Why is morality supposed to be unchanging?

[EGarrett]

Theists always assume that morals are supposed to never change, and when they try to argue for God-based morals they always throw in "what's to stop us from deciding what's right and wrong every few weeks" or something of that nature.

Why? Why do they assume that morality, or are ideas of what's right and wrong, must never change or be adjusted?

[slingblade]

It's not just the religious. Many people want to think that right and wrong are absolutes.
Not just that they'll never change, but that they also have no shades of grey, no situational ethics or morality.

I disagree, myself. Change is inevitable.

[EGarrett]

Why do they believe that?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Why do they believe that?

Comfort. It is comforting to think that God is in his heaven and all is right with the world. That papa is in charge, and there are no shades of gray.

And the desire to argue that they are right and you are wrong. Absolutely.

[Gregory]

Theists always assume that morals are supposed to never change, and when they try to argue for God-based morals they always throw in "what's to stop us from deciding what's right and wrong every few weeks" or something of that nature.

Why? Why do they assume that morality, or are ideas of what's right and wrong, must never change or be adjusted?

It seems to me that if morality isn't unchanging, it would be a huge boon to religious apologists, rather then a detriment.

"Yes, Moses ordered his people to slaughter the population of a town and keep the women as slaves. So what? Obviously that wouldn't be acceptable now-a-days, but morals change."

"Yes, the Bible says to stone disobedient children. Well obviously that wouldn't be okay now, but..."

Morality that changes with time would be a God-send.

[thatguywhojuggles]

All you have to do is read the Old Testament to see that morality changes.

[David Swidler]

Here's one theist agreeing that morality changes. Just as people mature, so does society. We have different standards of behavior at different individual and societal stages. EGarrett, singling out theists as the proponents of unchanging morality is both inaccurate and counterproductive.

Even within the OT there's something of an evolution of morality, and a much more pronounced one through the centuries of subsequent Hebrew/Jewish literature.

[Henners]

The innate human morality that evolved over millions of years is fairly unchanging and is probably not identical for each individual, for the stable states of behavioural strategies can exist where a certain proportion of the population behaves differently from the majority.

Religions have a bogus claim on morality, that seems to have done them a lot of good, to judge by their popularity.

[Fiona]

What an interesting question.

The facts of the universe exist but are gradually discovered as our knowledge increases. Is it possible that morality also exists and is also discovered? The mechanisms for doing this are undeveloped compared to scientific method but that does not necessarily mean we could not find an effective approach, just as we did with science. Perhaps this relates to Randfan's thread about the "truths" of religion, tangentially.

If morality is not unchanging then are we not driven to moral relativism? I am uncomfortable with that idea. Gregory gives a couple of examples of things which have been said to be ok in the past and which are not seen as ok now. I cannot see it was ever moral to keep slaves or to stone children to death. It was acceptable, perhaps, but it was not moral. That seems to me like saying that the earth used to be flat but it isn't any more.

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Circumstances alter cases: calendars don't.

If someone says in the course of a moral dispute " But this is 2008!", he had better have an answer to the question " And what is special about 2008?" If that is all the theist is saying, he is right. Unfortunately for him, his move " But God says so!" invites the similar question " And what is special about God's say-so?"

[AkuManiMani]

Theists always assume that morals are supposed to never change, and when they try to argue for God-based morals they always throw in "what's to stop us from deciding what's right and wrong every few weeks" or something of that nature.

Why? Why do they assume that morality, or are ideas of what's right and wrong, must never change or be adjusted?

I think you, or the theists you're referring to, are confusing social mores with actual morality. Things like murdering innocent children will always be immoral.

[dglas]

"Actual morality." What means this?

[Moochie]

It seems to me that if morality isn't unchanging, it would be a huge boon to religious apologists, rather then a detriment.

"Yes, Moses ordered his people to slaughter the population of a town and keep the women as slaves. So what? Obviously that wouldn't be acceptable now-a-days, but morals change."

"Yes, the Bible says to stone disobedient children. Well obviously that wouldn't be okay now, but..."

Morality that changes with time would be a God-send.

But morality does change with time. At least last time I looked it did.


M.

[Moochie]

What an interesting question.

The facts of the universe exist but are gradually discovered as our knowledge increases. Is it possible that morality also exists and is also discovered? The mechanisms for doing this are undeveloped compared to scientific method but that does not necessarily mean we could not find an effective approach, just as we did with science. Perhaps this relates to Randfan's thread about the "truths" of religion, tangentially.

If morality is not unchanging then are we not driven to moral relativism? I am uncomfortable with that idea. Gregory gives a couple of examples of things which have been said to be ok in the past and which are not seen as ok now. I cannot see it was ever moral to keep slaves or to stone children to death. It was acceptable, perhaps, but it was not moral. That seems to me like saying that the earth used to be flat but it isn't any more.


I don't know for sure, but since caucasian people regarded people of color as some sort of "lower breed," akin to simians, it's quite feasible to me that they would feel moral in keeping slaves -- as long as they treated them fairly, according to the prevailing morality of the time.


M.

[Moochie]

"Actual morality." What means this?


Nice to see the kinetic bunny back. :)


M.

[dglas]

What an interesting question.

The facts of the universe exist but are gradually discovered as our knowledge increases. Is it possible that morality also exists and is also discovered? The mechanisms for doing this are undeveloped compared to scientific method but that does not necessarily mean we could not find an effective approach, just as we did with science. Perhaps this relates to Randfan's thread about the "truths" of religion, tangentially.

If morality is not unchanging then are we not driven to moral relativism? I am uncomfortable with that idea. Gregory gives a couple of examples of things which have been said to be ok in the past and which are not seen as ok now. I cannot see it was ever moral to keep slaves or to stone children to death. It was acceptable, perhaps, but it was not moral. That seems to me like saying that the earth used to be flat but it isn't any more.

Seems to me we are driven to responsibility for our attitudes and beliefs, rather than just our actions. Heaven forbid!

Why uncomfortable? It just means we can adapt and grow and change, perhaps even for the "better." Wouldn't that be a pleasant change of pace? An opportunity to rise from the moral poverty of absolutist provincialism perhaps...

Perhaps a new way of viewing morality is in order - one more along secular lines rather than fluffy, metaphysical ones. Why is this distressing? You live with it every day.

Frankly, I'll take secular morality any day of the week. It is more consistent and coherent, not to mention whole orders of magnitude for humane. I'll take a moral system based on consensus rather than totalitarianism whenever I am given the choice. At least then ordinary human lives are taken into account, rather than just thrown away with the flood waters...

[kerikiwi]

I don't know for sure, but since caucasian people regarded people of color as some sort of "lower breed," akin to simians, it's quite feasible to me that they would feel moral in keeping slaves -- as long as they treated them fairly, according to the prevailing morality of the time.


M.

Just a slight derail: most of the slaveholders in the past, and in the present, were not 'caucasian' but 'people of colour' (by which I suppose you mean 'people of a dark colour')
Is it moral now, or has it ever been moral, to just blame the pale people and exonerate the dark?

[Fiona]

Seems to me we are driven to responsibility for our attitudes and beliefs, rather than just our actions. Heaven forbid!

Why uncomfortable? It just means we can adapt and grow and change, perhaps even for the "better." Wouldn't that be a pleasant change of pace? An opportunity to rise from the moral poverty of absolutist provincialism perhaps...

Perhaps a new way of viewing morality is in order - one more along secular lines rather than fluffy, metaphysical ones. Why is this distressing? You live with it every day.

Frankly, I'll take secular morality any day of the week. It is more consistent and coherent, not to mention whole orders of magnitude for humane. I'll take a moral system based on consensus rather than totalitarianism whenever I am given the choice. At least then ordinary human lives are taken into account, rather than just thrown away with the flood waters...

I do not think it is a question of secular or religious. But I am very uncomfortable with moral relativism because although things sometimes change for the better they often change for the worse. If we have only "concensus" then there is no counter when the mood changes. I am certainly all for a secular morality, but it does seem to me important that we have reasons for moral decisions and this is the point Lord Muck made, I believe.

