist theory to a degree and others which challenge it.

The tryptamines, such as LSD, certainly appear to alter our day-to-day perception, presumably through changing brain chemistry. But dissociatives, as you're mentioning anaesthetics, seem to me to be significantly different. The well-known dissociative anaesthetic, ketamine, used as a recreational drug and as a clinical anaesthetic for children, seems for example to actually shift the whole locus of awareness to outside of the physical body. This is a commonly noted effect. How would the materialist theory account for this experience?

My opinion? Well, I have no experience whatsoever about psychedelics. Alcohol is the strongest I have tried and there’s not much to report about that, except some psychedelic-like states during hangovers – I tend to call them ‘shamanic hangovers’. On the other hand I have indeed experienced some weird non-dual states etc. while having hangovers. I have read about psychedelic research quite bit thou, but that doesn’t equate to much anything. I have some interesting quotes by T. Leary & Co. – I even managed to present one in my master’s thesis.

On the other hand, I have been “under the knife” seven times, so general anaesthesia is pretty familiar, although there’s not much to report except that lights go off and then they’re switched on again – absolutely nothing in between. If there will be a next time, a friend of mine (an anaesthesiologist) promised to give me ketamine, so we’ll see.

The thing is thou, that no matter the experience, the bottom line seems to be that it doesn’t really matter what you’re experiencing, since it’s subjective anyway. The common denominator with drug enforced experiences seems to be that they are induced through materialistic means. It’s kind of like: there’s a variety of movies, but the same DVD player plays them. There’s no much we can conclude form extraordinary states of experience it seems, except private interpretations.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Good post.

I think we are near some exciting breakthroughs as they relate to AI. I hope I'm here when they happen.

Thanks.

Yeah, I hope they get to it soon since the rapture is apparently going to happen next month.

That guy (forgot his name) who is trying to recreate a cortical column is probably onto the right track, but that is just the barest tip of the iceburg since that will only help with cortical function and not even touch all the looping information streams from subcortical structures. One of these days, though, one of these days.........

[Nick227]

The thing is thou, that no matter the experience, the bottom line seems to be that it doesn’t really matter what you’re experiencing, since it’s subjective anyway. The common denominator with drug enforced experiences seems to be that they are induced through materialistic means. It’s kind of like: there’s a variety of movies, but the same DVD player plays them. There’s no much we can conclude form extraordinary states of experience it seems, except private interpretations.

I've no doubt there's a big materialist component in consciousness whichever way you cut it. But the thing with drugs, I find, is that it is tough to go back to just straight-down-the-line materialism after a few psychedelic experiences. Too many beliefs have been knocked around.

I'm sure Dave Chalmers has been there. Dan Dennet I don't know about.

Be interesting to find out if psychedelic drug use is a factor in belief about materialism.

Nick

[Piscivore]

I've no doubt there's a big materialist component in consciousness whichever way you cut it. But the thing with drugs, I find, is that it is tough to go back to just straight-down-the-line materialism after a few psychedelic experiences. Too many beliefs have been knocked around.

Nick

Those weren't "beliefs", those were neurons...


:p

[Ichneumonwasp]

I've no doubt there's a big materialist component in consciousness whichever way you cut it. But the thing with drugs, I find, is that it is tough to go back to just straight-down-the-line materialism after a few psychedelic experiences. Too many beliefs have been knocked around.

I'm sure Dave Chalmers has been there. Dan Dennet I don't know about.

Be interesting to find out if psychedelic drug use is a factor in belief about materialism.

Nick

That's a great question. We tend to believe our own experiences even when there is evidence to the contrary. Religious folk who have personally experienced the divine in some way will never be convinced that there is no God. This appears especially true of some people with temporal lobe epilepsy -- particularly those with Geschwind's syndrome (a neuropsychological sydrome consisting of hypergraphia, hyposexuality, hyper-religiosity, and excessive attention to details -- for those who have never heard of it).

[billydkid]

Oh God, not "the hard problem". I thought that went the way of "TLOP". Please God, no.

[Moochie]

I find it quite easy to imagine "red".

Yes, I can remember blue, too.

M.

[Nick227]

That's a great question. We tend to believe our own experiences even when there is evidence to the contrary. Religious folk who have personally experienced the divine in some way will never be convinced that there is no God.

I think during one of the periodic purges of Gnostic-related traditions, perhaps in France (not sure), they burnt at the stake literally hundreds of those who had taken I think a 2nd or 3rd level of initiation into "the mysteries." Only one is recorded as having recanted his belief to save his skin. Once a gnosis has occurred, I guess there's no point in pretending you can go back.

Once the mind has opened it's not at all easy to cram all that awareness back into such a small box - to go back to the belief that you're just this little "I" somewhere. I think sometimes it's actually needed, but it's not easy to cram it all back in.

Nick

[Mercutio]

I think during one of the periodic purges of Gnostic-related traditions, perhaps in France (not sure), they burnt at the stake literally hundreds of those who had taken I think a 2nd or 3rd level of initiation into "the mysteries." Only one is recorded as having recanted his belief to save his skin. Once a gnosis has occurred, I guess there's no point in pretending you can go back.

Once the mind has opened it's not at all easy to cram all that awareness back into such a small box - to go back to the belief that you're just this little "I" somewhere. I think sometimes it's actually needed, but it's not easy to cram it all back in.

Nick"People can be stubborn" is not evidence. Jonestown is not evidence that Jim Jones was right. Once a gnosis has occurred, I guess there's no point in pretending it means a damned thing.

[RandFan]

But the thing with drugs, I find, is that it is tough to go back to just straight-down-the-line materialism after a few psychedelic experiences. Too many beliefs have been knocked around. Susan Blackmore had an out-of-body experience after having taken LSD. She then began a long journey to prove the metaphysical.

Susan is an ardent materialist today.

[JoeEllison]

I think during one of the periodic purges of Gnostic-related traditions, perhaps in France (not sure), they burnt at the stake literally hundreds of those who had taken I think a 2nd or 3rd level of initiation into "the mysteries." Only one is recorded as having recanted his belief to save his skin. Once a gnosis has occurred, I guess there's no point in pretending you can go back.

Once the mind has opened it's not at all easy to cram all that awareness back into such a small box - to go back to the belief that you're just this little "I" somewhere. I think sometimes it's actually needed, but it's not easy to cram it all back in.

NickWow, that's a whole other level of stupid there. Intriguing, doesn't add to our knowledge of the universe.

[Nick227]

Susan Blackmore had an out-of-body experience after having taken LSD. She then began a long journey to prove the metaphysical.

Susan is an ardent materialist today.

Yes. One of the most central metaphysical texts known reads "It ascends to heaven, and descends again to earth." You have to come back to physicality. What I like about materialism is not that I think it's true, it's that I find it good for me. (So I probably still have some way to go with it!)

Nick

[Nick227]

"People can be stubborn" is not evidence. Jonestown is not evidence that Jim Jones was right. Once a gnosis has occurred, I guess there's no point in pretending it means a damned thing.

Well it's a fine line between gnosis and psychosis! Hey, sounds like it could be a song.

Nick

[Mercutio]

... and this is why they keep calling it a "hard problem".

[RandFan]

Yes. One of the most central metaphysical texts known reads "It ascends to heaven, and descends again to earth." You have to come back to physicality. What I like about materialism is not that I think it's true, it's that I find it good for me. (So I probably still have some way to go with it!)

NickI don't know what this means but it brings to mind one of my favorite truisms.

Reality is that which doesn't change just because you don't believe in it.

In other words, no matter how many out of body experiences you have the hot plate will still burn your hand each and every time you touch it(assuming of course that it is plugged in and hot).

I was recently very sick and in the hospital. No matter how much I wanted to pretend that I was a disembodied spirit and could escape the hell of an elevated white blood cell count I still was violently ill, vomited, shook and just felt like hell. Reality can be a bitch.

Of course there is always the closed room experiment. For those who think that there is anything significant to out of body experiences I suggest that we lock them in a room without food and toilet. When they realize that it is all a bunch of BS we let them out. Sadly, some people will actually go to the point of death.

Sorry for the rant but I for one am not much for make believe. It was fine as a child but I don't see the point anymore.

[RandFan]

... and this is why they keep calling it a "hard problem".:D

[Dancing David]

I've no doubt there's a big materialist component in consciousness whichever way you cut it. But the thing with drugs, I find, is that it is tough to go back to just straight-down-the-line materialism after a few psychedelic experiences. Too many beliefs have been knocked around.

I'm sure Dave Chalmers has been there. Dan Dennet I don't know about.

Be interesting to find out if psychedelic drug use is a factor in belief about materialism.

Nick

It convinced me before I avoided the addiction that consciousness is biochemical in nature. LSD hangs onto the seortonin receptor and won't let go, psylocibin latches and loosens, they both produce the serotonin cascade. I was an addict (strange but true) for 3 years to those two. I didn't realise I was addicted but I was, I was also looking for the serotonin rush.(A very bad form of self medication as it made the panic attacks worse) The most interesting was when i ate about 5 ounces of morning glory seed that I harvested and saved. They taste truely horrible for one and then they don't do the same as the LSD, it is longer lasting and more subtle, it also gave me rainbows in my night vision for about twenty years. (They stopped about a year ago.)

The alternate realities of drug use and shamanism are interesting, especially the shamanic ones, I really do recommend doing what the bigfoot kooks do, go sit all night in a quiet and very dark forest. You will find some interesting things in your self when you do that. Yet when I apply the standard of replication and reductionsism to those kinds of experience, I find no evidence that biochemistry isn't the root of consciousness. But all the magical thinking i had before my drug use, amplified by drug use, and present after I quit has all gone away. Thanks to Zoloft, no more magical associations, no more insomnia, no more compulsions and obsession.

