The hard problem of consciousness

[skiba]

Thanks to Mercutio, I can now articulate my objection to this type of teleporter more clearly.

The "I" is simply a behavior. Something that isn't "stored" and is destroyed, then recreated, by the machine. Since the original is destroyed, as it cannot be carried along, then that "I" no longer exist.


This makes no sense at all.
Of course behaviour is not stored anywhere, its physical movement and/or the brains processing. "Behaviour" continue only to exists as a memory of what you or somebody did or is doing at the very moment. You cannot carry "behaviour" to somewhere with or without a teleporter.

I still can't see what it is that cannot pass through the teleporter.

[Belz...]

There is no 'original "ran."' You are trying to make the past participle of a verb into a tangible entity.

There is no original ran ??? Are you trying to say that, when someone is running, the action is merely reducible to physical components ? If you replicate the organism, you don't replicate the action, do you ? What makes you think you will replicate the rest of the subject's actions ?

This is all besides the point, mind you. We all agree that the teleported person is a copy. By definition, he is not the same as the original. I don't see why you keep arguing about this.

[Belz...]

Of course behaviour is not stored anywhere, its physical movement and/or the brains processing.

That's what I'm saying. The copy will create its own behaviour. That it will be identical to the original's is irrelevant.

I still can't see what it is that cannot pass through the teleporter.

You can't copy momentum, for example.

[cyborg]

You can't copy momentum, for example.

Who says?

(Ignoring for a moment the real physics of the situation there is nothing about the hypothetical teleporter that says that a physical aspect of matter such as "momentum" cannot be equally well transmitted as what the bits of matter are - since it's just as much a bit of information as that).

[skiba]

That's what I'm saying. The copy will create its own behaviour. That it will be identical to the original's is irrelevant.

Theres only one person in this thought experiment. There's no copy.


You can't copy momentum, for example.


I dont see why not. Let's say the teleporter can replicate the velocity of object when something enters it.
I throw a ball in teleporter pod A, and it flies out of pod B.

Anyway, I don't see how this is relevant. Behaviour is the "momentum" of an organism, and you can't separate the two. If the momentum of your bodys particles is momentarily disrupted during the transfer, I dont see how thay causes the loss of "I".


I think you need to start off with the fact that the "I" is an illusion created by the brain, and take it from there.
It's a program in the brain, nothing more, programs can be replicated.

[Nick227]

There is no original ran ??? Are you trying to say that, when someone is running, the action is merely reducible to physical components ? If you replicate the organism, you don't replicate the action, do you ? What makes you think you will replicate the rest of the subject's actions ?

When someone is running, someone is running. So what? You seem to be trying to imply some complex process at work here. I think you'll find that the only place that any such process is happening, if it is happening at all, is in your head.

The "subject" is simply a machine immersed in an environment. It has a program which gives it a sense of being an experiencer. It has a related program which gives it a sense of self. The only thing that is not replicated is the actual physical material of the subject. The only thing that ascribes selfhood to the actual physical material of the subject is a belief formed by the brain. This belief will be replicated.

Nick

[Dancing David]

Neither selfhood nor behaviour are innate, if you ask me. I see no reason to suppose they should be. All the functions that give rise to behaviour or selfhood can be replicated. And I'm sure MercB would refuse to accept this just the same as MercA does!

Nick

In your thought experiemnt , yes.

In reality, no.

[Dancing David]

How is behaviour an innate property of living matter that cannot be replicated? If you replicate an organism you replicate its behaviour, allowing for environmental change.

How would BelzB's behaviour be different from BelzA's?

Nick


You are postulating a thought experiment. It is not possible to replicate at this time.

You are also ignoring the flow of the process, why is Nick 227-a, Nick227-b, and Nick227-c referenced as the 'same you'?

they are three sperate states in time. if the teleporter made a snap shot of all three and they were replicated for grimns, then they are obviously not all the same Nick227, the comes from different states and different slices of time, they are not the same.

[Dancing David]

So BelzA is still behaving just as he did before he stepped into the teleporter?

If he was a smoking wreck of goo when he entered the teleporter then yes.

[Nick227]

You are postulating a thought experiment. It is not possible to replicate at this time.

