View Full Version : Semi-Epiphenomenalism
Suggestologist
14th October 2003, 07:40 PM
Libet.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#Libet
In light of Libet's experiments which seem to show that we act before we are aware of intending to act; and that it therefore seems that the role of consciousness is to construct a coherent story about why we are acting -- it makes sense that epiphenomenalism emerged in philosophical discussion of the role of "consciousness".
Even if we just examine all of the automatic acts we do everyday; which include the typing of words without telling our fingers exactly where they should go -- since this has become a non-conscious automatic action -- it's easy to see that most of what we do, we do without direct and specific influence of our "consciousness".
Epiphenomenalism shouldn't seem like such a strange idea. We experience it in part, all the time. But not always. "Consciousness" can direct action by setting up the scope of thought processes, the areas of interest, and setting the value of resulting actions, as well as logical evaluation and premeditation. Still, most action occurs automatically, without direct conscious involvement.
Dancing David
15th October 2003, 07:02 AM
Originally posted by Suggestologist
Libet.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#Libet
In light of Libet's experiments which seem to show that we act before we are aware of intending to act; and that it therefore seems that the role of consciousness is to construct a coherent story about why we are acting -- it makes sense that epiphenomenalism emerged in philosophical discussion of the role of "consciousness".
Even if we just examine all of the automatic acts we do everyday; which include the typing of words without telling our fingers exactly where they should go -- since this has become a non-conscious automatic action -- it's easy to see that most of what we do, we do without direct and specific influence of our "consciousness".
Epiphenomenalism shouldn't seem like such a strange idea. We experience it in part, all the time. But not always. "Consciousness" can direct action by setting up the scope of thought processes, the areas of interest, and setting the value of resulting actions, as well as logical evaluation and premeditation. Still, most action occurs automatically, without direct conscious involvement.
That depends on whar level you deine consiousness, if you define consiousness as self aware cognition related to response to percepton. Then perhaps, but our body senses many things throughout the day that are filtered out of the active consiousness, but we could still be aware of them at some level.
Which would mean they participate in our consiousness. Which one is the epi-phenomena, the one where consiousness arises but is sepertae from the process?
hammegk
15th October 2003, 07:31 AM
Sure, all you need to do is convince yourself that the human ego ,or animal psyche -- brain function related -- are the *self*=*consciousness*.
Unfortunately that is the point under discussion, at least for some of us.
jan
15th October 2003, 10:16 AM
Originally posted by Suggestologist
Epiphenomenalism shouldn't seem like such a strange idea. We experience it in part, all the time. But not always. "Consciousness" can direct action by setting up the scope of thought processes, the areas of interest, and setting the value of resulting actions, as well as logical evaluation and premeditation. Still, most action occurs automatically, without direct conscious involvement.
I understand that "epiphenomen" is not the same as "doesn't exist". If some action is performed without consciousness, you don't need Epiphenomenalism to explain consciousness. You need Epiphenomenalism for the rest.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
16th October 2003, 02:24 PM
Suggestologist said:In light of Libet's experiments which seem to show that we act before we are aware of intending to act; and that it therefore seems that the role of consciousness is to construct a coherent story about why we are acting -- it makes sense that epiphenomenalism emerged in philosophical discussion of the role of "consciousness".
It makes sense only if you think of it as semi-epiphenomenalism, as your thread title suggests. If it were entirely epi, we wouldn't even remember that we'd had the consciousness, no matter when it occurs relative to the action.
~~ Paul
Suggestologist
18th October 2003, 09:57 PM
Originally posted by Dancing David
That depends on whar level you deine consiousness, if you define consiousness as self aware cognition related to response to percepton. Then perhaps, but our body senses many things throughout the day that are filtered out of the active consiousness, but we could still be aware of them at some level.
Well, I define consciousness for the purposes of this particular thread as awareness of specific intent prior to action.
Being aware "at some level" is not the same as being consciously -- and therefore phenomenally -- aware. The fact that it is our body -- and not our phenomenal awareness -- that senses things lends weight to the epiphenomenal side of the equation.
Which would mean they participate in our consiousness. Which one is the epi-phenomena, the one where consiousness arises but is sepertae from the process?
Yes, consciousness is ENTIRELY separate from the body processes -- that's epiphenomenalism. I recognize that phenomenal awareness is at times separate from the body processes -- which is why I see the existence of semi-epiphenomenology.
For example: How often are you aware of your own breathing? Yet you may become aware of a result of your breathing, without realizing that your breathing caused it. For example: the movement of a pencil due to the air coming from your mouth.
hammegk
19th October 2003, 08:24 AM
Originally posted by Suggestologist
Well, I define consciousness for the purposes of this particular thread as awareness of specific intent prior to action.
And you could also define up as down, cause as effect, etc. So what?
Being aware "at some level" is not the same as being consciously -- and therefore phenomenally -- aware.
Nice assertion; it could even be true if you assume materialism = true. Otherwise, LIbet may have also just performed the magick of calling effects "causes".
Meanwhile, *I* continue to "think". (Or if I'm just a figment, something/somewhere/somewhen does/did/will. :eek: )
Hmmm, maybe the "material world" you *think* you "perceive" is the epi-phenomena! I wonder who speculate dat first????
© 2001-2009, James Randi Educational Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
vBulletin® v3.7.7, Copyright ©2000-2012, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.