I like this reality alot, I miss the magical associations sometimes, but i do not miss obsession and panic attacks.

That and working with people with persistant and severe mental illness for ten years.

[Dancing David]

Yes. One of the most central metaphysical texts known reads "It ascends to heaven, and descends again to earth." You have to come back to physicality. What I like about materialism is not that I think it's true, it's that I find it good for me. (So I probably still have some way to go with it!)

Nick

Ah, the mother of the ten thousand things.

Use comes not from what is there but what is not there. A house is good, a door makes it useful.

Running a country is like cooking a small fish.

[Robin]

A phrase arises in my awareness. There is identification with the phrase. There is rationalisation. There is expression. You read the phrase. You interpret it. Something like this.
Direct from your mind to mine eh? Nothing in between?

You didn't recall typing the words on a keyboard perhaps. They didn't get stored in a computer's memory somewhere perhaps? A little thing called the Internet did not intervene? Recall the question you were asking.
I'm not saying they are imaginary. I don't really understand your point.
Here was your question:
What is there that is not consciousness? What experience, what object, what thought, what feeling? How are you going to examine something from which you cannot escape, from which there is no isolated point to observe it?

So if everything is consciousness then the comet must simply be an artifact of consciousness - ie imaginary.

But I suggest that would be impossible since that could not account for the consistency between the minds of the two astronomer - the comet must have existed outside their consciousness's. So your question is answered.
What is the value of scientific method in a non-dual system?
The value of the scientific method in a non-dual system, or anywhere else for that matter, is that it is the only epistemology that has ever actually worked.
I am not for a moment disputing that the organ we experience as the brain, arising in consciousness, experienced by the mind, is affecting consciousness. I'm saying it is fundamentally restraining and filtering consciousness to create seeming individual forms and diverse expressions out of an implicate whole. It first creates multiplicity, as a non-duality. It then creates the subject-object experience through identification with thought.
So if the brain is restraining and filtering consciousness, then someone who sustains brain damage ought to have this restraint and filtration lessened and should start to experience some sort of super-consciousness - right?
To me, what you are saying is analogous to saying that if water is flowing through a pipe and the pipe breaks then this is evidence that water is created by the pipe. I'm saying the brain is filtering and restraining consciousness.
When a pipe breaks the water bursts free. Damaging a brain does not free the consciousness - it severly damages it.

But even if you are right - if the brain filters and restrains consciousness rather than causing it, the mind is still in a causal relationship with the brain - and so the mind must be physical.
I have not conjectured a non-physical realm, have I? Not in this thread I don't think, anyway!
Yes you have, here:
I do not think personally that you are scratching the surface of Chalmers' core issue - can consciousness arise from a purely physical process? Personally, I doubt it severely.
and here:
Thus, it is argued, that non-physical things exist, leading to the question of how can a physical process create something which is not physical?

By the way, you haven't answered my question about my re-statement of the Mary problem - I would be interested in your comments:

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=3668939#post3668939

[Nick227]

I don't know what this means but it brings to mind one of my favorite truisms.

Reality is that which doesn't change just because you don't believe in it.

In other words, no matter how many out of body experiences you have the hot plate will still burn your hand each and every time you touch it(assuming of course that it is plugged in and hot).

I was recently very sick and in the hospital. No matter how much I wanted to pretend that I was a disembodied spirit and could escape the hell of an elevated white blood cell count I still was violently ill, vomited, shook and just felt like hell. Reality can be a bitch.

Of course there is always the closed room experiment. For those who think that there is anything significant to out of body experiences I suggest that we lock them in a room without food and toilet. When they realize that it is all a bunch of BS we let them out. Sadly, some people will actually go to the point of death.

Sorry for the rant but I for one am not much for make believe. It was fine as a child but I don't see the point anymore.

Rant away. It's cool.

Working as a therapist, the principle aim is to "get people to identify" and to me that is what you are talking about here. You're coming from the same point of view. I think it's good.

There is still, however, the accessible truth that finally you are not the body, the feelings, or the thoughts. Whilst identification with these things remains, you must follow, and the experience of "being" these things - this personality - will be sustained. To me this is the mechanism that is used to grow the personality - through identification with thought individuation is facilitated. But if and when individuation completes, there will be a let-go. When identification is no longer needed, it will drop away.

Nick

[cyborg]

Susan Blackmore had an out-of-body experience after having taken LSD. She then began a long journey to prove the metaphysical.

You imagine what reality is like on a daily basis. I am not surprised that imagining unreal things can seem very real. The trick is getting to the point accepting this about your own perceptions.

[Nick227]

Direct from your mind to mine eh? Nothing in between?

You didn't recall typing the words on a keyboard perhaps. They didn't get stored in a computer's memory somewhere perhaps? A little thing called the Internet did not intervene? Recall the question you were asking.

Hi Robin,

Well, I kind of lumped all that stuff in under expression. I wasn't really sure of the point you were trying to make so I didn't know how much detail was necessary.

Here was your question:

So if everything is consciousness then the comet must simply be an artifact of consciousness - ie imaginary.

Well, I don't see why you associate consciousness with imaginary. If you experience something, it is at least to a degree real, depending on how we class various types of experience.

BTW, if you are associating consciousness with imaginary, then why not pick a far more simple scenario to relate this? You could just say - oh, so if I whack my head into this wall it's imaginary, is it?

The value of the scientific method in a non-dual system, or anywhere else for that matter, is that it is the only epistemology that has ever actually worked.

Do you know what non-duality means?

So if the brain is restraining and filtering consciousness, then someone who sustains brain damage ought to have this restraint and filtration lessened and should start to experience some sort of super-consciousness - right?

Well, it would depend on the kind of brain damage.

When a pipe breaks the water bursts free. Damaging a brain does not free the consciousness - it severly damages it.

It's not such a great analogy, it's true. But if you break the pipe it no longer conveys all the water to the recipient.

But even if you are right - if the brain filters and restrains consciousness rather than causing it, the mind is still in a causal relationship with the brain - and so the mind must be physical.

Well, I would say the brain is in a causal relationship with the mind, yes. Change the brain chemistry and you experience a change in awareness.

Yes you have, here:

I'm not saying there's a non-physical realm here.

and here:

Fair enough, though I'm actually just trying to quote what I understood from reading a piece about this thought experiment thing.


By the way, you haven't answered my question about my re-statement of the Mary problem - I would be interested in your comments:

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=3668939#post3668939

I will check it out. But I claim no expertise on AI whatsoever. The first time I learned about this thing about Mary's room was checking out some of the issues raised in this thread. Reading more it was clear to me I would need to understand more and I don't know if my brain can really follow all the arguments to be honest. Probably it lacks the processing power of some of you guys. I will check it out anyway.

Nick

[Robin]

Well, I kind of lumped all that stuff in under expression. I wasn't really sure of the point you were trying to make so I didn't know how much detail was necessary.
I thought that given your question I was answering my meaning would be clear.

You asked "What is there that is not consciousness?" I asked how you thought that your words reached me.

I did not think that was a very obscure point. If there was nothing that was not consciousness then how could words reach from one consciousness to another? Clearly all the stuff in between - the keyboard, the computer, the internet - that is what there is that is not consciousness.
Well, I don't see why you associate consciousness with imaginary. If you experience something, it is at least to a degree real, depending on how we class various types of experience.
Imaginary is a pretty simple concept. If I perceive a comet but it exists only in my consciousness it is imaginary. If I perceive a comet and the perception is of a comet that exists independently of my consciousness then it is not imaginary.
BTW, if you are associating consciousness with imaginary...
Hang on - don't run away from your question. You asked "what is there that is not consciousness?". If there was nothing that was not consciousness then everything I percieved would be, by definition, imaginary.

So it is not me, but you that is associating consciousness with imaginary. Your 'simpler' example would obviously not work since it does not involve more than one consciousness.

My example had two consciousness's and a perceived object that was measurable consistent between them. This clearly demonstrates that there has to be somthing that is not consciousness.
Do you know what non-duality means?
I am assuming you are referring to an English approximation of Adviata. If so then, well I am not a great expert, but know enough to answer your question.


See that is the great thing about the epistemology of science - it is metaphysically neutral. Ernst Mach, for example, pointed out that even if the world were a dream then science would go on completely unaffected.
It's not such a great analogy, it's true. But if you break the pipe it no longer conveys all the water to the recipient.
No it is not a great analogy since consciousness is the recepient. If consciousness is merely filtered and restrained by the brain then the brain could hardly cut consciousness off from itself.

All analogies for this idea suffer from the same problem - William James, I recall, used the pipe organ or opaque dome. All seem to assume that there is an experiencer for whom the consciousness is filtered.

Bergson suggests that consciousness unnecessary for the biological entity is blocked. But the blocked consciousness would surely be conscious, no?
Well, I would say the brain is in a causal relationship with the mind, yes. Change the brain chemistry and you experience a change in awareness.
So basically this is a claim withing Materialism, rather than an alternative.
I'm not saying there's a non-physical realm here.
What are you saying then. That there is physical and non-physical all mixed in together - sometimes in a causal relationship and sometimes going their own way?
Probably it lacks the processing power of some of you guys. I will check it out anyway.
Don't bet on it. I think I have a Z80 between my ears. Not quick, but it can get there eventually.