You are also ignoring the flow of the process, why is Nick 227-a, Nick227-b, and Nick227-c referenced as the 'same you'?

Because "you" is a process that will be replicated in the teletransporter.

You seem to be constructing an argument on the basis that "you" is something innate to the actual individual organism. It is not. It is a process created by each individual organism.

At the point of replication each will have an identical "you" (or rather "I") to its antecedent, because selfhood is not innate. It is constructed according to the organism's physiological and neurological orientation, structures that will be replicated.

they are three sperate states in time. if the teleporter made a snap shot of all three and they were replicated for grimns, then they are obviously not all the same Nick227, the comes from different states and different slices of time, they are not the same.

They are not the same. No question about it. But each will have a sense of selfhood identical to the former at the point of replication. And because the "I" is not substantial, and so cannot be separated from the processes which create it, so it cannot be stated that there are two different "I"'s unless there are two Nick227s concurrently existing.

Assuming that the machine functions correctly, and Nick227-a dies to be replaced by Nick227-b then the "I" of Nick227-a has been conserved. It is anyway constantly ceasing and being recreated, teletransportation regardless.

Nick

[Mashuna]

Assuming that the machine functions correctly, and Nick227-a dies to be replaced by Nick227-b then the "I" of Nick227-a has been conserved. It is anyway constantly ceasing and being recreated, teletransportation regardless.

Nick

I could go with 'constantly changing', but 'constantly ceasing and being recreated' I don't see.

[Nick227]

I could go with 'constantly changing', but 'constantly ceasing and being recreated' I don't see.

Yes, fair enough. Be good to find an expression that was somewhere in between!

Nick

[Belz...]

Who says?

Well, momentum is not mad of stuff, so I don't know how the teleporter could copy that.

But let's say it can. Now what ? So you've got a copy of momentum. It's still not the same particle with the same momentum.

[Belz...]

Theres only one person in this thought experiment. There's no copy.

Of course there is, in all examples given.

I throw a ball in teleporter pod A, and it flies out of pod B.

I think you meant that the copy flies out of B.

I think you need to start off with the fact that the "I" is an illusion created by the brain, and take it from there.

That makes no difference, whatsoever.

This is getting ridiculous. You guys completely ignore private behaviour when making this thought experiment. You take it from the point of view of the telepod operator, or DaratB, but never adress DaratA. We already agree that, should the machine fail to vapourise DaratA, we have two distinct persons who DO NOT share their private behaviours. Once we agreed to this, it meant that, indeed, DaratB is a COPY of DaratA, and although identical, is not THE SAME person. Someone here, ANYONE, will have to explain to my why the loss of DaratA makes any difference to this conclusion.

Somebody.

[Belz...]

When someone is running, someone is running. So what? You seem to be trying to imply some complex process at work here. I think you'll find that the only place that any such process is happening, if it is happening at all, is in your head.

People don't run ?

If he was a smoking wreck of goo when he entered the teleporter then yes.

What is that supposed to mean ?

[Belz...]

Because "you" is a process that will be replicated in the teletransporter.

You keep making my point.

You seem to be constructing an argument on the basis that "you" is something innate to the actual individual organism. It is not. It is a process created by each individual organism.

How would you know ? You keep claiming this, but what does it mean, and how do you know it ? If it WERE innate, then it COULD be replicated. Otherwise, it's just created anew by the copy.

They are not the same. No question about it. But each will have a sense of selfhood identical to the former at the point of replication.

If you think that MercA's private behaviour will be magically transfered to MercB, then you hold a dualistic position, my friend.

[Dancing David]

People don't run ?



What is that supposed to mean ?


Merc A is destroyed and becomes a smoking wreck of goo,

question is asked, is MercB an exact copy of MercA,

answer is given that MercB is copy of MercA if MercB is smoking wreck of goo.

:D

[Nick227]

How would you know ? You keep claiming this, but what does it mean, and how do you know it ? If it WERE innate, then it COULD be replicated. Otherwise, it's just created anew by the copy.

We know, as much as we can know anything of this type, that selfhood is not innate to material because most things, notably inanimate material, clearly do not experience selfhood. I suppose you could try arguing that selfhood is innate to living matter, but I find it weak given that neurologists have uncovered a good deal of the neuro-circuitry involved in creating experiential selfhood.

