Are Beliefs a Matter of Choice?

[dglas]

The JREF seems to be dedicated to exposing woo for woo and thereby, presumably influencing the beliefs of the consumers of woo. This would seem to suggest that the JREF, in principle, understands that beliefs are matters of decion or choice, and that people can change their beliefs about, at least, some things.

However, a common "defence" we'll hear from some believers (and some determinists) is that one cannot control one's beliefs and since, as the old ethics maxim goes "one is not responsible what one cannot control," one cannot be responsible for one's beliefs. Interesting idea, that.

Even more interesting, some people apparently feel they ARE their beliefs. How do we understand such a view? Does it change how we assign responsibility for beliefs?

Now, if beliefs are a matter of choice, is it appropriate to hold the believer responsible for their beliefs? Does accepting that one is not responsible for one's beliefs have any impact on the possibility of influencing beliefs, as the JREF clearly attempts to do?

If you hold someone responsible for their beliefs are you being a bigot (or intolerant, if the word "bigot" bothers you) or are you empowering them with the possibility of change?

Does your assessment change at all when you are talking about, say, religious faith as opposed to belief in chi manipulation?

For your consideration.

[Rasmus]

I cannot change my beliefs at will. But I can chose to look at the evidence, I can chose to question my believes. I have a choice between being educated or sticking my fingers in my ears and going "la la la, I can't hear you!" when my believes are being challenged.

[Marquis de Carabas]

This would seem to suggest that the JREF, in principle, understands that beliefs are matters of decion or choice, and that people can change their beliefs about, at least, some things.
It suggests no such thing.

[the PC apeman]

Well said, Rasmus. I'm about as much of an atheist as they get around here and I don't see beliefs as a matter of choice. We can do the things that are likely to cause a change of belief but it seems to me that we cannot change them directly on demand.

PC

[dglas]

It suggests no such thing.

Then why does it bother to attempt to "educate" people about cold reading, psychic surgeons, flim-flam and other woo?

What exact kind of affect is the JREF trying to have then?

[Myshkin]

Then why does it bother to attempt to "educate" people about cold reading, psychic surgeons, flim-flam and other woo?

What exact kind of affect is the JREF trying to have then?

Because, over the course of our lives, we've seen our own beliefs change as our information changes. I cannot will myself to believe or not believe, but I can put myself in a position, e.g. being educated, such that my belief has a higher probability of being objectively true.

[Marquis de Carabas]

Then why does it bother to attempt to "educate" people about cold reading, psychic surgeons, flim-flam and other woo?

What exact kind of affect is the JREF trying to have then?
I'll try to skirt the popular (and insipid) debate oft heard around here about what is and is not a belief, and merely assert that a belief, however it is defined, is represented as some pattern in the brain. By trying to educate, one is trying to change that pattern. Unless you wish to defend the position that choice is the only mechanism for altering patterns in the brain, then an attempt at education is no indicator of an acceptance of choice in matters of belief.

[dglas]

Because, over the course of our lives, we've seen our own beliefs change as our information changes. I cannot will myself to believe or not believe, but I can put myself in a position, e.g. being educated, such that my belief has a higher probability of being objectively true.

So we are pawns of destiny, helplessly blown along on the winds of fate, subject to whatever "information" happens to intersect our blundering course?

Tell me, if I choose to cross at a cross-walk (or with the light) instead of jaywalking, am I not choosing to influence whether I get hit by a car or not?

[slingblade]

Excuse me, sir, but are these your worms?

I ask, because there seem to be quite a number of them, and I see you have an open container that has apparently been turned over.

We have laws against possessing open containers such as these, you understand. Now clean this mess up, and don't let it happen again.

[dglas]

I'll try to skirt the popular (and insipid) debate oft heard around here about what is and is not a belief, and merely assert that a belief, however it is defined, is represented as some pattern in the brain.

Okay.


By trying to educate, one is trying to change that pattern. Unless you wish to defend the position that choice is the only mechanism for altering patterns in the brain, then an attempt at education is no indicator of an acceptance of choice in matters of belief.

I never thought I'd actually see pure determinism in the real world. I role-played being a determinist, but...

So, in your view the JREF's view of "educating" is purely deterministic in nature?

So, let us assume you are correct. What are we to say then of the educators? Are they in any sense of the word "educating" or are they merely rocks rolling down a hill (determined "behaviour" patterns) in such a way that they influence (modify "behaviour" patterns) other rocks rolling down a hill?

[Darth Rotor]

Then why does it bother to attempt to "educate" people about cold reading, psychic surgeons, flim-flam and other woo?

What exact kind of affect is the JREF trying to have then?
Not sure what JREF is trying to achieve, but I am pretty certain I grok Mr Randi's motivation: he likes to expose fraud, and in particular, he likes to expose it in his profession as magician/entertainer. He takes the honorable position that his magic act is just that, an act, and is motivated to lead others in the profession to maintain that position of integrity. As part of that leadership by example role, he has branched out from exposing Mr Gellar the alleged mentalist to other mentalists, with Sylvia Browne being a favorite target. Likewise, given the number of paranormal claims, the opportunities to take on suspect assertions of magic as other than an act make for a target rich environment within the JREF RoE.

Extrapolating beyong that runs into the usual risk of things not scaling up evenly, and axes being ground in the pursuit of a Powerball win.

DR

[dglas]

Excuse me, sir, but are these your worms?

I ask, because there seem to be quite a number of them, and I see you have an open container that has apparently been turned over.

We have laws against possessing open containers such as these, you understand. Now clean this mess up, and don't let it happen again.

Let's go fishing!

We might catch something. A cold maybe. ;)

[dglas]

Not sure what JREF is trying to achieve, but I am pretty certain I grok Mr Randi's motivation: he likes to expose fraud, and in particular, he likes to expose it in his profession as magician/entertainer. He takes the honorable position that his magic act is just that, an act, and is motivated to lead others in the profession to maintain that position of integrity. As part of that leadership by example role, he has branched out from exposing Mr Gellar the alleged mentalist to other mentalists, with Sylvia Browne being a favorite target. Likewise, given the number of paranormal claims, the opportunities to take on suspect assertions of magic as other than an act are a suitable target within the JREF and Mr Randi's RoE.

Is that it? He "likes" to do it?
Is Mr. Randi just a not-so-big bundle of determined behaviour with a beard? Why is his position "honourable" or is the use of the word "honourable" just another pebble in the rockslide that is human behaviour?

You know, "Fraud" is a funny word. It has implications about the motive and intent (culpability) of the fraudulent person, dontcha think?


Extrapolating beyong that runs into the usual risk of things not scaling up evenly, and axes being ground in the pursuit of a Powerball win.

DR

I am interested in whether things "scale up evenly." I can't help it, I guess... ;)
You honestly think I write what I write just to get nominated? Okay. >shrug<

In any event, this is a derail. Keep plucking at the food pellet dispenser...

[Darth Rotor]

Is that it? He "likes" to do it? Is Mr. Randi just a not-so-big bundle of determined behaviour with a beard?
Descent into irrelevance noted.
Why is his position "honourable" or is the use of the word "honourable" just another pebble in the rockslide that is human behaviour?
Pointless screwing off with definitions noted.
You know, "Fraud" is a funny word. It has implications about the motive and intent of the fraudulent person, dontcha think?
Not laughing.
I am interested in whether things "scale up evenly." I can't help it, I guess... ;) You honestly think I write what I write just to get nominated? Okay. >shrug<
Writing won't earn you a Powerball win.
In any event, this is a derail. Keep plucking at the food pellet dispenser...
No.

[slingblade]

Okay, seriously this time.

I once said that I chose to be an atheist. I never considered this would be fodder for an argument. But it was, and how.

After a brand-new waste evacuation port had been drilled in my backside, I recanted/retracted my assertion somewhat and clarified that in my case, becoming an atheist and rejecting religion required a series of small choices I needed to make, all along the way.

My religious upbringing included a dictum against exploring other religions, as to do so might "shake my faith," or "cause me to doubt." So, in order to get from point A to point You're going to hell, you godless heathen, I had to choose to disobey that dictum and start looking at other religions, and other belief systems.

More often than not on that journey, I was confronted with certain ideas that were in conflict with my beliefs. And each time, I had to choose to examine the new idea, or choose to ignore it without examining it. At any point, I could have (and sometimes did) say "No, this idea conflicts with my beliefs too much. I'm not going to accept it."

Making a decision such as that is a choice. Choose to look at the idea, examine the idea, think about the idea, or choose to ignore it.

Eventually, all of these incremental choices led me to the place where I could say, "I really have looked at all these things, and have decided that what I believe makes little sense, is not logical, and is not the way I choose to define my beliefs."

So, I still maintain that becoming an atheist was, if not "a" choice, then a series of choices to examine memes and ideas that led me to a new and different conclusion.

I am still disagreed with, but I choose not to care. I may not be explaining what I mean very clearly, but it makes sense to me.

[Marquis de Carabas]

I never thought I'd actually see pure determinism in the real world. I role-played being a determinist, but...
What makes you think you have met one now?

So, in your view the JREF's view of "educating" is purely deterministic in nature?
I said nothing about pure determinism. You said the JREF's attempt at education implied acceptance that beliefs were chosen. The only way this is true is if the only way a pattern in the brain can be changed is by choice. If there is any other way, then the attempt does not imply the acceptance, even if choice is one way in which it can be done.

As for what the JREF actually believes on this matter, I know not, nor will I presume to guess.

[Gate2501]

I have always (since my late teens/early twenties) been under the impression that my own free will, and ability to choose, may very well be some manner of illusion brought about by the absolutely massive amount of variables responsible for said decisions.

I am not sure of this obviously, as there is no way to really test matters of consciousness and free will such as this, so I will admit that it borders on the woo. It is just a personal belief that I hold. I have always labeled myself as a "Behavioral Determinist", I have no idea if that phrase is used outside of my own head however.

In holding this belief, I really do see myself on the same level as everyone else, no matter their wealth, intellect, etcetera.

When I interact with people on these forums, I hope that the things that I say will change them in some way, by adding the variable that is Gate2501 to that massively complex *illusion* that is going on in their own little self contained universe. I know that *I* as a person, have been greatly affected by my time here lurking and posting, by the lot of you (even you Jerome). You force me to look up things, and challenge my world views.

In fact someone will probably challenge the world view that I just presented. :cool:

[Darth Rotor]

So, I still maintain that becoming an atheist was, if not "a" choice, then a series of choices to examine memes and ideas that led me to a new and different conclusion.

I am still disagreed with, but I choose not to care. I may not be explaining what I mean very clearly, but it makes sense to me.
Made perfect sense to me.

DR

[I Ratant]

Sling, I've that mile in my shoes also.

[dglas]

Descent into irrelevance noted.

Pointless screwing off with definitions noted.

Not laughing.

Writing won't earn you a Powerball win.

No.

WTH? Did I somehow strike a nerve or something?

Remember, I treat philosophies like tools (or toys). I don't take them too seriously, so quipping about them is par for the course for me. So often we see threads degenerate into hostility. I tried to keep it light. I didn't realize this was a bad thing. Still, if you choose not to laugh, that is your right...

It is true you did not present a determinist position, and if I seemed to paint that of you then my apologies. However, to depict my "screwing with definitions" as "pointless" is perhaps unwarranted based on the information you have so far.

[porch]

I never thought I'd actually see pure determinism in the real world. I role-played being a determinist, but...

So, in your view the JREF's view of "educating" is purely deterministic in nature?

So, let us assume you are correct. What are we to say then of the educators? Are they in any sense of the word "educating" or are they merely rocks rolling down a hill (determined "behaviour" patterns) in such a way that they influence (modify "behaviour" patterns) other rocks rolling down a hill?


That pretty much sums up my position on this. I could be wrong, but I have the impression that you're presenting a challenge to determinism . . . I just don't quite get what it is.

I'm also not sure why the assumption of determinism should make us call the word "educate" into question.

[slingblade]

Made perfect sense to me.

DR

Thank you, sir. I think. I mean, it is you, after all. :D



Sling, I've that mile in my shoes also.

Ah, so you see the minor point I'm making about choice? Cool. :)

One person, can't remember who, asked me if I thought I could choose to believe in god again. The person felt this thought should spotlight the flaw in my logic.

To an extent, it indeed does show me a problem or two. To answer it: No. Knowing (or maybe just believing?) what I do now, I could not rationally choose to believe in god(s) again.

BUT.

My stress level is incredibly high. I can envision myself getting so emotionally worked up that I turn back to a god-belief for comfort. I feel it would be short-lived if I did so, but I can still see it's possible. I hope I don't get that stressed, though. I'm not sure I'd live through it.

[Darth Rotor]

WTH? Did I somehow strike a nerve or something?
Perhaps, but I better appreciate your laughing tone now than I did when I read your response.

Sometimes, even I need the joke explained.
I tried to keep it light. I didn't realize this was a bad thing. Still, if you choose not to laugh, that is your right...
Or, it was my bad. :cool:
It is true you did not present a determinist position
Indeed, I am determined not to.

DR

[Myshkin]

So we are pawns of destiny, helplessly blown along on the winds of fate, subject to whatever "information" happens to intersect our blundering course?
I don't know. I don't see any way to test this hypothesis. For practical purposes, I accept the notion that I have some free will. I have the free will to stand in a place where information is likely to intersect me.

Tell me, if I choose to cross at a cross-walk (or with the light) instead of jaywalking, am I not choosing to influence whether I get hit by a car or not?

You got it. You are choosing to minimize the probability of getting hit by a car. But in before you make that choice, you need to believe that jaywalking is more dangerous. I don't know how that happens.

If I could choose to believe in things, I would believe in all sorts of great things. I could simply believe my way to happiness, peace, and prosperity.

[Darth Rotor]

Thank you, sir. I think. I mean, it is you, after all. :D
If you were seeking affirmation from a kilt wearing skeptic, I apologize for showing up in a Speedo. Sorry, everything else is in the wash, and the moths ate my kilt last winter. :(

So you're welcome, even if only for the horrid visual. :D

DR

[dglas]

What makes you think you have met one now?

Okay. I sit corrected ... for the moment...


I said nothing about pure determinism. You said the JREF's attempt at education implied acceptance that beliefs were chosen. The only way this is true is if the only way a pattern in the brain can be changed is by choice.

There is a significant difference between "were" and "can be" that I'm sure you are well aware of. Of course, this just raises the inevitable question: What sorts of beliefs (if any) are the sorts that are matters of choice, as opposed that ones (if any) that are not matters of choice and how do we distinguish between the two?


If there is any other way, then the attempt does not imply the acceptance, even if choice is one way in which it can be done.

Fair enough. I'll give you that - mainly because you are right about that. So those who "educate" are not necessarily acting to offer informed choices, but may just be seeking to promote blunt (dare I say "rote") change, is that it? Do you think this accurately represents the JREF mission? I mean, I have a letter here asking me to donate to the cause again. Shouldn't I know what the cause represents...?


As for what the JREF actually believes on this matter, I know not, nor will I presume to guess.

Now, assuming that I may (not assuming anything yet) have assumed something n the part of the JREF that may not be the case, do you have any views of your own on the questions at hand?

[slingblade]

If you were seeking affirmation from a kilt wearing skeptic, I apologize for showing up in a Speedo. Sorry, everything else is in the wash, and the moths ate my kilt last winter. :(

So you're welcome, even if only for the horrid visual. :D

DR

I think the only proper response to this is "Thank ewww."



:p

[dglas]

Okay, seriously this time.

Awww. You're no fun at all.... ;)


I once said that I chose to be an atheist. I never considered this would be fodder for an argument. But it was, and how.

Do you have a link to that thread or threads handy? I should be interested to see the arguments presented - and how you eventually came to the understanding you have now, in light of them.


After a brand-new waste evacuation port had been drilled in my backside, I recanted/retracted my assertion somewhat and clarified that in my case, becoming an atheist and rejecting religion required a series of small choices I needed to make, all along the way.

My religious upbringing included a dictum against exploring other religions, as to do so might "shake my faith," or "cause me to doubt."

Now THAT I find interesting (as I'm sure you knew I would!), but that's a subject for another time ... maybe.


So, in order to get from point A to point You're going to hell, you godless heathen, I had to choose to disobey that dictum and start looking at other religions, and other belief systems.

More often than not on that journey, I was confronted with certain ideas that were in conflict with my beliefs. And each time, I had to choose to examine the new idea, or choose to ignore it without examining it. At any point, I could have (and sometimes did) say "No, this idea conflicts with my beliefs too much. I'm not going to accept it."

Making a decision such as that is a choice. Choose to look at the idea, examine the idea, think about the idea, or choose to ignore it.

Interesting.


Eventually, all of these incremental choices led me to the place where I could say, "I really have looked at all these things, and have decided that what I believe makes little sense, is not logical, and is not the way I choose to define my beliefs."

You know what question popped into my head at this point, don't you? ;)
As a matter of interest, was it conflicting "facts" or was it conflicting "values" or what were these conflicting "things?"


So, I still maintain that becoming an atheist was, if not "a" choice, then a series of choices to examine memes and ideas that led me to a new and different conclusion.

I am still disagreed with, but I choose not to care. I may not be explaining what I mean very clearly, but it makes sense to me.

Thank you, Slingblade. A good post and one that bear considering. Certainly one I could not have written myself, not ever having the experience of being religious.

So, there's some meta-...something in the believer "meme" that prohibits choices ... is that what I'm hearing? If so, any idea what it might be?

[Lanzy]

Your beliefs are a matter of choice. Just not yours. Usually and frequently your parents pour crap into your head when you are at an age to accept pretty much anything they tell you. Maybe sibs, friends, shoot even TV contributes.

Once you reach the age of questioning your beliefs (some never do), they can be dropped, modifyied, etc..

just an opinion..I could be wrong.

[dglas]

Your beliefs are a matter of choice. Just not yours. Usually and frequently your parents pour crap into your head when you are at an age to accept pretty much anything they tell you. Maybe sibs, friends, shoot even TV contributes.

Once you reach the age of questioning your beliefs (some never do), they can be dropped, modifyied, etc..

just an opinion..I could be wrong.

Well now, this is where it gets fun. Are we talking about an "age" of questioning? Or is it an "education level?" Is it some sort of "critical-mass bull level?" Is there even a coherent pattern among those who go from point A to point B?

You seem to be suggesting that there is some point where "choice" becomes a factor. What is this point? And, more to the point of the OP, does choice (it such applies) suggest responsibility for beliefs held?

[slingblade]

Awww. You're no fun at all.... ;)

Heh-heh...there's a time and a place for everything.

Eight o'clock; my place; everything. :cool:



Do you have a link to that thread or threads handy? I should be interested to see the arguments presented - and how you eventually came to the understanding you have now in, light of them.

You know, I'm sorry but I don't. I know it was in R&P, and it was a few months ago, but I don't save or subscribe to threads, I'm afraid.

I think it was Scrut or Larsen who made the point I referred to in my post to I Ratant, above. "Could you choose to believe again?"

I don't think I could. If the first "choice" was a move from relative ignorance to knowledge, I don't see how I could voluntarily renounce my knowledge and go back to ignorance, no.

I mean, forget the subject at hand: what is this process called in other, similar subjects? I used to swear by astrology, but then my own empiric evidence ("This crap doesn't work!"), combined with Mr. Randi's horoscope experiment and my newly gained understanding of logical processes, led me to reject astrology for good. It's bunkum. I see that now. Was that a choice?

Um....maybe in the same way, in that I chose not to jam my fingers in my ears, shut my eyes, and la-la-la it away, yeah. Sort of.

Now THAT I find interesting (as I'm sure you knew I would!), but that's a subject for another time ... maybe.

Yup, it is its own thread, maybe, but you've never heard anyone religious say they were told, at least once, that to investigate other religions is dangerous and could shake your faith? Hmm. As an Oklahoma Pentecostal, I heard it all the time, especially as a kid.

Interesting.

:D

You know what question popped into my head at this point, don't you? ;)
As a matter of interest, was it conflicting "facts" or was it conflicting "values" or what were these conflicting "things?"

Hmmm. I think it was some of both, really. Religion is an emotional investment, after all, emotionally based. But facts are also there in abundance...or rather, the lack thereof....

I admit, there were many things about the belief system I was taught since I was old enough to listen that gave me grave doubts from the get-go. I read the Bible many, many times as a child, and I saw contradictions, and was pretty sure about my "either god hates me or god doesn't exist" stance from an early age.

They did their jobs, my elders. My mom and her family weren't particularly religious, and surely not in the Holly-Roller, Bible thumping, slain-in-the-spirit, speaking in Tongues way my father's family was, and it was my father's family who had the most contact with and influence over me. And in Oklahoma, my denomination was considered very mainstream, very much the norm, along with Baptists. My belief was definitely culturally informed, to a high degree. I'm from the land of Oral Roberts, if that's any clue.

So, I always had doubts, and though I lacked any decent crit thinking or logic skills, I felt strongly there was something hinky about all this. I just couldn't express it very well, didn't have the tools to do so.

I finally broke rank in 11th grade, and took the forbidden World Religions class. I recall my chief thoughts being "All these religions think they're the One True Faith, and they can't all be right..." and "Does my religion look as strange and false to these people as theirs look to me? Who's right? What if none of us are right?" :jaw-dropp

Only a year after that, I met and married my abusive first husband, and religion deeply informed that relationship, and that abuse. In order to get out of it, I not only had to give up my marriage, I had to part ways with my religion, and vice-versa.

Something like: "I don't care if divorce is a sin! I've done everything I could to be a good, Christian wife, and god keeps allowing this man to abuse me. God's either just as abusive as this jerk, or I've been stupidly praying to the ceiling for the last 13 years."

The beginning of the end, that was, for religion and me.

I think the one value religion violated most often, for me, was honesty. These people, this book, that god...they lied to me. They promised me things that never happened. I felt badly let down, and it's the main source for my feelings of inadequacy today. When you spend 30 years firmly believing you must not be good enough for god...it's hard to convince yourself you're good enough for anything.

The logic...I'd have to say it was finally being able to see the fairy-tale aspects of my belief as what they were: not metaphor for some higher meaning, but just myths. No more an explanation of reality than stories about Zeus or Odin. I didn't believe those myths...why did I believe this one, identical in so many ways to other myths I also don't believe? What claptrap! I'm done.

Thank you, Slingblade. A good post and one that bear considering. Certainly one I could not have written myself, not ever having the experience of being religious.

So, there's some meta-...something in the believer "meme" that prohibits choices ... is that what I'm hearing? If so, any idea what it might be?

You're welcome. Thanks for listening. :)

Another misconception I had, and didn't fully realize until I came here, was that most mainstream Christian denominations believe and teach basically the same doctrine. I mean, I was aware that we had some differences...when I was a kid, we Pentecosts made fun of (Southern?) Baptists and their "once saved, always saved" doctrine. We felt a person could "backslide," could fall from grace and reject or even lose their salvation, and would have to "be saved" again.

But I thought pretty much everyone was taught not to go digging into other faiths, and that to do so was a sign you had doubts about your own, which was bad. B.A.D. bad; sinful.

Now, I know this is not, as I thought, universally true for all Christians. My denomination, I've discovered, was rather controlling and dictatorial. I'd guess that means its memes were, too. I learned to be controlled from an early age. It was my downfall. I'm too trusting. Well. I was.

[porch]

. . . Now, if beliefs are a matter of choice, is it appropriate to hold the believer responsible for their beliefs?


Was that supposed to read, "if beliefs are not a matter of choice"? I don't think that people make choices, in the free will sense, so, on one level, I don't hold anybody responsible for anything.

Does accepting that one is not responsible for one's beliefs have any impact on the possibility of influencing beliefs, as the JREF clearly attempts to do?

If you conclude from your disbelief in beliefs-as-choice that there is nothing that can be done to effect change, and so do nothing, that will probably negatively impact your possibilities of influencing others. I don't think that's the rational conclusion, however. I think that recognizing our mechanistic nature can help us better understand how to go about efficiently exerting influence.

[Complexity]

I don't think there is free will.

I think that our 'choices' are fully determined.

Kind of knocks the whole pride / guilt thing out, doesn't it?

[dglas]

I don't think there is free will.

I think that our 'choices' are fully determined.

Kind of knocks the whole pride / guilt thing out, doesn't it?

Antecedent shape/squiggle stimulus: What, if anything, do words like "responsibility" signify?

Consequent shape/squiggle behaviour?

[MattusMaximus]

Seeing as how we can change our beliefs, and that I was once very religious (almost fundamentalist at one point) but am now an atheist, I would say that yes choice is involved in belief.


I don't think there is free will.

I think that our 'choices' are fully determined.

Kind of knocks the whole pride / guilt thing out, doesn't it?


Why do you believe this? I'm curious to know the source of your deterministic beliefs.

[MattusMaximus]

Made perfect sense to me.


Ditto.

[Ron_Tomkins]

According to the Merovigian, there is no choice. It's all about cause and effect.

So... yeah.... um......... there.

[Complexity]

Why do you believe this? I'm curious to know the source of your deterministic beliefs.


I've had this opinion for about twenty years.

I remember the day I accepted it as my working hypothesis. It was during the last year of my doctoral AI studies. I was waiting to take part in an (unrelated) seminar on science and religion and dualism had reared its ugly head once again. I had some free time to think about it.

I'd concluded (again) that there is no physical mechanism through which a non-physical mind could influence a physical brain. That left me with the mind-as-aspect-of-functioning-brain position.

I thought about brain state and neural events and signal propagation. I thought about flow.

I thought about the sequence of brain states at increasing levels of resolution and about what could affect a brain.

I thought about what 'I' was, that 'I' arise from the operation of my brain, that what 'I' perceive, think, and feel is fully determined by brain state, which is determined by prior brain state.