[Nick227]

OK, let's assume that as you say, the mind does not follow the laws of physics and instead follows the laws of some other realm - let us call it the metaphysical realm.

Could you explain to me what you mean by "the mind does not follow the laws of physics?" Does the mind follow the laws of physics anyway?

I asked the question about this Mary's room thing because I thought it was interesting. What I guess I found out, from dialoguing a bit with people here about it, was that a lot of the issues are really more to do with conceptualisation and definition. It didn't seem a simple enough issue, with enough widely-agreed principles, to be capable of making much of a point either way.

Relating to meta-physics - I am not, as I see it, articulating a metaphysical scheme of things when I say that the brain is not creating consciousness, merely channelling it. Perhaps I am, but I don't see that.

Nick

[Nick227]

You asked "What is there that is not consciousness?" I asked how you thought that your words reached me.

I did not think that was a very obscure point. If there was nothing that was not consciousness then how could words reach from one consciousness to another? Clearly all the stuff in between - the keyboard, the computer, the internet - that is what there is that is not consciousness.

Well, the scenario I'm suggesting is that all is consciousness, and that the human brain (as it appears to the mind, in consciousness), is merely filtering pure consciousness and creating from it the sensation of multiplicity, the sensation of limited form. Thus my statement "all is consciousness" is the articulating of a position.

Imaginary is a pretty simple concept. If I perceive a comet but it exists only in my consciousness it is imaginary. If I perceive a comet and the perception is of a comet that exists independently of my consciousness then it is not imaginary.

Well, I think that would depend on whether anyone else was trying to see it. If you see a comet and everyone else says "I see no comet" then to me it looks more like you're imagining things. The act of seeing a comet alone is not to me imaginary.

Hang on - don't run away from your question. You asked "what is there that is not consciousness?". If there was nothing that was not consciousness then everything I percieved would be, by definition, imaginary.

I don't understand why you consider something imaginary. If everything is arising from the brain's interaction with pure, undifferentiated consciousness then it is all real. Of course, one may then begin to class phenomena as real, less real, suspect, imaginary, as one wishes.

So it is not me, but you that is associating consciousness with imaginary. Your 'simpler' example would obviously not work since it does not involve more than one consciousness.

My example had two consciousness's and a perceived object that was measurable consistent between them. This clearly demonstrates that there has to be somthing that is not consciousness.

Not to my way of seeing things.

I am assuming you are referring to an English approximation of Adviata. If so then, well I am not a great expert, but know enough to answer your question.


See that is the great thing about the epistemology of science - it is metaphysically neutral. Ernst Mach, for example, pointed out that even if the world were a dream then science would go on completely unaffected.

It is not that non-duality disputes science per se, but it does somewhat diminish the value that can be attributed to it. If reality is non-dual then there is no isolated point from which a description of "how things are" can be intelligently be made. All description, all measurement, is simply arising like all other phenomena. All meaning attached to it also. None of it has any more or less a priori significance than say, a cat scratching its leg.

No it is not a great analogy since consciousness is the recepient. If consciousness is merely filtered and restrained by the brain then the brain could hardly cut consciousness off from itself.

Well, it can break down. This rather depends on how deterministic in belief you are, I think.

All analogies for this idea suffer from the same problem - William James, I recall, used the pipe organ or opaque dome. All seem to assume that there is an experiencer for whom the consciousness is filtered.

Well, the experiencer, if such a "thing" exists, would be pure, undifferentiated consciousness, I think. It is examining itself through a kind of lens, and imagining itself to be limited and surrounded by multiplicity. This is how I figure.

Bergson suggests that consciousness unnecessary for the biological entity is blocked. But the blocked consciousness would surely be conscious, no?

Er, not sure.

So basically this is a claim withing Materialism, rather than an alternative.

I would suggest that it is the objective of pure, undifferentiated consciousness to create the experience of materialism, of physicality, for itself. This is its intention.

Don't bet on it. I think I have a Z80 between my ears. Not quick, but it can get there eventually.

Mine charges around the place a bit! It probably needs servicing.

Nick

[RandFan]

Rant away. It's cool.

Working as a therapist, the principle aim is to "get people to identify" and to me that is what you are talking about here. You're coming from the same point of view. I think it's good.

There is still, however, the accessible truth that finally you are not the body, the feelings, or the thoughts. Whilst identification with these things remains, you must follow, and the experience of "being" these things - this personality - will be sustained. To me this is the mechanism that is used to grow the personality - through identification with thought individuation is facilitated. But if and when individuation completes, there will be a let-go. When identification is no longer needed, it will drop away.

NickThanks. I don't know if the language is simply esoteric or I'm just dumb. Sorry, I haven't a clue what you are talking about.

[Mercutio]

Rant away. It's cool.

Working as a therapist, the principle aim is to "get people to identify" and to me that is what you are talking about here. You're coming from the same point of view. I think it's good.
I know this wasn't addressed to me, but I wanted to address something you wrote below. Oh, and I only have a Ph. D. in experimental psych, and not much (but some) clinical experience, but you have a very different principal aim than I ever did.

There is still, however, the accessible truth that finally you are not the body, the feelings, or the thoughts. Whilst identification with these things remains, you must follow, and the experience of "being" these things - this personality - will be sustained. To me this is the mechanism that is used to grow the personality - through identification with thought individuation is facilitated. But if and when individuation completes, there will be a let-go. When identification is no longer needed, it will drop away.

NickWhere you say "accessible truth", please consider "bare assertion". Calling it a truth is asserting your conclusions prematurely. Whether or not it is a truth is, frankly, the very heart of the "hard problem"; the question assumes that you are not the body, the feelings, or the thoughts... then asks how the body "gives rise to" something that is not (by bare assertion) the body, the feelings, or the thoughts.

Again, it is a "hard problem" because the question asks for a dualistic answer to be phrased monistically. It is not so much a hard problem as a poorly phrased problem.

[Dancing David]

I am speechless and not going to comment on the value of some forms of un-proven therapies that waste peoples time and money.

Research based only rules!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What is there that is not consciousness? What experience, what object, what thought, what feeling?
The continuity of the world between the times you experience it.

How can you explain the continuity of your backyard between the times you stare out at it from a window? It clearly exhibits remarkable continuity, yet you were not conscious of it at all between those times.

~~ Paul

[RandFan]

Rant away. It's cool.

Working as a therapist, the principle aim is to "get people to identify" and to me that is what you are talking about here. You're coming from the same point of view. I think it's good.

There is still, however, the accessible truth that finally you are not the body, the feelings, or the thoughts. Whilst identification with these things remains, you must follow, and the experience of "being" these things - this personality - will be sustained. To me this is the mechanism that is used to grow the personality - through identification with thought individuation is facilitated. But if and when individuation completes, there will be a let-go. When identification is no longer needed, it will drop away.I've thought about this some and while I'm still not 100% clear I'm not sure what it has to do with anything I posted. I'm not sure why you responded to me if you were simply going to ignore my points and pat me on the head as if everything I said fit within and confirmed your world view.

I really don't think that it does.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, the scenario I'm suggesting is that all is consciousness, and that the human brain (as it appears to the mind, in consciousness), is merely filtering pure consciousness and creating from it the sensation of multiplicity, the sensation of limited form. Thus my statement "all is consciousness" is the articulating of a position.





Hmm, this seems to imply some form of dualism. If all is consciousness, then this includes those things that we call material objects in addition to thoughts, perceptions, feelings. Now, it may be that everything is consciousness, but that would imply that our brains don't filter it, but that our brains (which are consciousness as much as rocks) must somehow produce what we experience as consciousness through brain processes. If the brain, which is commonly referred to as material, simply filters consciousness, then there are at least two types of things, or two properties in the universe. Since the material world has a particular type of property and consciousness/thought another, if they are both the same thing, but the one does not produce the other, then you seem to be engaged in property dualism.

One of the reasons that materialism works as a monistic world-view is because it does not fall into this trap. We now know enough to reframe the "hard problem" in non-dualistic terms, so that it disappears. As Merc has already said so well the "problem" exists because of the way it is framed. Materilistic monism has the brain produce consciousness as an action/behavior and so does not engage in property dualism.

[Nick227]

I've thought about this some and while I'm still not 100% clear I'm not sure what it has to do with anything I posted. I'm not sure why you responded to me if you were simply going to ignore my points and pat me on the head as if everything I said fit within and confirmed your world view.

I really don't think that it does.

It's not my intention to pat you on the head.

I was recently very sick and in the hospital. No matter how much I wanted to pretend that I was a disembodied spirit and could escape the hell of an elevated white blood cell count I still was violently ill, vomited, shook and just felt like hell. Reality can be a bitch.

Of course there is always the closed room experiment. For those who think that there is anything significant to out of body experiences I suggest that we lock them in a room without food and toilet. When they realize that it is all a bunch of BS we let them out. Sadly, some people will actually go to the point of death.

Sorry for the rant but I for one am not much for make believe. It was fine as a child but I don't see the point anymore.

To me you're here talking about identification - the creation of the sensation of personal selfhood through identification with thought. Wanting to dissociate from pain, wanting to identify with out-of-body experiences - this to me is about identification.

Whilst there is identification with body, feelings, thoughts, the mindset will always be "This is who I am and all the rest is BS." This mindset is created by the force of identification. The feeling is - this thought is MINE, that is how it IS. Yet there is no actual "I" to whom any of these beliefs refer. The mind and body are just machines carrying out processing tasks. They have no innate need of a personal "I." It's just being created for them by an unconscious process. When that process drops off a bit, when it has driven the body and mind into fuller selfhood, then it can let go.