About your comment, if it were innate then it could be replicated, this is not so. If selfhood was an innate property of the unique organism, as it seems to me that Merc is arguing (apologies if I'm misrepresenting), then of course it would not be recreated.

To me it comes down to whether you want to go with the theoretical framework of behaviourism, or the hard data of science. I'm opting for the latter.

If you think that MercA's private behaviour will be magically transfered to MercB, then you hold a dualistic position, my friend.

No one has suggested anything being transfered. The machine replicates exactly the conditions that create the private behaviour. Personally I would say that you anyway cannot transfer the "I" for the simple reason that it has no substantial existence anyway. It's an apparent centre created by peripheral activity.

Nick

[cyborg]

Well, momentum is not mad of stuff, so I don't know how the teleporter could copy that.

This sentence is not made of stuff so I don't know how CTRL+V could copy that.

This sentence is not made of stuff so I don't know how CTRL+V could copy that.

This sentence is not made of stuff so I don't know how CTRL+V could copy that.

...

But let's say it can. Now what ? So you've got a copy of momentum. It's still not the same particle with the same momentum.

As I pointed out earlier there are two sets of people who refuse to agree on which definition of "same" should be used.

They are not the same instance.

They are the same class.

[Belz...]

This sentence is not made of stuff so I don't know how CTRL+V could copy that.

Of course it's made of stuff. What a funny thing to say.

As I pointed out earlier there are two sets of people who refuse to agree on which definition of "same" should be used.

They are not the same instance.

They are the same class.

I agree. Nick and others seem to think that they are the same instance. Otherwise how could they claim that "you" continue to exist ?

[Belz...]

We know, as much as we can know anything of this type, that selfhood is not innate to material because most things, notably inanimate material, clearly do not experience selfhood.

And you know this because... ?

About your comment, if it were innate then it could be replicated, this is not so. If selfhood was an innate property of the unique organism, as it seems to me that Merc is arguing (apologies if I'm misrepresenting), then of course it would not be recreated.

Nice subtle addition to create your strawman. "Innate" need not be a property of a unique organism, and even so, replicating the entire organism WILL replicate the innate property as well.

To me it comes down to whether you want to go with the theoretical framework of behaviourism, or the hard data of science. I'm opting for the latter.

Science has nothing to say so far about this thought experiment, because so far we don't fully understand awareness.

[cyborg]

Of course it's made of stuff. What a funny thing to say.

Hmm...

I agree. Nick and others seem to think that they are the same instance.

What a funny thing to say: are the three sentences the same instance? Would any sane person claim they are?

Otherwise how could they claim that "you" continue to exist ?

Pretty much the same way one could claim that "the sentence" continues to exist. Pretty much the same way you can claim that "you" continue to exist despite the fact that the instance of "you" now is not - and will never be - the exact same configuration of energy as the instance of "you" later.

[skiba]

Of course there is, in all examples given.

Not in my example. This is the third time I'll say this.

There is no person B.
The teleporter "disasembles" the body into particles. The original particles are then transfers to teleport pod B. There the particles are "assembled" back togerter exactly as they were when you pressed the button in pod A.
I don't think this is too hard to follow, but you just keep coming back at "what happens to A?" all the time.

Even if you think the "I" is innate to the material substance of the body, you still claim that in this example the "I" is destroyed, that it is no longer "you". :confused:

[Nick227]

And you know this because... ?

You're saying rocks experience selfhood?

Nice subtle addition to create your strawman. "Innate" need not be a property of a unique organism, and even so, replicating the entire organism WILL replicate the innate property as well.

So...you're saying that the individuality of the organism at a molecular level is replicated? The very same molecules show up in pod B?

Science has nothing to say so far about this thought experiment, because so far we don't fully understand awareness.

But we do understand a fair bit about selfhood. We know that the somatosensory cortex creates body-map. We know that mirror neurons help us identify ourselves as ourselves. If you're a materialist then you believe that all the attributes given to "consciousness" will be explained by reference to the physical substance of the brain. I'd say we know easily enough to know that selfhood is a process, or a series of processes, and that it is highly reasonable to believe that it can be replicated.