I realized that 'choice' is an illusion. Every time that I approach a choice, there may appear to be several possible alternatives, but only one alternative is chosen, and the mechanism of choice is merely the passage of time, the inexorable flow of brain activity.

'I' feel independent, non-contingent, the master of, if not my fate, at least of my choices where I have choices.

In reality, however, 'I' am as fully contingent upon the past as the rest of my body. What choices I make, however deliberate or painful, are the only choices that I can make.

[JoeEllison]

"Choice" is the least powerful factor in human existence. If "choice" had any real and immediate sway, then there would be no fat people, no addicts, and no failures. Everyone would just choose to be healthy and happy and successful. To claim otherwise seems to approach "The Secret" woo.

Personally, I was born without whatever it is that makes people believe in religious stuff. I was also lucky enough to have been told the right things at the right age to make atheism an inevitability. I almost wish I did have some sort of conversion story, or that I could take some pride in my atheism, but the truth is that I don't think I had much in the way of choice.

[I Ratant]

"Choice" is the least powerful factor in human existence. If "choice" had any real and immediate sway, then there would be no fat people, no addicts, and no failures. Everyone would just choose to be healthy and happy and successful. To claim otherwise seems to approach "The Secret" woo.

Personally, I was born without whatever it is that makes people believe in religious stuff. I was also lucky enough to have been told the right things at the right age to make atheism an inevitability. I almost wish I did have some sort of conversion story, or that I could take some pride in my atheism, but the truth is that I don't think I had much in the way of choice.
.
No, people do not "choose" the "obvious" correct things. They choose what they want. To be fat, if that's the easiest. Addicts know there's a choice, but choose addiction. Failures occur all the time, with a continuing series of bad choices despite the best of intentions.

[Beth]

Now, if beliefs are a matter of choice, is it appropriate to hold the believer responsible for their beliefs? Does accepting that one is not responsible for one's beliefs have any impact on the possibility of influencing beliefs, as the JREF clearly attempts to do?

If you hold someone responsible for their beliefs are you being a bigot (or intolerant, if the word "bigot" bothers you) or are you empowering them with the possibility of change?

Does your assessment change at all when you are talking about, say, religious faith as opposed to belief in chi manipulation?

For your consideration.

This is an interesting question. My own assessment is that, like most things, we have some choices and some limitations on what those choices can be that are imposed by our environment and our genetic make-up.

When atheists were surveyed and asked why they rejected the religion they were raised in, the most common response was "I just can't believe that". Are they making a choice to not believe?

What religion an adult believer belongs to indicates a choice in most cases. But believing in a religion may be as innate to them as not believing is to many atheists. Clearly, this is speculation on my part, but I find it plausible that the tendancy to believe (or not) may well be innate.

Like many innate tendancies, we have choices in how to express that tendancy but not whether we have the tendancy. A natural artist may become a painter, an graphic designer, or a quilter. They have many choices about how to express their artistic inclinations, but not whether they have those inclinations. Likewise, I think we all have choices about what religious beliefs we may hold, but the choice about whether to be religious or not may be more of a natural tendancy than a choice. While we can choose to go with or fight against our natural tendancies, we cannot chose what those tendancies are.

Thus, I think it is reasonable to hold people responsible for the content of their beliefs and the actions they take based upon those beliefs. After all, we hold an alcoholic responsible for choosing to drink and drive even if we don't hold him/her responsible for their reaction to alcohol.

[BenBurch]

How can beliefs be anything except a matter of choice? The OP makes no sense at all unless you really believe you can force an idea into somebody's head?

Die Gedanken Sind Frei
("My Thoughts Are Free")
Die Gedanken sind frei-
My thoughts freely flower.
Die Gedanken sind frei-
My thoughts give me power.
No scholar can map them,
No hunter can trap them.
No person can deny
Die Gedanken sind frei.
I think as I please
And this gives me pleasure.
My conscience decrees
This right I must treasure.
My thoughts will not cater
To duke or dictator.
No person can deny
Die Gedanken sind frei.
And should tyrants take me and throw me in prison,
My thoughts will burst free, like blossoms in season.
Foundations will crumble, and structures will tumble,
And free people shall cry, "Die Gedanken sind frei.

[Furi]

Whether you have perceived beliefs as a matter of your predeterminism, or have arrived at your beliefs through individual ability and reasoning, as long as they are your beliefs I have no real issue.

Just keep your mitts off mine or I'll eviscerate you with a spork.

[thaiboxerken]

If beliefs were a matter of choice, then why not simply choose to be a raving, fundamentalist Muslim?

[porch]

Antecedent shape/squiggle stimulus: What, if anything, do words like "responsibility" signify?

Consequent shape/squiggle behaviour?


Although this wasn't directed at me, I'm going to take a stab at it and say: Responsibility is a human construct with limited utility.

[slingblade]

If beliefs were a matter of choice, then why not simply choose to be a raving, fundamentalist Muslim?

Why?

[Gate2501]

I've had this opinion for about twenty years.

I remember the day I accepted it as my working hypothesis. It was during the last year of my doctoral AI studies. I was waiting to take part in an (unrelated) seminar on science and religion and dualism had reared its ugly head once again. I had some free time to think about it.

I'd concluded (again) that there is no physical mechanism through which a non-physical mind could influence a physical brain. That left me with the mind-as-aspect-of-functioning-brain position.

I thought about brain state and neural events and signal propagation. I thought about flow.

I thought about the sequence of brain states at increasing levels of resolution and about what could affect a brain.

I thought about what 'I' was, that 'I' arise from the operation of my brain, that what 'I' perceive, think, and feel is fully determined by brain state, which is determined by prior brain state.

I realized that 'choice' is an illusion. Every time that I approach a choice, there may appear to be several possible alternatives, but only one alternative is chosen, and the mechanism of choice is merely the passage of time, the inexorable flow of brain activity.

'I' feel independent, non-contingent, the master of, if not my fate, at least of my choices where I have choices.

In reality, however, 'I' am as fully contingent upon the past as the rest of my body. What choices I make, however deliberate or painful, are the only choices that I can make.

I agree with you completely on this issue. You said things more eloquently than I did in my earlier post, but my point was much the same. I believe that free will / choice are illusions that are created due to a massive amount of variables going into every choice that we cannot possibly be cognizant of. It is all cause and effect, but there are buttrillions (new number) of causes for the effect that appears to be a choice.

Perhaps you say it better than me because you came to this hypothesis in an educational environment, and I came to it drinking beer in the bathtub in my early twenties.

I do believe that free will and choice *must* be an illusion, unless something *magical* is going on in my brain.

[thaiboxerken]

Why?

Why not? You get 72 virgins if you simply just suicide yourself while killing infidels.

[ParanoidAndroid]

Why not? You get 72 virgins if you simply just suicide yourself while killing infidels.


And thus, I presume, some do choose according to this line of thinking.

[Careyp74]

Why not? You get 72 virgins if you simply just suicide yourself while killing infidels.

I hope you are just trying to be silly, and are not attempting a valid point. The fact that we do not choose to be Muslim does not mean that we do not have a choice at all. We know there are no 72 virgins waiting for us if we become Muslim, and that is one of the reasons why we do not just become Muslim. If you believed that there are 72 virgins waiting for you, then go ahead and become Muslim, no one is stopping you from making that choice.

[slingblade]

Why not? You get 72 virgins if you simply just suicide yourself while killing infidels.


Sorry, I'm missing the joke, or the point.

Are you saying, "If belief is a choice, why not choose the belief that goes against your morality and ethics the most?"

Why wait for the afterlife? If belief is a choice, why not choose to be a baby-raping FLDS polygamist, and get your nookie right now?

Hmmm...let's see...why not choose those things...maybe because I'm female, and in those systems I would be the one being abused, not the one doing the abusing.

Because when I was trying to figure out why Christianity doesn't work as advertised, it occurred to me that no religion does.

Because it doesn't matter how you dress up domination, oppression, and control, they still smell.

Could you maybe explain your point in more than one or two terse sentences? Thanks.

[slingblade]

I do believe that free will and choice *must* be an illusion, unless something *magical* is going on in my brain.

You've never been to an all-you-can-eat buffet, then, I take it?

[thaiboxerken]

Are you saying, "If belief is a choice, why not choose the belief that goes against your morality and ethics the most?"

That's exactly the point. If belief is merely a matter of choice, just choose to believe a different set of morality and ethics.


Why wait for the afterlife? If belief is a choice, why not choose to be a baby-raping FLDS polygamist, and get your nookie right now?

Exactly. Why not?


Hmmm...let's see...why not choose those things...maybe because I'm female, and in those systems I would be the one being abused, not the one doing the abusing.

Why not choose to enjoy being abused?


Because when I was trying to figure out why Christianity doesn't work as advertised, it occurred to me that no religion does.

So? Simply choose to believe that such things don't matter.


Because it doesn't matter how you dress up domination, oppression, and control, they still smell.

Just choose to not see the domination, oppression and control.


Could you maybe explain your point in more than one or two terse sentences? Thanks.

I think you've proven my point for me. Beliefs are not a choice. You've come to realize how futile and idiotic those religious beliefs are. You simply can't believe them.

[Gate2501]

You've never been to an all-you-can-eat buffet, then, I take it?

I can visit one without guilt!

My *choices* at the buffet are just cause and effect. I have no control over the amount I eat or do not eat, that amount is predetermined, and could be calculated before I sit down to eat. If you were to tell me about the results however, it would change the formula, adding new variables that have much weight behind them. That is where the illusion comes from in the first place.

You *are* one of the variables. Your knowledge of past events, past experiences. That does not mean that you have some sort of magical power to change the equation, or your value therein.

[Piscivore]

Why not? You get 72 virgins if you simply just suicide yourself while killing infidels.

Which one should I choose to get a couple of naughty girls with experience who enjoy doing housework?

[thaiboxerken]

Which one should I choose to get a couple of naughty girls with experience who enjoy doing housework?

Church of Ladder Day Saints.

[Piscivore]

Church of Ladder Day Saints.

:D


(When is "ladder day"? I'm acrophobic) :p

[slingblade]

That's exactly the point. If belief is merely a matter of choice, just choose to believe a different set of morality and ethics.

I don't recall saying it was "merely" a matter of choice. I don't think anyone's said that.

Exactly. Why not?

Oh, okay. This is one of those philosophical things that have never made much sense to me, like "how do you know you exist," isn't it?

Why not choose to enjoy being abused?

I know you're trying to prove a point. It's being lost on me, a victim of decades of abuse. Sorry.

So? Simply choose to believe that such things don't matter.

I did. I kept telling myself religion didn't work as advertised because I was defective. At some point, did I not choose to examine the belief, rather than myself?

People often tell me to stop beating myself up. Apparently, I can't do that, because I have no choice in the matter. I'm a total slave to my emotions, is that right?

Just choose to not see the domination, oppression and control.

Lots of people do. Why did I stop being one of them?

I think you've proven my point for me.

I wasn't trying to. I was trying to prove my own. I wonder why I resent your saying that? Oh, I guess because I had no choice but to prove your point.

Damn. I feel awfully stinking helpless right now. I've got no choice in anything. Ah, well; that will certainly make decision-making much more simple.

Beliefs are not a choice. You've come to realize how futile and idiotic those religious beliefs are. You simply can't believe them.

How did I do that, I wonder? It must have just floated to me on the ether.....

[ParanoidAndroid]

A boring old pragmatic approach courtesy of PA…

The JREF seems to be dedicated to exposing woo for woo and thereby, presumably influencing the beliefs of the consumers of woo.


This was the presumption that I had when I first arrived at JREF. I am now undecided.

This would seem to suggest that the JREF, in principle, understands that beliefs are matters of decion or choice, and that people can change their beliefs about, at least, some things.


Providing that the presumed underlying motivation is correct, this is at least one possible perspective…one to which I subscribe.

However, a common "defence" we'll hear from some believers (and some determinists) is that one cannot control one's beliefs and since, as the old ethics maxim goes "one is not responsible what one cannot control," one cannot be responsible for one's beliefs. Interesting idea, that.


Interesting…perplexing…clearly doesn’t fit with any concept I understand relative to personal responsibility; a tempting stance if you desire to alleviate personal responsibility (or believe there is no such personal responsibility).

Even more interesting, some people apparently feel they ARE their beliefs. How do we understand such a view? Does it change how we assign responsibility for beliefs?


This seems to me to fit with the fanatics/fundamentalists (particularly regarding religion), primarily; I can’t even pretend to understand their perspectives.

At most, the majority of believers I have encountered would better fit the perspective of “what I believe helps shape who I am”…It’s worth note that I have spent zero time living in The South/Bible Belt of the USA (a fact for which I am EXTREMELY thankful and is likely influencing my perspective).

Either way, the belief is of no concern to me (but for discussion) until they manifest actions; people (at least consenting adults) should be held accountable for there actions, whatever the source of motivation (this does not include cases of extreme coercion, which certainly exist). When involving discussions of personal beliefs, personal responsibility for those beliefs should apply, IMO.

Now, if beliefs are a matter of choice, is it appropriate to hold the believer responsible for their beliefs?


Again, the belief doesn’t concern me (except specifically in discussion). It is requisite that people are held responsible for their actions to maintain society. Likewise, it is necessary when discussing personal beliefs that the holder of the belief is held accountable, IMO.

Does accepting that one is not responsible for one's beliefs have any impact on the possibility of influencing beliefs, as the JREF clearly attempts to do?


I mean in no way to offend by the statement to follow (but am certain I will, nonetheless): if one accepts that there is no personal responsibility in association with beliefs and no choice, I see no way that the JREF is not reduced to intellectual group masturbation…just my perspective.

If you hold someone responsible for their beliefs are you being a bigot (or intolerant, if the word "bigot" bothers you) or are you empowering them with the possibility of change?


Empowering; though in terms of discussion, depending on the tone and the frame of mind of the believer, the believer may perceive it as prejudice.

Does your assessment change at all when you are talking about, say, religious faith as opposed to belief in chi manipulation?

For your consideration.


My assessment remains the same regardless of the content of the beliefs (in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary).

A common problem with choice is ‘the other side of the coin’: personal responsibility. People want to believe in choice, but often are unwilling to take on the responsibility that comes along with it. Until one learns to take personal responsibility for thoughts and actions, the possibility of choice or change is greatly compromised. Admittedly, prescriptive elements characteristic of many beliefs complicates one’s ability to choose to take personal responsibility; all the more reason to embrace choice/responsibility as existent: this is what conceptually defeats prescription.

Again, just my perspective, FWIW.

[JoeEllison]

.
No, people do not "choose" the "obvious" correct things. They choose what they want. To be fat, if that's the easiest. Addicts know there's a choice, but choose addiction. Failures occur all the time, with a continuing series of bad choices despite the best of intentions.

Wrong wrong and wrong. Thanks for trying, though. :rolleyes:

[Marquis de Carabas]

How can beliefs be anything except a matter of choice? The OP makes no sense at all unless you really believe you can force an idea into somebody's head?
Of course I can. Don't think of an elephant.

[I Ratant]

Wrong wrong and wrong. Thanks for trying, though. :rolleyes:
.
I'm thinking of a friend, seriously overweight, who's done the diet/exercise thing successfully, but still plumps back up.
He last had his stomach stapled. Certainly that's a choice.
The weight flew off......... for a while.
Now he's back to plump.
I wonder what "choice" is, if one's body shape isn't something one can alter through choice.
And the follow-up, determination.

[I Ratant]

"I would like to meet as many Americans as possible, and have them meet me, just so they can see what an Iraqi looks like before they kill him."-- Fadhil Al-Kazily, Iraqi-American peace activist"
.
My college room mate for 3 of the 4 years was an Iraqi.
Apparently not all that religious.
I did note, to him, that for a Semite, he was quite anti-Semitic.
There's a couple of stores over at the Mall run by Iranians.
One of them is not appreciative of the average Arab.
And became somewhat of a racist after some experiences here.

[Myshkin]

OK. Will someone from the "belief is a choice" camp please instruct me on how to choose to believe in...whatever.

I can choose to go to church, to say whatever believers say, to pray, etc., but I have no idea how to believe. All I know is that the evidence for...whatever...appears insufficient to believe. I want to choose to make this evidence appear sufficient. Help me.

[slingblade]

OK. Will someone from the "belief is a choice" camp please instruct me on how to choose to believe in...whatever.

I can choose to go to church, to say whatever believers say, to pray, etc., but I have no idea how to believe. All I know is that the evidence for...whatever...appears insufficient to believe. I want to choose to make this evidence appear sufficient. Help me.

Sure. You examine whatever it is, and if it makes sense to you, you say "I can believe that." And then you do.

ETA: Check out the new (and the old) threads on Anthony Flew. How did he do it, aside from being dotty, as some suggest?

@PA: Any squirrels or birds outside your window? Ever wonder why they hang around outside your window? Oh, nothing, nothing, I'm not implying anything. ;)

[ParanoidAndroid]

OK. Will someone from the "belief is a choice" camp please instruct me on how to choose to believe in...whatever.

I can choose to go to church, to say whatever believers say, to pray, etc., but I have no idea how to believe. All I know is that the evidence for...whatever...appears insufficient to believe. I want to choose to make this evidence appear sufficient. Help me.


In the case you present...choose to disregard the apparent insufficiency of evidence, the criteria for establishing claims as evidence, or the need for evidence.

It doesn't work for everybody (certainly not for me), but that's one way. I suspect it won't work for you either, based on your question.

I imagine there are other ways to choose but I'm ill-equipped to address them at present. Perhaps someone with faith could weigh in...

ETA: ...plus what slingblade said...@ slingblade: how do you always preempt my posts? I'm still typing a bit slow I guess.

[Complexity]

I agree with you completely on this issue. You said things more eloquently than I did in my earlier post, but my point was much the same. I believe that free will / choice are illusions that are created due to a massive amount of variables going into every choice that we cannot possibly be cognizant of. It is all cause and effect, but there are buttrillions (new number) of causes for the effect that appears to be a choice.

Perhaps you say it better than me because you came to this hypothesis in an educational environment, and I came to it drinking beer in the bathtub in my early twenties.

I do believe that free will and choice *must* be an illusion, unless something *magical* is going on in my brain.


Laughed out loud. Wish I'd been drinking beer in a bathtub. I was religious at the time and hadn't had a beer in nine years.

Thanks for the encouragement.

[MattusMaximus]

Of course I can. Don't think of an elephant.


Excellent! :D

[MattusMaximus]

I've had this opinion for about twenty years.

I remember the day I accepted it as my working hypothesis. It was during the last year of my doctoral AI studies. I was waiting to take part in an (unrelated) seminar on science and religion and dualism had reared its ugly head once again. I had some free time to think about it.

I'd concluded (again) that there is no physical mechanism through which a non-physical mind could influence a physical brain. That left me with the mind-as-aspect-of-functioning-brain position.

I thought about brain state and neural events and signal propagation. I thought about flow.

I thought about the sequence of brain states at increasing levels of resolution and about what could affect a brain.

I thought about what 'I' was, that 'I' arise from the operation of my brain, that what 'I' perceive, think, and feel is fully determined by brain state, which is determined by prior brain state.

I realized that 'choice' is an illusion. Every time that I approach a choice, there may appear to be several possible alternatives, but only one alternative is chosen, and the mechanism of choice is merely the passage of time, the inexorable flow of brain activity.

'I' feel independent, non-contingent, the master of, if not my fate, at least of my choices where I have choices.

In reality, however, 'I' am as fully contingent upon the past as the rest of my body. What choices I make, however deliberate or painful, are the only choices that I can make.


Very interesting - thanks for sharing :)

[Piscivore]

I agree with you completely on this issue. You said things more eloquently than I did in my earlier post, but my point was much the same. I believe that free will / choice are illusions that are created due to a massive amount of variables going into every choice that we cannot possibly be cognizant of. It is all cause and effect, but there are buttrillions (new number) of causes for the effect that appears to be a choice.

Perhaps you say it better than me because you came to this hypothesis in an educational environment, and I came to it drinking beer in the bathtub in my early twenties.

I do believe that free will and choice *must* be an illusion, unless something *magical* is going on in my brain.

Thirded. And I'm so stealing "buttrillions". :)

[James Fox]

Great thread everyone!

I’ve decided that no one can know anything with 100% certainty. Except what I just said, which is special knowledge only given to a few chosen individuals. ;)

I’m thinking I’ll abandon beliefs altogether and hold out for credible evidence that supports a premise, proposition or theory allowing me to provisionally accept said premise, proposition or theory with varying levels of certainty based on the nature and amount of evidence; and all the while being open to new evidence which may result in a change of position.

So is changing ones position regarding a notion, idea or doctrine the same as changing ones mind? And if so, that it was only the necessary resultant manifestation of my brain chemical soup’s deterministic reactions, I’ll stick with what makes me happy, seems reasonable and tastes good!!

[BenBurch]

Why not? You get 72 virgins if you simply just suicide yourself while killing infidels.

I've heard that what we see translated as 72 virgins might have actually meant 72 grapes...

[BenBurch]

Of course I can. Don't think of an elephant.

That one doesn't work on me. Too much yoga training. I just visualize a unicursal hexagram and all other thoughts are gone.

[Piscivore]

And if so, that it was only the necessary resultant manifestation of my brain chemical soup’s deterministic reactions, I’ll stick with what makes me happy, seems reasonable and tastes good!!

Like you have a choice...

:p

[thaiboxerken]

I don't recall saying it was "merely" a matter of choice. I don't think anyone's said that.

The "merely" qualifier is certainly implied in many arguments.


I did. I kept telling myself religion didn't work as advertised because I was defective. At some point, did I not choose to examine the belief, rather than myself?

Choosing to examine a belief and choosing to believe are two different subjects.


People often tell me to stop beating myself up. Apparently, I can't do that, because I have no choice in the matter. I'm a total slave to my emotions, is that right?

Not to your emotions, but to your beliefs.


Lots of people do. Why did I stop being one of them?

Because of many different factors.


Oh, I guess because I had no choice but to prove your point.

Your proving my point probably wasn't by choice, but by your own inability to realize that you ARE proving my point everytime you say "I can't choose do believe something that goes against my morals and/or ethics."


How did I do that, I wonder? It must have just floated to me on the ether.....

Experiences influence your beliefs. I'd like an explanation of how people simply choose what they believe. Does it have to do with a magical free will that came with a soul?

[Jeff Corey]

Interesting thread. Did anyone read the 1971 novel "The Diceman" about psychiatrist Luke Rheinhart who decides to make major decisions based on the roll of the dice? I always wondered how he decided to do that. Did he flip a coin?
But I agree with you here who feel that the illusion of free will is maintained by the multidetermined, complex chaotic nature of the causes of our behavior combined with our tendency to employ confirmation bias and other tricks to rationalize doing what we do.

[slingblade]

The "merely" qualifier is certainly implied in many arguments.

Is it? Evidence?


Choosing to examine a belief and choosing to believe are two different subjects.

One informs the other. One leads to another.

Not to your emotions, but to your beliefs.

Then how did I discard any of them, or gain new ones, if I'm such a slave to my beliefs?

I don't know there is no god. I believe it. I believe it strongly, based on the evidence I chose to examine. I've said, repeatedly, this wasn't an overnight event. It took years of incremental choices. Choice wasn't the sole factor, but it was heavily involved.

Because of many different factors.

Name some, if you know any.

Your proving my point probably wasn't by choice, but by your own inability to realize that you ARE proving my point everytime you say "I can't choose to believe something that goes against my morals and/or ethics."

Huh? Because I couldn't choose the examples you gave, the limited and extreme examples, this means I said I can never choose to believe something that goes against my morals or ethichs? I said no such thing! Get your words out of my mouth.

Experiences influence your beliefs. I'd like an explanation of how people simply choose what they believe.

There wasn't anything simple about it. I had to excise a chunk of my identity to do so, and it was as mentally painful as chewing off my own leg would be physically painful.

Does it have to do with a magical free will that came with a soul?

Has free will been proven to be "magical?" I'm new to the discussion. I don't suppose there'd be any point in arguing for a limited free will, no? Yeah, didn't think so.

Have we proven the soul doesn't exist? I used to believe I had one, but now I don't believe it because it's part of the dogma I chose to reject. Er, I mean, that I magically just no longer believed, somehow, one day.

[articulett]

M0Alhhe-JA8

[thaiboxerken]

Because I couldn't choose the examples you gave, the limited and extreme examples, this means I said I can never choose to believe something that goes against my morals or ethichs?

If you can't choose to believe something for any reason, then that disbelief is not a choice.

Do you choose not to believe what I'm posting, or are you unable to believe what I'm posting because of your other beliefs?

[slingblade]

If you can't choose to believe something for any reason, then that disbelief is not a choice.

Do you choose not to believe what I'm posting, or are you unable to believe what I'm posting because of your other beliefs?

I guess the point you're missing is that I've already examined your examples, or even lived them, and I've already made my choice. That's why I can't believe them. Before ever speaking to you, I chose to reject them.

I chose to reject religious dogma. So I've decided (a result of having a choice) that those 72 virgins don't exist.

When I was a kid and encountered things about religion that didn't make sense, I chose to ignore them, and continued to believe. It wasn't until I made a conscious choice to stop ignoring it that I was able to change my beliefs.

How do you decide anything, if you don't think you have a choice?

[Rasmus]

Slingblade,

I have no doubt that you made choices and that those influenced who you are today and what you believe. But from what you say I don't get the impression that you ever chose to not believe anymore.

You made choices that eventually led you to your disbelief, based on factors that you held more important than your religion at the time.

But choosing to believe something to me means to go through the mental act of declaring "I will henceforth believe that x is true." and then immediately having that particular belief because of the direct decision to have it. In that sense I don't think one can chose what to believe.

Broadly speaking, I think people can make choices. (Not discussing determinism here for the time being.) But you can't chose anything. If I could chose anything, I'd have wings and could fly. I don't, but that doesn't mean there aren't other things that I can have a choice about.