So are you arguing that there can never be reasons for a moral code; that there is no right and wrong, only consensus in a given place and time? I do not see your opposition between democratic/totalitarian in this question: I see potential for a reasoned morality, however difficult it may be to reach that. Just as with science, 10,000 flies CAN be wrong. I acknowledge we find it hard to find an approach but that does not mean we should abandon the search for it. It may be there is an approach but even if there is no "moral method" comparable to "scientific method" I will still never accept that it is right to keep slaves, even when all of one's contemporaries "feel" it is a moral act. They are wrong. I cannot prove it in an objective sense like newton's laws, but I will take a lot of convincing that one can find a moral position through the ballot box

[Beerina]

Theists always assume that morals are supposed to never change, and when they try to argue for God-based morals they always throw in "what's to stop us from deciding what's right and wrong every few weeks" or something of that nature.

Why? Why do they assume that morality, or are ideas of what's right and wrong, must never change or be adjusted?

In defense of treating morals as absolute (or at least slowly changing, yes this is technically a "conservative" position, go look it up), humanity has a poor record of quality of life when the power hungry can pell-mell swap around said morals when leading people on cruscades.

[Moochie]

Just a slight derail: most of the slaveholders in the past, and in the present, were not 'caucasian' but 'people of colour' (by which I suppose you mean 'people of a dark colour')
Is it moral now, or has it ever been moral, to just blame the pale people and exonerate the dark?

Not necessarily dark -- that's why I used the word "color."

As for your "most of the slaveholders in the past, and in the present, were not 'caucasian'" comment, I wouldn't know about that. I was saying how slaveholders of whatever color could justify slaveholding to themselves and among each other.


M.

[GreyICE]

In defense of treating morals as absolute (or at least slowly changing, yes this is technically a "conservative" position, go look it up), humanity has a poor record of quality of life when the power hungry can pell-mell swap around said morals when leading people on cruscades.

Actually, one would note that humanity has a poor record of quality of life whenever power-hungry leaders start talking too much about morality. It inevitably means that they're justifying killing someone because it's the right thing to do.

I want my leaders talking about happiness, comfort, and how to best manage the country in order to keep it healthy and prosperous. I note that my health, prosperity, and comfort rarely involve killing and dying in some foreign country.

[Richard Masters]

Theists always assume that morals are supposed to never change, and when they try to argue for God-based morals they always throw in "what's to stop us from deciding what's right and wrong every few weeks" or something of that nature.

Why? Why do they assume that morality, or are ideas of what's right and wrong, must never change or be adjusted?

If you are omniscient, then morality should never change.

If you are not omniscient, your view of morality should change as you learn new information about the world.

This is bad for Mormons, the Catholic Church, and theists with gods that can't make up their mind.

[Darth Rotor]

Why is morality supposed to be unchanging?
Why did you beg the question?
Theists always --
Really?
assume that morals are supposed to never change, and when they try to argue for God-based morals they always throw in "what's to stop us from deciding what's right and wrong every few weeks" or something of that nature.
See David Swidler's reply for your erroneous assumption.
Why? Why do they assume that morality, or are ideas of what's right and wrong, must never change or be adjusted?
Please provide a slightly more concise description of "they" before you ask for a reasoned reply.

DR

[kerikiwi]

Not necessarily dark -- that's why I used the word "color."

As for your "most of the slaveholders in the past, and in the present, were not 'caucasian'" comment, I wouldn't know about that. I was saying how slaveholders of whatever color could justify slaveholding to themselves and among each other.


M.
So 'colour' the way you use it doesn't mean dark-skinned? Why then use 'Caucasian' to refer to slave-holders?

Clearly you did mean dark-skinned when saying 'people of colour'. And you were not referring to slaveholders 'of whatever colour'.

And really you don't know that 'Caucasians' have not been history's most prolific slaveholders?

[Soapy Sam]

Morality: Individual survival behaviour in a herd context.

(From "Working Definitions: A work in progress" , by S.Sam)

[AkuManiMani]

Morality: Individual survival behaviour in a herd context.

(From "Working Definitions: A work in progress" , by S.Sam)

I think is quite the opposite. Morality is more about group survival than individual benefit.

[Dragoonster]

If morality is not unchanging then are we not driven to moral relativism? I am uncomfortable with that idea.

Why? A lack of belief in an objective morality doesn't mean one has to act amorally. Any of us or any society is free to devise any subjective morality we want. Then we can call it objective only within the context of our creation, and do just fine.

I think is quite the opposite. Morality is more about group survival than individual benefit.

It's quite whatever we, you, or I define it as, or our ancestors or our offspring. Morality is a mercurial human notion, easily changed, never objectively absolute.

God-given morality is a crutch or delusion for the theist. But if the atheist can't accept that morality is subjective (or, only "objective" to a particular society/individual), it seems he's searching for the same crutch.

[Herzblut]

But I am very uncomfortable with moral relativism because although things sometimes change for the better they often change for the worse.

Of course, Fiona. And the latter type of change is totally unacceptable,. Two generations in Germany, millions of people, have sacrificed blood, sweat and tears when they fought and died for reaching this liberal society. Society, based on immutable values like human dignity, human life, equal rights etc.

This fundamental moral codex will not be changed under no circumstance.



If we have only "concensus" then there is no counter when the mood changes. I am certainly all for a secular morality, but it does seem to me important that we have reasons for moral decisions and this is the point Lord Muck made, I believe.

So are you arguing that there can never be reasons for a moral code; that there is no right and wrong, only consensus in a given place and time? I do not see your opposition between democratic/totalitarian in this question: <snap>

But you will see mine, now.

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
Article 1 [Human dignity]
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.


Article 20 [Basic institutional principles; defense of the constitutional order]
...
(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.

(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.


Article 79 [Amendment of the Basic Law]
...
(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting ... the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.

Assume some insane idiots wanted to establish "animal rights" by ankering them into Art 1.1 "Human and Gorilla dignity shall be inviolable."

This is not easy, because Art 79 protects Art 1 "forever". Fundamentalists might try to change Art. 79 first, and then Art 1. This is clearly unconstitutional, but that could be dealt with later while centrally steered hordes are raging thru the streets.

What would inevitably happen in this critical situation is: I'd get me a machine gun to protect the central constitutional moral value, "human dignity". Art 1.1 would only be changed over my dead body.

[Moochie]

So 'colour' the way you use it doesn't mean dark-skinned? Why then use 'Caucasian' to refer to slave-holders?

Clearly you did mean dark-skinned when saying 'people of colour'. And you were not referring to slaveholders 'of whatever colour'.

And really you don't know that 'Caucasians' have not been history's most prolific slaveholders?

The point I was making is that people of whatever color will rationalize the most abominable behavior towards others by dehumanizing those others. White slave owners did it in regard to their black slaves. The Nazis did it in regard to Jewish people.

What's your point?


M.

[dglas]

I do not think it is a question of secular or religious. But I am very uncomfortable with moral relativism because although things sometimes change for the better they often change for the worse. If we have only "concensus" then there is no counter when the mood changes. I am certainly all for a secular morality, but it does seem to me important that we have reasons for moral decisions and this is the point Lord Muck made, I believe.

So are you arguing that there can never be reasons for a moral code; that there is no right and wrong, only consensus in a given place and time? I do not see your opposition between democratic/totalitarian in this question: I see potential for a reasoned morality, however difficult it may be to reach that. Just as with science, 10,000 flies CAN be wrong. I acknowledge we find it hard to find an approach but that does not mean we should abandon the search for it. It may be there is an approach but even if there is no "moral method" comparable to "scientific method" I will still never accept that it is right to keep slaves, even when all of one's contemporaries "feel" it is a moral act. They are wrong. I cannot prove it in an objective sense like newton's laws, but I will take a lot of convincing that one can find a moral position through the ballot box

Roleplaying an Absolutist:
I will still never accept that it is right to allow contraceptives, even when one's contemporaries "feel" it is a moral act. They are wrong. I cannot prove it in an objective sense...

I will still never accept that it is right to use STD innoculations, even when one's contemporaries "feel" it is a moral act. They are wrong. I cannot prove it in an objective sense...