Don't know if this helps any. I feel like I'm lecturing a bit.

Nick

[Nick227]

Hmm, this seems to imply some form of dualism. If all is consciousness, then this includes those things that we call material objects in addition to thoughts, perceptions, feelings. Now, it may be that everything is consciousness, but that would imply that our brains don't filter it, but that our brains (which are consciousness as much as rocks) must somehow produce what we experience as consciousness through brain processes. If the brain, which is commonly referred to as material, simply filters consciousness, then there are at least two types of things, or two properties in the universe. Since the material world has a particular type of property and consciousness/thought another, if they are both the same thing, but the one does not produce the other, then you seem to be engaged in property dualism.

Well, I think the issue is more one of terminology. If all is consciousness, then one can either say that a thought is equally real as a brain, or that there are layers of manifest creation. Either way it doesn't intrinsically need to be overtly dualistic. What the brain finally is, as opposed to how it appears to itself, is hard to determine anyway.

One of the reasons that materialism works as a monistic world-view is because it does not fall into this trap. We now know enough to reframe the "hard problem" in non-dualistic terms, so that it disappears. As Merc has already said so well the "problem" exists because of the way it is framed. Materilistic monism has the brain produce consciousness as an action/behavior and so does not engage in property dualism.

Well, to do this it would also need to produce selfhood as well. But as we both already agree that it does this, there's no problem there. Personally I think materialism is basically a good philosophy. As I see it, the intention of consciousness is to give itself a materialist experience. I'm a rebel, basically!

Nick

[Nick227]

I know this wasn't addressed to me, but I wanted to address something you wrote below. Oh, and I only have a Ph. D. in experimental psych, and not much (but some) clinical experience, but you have a very different principal aim than I ever did.

In what way? I'm interested.

Working with clients one of the principle things is to get them to access and own what's going on inside of them (subconscious processes). This is working with identification.

Where you say "accessible truth", please consider "bare assertion". Calling it a truth is asserting your conclusions prematurely.

I'm saying the truth may only be subjectively experienced. You may consider that only objectively demonstrable truths have meaning or validity. That's fair enough. I'm not so bothered. I'm interested in truth, regardless of whether it may be objectively demonstrated to others or not.

I called what I said an "accessible truth" because you have the option to check it out for yourself. You won't be able to demonstrate it to anybody else, that's the nature of introspective endeavours. However, once you see it I very much doubt you'll forget it, and I doubt even more that you will feel quite the same about objectivity in future.

Nick

[Nick227]

The continuity of the world between the times you experience it.

How can you explain the continuity of your backyard between the times you stare out at it from a window? It clearly exhibits remarkable continuity, yet you were not conscious of it at all between those times.

~~ Paul

Why should it change? Do things usually move about by themselves in your experience?

Nick

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why should it change? Do things usually move about by themselves in your experience?
You said:

What is there that is not consciousness? What experience, what object, what thought, what feeling?
The continuity of your backyard is not maintained by consciousness. If it were, and you did not pay constant attention, it would change at random or disappear altogether.

Perhaps you mean to ask "What experience is there that is not consciousness?"

~~ Paul

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, I think the issue is more one of terminology. If all is consciousness, then one can either say that a thought is equally real as a brain, or that there are layers of manifest creation. Either way it doesn't intrinsically need to be overtly dualistic. What the brain finally is, as opposed to how it appears to itself, is hard to determine anyway.



Well, to do this it would also need to produce selfhood as well. But as we both already agree that it does this, there's no problem there. Personally I think materialism is basically a good philosophy. As I see it, the intention of consciousness is to give itself a materialist experience. I'm a rebel, basically!

Nick



The problem as I see it is that we have no good explanation as to why consciousness appears as consciousness and as the material world. Why these two very different properties? It seems that we would need some sort of very good explanation. Otherwise, this is just dualism in disguise. Materialism supplies a good, though admittedly, very incomplete, as it relates to consciousness, explanation.

[Moochie]

It convinced me before I avoided the addiction that consciousness is biochemical in nature. LSD hangs onto the seortonin receptor and won't let go, psylocibin latches and loosens, they both produce the serotonin cascade. I was an addict (strange but true) for 3 years to those two. I didn't realise I was addicted but I was, I was also looking for the serotonin rush.(A very bad form of self medication as it made the panic attacks worse) The most interesting was when i ate about 5 ounces of morning glory seed that I harvested and saved. They taste truely horrible for one and then they don't do the same as the LSD, it is longer lasting and more subtle, it also gave me rainbows in my night vision for about twenty years. (They stopped about a year ago.)

The alternate realities of drug use and shamanism are interesting, especially the shamanic ones, I really do recommend doing what the bigfoot kooks do, go sit all night in a quiet and very dark forest. You will find some interesting things in your self when you do that. Yet when I apply the standard of replication and reductionsism to those kinds of experience, I find no evidence that biochemistry isn't the root of consciousness. But all the magical thinking i had before my drug use, amplified by drug use, and present after I quit has all gone away. Thanks to Zoloft, no more magical associations, no more insomnia, no more compulsions and obsession.

I like this reality alot, I miss the magical associations sometimes, but i do not miss obsession and panic attacks.

That and working with people with persistant and severe mental illness for ten years.

Zoloft did nothing for me. Nor did Prozac and Effexor. That's not to say they can't be effective for some, but I think medicos have to stop living in that "one size fits all" mentality, because it clearly does not.

I don't know why I "see the world darkly," I just do, and appeals I've encountered from (sometimes) well-meaning people to try this or that "magical cure" just aggravate things, to the point that a quart of vodka seems like a good idea.

I've yet to meet one person who knows, or at least can realistically approximate, just how I feel. I don't think such a person exists, or perhaps they're just adept at hiding themselves. Hiding seems to be a key survival mechanism among us.

As for antidepressants, it looks to me like those not affected by it are calling the shots as to what can be seriously trialled and what can't, and this is totally wrong, in my opinion.

There are pharmacological substances that offer glimmers of hope, yet are ruled out of contention by people who seem to neither know or care about depression or those affected by it. One can only suspect that such people are working on illogic, at best, or plain greed at worst. I go toward the latter. It makes a heap more sense when the evidence is subjected to Occam's Razor.

M.

[RandFan]

It's not my intention to pat you on the head.

To me you're here talking about identification - the creation of the sensation of personal selfhood through identification with thought. Wanting to dissociate from pain, wanting to identify with out-of-body experiences - this to me is about identification.

Whilst there is identification with body, feelings, thoughts, the mindset will always be "This is who I am and all the rest is BS." This mindset is created by the force of identification. The feeling is - this thought is MINE, that is how it IS. Yet there is no actual "I" to whom any of these beliefs refer. The mind and body are just machines carrying out processing tasks. They have no innate need of a personal "I." It's just being created for them by an unconscious process. When that process drops off a bit, when it has driven the body and mind into fuller selfhood, then it can let go.

Don't know if this helps any. I feel like I'm lecturing a bit. I'm not sure if it helps or not. I'm not sure you understand my point but then I'm not sure how much I care.

I'm only trying to relate to you that reality isn't changed by mumbo-jumbo. You might be able to change a person's perception but that's it. Reality doesn't go away based on a person's world view.

FTR, I really don't care if there is an "I" or not. I don't care if what we think of as self is simply an illusion or if in fact there is a homunculus though I seriously doubt that. Don't get me wrong, I think learning all I can about cognition and the science behind the mind is cool and I like to discuss philosophically the concept of free will or the lack thereof and ego and all of the other fun things but I'm not emotionally invested in my sense of self beyond my own personal want for well being. It seems to me that far too many people are too caught up in their "identification". It's really not that big of a deal.

[Dancing David]

You said:

The continuity of your backyard is not maintained by consciousness. If it were, and you did not pay constant attention, it would change at random or disappear altogether.

Perhaps you mean to ask "What experience is there that is not consciousness?"

~~ Paul


No, if you have this uber-consciousnes, that there is no evidence for and a lot like the magic sky pixie, well then you aren't the one that has to be conscious because there is the grass, and the rocks and the bugs and even if they weren't there; there is always the vague and wonderfull mystery consciousness.

[Dancing David]

Zoloft did nothing for me. Nor did Prozac and Effexor. That's not to say they can't be effective for some, but I think medicos have to stop living in that "one size fits all" mentality, because it clearly does not.

I don't know why I "see the world darkly," I just do, and appeals I've encountered from (sometimes) well-meaning people to try this or that "magical cure" just aggravate things, to the point that a quart of vodka seems like a good idea.

I've yet to meet one person who knows, or at least can realistically approximate, just how I feel. I don't think such a person exists, or perhaps they're just adept at hiding themselves. Hiding seems to be a key survival mechanism among us.

As for antidepressants, it looks to me like those not affected by it are calling the shots as to what can be seriously trialled and what can't, and this is totally wrong, in my opinion.

There are pharmacological substances that offer glimmers of hope, yet are ruled out of contention by people who seem to neither know or care about depression or those affected by it. One can only suspect that such people are working on illogic, at best, or plain greed at worst. I go toward the latter. It makes a heap more sense when the evidence is subjected to Occam's Razor.

M.

I hope you get to feeling better.

I don't think that SSRIs are a panacea.

[Nick227]

The problem as I see it is that we have no good explanation as to why consciousness appears as consciousness and as the material world. Why these two very different properties? It seems that we would need some sort of very good explanation. Otherwise, this is just dualism in disguise. Materialism supplies a good, though admittedly, very incomplete, as it relates to consciousness, explanation.