[I Ratant]

I guess the point you're missing is that I've already examined your examples, or even lived them, and I've already made my choice. That's why I can't believe them. Before ever speaking to you, I chose to reject them.

I chose to reject religious dogma. So I've decided (a result of having a choice) that those 72 virgins don't exist.

When I was a kid and encountered things about religion that didn't make sense, I chose to ignore them, and continued to believe. It wasn't until I made a conscious choice to stop ignoring it that I was able to change my beliefs.

How do you decide anything, if you don't think you have a choice?
.
There's more besides just the virgins/houri...
"It was mentioned by Daraj Ibn Abi Hatim, that Abu al-Haytham 'Adullah Ibn Wahb narrated from Abu Sa'id al-Khudhri, who heard Muhammad saying, 'The smallest reward for the people of Heaven is an abode where there are eighty thousand servants and seventy-two houri, over which stands a dome decorated with pearls, aquamarine and ruby, as wide as the distance from al-Jabiyyah to San'a."
.
These are considered as "real" in mainstream Islam.as the harps and robes the fundie Christians are expecting.
It may be the driving force for a large proportion of the murder/suicides, but things like 9/11 had more than just sex after death; a desire to rid Islam of its "enemies" was more important.

[thaiboxerken]

I guess the point you're missing is that I've already examined your examples, or even lived them, and I've already made my choice. That's why I can't believe them. Before ever speaking to you, I chose to reject them.

There are plenty of other decisions where choices can be made. However, people do not simply choose to believe what they believe.

If a person thinks an idea is absurd, stupid or foolish, they simply cannot choose to believe that idea. They have to be convinced to believe in one way or another. For many skeptics, evidence and logic and science is what it would take to convince us to believe. For others, flawed logic or fear or other irrational processes can work to change a conviction. However, it's not choice that's driving the process of belief. It's experience and thought processes along with, in many cases, indoctrination.

You've admitted above that you used to believe, but from your experiences and critical thought processes and exercises, you've come to a point where you CAN'T believe. You've just admitted that those beliefs are not a choice for you.

Thank you for proving my point once again.

[I Ratant]

...
But choosing to believe something to me means to go through the mental act of declaring "I will henceforth believe that x is true." and then immediately having that particular belief because of the direct decision to have it. In that sense I don't think one can chose what to believe.

Broadly speaking, I think people can make choices. (Not discussing determinism here for the time being.) But you can't chose anything. If I could chose anything, I'd have wings and could fly. I don't, but that doesn't mean there aren't other things that I can have a choice about.
.
You MUST be able to make choices. Whether paper or plastic, or wear brown or grey, these are all based on previous choices.
On things "intellectual", you decide which makes sense, and which doesn't, and accept/reject the subject at hand based on what you "believe" makes one choice more palatable than another, but few weld themselves to any belief regardless of anything which comes along after -a- choice has been made, that creates another opportunity to choose again.
This is one of the major problems with religions. Those that do weld themselves to specific dogmas become extremely uncomfortable when confronted with alternatives. The easy way out is to eliminate those with the alternatives.
Don't think about it at all.
Thinking leads to choosing.

[dglas]

My apologies to everyone for being absent for a bit. I have been mulling our determinist's replies over. In light of such....

...A few quick questions for our determinist friends then:

How do you, as determinists claiming there is no such thing as "free will" and therefore no "choice," understand such ideas as "responsibility," "culpability," "free will," and "choice" (and the host of other concepts on which we base the running of our societies) in terms of your determinism? Do you just dismiss these as nonsense, or do you understand them in terms of "reinforcements" or "behavioural modifiers?" Are they "internal" behaviours, now becoming more and more accessable (read: subject to verification/refutation) through advances in neural scienecs? Are they convenient social fictions? Do these concepts need to be excised from our concepts of self?

Now I asked Complexity (in post #34 - albeit in a quirky kinda way) what words like "responsibility" signify, but he ignored my question, which I think is very unfortunate, since, clearly, we do truck in these ideas and concepts of self (as many of the responses in this thread indicate). We do live in a social context in which we perceive of these words as meaningful and we base our public policies on human interaction around them. What are we, as determinists, to say of this?

If I understand correctly, behaviouralism (Skinnerian behaviouralism anyway) depicted our sense of "choice" and the like as being contingent on behaviour (in effect reversing the cause-effect chain or supervening one on the other) explaining them as us experiencing our behaviour and simply ignored such internal events as unverifiable. Is it possible to understand such internal states as interesting without recognizing the more commonly understood order of causality (volition therefore behaviour) as opposed to the determinist (behaviour therefore the sense of "volition") one?

It is interesting that, in post #38, Complexity makes a distinction between I and "I." Similarly, Porch makes a strange sort of reference (in post #32) as follows:

I don't think that people make choices, in the free will sense, so, on one level, I don't hold anybody responsible for anything.
What means this "on one level?" Are we to understand that there may be be more than one level of understanding responsibility/culpability? Are we to understand that "choice" is meaningful, say in some context, and not merely some sort of tragic error in our understanding of self? If so, what is this other "level?"

And what does Complexity mean by "I?"


I realized that 'choice' is an illusion. Every time that I approach a choice, there may appear to be several possible alternatives, but only one alternative is chosen, and the mechanism of choice is merely the passage of time, the inexorable flow of brain activity.

Complexity's post was interesting and heady stuff. The section I quote above needs, I think, some clarification, however. That only one alternative is chosen says nothing at all about the cause of selection, being "free will" or antecedent-consequent causal chains. That only one alternative is selected may very well be a function of the definition of mutually exclusive alternatives. He indicates that the "passage of time and the "inexorable flow of brain activity" is/are the "mechanism of choice." At this point, I think we need to consider the nature of this kind of explanation - is it a scientific one, subject to falsifiability or is it another example of a God concept (explaining everything but prohibiting nothing)? Does this understanding provide predictive power (at least in principle)? If so, how? Given a series of alternatives, how are we to use these ideas (inexorable flow of brain-states and the passage of time), and these ideas alone, to predict which alternative will be chosen?

I'll try to illustrate what I mean here with an example. Suppose we were to posit that the explanation for all things is "God's Will." Let's set up a scenario. I am, precariously teetering at a 45 degree angle off the precipice of a steep cliff. Now, assuming that God's Will is the determining factor on whether I fall or recover my balance (by definition potentially negating the influences of all other possible influences - including gravity), how can we predict if I will fall or recover my balance? In this scenario "God's Will" "explains" both mutually exclusive outcomes, but precludes neither (indeed, it doesn't even provide sufficient context to limit the number of possible outcomes!) Hence, "God's Will" fails as a concept offering predictive power.

Is brain-states another example of a "Gods Will" or "Self-Interest" concept, "explaining" all outcomes, but precluding none? I leave that for our determinist friends to answer. For the scientifically-minded, the answer is far from trivial...yes?

[James Fox]

Like you have a choice...

:p

But thinking I have a choice does make me happy!! And just hoping I’m not delusional hardly seems worth the effort.

[ParanoidAndroid]

@PA: Any squirrels or birds outside your window? Ever wonder why they hang around outside your window? Oh, nothing, nothing, I'm not implying anything. ;)


That's just GREAT! Prior to seeing your comments above, I had been using my obsessive/compulsive "skills" towards entirely different subjects. Now I'll apparently have to keep a more watchful eye (or 2) on "nature's little creatures" :wide-eyed ...thanks for broadening my paranoia...

:eek: was that a chirp just then? :scared:

[Ichneumonwasp]

How do you, as determinists claiming there is no such thing as "free will" and therefore no "choice," understand such ideas as "responsibility," "culpability," "free will," and "choice" (and the host of other concepts on which we base the running of our societies) in terms of your determinism? Do you just dismiss these as nonsense, or do you understand them in terms of "reinforcements" or "behavioural modifiers?" Are they "internal" behaviours, now becoming more and more accessable (read: subject to verification/refutation) through advances in neural scienecs? Are they convenient social fictions? Do these concepts need to be excised from our concepts of self?

Same as any other words in this mid-level existence we share. In an ultimate sense -- looking at ultimate reality -- those words are meaningless, but so are all words. Words are place-holders in the middle-ground where we live, so that we may communicate.

I would guess that most folks who subscribe to determinism agree to some form of compatibilism, so in this level the words do have meaning.

Now I asked Complexity (in post #34 - albeit in a quirky kinda way) what words like "responsibility" signify, but he ignored my question, which I think is very unfortunate, since, clearly, we do truck in these ideas and concepts of self (as many of the responses in this thread indicate). We do live in a social context in which we perceive of these words as meaningful and we base our public policies on human interaction around them. What are we, as determinists, to say of this?

That they are useful? The words we keep are generally those we find useful for dealing with whatever is *really* out there.


What means this "on one level?" Are we to understand that there may be be more than one level of understanding responsibility/culpability?

Yes.

Are we to understand that "choice" is meaningful, say in some context, and not merely some sort of tragic error in our understanding of self? If so, what is this other "level?"

There is the level on which which live -- this mid/macro level and there is the level of atoms smashing into one another. Whether or not determinism holds at that "lower" level is a matter of contention, which might impact all levels of description. But if determinism is correct, then the level of description -- the story we tell ourselves -- where we live admits "choice" as a meaningful abstraction/lie. Of course, if the lower level description of determinism is correct, then we have no choice but to act as though we have and believe in choice. Just like Neo.

[Piscivore]

But thinking I have a choice does make me happy!!
Right, but you don't have a choice about thinking you have a choice.

And just hoping I’m not delusional hardly seems worth the effort.
Really? You should try it the other way 'round sometime.

[slingblade]

However, people do not simply choose to believe what they believe.

Thank you for twisiting my point out of recognition.

I have been QUITE CLEAR in saying my choice wasn't a single, grand choice, but a series of incremental ones. Keep distorting what I say, though. It brings us closer.

If a person thinks an idea is absurd, stupid or foolish, they simply cannot choose to believe that idea.

And how do they come to the conclusion that any idea is absurd, stupid, or foolish?

You've just admitted that those beliefs are not a choice for you.

Not after I chose to examine them instead of ignoring them. Once I made that choice, I was able to evaluate them and reject them.

Thank you for proving my point once again.

I find this insulting. I'm quite angry you keep saying it to me. You know you're being insulting, poking me with a stick.

I'd ask you to refrain, but that won't do any good. So I'll use my usual method of dealing with my anger.

[slingblade]

I sure hope the question's been answered now:

No, no one has any choice about believing anything. You are helpless in what you believe, and that's it.

[Nick227]

...A few quick questions for our determinist friends then:

How do you, as determinists claiming there is no such thing as "free will" and therefore no "choice," understand such ideas as "responsibility," "culpability," "free will," and "choice" (and the host of other concepts on which we base the running of our societies) in terms of your determinism? Do you just dismiss these as nonsense, or do you understand them in terms of "reinforcements" or "behavioural modifiers?" Are they "internal" behaviours, now becoming more and more accessable (read: subject to verification/refutation) through advances in neural scienecs? Are they convenient social fictions? Do these concepts need to be excised from our concepts of self?

Determinism doesn't say you don't experience free will, rather that the experience of it is finally somewhat illusory, transitory, or based on lack of self-awareness, depending on where you stand with it.

Determinism is not nilhilistic. If you experience choice, you can use it. It's not saying you can't experience a better life through better choices.

Nick

[porch]

Thanks, dglas, for the engaging discussion. I was thinking of quoting your most recent post and addressing it point for point, but I think (hope) I can get my ideas across better through blurting and rambling.

I choose to use the words "I" and "choose" as a social and linguistic convenience. Even though my understanding of those words is different from the majority of people I speak with, they still represent shared experiences. For example, if a friend came up to me and wanted to discuss a difficult decision - let's say he's contemplating breaking up with his long time girlfriend - well, I would relate my relevant thoughts and experiences, but most likely say, in the end, "Well, it's your choice to make. I don't envy you." I could empathize with the straining experience he's going through. Probably the last thing he would want to hear at the time would be my thoughts on determinism, and how there is no actual self that controls the outcome. Also, that wouldn't be the most important thing for me to express at the time.

Regarding a lack of free will and responsibility: My current thoughts on the matter do a lot to shape my opinions on crime, punishment and correction. Since people have no free will and no ultimate responsibility, I find it hard to accept that it's just for someone to be punished - have pain inflicted on them - for whatever transgression they have made. If it can be shown that the threat of punishment deters crime, and for that threat to be taken seriously, that at least some of the time the threats need be carried out, then I can accept that. Also, if it can be shown that vengeance has some greater social utility, then I'm willing to explore that. Barring those conditions, I see punishment as unnecessarily cruel, and counter to the goal of having a safer, more harmonious, society.

That's on one level. On the other hand . . . I had a friend who seriously screwed over a mutual friend. My thoughts on a lack of ultimate responsibility serve to temper my emotional response somewhat, but I still can't help but feel anger and disappointment. Having held this friend in high esteem, I can't shake the notion that he should have known better. Believing that we're flesh machines doesn't stop me from feeling and behaving as a flesh machine.

Regarding the predictive power of deterministic behaviourism: For the most part, the system we're dealing with is too complex to make specific predictions. I do think, though, that if it were ethical to put a human in a Skinner box, that we could get results as reliable as we do with pigeons.

[Nick227]

Thanks, dglas, for the engaging discussion. I was thinking of quoting your most recent post and addressing it point for point, but I think (hope) I can get my ideas across better through blurting and rambling.

I choose to use the words "I" and "choose" as a social and linguistic convenience. Even though my understanding of those words is different from the majority of people I speak with, they still represent shared experiences. For example, if a friend came up to me and wanted to discuss a difficult decision - let's say he's contemplating breaking up with his long time girlfriend - well, I would relate my relevant thoughts and experiences, but most likely say, in the end, "Well, it's your choice to make. I don't envy you." I could empathize with the straining experience he's going through. Probably the last thing he would want to hear at the time would be my thoughts on determinism, and how there is no actual self that controls the outcome. Also, that wouldn't be the most important thing for me to express at the time.

Regarding a lack of free will and responsibility: My current thoughts on the matter do a lot to shape my opinions on crime, punishment and correction. Since people have no free will and no ultimate responsibility, I find it hard to accept that it's just for someone to be punished - have pain inflicted on them - for whatever transgression they have made. If it can be shown that the threat of punishment deters crime, and for that threat to be taken seriously, that at least some of the time the threats need be carried out, then I can accept that. Also, if it can be shown that vengeance has some greater social utility, then I'm willing to explore that. Barring those conditions, I see punishment as unnecessarily cruel, and counter to the goal of having a safer, more harmonious, society.

That's on one level. On the other hand . . . I had a friend who seriously screwed over a mutual friend. My thoughts on a lack of ultimate responsibility serve to temper my emotional response somewhat, but I still can't help but feel anger and disappointment. Having held this friend in high esteem, I can't shake the notion that he should have known better. Believing that we're flesh machines doesn't stop me from feeling and behaving as a flesh machine.

Regarding the predictive power of deterministic behaviourism: For the most part, the system we're dealing with is too complex to make specific predictions. I do think, though, that if it were ethical to put a human in a Skinner box, that we could get results as reliable as we do with pigeons.

I don't personally see that the need for responsibility or retribution should necessarily be tempered in someone who regards free will as finally illusory. There is action. There will very likely have been the experience of choice in that action. Thus the retributive act, if thought out intelligently, will serve to correct that particular experience of choice. The important part is to create a response through awareness not reaction.

I think it's important to distinguish between one's beliefs about how things are and one's experiential reality. That free will is likely non-existent, and our world deterministic, seems to me rather a moot point at the end of the day.

Nick

[ParanoidAndroid]

A little latitude, if you will...

I sure hope the question's been answered now:

No, no one has any choice about believing anything. You are helpless in what you believe, and that's it.


THANK GOD! This will make answering all those pesky questions that start out "why do you think..." so much easier and tidier: "just because an inconceivable multitude of "causal factors" (many/most of which I am not even aware) combined to lead me inextricably to that "effect" I perceive. Any appearance of my “choosing” that conclusion was an illusion"…

Dear Personal Responsibility,

Be gone specter of illusion, cruel igniter of false empowerment. You are of no use to (wo)mankind any longer; go work your magic on a less advanced species. Join the other ghosts of humanity: Choice, Emotions, Perception, etc.

Sincerely,
I. M. Determinist

...I am aware I have oversimplified, overstated, and taken liberties to deny the complex subtleties of determinism; I just couldn't resist the dangling carrot in the name of humor; forgive me (unless your previous experiences won't allow). :D

[Piscivore]

I don't personally see that the need for responsibility or retribution should necessarily be tempered in someone who regards free will as finally illusory.

Quite correct, the only thing that falls apart is the erroneous notion that someone who does take personal responsibility is any more "noble" or "good" than someone who does not. Both people are acting according to the dictates of their ubringing, experiences, and capabilities and cannot do otherwise.

[I Ratant]

Same as any other words in this mid-level existence we share. ...
.
"mid-level" ?????
The Heaven's Gate folks chose to go on to the "next level above human".
I believe the result was merely some bad smelling corpses, when found.
Like Jonestown.
This is the only level we get.
We can choose how to exist here, or not, but that's it.

[Myshkin]

Sure. You examine whatever it is, and if it makes sense to you, you say "I can believe that." And then you do.

Do you have any choice over whether it makes sense to you?

[Myshkin]

How do you, as determinists claiming there is no such thing as "free will" and therefore no "choice," understand such ideas as "responsibility," "culpability," "free will," and "choice" (and the host of other concepts on which we base the running of our societies) in terms of your determinism?

Assuming for the moment that I have choice in some cases, I contend that I do not have a choice to believe, which is how this discussion started. Nor do I have a choice to recall that thing that I forgot. Nor a choice to smell curry if there's none around. The closest we get to 'choosing' these things is to choose to put ourselves in a position to have them happen.

I think maybe we've ended up equivocating about the definition of 'choice'.

Assuming determinism, how do I account for "responsibility", etc.?

Social norms? Psychological models, maybe integrated systems is a better term, that integrate all the firing neurons into an emergent phenomenon called a 'thought'?

[ParanoidAndroid]

Kidding aside:

I am not generally one to dismiss semantic differences, but I'm struggling with the portion of determinism (that has been stated here in this thread) that posits 'choice' as an illusion but keeps 'personal responsibility' as somehow more substantive, sans positive adjectives. Are both 'choice' and 'personal responsibility' illusory or real? If thy are regarded by determinism as not relative to one another, how is that?

Even if both 'choice' and 'personal responsibility' are illusions viewed only through the spectacles of 'human experience', how then does determinism do anything but present a 'semantic' shift in perspective? How is either one any less valid in the concepts of reality as humans, such as we are?

Isn't the differentiation ultimately moot, except to make the concepts of choice and personal responsibility fit a more scientific language preferable to some?

...clarifications please...

[thaiboxerken]

I have been QUITE CLEAR in saying my choice wasn't a single, grand choice, but a series of incremental ones. Keep distorting what I say, though. It brings us closer.

It's not distortion. I'm merely trying to point out that because of the series of choices and experiences you've made and had, you are unable to believe that you are a pink elephant. You don't choose to disbelieve that you are a pink elephant, you simply can't because the idea is absurd, it's beyond belief.


And how do they come to the conclusion that any idea is absurd, stupid, or foolish?

Past experiences and mode of thought.


Not after I chose to examine them instead of ignoring them. Once I made that choice, I was able to evaluate them and reject them.

Sure, you made the choice to evaluate and think about it. You didn't choose to believe it to be nonsense. You were convinced it was nonsense.


I find this insulting. I'm quite angry you keep saying it to me. You know you're being insulting, poking me with a stick.

I'm not doing this to be insulting. You merely keep proving my point for me and then deny it.


Do you have any choice over whether it makes sense to you?

Exactly!

[Piscivore]

Kidding aside:

I am not generally one to dismiss semantic differences, but I'm struggling with the portion of determinism (that has been stated here in this thread) that posits 'choice' as an illusion but keeps 'personal responsibility' as somehow more substantive, sans positive adjectives.
Did I do that? I didn't mean to. "Personal responsibility" has no more "substance" than "choice", no. In fact, I'd argue those "positive adjectives"- a.k.a. subjective value judgements- are what give it "substance" at all in most people's thinking.

Are both 'choice' and 'personal responsibility' illusory or real?
Illusory. Practical, functional, perhaps even necessary illusions, but an illusions nonetheless.

If thy are regarded by determinism as not relative to one another, how is that?
Not speaking for all of determinism here, I'd say they are very much related. If you are going to be thinking in terms of choice (and we almost have to, because our brains cannot pecieve all the variables involved, let alone can that little bit of the process we call "I" correlate them and calculate the behaviour we are going to "choose"), then however the person values "personal responsibility" is going to factor into what he does about the consequences of those choices. I personally value personal responsibility highly, but I take no pride in that, because I did not choose to do so, and I do not think myself better than those that do because they didn't choose not too.

I also didn't choose to think this way. Far from being a loosed collar to a rabid dog, morality-wise, thinking this way is quite humbling in my experience.

Even if both 'choice' and 'personal responsibility' are illusions viewed only through the spectacles of 'human experience', how then does determinism do anything but present a 'semantic' shift in perspective? How is either one any less valid in the concepts of reality as humans, such as we are?
In practical, everyday terms, not much less valid. Think of it in terms of a pachinko machine- each ball looks like it is moving randomly through the pegs, but it isn't, is it? Friction, gravity, the velocity of the release, the spin of the ball, the geometry of the pegs- these are all dictating the precise path each ball will take, and each ball can no more deviate from it than they can freeze in place and start singing "Margaritaville". Yet looking at them cascading down we can't do better than guess where they will go.

Isn't the differentiation ultimately moot, except to make the concepts of choice and personal responsibility fit a more scientific language preferable to some?
I'm sorry, you lost me- the difference between "choice" and "personal responsibility" or the difference between the functional illusion of "choice" and "personal responsibility" and "real" choice and personal responsibility?

[Nogbad]

Evidence would suggest that choices for a great many are limited. Rational choice of beliefs would suggest...

1) Perfect knowledge of the market (all the available choices)

2) Equal access to that market (no one declaring a jihad or similar on your ass for departing from the social norm).

In practice, Muslims beget Muslims, Christians beget Christians and so on. Crossover does occur but it is a fringe activity and only in those societies that tolerate a plurality of ideas. Sometimes whole societies change belief systems but this generally is accompanied by pressure from the ruling elite. The Roman Empire became Christian when Constantine decided it was going to.

In short, I would not consider that beliefs are set in stone but they are pretty predictable.

[ParanoidAndroid]

I'm sorry, you lost me- the difference between "choice" and "personal responsibility" or the difference between the functional illusion of "choice" and "personal responsibility" and "real" choice and personal responsibility?


No need to apologize, I loose myself and others on a daily basis; neither my mouth nor fingers can keep up with the pace of my thought (if only thoughts were as sound as they are fleeting). :D

I meant to ask if the difference between the "common" understanding of 'choice' and 'personal responsibility' and that offered by determinism was moot in terms of day-to-day conduct/thought/actions?

ETA: Thanks for the clarifications, Pisci! I think I'm starting to wrap my head around the applications of determinism and how it relates to perception...I'll keep at it. :o

[ParanoidAndroid]

So then (in deterministic terms) would the "purpose" of JREF be to help 'cause' (inform/educate) individuals in an attempt to broaden their 'experiences' thus leading them to more aware 'effects' (more informed/considered decisions, beliefs, actions, choices, etc)?

[Piscivore]

No need to apologize, I loose myself and others on a daily basis; neither my mouth nor fingers can keep up with the pace of my thought (if only thoughts were as sound as they are fleeting). :D
Indeed. :D

I meant to ask if the difference between the "common" understanding of 'choice' and 'personal responsibility' and that offered by determinism was moot in terms of day-to-day conduct/thought/actions?
Yeah, more or less. The understanding does have an influence on one's day to day behaviour, though. In my case, it's helped me take things far less personally than I used to, just for an example.

ETA: Thanks for the clarifications, Pisci! I think I'm starting to wrap my head around the applications of determinism and how it relates to perception...I'll keep at it. :o
Happy to oblige. I expect I may have an error or two in there that Mercutio in particular could correct, but that's my view.

[Piscivore]

So then (in deterministic terms) would the "purpose" of JREF be to help 'cause' (inform/educate) individuals in an attempt to broaden their 'experiences' thus leading them to more aware 'effects' (more informed/considered decisions, beliefs, actions, choices, etc)?

Basically, yes. Logic and reason and critical thinking cannot influence somone's behaviour to their benefit if they are never exposed to the concepts, misunderstand what they are, or are negatively biased against them.

[Complexity]

Hi, dglas and all.

I didn't mean not to answer your question from a day or so ago - I wanted to think about it, and then I forgot about it.

I've got some thoughts on your questions and the issues that you have raised. I'll be on again in a few hours and will start to frame a reply - probably more than one.

[ParanoidAndroid]

Basically, yes. Logic and reason and critical thinking cannot influence somone's behaviour to their benefit if they are never exposed to the concepts, misunderstand what they are, or are negatively biased against them.


I'm getting closer to a better understanding of how determinism "functions"; thanks again. ;)

[porch]

. . . I meant to ask if the difference between the "common" understanding of 'choice' and 'personal responsibility' and that offered by determinism was moot in terms of day-to-day conduct/thought/actions? . . .


The acceptance of a deterministic viewpoint could have great implications for social policy, that is, how we analyze and address social problems. I think it lends itself to focusing on creating the optimum conditions to have the highest chance of getting the desired results. Psychological environmentalism?

Maybe we could have a huge social engineering/propaganda campaign to induce people to think for themselves! :p

[ParanoidAndroid]

The acceptance of a deterministic viewpoint could have great implications for social policy, that is, how we analyze and address social problems. I think it lends itself to focusing on creating the optimum conditions to have the highest chance of getting the desired results. Psychological environmentalism?