I will still never accept that it is right to allow speech harmful to my viewpoint, even if one's contemporaries "feel" it is a moral act. They are wrong. I cannot prove it in an objective sense...

I will still never accept that it is right to accept to employ pain killers for birthing women, even when one's contemporaries "feel" it is a moral act. They are wrong. I cannot prove it in an objective sense...
Role play mode off.

Need I go on? The problem is not in the particular content; the problem is in the mindset. Yes, thinking one is right and somehow morally superior is seductive, but that doesn't make it any less dangerous. Moral absolutism represents inflexibility and an inability to adapt to changing circumstances, and sometimes values conflict. Shall we lapse into a state of learned helplessness in such cases? Or shall we, as one poster suggested, pick up a machine gun and start killing people? Shall we create a hierarchy of values in which absolute wrong become absolute right?

One may be uncomfortable with moral relativism, but moral absolutism is much more hobbling and horrific. Do you see, in Herzblut's post, the shift to finding it "right" to kill in the name of this or that morality?

Absolutism is just as arbitrary, possibly even more so than relativism (sorry to burst bubbles, but there it is). But it also has the detriments of:
(1) it is inflexible and maladaptive;
(2) it has stronger prescriptive power making it dangerously influential;
(3) it is exclusivist (just another reason to hate each other, with extreme prejudice);
(4) it leads to a conviction that violence is somehow "right" (in defence of whatever objective moral truth is the flavour of the day);
(5) it has no recognized checks or balances (the ballot box still rules -we just don't like to recognize it);
(6) it absolves us from responsibility for our attitudes; protects us from the difficult work of self-evaluating. With absolutism, we can kill without worry);
(7) it artificially elevates a philosophy above humanity, changes us into mere cogs in a dogmatic meat grinder.

Theists get their morals from exactly the same place non-theists do - other people and a social context. They just don't want to admit it.

Absolutism is the internalization of violence as a "right" way of being and the subjugation of humanity.

It's in my sig, but I'll say it again here: Philosophies exist to serve people; not the other way around.

[Fiona]

Need I go on? The problem is not in the particular content; the problem is in the mindset.

Of course I understand the point you are making, yet I do not think you are proposing a fair opposition, nonetheless. I am not arguing for a mindset: I am arguing for moral positions which are underpinned by reason. As I stated, I do not think that reaching any such position is easy: and I am far from certain it is possible. However I do think the problem is indeed the content. Your examples are funny but they do not address my point, I think. It may be that I have confused you by failing to make a distinction which Herzblut elaborated when he separated morals and ethics. I confess I have not seen them so defined before and so this may be a source of confusion.


Yes, thinking one is right and somehow morally superior is seductive, but that doesn't make it any less dangerous.

I do not think that believing one is right is associated with thinking one is morally superior in any way. I do not hold any opinions I do not believe to be right: I would not hold them if I did not believe that. That in no way implies I am certain of them. In light of arguments I have not considered or evidence I did not know about or did not previously exist, I like to think I will change them. I like to think I can learn. I do not honestly see any danger at all in believing I am right: or in you believing you are right. Do you really not think you are?

Moral absolutism represents inflexibility and an inability to adapt to changing circumstances

I do agree with this. I do not, on the other hand, admire "flexibility" if it only serves to treat morals in the same way as fashion. There is no need to provide a reason for a change in fashion as nothing hangs on it: there is a very strong need to provide good reason to change a moral principle such as "it is wrong to kill"

and sometimes values conflict. Shall we lapse into a state of learned helplessness in such cases? Or shall we, as one poster suggested, pick up a machine gun and start killing people? Shall we create a hierarchy of values in which absolute wrong become absolute right?

Certainly. It is in the context of such conflict that we refine our moral stance surely? Those hard cases are very challenging and they stretch our understanding of our principles. This is not very much harder than dealing with competing theories in the field of science, though in the absence of a very effective methodology we are in the same position as the hard sciences before the development of the scientific method. That is not a reason to give up though. I do not feel we are helpless. What is problematic is finding a place where moral theory meets the real example and this is where science scores. But even in science our most cherished theories are subject to change in the face of evidence and I do not see the basis is much different in morality.

One may be uncomfortable with moral relativism, but moral absolutism is much more hobbling and horrific. Do you see, in Herzblut's post, the shift to finding it "right" to kill in the name of this or that morality?

Once again you make a false opposition. Moral relativism is not opposed to moral absolutism: it is opposed to moral objectivism. And this is where I think the confusion lies. Let us think about how the words are used. If moral relativism was really adopted then I could not offend anyone if I made a statement which criticised their moral stance. This is because the words "for me" would be explicitly or implicitly contained in any moral statement. However our language does not work that way for the simple reason our thinking does not work that way. In another thread you argued for the prescriptive content of moral utterances and I agreed with you. Here you seem to abandon that position ( sorry if I have misunderstood your stance: if I have please feel free to correct me). I have no truck with absolutism in science or morality or anywhere, really. We are not infallible and things do change. As I said, I think they should change for a reason and not for fashion or irrational impulses. Particularly in the field of morality I think it would be helpful if we all had to think about and justify our positions quite robustly, as scientists do in thier own field. And new moral ideas should have to fight for acceptance just as hard as new scientific ones and for the same reasons. But that is not to say it cannot grow or change: just that we should not blow in the wind

Absolutism is just as arbitrary, possibly even more so than relativism (sorry to burst bubbles, but there it is). But it also has the detriments of:
(1) it is inflexible and maladaptive;
(2) it has stronger prescriptive power making it dangerously influential;
(3) it is exclusivist (just another reason to hate each other, with extreme prejudice);
(4) it leads to a conviction that violence is somehow "right" (in defence of whatever objective moral truth is the flavour of the day);
(5) it has no recognized checks or balances (the ballot box still rules -we just don't like to recognize it);
(6) it absolves us from responsibility for our attitudes; protects us from the difficult work of self-evaluating. With absolutism, we can kill without worry);
(7) it artificially elevates a philosophy above humanity, changes us into mere cogs in a dogmatic meat grinder.

I absolutely agree with this :p

Theists get their morals from exactly the same place non-theists do - other people and a social context. They just don't want to admit it.

I am not a theist, but again I agree. I hope what I have said shows why this is not relevant to the case I am making. It occurs to me I may have been off topic from the start however: if so that was not intentional. I focussed on why we should take a conservative stance on morality rather than on absolutism: and on why we should at least seek to establish well founded moral principles on which to judge any proposed change. I now realise that the OP was more absolutist than I noticed and so I apologise for derailing

[Winston]

I think you, or the theists you're referring to, are confusing social mores with actual morality. Things like murdering innocent children will always be immoral.

Mmmm... errr... Sparta didn't think so.

They had the moral view that keeping a baby that was deformed was more damaging to their society than harm to the baby of killing it. It is a utilitarian argument that still exists in cultures today.

Another example is the current Chinese policy of "one child" per couple.

It is difficult to find moral absolutes that cross all cultures.

[westprog]

I think you, or the theists you're referring to, are confusing social mores with actual morality. Things like murdering innocent children will always be immoral.

If the murder of innocent children is always immoral, then there's such a thing as morality as an objective quantity in the Universe.

If I understand it correctly, then the materialist position is that the universe consists of atoms and energy moving around, and no particular configuration is of any more absolute value than any other, beyond what choices we make.

[Winston]

More directly to the question at hand...

Are germs moral? How about cats? Do trees have morality? Can anyone propose and objective, repeatable test for any part of morality?

As long as morality is subjective to ones knowledge base, even humans can not agree on what "it" is.

The closest to morality I can come is the decision trees you get from various game theory experiments (still unable to post URLS, but search "tit for tat" and "game theory").

The basic idea is that the most successful survival and reproductive strategies know by human at even given time are often considered the most moral behaviour.

Cooperation usually works better than competition. But if someone else is competing instead of cooperating then you should compete back. (tit-for-tat). I do not kill because I could be killed. You killed her, we will kill you.

The definition of cooperation changes however with location and time (and thus moral relatativism source I imagine).