But it is not appearing as consciousness. You can't place pure consciousness as one element of an objective system and then call it dualism. It is not really dualism. Signal and ground is not really dualism. Not when you can't anyway escape from the ground, when everything is arising out of the ground, is an aspect of the ground, when actually you are the ground.

Whenever a term like "pure consciousness" is used there is an inevitable tendency to regard it now as a concept, and apply to it rules that may be applied to other concepts. But it is not a concept. The concept, the words, are pointing at nothing.

Materialism can be the basis for a good personal life philosophy, but it will never be a map of reality, except to the extent that it can be believed to be as such.

Nick

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Whenever a term like "pure consciousness" is used there is an inevitable tendency to regard it now as a concept, and apply to it rules that may be applied to other concepts. But it is not a concept. The concept, the words, are pointing at nothing.
Then how is it different from "vacuum state" or "pure existence" or any other term used to describe the potential for something without the something?

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

You said:

The continuity of your backyard is not maintained by consciousness. If it were, and you did not pay constant attention, it would change at random or disappear altogether.

Perhaps you mean to ask "What experience is there that is not consciousness?"

~~ Paul

You mean someone imagining a scenario which seems to them to prove that not everything is consciousness? Where is this imagining going on? What is it? It is consciousness. What is there that is not consciousness? When have you ever escaped from consciousness? Maybe you don't have some memories, but when have you ever been not here now? Tell me.

Nick

[Nick227]

Then how is it different from "vacuum state" or "pure existence" or any other term used to describe the potential for something without the something?

~~ Paul

Whenever you create a concept for some notion of a "ground of being", some notion of "pure consciousness", whatever, you are essentially denying what you are putting forth. You are creating a conceptual model for something which, by definition, cannot be conceptualised. It's a collosal mind****, a clinging to dualism. I cling to dualism because materialism does not fit my experience.

Nick

[RandFan]

I cling to dualism because materialism does not fit my experience.In what way does it not fit your experience?

[PixyMisa]

When Nick talks about his "experience", what he means is "not experience". Things he believes but has no objective evidence for whatsoever. (Such as the mystical alchemical order of immortal illuminati that rules the world, to pick an example entirely at random...)

So that sentence basically translates into "I cling to dualism because materialism does not fit my beliefs." Or, more simply, "I believe in dualism."

[RandFan]

When Nick talks about his "experience", what he means is "not experience". Things he believes but has no objective evidence for whatsoever. (Such as the mystical alchemical order of immortal illuminati that rules the world, to pick an example entirely at random...)

So that sentence basically translates into "I cling to dualism because materialism does not fit my beliefs." Or, more simply, "I believe in dualism." Thanks Pixy. Reality is too much for some to take I guess.

[Nick227]

In what way does it not fit your experience?

It's hard to describe but I am aware of a basic sensation of a kind of presence in non-reflective observation of thought. Where I struggle with materialism is that I am aware that without thought there is no personality. There is the experience of a body, feelings and thoughts but there is awareness that these are somewhat on the surface and only through identification is there the experience of them having some seemingly concrete existence. The ego is constantly constructed through identification. The brain is doing a lot of the constructing but I doubt that its physical aspects are all there is. Of course, to all intents and purposes, it is impossible to objectively demonstrate this. Such is life. But, like I said, I don't associate the level of value to objectivity many on this list do. My experience is that most truths are subjective in nature.

Nick

[Nick227]

When Nick talks about his "experience", what he means is "not experience". Things he believes but has no objective evidence for whatsoever. (Such as the mystical alchemical order of immortal illuminati that rules the world, to pick an example entirely at random...)

Well, I like to put my ideas out!

So that sentence basically translates into "I cling to dualism because materialism does not fit my beliefs." Or, more simply, "I believe in dualism."

I don't believe in dualism. I am dualist. I believe in non-dualism, which as anyone who understands the full ramifications of non-dualism appreciates, usually means I am Dualist.

Nick

[Ichneumonwasp]

But it is not appearing as consciousness. You can't place pure consciousness as one element of an objective system and then call it dualism. It is not really dualism. Signal and ground is not really dualism. Not when you can't anyway escape from the ground, when everything is arising out of the ground, is an aspect of the ground, when actually you are the ground.

Whenever a term like "pure consciousness" is used there is an inevitable tendency to regard it now as a concept, and apply to it rules that may be applied to other concepts. But it is not a concept. The concept, the words, are pointing at nothing.

Materialism can be the basis for a good personal life philosophy, but it will never be a map of reality, except to the extent that it can be believed to be as such.

Nick

Perhaps I have misunderstood you. I thought that your idea was that pure consciousness was the ground of being and that our human consciousness was a very filtered version of that purer consciousness. We can sometimes access that pure consciousness as pure consciousness (instead of our limited, filtered human consciousness) through certain types of experiences -- drugs, "mystical" journeys, etc.

If I have that correct, then you have this pure consciousness not only performing two functions -- ground and signal -- but it has two fundamentally different properties. I thought I understood you to say that consciousness was not reducible to what we view as the material world -- that brains cannot explain consciousness. If that is the case, then you have clearly engaged in a form of property dualism. One entity not being reducible to the other, even in theory, means that there are at minimum two irreducible properties in the universe if not two separate substances.

Materialism is not necessarily a map of reality, yes, but depending on what we mean by materialism. Since I haven't the foggiest notion what matter is, and since quantum mechanics may be telling us that reality simply isn't, I think materialism tells us that older version of materialism are not maps of reality. It may be telling us that reality isn't, at least in the old ways of describing reality.


ETA:

Whoops, I guess I should have read your later posts, which obviate the need for this post. Sorry.

[Dancing David]

When Nick talks about his "experience", what he means is "not experience". Things he believes but has no objective evidence for whatsoever. (Such as the mystical alchemical order of immortal illuminati that rules the world, to pick an example entirely at random...)

So that sentence basically translates into "I cling to dualism because materialism does not fit my beliefs." Or, more simply, "I believe in dualism."

I have found that he strongly opposes any discussion of possible objective frames of existance.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You mean someone imagining a scenario which seems to them to prove that not everything is consciousness? Where is this imagining going on? What is it? It is consciousness. What is there that is not consciousness? When have you ever escaped from consciousness? Maybe you don't have some memories, but when have you ever been not here now? Tell me.
This is what there is that is not consciousness: The continuity of my backyard. My consciousness is not involved in maintaining that continuity. Are you suggesting that it is, but I simply can't remember? If I can't remember, why should I assume that it was my consciousness?

~~ Paul

[PixyMisa]

Well, I like to put my ideas out!
Can't hold that against you. ;)

I don't believe in dualism. I am dualist. I believe in non-dualism, which as anyone who understands the full ramifications of non-dualism appreciates, usually means I am Dualist.
Have you met Doronshadmi? I think the two of you would get on like a house on fire.

[Ichneumonwasp]

This is what there is that is not consciousness: The continuity of my backyard. My consciousness is not involved in maintaining that continuity. Are you suggesting that it is, but I simply can't remember? If I can't remember, why should I assume that it was my consciousness?

~~ Paul

I think he is saying that pure consciousness, the ground of being, maintains that continuity. I could be wrong, though.

Our individual consciousnesses, from what I gather, are filtered versions of pure consciousness. But that is dualism -- this pure consciousness is both consciousness and the material world.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I think he is saying that pure consciousness, the ground of being, maintains that continuity. I could be wrong, though.
Sure, but it could just as well be pure lemon jello.

Our individual consciousnesses, from what I gather, are filtered versions of pure consciousness. But that is dualism -- this pure consciousness is both consciousness and the material world.
That's dualism? I thought the idea that everything is a form of consciousness is idealism. Dualism says there really is material stuff and mental stuff.

~~ Paul

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sure, but it could just as well be pure lemon jello.

Yep.


That's dualism? I thought the idea that everything is a form of consciousness is idealism. Dualism says there really is material stuff and mental stuff.

~~ Paul

If you want to hold onto consciousness as consciousness and have it create the material world, then it is property dualism. Idealism says that consciousness underlies it all, but if they want to be consistent, then our human consciousness must arise through what we see as materialism (so it is a result of the pure consciousness rather than being a reflection of it). Trying to hold onto pure consciousness as pure consciousness and as the cause of the material world, this must be some form of dualism -- not necessarily substance dualism, but at least property dualism.

Most of the time Hammy would agree to this, but at other times he also flirted with property dualism. When it comes down to it, if monism is correct, we shouldn't be able to tell if the ur-substance is material, ideal, or lemon curry.

[Nick227]

This is what there is that is not consciousness: The continuity of my backyard. My consciousness is not involved in maintaining that continuity. Are you suggesting that it is, but I simply can't remember? If I can't remember, why should I assume that it was my consciousness?

~~ Paul

I'm saying that there is no aspect of the scenario you are putting out that is not consciousness. You do not know what or how the backyard is whilst you are not observing it. The notion that some inference can be drawn from how it later appears to be is itself merely arising in consciousness.

Nick

[Nick227]

Perhaps I have misunderstood you. I thought that your idea was that pure consciousness was the ground of being and that our human consciousness was a very filtered version of that purer consciousness.

Yes. It is of course important here to understand the difference between that which the phrase "pure consciousness" points at and the phrase itself.


We can sometimes access that pure consciousness as pure consciousness (instead of our limited, filtered human consciousness) through certain types of experiences -- drugs, "mystical" journeys, etc.

Yes, pretty much. Also it appears that it can sometimes be accessed as some form of higher dimensional or archetypal realm, giving rise to all manner of spiritual beliefs and cosmologies.