Maybe we could have a huge social engineering/propaganda campaign to induce people to think for themselves! :p


Interesting notion. ;) Would you echo the clarifications that Piscivore provided?

I have studied determinism some, but had always couched it as more-or-less a semantic perspective shift; it has been a while (15 years or so) since I have considered it until this thread. I'm starting to see that there may perhaps be at least a bit more to it.

[Piscivore]

Interesting notion. ;) Would you echo the clarifications that Piscivore provided?

I have studied determinism some, but had always couched it as more-or-less a semantic perspective shift; it has been a while (15 years or so) since I have considered it until this thread. I'm starting to see that there may perhaps be at least a bit more to it.

I'll tell you, it was a real shock to me, when I finally "got it". I was heavily invested emotionally in free will and self-determinism at one time.

[porch]

. . . Would you echo the clarifications that Piscivore provided? . . .

What he says seems to jibe with me. I would like for him to expand more on the "Practical, functional, perhaps even necessary illusions" part.

I, too, have found that I take things less personally, and am less judgmental overall. Speaking of echoing:

Kind of knocks the whole pride / guilt thing out, doesn't it?

[Piscivore]

I would like for him to expand more on the "Practical, functional, perhaps even necessary illusions" part.

In that it is shorter and simpler to talk of and act on "choices" in our day to day activities. It's overwhelming, tedious, unecessary, and mostly impossible to outline all the forces that make our decisions for us. And as much as we can sit and talk about this detachedly here, in our day to day life we are not simply spectators. Back to the pachinko analogy, we are bouncing down the field every second. We can't stop it, we can't separate ourselves out of it, we can't usually take the time to contemplate all the influences, and we don't know what pegs we are going to bump into or where we are going to end up, even if where and how we get there is inevitable. We don't- can't- see all the pegs that bounce us one way or the other, so what we call the pegs- the events that initiate changes- is a "choice".

I hope that wasn't too out there.

[dglas]

Hi, dglas and all.

I didn't mean not to answer your question from a day or so ago - I wanted to think about it, and then I forgot about it.

I've got some thoughts on your questions and the issues that you have raised. I'll be on again in a few hours and will start to frame a reply - probably more than one.

I am looking forward to seeing them, Complexity. I have some small interest in how they affect the OP, for obvious reasons... ;)

[Complexity]

I've made a lot of notes, and I was planning on organizing my thoughts before starting to write, but I chose to get some sleep, instead.

I choose. I reach a decision point, I consider a set of apparently achievable alternatives, I imagine what might happen on choosing each alternative, I draw on my experiences, my values, experiences, and dreams in making my choice.

Having made a choice, I need to execute that choice. For all but the simplest choices, that will involve further choices. Whether my execution of that choice is successful is determined in part by how realistic my evaluation of the chosen alternative was, whether the choice was formal rather than intensional, whether circumstances change, how motivated I am, how that choice interacts with other choices that I make, and many other factors.

I choose. Based upon everything available to me at moment of choice, I choose.

Did I really have a choice in that choice? I maintain that I did not. I certainly experienced a sense of freedom in considering a range of alternatives, I felt as though nothing could prevent me from selecting this alternative rather than that alternative if I chose to do so. This is how I feel, but it is not the truth of the matter.

I believe that each choice that I make is fully determined by the past. This is not to say that I think we can predict everything, but that a choice could be fully explained after it occurred if one were omniscient.

Each choice that I make is fully determined by the past. If you want a different choice to be made, you'd need to reach back into the past and change things so that the outcome is different. Not likely. But this is, in a sense, what we do in education, in raising children, in cultivating relationships, and in living as ourselves - we choose to alter aspects of the present so that, when it becomes the past, the choices that are made are more likely to be to our liking.

I do not think that there is free will.

I do not think that anyone is responsible for their actions.

Intellectually, I understand this. Emotionally, I hold everyone responsible for their actions, and I don't think that doing so is a bad thing.

If I expect someone to be responsible for his actions, if I treat him as though he were responsible for his actions, his behavior may be different than it would have been had I not had those expections and treated him accordingly.

If I treat someone as if he is honorable, kind, thoughtful, humane, responsible, loving, curious, and intelligent, I may very well get someone who is more honorable, kind, thoughtful, humane, responsible, loving, curious, and intelligent as a result.

That neither he nor I have any real choice in the matter is not relevant.

I live in a world in which choices are real - people approach them, make them, try to execute them, and live with the consequences. People may not really be free to make any choices, but we think we are, we feel as if we are. We believe that we can change the world, or at least our small corners of it. We act in this belief. We experience joy and frustration, pride and shame. These experiences shape future choices that we'll make - they are quite real, and of great importance. That they aren't justified isn't relevant.

I like living in a world in which people are held responsible for their actions. I also acknowledge that people aren't really responsible for their actions. It is a remarkably useful fiction that we are responsible, and the world actually is a better place for this fiction.

I think it important that we treat some behaviors as sufficiently undesireable as to be criminal and to do some form of behavior mod, up to and including segregation. As a determinist, I don't think that retribution, punishment, the infliction of pain, or death can be justified. I do think that shame, ostracism, and imprisonment can be justified in a you-aren't-really-responsible-for-your-actions-but-if-we-respond-to-your-actions-in-this-way-the-world-may-be-a-better-place sort of way.

I have to get ready for work. I know I haven't addressed many of the issues that were raised, especially by dglas, but I'll post again soon and extend my remarks.

I hope some of this has made some sense, however little you may agree with it.

[Piscivore]

Well said.

[James Fox]

The acceptance of a deterministic viewpoint could have great implications for social policy, that is, how we analyze and address social problems. I think it lends itself to focusing on creating the optimum conditions to have the highest chance of getting the desired results. Psychological environmentalism?

Maybe we could have a huge social engineering/propaganda campaign to induce people to think for themselves! :p

Please report to room 101 where you will be assisted with your faulty perceptions and inadequate thinking. We only want you to have an optimal opportunity, to not only think for yourself, but gain fulfillment as a human being devoid of all that evolutionary baggage that so constrains the modern individual, and hinders the ultimate advancement of our nations and species.;)

[Darth Rotor]

No, no one has any choice about believing anything. You are helpless in what you believe, and that's it.(Your sarcastic tone noted and embraced.)
Some of us call that approach neo-Calvinism. Ironic, don't you think, that Atheists adapt such a positoin?

How does a Determinist choose that position? No one is born a Determinist. Maybe the Determinist is bent over by Bubba, so positioned in this prison life we all live. :rolleyes:

Thought: maybe that is why suicide happens as often as it does

*Roger Daltry voice*

There ain't no way out!

(Lyric from song However Much I Booze, Who By Numbers)

DR

[slingblade]

(Your sarcastic tone noted and embraced.)
Some of us call that approach neo-Calvinism. Ironic, don't you think, that Atheists adapt such a positoin?

How does a Determinist choose that position? No one is born a Determinist. Maybe the Determinist is bent over by Bubba, so positioned in this prison life we all live. :rolleyes:

Thought: maybe that is why suicide happens as often as it does

*Roger Daltry voice*

There ain't no way out!

(Lyric from song However Much I Booze, Who By Numbers)

DR

Sure, suits me. Whatever you want.

None of it matters, anyway, does it?

[Piscivore]

Sure, suits me. Whatever you want.

None of it matters, anyway, does it?

Only to us, so you might as well enjoy it.

[Myshkin]

Originally Posted by slingblade
Sure. You examine whatever it is, and if it makes sense to you, you say "I can believe that." And then you do.


Do you have any choice over whether it makes sense to you?

Do you have an answer?

[James Fox]

Sure, suits me. Whatever you want.

None of it matters, anyway, does it?

Nope, if it’s all matter it just doesn’t matter. Unless you’re a Bose-Einstein condensate! :melting

Cmplx, Pisc, PA, Slng and others, great conversation and thoughtful remarks!

I think it would also be reasonable to say that some peoples neurological makeup is such that their decisions are much more likely or less likely to be characteristically different in the future given ongoing education, treatment or a change in environment.

I’ve worked in social services and the mental health field for twenty five years and have always held that past behavior is not only the best predictor of future behavior but the only reliable predictor. If a persons cognitive abilities and their capacity for change can be identified then you can know with great certainty the likelihood of success for a specific intervention.

Changing behavior patterns through sound argument or education, some form of treatment or a new environment is only likely to have any lasting effect for a person who has the capacity and ability for change. This is nearly always determined by history, IQ, genetic make up, and environment. This also includes the involuntary imposition of limits on behavior, such as being court ordered into treatment or restricting ones environment.

Of course the implications for public policy are huge with regard to substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment and criminal rehabilitation. It seems a clear survival benefit to hold people responsible of their actions, not to mention the operational benefit to social and civil structures that exist to maintain human welfare.

I think it is interesting to observe that one reason religions exist and will for the foreseeable future is that they provide a social structure that does allow for changes that effect future decisions or supports an ongoing enviornmental stasis humans seem to like. Support groups can work in that there is ongoing influence and environmental change that can alter future behavior patterns. I suppose the reported number of attempts at quitting (8) that the average smoker makes before being successful is a reasonable illustration of how much reprocessing of our behaviors and thought patterns needs to take place before a change can be made. (Not to mention the chemical hurdles)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

(to the OP) No.

You don't, and you can't "choose" what to believe. Beliefs are not something "out there" waiting to be acquired by people. Beliefs are a response to the environment, they are part of our particular, personal POV. We see the world via our beliefs (they are like a translation device).

We can say that our "world view" is the (chaotic) conglomerate of all our beliefs, and these are constantly evolving, changing, adapting. I see people all the time believing they can express what they believe with words... nope, words are the tip of the iceberg, beliefs are so deeply tied with what we are that we can say that we are our belief systems (to an extent, of course).

[Piscivore]

.
"mid-level" ?????
The Heaven's Gate folks chose to go on to the "next level above human".
I believe the result was merely some bad smelling corpses, when found.
Like Jonestown.
This is the only level we get.
We can choose how to exist here, or not, but that's it.

At the risk of speaking for Ich, I believe he meant "mid-level" in terms of scale- between the biochemical reactions in our brains, and the "big picture" view where we could (theoretically) see all the external influences at the same time. Not as a "different plane of existence" sort of thing.

[Ichneumonwasp]

At the risk of speaking for Ich, I believe he meant "mid-level" in terms of scale- between the biochemical reactions in our brains, and the "big picture" view where we could (theoretically) see all the external influences at the same time. Not as a "different plane of existence" sort of thing.

Well, yeah, but that's only because I missed my chance for a free ride on the Hale-Bopp comet. I wonder what Cygnus X-1 looks like this time of year?

[Piscivore]

Well, yeah, but that's only because I missed my chance for a free ride on the Hale-Bopp comet. I wonder what Cygnus X-1 looks like this time of year?

Dark and boring, but eventually you get so drawn into the place you can't leave.

[ParanoidAndroid]

...I’ve worked in social services and the mental health field for twenty five years and have always held that past behavior is not only the best predictor of future behavior but the only reliable predictor. If a persons cognitive abilities and their capacity for change can be identified then you can know with great certainty the likelihood of success for a specific intervention...


This, I find interesting and somewhat confusing (within the deterministic framework): does determinism account for varied human aptitude relative to change/education; and if so, how? Is it even necessary or useful in deterministic terms to consider this aptitude?

If this has already been covered, I apologize for missing it.

[I Ratant]

Dark and boring, but eventually you get so drawn into the place you can't leave.
.
Sounds like my girl friend! :(

[Beth]

Thanks for taking the time and making the effort to share your beliefs on the matter of personal choice and responsibility. I have a question for you though.

Illusory. Practical, functional, perhaps even necessary illusions, but an illusions nonetheless.

In practical, everyday terms, not much less valid. Think of it in terms of a pachinko machine- each ball looks like it is moving randomly through the pegs, but it isn't, is it? Friction, gravity, the velocity of the release, the spin of the ball, the geometry of the pegs- these are all dictating the precise path each ball will take, and each ball can no more deviate from it than they can freeze in place and start singing "Margaritaville". Yet looking at them cascading down we can't do better than guess where they will go.


Basically, yes. Logic and reason and critical thinking cannot influence somone's behaviour to their benefit if they are never exposed to the concepts, misunderstand what they are, or are negatively biased against them.

Back to the pachinko analogy, we are bouncing down the field every second. We can't stop it, we can't separate ourselves out of it, we can't usually take the time to contemplate all the influences, and we don't know what pegs we are going to bump into or where we are going to end up, even if where and how we get there is inevitable. We don't- can't- see all the pegs that bounce us one way or the other, so what we call the pegs- the events that initiate changes- is a "choice".

I hope that wasn't too out there.


I think I understand you, but I am puzzled by your certainty that humans making choices of their own free will is an illusion. Given that the ultimate result is unpredictable, whether talking about the final slot the pachinko ball lands in or the way a human beings life will turn out, random seems a better description than deterministic.

Further, while the pachinko balls do not impact the environment they course through, humans alter their environment according to their decisions which are a direct result of their thinking patterns. It seems undeniable that the thoughts we choose to think are not deterministic in any meaningful way.

Thus, it seems to me that humans make choices that are a) not predictable in any way other than as probabilities and b) dependent on the thought we choose to think. While the probabiality distribution of choices may be predictible for humans, that doesn't imply that individuals don't make choices in the same way that pachinko balls don't make choices. While we may not be able to see all the 'pegs' we bounce up against ahead of time, unlike with pachinko balls, there are occasions when a particular 'peg' is foreseeable and can be either avoided or selected with conscious forethought. It seems to me, that is what constitutes making a choice rather than a deterministic outcome.

If you can't differentiate between choice and the illusion of choice, how can you be so certain that our choices to be responsible or not, to believe in a particular religion or not, is only an illusion?

[I Ratant]

Determinism as detailed by Compl. almost makes sense. It is sure more plausible than "pre-destination", but..
Way back when, I could burn my fingers on the griddle Ma cooked up the eggs on.
Didn't take too many close encounters to finger out that touching it wasn't a good idea.
But, I can -still- touch that hot griddle when I whip up my eggs in the morning, if I choose to.
My past experience doesn't -force- me to not touch it now.

[dglas]

Thanks to Complexity and others for offering their perspectives on some of the questions I have asked about determinism.

So (tentatively), if I understand properly the viewpoints of the determinists in this thread, while we may not (or, more strongly, do not) have really real "free will," (in terms of magical/mystical ability to break antecedent-consequent causal chains) in a social context it serves us to maintain these conventions (responsibility, culpability, freedom, dignity, choice and the like) for the smooth running of our societies. Perhaps that these ideas provide a context for the consistent and understandable application of reinforcements? And this primarily because it "creates" efficacy with respect to running our societies.

Am I understanding this correctly?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

... in a social context it serves us to maintain these conventions (responsibility, culpability, freedom, dignity, choice and the like) for the smooth running of our societies.

For instance, I believe the opposite. Current society is FAR from running smooth because (among other things) there are so many absurd concepts that are hold as absolutes (responsibility, culpability, dignity, pride, etc).

Behaving in ways that facilitate social interactions is a requirement for individuals to participate in the society, but punishment, believing in "good" and "evil" and attributing behavior to magical causes should end at some point.

[Piscivore]

This, I find interesting and somewhat confusing (within the deterministic framework): does determinism account for varied human aptitude relative to change/education; and if so, how?
Sure. It is the result of the individual's past experience, genetic makeup, and environmental opportunities. All of which are under sway of the same immutable forces of the universe that restrict the individual.

Is it even necessary or useful in deterministic terms to consider this aptitude?
Sure. "pearls before swine" and all that. Someone who isn't prepared or capable of understanding something- critical thinking, in our case- isn't going to be influenced to adopt it no matter what we do. However, this being true does not mean that any one of us, with our limited perceptions and awareness, can know for certain this is the case. We can guess, make gross approximations, but not know.

[Piscivore]

Determinism as detailed by Compl. almost makes sense. It is sure more plausible than "pre-destination", but..
Way back when, I could burn my fingers on the griddle Ma cooked up the eggs on.
Didn't take too many close encounters to finger out that touching it wasn't a good idea.
But, I can -still- touch that hot griddle when I whip up my eggs in the morning, if I choose to.
My past experience doesn't -force- me to not touch it now.

No, because other past experiences modified the original experience. You are not "choosing" to touch the griddle, the pressures to touch it (and I'm just postulating things here for example): desire to cook with the griddle, desire for eggs, lack of anyone else to cook for you, reluctance to use/absence of a potholder, other past experiences of touching the griddle without permanent harm, understanding that non-damaging pain is temporary) exert more force on your behaviour than the past bad experiences.

[dglas]

For instance, I believe the opposite. Current society is FAR from running smooth because (among other things) there are so many absurd concepts that are hold as absolutes (responsibility, culpability, dignity, pride, etc).

On a macro scale is it really the case that our societies are not running smoothly? We tend to notice the hits and ignore the misses sometimes. If one considers the pure scale of a society like the United States or even Canada or any other country who's population measures in the millions, do the instances of "deviance" really represent a general failure or isolated instances of failure?

Perhaps it is the bumps in the road that allow for change. We could try to create a Walden 2 (yes, I actually read it), but how would such a society adapt and progress. The problem with utopian thinking is that utopias tend to be stagnant, yes? Still, whether we might enhance the adaptability of our societies by excising some or all of these things you suggest is an open question - one we are struggling with (although it is usually couched in different terms).


Behaving in ways that facilitate social interactions is a requirement for individuals to participate in the society, but punishment, believing in "good" and "evil" and attributing behavior to magical causes should end at some point.

You may be right about this.

Let's be careful to keep some firmly things in mind:

(1) Reinforcements need not consist only of punishments. If I understand correctly, behaviourists have determined (;))that positive reinforcements are generally more effective than aversive reinforcements at modifying behaviour.

(2) Punishment can be thought of in terms of rehabilitation or retribution. One thing about determinism; it tends to nip retributivism in the bud as an attitude towards modifying behaviour. This is a point a few of our determinist posters have made, albeit in somewhat different wording.

(3) There are degrees and kinds of reinforcement. A smile of approval is a reinforcement just as as giving food pellets is an example. In terms of aversive reinforcement, a frown is an example just as prison time or torture is an example. The "slippery slope" types will immediately categorize things in terms of extremes, but we need not do so. It is, indeed, useful to do so in order to guard against the extremes, but if we dismiss anything out of hand because extremes are possible, then we effectively hobble ourselves. As in most cases, we seem to negotiate a balance between extremes...


I, personally, haven't weighed in on the determinist way of thinking yet. Right now, I'm asking questions. My view is actually changing courtesy of some things I am seeing in this thread...

[Piscivore]

Thanks for taking the time and making the effort to share your beliefs on the matter of personal choice and responsibility. I have a question for you though.

I think I understand you, but I am puzzled by your certainty that humans making choices of their own free will is an illusion. Given that the ultimate result is unpredictable, whether talking about the final slot the pachinko ball lands in or the way a human beings life will turn out, random seems a better description than deterministic.

Well, it's predicated on a few important premises:
1) That causality exists. Without this, there could be no science.
2) that humans, bodies, brains, and "mental processes" are affected wholly and completely by causality.
3) That duality is incorrect. There is no magic stuff that can violate causality (stuff that for which there is, as we speak, no evidence)

If human behaviour was truly random, no predictions could be made about it. The fields of psychology, criminal science, political science, marketing, group dynamics, etc. all suggest otherwise.

Further, while the pachinko balls do not impact the environment they course through,
Who said they don't? Each hit on a pin may deform the pin ever so slightly, or set up a vibration that affects the next ball to strike it. They wear grooves into the backboard. The balls disturb the air molecules they move through. Of course they affect their environment.

humans alter their environment according to their decisions which are a direct result of their thinking patterns.
No, humans alter their environment soley by their behaviour.

It seems undeniable that the thoughts we choose to think are not deterministic in any meaningful way.
That's pretty much not true given the content of this thread. :)

Thus, it seems to me that humans make choices that are a) not predictable in any way other than as probabilities...
because our limited perceptual ability and inabbility to correlate all the factors we do percieve prevents us, not because they are "random".

and b) dependent on the thought we choose to think.
But, as has been illustrated, you cannot "choose" to think anything. Indeed, there is research to suggest that the thinking happens after the body starts to perform the "chosen" action.

While the probabiality distribution of choices may be predictible for humans, that doesn't imply that individuals don't make choices in the same way that pachinko balls don't make choices. While we may not be able to see all the 'pegs' we bounce up against ahead of time, unlike with pachinko balls, there are occasions when a particular 'peg' is foreseeable and can be either avoided or selected with conscious forethought.
What you are calling "conscious forethought" involves causality and the accumulated history of experience. You cannot "foresee" a peg unless you have experienced, or been exposed to a description of the experience of another, a similar situation. You also cannot "choose" anything but what the pressures of previous experience and other factors allow.

It seems to me, that is what constitutes making a choice rather than a deterministic outcome.
And that is exactly because of limted perception, unawareness of the variables affecting your "choice". Don't think about hypotheical, abstract choices- think about the last real "choice" you made- can you honestly claim that it was made in a vaccuum, completely unaffected by your environment, your upbringing, your emotions, your upbringing, or any of your other life experinces so far?

If you can't differentiate between choice and the illusion of choice, how can you be so certain that our choices to be responsible or not, to believe in a particular religion or not, is only an illusion?
Science, logic, and reason.

[dglas]

I must admit, I find the discussion between Beth ad Piscivore particularly interesting (entertaining even). I should be interested to see how it turns out. They are both, I think on the very edge of respective revelations.... ;)

Piscivore is reading the signs and Beth is saying they don't mean what he thinks they do...

There. That should annoy them... :D

[ParanoidAndroid]

Sure. It is the result of the individual's past experience, genetic makeup, and environmental opportunities. All of which are under sway of the same immutable forces of the universe that restrict the individual.

Sure. "pearls before swine" and all that. Someone who isn't prepared or capable of understanding something- critical thinking, in our case- isn't going to be influenced to adopt it no matter what we do. However, this being true does not mean that any one of us, with our limited perceptions and awareness, can know for certain this is the case. We can guess, make gross approximations, but not know.


Sorry; that should have been more obvious to me. Thanks for walking me through it anyway. :o

[James Fox]

This, I find interesting and somewhat confusing (within the deterministic framework): does determinism account for varied human aptitude relative to change/education; and if so, how? Is it even necessary or useful in deterministic terms to consider this aptitude?

If this has already been covered, I apologize for missing it.

If your asking if ones ability to change their pattern of behaviors is predicated on aptitude I’d say absolutely yes. The question I was raising, or just commenting on had more to do with public policy ramifications with regard to the limited likelihood of people making significant life changes regardless of the type of intervention.

I personally think any notion of the rational brain somehow floating outside our physical, chemical and animal bodies is absurd. If you drink to much you will alter the chemical reactions in your brain, inevitably determining your subsequent perceptions to be faulty and giving you an impaired ability act on these faulty perceptions.

Martini drinkers axiom: the decision to have a second martini is a good one, all subsequent decisions are suspect.

When asked to describe a martini Billie Holiday said, “it’s a bowel of razor blade soup”.

[Complexity]

Determinism as detailed by Compl. almost makes sense. It is sure more plausible than "pre-destination", but..
Way back when, I could burn my fingers on the griddle Ma cooked up the eggs on.
Didn't take too many close encounters to finger out that touching it wasn't a good idea.
But, I can -still- touch that hot griddle when I whip up my eggs in the morning, if I choose to.
My past experience doesn't -force- me to not touch it now.


Your past experience with hot griddles isn't the only factor that contributes to your decision to touch or not touch the griddle.

Your whim or perversity (i.e. your desire to show me up) may outweigh your memory of pain that resulted from previous griddle experiences, and your choice may be to touch the griddle.

Does this mean that your 'choice' wasn't fully determined by the past? Not at all. Your desire to show me up is also fully determined by the past.

Everything that contributed to your decision was fully determined by the past.

[ParanoidAndroid]

If your asking if ones ability to change their pattern of behaviors is predicated on aptitude I’d say absolutely yes. The question I was raising, or just commenting on had more to do with public policy ramifications with regard to the limited likelihood of people making significant life changes regardless of the type of intervention.

I personally think any notion of the rational brain somehow floating outside our physical, chemical and animal bodies is absurd. If you drink to much you will alter the chemical reactions in your brain, inevitably determining your subsequent perceptions to be faulty and giving you an impaired ability act on these faulty perceptions.


Thanks for that...I think I just got my wires crossed for a second and forgot about the personal vs. societal implications you clarify above. Between you, Pisci, and Porch, (and Complexity's comments) I am now seeing determinism much more as a practical view point and less as theoretical fluff.

I think I need a little time to let it really sink in, but I find it nearly impossible to dismiss determinism as merely a semantic perspective shift lacking merit (don't think I would have been capable of that statement when this thread started).

:)

[Piscivore]

I must admit, I find the discussion between Beth ad Piscivore particularly interesting (entertaining even). I should be interested to see how it turns out. They are both, I think on the very edge of respective revelations.... ;)

Piscivore is reading the signs and Beth is saying they don't mean what he thinks they do...

There. That should annoy them... :D

Why?

And I thought you were ignoring me?

[Complexity]

Thanks to Complexity and others for offering their perspectives on some of the questions I have asked about determinism.

So (tentatively), if I understand properly the viewpoints of the determinists in this thread, while we may not (or, more strongly, do not) have really real "free will," (in terms of magical/mystical ability to break antecedent-consequent causal chains) in a social context it serves us to maintain these conventions (responsibility, culpability, freedom, dignity, choice and the like) for the smooth running of our societies. Perhaps that these ideas provide a context for the consistent and understandable application of reinforcements? And this primarily because it "creates" efficacy with respect to running our societies.