Nick

[Mercutio]

You're saying rocks experience selfhood?
You are once again conflating your own notions ("experiences selfhood") with others' definitions (self as behaving organism in environmental context). That one definition leads to logical problems is not a problem for the other definition. My computer shuts itself off--does it require an experience of selfhood to do that?

But we do understand a fair bit about selfhood. We know that the somatosensory cortex creates body-map.Creates? Watch your verbs.
We know that mirror neurons help us identify ourselves as ourselves. True. We also know our environment helps identify ourselves as ourselves.
If you're a materialist then you believe that all the attributes given to "consciousness" will be explained by reference to the physical substance of the brain.No. Absolutely not. Some materialists may well think this way, but it does not follow at all from materialism. To give just one example, the view of consciousness as a collection of behaviors which are extended in time and embedded in an environmental context is perfectly compatible with materialism, and yet cannot be reduced to the physical substance of the brain.
I'd say we know easily enough to know that selfhood is a process, or a series of processes, and that it is highly reasonable to believe that it can be replicated.

NickDepends on whom you ask. If the materialistic counterexample is right, you could only replicate consciousness by replicating both the organism and the environment. Of course, if you did that successfully, there would be no way of knowing that you had!

[shuttlt]

Man, this is a long thread, so apologies if I'm repeating something someone has already said.

It just seems to me reading this debate that there are at least two definitions of consciousness being used here. One of them is coming from the standpoint of atoms, neuroscience, etc... and the other from the standpoint of what-it-feels-like-to-be-something-that-feels. How would one ever know if the what-it-feels-like-to-be-something-that-feels-ness is copied by the teleporter or not?

As far as I can see, a short hand way of describing what I mean by what-it-feels-like-to-be-something-that-feels, is the aspect of a 'mind' that cannot be externally measured and gives rise to no behavior. It could well be that I'm out of my depth here, but if I'm write in this definition, is consciousness in this sense a scientific concept.

[Belz...]

Pretty much the same way one could claim that "the sentence" continues to exist. Pretty much the same way you can claim that "you" continue to exist despite the fact that the instance of "you" now is not - and will never be - the exact same configuration of energy as the instance of "you" later.

Ugh. Allright. Let's define "me" as the pattern, not the instance. Under that definition "I" continue to exist in the copy of the original.

But it changes NOTHING of what I've said. All I need to do is reword it to cope with the new definition:

The original instance dies. The original instance does not want to die.

[Belz...]

Not in my example. This is the third time I'll say this.

There is no person B.
The teleporter "disasembles" the body into particles.

And therefore KILLS personA.

The original particles are then transfers to teleport pod B. There the particles are "assembled" back togerter exactly as they were when you pressed the button in pod A.
I don't think this is too hard to follow, but you just keep coming back at "what happens to A?" all the time.

Who gives a rat's behind if you use the same particles ? You killed personA and made an exact replica using the same material. It's still personB at this point.

Even if you think the "I" is innate to the material substance of the body, you still claim that in this example the "I" is destroyed, that it is no longer "you". :confused:

Correct. As Nick has pointed out, it's a process of the original body. The process ceases, completely, and is replaced by a completely new instance, once the copy starts to exist.

[Belz...]

You're saying rocks experience selfhood?

No, I said "And you know this because... ?". It's amazing that you read "Rocks experience selfhood" in there.

So...you're saying that the individuality of the organism at a molecular level is replicated? The very same molecules show up in pod B?

What the hell is an "individuality" and where can I buy one ? And where did I say the very same molecules show up in B ? Are we having the same conversation ?

If you're a materialist then you believe that all the attributes given to "consciousness" will be explained by reference to the physical substance of the brain.

To the behaviours of the body, you mean.

I'd say we know easily enough to know that selfhood is a process, or a series of processes, and that it is highly reasonable to believe that it can be replicated.

That actually makes MY point, not yours.

[Nick227]

True. We also know our environment helps identify ourselves as ourselves.

I would say to a lesser degree that is so. The only environmental factors I can see are (i) other people saying "you're Nick" and (ii) the constancy of the body around the perceived locus of awareness.

No. Absolutely not. Some materialists may well think this way, but it does not follow at all from materialism. To give just one example, the view of consciousness as a collection of behaviors which are extended in time and embedded in an environmental context is perfectly compatible with materialism, and yet cannot be reduced to the physical substance of the brain.