If I have that correct, then you have this pure consciousness not only performing two functions -- ground and signal -- but it has two fundamentally different properties. I thought I understood you to say that consciousness was not reducible to what we view as the material world -- that brains cannot explain consciousness.

I am saying, and it's not easy for me to articulate it, that what is experienced is essentially the difference between pure consciousness and the action of the brain upon pure consciousness. You are pure consciousness. That which is experienced is filtered consciousness.

If that is the case, then you have clearly engaged in a form of property dualism. One entity not being reducible to the other, even in theory, means that there are at minimum two irreducible properties in the universe if not two separate substances.

I'm not completely clear here but I think you are looking at the finger and not where it's pointing. You cannot create a meaningful concept for pure consciousness. So all terms, symbols, ideas, whatever here are merely signposts.

For example, non-dualism and dualism are not in opposition. The latter arises out of the former.

Whoops, I guess I should have read your later posts, which obviate the need for this post. Sorry.

I just did the same.

Nick

[Nick227]

If you want to hold onto consciousness as consciousness and have it create the material world, then it is property dualism. Idealism says that consciousness underlies it all, but if they want to be consistent, then our human consciousness must arise through what we see as materialism (so it is a result of the pure consciousness rather than being a reflection of it). Trying to hold onto pure consciousness as pure consciousness and as the cause of the material world, this must be some form of dualism -- not necessarily substance dualism, but at least property dualism.


IMO this is not really property dualism as, according to the theory, all of this is simply arising out of pure consciousness - the thoughts, the terms, the concepts, the beliefs, the interpretations, this dialogue. There is nothing which is not pure consciousness and is not non-dual. It is simply that pure consciousness is creating this experience of duality for itself.

Articulated as a theory it must inevitably have dualistic aspects. But the theory is just a signpost.

Nick

[Mercutio]

I'm saying the truth may only be subjectively experienced.
How, then, do you know it is the truth? Or do you simply define it as truth?
You may consider that only objectively demonstrable truths have meaning or validity. That's fair enough. I do not. I am a pragmatist; "truth" is not something that can be demonstrated, so I will settle for practical use and explanatory value. All of reality may well be material, or ideal, and it would not bother me a bit. On the other hand, dualism (both flavors that Ich-Wasp spoke of) is a fatally flawed bit of hand-waving and assuming of conclusions.
I'm not so bothered. I'm interested in truth, regardless of whether it may be objectively demonstrated to others or not.
Fascinating. Do you realize that it also cannot be demonstrated to yourself? Or, again, do you simply define your perception as truth, thus making it trivially true?

I called what I said an "accessible truth" because you have the option to check it out for yourself.I would simply call it "private", but recognize that even the access that I have is not the full picture. It cannot be.
You won't be able to demonstrate it to anybody else, that's the nature of introspective endeavours. That is the nature of private experience--but of course, we can compare with other forms of experience, and greatly increase our own self-knowledge. There may be no "objective", but of course that does not matter unless one is a dualist. There is an intersubjective agreement that will have to do, though, and this gives us an additional perspective which we can either ignore (as you appear to) or attempt to reconcile with our private experience. For instance, the introspective "truth" you claim can easily be shown to be very different from how it appears. We typically experience a unified perception of, say, a friend's face, but of course we process different parts (color, distance, recognition, memory, shape, name, face-ness, and more...) in different brain pathways, with never a place where it all comes together. There is no unified image, no unified percept, no unified thought.

So, which is the "truth"? What you perceive by yourself? What you perceive along with the intersubjective community? Something more than that? Less than any of these?
However, once you see it I very much doubt you'll forget it, and I doubt even more that you will feel quite the same about objectivity in future.

Nick We change constantly; feeling different about pretty much anything is a safe bet. Oh--did you mean I might come to agree with you? I think I know too much about our sensory, perceptual, cognitive and memory systems to take that big a step back. You can't unring a bell...

[PixyMisa]

I'm saying that there is no aspect of the scenario you are putting out that is not consciousness. You do not know what or how the backyard is whilst you are not observing it. The notion that some inference can be drawn from how it later appears to be is itself merely arising in consciousness.
The problem with this is that it's total rubbish.

We know where consciousness, as in human awareness, self-awareness, perception, thought, comes from, and it comes from the human brain. There is no possible rational argument to the contrary; it's like arguing that apples don't grow on apple trees.

Everything, always, acts as though the material is what is real. Nothing, ever, acts as though human consciousness is what is real. Your garden, always, exhibits continuity between observations. Everything does. To argue as you do is to invert all of human experience and understanding on a whim.

That doesn't directly address the fundamental nature of the universe, but if the fundamental nature is anything other than material, then that has to give rise to the material, which in turn gives rise to human consciousness.

You can't assume human consciousness as the fundamental nature of the universe, because that's simply not what we observe. You can talk of something else, immaterial, as the basis for reality, but you can't use the word consciousness for it, because we've seen that, and that ain't it.

[RandFan]

It's hard to describe but I am aware of a basic sensation of a kind of presence in non-reflective observation of thought. Where I struggle with materialism is that I am aware that without thought there is no personality. There is the experience of a body, feelings and thoughts but there is awareness that these are somewhat on the surface and only through identification is there the experience of them having some seemingly concrete existence. The ego is constantly constructed through identification. The brain is doing a lot of the constructing but I doubt that its physical aspects are all there is. Of course, to all intents and purposes, it is impossible to objectively demonstrate this. Such is life. But, like I said, I don't associate the level of value to objectivity many on this list do. My experience is that most truths are subjective in nature. I don't get the idea of "most"? If we construct a disjunction we have materialism and non-materialism (idealism, monism, dualism, pluralism, etc.) With the exception of pluralism (perhaps) I don't know of a philosophy that would encompass your beliefs. You don't reject the physical world nor do you completely reject objectivity you just seem to place most truths outside of the realm of objectivity.

I'm not certain that your philosophy is coherent.

[Moochie]

I'm saying that there is no aspect of the scenario you are putting out that is not consciousness. You do not know what or how the backyard is whilst you are not observing it. The notion that some inference can be drawn from how it later appears to be is itself merely arising in consciousness.

Nick

Is there any way we can apply this so that my overgrown backyard is un-overgrown? I mean, are there any practical aspects to knowing all this stuff?

M.

[PixyMisa]

Is there any way we can apply this so that my overgrown backyard is un-overgrown?
Sure. You just imagine that it's un-overgrown. Which doesn't change the garden, of course, but you can be happy as long as you are careful to avoid actually looking at it.

I mean, are there any practical aspects to knowing all this stuff?
Not so much, no.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm saying that there is no aspect of the scenario you are putting out that is not consciousness. You do not know what or how the backyard is whilst you are not observing it. The notion that some inference can be drawn from how it later appears to be is itself merely arising in consciousness.
I agree that the notion is arising in (what we call) consciousness. Nevertheless, my backyard is consistent over time even though I was not conscious of it. You have no basis upon which to assume that consciousness had anything to do with maintaining that consistency.

~~ Paul

[rocketdodger]

I agree that the notion is arising in (what we call) consciousness. Nevertheless, my backyard is consistent over time even though I was not conscious of it. You have no basis upon which to assume that consciousness had anything to do with maintaining that consistency.

~~ Paul

Sure he does -- if everything is his consciousness, then clearly it must have had everything to do with maintaining that consistency.

Of course the problem with Nick's outlook (which nobody seems to have brought up, curiously) is that it implies the other consciousnesses with which he interacts everyday (in particular, you, I, and the rest of us) are merely subjective figments of his own imagination. So in essence, Nick's pure unfiltered consciousness generated these words everyone is reading, and his "filtered" consciousness is tricked into thinking I actually wrote them -- when in reality, it is all in his head. This would make a good novel, if you ask me.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sure he does -- if everything is his consciousness, then clearly it must have had everything to do with maintaining that consistency.
But the consistency of his backyard is not in his consciousness. He does not think about it continuously.


Of course the problem with Nick's outlook (which nobody seems to have brought up, curiously) is that it implies the other consciousnesses with which he interacts everyday (in particular, you, I, and the rest of us) are merely subjective figments of his own imagination. So in essence, Nick's pure unfiltered consciousness generated these words everyone is reading, and his "filtered" consciousness is tricked into thinking I actually wrote them -- when in reality, it is all in his head. This would make a good novel, if you ask me.
I don't think Nick is a solipsist. I think he's just claiming that everything is consciousness at its root.

~~ Paul

[RandFan]

I don't think Nick is a solipsist. I think he's just claiming that everything is consciousness at its root. I agree but Dodger has a point. If I come over to your house and look into your back yard am I likely to observe the same objective reality as you? If everything is consciousness then how are my perceptions and your perceptions of what is otherwise known as objective reality the same? We've come to the point that we have to face up to the consequences of Nick's philosophy and resolve it or write it off as incoherent. I think Nick wants to have his cake and eat it too which is why he hedges and says "most truths are subjective in nature".

[Mercutio]

But the consistency of his backyard is not in his consciousness. He does not think about it continuously.
It does not have to be in his consciousness. It is in the unfiltered consciousness.

I don't think Nick is a solipsist. I think he's just claiming that everything is consciousness at its root.

~~ PaulYup. As did a few others around here. Some more consistently than others.

For any who want an extraordinarily well-written version of an idealist stance (though an atypical one), I suggest hunting down Mary Calkins' "The philosophical credo of an absolutistic personalist". Sadly, it does not appear to exist online.

[Mercutio]

I agree but Dodger has a point. If I come over to your house and look into your back yard am I likely to observe the same objective reality as you?
Sure--because the same unfiltered consciousness is being filtered through each of your subjectivities.