[AkuManiMani]

If the murder of innocent children is always immoral, then there's such a thing as morality as an objective quantity in the Universe.

Hmm... I would say that morality is an objective quality of subjective experiencers and not the universe as a whole. The universe cannot be said to contain any morality is there is no one within it. I suppose one could consider subjective experience to be a microcosm in which morality exists; outside of that context its nonexistent.

[Fiona]

You can say the same of all social sciences. Does that mean they are not/cannot be objective?

[Dragoonster]

If the murder of innocent children is always immoral, then there's such a thing as morality as an objective quantity in the Universe.

If I understand it correctly, then the materialist position is that the universe consists of atoms and energy moving around, and no particular configuration is of any more absolute value than any other, beyond what choices we make.

I'm guessing, but the materialist would say evolution leads to survival mechanisms; once a species reaches conscious self-reflection that mechanism is realized in "morality" conceptions. Which are as real as any materialist thing, simply because they exist and apparently fit a predictive/evolutionary template.

I agree this doesn't make it objective, except to certain species, and further certain societies. As it's defintion is futher defined by a small number fighting for survival, it seems no more objective than a lion murdering another lion's offspring, or a dolphin raping another dolphin, or a wasp enslaving another species to serve host to its offspring.

You can say the same of all social sciences. Does that mean they are not/cannot be objective?

They're objective to their context. That doesn't mean the context is objective.

Imagine a race from Seti Alpha 5 that takes pleasure in masochism. They've built an entirely rational (from their perspective) morality from this. They'd likely try to convince humans that masochism is "good"; well, as likely as humans are to try to convince them that it's "bad".

[westprog]

I'm guessing, but the materialist would say evolution leads to survival mechanisms; once a species reaches conscious self-reflection that mechanism is realized in "morality" conceptions. Which are as real as any materialist thing, simply because they exist and apparently fit a predictive/evolutionary template.

I agree this doesn't make it objective, except to certain species, and further certain societies. As it's defintion is futher defined by a small number fighting for survival, it seems no more objective than a lion murdering another lion's offspring, or a dolphin raping another dolphin, or a wasp enslaving another species to serve host to its offspring.


The creation of species is only possible because of behaviour that was anomalous for another species. Any behaviour by any species is only conditionally good for the survival of the individual or the species.

Additionally, there are plenty of behaviours or characteristics that are only good for the individual, but do nothing to help the species. A peacock's tail does nothing to help peacocks survive as a species. Is it immoral for a peacock to have a huge tail just toget the girls for his own selfish pleasure?

What I'm getting at is that equating behaviour that is evolutionally sound with morality is not necessarily a good fit.


They're objective to their context. That doesn't mean the context is objective.



Imagine a race from Seti Alpha 5 that takes pleasure in masochism. They've built an entirely rational (from their perspective) morality from this. They'd likely try to convince humans that masochism is "good"; well, as likely as humans are to try to convince them that it's "bad".

I think masochism isn't a perfect example, because most tolerant humans would agree that if it feels good, do it. If the Setians like to thrash each other, then whatever goes on between consenting sentient Setians is cool.

A more troublesome encounter would be with the octopoid creatures from Sirius who like hurting each other but who don't like being hurt. A sadistic culture without any masochists. They might insist - and they might be able to demonstrate - that it is good for them. The powerful Sirians like being able to hurt the lesser beings. The less powerful Sirians hate the pain, but have no wish to change the overall structure, but just want to be inflicting instead of inflicted. In such a society, where pointless suffering seems endemic, could a human visitor be justified in telling them to go easy on each other?

[drkitten]

I do not think it is a question of secular or religious. But I am very uncomfortable with moral relativism because although things sometimes change for the better they often change for the worse. If we have only "concensus" then there is no counter when the mood changes. I am certainly all for a secular morality, but it does seem to me important that we have reasons for moral decisions and this is the point Lord Muck made, I believe.

Yes, but most of the moral "advances" made over the past zillion or so centuries are not merely based on "consensus," but also based (at least partially) on empirical evidence. In many cases, what the empirical evidence shows is that the prior belief were not based on evidence and should be abandoned.

A good example of that is paternalistic slavery. I start from two premises (that most people throughout western history would agree with) : first, that it is immoral to enslave your equal and that similarly situated people should have similar rights. This is basically the idea of "rule of law" that we've inherited from the Romans and Babylonians; while I may not be similarly situated to a divinely-annointed king, I do share status with all the other peasants in my village and it would be inappropriate for me to enforce my will on them.

Second, however, I assume that is is not only moral but praiseworthy to take care of those who are not able to care for themselves -- children being the most common example today. It is immoral to abandon children to fend for themselves or even to make them take responsibility for their actions that they do not understand. This is also why the "incompent" are placed under the care and authority of state-appointed guardians when necessary. Again, this should be uncontroversial.

But five hundred years ago, women and "inferior races" were also "recognized" as not being able to take care of themselves, which is why (white) men needs to have authority over them, in order to protect them. (There are some very good writings by Jefferson on exactly this subject; he worried that if he freed them, they would be unable to survive in white-dominated society and would end up worse off than before.)

What we have now is a tremendous body of evidence that women and racial minorities are NOT inferior and do not need "protection" from the evils of the world.

I don't think this is mere "consensus"; I think this is a genuine, evidence-based increase in our understanding of the world.

[Fiona]

And that is precisely why moral relativism is not tenable. It also points up the possibility of moral objectivity and how we can go about achieving that at least in some spheres.

[drkitten]

And that is precisely why moral relativism is not tenable.

Huh?

It's exactly why moral absolutism is not tenable, and why moral relativism is the only tenable option.

Moral relativism is simply the belief that circumstances alter cases; actions that may be moral in some circumstances may be immoral in others. One sort of circumstances that can be shown to be directly relevant is the knowledge state of the agent; two agents who "know" different things can take directly opposite actions based on their "knowledge" (in this case, obviously at most one of the agents has genuine, true, knowledge, but no one, including third-party observers, knows which).

You're confusing "moral relativism" with mere populism --- or worse, with the straw man of relativism that seems to think that it means "anything goes" or morality-of-convenience.

[Winston]

Another way to think about moral relativism is this:

"When should we stop changing our morals?"

If you believe in an absolute morality embedded into reality, then we merely need to discover it and be done.

While I've no decisive arguement against an absolute morality existing in nature, I do know that I'll never have enough wisdom or knowledge to figure it out during the few years I've left to live. So this presents me with a real day to day problem of figuring out the best possible morals to follow.

When I stop growing and stagnate, I'll let you know what my personal morals are. Until then...

[Fiona]

Huh?

It's exactly why moral absolutism is not tenable, and why moral relativism is the only tenable option.

I disagree for the reasons I set out before. Your post appeared to me to support my position, with examples which were well drawn.

Moral relativism is simply the belief that circumstances alter cases;

Not really. Moral relativism does have a number of different meanings, it is true. But fundamental to the concept is the idea that there is NO rational basis for resolving moral disagreement. This is what I find worrying and judging from you post you agree. Unless I completely misunderstand the purpose of your excellent examples.

actions that may be moral in some circumstances may be immoral in others.

That is the nature of the question, surely? It is certainly true that such contradictions appear to arise and they are useful in refining our understanding of our moral positions. I do not think it is yet shown that the moral can become immoral, however: I think where this appears to happen we need to work to identify why this seems to be true and then to resolve the problem


One sort of circumstances that can be shown to be directly relevant is the knowledge state of the agent; two agents who "know" different things can take directly opposite actions based on their "knowledge" (in this case, obviously at most one of the agents has genuine, true, knowledge, but no one, including third-party observers, knows which).

My whole position is based on differential knowledge of the agents who disagree on a moral question. On your own example. There was a hypothesis that certain groups of human beings were in fact not fully human in the sense that they were not capable of effective physical and/or moral agency. This underpinned an apparently moral stance of "protection", as you put it. The underlying theory was wrong and the morality which arose from that was also wrong. Objectively wrong. It is certainly true that such objective conclusions are difficult to reach, but your own post demonstrates it is not beyond possibility.