Am I understanding this correctly?


While I've said that I like living in a world where people appear to be responsible for their actions and are held (by some) to be responsible for their actions, I'm not terribly comfortable with that position. In fact, I may have to drastically rethink my complacency with respect to the fiction of responsibility.

The reason is simple: If I go along with pretending that people are responsible for their actions for pragmatic reasons, 1) I'm being intellectually dishonest, and 2) it becomes difficult for me to argue with someone saying, "Well, we know religious belief is based upon woo and has no connection with reality, but it does tend to keep some people in line and has its uses, so let's act as though it is true."

Both are very strong arguments for me not to continue to pretend that I think people are responsible for their actions. Good. I've been uncomfortable with that aspect of what I wrote this morning.

I'm afraid I've just muddied up the waters a bit.

This has a lot of implications that I won't try to explore now.

This doesn't mean that I shouldn't try to shape the behavior of others or of myself, for recognition of the efficacy of behavior modification does not require a false belief in responsibility.

You and I may not agree on goals that we have, either for ourselves or for the societies in which we live. I may not be terribly concerned about the 'smooth running of our societies." I may not value efficacy in the running of our societies. We may disagree. I have to say that I don't think 'maintaining these conventions' (i.e. pretending, lying to ourselves) can be justified.

I've got to do a lot more thinking on these ideas.

[Complexity]

dglas asked why I used 'I' occasionally in an earlier post, and whether I and 'I' represent an important distinction to me.

I used 'I' to suggest that I regard the self as poorly defined, whispily constituted, uncentered, fleeting, discontinuous from one moment to the next, and nearly unreal. My views on the self have been influenced by both Dennett and some ideas in Buddhism.

I could have used the quoted form of I throughout.

[Dr H]

The JREF seems to be dedicated to exposing woo for woo and thereby, presumably influencing the beliefs of the consumers of woo. This would seem to suggest that the JREF, in principle, understands that beliefs are matters of decion or choice, and that people can change their beliefs about, at least, some things.

However, a common "defence" we'll hear from some believers (and some determinists) is that one cannot control one's beliefs and since, as the old ethics maxim goes "one is not responsible what one cannot control," one cannot be responsible for one's beliefs. Interesting idea, that.

People can control their beliefs to the extent that they are willing to examine them honestly, and with an open mind. Changing one's belief about something is, perhaps, more than a simple matter of will, requiring much rational assessment and reflection in the face of new evidence. They can change, though it may often be more a matter of work than of will. It does however seem to be true that people can deliberately choose to not change their belief in certain things -- one commonly seen aspect of faith is the persistence of a belief in spite of contrary evidence.

When I approach someone who holds what I feel to be an irrational belief I am to some extent hoping that the information I provide will interest them in further educating themselves, and maybe re-evaluating, and perhaps eventually changing their belief to something more rational.

On the other hand, I am not an evangelist, and I'm not out to force people to change, with this caveat: so long as their beliefs are not harming others. With that in mind it appears to me that at least part of Randi's motivation, and perhaps JREF's as well, is not so much about change in belief as about change in behavior.

There are some wacky beliefs which are definitely harmful. Someone believing in astrology may be of no more consequence than the guy who walks down the street with his underwear outside his pants -- a little quirky, but he's not endangering anyone. But a homeopathist who sells distilled water that's been shaken 139 times to the left as a cancer cure is causing harm: he's exploiting sick people, perhaps leading them away from proper treatment, and certainly helping to deplete their financial resources.

Likewise, there's a difference between somebody doing a few Tarot readings for their friends at a party, and scumbags like John Edward who exploit people's grief for their own profit.

For myself, I'll gladly argue any wacky belief with someone, and I don't necessarily insist that they change it; but if I see them harming others with that belief, I will do whatever I can to get them to change that behavior. If they also change their belief, that's just icing on the cake.

[Piscivore]

There are some wacky beliefs behaviours which are definitely harmful. Someone believing in astrology may be of no more consequence than the guy who walks down the street with his underwear outside his pants -- a little quirky, but he's not endangering anyone. But a homeopathist who sells distilled water that's been shaken 139 times to the left as a cancer cure is causing harm: he's exploiting sick people, perhaps leading them away from proper treatment, and certainly helping to deplete their financial resources.

Likewise, there's a difference between somebody doing a few Tarot readings for their friends at a party, and scumbags like John Edward who exploit people's grief for their own profit.
One minor correction.

All the examples you note are behaviours, not "beliefs". We don't know what is in the head of the man with his pants outside his trousers. We don't know if the homeopathist "believes" in his product, or is just trying to make a buck. We don't know if the Tarot reader "believes" they are reading the future, or if they are just entertaining themselves and their friends. And we don't know if Edwards "believes" he can talk to dead people, is in it for the money, or if he just enjoys being in a spotlight.

We only know what they do.

[Dr H]

What religion an adult believer belongs to indicates a choice in most cases. But believing in a religion may be as innate to them as not believing is to many atheists. Clearly, this is speculation on my part, but I find it plausible that the tendancy to believe (or not) may well be innate.

Hmm... What if belief in religion, or belief in God has a genetic basis? :-)

Like many innate tendancies, we have choices in how to express that tendancy but not whether we have the tendancy. A natural artist may become a painter, an graphic designer, or a quilter. They have many choices about how to express their artistic inclinations, but not whether they have those inclinations. Likewise, I think we all have choices about what religious beliefs we may hold, but the choice about whether to be religious or not may be more of a natural tendancy than a choice. While we can choose to go with or fight against our natural tendancies, we cannot chose what those tendancies are.

Sounds like a variation on the "nature or nurture" argument.

Thus, I think it is reasonable to hold people responsible for the content of their beliefs and the actions they take based upon those beliefs. After all, we hold an alcoholic responsible for choosing to drink and drive even if we don't hold him/her responsible for their reaction to alcohol.

Perhaps not the best of analogies, since the position of most evidence-based treatment programs is that alcoholism is a disease(1). To what extent do you hold someone responsible for having a disease? A disease they may not know they have until they've entered a context -- e.g. drinking -- in which it suddenly becomes apparent?

I can't choose my genetic makeup, but I can choose whether I go to a Lutheran church, a Catholic church, an Ashram, or to no house of worship at all. What I believe must to some extent be a product of my environment, evidenced by, if nothing else, the fact that people believe some religious things now which they didn't believe 200 years ago, because those particular systems of belief didn't exist then.



(1)DSM-IVr; The American Medical Association; The American Psychiatric Association; The World Health Organization; and the American College of Physicians (among others) all tkae this view.

[Dr H]

I realized that 'choice' is an illusion. Every time that I approach a choice, there may appear to be several possible alternatives, but only one alternative is chosen, and the mechanism of choice is merely the passage of time, the inexorable flow of brain activity.

Nah. Every time there are alternatives the universe subdivides, so that while you only choose one of them in this universe, in the sum total of universes you have actually chosen all alternatives.

Of course it could still be argued that that makes 'choice' an illusion.

:-)

[Dr H]

One minor correction.

All the examples you note are behaviours, not "beliefs". We don't know what is in the head of the man with his pants outside his trousers. We don't know if the homeopathist "believes" in his product, or is just trying to make a buck. We don't know if the Tarot reader "believes" they are reading the future, or if they are just entertaining themselves and their friends. And we don't know if Edwards "believes" he can talk to dead people, is in it for the money, or if he just enjoys being in a spotlight.

We only know what they do.

It's possible, I suppose, that Edwards might not really believe that he can make money by convincing people that he can communicate with the dead, but if so then he's carrying an even weirder psychopathology than I had imagined.

Whether he actually believes that he can talk to the dead is a different issue.

[Dr H]

I mean in no way to offend by the statement to follow (but am certain I will, nonetheless): if one accepts that there is no personal responsibility in association with beliefs and no choice, I see no way that the JREF is not reduced to intellectual group masturbation…just my perspective.

"Don't knock masturbation; it's sex with someone I love." -- Woody Allen

[ParanoidAndroid]

"Don't knock masturbation; it's sex with someone I love." -- Woody Allen


Great quote! Don't get me wrong; I am a vocal proponent of masturbation. I was just expressing my relevant ignorance in a "colorful" way. :D

[Piscivore]

It's possible, I suppose, that Edwards might not really believe that he can make money by convincing people that he can communicate with the dead, but if so then he's carrying an even weirder psychopathology than I had imagined.
:D

[articulett]

I think most people are content to believe whatever it is that they've been indoctrinated to believe...

I think it takes someone really choosing to really know the truth... or to admit not knowing something-- to let go of beliefs. It takes an awareness of the alternative and a preference for wanting to know the truth, even if it means you've been fooling yourself. I don't think most people are comfortable with that kind of choice even if it occurs to them that it's an option. And I don't think a lot of people are even aware of the option. When you are told by the people you trust the most that you will live happily ever after for believing a certain story and suffer for eternity for not believing it... it becomes easier to believe... or at least say you do-- rather than to think about it, and risk losing faith.

[Complexity]

I don't think you can choose to adopt a new belief.

I think you can choose to examine some aspect of your beliefs, to read, to talk with people, to sit and ponder, and out of this may come a change in the strength of some of your beliefs, or the loss of a belief, or the acceptance of a new belief, but I don't think you can steer towards a new belief and hope to get there.

All, of course, within the context of determinism.

[slingblade]

Originally Posted by slingblade





Do you have an answer?


Nope.

[James Fox]

Thanks for that...I think I just got my wires crossed for a second and forgot about the personal vs. societal implications you clarify above. Between you, Pisci, and Porch, (and Complexity's comments) I am now seeing determinism much more as a practical view point and less as theoretical fluff.

I think I need a little time to let it really sink in, but I find it nearly impossible to dismiss determinism as merely a semantic perspective shift lacking merit (don't think I would have been capable of that statement when this thread started).

:)
I hope I didn’t sound to pessimistic. I started out my career as a substance abuse counselor, moved on to mental health evaluations and for the past twenty-one years I’ve investigated child abuse and neglect for Big Brother. My personal experience has been that change is fairly rare but it does happen given the right circumstances. I concede that my personal experience has had a significant impact on my philosophical world view and how I see the human condition played out as part of a material world. Perhaps this is why I swing back and forth between the Romantic in music and the fine arts, and angst ridden raging angry **** at times.


I'm afraid I've just muddied up the waters a bit.

This doesn't mean that I shouldn't try to shape the behavior of others or of myself, for recognition of the efficacy of behavior modification does not require a false belief in responsibility.

I've got to do a lot more thinking on these ideas.

The waters of every day life are muddy. And clear pristine waters only exist between the neural synapses of our brains. So lets agree to value thinking!

And I really do appreciate your struggle with the whole responsibility thing; you're in very good historical/philosophical company. Again my experience advises me that what efficiency that can be achieved through a presumptive responsibility has a value greater than having arrived at the defensible abstract conclusion of non responsibility. At some point the deterministic/free will/choice discussion ends up confronting values with regard to our fellow humans. Should parents be held responsible for meeting the basic minimal needs of their children? Not likely to hear any objection to that proposition or any number of other ideas that apply to the protection of the week and defenseless. At a minimum we could simply accept that the proposition of personal responsibility as we now understand it is the only functional and feasible option given the status of human evolution.

As for our ultimate capacity to determine our own course of action, I’m not sure that we have any thing more than a finite ability to process what is in front of us based on the limitations of the organism and its cumulative history up to that point. Something much more complex than the field of sunflowers following the sun across the sky, but not much more than your dog scratching and sitting in front of the door wanting to be let out.

[dglas]

Okay. Allow me to muddle the waters even further....

Why does determinism appeal to you? What makes you think it is true?

[ParanoidAndroid]

I don't think you can choose to adopt a new belief.

I think you can choose to examine some aspect of your beliefs, to read, to talk with people, to sit and ponder, and out of this may come a change in the strength of some of your beliefs, or the loss of a belief, or the acceptance of a new belief, but I don't think you can steer towards a new belief and hope to get there.

All, of course, within the context of determinism.


just a side note...

While they are rare (and horribly impressionable) there are those who "choose" beliefs in a similar fashion to how they "choose" the color of shirt they will wear on a given day.

I think certain people can "choose" to adopt a belief; I don't think that most do so in this fashion. I have known a couple 'free sprits' like these (although I seriously doubt their reasonability). :wink:

[articulett]

I agree with complexity... Maybe you could get yourself to sort of believe something... or to feel like you had faith if you used enough affirmations or something... but I don't think that believing something is really exactly a choice... it's more like emotions... you can choose them or alter them to some extent but, by and large,... they happen and you interpret why--what caused them--confabulating a reason if you must. I think the same is probably true for "beliefs".

Sexual attraction is kind of like that too... if it's a choice... it doesn't seem like it's very much of one... there's wiggle room (pun intended :) )-- but, by and large, neither we nor other animals seem to "choose" what we are attracted to to any great extent. Rather, it's more like it happens to us. The same with love. That's what is weird about the bible... you are told to love people and god... but how can you make yourself "love"? How do you know if you're loving enough or doing it right. Can you just act like you "love"-- or do you have to really feel it? I could say I "believe" or that I "love" but I think those are brain processes and I don't think we have a whole lot of control over our brain processes.

There's a choice in the sense that there may not be coercion or manipulation... but that's a small choice amidst culture, indoctrination, tendencies, brain processes, etc.--at least not instant control.

[Complexity]

Okay. Allow me to muddle the waters even further....

Why does determinism appeal to you? What makes you think it is true?


I don't think that I believe in determinism because it appeals to me - I'm not sure whether it does appeal to me. I simply think it best describes how I think the world works.

My explanation of why I think it is true was given in post #38. Look it over again, if you will, and ask me some questions. I'll be happy to try to answer.

Let me ask you this: What alternative to determinism do you propose?

[Beth]

Well, it's predicated on a few important premises:
1) That causality exists. Without this, there could be no science.

Okay. That's a reasonable premise [/quote]

2) that humans, bodies, brains, and "mental processes" are affected wholly and completely by causality.[/quote] But you include "past mental processes" as part of the causality, do you not? If so, then that's a reasonable premise also. But if past mental processes are part of that causality, we have a bit of circular reasoning to deal with. How do you deal with it? I deal with it by being less certain of this premise than you apparently are.


3) That duality is incorrect. There is no magic stuff that can violate causality (stuff that for which there is, as we speak, no evidence) I'm not sure I agree with this premise or not. I find it a reasonable premise, but it basically ignores the issue of 'it's turtles all the way down', so again I am less certain of this premise than you seem to be.

Thank you. I think that explains your certainty. But if you wanted to further expound on why you find those premises so solid, I would be interested to hear it.




If human behaviour was truly random, no predictions could be made about it. The fields of psychology, criminal science, political science, marketing, group dynamics, etc. all suggest otherwise. Random behavior is predictable! That's how those things work. They are predicated on finding the expected probability distribution of the behaviors in question and correlating that distribution with various other predictive factors.
[quote]Who said they don't? Each hit on a pin may deform the pin ever so slightly, or set up a vibration that affects the next ball to strike it. They wear grooves into the backboard. The balls disturb the air molecules they move through. Of course they affect their environment. Okay. Point taken. They affect the environment. We don't presume they do so knowingly in order to achieve effects they have decided they want for themselves. Human beings do.
No, humans alter their environment soley by their behaviour. Their behavior depends on their thoughts and beliefs. Do you disagree that what goes on in people's head does affect their behavior?


That's pretty much not true given the content of this thread. :) :) Valid point. It is, indeed, of subject of much contention.


because our limited perceptual ability and inabbility to correlate all the factors we do percieve prevents us, not because they are "random". How do you know this? Particularly given the fact that quantum fluctions combined with chaotic systems implies that unpredictability of an integral aspect of the physical world, why are you so sure this is the case?


But, as has been illustrated, you cannot "choose" to think anything.
I'm sorry, but I'll have to disagree. That has not been illustrated. It has been hypothesized. You have presented a reasonably convincing case, but there remain certain inconsistencies detailed above. Not to mention the fact that 'it's all an illusion' is not a falsifiable hypothesis. You can't disprove it anymore than you can disprove the matrix or a god that never interacts with the universe either. Why are you so sure this unfalsifiable hypothesis is correct?

Indeed, there is research to suggest that the thinking happens after the body starts to perform the "chosen" action. Yes, that's quite interesting research. I'm not sure I agree that the timing implies that it cannot be a conscious process. It's certainly one interpretation of the experimental results.

Nice chatting with you Pisci. This has been an interesting thread and I'll look forward to reading more responses in the morning.

[AkuManiMani]

Nah. Every time there are alternatives the universe subdivides, so that while you only choose one of them in this universe, in the sum total of universes you have actually chosen all alternatives.

Of course it could still be argued that that makes 'choice' an illusion.

:-)

A choice is a conscious decision [as opposed to an involuntary action like a reflex]. The fact that there are underlying mechanisms in an individual's decision making process doesn't make it an 'illusion'.

I don't think that I believe in determinism because it appeals to me - I'm not sure whether it does appeal to me. I simply think it best describes how I think the world works.

Up until the early portion of the 20th century determinism was a pretty viable philosophy. In light of the understandings of fundamental physics gained since then it would appear that it has been pretty much invalidated.

As far as the whole issue of "free will" is concerned one need not invoke dualism in order for human decision making to be 'free'.

Let me ask you this: What alternative to determinism do you propose?

According to QM reality is fundamentally probabilistic.

[porch]

Okay. Allow me to muddle the waters even further....

Why does determinism appeal to you? What makes you think it is true?

On the appeals of determinism: When I first started seriously contemplating determinism in human behaviour, it didn't appeal to me at all. I really felt like I'd be losing something if I found that it were true. Upon choosing determinism to be my belief ;) , I actually had a bit of a rough go of it and found myself in a state of despair. Gradually, it stopped seeming so bad, and I even started occasionally having numinous experiences when mulling over the situation. Now I'm quite content with the notion. I guess I'm another example of a person who fails to predict what will make himself happy.

What I found most appealing, at first, despite my emotional revulsion to the idea, was that it seemed to be true. Which brings us to your second question: I can see everything else in the universe being "reduced" to physical laws. Why should the human mind be exempt? I have yet to see any compelling evidence. It's funny, when I believed in free will, I thought I knew what it meant. Now . . . it seems all seems very fuzzy. While it's true that a mechanistic explanation of choice would be indistinguishable from a model involving some inexplicable force called free will, I don't see why it's necessary. It reminds me of a theory that a lot of you here must have heard, that the brain could be some kind of receptor that picks up signals of consciousness - so yes, it's true that consciousness in an individual is damaged by damage to the brain, but it still leaves room for the consciousness to be intact. Somewhere. But where did these consciousness beams come from? It's at this point that I pull Ockham's Switchcomb out my back pocket and do a bit of grooming.

[Complexity]

I'm delighted to have met several interesting new people in this thread. Some of you actually seem to agree with me, at least in part, and this doesn't happen very often. I've learned from all that I don't have on Ignore.

I really appreciate that, at least from my view of the thread, it has been kept nearly free of the jargon of philosophy. Too many threads on free will and determinism have gotten bogged down in jargon and have been, in my opinion, a waste of time.

I also really appreciate that no one has mentioned 'quantum' yet. My bad. It isn't relevant to this discussion, but many enthusiasts just can't let it go.

Thanks. I look forward to reading more.

[dglas]

I'm delighted to have met several interesting new people in this thread. Some of you actually seem to agree with me, at least in part, and this doesn't happen very often. I've learned from all that I don't have on Ignore.

I really appreciate that, at least from my view of the thread, it has been kept nearly free of the jargon of philosophy. Too many threads on free will and determinism have gotten bogged down in jargon and have been, in my opinion, a waste of time.

I also really appreciate that no one has mentioned 'quantum' yet. My bad. It isn't relevant to this discussion, but many enthusiasts just can't let it go.

Thanks. I look forward to reading more.

Heh. Pre-emptive strike, eh? ;)
A recent movie told us that QM is used for hacking computers.
What? :D

I will need a little time to put together a response to: "Let me ask you this: What alternative to determinism do you propose?"
I honestly don't know if I am quite clever enough to come up with a fully fledged alternative to it in a few hours, if at all. ;)

Still, I shall try to answer as best I can. Just need a little time to put it together.

[Beth]

Hmm... What if belief in religion, or belief in God has a genetic basis? :-) Yes, that strikes me as one plausible explanation for the near universal belief in god/s of some sort throughout human societies.

Sounds like a variation on the "nature or nurture" argument. Not exactly. I'm saying beliefs, like everything else about us, are a combination of the two. We are, all of us, limited in some ways by our genetic structure and by our environment. I don't see why the ability to choose cannot exist within those limitations.

Perhaps not the best of analogies, since the position of most evidence-based treatment programs is that alcoholism is a disease(1). To what extent do you hold someone responsible for having a disease? A disease they may not know they have until they've entered a context -- e.g. drinking -- in which it suddenly becomes apparent? Alcoholism, like other addictions, is 'cured' by changing the individuals thought patterns so that they cease engaging in certain self-destructive behaviors. In order for this to happen, the individual must desire change and make a concious choice to not drink again. To the extent that alcoholism is held in remission by an act of will (i.e. the choice to NOT drink), I think it fits with this discussion.

I can't choose my genetic makeup, but I can choose whether I go to a Lutheran church, a Catholic church, an Ashram, or to no house of worship at all. What I believe must to some extent be a product of my environment, evidenced by, if nothing else, the fact that people believe some religious things now which they didn't believe 200 years ago, because those particular systems of belief didn't exist then. I quite agree. Environment certainly plays a role in which specific beliefs an individual holds.

A choice is a conscious decision [as opposed to an involuntary action like a reflex]. The fact that there are underlying mechanisms in an individual's decision making process doesn't make it an 'illusion'.

I agree with this. In addition, I don't think the fact that choices are never completely free, but constrained by the environment and the genetic make-up of an individual mean it is an 'illusion' either.

[Complexity]

I will need a little time to put together a response to: "Let me ask you this: What alternative to determinism do you propose?"
I honestly don't know if I am quite clever enough to come up with a fully fledged alternative to it in a few hours, if at all. ;)

Still, I shall try to answer as best I can. Just need a little time to put it together.


Don't worry about constructing a position that you're comfortable with and regard as defensible - I'd just like to have a point of entry into a discussion. There are many alternatives to determinism that have been proposed in the past - rather than pick one at random, I thought it would be better if you point me in a direction.

One request: I'm not at all interested in discussing god-did-it alternatives. Please pick one that doesn't appear to involve the supernatural (if you can think of one).

[James Fox]

According to QM reality is fundamentally probabilistic.

[QUOTE=Complexity;3689489]

I also really appreciate that no one has mentioned 'quantum' yet. My bad. It isn't relevant to this discussion, but many enthusiasts just can't let it go.
[QUOTE]

Pssssst. Hey Complexity..., on the QT, QM was mentioned. Sorry to bring it up.

[Complexity]

I also really appreciate that no one has mentioned 'quantum' yet. My bad. It isn't relevant to this discussion, but many enthusiasts just can't let it go.



Pssssst. Hey Complexity..., on the QT, QM was mentioned. Sorry to bring it up.


But only by an Ignorable.

For the record, the reason why quantum mechanics isn't relevant to this discussion is that it pertains to prediction of future states (looking forward), and I'm dealing with trying to account for the transition between states, deliberately looking back so that issues like quantum mechanics are ignorable.

It doesn't matter to me that there may be unpredictable factors in state transition - the important thing is that those unpredictable factors don't provide an entry point for will or volition. They don't. (Yes, I know that many woos disagree. They don't matter.)

[I Ratant]

"Alcoholism, like other addictions, is 'cured' by changing the individuals thought patterns so that they cease engaging in certain self-destructive behaviors. In order for this to happen, the individual must desire change and make a conscious choice to not drink again. To the extent that alcoholism is held in remission by an act of will (i.e. the choice to NOT drink), I think it fits with this discussion."
.
I will confirm this.
Only by consciously derailing the need to continue the addiction can an addiction be halted.
Worked for me, when realized some 34 years ago.
No 12-steps, just one.
"Never again!"
The desire is still there.
But I remember.. "One is too many, six won't be enough."

[Darth Rotor]

"Alcoholism, like other addictions, is 'cured' by changing the individuals thought patterns so that they cease engaging in certain self-destructive behaviors. In order for this to happen, the individual must desire change and make a conscious choice to not drink again. To the extent that alcoholism is held in remission by an act of will (i.e. the choice to NOT drink), I think it fits with this discussion."
.
I will confirm this.
Only by consciously derailing the need to continue the addiction can an addiction be halted.
Worked for me, when realized some 34 years ago.
No 12-steps, just one.
"Never again!"
The desire is still there.
But I remember.. "One is too many, six won't be enough."How dare you defy the pre-determined state of you? You were either bound to be a drinker, and you defied it, or you were bound to be dry, and you temporarily defied it.

How dare you? :D
*don's smart alec hat*

Weren't you aware that among True Skeptics, experiential data is dismissed? :o

(Hang in there. That sorta worked for me vis a vis smoking, but I fell off the wagon a few months ago. Damnit. Am I determined to always be a smoker? :p )

DR

[AkuManiMani]

Pssssst. Hey Complexity..., on the QT, QM was mentioned. Sorry to bring it up.

*sigh*

Yea, Complexity has a a tendency to regard any facts that contradict his assumptions as 'irrelevant' and any poster that disagrees with him as 'ignorable'. Honestly, I think he's psychologically incapable of even entertaining the possibility of being wrong...about anything :rolleyes:

I will need a little time to put together a response to: "Let me ask you this: What alternative to determinism do you propose?"
I honestly don't know if I am quite clever enough to come up with a fully fledged alternative to it in a few hours, if at all. ;)

Why would you need a few hours to come up with an alternative? Either all events are deterministic [i.e. perfect knowledge of initial states and the rules that govern them, in principle, gives perfect knowledge of unfolding events] or it is not. If the former is true then every event that occurs is predetermined, if the latter then one can not -- even in principle -- predict future events with certainty.