All it requires is the assumption of this unfiltered consciousness in the first place. Just as materialism requires the assumption of a real material world.

[RandFan]

Sure--because the same unfiltered consciousness is being filtered through each of your subjectivities.

All it requires is the assumption of this unfiltered consciousness in the first place. Just as materialism requires the assumption of a real material world.Got it. If I'm wearing rose color glasses and Paul is wearing yellow we are seeing the same thing but simply percieving it differently. What if we describe it the same?

[Mercutio]

Got it. If I'm wearing rose color glasses and Paul is wearing yellow we are seeing the same thing but simply percieving it differently. What if we describe it the same?
To a great extent, you should, actually. Much of what we perceive as color is determined not simply by wavelength, but also by contrast with surrounding colors. If we learn colors by association with public referents (which we do) rather than by some ideal understanding of a qualia, then you will learn with your rose-colored glasses, and Paul with his yellow, the precise same labels for the colors I see with no glasses.

(And the cool thing is, once you take the glasses off, you will likely adjust and still see things relatively normally. Pay attention next time you wear tinted sunglasses--eventually everything seems normal, looking odd for a bit once you take the glasses off, and returning to normal in a short while.)

This is the case whether the ontological reality is material or ideal. I suspect that some here remember what I said a while ago about ontology...

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sure--because the same unfiltered consciousness is being filtered through each of your subjectivities.

All it requires is the assumption of this unfiltered consciousness in the first place. Just as materialism requires the assumption of a real material world.


I still maintain that the presence of the unfiltered consciousness and the filter that is created by the unfiltered consciousness admits property dualism at the very least.

[Mercutio]

I still maintain that the presence of the unfiltered consciousness and the filter that is created by the unfiltered consciousness admits property dualism at the very least.

I agree. Meant to say that, earlier. Of course, I have also accused some materialists here of de facto dualism, so such things are not limited to idealists.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I agree. Meant to say that, earlier. Of course, I have also accused some materialists here of de facto dualism, so such things are not limited to idealists.

Yes, indeed. Maintaining a purely monistic stance is one of the harder tasks one can set. I admire Robin and you and Paul and cyborg for keeping it up so well. I slip into dualistic language all the time.

[RandFan]

To a great extent, you should, actually. Much of what we perceive as color is determined not simply by wavelength, but also by contrast with surrounding colors. If we learn colors by association with public referents (which we do) rather than by some ideal understanding of a qualia, then you will learn with your rose-colored glasses, and Paul with his yellow, the precise same labels for the colors I see with no glasses.

(And the cool thing is, once you take the glasses off, you will likely adjust and still see things relatively normally. Pay attention next time you wear tinted sunglasses--eventually everything seems normal, looking odd for a bit once you take the glasses off, and returning to normal in a short while.)

This is the case whether the ontological reality is material or ideal. I suspect that some here remember what I said a while ago about ontology... I didn't mean concerning color though I can easily see how color is such a great example and how that can be carried over to other perceptions.

What if both of us see what we each label a bicycle in the backyard? Can that be dismissed simply as a shared label? What if what Paul labels as a bicycle is what I would see as a tree stump?

So the next day we both see someone riding to work on what we each label as a bicycle. Is it possible for me to see someone riding to work on a tree stump or is the idea that the continuity doesn't work that way? I'm confused.

Color is easy but the hypothesis, it seems to me, breaks down when it comes to complex objects that we must interact with. Paul might see a bird flying south for the winter and I might see my sister going to grandmas house. If we all three end up at grandmas house later that evening what is it then that Paul sees? Is it that there really is no continuity? Paul's filter simply adjusts to account for inconsistencies?

Sorry for all of the questions. I didn't see your earlier posts on ontology and I suspect I didn't pay attention in Philosophy class as much as I should have or my memory has failed me again.

[rocketdodger]

Sure--because the same unfiltered consciousness is being filtered through each of your subjectivities.

All it requires is the assumption of this unfiltered consciousness in the first place. Just as materialism requires the assumption of a real material world.

If one uses the most robust definition of materialism (brought up in recent threads) -- "everything can be mathematically modeled" or "everything can be scientifically observed" or "everything is based on the same underlying order" -- then doesn't materialism in fact encompass idealism?

I don't see any advantage to an arbitrary "unfiltered consciousness --> filtered consciousness" process, because it will need to mirror what materialists consider "physical" processes anyway. This seems to be just another case of renaming terms without gaining any actual information from it.

[Ichneumonwasp]

If one uses the most robust definition of materialism (brought up in recent threads) -- "everything can be mathematically modeled" or "everything can be scientifically observed" or "everything is based on the same underlying order" -- then doesn't materialism in fact encompass idealism?

I don't see any advantage to an arbitrary "unfiltered consciousness --> filtered consciousness" process, because it will need to mirror what materialists consider "physical" processes anyway. This seems to be just another case of renaming terms without gaining any actual information from it.

I caution to stick my nose into this, but I think it might be more proper to say that we should not be able to tell the difference between materialism and idealism as "different" monisms rather than one encompassing the other. The problem with Nick's scheme is that he does not seem to be consistent in his idealism, if idealism is the goal. He seems to want his cake and to eat it too, by having the unfiltered consciousness perform two separate tasks. But since he has identified as a dualist, he is then stuck with the typical dualist issues.

[Mercutio]

If one uses the most robust definition of materialism (brought up in recent threads) -- "everything can be mathematically modeled" or "everything can be scientifically observed" or "everything is based on the same underlying order" -- then doesn't materialism in fact encompass idealism?

I don't see any advantage to an arbitrary "unfiltered consciousness --> filtered consciousness" process, because it will need to mirror what materialists consider "physical" processes anyway. This seems to be just another case of renaming terms without gaining any actual information from it.

Wasp got it--either monism can explain the appearance of the other, and thus far neither one offers any advantage. The trick is, once you have assumed one (say, materialism), it explains the other so well that you forget that your own stance is based on an axiomatic assumption. It works both ways; hammy used to be adamant about his ~materialism, but was never able to explain why he found an advantage to it over materialism.

The problem is not in assuming a monism--it is in pretending to have assumed a monism, while maintaining an incoherent dualistic stance. And that is entirely too easy.

[Mercutio]

What if both of us see what we each label a bicycle in the backyard? Can that be dismissed simply as a shared label? What if what Paul labels as a bicycle is what I would see as a tree stump?

So the next day we both see someone riding to work on what we each label as a bicycle. Is it possible for me to see someone riding to work on a tree stump or is the idea that the continuity doesn't work that way? I'm confused.

Color is easy but the hypothesis, it seems to me, breaks down when it comes to complex objects that we must interact with. Paul might see a bird flying south for the winter and I might see my sister going to grandmas house. If we all three end up at grandmas house later that evening what is it then that Paul sees? Is it that there really is no continuity? Paul's filter simply adjusts to account for inconsistencies?
The trick here is, you are having to posit inconsistencies in order to ask the model to account for them. The model actually should have no inconsistencies, as there is a real world that is being perceived. The only trick here is whether that real world is material or ideal, ontologically, and that does not make a practical difference.

I may be wrong, but I suspect that your question assumes the "perception" part of a dualistic model, rather than "perception" as the fundamental reality. When you only take half of a model, it should not surprise that it does not make sense.

[Robin]

Could you explain to me what you mean by "the mind does not follow the laws of physics?"
Why are you asking me???!??? That is your claim - don't expect me to explain your own claim to you.
Does the mind follow the laws of physics anyway?
Well it certainly appears to, for reason I have given in large dollops. If it does not follow the laws of physics then what law does it follow?

[Robin]

It is not that non-duality disputes science per se, but it does somewhat diminish the value that can be attributed to it. If reality is non-dual then there is no isolated point from which a description of "how things are" can be intelligently be made. All description, all measurement, is simply arising like all other phenomena. All meaning attached to it also. None of it has any more or less a priori significance than say, a cat scratching its leg.
Seems to me you have just given a description of scientific empiricism

There is no isolated point in science. In science all measurement and description are phenomena just like any other. Science attaches no meaning to them, merely relationships, and nothing in science has any more or less a priori significance than a cat scratching its leg.

So it sounds like a perfect fit to me!

[Robin]

If one uses the most robust definition of materialism (brought up in recent threads) -- "everything can be mathematically modeled" or "everything can be scientifically observed" or "everything is based on the same underlying order" -- then doesn't materialism in fact encompass idealism?
Yes, although few Idealists would be happy with the idea that consciousness could be mathematically modelled. Idealists tend to cling to the idea that their metaphysic delivers them libertarian free will.

However Materialism has also traditionally included the claim that all mental phenomena can be explained in terms of non-mental phenomena and that would seem to distinguish it from Idealism.

[RandFan]

The trick here is, you are having to posit inconsistencies in order to ask the model to account for them. The model actually should have no inconsistencies, as there is a real world that is being perceived. The only trick here is whether that real world is material or ideal, ontologically, and that does not make a practical difference.

I may be wrong, but I suspect that your question assumes the "perception" part of a dualistic model, rather than "perception" as the fundamental reality. When you only take half of a model, it should not surprise that it does not make sense. Thanks. This all brings back memories of Lifegazer. I see no practical difference between idealism and materialism. I don't see a reason to chose one over the other. In any event, I still think Nick's philosophy incoherent but I could be wrong.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, although few Idealists would be happy with the idea that consciousness could be mathematically modelled. Idealists tend to cling to the idea that their metaphysic delivers them libertarian free will.