You're confusing "moral relativism" with mere populism --- or worse, with the straw man of relativism that seems to think that it means "anything goes" or morality-of-convenience.

I do not think I am. Moral relativism certainly means it is impossible to choose between one moral view and another for somebody else. Thus if someone chooses to embrace slavery as a moral way to organise society it would be impossible to criticise this. That is what the term means. It is not populism: it is the nature of the stance.

I do not think we disagree though we are using the words differently.

[Roboramma]

DrKitten, I've just realised (after writing all that goes below) that most of this isn't in response to you so much as thoughts that came up as I was reading your post. I think I mostly agree with what you've said (though you may disagree with what I say).

Yes, but most of the moral "advances" made over the past zillion or so centuries are not merely based on "consensus," but also based (at least partially) on empirical evidence. In many cases, what the empirical evidence shows is that the prior belief were not based on evidence and should be abandoned. Maybe I misunderstand moral relativism, but isn't the ability to distinguish between one moral stance and another, based on evidence, and say, "this one is better" what many here are arguing against?
I thought so, but I may be misunderstanding.

A good example of that is paternalistic slavery. I start from two premises (that most people throughout western history would agree with) : first, that it is immoral to enslave your equal and that similarly situated people should have similar rights. This is basically the idea of "rule of law" that we've inherited from the Romans and Babylonians; while I may not be similarly situated to a divinely-annointed king, I do share status with all the other peasants in my village and it would be inappropriate for me to enforce my will on them. Basing morality on basic principles that we can all (or at least almost all) come to agreement on is exactly what I would suggest. It doesn't create an unchanging morality - obviously as our knowledge increases we have to alter our conclusions - but it certainly means that there is some right answer to any moral question, even if we don't know what that answer is.

Second, however, I assume that is is not only moral but praiseworthy to take care of those who are not able to care for themselves -- children being the most common example today. It is immoral to abandon children to fend for themselves or even to make them take responsibility for their actions that they do not understand. This is also why the "incompent" are placed under the care and authority of state-appointed guardians when necessary. Again, this should be uncontroversial.
Just as an aside - I don't think that the principle here is controversial, but I do question whether or not it's the actual motivation for the behavior (parental care).
That is, I don't think parents, or society, look at children and say "it's immoral to abandon them to fend for themselves". I think rather we have parental instincts that we justify with this argument. Of course, it doesn't make the argument wrong.

But five hundred years ago, women and "inferior races" were also "recognized" as not being able to take care of themselves, which is why (white) men needs to have authority over them, in order to protect them. (There are some very good writings by Jefferson on exactly this subject; he worried that if he freed them, they would be unable to survive in white-dominated society and would end up worse off than before.) While that may have been the justification many used for slavery, and the reason that thinkers like Jefferson were able to consider it the right way to structure society, I don't think that's the motivation for the practice on the grass-roots level.
That is - the men involved in the slave trade, and those who used the labour of slaves, didn't do so out of a feeling of moral obligation, but rather out of self-interest.

Of course, thinking about it, we probably do much the same today - I support free speech because I want to be able to speak freely (and enjoy the products of other's free speech) and not because I think it's "right".
Though in some cases I think the latter is the driving force.

What we have now is a tremendous body of evidence that women and racial minorities are NOT inferior and do not need "protection" from the evils of the world.

I don't think this is mere "consensus"; I think this is a genuine, evidence-based increase in our understanding of the world.

I agree, and I think morality should be based upon exactly that. The idea that questions have answers, even if we don't know them yet.

Of course those answers are case dependent. Just as there isn't a "best" way to build a house, without consideration for where the house will be built, the resources of the person building it, the cost of materials in that area, the availability of land, the uses that the house will be put to, etc.

There also isn't a "best" way to behave, without consideration of the particulars of the case. Saying, "killing is wrong" is no different from saying "houses should be made of wood". Depending on the case both statements could be right or wrong.

But that doesn't mean that there aren't underlying things that are true of building houses, things that can be discovered the more that we learn about the world (such as how and when to build a foundation, or the ways that particular kinds of roofs require support from the walls).

Moreover, unless we can agree (or the builder knows) on the purpose of the house, there is no answer to those questions - but once the purpose is understood, in the context of the particular case, with reason and understanding we can find answers.

And I think that moral considerations are similar - at least so long as we can agree on some underlying principles, we can develop an understanding of the world that can answer specific cases.

Sometimes we'll be wrong - simply because we don't know enough and come to faulty conclusions based on incomplete data - but we'll be right more often than if we based our morality on the stars or the whims of deluded prophets.

[Roboramma]

Another way to think about moral relativism is this:

"When should we stop changing our morals?"

If you believe in an absolute morality embedded into reality, then we merely need to discover it and be done.

While I've no decisive arguement against an absolute morality existing in nature, I do know that I'll never have enough wisdom or knowledge to figure it out during the few years I've left to live. So this presents me with a real day to day problem of figuring out the best possible morals to follow.

When I stop growing and stagnate, I'll let you know what my personal morals are. Until then...

Don't all questions face the same problems? Or, if not all, most questions about the nature of the universe?

What is going on at the heart of the sun? We've got a pretty good idea, but we don't for sure, and what we do know is subject to revision should new data appear.
What were our ancestors like three million years ago? Again, we've got a picture, with good evidence to back it up, but there's still plenty of room for clarification, and even big change (maybe there was an aquatic ape stage?).

That's the nature of life and our understanding of the universe - we have to be willing to admit that we don't know for certain. But that doesn't mean answers don't exist, or that we shouldn't base our actions on the (uncertain) conclusions that we've come to based on what we do know.

Sometimes we should just be careful, knowing, as we do, that we could be wrong. And so, in moral considerations, I'd say it's better to err on the side of compassion.

[drkitten]

Maybe I misunderstand moral relativism, but isn't the ability to distinguish between one moral stance and another, based on evidence, and say, "this one is better" what many here are arguing against?

Not at all. Almost all conventional moralist claim to be able to be able to distinguish between one moral stance and another "based upon evidence." And, of course, upon the axiomatic principles of their moral system, which are presumed to be above mere evidence in the same sense that points and lines are above mathematical proof. The fundamental question of ethics is : how do I tell whether or not an action is moral, and the answer to that must be based at least partly on the evidence surrounding that action. Even the Bible does this : it says that thou shalt not kill, and then proscribes the death penalty for hundreds of petty offenses.

What distinguishes moral relativism from moral absolutism is the idea that the axioms themselves might change; in a relativistic situation, axioms are not universally valid. What is a moral axiom in one situation might not be a moral axiom in others.


Basing morality on basic principles that we can all (or at least almost all) come to agreement on is exactly what I would suggest.

That's a form of moral absolutism -- read Lewis' Men Without Chests for a relatively well-written exploration of that idea. The "Tao" gives us axioms of "practical reason," (meaning ethics) that morality demands that we follow. And these axioms are universal in both time and space.

At least, the sensible interpretation of that is Lewis' "Tao." There is an unsensible interpretation of what you wrote that makes moral principles subject to majoritarianism, and so if we all vote that murder is right, it is. That's the usual strawman version of "moral relativism" that the Bible-thumpers like to rail against in order to get support for their version of moral absolutes. I will do you the courtesy of assuming that's not what you meant.

But in this case, "obviously" a new scientific discovery can esult in a change in what everyone accepts as moral behavior. As a simple example, if a particular disease is known to result ina long, prolonged, and unavoidable death, then many people would hold it moral to commit suicide if you get diagnosed with it. (AIDS used to be in this category, and before that syphillis.) If/when we discover a cure --- well, no one would accept the idea that you should commit suicide instead of taking penicillin for syphillis.


And I think that moral considerations are similar - at least so long as we can agree on some underlying principles, we can develop an understanding of the world that can answer specific cases.

Well, that's part of the issue. Why should our agreement be necessary? Alternatively, why should I care whether or not you understand my moral behavior (especially if I'm not even aware of your existence or your belief structure.)