[Piscivore]

But you include "past mental processes" as part of the causality, do you not? If so, then that's a reasonable premise also.
Yes, but notice that it is in quotes. "Past mental processes" is shorthand for the myriad influences and events that make up a memory.

But if past mental processes are part of that causality, we have a bit of circular reasoning to deal with. How do you deal with it?
Can you explicate? I dodn't see any circular reasoning about it. Any peg that the ball strikes on the way down is going to change somethng about the ball's velocity, spin and/or direction, and that's going to impact the way the ball strikes the next peg. Similarly, what happened to you then is going to impact what happens to you next. If you read about someone getting mugged in a dark alley, that might make you hesitate before stepping into a dark alley. Or it might make you buy a gun. Or it might make you travel with a companion. Or it might make you join a gym.

But do note that this is an extremely simplified example. In "real life" there are going to be hundreds of different infuences impacting your behaviour.

I deal with it by being less certain of this premise than you apparently are.
Okay. Tell me where the error lies, as you see it. It might convince me too.

I'm not sure I agree with this premise or not. I find it a reasonable premise, but it basically ignores the issue of 'it's turtles all the way down', so again I am less certain of this premise than you seem to be.
It's not the same thing at all. We can observe causality, study it's effects, and have thusfar (to my knowledge) found any reasonable evidence that anything can violate it. Note that I'm ignoring QM for now because 1) I don't know much about it, 2) I do know that quite a lot of what people say they know about it is said to be incorrect by people in a position to actually know about it, 3) it is common to use misrepresentations of QM to prop up all kinds of pseudoscientific "woo, and 4) those that are in a postition to know something about QM say that it operates only on the sub-subatomic level- once you get past atoms it's causality all the way up. If you've got evidence otherwise I'd love to hear it.

That's hardly the same thing as postulating an infinite chain of imaginary entities.

Thank you. I think that explains your certainty. But if you wanted to further expound on why you find those premises so solid, I would be interested to hear it.
Sure, anything specific you'd like me to address?

Random behavior is predictable! That's how those things work. They are predicated on finding the expected probability distribution of the behaviors in question and correlating that distribution with various other predictive factors.
No, you can't "predict" random behaviour. You can guess, more or less accurately, but you can't predict. And apparent "randomness" is explained adequately by unpredictability- the idea that the factors involved are too complex (or are unmeasurable) to all be accounted for.

It seems a lot simpler explanation for this phenomenon of "randomness" to say there are factors the guesser is unaware of, that to postulate some extra-causual mechanism that breaks the chain of causality, doesn't it?

Their behavior depends on their thoughts and beliefs. Do you disagree that what goes on in people's head does affect their behavior?

Yes. The research I pointed to indicates that you've got it backwards. Our bodies do the acting, in a complex, ongoing dance of stimulus/response- just like every other "non-conscious" oranism alive. The only difference between us and them is memory and self-awareness. And these both occur after the action is taken.

Basically, what "we" are, this identity we cling to, is nothing more than what we remember doing.

How do you know this? Particularly given the fact that quantum fluctions combined with chaotic systems implies that unpredictability of an integral aspect of the physical world, why are you so sure this is the case?
Well, you may or may not know more about QM than I, but you clearly don't seem to understand chaos theory:
Systems that exhibit mathematical chaos are deterministic and thus orderly in some sense; this technical use of the word chaos is at odds with common parlance, which suggests complete disorder.

I'm sorry, but I'll have to disagree. That has not been illustrated. It has been hypothesized. You have presented a reasonably convincing case, but there remain certain inconsistencies detailed above.
I'll address any remaing as best I can.

Not to mention the fact that 'it's all an illusion' is not a falsifiable hypothesis.
Well, "it's all an illusion" isn't what I said. I said that free will is an illusion. It is certainly falsifiable, all one need to is demonstrate a "choice" that was uninfluenced by any external factor, find evidence of a non-causal agent in human cognition, or demonstrate that human behaviour was not bound by the chain of causality.

You can't disprove it anymore than you can disprove the matrix or a god that never interacts with the universe either.
Oh, not true. Not even close. Because this hypothesis is entirely grounded in the universe and its interactions.

Why are you so sure this unfalsifiable hypothesis is correct?
Because it fits with all the evidence and research I have available to me, and because it is not unfalsifiable.

Yes, that's quite interesting research. I'm not sure I agree that the timing implies that it cannot be a conscious process. It's certainly one interpretation of the experimental results.
And what is the basis for an alternative "interpretation"?

Nice chatting with you Pisci. This has been an interesting thread and I'll look forward to reading more responses in the morning.
Likewise. :)

[Piscivore]

Alcoholism, like other addictions, is 'cured' by changing the individuals thought patterns so that they cease engaging in certain self-destructive behaviors. In order for this to happen, the individual must desire change and make a concious choice to not drink again. To the extent that alcoholism is held in remission by an act of will (i.e. the choice to NOT drink), I think it fits with this discussion.

Not quite. People "decide" to quit drinking, smoking, overeating, etc. all the time, but keep doing it. Contrariwise, the person who no longer has access to the substance in question will not drink or smoke or overeat, regardless of whether he wants to or not.

The only way to "cease engaging in certain self-destructive behaviors" is to cease engaging in certain self-destructive behaviors. "Choice" is just a shorhand, post-hoc (and incorrect) description of the myriad forces that altered the behaviour.

[dglas]

One request: I'm not at all interested in discussing god-did-it alternatives. Please pick one that doesn't appear to involve the supernatural (if you can think of one).

Gak! Have you read nothing I have written? I am not about to take refuge in a God-concept! (is there a tsk-tsk smiley?) ;)

I might end up saying I don't know something though. I claim that right as a skeptic...

[I Ratant]

I'm getting to read "determinism" as a rationalization for making bad decisions, and wishing to find someone/something else to blame, rather than actually saying "I did it."
When "it" turns out well, then all those previous experiences get the credit.
When "it" turns out poorly, then it's "I had no control, it's all those previous experiences that forced me to ... ".
As much asprevious experience gives people a basis to work from, it's not a cause for anything now.

[dglas]

Why would you need a few hours to come up with an alternative? Either all events are deterministic [i.e. perfect knowledge of initial states and the rules that govern them, in principle, gives perfect knowledge of unfolding events] or it is not. If the former is true then every event that occurs is predetermined, if the latter then one can not -- even in principle -- predict future events with certainty.

I was making a quip about doing in a few hours what others take whole careers to accomplish. I guess you had to be there... ;)

Possibly (although one runs into troubles with including "knowledge" in that understanding). However, most of us are not merely content with a "yes" or a "no." We'd like to see the reasons for giving the "yes" or the "no." We are talking about explanatory devices (indeed different kinds of explanatory devices) and, for the purposes of this thread, their impact on social policy.

[dglas]

I'm getting to read "determinism" as a rationalization for making bad decisions, and wishing to find someone/something else to blame, rather than actually saying "I did it."
When "it" turns out well, then all those previous experiences get the credit.
When "it" turns out poorly, then it's "I had no control, it's all those previous experiences that forced me to ... ".

You can read it that way if you want, but it doesn't capture the full force of the idea. Add credit to blame as well and you start to get the idea. Determinism is not just a way of trying to avoid the bad part of volition. That is only one particular consequence of determinism.


As much asprevious experience gives people a basis to work from, it's not a cause for anything now.

Well now. Quibbling about "experience" aside, that seems to be the question at hand (at least for the conversation on determinism), doesn't it?

[James Fox]

Okay. Allow me to muddle the waters even further....

Why does determinism appeal to you? What makes you think it is true?

At present it seems the most rational, reasonable and likely option given what I presume to know and have experienced. As with Complexity there is no “appeal” for me in the manner that I’m drawn to a particular painting or author. If anything (like others have mentioned)I have feelings of sadness and even regret that there isn’t something more affirming of my desires and feelings. Emotionally I can tend toward Romantic or Epic narrative and emotionally overwhelming music and images are great loads of fun. Those who thought music and art should be reflective of current philosophical trends and beliefs take themselves way to seriously.

But only by an Ignorable.

For the record, the reason why quantum mechanics isn't relevant to this discussion is that it pertains to prediction of future states (looking forward), and I'm dealing with trying to account for the transition between states, deliberately looking back so that issues like quantum mechanics are ignorable.

It doesn't matter to me that there may be unpredictable factors in state transition - the important thing is that those unpredictable factors don't provide an entry point for will or volition. They don't. (Yes, I know that many woos disagree. They don't matter.)

Agreed. It seems to me that no matter what all future potential choices/possibilities may be, that potential has no capacity to predict or compel the actual event specific as it has no real existence except as conceptual theory. To postulate potentials as preexistent realities, which will somehow be pulled into an existent reality as a result of some thought/choice/decision mechanism has always seemed wrought with woo and smelling of deconstructed post Socratic cosmology. (how’s that for the daily dose of philosophical jargon?)

[dglas]

Let's see how thoroughly I can get my ass kicked... ;)

I think in order to understand why I am not a strict determinist, I will need, like Complexity did, to give a brief history of my thinking.

God-Concepts
As a student of philosophy (waaay back then) and a non-theist, I was intrigued with the kind of concept God was. After only a little bit of work I learned that, as an explanatory device, God was a failure. For many, the idea that it explained everything was persuasive, but I saw that it prohibited nothing and realized that as an explanatory device it provided us with a goose-egg in terms of predictive power. I referred to it as a God-concept (go figure!), and started looking for others...

Self-Interest
In analytic ethics, I came across the plethora of theories based on this idea of "self-interest." What was interesting about the idea of self-interest is that every possible choice could be characterized in terms of self-interest. It soon became plainly obvious that the reason for this was the way in which the concept was defined. It explained all possible behaviours, including self-contradictory ones, and prohibited none, and in so doing, negated any predictive power the idea had. I had found another God-Concept and this one was commonly accepted among contemporary scholars. Again, arguments from self-interest are ridiculously persuasive precisely because self-interest seems to explain everything.

Determinism
Along came determinism. For me it was in the form of Skinnerian behaviouralism. It's central effort was an attempt to turn psychology into a science by dealing only with what could be "verified" (external behaviour) and (pretty much) ignoring everything else. A passing nod was given to internal states by asserting that our feelings of free will and the like were us experiencing our behaviour. It also assumed a causal (or at least correlational chain) between antecedent events and consequent behaviours. Again a scientific way of looking at things. At first I played along with it, trying determinism on for size as it were. It quickly dawned on me that it could explain ever behaviour as a consequent of antecedent causal events including self-contradictory ones. Very persuasive. The next obvious task was to try to find a behaviour example it does not explain. Still looking. That's right. Another God-concept. Antecedent events are perceived as causal effects because they are defined such that they are.

So, to be perfectly honest, I dismiss determinism as an explanatory device for exactly the same reason I dismiss God and self-interest as explanatory devices: they have no predictive power because they "explain everything and preclude nothing." Now, I'm not saying that I don't think determinism has something to offer us, however, to assume it is the truth is as much an error from a scientific perspective (not even considering a skeptical perspective) as it is to accept God as an explanatory device. I suspect it is the first step down a long path, but it is not, as far as I can tell the end point.

Rampant Speculation

Now, there can be any number of possible and different ideas about free will, not all of which need be supernatural in nature. The interesting thing, historically, is that religion sought to annex human volition (just as it sought to annex just about every other human quality and function) within its supernatural framework and most have come to accept this, including, I suspect, some folks critical of religion - perhaps to the point where they dismiss free will on the basis of its presumed supernatural association. Perhaps the reason we see free will as a supernatural breaking of a causal chain is because we rarely try to phrase it any other way, or pehaps more to the point, because determinism presents us with a dichotomous understanding of determined vs uncaused - a dichotomous relationship supported and promoted by religion seeking to present itself as the fundament of free will.

One such non-supernatural way of viewing free will might be as an emergent property of mind as a social construct. I am not saying this is the case, nor am I able at this point to defend it. All I am suggesting is that it may be possible to posit something functionally identical to (or very much like) free will in non-supernatural terms. Perhaps free will is something that naturally arises from our distinction between self and environment, or perhaps from some other aspect of our understanding of self. This is not as new-agey as it may sound. After all, if one conceives of oneself as being comprised of three warring selves in constant conflict, is it any surprise that one feels internally conflicted? If one perceives of oneself as being a being of sin, is it any surprise that one feels the need for forgiveness? You could build a business off of those...

The point really is that just because a particular idea (even something as seemingly irrefutable as determinism) suggests that something is true doesn't mean it is. Of all people, skeptics (scientific skeptics included) must understand this. We've seen through it with respect to the first God-concept....

It may be that we are wholly determined beings, but for the time being, I do not see sufficient cause to accept that we are without allowing for possible alternatives...

Have at it, vile fiends.... ;)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I have noticed a pattern. People (in general) tend to think in opposites.

For example, in several discussions on this forum people is either in favor or against "Global Warming". People is either a materialist or an idealist. The same goes for atheist and theist, naturalist and supernaturalist, and so on.

I (hope) want to believe this is wrong, that not everybody have this incredible lack of imagination! ;)

But then again, when I look in this thread... it appears to break down (for most) in just two components, either you believe in "free will", or you believe in "determinism".

For a lack of a better expression, I believe that sucks. Yes, free will is absurd, we lack free will, it is an illusion, but the opposite is also absurd, we are not simple machines with a binary code, most decisions involve an hypercomplex arrangement of what we call "choices", emotional pressures, memories and so on.

Like Akumanimani said, nature is probabilistic. More exactly, our best theoretical approach to predict reality relies on mathematical probabilistic models. Some events are so close to being deterministic that we have learn to label them as that. In other words, we conclude that a "real determinism" was going on.

But such model is as obsolete as Newtonian mechanics. Even when dealing with relatively simple systems (like billiards) the probabilities of something to happen are so incredible high that it appears that the outcome is determinate by the initial settings.

Other (relatively speaking) systems, like the movement of planets, can also be described (to an extent) with strict deterministic models. But when dealing with other kind of systems (weather, earthquakes, beliefs, quantum states) our deterministic models are simply rendered obsolete.

[AkuManiMani]

God-Concepts
As a student of philosophy (waaay back then) and a non-theist, I was intrigued with the kind of concept God was. After only a little bit of work I learned that, as an explanatory device, God was a failure. For many, the idea that it explained everything was persuasive, but I saw that it prohibited nothing and realized that as an explanatory device it provided us with a goose-egg in terms of predictive power. I referred to it as a God-concept (go figure!), and started looking for others...

Pretty much have to agree with you here. The whole "It is thus because God willed it to be so" is really a non-answer that explains nothing. I don't even see how it even really addresses the issue of free will other than rendering it meaningless by making everything the product of conscious agency.

Self-Interest
In analytic ethics, I came across the plethora of theories based on this idea of "self-interest." What was interesting about the idea of self-interest is that every possible choice could be characterized in terms of self-interest. It soon became plainly obvious that the reason for this was the way in which the concept was defined. It explained all possible behaviours, including self-contradictory ones, and prohibited none, and in so doing, negated any predictive power the idea had. I had found another God-Concept and this one was commonly accepted among contemporary scholars. Again, arguments from self-interest are ridiculously persuasive precisely because self-interest seems to explain everything.

Hmm...I don't find this particular line of though very persuasive - even at face value precisely for the reason you mentioned; one could simply broaden the definition of 'self-interest' to fit any action taken.

Determinism
Along came determinism. For me it was in the form of Skinnerian behaviouralism. It's central effort was an attempt to turn psychology into a science by dealing only with what could be "verified" (external behaviour) and (pretty much) ignoring everything else. A passing nod was given to internal states by asserting that our feelings of free will and the like were us experiencing our behaviour. It also assumed a causal (or at least correlational chain) between antecedent events and consequent behaviours. Again a scientific way of looking at things. At first I played along with it, trying determinism on for size as it were. It quickly dawned on me that it could explain ever behaviour as a consequent of antecedent causal events including self-contradictory ones. Very persuasive. The next obvious task was to try to find a behaviour example it does not explain. Still looking. That's right. Another God-concept. Antecedent events are perceived as causal effects because they are defined such that they are.

I wouldn't go as far as to call determinism a 'God concept', it predicts only that given enough knowledge about an entity and its surroundings one can predict its behavior to an arbitrary degree whether the subject in question is an inanimate object, a system or an intelligent agency. On its face, its very commonsensical in much the same way that the early assumption that the earth's position is fixed as the sun and stars revolved around it.

As you mentioned, unlike the previous two interpretations, determinism is much more scientific in the sense that it lends itself to empirical scrutiny. The thing is that the actual findings of 20th century physics don't really agree with the classical assumptions of determinism. As a philosophy determinism is quite coherent and logically consistent but its basic assumptions are as illusory as the immobility of the earth.

Rampant Speculation

Now, there can be any number of possible and different ideas about free will, not all of which need be supernatural in nature. The interesting thing, historically, is that religion sought to annex human volition (just as it sought to annex just about every other human quality and function) within its supernatural framework and most have come to accept this, including, I suspect, some folks critical of religion - perhaps to the point where they dismiss free will on the basis of its presumed supernatural association. Perhaps the reason we see free will as a supernatural breaking of a causal chain is because we rarely try to phrase it any other way, or pehaps more to the point, because determinism presents us with a dichotomous understanding of determined vs uncaused - a dichotomous relationship supported and promoted by religion seeking to present itself as the fundament of free will.

I think I'm pretty much in agreement with you on this one. The whole 'free will vs. determinism' debate is a false dichotomy much like the whole 'nature vs. nurture' argument. I believe much of the contention arises from how one defines the 'free' in free will -- to those thinking within the dichotomy 'free' implies 'uncaused'. Determinist philosophy isn't so much an attempt to explain or understand volition; its an attempt to keep teleological arguments of any sort from creeping into scientific discourse.

The fear is that if one ascribes the behavior of any entity to 'free will' one opens the door to teleological thinking and its big ugly brother Theism. The idea of reducing the explanation of an event to 'such-in-such willed it to be so' is equivalent to invoking a 'god' explanation that doesn't actually [I]explain anything. IMO, the rationale is well intentioned but misguided. If one's purpose is to gain a scientific understanding of volition [as apposed to other types of phenomenon] its very counter productive to pretend it doesn't exist. Choice [aka free-will] isn't mutually exclusive to cause & effect.

One such non-supernatural way of viewing free will might be as an emergent property of mind as a social construct.

Any actual explanation is, by definition, non-supernatural.

I am not saying this is the case, nor am I able at this point to defend it. All I am suggesting is that it may be possible to posit something functionally identical to (or very much like) free will in non-supernatural terms. Perhaps free will is something that naturally arises from our distinction between self and environment, or perhaps from some other aspect of our understanding of self.

Hmmm..I wouldn't exactly put it that way. I'd say that being aware of any distinctions is consciousness. Free will is being aware of possible scenarios based off of those perceived distinctions, discerning which are more favorable than the others, and setting a course of action based off of those assessments. When a conscious entity's actions are based upon its own native assessments its will can be considered 'free'. If this process is impeded by an outside agency their will is not as 'free'; if its overridden then they cannot be said to have a will at all -- let alone a 'free' one.

[a_unique_person]

Then why does it bother to attempt to "educate" people about cold reading, psychic surgeons, flim-flam and other woo?

What exact kind of affect is the JREF trying to have then?

Because at any one time, there will be 'X' number of people who have decided their current belief system is useless, and are looking for another. That's how Charles Manson got his team together, by just collecting people who were after something other than what they had. Hopefully, scepticism will give them something that is a lot more, a system of not just moving on from the totally useless, but finding something that is a systematic method of selecting what is worth knowing.

[AkuManiMani]

I have noticed a pattern. People (in general) tend to think in opposites.

For example, in several discussions on this forum people is either in favor or against "Global Warming". People is either a materialist or an idealist. The same goes for atheist and theist, naturalist and supernaturalist, and so on.

I (hope) want to believe this is wrong, that not everybody have this incredible lack of imagination! ;)

But then again, when I look in this thread... it appears to break down (for most) in just two components, either you believe in "free will", or you believe in "determinism".

For a lack of a better expression, I believe that sucks. Yes, free will is absurd, we lack free will, it is an illusion, but the opposite is also absurd, we are not simple machines with a binary code, most decisions involve an hypercomplex arrangement of what we call "choices", emotional pressures, memories and so on.

Like Akumanimani said, nature is probabilistic. More exactly, our best theoretical approach to predict reality relies on mathematical probabilistic models. Some events are so close to being deterministic that we have learn to label them as that. In other words, we conclude that a "real determinism" was going on.

But such model is as obsolete as Newtonian mechanics. Even when dealing with relatively simple systems (like billiards) the probabilities of something to happen are so incredible high that it appears that the outcome is determinate by the initial settings.

Other (relatively speaking) systems, like the movement of planets, can also be described (to an extent) with strict deterministic models. But when dealing with other kind of systems (weather, earthquakes, beliefs, quantum states) our deterministic models are simply rendered obsolete.

Hey BDZ, didn't you get the memo posted earlier in the thread? We're forbidden from mentioning quantum mechanics [oops!]. Apparently, certain responders on this thread would like to leave actual science out of this discussion and keep it purely within the realm of ideological bickering. Facts are counter productive, dontcha know? ;)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

On a macro scale is it really the case that our societies are not running smoothly? We tend to notice the hits and ignore the misses sometimes. If one considers the pure scale of a society like the United States or even Canada or any other country who's population measures in the millions, do the instances of "deviance" really represent a general failure or isolated instances of failure?

I would easily call this current society a general failure. Enough food is produced to feed every human alive, half of it goes to the trash can because costs, half humanity dies of hunger. Monetary based economy leads to some individuals accumulating billions and others that live with a budget of a couple of dollars a month. Our political systems are based on manipulating opinions instead of solving problems... and I can go on and on, please don't get me started!

Perhaps it is the bumps in the road that allow for change. We could try to create a Walden 2 (yes, I actually read it), but how would such a society adapt and progress. The problem with utopian thinking is that utopias tend to be stagnant, yes? Still, whether we might enhance the adaptability of our societies by excising some or all of these things you suggest is an open question - one we are struggling with (although it is usually couched in different terms).

Walden 2, great book, but nothing but fiction at this stage. Big changes need (painfully) a lot of time to happen. As for utopias.. we live in utopia! (go back in time and bring people to our time, you will see what I mean).

(1) Reinforcements need not consist only of punishments. If I understand correctly, behaviourists have determined (;))that positive reinforcements are generally more effective than aversive reinforcements at modifying behaviour.

Yet both are insufficient when dealing with biological causes of behavior.

(2) Punishment can be thought of in terms of rehabilitation or retribution. One thing about determinism; it tends to nip retributivism in the bud as an attitude towards modifying behaviour. This is a point a few of our determinist posters have made, albeit in somewhat different wording.

Then why call it punishment? For me it is clear that "punishment" comes from a worldview that believes that there is "good" and "evil", and a god that rules what is just and what is not. People need to be punished because of their sins. Absurd.

(3) There are degrees and kinds of reinforcement. A smile of approval is a reinforcement just as as giving food pellets is an example. In terms of aversive reinforcement, a frown is an example just as prison time or torture is an example. The "slippery slope" types will immediately categorize things in terms of extremes, but we need not do so. It is, indeed, useful to do so in order to guard against the extremes, but if we dismiss anything out of hand because extremes are possible, then we effectively hobble ourselves. As in most cases, we seem to negotiate a balance between extremes...

And I believe this is the case in general, still, we need to understand better behavior to be able to "guide" it, and as long as our views are permeated with concepts like "justice", "punishment", "good", "evil", "you get what you deserve" and so on... we are FAR away from guiding it.

I, personally, haven't weighed in on the determinist way of thinking yet. Right now, I'm asking questions. My view is actually changing courtesy of some things I am seeing in this thread...

Good!

[Ichneumonwasp]

The whole 'free will vs. determinism' debate is a false dichotomy much like the whole 'nature vs. nurture' argument. I believe much of the contention arises from how one defines the 'free' in free will -- to those thinking within the dichotomy 'free' implies 'uncaused'. Determinist philosophy isn't so much an attempt to explain or understand volition; its an attempt to keep teleological arguments of any sort from creeping into scientific discourse.

The fear is that if one ascribes the behavior of any entity to 'free will' one opens the door to teleological thinking and its big ugly brother Theism. The idea of reducing the explanation of an event to 'such-in-such willed it to be so' is equivalent to invoking a 'god' explanation that doesn't actually [I]explain anything. IMO, the rationale is well intentioned but misguided. If one's purpose is to gain a scientific understanding of volition [as apposed to other types of phenomenon] its very counter productive to pretend it doesn't exist. Choice [aka free-will] isn't mutually exclusive to cause & effect.


Couple of quibbles.

In most current views nature vs. nurture is not a zero-sum game (not an either-or) in the same way that libertarian free will and determinism are. But, the point is, otherwise, well-taken.

I think that most who argue the determinism card do so from the standpoint of also being compatilibilists, so the real issues in this discussion arise from equivocation over the levels of analysis.

To co-opt Carl Sagan's (later Richard Dawkin's) ideas, we live in a middle kingdom. "Underneath" us is the world of atoms and possible superstrings. "Beyond" us is the immensity of space-time with galactic clusters existing at scales we cannot properly comprehend (add to this, possibly, multiple "universes" on an increasingly ridiculous scale). Folks who speak of the illusion of free will do so by examining the "micro-scale" of quarks and electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. and positing a billiard-ball explanation. Whether this "world" is deterministic or indeterministic matters not for the question of "free will". If we are the sum of these parts that act on forces that do not include an underlying "will", then free will is an illusion when examined at that scale.