Yes. But that is because most of them are actually dualists in disguise. If they want to be consistent they need to posit that the only libertarian free will, if it is possible, exists in the mind of God (or ultimate consciousness), so it is not available to us. Monism is monism. Human free will exists in no monistic universe that I can comprehend (which may be my own failing, but I certainly cannot make philosophical sense of it). It is primarily posited in all those dualistic models that suppose they are merely ideal but are not.

However Materialism has also traditionally included the claim that all mental phenomena can be explained in terms of non-mental phenomena and that would seem to distinguish it from Idealism.

Distinguishable only in terms of opening stance. As far as what we observe, there cannot be a difference -- we must necessarily see mental phenomena explained in terms or non-mental phenomena. The difference is that materialism says, "There, that's the answer." Idealism says, "Wait, there's another step, since all those non-mental phenomena are really just mental phenomena within the Great Mind after all." The idealist stance seems attractive following Descartes' cogito, which concerns our epistemological quandaries (thought must exist); but it really only adds a new layer of explanation when closely examined. The attractiveness disappears when you realize that identifying the Great Mind with our minds results from a form of hidden dualism.

But, ultimately, I cannot see any way to distinguish between idealism and materialism, which is why I ascribe to monism but not to an ultimate ontology. Materialism, idealism, bleh, what difference does it make? The real issue is -- can anyone make sense of dualism or pluralism? If you can, then God and human free will are possible.

[Robin]

I still maintain that the presence of the unfiltered consciousness and the filter that is created by the unfiltered consciousness admits property dualism at the very least.
Absolutely, the idea that the brain performs a filtration, restraint or transmission function on consciousness is essentially a dualist theory as proposed by such philosophers as Bergson and James.

If consciousnessness is being filtered, restrained or transmitted then it stands to reason that something must be doing the filtration, retraint and transmission.

Nick is overlaying it on the Hindu tradition of Idealism. However since this tradition is, in turns, dualistic, Idealistic and Materialistic there is not much that you couldn't overlay on it.

[Robin]

Distinguishable only in terms of opening stance. As far as what we observe, there cannot be a difference -- we must necessarily see mental phenomena explained in terms or non-mental phenomena. The difference is that materialism says, "There, that's the answer." Idealism says, "Wait, there's another step, since all those non-mental phenomena are really just mental phenomena within the Great Mind after all." The idealist stance seems attractive following Descartes' cogito, which concerns our epistemological quandaries (thought must exist); but it really only adds a new layer of explanation when closely examined. The attractiveness disappears when you realize that identifying the Great Mind with our minds results from a form of hidden dualism.
But also that the logic of the step that says "my only access to knowledge is through perception, therefore all that can exist is perception". Or to put it another way "the only thing that can possibly exist is my mechanism for perceiving that which exists".

A metaphysic that has no explanatory power and is, in any case, built on a fallacy that would have got someone kicked out of a first year logic class, seems a little pointless.

And also, as I say, the idea that a computationally complex process like consciousness might contain no subsets of lesser complexity.

So really, I see quite a few ways of differentiating Idealism and Materialism.
But, ultimately, I cannot see any way to distinguish between idealism and materialism, which is why I ascribe to monism but not to an ultimate ontology. Materialism, idealism, bleh, what difference does it make? The real issue is -- can anyone make sense of dualism or pluralism? If you can, then God and human free will are possible.
Actually I don't see how dualism or pluralism make free will possible. If it is a logical possibility at all, then why not under Idealism or Materialism?

[Mercutio]

So really, I see quite a few ways of differentiating Idealism and Materialism.
I must echo the Wasp here, and suggest that the Idealism you are finding fault with there is a Dualism-in-an-Idealist-dress sort of thing. The thing with no explanatory power or utility is ontology; science can be done just fine from either the materialist or idealist assumptions (a poster here, Stimpson J. Cat, is worth searching for, for any who think physics is only possible under assumptions of materialism. Stimpy is not an idealist, but simply demonstrates that the ontological stance is irrelevant to physics.)

Actually I don't see how dualism or pluralism make free will possible. If it is a logical possibility at all, then why not under Idealism or Materialism?
Ah, it is only a logical possibility under the flawed assumptions of dualism. (This may be why the dualism-in-a-dress idealists are so easily identified.) It is just a matter of where you make the error.

[Robin]

I must echo the Wasp here, and suggest that the Idealism you are finding fault with there is a Dualism-in-an-Idealist-dress sort of thing. The thing with no explanatory power or utility is ontology; science can be done just fine from either the materialist or idealist assumptions (a poster here, Stimpson J. Cat, is worth searching for, for any who think physics is only possible under assumptions of materialism.
I don't need to - it is a point I have made frequently for a number of years on this forum. I usually quote Ernst Mach who says that science would operate the same way even if the whole world was a dream.

I have made this point every time someone claims that science requires a materialist assumption. People like Interesting Ian, Lifegazer, JustGeoff, Plumjam and even some people here who should know better make this claim.

I used to have a whole bunch of quotes from Mach, Einstein and Hawking ready to throw at people every time they claimed (and they do with monotonous regularity) that science operates with a Materialist assumption.

So yes, your grandmother does know how to suck eggs, thank you very much.

But do you notice that every metaphysic that is not Materialism seems to necessitate a step that says "then something happened to make to observable world look just like Materialism". Just for example:
I would suggest that it is the objective of pure, undifferentiated consciousness to create the experience of materialism, of physicality, for itself. This is its intention.
The Christian "Fall" doctrine is another example of this.
Ah, it is only a logical possibility under the flawed assumptions of dualism. (This may be why the dualism-in-a-dress idealists are so easily identified.) It is just a matter of where you make the error.
I don't understand how dualism can make it a logical possibility. Can you explain?

[amb]

I've read most of the thread so I hope I''m not repeating the obvious here.
Is there a ghost in the machine? or vice versa?
I feel that without the machine there can not be a ghost. Ghosts don't exist, but mind does. The problem as I see it is that some people believe this ''mind'' is the ghost.
Nothing could be further from the truth. I repeat it here. Mind is the effects of the material brain, nothing more or less.

[Mercutio]

I don't understand how dualism can make it a logical possibility. Can you explain?
I used to think I could. Not so certain any more.

Under either monism, the world appears to behave lawfully. In either case, I would agree that free will is not possible. The flawed logic of the dualist starts with two givens--that there is a real (objective) material world, and a real (subjective) ideal world, which are by definition non-overlapping domains. The reality of the mental world is unquestioned--we think, therefore we are. The reality of the physical world is inferred from the continuity Paul spoke of, or from the fact that imagining we are eating does not keep us alive.

Oddly, though, these two non-overlapping domains are synchronized, when there is no reason that they should be. There needs to be some sort of connection between the two unconnected domains. Different dualists posit different connections--the pineal gland, microtubules, God, or will. Rather than challenging and discarding the assumptions of two domains, the domains are taken axiomatically, and some connector must be inferred. The solution to "why does it feel as if I am choosing my actions?" cannot be "it's an illusion", since the mental reality is axiomatic.

I didn't say it was *good* logic. Garbage in, garbage out. And if someone can speak for Penrose's microtubules in a more coherent manner, please speak up. I have done battle with his book, and this is as close as I can come to it.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It does not have to be in his consciousness. It is in the unfiltered consciousness.
That is what Nick claims, but he has no evidence for this as opposed to any other hypothesis. The only thing he has direct evidence for is his personal consciousness.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I must echo the Wasp here, and suggest that the Idealism you are finding fault with there is a Dualism-in-an-Idealist-dress sort of thing. The thing with no explanatory power or utility is ontology; science can be done just fine from either the materialist or idealist assumptions (a poster here, Stimpson J. Cat, is worth searching for, for any who think physics is only possible under assumptions of materialism. Stimpy is not an idealist, but simply demonstrates that the ontological stance is irrelevant to physics.)
Reposted for emphasis.

If a materialist and an idealist were to flesh out their proprosals so that they explained everything we see in the world around us, the two ontologies would be equivalent modulo terminology.

~~ Paul

[cyborg]

Idealism: The concrete is a product of the asbtract.
Materialism: The abstract is a product of the concrete.
Dualism: The abstract is not a product of the concrete and the concrete is not a product of the abstract.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Idealism: The concrete is a product of the asbtract.
Materialism: The abstract is a product of the concrete.
Dualism: The abstract is not a product of the concrete and the concrete is not a product of the abstract.
Confusionism: Abstract/concrete is a spectrum and therefore the distinction is meaningless.

~~ Paul

[rocketdodger]

Reposted for emphasis.

If a materialist and an idealist were to flesh out their proprosals so that they explained everything we see in the world around us, the two ontologies would be equivalent modulo terminology.

~~ Paul

Yeah ok that is what I was getting at. Thanks for everyone who phrased it more elegantly! (thats why I come here!).

[Dancing David]

I've read most of the thread so I hope I''m not repeating the obvious here.
Is there a ghost in the machine? or vice versa?
I feel that without the machine there can not be a ghost. Ghosts don't exist, but mind does. The problem as I see it is that some people believe this ''mind'' is the ghost.
Nothing could be further from the truth. I repeat it here. Mind is the effects of the material brain, nothing more or less.


No it is standard solipsist foolishness dressed up as something else.

there is this 'ghost' that is all of reality and encompasses all things. this ghost whatever it may be made machines so it could play with itself.

so the ghost made the machine and lives in it.

never mind that there is no evidence, Nick will apriori dismiss any attemopts to discuss reductionsim or an objective stance. he is like an uber Berkley that way.