Jefferson and slavery again provide a good example --- five minutes with google will uncover hundreds of pages damning Jefferson for his "immorality" and his "condoning" of slavery. To suggest that Jefferson is/was a product of his times and that he was unable NOT to own slaves according to the legal and ethical conventions of the early 19th century is damned as moral relativism. We now have a moral "absolute" that states that "chattel slavery is bad" which we impose retroactively across all of US, if not world, history.

That's also why Fiona is wrong when she writes:


Moral relativism does have a number of different meanings, it is true. But fundamental to the concept is the idea that there is NO rational basis for resolving moral disagreement.

That's another strawman; I doubt that any sophisticated philosopher would accept that for a minute. Of course there's a rational basis to resolving moral disagreement. Reason and good faith, jointly applied. Even a moral relativist can identify a tetotalling whisky-taster as a hypocrite. What moral relativists accept is that there are some axioms that reasonable people can still in good faith disagree upon.

[drkitten]

Don't all questions face the same problems? Or, if not all, most questions about the nature of the universe?

Well, that's part of the issue. Most empirical questions do, certainly. On the other hand, I'm 100% confident that there are an infinite number of prime numbers, because mathematics is most definitely NOT empirical.

Is morality empirical? Most relativists would say "yes," most absolutists would say "no." If has given us access to a set of moral principles, we can just resolve any moral question by asking ourselves What-Would-[Insert Deity Here]-Do? If the basis for all morality is evolutionary and instinctual, then simply follow-your-instincts.

And since you have the same knowledge of your instincts or of [Insert Deity Here] that I do, our answers should not differ -- if they do, you've obviously made a mistake somewhere. Hence Jefferson was [i]wrong to own slaves, because we're self-evidently right.

[Fiona]

It is not a strawman, drkitten. It is mainstream thinking. I think you misunderstand the meaning of moral relativism

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

. Are Moral Disagreements Rationally Resolvable?

Philosophers generally agree that, even if DMR were true without qualification, it would not directly follow that MMR is true. In particular, if moral disagreements could be resolved rationally for the most part, then disagreement-based arguments for MMR would be undermined, and there would be little incentive to endorse the position. Such resolvability, at least in principle, is what moral objectivism would lead us to expect. One of the main points of contention between proponents of MMR and their objectivist critics concerns the possibility of rationally resolving moral disagreements. It might be thought that the defender of MMR needs to show conclusively that the moral disagreements identified in DMR cannot be rationally resolved, or again that the moral objectivist must show conclusively that they can be. Neither is a reasonable expectation. Indeed, it is unclear what would count as conclusively arguing for either conclusion. The center of the debate concerns what plausibly may be expected. Adherents of MMR attempt to show why rational resolution is an unlikely prospect, while their objectivist critics try to show why to a large extent this is likely, or at least not unlikely.

Moral objectivists can allow that there are special cases in which moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, for example on account of vagueness or indeterminacy in the concepts involved. Their main claim is that ordinarily there is a rational basis for overcoming disagreements (not that people would actually come to agree). Objectivists maintain that, typically, at least one party in a moral disagreement accepts the moral judgment on account of some factual or logical mistake, and that revealing such mistakes would be sufficient to rationally resolve the disagreement. They suggest that whatever genuine moral disagreements there are usually can be resolved in this fashion. In addition, objectivists sometimes offer an analysis of why people make such mistakes. For example, people may be influenced by passion, prejudice, ideology, self-interest, and the like. In general, objectivists think, insofar as people set these influences aside, and are reasonable and well-informed, there is generally a basis for resolving their moral differences. (They might also say that at least some agreements about moral truths reflect the fact that, with respect to matters pertaining to these truths, people generally have been reasonable and well-informed.)

Proponents of MMR may allow that moral disagreements sometimes are rationally resolved. In particular, they may grant that this often happens when the parties to a moral dispute share a moral framework. The characteristic relativist contention is that a common moral framework is often lacking, especially in moral disagreements between one society and another, and that differences in moral frameworks usually cannot be explained simply by supposing that one society or the other is making factual or logical mistakes. These moral disagreements are ultimately rooted in fundamentally different moral orientations, and there is usually no reason to think these differences result from the fact that, in relevant respects, one side is less reasonable or well-informed than the other. This conclusion might rest on the observation that it is not evident that mistakes are at the root of these disagreement. But it might also depend on a theory, developed to explain such observations, that the frameworks are incommensurable: They do not have enough in common, in terms of either shared concepts or shared standards, to resolve their differences, and there is no impartial third standpoint, accessible to any reasonable and well-informed person, that could be invoked to resolve the conflict.

[Roboramma]

Not at all. Almost all conventional moralist claim to be able to be able to distinguish between one moral stance and another "based upon evidence." And, of course, upon the axiomatic principles of their moral system, which are presumed to be above mere evidence in the same sense that points and lines are above mathematical proof. Then I suppose I've been arguing with a strawman. I can agree with all of the above (and what I snipped).

What distinguishes moral relativism from moral absolutism is the idea that the axioms themselves might change; in a relativistic situation, axioms are not universally valid. What is a moral axiom in one situation might not be a moral axiom in others. This I have a bit of a hard time with. I can agree that changing the axioms based on, I don't know, a realisation that they aren't right, that they are contradictory, whatever, makes good sense. But in that case I'd suggest that we've chosen the wrong axioms, not that such axioms don't exist.

I have a hard time with this issue, however. It's difficult to see where the axioms of a moral system should be derived from. On the other hand, I don't understand how if there is a way to derive them, some way to choose one axiom over another, that they could be subject to change.

One way to choose axioms is emotion - such and such feels wrong. But there are plenty of things that feel wrong that I don't think are wrong (or the feel right that I think are wrong), and I don't think that this is a good way to develop a moral system. On the other hand, I know that my feelings influence my views on morality.

The way I attempt to do this is through a utilitarianism, at least I think so. I've tried to find something that I think is solid - in this case, that my suffering is bad, my happiness is good - this is something I can't prove, but I'm unwilling to relinquish. But since I don't know of any meaningful way to distinguish my own happiness or suffering from those of others I give them equal weight.
I don't know how valid all this is, and I recognise that I have moral concepts that aren't derived from these premises, but... it's the best I've been able to do so far.


That's a form of moral absolutism -- read Lewis' Men Without Chests for a relatively well-written exploration of that idea. The "Tao" gives us axioms of "practical reason," (meaning ethics) that morality demands that we follow. And these axioms are universal in both time and space. Yeah. This has always been a big question for me. I don't pretend to have any valid answers - hoping something comes up in this discussion, actually.

At least, the sensible interpretation of that is Lewis' "Tao." There is an unsensible interpretation of what you wrote that makes moral principles subject to majoritarianism, and so if we all vote that murder is right, it is. That's the usual strawman version of "moral relativism" that the Bible-thumpers like to rail against in order to get support for their version of moral absolutes. I will do you the courtesy of assuming that's not what you meant. At first I was going to thank you for that courtesy. Then I realised that I may have actually put forward that idea (if without realising it).
I guess in discussion about moral issues I try to find some common ground, but when it comes to morality, I agree - consensus doesn't ensure accuracy any more than in any other field.


But in this case, "obviously" a new scientific discovery can esult in a change in what everyone accepts as moral behavior. As a simple example, if a particular disease is known to result ina long, prolonged, and unavoidable death, then many people would hold it moral to commit suicide if you get diagnosed with it. (AIDS used to be in this category, and before that syphillis.) If/when we discover a cure --- well, no one would accept the idea that you should commit suicide instead of taking penicillin for syphillis. Absolutely. This is the kind of way that I suggest our moral viewpoint should change, and that the decision of what actions are the right ones should change. Just as if the price of wood went up high enough it might be a good idea to build your house out of brick.

Well, that's part of the issue. Why should our agreement be necessary? Alternatively, why should I care whether or not you understand my moral behavior (especially if I'm not even aware of your existence or your belief structure.) Actually, I agree. What others believe isn't important so much as why they believe it - and that only matters if they're right.