In the middle kingdom, where we do all the living and dying, we feel free to think and act. We clearly have free will. We are responsible for our actions. That is the core of the compatibilist doctrine. Whether or not we are "ultimately free" in some libertarian free will sense doesn't matter when discussing free will at this level in the same way that it matters at that lower level.

Where we seem to run into trouble, I think, is in equivocating over these two levels of description. Trying to say that we cannot punish some guy because ultimately "he" was not free to make the decision to rob that store because of his past is dumb. Of course, "he" is responsible in the same way that "we" are responsible for punishing him. But ultimately? Well, it may just be that we are the "bidding" of all those quarks and electrons just as "he" was (not "doing the bidding", but the "bidding itself"). "I", "you", "us", "them" are all abstractions in this sense and at that level of analysis. Our moral sense may be part of the universe playing out, but it doesn't make sense to speak of "me" being plaything of the universe because that is dualist talk -- there is no "me" properly speaking in this scheme. For day to day activity, though, there is clearly a "me" that must decide whether or not to rob that store or donate time to the food bank or money to Oxfam.

When we speak of free will, I think we need to steer clear of mixing these two "realms". At the level of description that includes humans, there is free will and responsibility, whether or not the whole thing is an illusion. That it is an illusion should have no bearing on the way we live our lives. We can realize the illusion, just as we realize what we see "out there" is just a creation within our own "minds" through interaction of the "world outside" and our brains. But morality is, and we should simply continue living our doggy lives the best we can.

[AkuManiMani]

Couple of quibbles.

In most current views nature vs. nurture is not a zero-sum game (not an either-or) in the same way that libertarian free will and determinism are. But, the point is, otherwise, well-taken.

I suppose I have to read up more on where the current front-lines of debate are in regard to nature/nurture. So far I've mostly seen it framed as environmental determinism vs. genetic determinism but I'll definitely look into the subject summore :)

I think that most who argue the determinism card do so from the standpoint of also being compatilibilists, so the real issues in this discussion arise from equivocation over the levels of analysis.

To co-opt Carl Sagan's (later Richard Dawkin's) ideas, we live in a middle kingdom. "Underneath" us is the world of atoms and possible superstrings. "Beyond" us is the immensity of space-time with galactic clusters existing at scales we cannot properly comprehend (add to this, possibly, multiple "universes" on an increasingly ridiculous scale). Folks who speak of the illusion of free will do so by examining the "micro-scale" of quarks and electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. and positing a billiard-ball explanation. Whether this "world" is deterministic or indeterministic matters not for the question of "free will". If we are the sum of these parts that act on forces that do not include an underlying "will", then free will is an illusion when examined at that scale.

In the middle kingdom, where we do all the living and dying, we feel free to think and act. We clearly have free will. We are responsible for our actions. That is the core of the compatibilist doctrine. Whether or not we are "ultimately free" in some libertarian free will sense doesn't matter when discussing free will at this level in the same way that it matters at that lower level.

I think what the debate really comes down to is; what are the limits of the reductionist interpretation in helping us understand certain phenomenon?

Obviously, the elementary particles of which one is composed at any given moment cannot be said to have a will. The problem is that merely describing the atomic chemical properties of the materials that composes a person isn't very good psychology. The behavior of human beings takes place within the framework of the laws of physics and chemistry but those fundamental laws do not describe emergent tendencies built upon them. Biology [and by extension psychology] is constrained by the basic laws of physics but is not explicitly determined by those constraints.

The thing is that when one speaks of intent they aren't referring to the components of the intending agency [which are transient] but the system as a whole. The 'will' the isn't an underlying force. It isn't a fundamental component like and atom or quark [which behave nothing like billiard balls]; its a collective property. Surface tension isn't an underlying component of a water molecule; its only arises as a collective property of a group of them.


Where we seem to run into trouble, I think, is in equivocating over these two levels of description. Trying to say that we cannot punish some guy because ultimately "he" was not free to make the decision to rob that store because of his past is dumb. Of course, "he" is responsible in the same way that "we" are responsible for punishing him. But ultimately? Well, it may just be that we are the "bidding" of all those quarks and electrons just as "he" was (not "doing the bidding", but the "bidding itself"). "I", "you", "us", "them" are all abstractions in this sense and at that level of analysis. Our moral sense may be part of the universe playing out, but it doesn't make sense to speak of "me" being plaything of the universe because that is dualist talk -- there is no "me" properly speaking in this scheme. For day to day activity, though, there is clearly a "me" that must decide whether or not to rob that store or donate time to the food bank or money to Oxfam.

When we speak of free will, I think we need to steer clear of mixing these two "realms". At the level of description that includes humans, there is free will and responsibility, whether or not the whole thing is an illusion. That it is an illusion should have no bearing on the way we live our lives. We can realize the illusion, just as we realize what we see "out there" is just a creation within our own "minds" through interaction of the "world outside" and our brains. But morality is, and we should simply continue living our doggy lives the best we can.

The thing is that morality is meaningless without conscious agency -- which isn't reducible to chemical or atomic components. When a person is punished for a crime it isn't his chemical components that are being punished [the person in question may not even contain the same atoms they did at the time the crime was committed]. Its the conscious agency generated by the collective activity of the atoms thats put on trial and not the atoms themselves. Its better to think of the "self" or person as a system rather than an actual discreet object.

[Piscivore]

Couple of quibbles.

In most current views nature vs. nurture is not a zero-sum game (not an either-or) in the same way that libertarian free will and determinism are. But, the point is, otherwise, well-taken.

I think that most who argue the determinism card do so from the standpoint of also being compatilibilists, so the real issues in this discussion arise from equivocation over the levels of analysis.

To co-opt Carl Sagan's (later Richard Dawkin's) ideas, we live in a middle kingdom. "Underneath" us is the world of atoms and possible superstrings. "Beyond" us is the immensity of space-time with galactic clusters existing at scales we cannot properly comprehend (add to this, possibly, multiple "universes" on an increasingly ridiculous scale). Folks who speak of the illusion of free will do so by examining the "micro-scale" of quarks and electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. and positing a billiard-ball explanation. Whether this "world" is deterministic or indeterministic matters not for the question of "free will". If we are the sum of these parts that act on forces that do not include an underlying "will", then free will is an illusion when examined at that scale.

In the middle kingdom, where we do all the living and dying, we feel free to think and act. We clearly have free will. We are responsible for our actions. That is the core of the compatibilist doctrine. Whether or not we are "ultimately free" in some libertarian free will sense doesn't matter when discussing free will at this level in the same way that it matters at that lower level.

Where we seem to run into trouble, I think, is in equivocating over these two levels of description. Trying to say that we cannot punish some guy because ultimately "he" was not free to make the decision to rob that store because of his past is dumb. Of course, "he" is responsible in the same way that "we" are responsible for punishing him. But ultimately? Well, it may just be that we are the "bidding" of all those quarks and electrons just as "he" was (not "doing the bidding", but the "bidding itself"). "I", "you", "us", "them" are all abstractions in this sense and at that level of analysis. Our moral sense may be part of the universe playing out, but it doesn't make sense to speak of "me" being plaything of the universe because that is dualist talk -- there is no "me" properly speaking in this scheme. For day to day activity, though, there is clearly a "me" that must decide whether or not to rob that store or donate time to the food bank or money to Oxfam.

When we speak of free will, I think we need to steer clear of mixing these two "realms". At the level of description that includes humans, there is free will and responsibility, whether or not the whole thing is an illusion. That it is an illusion should have no bearing on the way we live our lives. We can realize the illusion, just as we realize what we see "out there" is just a creation within our own "minds" through interaction of the "world outside" and our brains. But morality is, and we should simply continue living our doggy lives the best we can.

Well said.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I suppose I have to read up more on where the current front-lines of debate are in regard to nature/nurture. So far I've mostly seen it framed as environmental determinism vs. genetic determinism but I'll definitely look into the subject summore :)

We really can't even speak in terms of nature vs nurture any longer. Even on the simplest level nature -- gene product x -- works as nurture (environment) for gene product y.



I think what the debate really comes down to is; what are the limits of the reductionist interpretation in helping us understand certain phenomenon?

Obviously, the elementary particles of which one is composed at any given moment cannot be said to have a will. The problem is that merely describing the atomic chemical properties of the materials that composes a person isn't very good psychology. The behavior of human beings takes place within the framework of the laws of physics and chemistry but those fundamental laws do not describe emergent tendencies built upon them. Biology [and by extension psychology] is constrained by the basic laws of physics but is not explicitly determined by those constraints.

This is possibly true, but I doubt it. It is also possibly true that we simply lack the knowledge to supply a complete reductionist interpretation. It isn't clear that emergent properties provide anything that will help in this situation. "Will" doesn't simply spring up from neuron interaction in any absolute libertarian sense that anyone can identify. From a reductionist perspective, I can even tell you where it is in the brain. Cut out the anterior cingulate bilaterally and the will disappears -- such folks stare mutely, eyes tracking people occasionally, but otherwise immobile as though they have no will of their own. If we can describe this from a purely neuronal perspective -- we do not have the knowledge quite yet for a full description -- then the appeal to emergent property will carry no force.

The thing is that when one speaks of intent they aren't referring to the components of the intending agency [which are transient] but the system as a whole. The 'will' the isn't an underlying force. It isn't a fundamental component like and atom or quark [which behave nothing like billiard balls]; its a collective property. Surface tension isn't an underlying component of a water molecule; its only arises as a collective property of a group of them.

But intent may have a purely naturalistic, even deterministic description. It seems as though it will, with what we already know neurologically. So, the problem still arises -- we have the billiard ball description which works fine at the micro level and probably demonstrates the free will is an illusion and we have the macro level where we see free will in action. That macro level does not necessarily work off any libertarian free will principles. If it does, then the world is dualistic. If the world is monistic, then free will is ultimately an illusion and appeals to emergent properties will never help save it from that fate.


The thing is that morality is meaningless without conscious agency -- which isn't reducible to chemical or atomic components. When a person is punished for a crime it isn't his chemical components that are being punished [the person in question may not even contain the same atoms they did at the time the crime was committed]. Its the conscious agency generated by the collective activity of the atoms thats put on trial and not the atoms themselves. Its better to think of the "self" or person as a system rather than an actual discreet object.

Why not? Simply because we lack the explanatory power to reduce actions to their component parts does not mean that those components are not the ultimate cause of those actions.

We act, in this macro sphere, as though everyone is a separate conscious agent. We assume that we are conscious agents. It doesn't even matter, in the macro world, if every supposedly conscious agent is really just a collection of atoms banging into one another and those interactions are determined (or even probabilistic, since ultimately neither have free will). Yes, we are all systems, but that doesn't change the basic equation when it comes to ultimate explanations. Those gross descriptions -- we are individual conscious agents with will and moral responsibility -- work in this macro world. That is why we use such descriptors and act as though they are true. That does not mean that in some ultimate sense we are truly free. This issue doesn't matter in the least to non-theists because morality is clearly important in the macro world. Ultimate issues of free will matter only to those who posit ultimate responsibility in the universe to a self -- theists and those who ascribe to absolutist moral systems.

[Piscivore]

We act, in this macro sphere, as though everyone is a separate conscious agent. We assume that we are conscious agents. It doesn't even matter, in the macro world, if every supposedly conscious agent is really just a collection of atoms banging into one another and those interactions are determined (or even probabilistic, since ultimately neither have free will). Yes, we are all systems, but that doesn't change the basic equation when it comes to ultimate explanations. Those gross descriptions -- we are individual conscious agents with will and moral responsibility -- work in this macro world. That is why we use such descriptors and act as though they are true. That does not mean that in some ultimate sense we are truly free.

Exactly. Think of it this way, Aku- when one is watching a movie, it looks like one sees motion, because the human viewer does not have senses that can detect (unaided) that what is actually happening is the continuous display of 24 different static images per second. Still, it makes sense in the theatre to talk of characters doing this and that, as if they were moving.

[AkuManiMani]

This is possibly true, but I doubt it. It is also possibly true that we simply lack the knowledge to supply a complete reductionist interpretation.


I suspect that that is impossible -- even in principle. If one operates under the axiomatic assumption that the universe is built upon an infinite regression of scale it stands to reason that one would come upon an ultimate component. At the moment the smallest scale we've conceived of theoretically is that of strings but why assume that it stops there? It would stand to reason that any "elementary" component of existence would also be composed still more fundamental components and so on, ad infinitum. So, even assuming that determinism is true [which current theoretical physics seems to conclusively invalidate] there would still be limits to certainty and predictability.

It isn't clear that emergent properties provide anything that will help in this situation. "Will" doesn't simply spring up from neuron interaction in any absolute libertarian sense that anyone can identify. From a reductionist perspective, I can even tell you where it is in the brain. Cut out the anterior cingulate bilaterally and the will disappears -- such folks stare mutely, eyes tracking people occasionally, but otherwise immobile as though they have no will of their own. If we can describe this from a purely neuronal perspective -- we do not have the knowledge quite yet for a full description -- then the appeal to emergent property will carry no force.

For the record, I find the strict libertarian perspective to be just as silly as the strict determinist perspective. If one were to ascribe to such a view all conscious "decisions" would essentially be random and one could not reasonably distinguish one conscious agency from another.

With that out of that way, I would like to point out that surgically mutilating a subject's brain until they're rendered invalids doesn't tell us anymore about consciousness or free will than simply putting a bullet to them. The example you just used is like citing broken legs as evidence that bipedal locomotion is illusory. Obviously, if you damage or destroy the organ that generates a person's decision making their capacity for such will be hampered or eliminated.

But intent may have a purely naturalistic, even deterministic description. It seems as though it will, with what we already know neurologically. So, the problem still arises -- we have the billiard ball description which works fine at the micro level and probably demonstrates the free will is an illusion and we have the macro level where we see free will in action. That macro level does not necessarily work off any libertarian free will principles. If it does, then the world is dualistic. If the world is monistic, then free will is ultimately an illusion and appeals to emergent properties will never help save it from that fate.

Oh, I'm not actually trying to dispute a naturalistic understanding of intent or even monism. I fully ascribe to monist ontology and I consider the concept of non-naturalistic explanations to be an oxymoron. Monism, in and of itself, does not imply determinism or non-determinism. Neither does reductionism necessarily imply determinism -- tho adherence to a strict reductionist interpretation must assume determinism to be viable. Ontologically matter and energy are basically the 'same thing' but each instance has different properties and exhibits different behavior from the other instances. Having a common ontological root doesn't render those differences illusory.

My view is simply that strict reductionism has limitations as a means of understanding some systems, especially in the case of conscious agencies. Ironically enough, it is reductionism that has led modern physics to conclude that determinism itself is illusory. As BDZ mentioned earlier, determinism makes for a good approximate description of macro-level events but fundamentally the working of reality is very different. Generally speaking, most of the time we can ignore much of what goes on at such small scales and still make reasonably accurate predictions of macro level events but there are some cases where what happens on the small [indeterminate] scale can have a major effect on the large.

For instance, much of human thought is pretty much spontaneous and isn't caused by any external stimulus. A person can, out of the blue, think of a distressing scenario that leads to macro level changes in their body chemistry by generating a stress response to the imagined stimulus. The initial trigger most likely originated as a molecular scale fluctuation [the scale at which the deterministic view of causality breaks down] leads to a macro level physical change. It seems pretty clear that the most one will be able to accomplish [especially in the case of conscious organisms] is establish a range of probable behaviors. Its within this range of probability that the 'will' can be said to be free, IMO.

Why not? Simply because we lack the explanatory power to reduce actions to their component parts does not mean that those components are not the ultimate cause of those actions.

Well when it comes to biological processes in general it becomes a bit meaningless to invoke 'ultimate' causes because just about all biological behavior is based off of systems of complex feedback loops within the organism. Throw in the fact that a living, metabolizing, organism constantly cycles matter and energy in and out of itself throughout its lifetime the plot thickens even more. Its apparent that whats central to the integrity and identity of an organism isn't so much the raw materials that its composed of at any given moment but the information thats stored, utilized, and transmitted by those materials. Like I mentioned before, I tend to view the organism as the organizing software the governs the activity of the matter within it at any given time.

We act, in this macro sphere, as though everyone is a separate conscious agent. We assume that we are conscious agents. It doesn't even matter, in the macro world, if every supposedly conscious agent is really just a collection of atoms banging into one another and those interactions are determined (or even probabilistic, since ultimately neither have free will). Yes, we are all systems, but that doesn't change the basic equation when it comes to ultimate explanations. Those gross descriptions -- we are individual conscious agents with will and moral responsibility -- work in this macro world. That is why we use such descriptors and act as though they are true. That does not mean that in some ultimate sense we are truly free. This issue doesn't matter in the least to non-theists because morality is clearly important in the macro world. Ultimate issues of free will matter only to those who posit ultimate responsibility in the universe to a self -- theists and those who ascribe to absolutist moral systems.

Hmm...I'll try to sum up my position with another sample. A house may be composed of bricks, but it isn't 'just a collection of bricks'. Its a specific class of functional unit that happens to be composed of bricks and is distinguished from a mere pile of bricks by virtue of its form and function. What makes the house a house is the collective configuration of is components and isn't necessarily reducible to a magical 'house trait' that one can find by dismantling it down to it's brick components. There is no supernatural duality between "houseness" and bricks and no need to invoke one any more than one would have to invoke a duality between words and ink.

In the case of an organism, like a human being, not only are the components not central to the entity's identity as such, but those same components are transient to the entity in question. A person isn't simply 'a collection of atoms banging into one another' [tho, technically, atoms never 'touch']. Sure the constituent atoms are a vital part of the equation but they are not sum of the story. Take all the atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, calcium etc. that compose the body of a person at any given time in their exact same proportions. Then fling them together and watch as they commence their 'bumping' action. The end result will be a far cry from a person.

I suspect that what this really boils down to is whether or not one considers abstractoins [like systems, information, morality, etc] to be 'real' in a literal sense in much the same way that atomic matter is. Such things cannot be reduced to atoms of subatomic particles because they are not spacial objects but they are quite real and have a definite effect on the behavior of atomic matter


Edit: [I]Wow, we're starting to really get a bit off topic aren't we? :D

[Piscivore]

How very curious you can say this:
Well when it comes to biological processes in general it becomes a bit meaningless to invoke 'ultimate' causes because just about all biological behavior is based off of systems of complex feedback loops within the organism.

Right after you imply that "macro level physical change"- and quite a lot of them, in fact- can occur just from a single source, a "thought":
A person can, out of the blue, think of a distressing scenario that leads to macro level changes in their body chemistry by generating a stress response to the imagined stimulus. The initial trigger most likely originated as a molecular scale fluctuation [the scale at which the deterministic view of causality breaks down] leads to a macro level physical change.

Do you have anything to back that up? Isn't it more likely that what the subject- with limited perception, mind- calls a "thought" is just a label he puts on the "systems of complex feedback loops within the organism" of which he is largely unaware?

[Complexity]

Let's see how thoroughly I can get my ass kicked... ;)

I think in order to understand why I am not a strict determinist, I will need, like Complexity did, to give a brief history of my thinking.

God-Concepts
As a student of philosophy (waaay back then) and a non-theist, I was intrigued with the kind of concept God was. After only a little bit of work I learned that, as an explanatory device, God was a failure. For many, the idea that it explained everything was persuasive, but I saw that it prohibited nothing and realized that as an explanatory device it provided us with a goose-egg in terms of predictive power. I referred to it as a God-concept (go figure!), and started looking for others...


Agreed. godcrap is most silly.


Self-Interest
In analytic ethics, I came across the plethora of theories based on this idea of "self-interest." What was interesting about the idea of self-interest is that every possible choice could be characterized in terms of self-interest. It soon became plainly obvious that the reason for this was the way in which the concept was defined. It explained all possible behaviours, including self-contradictory ones, and prohibited none, and in so doing, negated any predictive power the idea had. I had found another God-Concept and this one was commonly accepted among contemporary scholars. Again, arguments from self-interest are ridiculously persuasive precisely because self-interest seems to explain everything.


This one isn't silly, but it is pretty orthogonal to determinism.

I don't think this qualifies as a 'god-concept' - only the original one does - and I think your trying to treat that as a kind is a mistake.

I also think your emphasis on explanatory power is misplaced.


Determinism
Along came determinism. For me it was in the form of Skinnerian behaviouralism. It's central effort was an attempt to turn psychology into a science by dealing only with what could be "verified" (external behaviour) and (pretty much) ignoring everything else. A passing nod was given to internal states by asserting that our feelings of free will and the like were us experiencing our behaviour. It also assumed a causal (or at least correlational chain) between antecedent events and consequent behaviours. Again a scientific way of looking at things. At first I played along with it, trying determinism on for size as it were. It quickly dawned on me that it could explain ever behaviour as a consequent of antecedent causal events including self-contradictory ones. Very persuasive. The next obvious task was to try to find a behaviour example it does not explain. Still looking. That's right. Another God-concept. Antecedent events are perceived as causal effects because they are defined such that they are.

So, to be perfectly honest, I dismiss determinism as an explanatory device for exactly the same reason I dismiss God and self-interest as explanatory devices: they have no predictive power because they "explain everything and preclude nothing." Now, I'm not saying that I don't think determinism has something to offer us, however, to assume it is the truth is as much an error from a scientific perspective (not even considering a skeptical perspective) as it is to accept God as an explanatory device. I suspect it is the first step down a long path, but it is not, as far as I can tell the end point.


Once again, I think your emphasis on explanatory power is misplaced and I don't agree with your placing self-interest and god in the same bag.

I think that your thinking on determinism has been tainted with its early association with Skinnerism in your mind. I've always found Skinnerism rather crude and shallow, and it has had little to do with how I've come to understand determinism.

Determinism simply asserts that the physical present is the consequence of the physical past.

Being sane (i.e. a materialist), I assert that all of reality is physical, that there is nothing that is not physical, and that the following statement is equivalent to the previous statement and just as valid:

Determinism simply asserts that the present is the consequence of the past.

I think you are letting the conventional incantations of philosophy confuse you.


Rampant Speculation

Now, there can be any number of possible and different ideas about free will, not all of which need be supernatural in nature. The interesting thing, historically, is that religion sought to annex human volition (just as it sought to annex just about every other human quality and function) within its supernatural framework and most have come to accept this, including, I suspect, some folks critical of religion - perhaps to the point where they dismiss free will on the basis of its presumed supernatural association. Perhaps the reason we see free will as a supernatural breaking of a causal chain is because we rarely try to phrase it any other way, or pehaps more to the point, because determinism presents us with a dichotomous understanding of determined vs uncaused - a dichotomous relationship supported and promoted by religion seeking to present itself as the fundament of free will.

One such non-supernatural way of viewing free will might be as an emergent property of mind as a social construct. I am not saying this is the case, nor am I able at this point to defend it. All I am suggesting is that it may be possible to posit something functionally identical to (or very much like) free will in non-supernatural terms. Perhaps free will is something that naturally arises from our distinction between self and environment, or perhaps from some other aspect of our understanding of self. This is not as new-agey as it may sound. After all, if one conceives of oneself as being comprised of three warring selves in constant conflict, is it any surprise that one feels internally conflicted? If one perceives of oneself as being a being of sin, is it any surprise that one feels the need for forgiveness? You could build a business off of those...


Well, I think you've put your foot in it. What a pile to choose...

I honestly don't see an alternative to determinism hiding in here.

Feel free to explain what any of this has to do with free will vs. determinism. If your idea is to get off the ground, you'll have to explain how it doesn't fit into a deterministic framework while being materialistic. If it is materialistic but not deterministic, what is it?


The point really is that just because a particular idea (even something as seemingly irrefutable as determinism) suggests that something is true doesn't mean it is. Of all people, skeptics (scientific skeptics included) must understand this. We've seen through it with respect to the first God-concept....

It may be that we are wholly determined beings, but for the time being, I do not see sufficient cause to accept that we are without allowing for possible alternatives...


Or, as I would say, the only 'god-concept'. You are playing too close to 'Poisoning the Well'.

I've never claimed that something is true because it appears to be.

I do claim that there is a remarkable amount of evidence in favor of determinism (including qm unpredictability, etc.) and no evidence in favor of a non-deterministic free will.

Bring up the alternatives and we'll examine them.

I have no interest in spending much time on alternatives that are predicated upon the supernatural / non-material, as I think that there is no evidence for such things.

I would be interested in seeing alternatives that are materialistic but non-deterministic (remembering that I embrace quantum mechanics and regard it as integral to determinism).

I think I have very good reasons to hold determinism as my working hypothesis. Nothing that has been said has even suggested a plausible alternative.


Have at it, vile fiends.... ;)


Be careful what you ask for.

[Complexity]

I have noticed a pattern. People (in general) tend to think in opposites.

For example, in several discussions on this forum people is either in favor or against "Global Warming". People is either a materialist or an idealist. The same goes for atheist and theist, naturalist and supernaturalist, and so on.

I (hope) want to believe this is wrong, that not everybody have this incredible lack of imagination! ;)

But then again, when I look in this thread... it appears to break down (for most) in just two components, either you believe in "free will", or you believe in "determinism".

For a lack of a better expression, I believe that sucks. Yes, free will is absurd, we lack free will, it is an illusion, but the opposite is also absurd, we are not simple machines with a binary code, most decisions involve an hypercomplex arrangement of what we call "choices", emotional pressures, memories and so on.

Like Akumanimani said, nature is probabilistic. More exactly, our best theoretical approach to predict reality relies on mathematical probabilistic models. Some events are so close to being deterministic that we have learn to label them as that. In other words, we conclude that a "real determinism" was going on.

But such model is as obsolete as Newtonian mechanics. Even when dealing with relatively simple systems (like billiards) the probabilities of something to happen are so incredible high that it appears that the outcome is determinate by the initial settings.