Fair enough. But it's not really science, is it? And, it doesn't to my mind offer to reveal much truth about consciousness or selfhood. On an empiric level it seems to me kind of a dead end.

Nick

[Darat]

...snip...


Fair enough. But it's not really science, is it? And, it doesn't to my mind offer to reveal much truth about consciousness or selfhood. On an empiric level it seems to me kind of a dead end.

Nick

Why not? If you think about it it is no different then describing the planets and including their orbits within that description.

[skiba]

And therefore KILLS personA.

Who gives a rat's behind if you use the same particles ? You killed personA and made an exact replica using the same material. It's still personB at this point.

Correct. As Nick has pointed out, it's a process of the original body. The process ceases, completely, and is replaced by a completely new instance, once the copy starts to exist.

You continue to use words like "copy" and "replica". You could say the body ceases to exist for a short period of time during the transfer, but theres no replication.

[Nick227]

What the hell is an "individuality" and where can I buy one ? And where did I say the very same molecules show up in B ? Are we having the same conversation ?

To the behaviours of the body, you mean.

Frankly, Belz, I think you'd subscribe to any philosophy that meant you didn't have to get in the teletransporter.

Nick

[Nick227]

Why not? If you think about it it is no different then describing the planets and including their orbits within that description.

The solar system doesn't have an inner life.

Nick

[Mashuna]

The solar system doesn't have an inner life.

Nick

Parts of it do. ;)

[Darat]

The solar system doesn't have an inner life.

Nick

Apart from all those billions of course.....

[Belz...]

You continue to use words like "copy" and "replica". You could say the body ceases to exist for a short period of time during the transfer, but theres no replication.

Amazing. So, if I tear down a building, and take the same bricks and build it right up again, it's the same building ?

[Belz...]

Frankly, Belz, I think you'd subscribe to any philosophy that meant you didn't have to get in the teletransporter.

Nick

Running out of steam, Nick ?

I don't subscribe to philosophies. I have my own, thank you very much.

Frankly, I find it tiresome that I manage to write posts and sentences and you don't actually answer them. Could it be that I caught you playing with your strawman dolls ?

Do you agree that the "self" is a function of the whole body, not just the brain ? Because I happen to feel my fingers as I'm typing this.

[shuttlt]

The solar system doesn't have an inner life.

Nick

How do yo know?

[Mercutio]

I would say to a lesser degree that is so. The only environmental factors I can see are (i) other people saying "you're Nick" and (ii) the constancy of the body around the perceived locus of awareness.
You are neglecting a long history of learning from environmental feedback--again, a process extended in time. Ever watch a baby learn to find his/her own hand?

Fair enough. But it's not really science, is it? And, it doesn't to my mind offer to reveal much truth about consciousness or selfhood. On an empiric level it seems to me kind of a dead end.

NickNot really science? Gee, if only there were a science that focused on the learning of behavior through interaction with the environment. Oh, wait! There is! My own science! Psychology--in particular, the experimental analysis of behavior! Fortunately, we don't have to rely on your evaluation of worth in order to do our jobs. And it is not a dead end, unless you start making up fictional entities and then try to explain them. That, of course, would not be science.

[Mercutio]

This sentence is not made of stuff so I don't know how CTRL+V could copy that.

This sentence is not made of stuff so I don't know how CTRL+V could copy that.

This sentence is not made of stuff so I don't know how CTRL+V could copy that.

...

As I pointed out earlier there are two sets of people who refuse to agree on which definition of "same" should be used.

They are not the same instance.

They are the same class.Actually, this could save us a lot of time and effort. As long as we are looking at the same "class", we should just pull the focus out a bit more, and realize there is precious little difference among the different instances (individuals) in a given class (say, humans). Since each of us changes constantly from moment to moment anyway, why not just have MercutioA step into the box, and have DaratA step out of the other box, and call it done? They are not the same instance, sure, but they are the same class. Roughly two arms, two legs, somewhat more than one ear, fewer than two noses... Sure, they don't share the same XYZ coordinates, but people here have been arguing that that doesn't matter anyway.

[Nick227]

Do you agree that the "self" is a function of the whole body, not just the brain ? Because I happen to feel my fingers as I'm typing this.