Jefferson and slavery again provide a good example --- five minutes with google will uncover hundreds of pages damning Jefferson for his "immorality" and his "condoning" of slavery. To suggest that Jefferson is/was a product of his times and that he was unable NOT to own slaves according to the legal and ethical conventions of the early 19th century is damned as moral relativism. We now have a moral "absolute" that states that "chattel slavery is bad" which we impose retroactively across all of US, if not world, history. I disagree completely with the idea that all slave owners were wrong to do so. I think that we can only judge people based upon their understanding at the time.
To take a stupid analogy - I might have a family to support, and so go to work, driving to get there. I fail to realise that there is a child playing under my car and, through no fault of my own, kill the child. Was I wrong to drive the car? Clearly not, yet if I'd known of the existence of the child, and the repercussions of my actions, I would have been.

Similarly I can't fault someone who's knowledge leads to incorrect conclusions. I can't even fault someone who has complete knowledge but poor reasoning skills, so long as they are genuinely applied.

I think a person is moral if she does what she thinks is right, and spends time considering the issue of whether or not her actions or beliefs are right. Thus moral people can do immoral things without themselves being immoral. Slavery was wrong, but not every slave owner, or slave supporter, was a bad person.
I also think that there is some objective way to find the best (more moral) thing to do in any given situation, but that the people involved often won't have the knowledge or tools (reasoning ability for instance) to arrive at it. I certainly don't know how.

That's another strawman; I doubt that any sophisticated philosopher would accept that for a minute. Of course there's a rational basis to resolving moral disagreement. Reason and good faith, jointly applied. Even a moral relativist can identify a tetotalling whisky-taster as a hypocrite. What moral relativists accept is that there are some axioms that reasonable people can still in good faith disagree upon.
That last is a good point, and I think I can agree with it. But does it suggest that there isn't a correct set of axioms?
I mean, I can accept that your ideas of good economic policy, which are different from mine, are still the product of a reasonable mind, genuinely offered in good faith, without supposing that there isn't a best economic policy for this particular country at this particular time.

On the other hand I can also see that it's possible that in a given situation two different 'answers' might both be equally right, in so much as doing as much good as each other, yet radically different, and springing from completely different ethical and moral traditions.

So, in that case, I'll amend what I'm saying. I don't contend so much that there is a best answer, so much as that some answers are, objectively, better than others, and that with reason and knowledge we can come closer to those answers.

And, I suppose, in that case it's possible that we agree. I'm just still so mixed up about all of this that I'm not entirely certain.

[Roboramma]

Well, that's part of the issue. Most empirical questions do, certainly. On the other hand, I'm 100% confident that there are an infinite number of prime numbers, because mathematics is most definitely NOT empirical.

Is morality empirical? Most relativists would say "yes," most absolutists would say "no." If [Insert Deity Here] has given us access to a set of moral principles, we can just resolve any moral question by asking ourselves What-Would-[Insert Deity Here]-Do? Doesn't that require both a complete understanding of the deity and of the situation at hand?
For instance, maybe would take responsibility for the lives and decisions of those who can't take care of themselves. But when making a decision in a particular case we still need to determine (empirically) whether or not the individuals involved [i]can take care of themselves.

Similarly, there may be questions to which has not given us answers. Should I put sugar in my coffee, or not? [Insert Deity Here] may have been silent, and so I'm forced to make an interpretation based upon [Insert Deity Here]'s [i]other pronouncements. The way to do that may not be obvious, and reasonable people may disagree about how it should be done. There may not be an answer in scripture.

[drkitten]

Doesn't that require both a complete understanding of the deity and of the situation at hand?

No more than the statement that there is an infinite number of primes requires a complete understanding of mathematics.

[Roboramma]

No more than the statement that there is an infinite number of primes requires a complete understanding of mathematics.

Oh, certainly. I was too broad. There are some situations which the diety may have been perfectly clear about - "should I steal my father's car?" might be an example, similar to "how many prime numbers are there?"
I'm just suggesting that there are some questions on which the deity is not so clear, in which one who bases his morality upon the pronouncements of that deity will have to either interpret prounounments that don't apply specifically to that situation, or the people or things involved in that situation (from your example - black people are like children, for instance. The deity may be very clear about how to treat children, but not black people. We are forced to determine (empirically) if they should be treated like children, or like adults of our own race, or like something else that the deity did speak about).
So I agree that religiously based morality can be very clear and unequivocal (just like mathematics). I'm just saying that it isn't always, in every situation.

[drkitten]

So I agree that religiously based morality can be very clear and unequivocal (just like mathematics). I'm just saying that it isn't always, in every situation.

Oh, certainly. The usual response is simply to believe that [Insert Deity Here] either provides continuing revelation (praying for guidance, a very common Christian practice) or else gave you everything important that you need, so if you just look hard enough, the answer is implicit in the axioms (and much of the task of rabbis and other research theologians is to dig it out).

I think you actually came up with a good example. The Decalogue does not address stealing cars. Houses, fields, wifes, man- or maid-servants, oxen, yes. Even donkeys. It also doesn't say anything about the guy who lives in the next house but one. But "reasonable people" will generalize.

[Fiona]

Then I suppose I've been arguing with a strawman. I can agree with all of the above (and what I snipped).

No you have not. Moral relativists do believe that there is NO evidence which can settle the question of what is moral. The position is that morality is defined by the time and place (ie. consensus) and that there is no objectivity to be had. Evidence does not come into it: it is a social contract primarily. This is not a misrepresentation of the relativist position: it is what moral relativism means

This I have a bit of a hard time with.I can agree that changing the axioms based on, I don't know, a realisation that they aren't right, that they are contradictory, whatever, makes good sense. But in that case I'd suggest that we've chosen the wrong axioms, not that such axioms don't exist.

Again you have correctly understood the relativist position, so far as I can see. And your confusion arises from that understanding. From an objectivist position our understanding of moral principles is subject to change on the basis of evidence such as drkitten outlined in the earlier post. From the relativist stance it is not. Change comes from a move in the consensus of the society: that may come from the fact that a social group chooses to accept some alteration based on such evidence: but the evidence itself does not demand any such change. In this conception morality is what is accepted by the group (or in a special case by the individual): evidence is wholly tangential

I have a hard time with this issue, however. It's difficult to see where the axioms of a moral system should be derived from. On the other hand, I don't understand how if there is a way to derive them, some way to choose one axiom over another, that they could be subject to change.

This is the question. It is the objectivist position that there is the possibility of deriving such principles on rational grounds. It is not easy and we have not made much progress but in principle it is possible. It is the relativist position that it is not possible: in fact such an enterprise is itself irrational, in this scheme. The relativist proposes that any moral axiom is valid. Drkitten states that this is a strawman: it is the essence of relativism, rather


One way to choose axioms is emotion - such and such feels wrong. But there are plenty of things that feel wrong that I don't think are wrong (or the feel right that I think are wrong), and I don't think that this is a good way to develop a moral system. On the other hand, I know that my feelings influence my views on morality.

I think that drkitten herself showed us some better ways to approach the problem: emotion etc is involved in our moral choices: but then it is also involved in what we choose to investigate using the scientific method. Fortunately it can provide a starting point but never an end. Or so I think

<snip>


Basing morality on basic principles that we can all (or at least almost all) come to agreement on is exactly what I would suggest.

That's a form of moral absolutism -- read Lewis' Men Without Chests for a relatively well-written exploration of that idea. The "Tao" gives us axioms of "practical reason," (meaning ethics) that morality demands that we follow. And these axioms are universal in both time and space.

No, I don't think so. What you are suggesting is moral objectivism. It is distinct from absolutism, as I have tried to show. It is a reasonable position.

At first I was going to thank you for that courtesy. Then I realised that I may have actually put forward that idea (if without realising it).
I guess in discussion about moral issues I try to find some common ground, but when it comes to morality, I agree - consensus doesn't ensure accuracy any more than in any other field.

Agreed. That is why moral relativism is untenable

]But in this case, "obviously" a new scientific discovery can esult in a change in what everyone accepts as moral behavior. As a simple example, if a particular disease is known to result ina long, prolonged, and unavoidable death, then many people would hold it moral to commit suicide if you get diagnosed with it. (AIDS used to be in this category, and before that syphillis.) If/when we discover a cure --- well, no one would accept the idea that you should commit suicide instead of taking penicillin for syphillis.