Other (relatively speaking) systems, like the movement of planets, can also be described (to an extent) with strict deterministic models. But when dealing with other kind of systems (weather, earthquakes, beliefs, quantum states) our deterministic models are simply rendered obsolete.


Please read more carefully.

I think that the only plausible modern conception of determinism must be fully consistent with our best scientific models, especially with quantum mechanics.

As I have said more than once, this discussion has nothing to do with prediction and predictability - it has to do with how the present emerges from the past and whether there is any room for 'free-will' to inject itself into a physical reality. As a result, quantum mechanics has no place in the discussion unless you believe that something non-material 'directs' the 'selection' of outcomes and, if you believe that, we have absolutely no basis for an intelligent discussion.

Your problem is that you don't understand what is meant by 'determinism' and are using your own misunderstandings to construct straw men.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Let me preface by saying, good discussion.



I suspect that that is impossible -- even in principle. If one operates under the axiomatic assumption that the universe is built upon an infinite regression of scale it stands to reason that one would come upon an ultimate component. At the moment the smallest scale we've conceived of theoretically is that of strings but why assume that it stops there? It would stand to reason that any "elementary" component of existence would also be composed still more fundamental components and so on, ad infinitum. So, even assuming that determinism is true [which current theoretical physics seems to conclusively invalidate] there would still be limits to certainty and predictability.

As to the notion of an "elementary component", strings would seem to be the ultimate in a sense -- since they are supposedly composed of vibrating energy, vibrating at different frequencies. There does not seem to be a further level through which one could "cut". How do you slice energy into smaller component parts? Can we even speak of component parts of energy? Of course, we do not know that string theory is correct or what version of string theory may be correct or what the heck "energy" *is*.


For the record, I find the strict libertarian perspective to be just as silly as the strict determinist perspective. If one were to ascribe to such a view all conscious "decisions" would essentially be random and one could not reasonably distinguish one conscious agency from another.

OK, but that is the alternative to determinism -- the opposite, this libertarian freedom. And it seems required by theism. I think we basically agree that a compatibilist stance is the only other option.

With that out of that way, I would like to point out that surgically mutilating a subject's brain until they're rendered invalids doesn't tell us anymore about consciousness or free will than simply putting a bullet to them. The example you just used is like citing broken legs as evidence that bipedal locomotion is illusory. Obviously, if you damage or destroy the organ that generates a person's decision making their capacity for such will be hampered or eliminated.

Um, no. The example demonstrates that "will" arises in this brain region. It isn't as though will is created by any old brain structure. We have good evidence for where it arises within the brain -- again, no good story to explain it in detail -- showing that it is subject to the same forces as the rest of the brain. There simply does not appear to be anything mysterious or special about it, from that perspective.

As to your counter-example, broken legs as evidence that locomotion is illusory? What? Do you not understand the example at all? I'm sorry, but I'm a bit shocked by your "counter-example". The issue is not that knocking out a function (in the real world this occurs not by means of a scalpel, but by means of stroke) shows the function to be illusory; in this instance it shows that the function depends on that structure, just as walking depends on legs. When it comes to libertarian free will, there can be no dependence on a brain structure since libertarian free will is supposed to arise without any prior cause than what the individual (who is supposedly acausal as well) desires. The existence of brain structures on which the will depends demonstrates a causal chain for the will -- so that the will is dependent on the same causal chain that governs the interactions of billiard balls. The fact that there is a causal chain is what shows free will to be illusory, since free will is supposed to occur acausally.


Oh, I'm not actually trying to dispute a naturalistic understanding of intent or even monism. I fully ascribe to monist ontology and I consider the concept of non-naturalistic explanations to be an oxymoron. Monism, in and of itself, does not imply determinism or non-determinism. Neither does reductionism necessarily imply determinism -- tho adherence to a strict reductionist interpretation must assume determinism to be viable. Ontologically matter and energy are basically the 'same thing' but each instance has different properties and exhibits different behavior from the other instances. Having a common ontological root doesn't render those differences illusory.

Of course monism doesn't in and of itself imply determinism, but a monistic world without causality would look entirely different from the one we inhabit, so the point is moot.

We see causality. If you want to argue that causality is illusory, that is fine. I might even agree to some extent, but that is the only way out of this conundrum. If causality has any explanatory power, and there is only one type of substance in the world, and we can show a causal chain involving "the will", as has been done through much work in neuroscience (though, again a complete picture is still not available), then there is no recourse to alternate explanations. Monism simply will not allow it. There is clearly a type of will that we all enjoy, but it ultimately rests on that lower level causal chain. The appeal to emergent properties requires that you show how "will" could emerge from neuronal action (rather than simply a direct causal chain) instead of baldly stating that it does (or could).

My view is simply that strict reductionism has limitations as a means of understanding some systems, especially in the case of conscious agencies.

Here we agree, but I don't think that I would add "especially in the case of conscious agencies" since I don't see anything particularly special about conscious agency. It is simply one phenomenon among many, and one that has been mangled through our dualistically laden language. The whole idea of "free will" is a dualistic concept from the get-go. My view is that monism, when closely examined sees this whole issue as a colossal waste of time, built on faulty analogies.

Ironically enough, it is reductionism that has led modern physics to conclude that determinism itself is illusory. As BDZ mentioned earlier, determinism makes for a good approximate description of macro-level events [i.e. Newtonian mechanics] but fundamentally the working of reality is very different. Generally speaking, most of the time we can ignore much of what goes on at such small scales and still make reasonably accurate predictions of macro level events but there are some cases where what happens on the small [indeterminate] scale can have a major effect on the large.


Yes, but as I previously stated -- determinism, indeterminism, what difference does it make? Neither option can provide this illusory "free will" that exists within dualism. It doesn't matter if the world works on deterministic or indeterministic inputs. "We" are higher level abstractions -- we act as though we exist as independent entities, when we may simply be patterns of vibrating energy strings. "We" are just packets of "stuff" -- one with the universal medium -- not independent entities that have a completely separate existence, or existence completely separate from the rest of the universe. To say that "we" are caused by the universe would be wrong -- because, that itself, is dualistic thinking. "We" are just patterned packets of the universe playing out. As such, "we" are not capable of a will independent from the working out of the universe. The very idea is anathema to a monistic worldview.

For instance, much of human thought is pretty much spontaneous and isn't caused by any external stimulus. A person can, out of the blue, think of a distressing scenario that leads to macro level changes in their body chemistry by generating a stress response to the imagined stimulus. The initial trigger most likely originated as a molecular scale fluctuation [the scale at which the deterministic view of causality breaks down] leads to a macro level physical change. It seems pretty clear that the most one will be able to accomplish [especially in the case of conscious organisms] is establish a range of probable behaviors. Its within this range of probability that the 'will' can be said to be free, IMO.

Not applicable. Saying that human thought occurs spontaneously without external stimulus is to delve into dualistic thinking; you seem to positing a human that exists independent of the universe as a whole, arriving at new thoughts through no influence.

This is where I see the problem, so let me elaborate a bit. These ideas seem to be motivated by the confusion that I earlier cited and by confusions over older versions of behaviorism -- that "we" act like stimulus-response robots. That is not what I am discussing, though. At the level of abstraction where we live -- in the middle kingdom, so to speak -- it makes sense to speak in such language. But we must also recognize that this is an abstraction. If we are good monists, we must also recognize that the stuff of which "we" are made (I know that I am delving into dualistic talk here) is the stuff of the universe and it follows universal laws. "Ultimate" explanations would still have "us" as energy packets banging around and vibrating at various frequencies. There is no free will at that level -- the "ultimate" level. At the mid-level abstract explanation, where we blur the underlying components into this higher level abstraction that we call "us", sure we can talk about willing independent of obvious external influence. But, even there, we probably say so because of a failure of imagination -- no obvious influences now, but what of past influences housed in our neural structures and which determine action. There are reasons why folks think sad thoughts at particular times, there are influences hidden to us. But that does not mean those influences do not exist.

Behaviorism treated the brain as a "black box" initially because we used to be very ignorant its actions. New forms of behaviorism see all the stuff happening "in there" as different types of behavior.

That some of this stuff appears mysterious, fine, no argument there. But that doesn't mean that it is mysterious, or special. We find it special because it is what we are and we naturally think of ourselves as special -- we value, and we value us above all.

Well when it comes to biological processes in general it becomes a bit meaningless to invoke 'ultimate' causes because just about all biological behavior is based off of systems of complex feedback loops within the organism. Throw in the fact that a living, metabolizing, organism constantly cycles matter and energy in and out of itself throughout its lifetime the plot thickens even more. Its apparent that whats central to the integrity and identity of an organism isn't so much the raw materials that its composed of at any given moment but the information thats stored, utilized, and transmitted by those materials. Like I mentioned before, I tend to view the organism as the organizing software the governs the activity of the matter within it at any given time.

That's fine, and I agree, but it has no bearing at all on what we are discussing.



Hmm...I'll try to sum up my position with another sample. A house may be composed of bricks, but it isn't 'just a collection of bricks'. Its a specific class of functional unit that happens to be composed of bricks and is distinguished from a mere pile of bricks by virtue of its form and function. What makes the house a house is the collective configuration of is components and isn't necessarily reducible to a magical 'house trait' that one can find by dismantling it down to it's brick components. There is no supernatural duality between "houseness" and bricks and no need to invoke one any more than one would have to invoke a duality between words and ink.

Again, I agree. And, again, this has no bearing on the topic at hand. That "we" are particular patterns of vibrating stuff does not excuse "us" from being vibrating stuff. Those patterns do not suddenly exempt us from the laws of the universe.

Once again, compatibilism is the answer that we arrive at to discuss this issue. At the mid-level we can talk about "us" being free, but we are still abstractions.

In the case of an organism, like a human being, not only are the components not central to the entity's identity as such, but those same components are transient to the entity in question. A person isn't simply 'a collection of atoms banging into one another' [tho, technically, atoms never 'touch']. Sure the constituent atoms are a vital part of the equation but they are not sum of the story. Take all the atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, calcium etc. that compose the body of a person at any given time in their exact same proportions. Then fling them together and watch as they commence their 'bumping' action. The end result will be a far cry from a person.

I suspect that what this really boils down to is whether or not one considers abstractions [like systems, information, morality, etc] to be 'real' in a literal sense in much the same way that atomic matter is. Such things cannot be reduced to atoms of subatomic particles because they are not spacial objects but they are quite real and have a definite effect on the behavior of atomic matter




Everything *is* ultimately pattern and not the vibrating "stuff" itself -- rather, pattern expressed in the vibrating stuff. But that is still beside the point when it comes to issues of free will. That issue concerns identity, which is a whole other kettle of fish. Discussions of the patterns that comprise who we *are* do not demonstrate emergent properties that create free will in an ultimate sense.

[AkuManiMani]

How very curious you can say this:


Well when it comes to biological processes in general it becomes a bit meaningless to invoke 'ultimate' causes because just about all biological behavior is based off of systems of complex feedback loops within the organism.


Right after you imply that "macro level physical change"- and quite a lot of them, in fact- can occur just from a single source, a "thought":



A person can, out of the blue, think of a distressing scenario that leads to macro level changes in their body chemistry by generating a stress response to the imagined stimulus. The initial trigger most likely originated as a molecular scale fluctuation [the scale at which the deterministic view of causality breaks down] leads to a macro level physical change.


Do you have anything to back that up? Isn't it more likely that what the subject- with limited perception, mind- calls a "thought" is just a label he puts on the "systems of complex feedback loops within the organism" of which he is largely unaware?

Interesting question..

Ah, well I suppose one could argue that a chain of circular causes [feedback loops] could be itself considered a cause. My main point was to illustrate that while the reductionist approach, while quite effective at parsing out the characteristics of individual components, can be limiting in trying to understand a system as a whole if you just think of it strictly in terms of a list of parts and their individual properties. The system of which the components are a part of can govern their behaviors as much as, or more so, than their individual properties.

As for the issue of 'thought' being the trigger for macro-level physical changes [MLPC] I didn't mean to imply that a thought was itself an irreducible "ultimate component" . I was auguring that very small scale effects [which could very well be described in QM terms] can trigger the onset of 'spontaneous' thoughts and, by extension, MLPCs. I suppose one could consider it an example of the 'butterfly effect' at work in an organism. Thought itself would be the effect of an essentially 'random' cause.

In light of such probabilistic elements I would argue that one could say that human behavior and volition could be considered 'free' rather than strictly deterministic. I don't think that its necessary to eliminate causality in order for there to be 'free will'.


Let me preface by saying, good discussion.

Agreed. :)


As to the notion of an "elementary component", strings would seem to be the ultimate in a sense -- since they are supposedly composed of vibrating energy, vibrating at different frequencies. There does not seem to be a further level through which one could "cut". How do you slice energy into smaller component parts? Can we even speak of component parts of energy? Of course, we do not know that string theory is correct or what version of string theory may be correct or what the heck "energy" *is*.

Which kinda makes me suspect that the reductionist approach is an eternal search for a more "ultimate" cause than the ones that are currently known. I think that the philosophy behind it is based off of an incomplete ontological framework of 'know the parts, know the whole'. The old cliché [I]"missing the forest for the trees" describes the conundrum pretty well.

As to your counter-example, broken legs as evidence that locomotion is illusory? What? Do you not understand the example at all? I'm sorry, but I'm a bit shocked by your "counter-example". The issue is not that knocking out a function (in the real world this occurs not by means of a scalpel, but by means of stroke) shows the function to be illusory; in this instance it shows that the function depends on that structure, just as walking depends on legs. When it comes to libertarian free will, there can be no dependence on a brain structure since libertarian free will is supposed to arise without any prior cause than what the individual (who is supposedly acausal as well) desires. The existence of brain structures on which the will depends demonstrates a causal chain for the will -- so that the will is dependent on the same causal chain that governs the interactions of billiard balls. The fact that there is a causal chain is what shows free will to be illusory, since free will is supposed to occur acausally.

Okay, I'm starting to understand where we really differ. I think the bone of contention here rest on the different definitions of 'free will' we're working with. The one you're thinking of implies a kind of 'uncaused cause' philosophy thats often employed as the basis of theism. Certain capacities and functions of the mind may be dependent upon specialized structures in the nervous system [and who knows -- maybe even the limbic system and beyond] but its agency can still be considered 'free' since its behavior isn't acting according to a strict, predetermined algorithm. I don't think that our volition lies completely outside of the chain of causality [something that sounds eerily like supernaturalism] but that the probabilistic nature of our neurophysics [and of reality in general] is enough for one to consider volition 'free'; imo, it needn't transcend the laws of physics to be valid.

I'm willing to bet that even when our scientific understanding of the mind is rigorous enough for us to 'read' thought patterns we would have difficulties completely pinning them down in much the same way [and for pretty much the same reasons] that one cannot precisely pin down an elementary particle.

[Piscivore]

Interesting question..

Ah, well I suppose one could argue that a chain of circular causes [feedback loops] could be itself considered a cause. My main point was to illustrate that while the reductionist approach, while quite effective at parsing out the characteristics of individual components, can be limiting in trying to understand a system as a whole if you just think of it strictly in terms of a list of list of parts and their individual properties. The system of which the components are a part of can govern their behaviors as much as, or more so, than their individual properties.
No argument on that score.

As for the issue of 'thought' being the trigger for macro-level physical changes [MLPC] I didn't mean to imply that a thought was itself an irreducible "ultimate component" [i.e. an 'uncaused cause'].
Fair enough.

I made a bit of a conjectural leap [based off of what bits I've read on the subject] in my statement that very small scale effects [which could very well be described in QM terms] can trigger the onset of 'spontaneous' thoughts and, by extension, MLPCs. I suppose one could consider it an example of the 'butterfly effect' at work in an organism. Thought itself would be the effect of an essentially 'random' cause.
Okay, but I it seems to me this is a bit of an oversimplification. The quantum "random" effect" might influence one electron to do (A) instead of (B), and that might have some effect in the larger scheme of atoms, but doesn't the collective influence of all the other electrons and protons even out this "randomness" somewhat?

In light of such probabilistic elements I would argue that one could say that human behavior and volition could be considered 'free' rather than strictly deterministic. I don't think that its necessary to eliminate causality in order for there to be 'free will'.
Ah, but unless the person doing the "choosing" can influence those quantum events- and as they are not even perceptible, as I understand, I'm at a loss to understand how that could be possible- then he doesn not have either "freedom" or "will"- he is still bound by whatever actually happens with the atoms in his brain and all the millions of influences acting on him.

Further, it is my understanding that the "probability" part of QM isn't saying that the universe at the lowest level is in a perpetually unformed state, but just that it is impossible for us to have enough information to make accurate predictions on the subatomic level. Schrodinger's cat isn't half alive and half dead, we just don't know which state it will be in when the box is opened. Once the box is opened, it is either alive or dead and from then on it stays in that state, unless acted upon in a deterministic way by other "cats".

This is exactly the kind of limited perceptual ability I've been talking about. We can't account for causes we can't percieve, so it feels to us like we aren't influenced by them.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't have much to add to Piscivore's excellent reply except to stress that the free will debate doesn't concern the issue of determined vs. undetermined; rather it concerns caused vs. uncaused. If the cause of behavior is probabilistic, "we" are no more or less "free" than if it is completely determined. Our ability to understand what goes on in our brains does not translate into any form of libertarian free will.

Compatibilist free will? Sure, I think we can all agree to that. But, whatever we are dealing with here, it is caused in some sense. If caused, then the idea of ultimate freedom allowing ultimate responsibility for action is gone (only an issue for theists). The perpetrator of a crime and everyone who looks on is in the same boat -- all our behavior has underlying causes (determined, probabilistic, undetermined, whatever -- it doesn't matter); so his crime was caused and our response to his crime is caused in some grand universal symphony.

[Dr H]

Nah. Every time there are alternatives the universe subdivides, so that while you only choose one of them in this universe, in the sum total of universes you have actually chosen all alternatives.

Of course it could still be argued that that makes 'choice' an illusion.

A choice is a conscious decision [as opposed to an involuntary action like a reflex]. The fact that there are underlying mechanisms in an individual's decision making process doesn't make it an 'illusion'.

I was speaking tongue-in-cheek, but it still follows that if every time you have several alternatives you take all of them (in the "many worlds" model), then choice is illusory. If all alternatives are followed, they aren't really "alternatives" -- they're just parts of the complete description of a parituclar event.

Up until the early portion of the 20th century determinism was a pretty viable philosophy. In light of the understandings of fundamental physics gained since then it would appear that it has been pretty much invalidated.

As far as the whole issue of "free will" is concerned one need not invoke dualism in order for human decision making to be 'free'.

According to QM reality is fundamentally probabilistic.

Only in the probabilistic or "Copenhagen interpretation" of QM. If the "many worlds" model is true it could be a strong argument for determinism.

[Dr H]

Hmm... What if belief in religion, or belief in God has a genetic basis? :-)
Yes, that strikes me as one plausible explanation for the near universal belief in god/s of some sort throughout human societies.

Well, Persinger did apparently locate the part of the brain connected with religious experience.

Alcoholism, like other addictions, is 'cured' by changing the individuals thought patterns so that they cease engaging in certain self-destructive behaviors. In order for this to happen, the individual must desire change and make a concious choice to not drink again. To the extent that alcoholism is held in remission by an act of will (i.e. the choice to NOT drink), I think it fits with this discussion.

OK, to that extent I agree. Kind of like a person with an allergy preventing allergic reactions by avoiding exposing themselves to the particular allergin -- they always have the allergy, but they choose what they expose themselves to.



I quite agree. Environment certainly plays a role in which specific beliefs an individual holds.

The question then would be: if a person were reared in an environment free from the trappings of religion, could they nonetheless choose to have religious beliefs? Or if they do develop such beliefs, are they something that "just happened" to them, once their brain reached a certain stage of development, or certain hormones kicked in?

[dglas]

Sorry for the absence, folks. I was pretty much unavailable for the last three days.

So...

If I understand correctly, our determinist friends here (with the possible exceptions of one or two), and I actually count myself provisionally in the determinist camp, have either adopted an "other kingdom" approach or some other approach that still allows us to sensibly speak of responsibility and "choice" in our lives, possibly suggesting that freedom is not necessarily a breaking of causal links or the like. Am I correct about this?

Has the determinist derail pretty much burned itself out now? Honestly, I have absolutely no problem with a recharacterization of the OP's questions in a form determinist will be more comfortable with. I suspect that the folks who use the "I cannot change my beliefs" argument are not themselves determinists as we have been speaking of it here. I suspect that the basis of their "I cannot change my beliefs" argument arises from an entirely different source.

Still if you wish to continue this or that particular escape from the iron grip of determinism, please do feel free, although truth-to-tell it might warrant another thread... ;)



P.S.: I will likely start another thread at some time in the future on my thoughts on "God-Concepts" so that that can be hashed over (if folks are so inclined), but as that was mostly a sub-topic in the determinist discussion, I shall not continue it here.

[articulett]

I think people evolved to look for answers and understand the world the best they can-- they use stories, and the people they trust, and myths for clues-- and the brain even confabulates to help make sense of our world.

I think religion has hijacked these tendencies through fear and promises and a supposed peek at the "divine". Without religion... kids don't grow up religious. They might have fear... they might not know what causes it... but they don't imagine it's demons or ghosts. They don't believe in invisible entities without someone telling them about such things.

[ParanoidAndroid]

I think people evolved to look for answers and understand the world the best they can-- they use stories, and the people they trust, and myths for clues-- and the brain even confabulates to help make sense of our world.


100% agreement so far...

I think religion has hijacked these tendencies through fear and promises and a supposed peek at the "divine".


To be arguably correct, I would only amend this to state that some religions try to hijack these tendencies...

Without religion... kids don't grow up religious. They might have fear... they might not know what causes it... but they don't imagine it's demons or ghosts.


Some kids do in fact grow up (to be) religious in spite of being raised in a secular manner. Granted it is personal experience, but I grew up with 2 people who were raised in households heavily beholden to education, and both were raised expressly without any religion; one grew up to be a Catholic and the other has gone from being atheist, to Methodist, and then to Episcopalian. As for whether or not they could or did imagine demons, I can't say; the double convert from atheism definitely believed in ghosts even when we were 5 or 6 years old...

They don't believe in invisible entities without someone telling them about such things.


This one is patently false: kids have long demonstrated a tendency to develop and maintain "imaginary friends": http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan05/imaginary.html

[Piscivore]

To be arguably correct, I would only amend this to state that some religions try to hijack these tendencies...

And with the caveat that it is not only religions that hijack them, but political entities, suitors, and con men of every stripe.

[ParanoidAndroid]

And with the caveat that it is not only religions that hijack them, but political entities, suitors, and con men of every stripe.


Excellent caveat; should have included that. :o

[Dr H]

I think religion has hijacked these tendencies through fear and promises and a supposed peek at the "divine". Without religion... kids don't grow up religious. They might have fear... they might not know what causes it... but they don't imagine it's demons or ghosts. They don't believe in invisible entities without someone telling them about such things.

I agree with the first part, but not with the second. Human beings have imaginations -- often vivid imaginations. If the only way a person comes to believe in invisible entities like demons or ghosts is for someone to tell them, who told the person who told them? Who told the first person to entertain such a belief?

It seems to be a part of the human condition that human beings like answers, and are uncomfortable not having them. Some people are very uncomfortable not having them-- so much so that when they can't find ready explanations in nature that they can easily understand, they create their own. And in many cases they come to believe them.

That, I think, is how religions come to be. They can be propogated and maintained by telling other people about them, and they can be recognized as a potential means of socio/political control and exploited as such. But in the absense of other input, people (some people, anyway) will use their imaginations to create their own explanations, and some of these explanations will grow in to the systems that we call "religions."

[Piscivore]

I agree with the first part, but not with the second. Human beings have imaginations -- often vivid imaginations. If the only way a person comes to believe in invisible entities like demons or ghosts is for someone to tell them, who told the person who told them? Who told the first person to entertain such a belief?

It seems to be a part of the human condition that human beings like answers, and are uncomfortable not having them. Some people are very uncomfortable not having them-- so much so that when they can't find ready explanations in nature that they can easily understand, they create their own. And in many cases they come to believe them.

That, I think, is how religions come to be. They can be propogated and maintained by telling other people about them, and they can be recognized as a potential means of socio/political control and exploited as such. But in the absense of other input, people (some people, anyway) will use their imaginations to create their own explanations, and some of these explanations will grow in to the systems that we call "religions."

Well said.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I think people evolved to look for answers and understand the world the best they can-- they use stories, and the people they trust, and myths for clues-- and the brain even confabulates to help make sense of our world.

Like Dr H I agree with this part.

I think religion has hijacked these tendencies through fear and promises and a supposed peek at the "divine".

Not religion, but "political obsessed religious authorities". People who have been able to live better than others merchandising religious stuff.

Without religion... kids don't grow up religious. They might have fear... they might not know what causes it... but they don't imagine it's demons or ghosts. They don't believe in invisible entities without someone telling them about such things.

But, excuse me, this is absurd. Some individuals will develop religions, some others not. Like Dr H said, it can be called "a human necessity" to have answers. For me, it is simply that humans need solid ground in order to being able to justify our actions.

You also ignore here how the brain functions, some people are hardwired in a way that they will see ghosts, they will hear voices, they will "feel" things that they will label "extraordinary", "supernatural" and things like that.

Nope, "teaching them" that science can deal with what they believe is "supernatural" will not (always) help. They see the world in a way you possible will never understand (not that I do, but at least I'm aware of this).

I'm sure you know the experiment designed to make you feel "a divine presence" by simply stimulating your brain with EM. So, in conclusion, BRAINS produce such beliefs, it is normal. The search for meaning is natural in our species, and for some this meaning comes in the form of ghosts, gods and supernatural beliefs.