Self is a function of various bodily processes, as I've mentioned a few times on this thread. I mean, the sense of body-map we have of course needs a body. And a body is needed to help recognise other humans!

I would say that it's completely valid to assert that one is referring to ones whole organism when using the word "I." But if you're examining these things through the lens of reductionist science then there will be a challenge to this habit.

Nick

[Darat]

Swap a MercA for a DaratA - sounds a good idea to me!

[Nick227]

You are neglecting a long history of learning from environmental feedback--again, a process extended in time. Ever watch a baby learn to find his/her own hand?

I would say that it's hard in this particular case to distinguish purely environmental factors from developing neuroanatomy. With selfhood in general I think the nature-nuture issue is less clear. With the "I" aspect of selfhood specifically - is it neurological or environmental? That would be an interesting question.

Not really science? Gee, if only there were a science that focused on the learning of behavior through interaction with the environment. Oh, wait! There is! My own science! Psychology--in particular, the experimental analysis of behavior!
..............


Yes, but psychology isn't proper science, is it really? Let's face it. And even if we say it is then if people won't get in hypothetical teletransporters because of it then it sounds somewhat antiquated to me.

Nick

[Mashuna]

Yes, but psychology isn't proper science, is it really? Let's face it. And even if we say it is then if people won't get in hypothetical teletransporters because of it then it sounds somewhat antiquated to me.

Nick

<Steps away from the unexploded comment>

And there's a great bit of assuming the conclusion in your last sentence there. . .

[lupus_in_fabula]

I would say that it's hard in this particular case to distinguish purely environmental factors from developing neuroanatomy. With selfhood in general I think the nature-nuture issue is less clear. With the "I" aspect of selfhood specifically - is it neurological or environmental? That would be an interesting question.

Well, I would say it’s hard because making such a distinction, in regards to ‘selfhood’, is always going to be somewhat artificial. Dividing up the world in nouns is pragmatic for sure, but falls apart when approaching the boundaries of what we know (for example in regards to consciousness).

Yes, but psychology isn't proper science, is it really? Let's face it. And even if we say it is then if people won't get in hypothetical teletransporters because of it then it sounds somewhat antiquated to me.

Nick

How do people get into hypothetical teletransporters anyway? :D We are talking about things that do not exist, and that already gives green light for various philosophical perspectives about the issue – actually it’s the only thing we can work with. It’s quite surprising how you seem to evaluate psychology as antiquated according to a standard of your own narrow standard; a standard that’s seems to be quite arbitrarily constructed (according to how you perceive selfhood).

[Nick227]

How do people get into hypothetical teletransporters anyway? :D We are talking about things that do not exist, and that already gives green light for various philosophical perspectives about the issue – actually it’s the only thing we can work with. It’s quite surprising how you seem to evaluate psychology as antiquated according to a standard of your own narrow standard; a standard that’s seems to be quite arbitrarily constructed (according to how you perceive selfhood).

Well, I'm pointing out that, in considering selfhood, the behavioural model does appear to be very at odds with monist materialism and where many more scientific researchers in this field are going. The view of self in behaviourism seems to be simply hypothesis. It has no basis that I can see in empiric examination. Personally, if there is no substantial self, then I would rather say "There is no substantial self", as opposed to "yes....but."

As I've pointed out before, in this area behaviourism is overly cerebral, imo, and condemns the believer to simply beliefs.

Nick

[Belz...]

I would say that it's completely valid to assert that one is referring to ones whole organism when using the word "I." But if you're examining these things through the lens of reductionist science then there will be a challenge to this habit.

Er.... why ?

[Nick227]

I would say that it's completely valid to assert that one is referring to ones whole organism when using the word "I." But if you're examining these things through the lens of reductionist science then there will be a challenge to this habit.

Er.... why ?

Because in examining the actual neurological processes of the organism, it can be seen how the various aspects of selfhood are being created. The behavioural approach says that when you say "I" your whole organism is referred to, and this is for sure our usual social position. However, from a reductionist perspective, the word "I" has nothing substantial whatsoever behind it.

This difference is perspective shows up in thought experiments like the teletransporter.