I am not certain that "everyone" would really accept suicide as a moral act in those circumstances. Pragmatic? sensible? considerate of those caring for you? maybe. Moral? some would some wouldn't. It would be a very peculiar use of language in our culture: that is for sure. And if it is not within what is ordinarily described as moral decision making it cannot be that the moral weight of such an action is changed by the scientific discovery of penicillin.

Absolutely. This is the kind of way that I suggest our moral viewpoint should change, and that the decision of what actions are the right ones should change. Just as if the price of wood went up high enough it might be a good idea to build your house out of brick.

And I think this illustrates the point even better. I do not think that an economic decision of this sort would fall into the category of moral decision making as those terms are usually understood.

Having said that the underlying point is still valid: there is the possibility of an objective aspect to morality

Actually, I agree. What others believe isn't important so much as why they believe it - and that only matters if they're right.

Agreed.That is why I have argued for a secular morality based on reason. I think it might be possible. I believe it is desirable to apply our reason to this field and also to robustly test new moral ideas just as we test new scientific ones. In a relativist conception this is a ridiculous idea, because there cannot be any answer when all morals are based only on group consensus and it does not matter at all if they are right because the question is essentially incoherent, on that approach

I disagree completely with the idea that all slave owners were wrong to do so. I think that we can only judge people based upon their understanding at the time.

Here you are conflating separate concepts. Whether a person is good or bad is wholly independent of whether his actions were moral or immoral. On a moral relativist point of view a german in the time of Hitler was right to support the holocaust: it was the moral consensus in that time and place and if we can only judge people based on their understanding at the time there is no more to be said. But I think most people would agree there is certainly more to be said. It is one thing to say a person was no worse than his peers: it is quite another to say that his actions were right. And it is outright fallacious to say "he behaved as his peers did therefore his actions were not wrong. I bet your mother had something to say about that

I would add that I do not think it is possible to argue that people in the past were not aware that some of what they did was wrong: none of those who indulged in the ownership of slaves wanted to be slaves and they went to quite a lot of trouble to make sure it did not happen to them. It was recognised as an appalling fate (see Homer) and they had to go to really silly lengths to justify it (see Aristotle). Slave owners in the American south were not unaware that there was something wrong with it: the information was all over the place and they continued to defend it very aggressively indeed. I don't buy this relativism


To take a stupid analogy - I might have a family to support, and so go to work, driving to get there. I fail to realise that there is a child playing under my car and, through no fault of my own, kill the child. Was I wrong to drive the car? Clearly not, yet if I'd known of the existence of the child, and the repercussions of my actions, I would have been.

Here I think you give a good example of the difference between am immoral act and a bad act, which neatly illustrates the distinction I am drawing.

Similarly I can't fault someone who's knowledge leads to incorrect conclusions. I can't even fault someone who has complete knowledge but poor reasoning skills, so long as they are genuinely applied.
I think a person is moral if she does what she thinks is right, and spends time considering the issue of whether or not her actions or beliefs are right. Thus moral people can do immoral things without themselves being immoral. Slavery was wrong, but not every slave owner, or slave supporter, was a bad person.

You cannot find any way to fault the concentration camp guard? Really? Well as an individual, if he has sincerely thought about the issue and sincerely concluded, for example, that
1. Jews and gays and gypsies are destroying his country/race
2. The destruction of his country/race is such a bad thing that preventing that destruction is the most important thing one can do
3. That no other action could succeed in preventing that destruction except the mass murder of those groups which pose the threat
4. That it is not enough to allow others to do this because he must act on his own knowledge, understanding and reasoning and genuinely apply them in the best way he can

I cannot criticise him as a bad person either. His actions are still morally wrong though. :)


I also think that there is some objective way to find the best (more moral) thing to do in any given situation, but that the people involved often won't have the knowledge or tools (reasoning ability for instance) to arrive at it. I certainly don't know how.

Me neither. :D. Nobody said it was easy though


That last is a good point, and I think I can agree with it. But does it suggest that there isn't a correct set of axioms?
I mean, I can accept that your ideas of good economic policy, which are different from mine, are still the product of a reasonable mind, genuinely offered in good faith, without supposing that there isn't a best economic policy for this particular country at this particular time.

On the other hand I can also see that it's possible that in a given situation two different 'answers' might both be equally right, in so much as doing as much good as each other, yet radically different, and springing from completely different ethical and moral traditions.

So, in that case, I'll amend what I'm saying. I don't contend so much that there is a best answer, so much as that some answers are, objectively, better than others, and that with reason and knowledge we can come closer to those answers.

Agreed. You appear to be firmly in the moral objectivist camp, so far as I can see.

[Roboramma]

Here you are conflating separate concepts. Whether a person is good or bad is wholly independent of whether his actions were moral or immoral. That's actually what I was trying to say - I think I said it poorly.

On a moral relativist point of view a german in the time of Hitler was right to support the holocaust: it was the moral consensus in that time and place and if we can only judge people based on their understanding at the time there is no more to be said. But I think most people would agree there is certainly more to be said. Of course there's more to be said. Most Germans who supported the holocaust didn't do so out of a well considered moral position, but rather because it was in their best interest to do so. However, it is possible that some may have supported it out of truly thinking that it was for the greater good. In that case, I fault their actions but not their intentions, and I can say that they aren't "bad people" in spite of opposing the things that they support.


It is one thing to say a person was no worse than his peers: it is quite another to say that his actions were right. And it is outright fallacious to say "he behaved as his peers did therefore his actions were not wrong. I bet your mother had something to say about that
Oh, definitely. On the other hand I still think that the best an individual can do is to do what he thinks is right. Sometimes he'll be wrong about that, but that's the best that he can do.

I would add that I do not think it is possible to argue that people in the past were not aware that some of what they did was wrong: Well, agree that some, even most people in the past may have known that what they were doing was wrong. However, certainly it's possible that some of them were unaware, and were behaving in a way that they thought was moral. It's even possible that they were right and we're wrong, though I doubt it. And I definitely think that there are some things that I consider moral which, if I knew more or had access to the future works of great philosophers, I would change my mind about.

none of those who indulged in the ownership of slaves wanted to be slaves and they went to quite a lot of trouble to make sure it did not happen to them. Sure, but that doesn't mean that they thought slavery was wrong. If I were begging in the street I wouldn't want someone to deny to give me a few dollars, on the other hand I don't think I'm wrong to do so when I'm walking down the street.
Perhaps a better analogy - I don't think it's wrong to put some people in nursing homes, yet I wouldn't want to be put in one myself. Why the hypocracy? Because I see those people as part of a different class (in this case requiring large amounts of medical attention) from me, and thus deserving of different treatment.
The same argument could apply to slavery if the biological facts were different. I don't know that I think it actually would, but I haven't considered it much because I know the biological facts aren't that way.

It was recognised as an appalling fate (see Homer) and they had to go to really silly lengths to justify it (see Aristotle). Slave owners in the American south were not unaware that there was something wrong with it: the information was all over the place and they continued to defend it very aggressively indeed. I don't buy this relativism I agree with this for the most part - I just don't think that it can be applied universally. Moreover, those who hadn't seen slavery first hand could have supported it based on false understanding of what happened and of the biology of the people invovled.


You cannot find any way to fault the concentration camp guard? Really? Well as an individual, if he has sincerely thought about the issue and sincerely concluded, for example, that
1. Jews and gays and gypsies are destroying his country/race
2. The destruction of his country/race is such a bad thing that preventing that destruction is the most important thing one can do
3. That no other action could succeed in preventing that destruction except the mass murder of those groups which pose the threat
4. That it is not enough to allow others to do this because he must act on his own knowledge, understanding and reasoning and genuinely apply them in the best way he can

I cannot criticise him as a bad person either. His actions are still morally wrong though. :) I agree. I also think that such concentration camp guards were probably very rare, if existent at all.


I think we agree about almost everything. And yet I'm still challenged, and enjoying this conversation quite a bit. :)