Nick

[Mercutio]

I would say that it's hard in this particular case to distinguish purely environmental factors from developing neuroanatomy. With selfhood in general I think the nature-nuture issue is less clear. With the "I" aspect of selfhood specifically - is it neurological or environmental? That would be an interesting question.
It would indeed, and it would be something that the science of psychology has been chipping away at for some time. Neuroanatomy, of course, does not develop without interaction with the environment; we can experimentally manipulate the environment and see systematic deficits in brain function as a result (I know these experiments have been done in cats and monkeys, at least; only anecdotal accounts are ethically available for human study). We also know that our conception of selfhood varies as a function of culture (both across time and across geography).

Your question, distinguishing "purely environmental" factors, is yet again a reductionistic dissection of a whole into arbitrary and artificial parts. No wonder your view is confusing.

Yes, but psychology isn't proper science, is it really? Let's face it. And even if we say it is then if people won't get in hypothetical teletransporters because of it then it sounds somewhat antiquated to me.
Your ignorance of science is not shared by all scientists. Certainly, there are physicists who will readily admit that the subject matter of psychology is much much more difficult than that of physics; that does nothing to make either of them more or less a science. There are things labeled "psychology" that are utter crap (check any bookstore), but there are also quackpot physicists who are promoting zero-point energy and other perpetual motion machines. (And let us not forget that Targ and Puthoff, who put their stamp of approval on Uri Geller, were physicists. Psychologists [well, some branches] are aware that their subjects may lie. physicists are not accustomed to having to control for that.)

And it sounds like you have made your decision, and are judging a science by how well it agrees with you. I don't think that's proper science, is it really?

[Mercutio]

Well, I'm pointing out that, in considering selfhood, the behavioural model does appear to be very at odds with monist materialism and where many more scientific researchers in this field are going. No. It is at odds with your pet monist materialist analysis, but (as we have shown) not with all.
The view of self in behaviourism seems to be simply hypothesis. It has no basis that I can see in empiric examination. This would be correct, if you are asking about the "self" as you have continued to define it (i.e., fictionally).
Personally, if there is no substantial self, then I would rather say "There is no substantial self", as opposed to "yes....but."
There is no substantial reductionist self. There, I have said it. That is not at all the same thing as saying there is no self. We use the word all the time, and meaningfully. It is only when we attempt to fit a dualistic interpretation (whether substance dualism like Descartes, or your functional dualism) that "self" begins to be illusory.

As I've pointed out before, in this area behaviourism is overly cerebral, imo, and condemns the believer to simply beliefs.

And natural selection condemns the believer to thinking we simply evolved. Your opinion is informed more by your ignorance than by the actual theory.

aside: The question, as a thought problem, is not an empirical question at all, although certain elements of it can be informed by what we have found experimentally. Your reductionist approach is nothing more than the philosophical metaphor of Mechanism, which sees any given problem in the metaphor of a machine, with interacting parts. Seeing how those parts work together is the goal of this philosophy. Mechanism, however, is not the only philosophy to underly a science. Contextualism (or Functional Contextualism) underlies Radical Behaviorism, and informs such sciences as the experimental analysis of behavior, and evolutionary biology.

Neither Mechanism nor Contextualism have a monopoly on science, nor a monopoly on usefulness in explaining the world. But questions asked in one approach are not asked in the other--indeed, may not even make sense in the other.

Do not confuse a different approach with an inadequate approach. It may well be a more useful approach, even though it is not what you are accustomed to. It also is good practice to recognize the philosophical assumptions that underlie your own point of view, and to understand that they are indeed assumptions, and not more than that.

[cyborg]

Ugh. Allright. Let's define "me" as the pattern, not the instance. Under that definition "I" continue to exist in the copy of the original.

Which pretty much undermines your argument when you say, "it's not *I* that copy because *I* am over here - a separate instance despite our identical patterns."

The original instance dies. The original instance does not want to die.

That's an emotive argument - not a reasoned one.

This sentence does not want to die.

This sentence does not want to die.

This sentence does not want to die.

Does this want actually create a new situation?

In short arguing that it's a different person because of some moral argument does not and cannot persuade me - i.e. callign some process a "death" and "death is wrong" doesn't alter the issue of identity for me one iota.

[cyborg]

Actually, this could save us a lot of time and effort. As long as we are looking at the same "class", we should just pull the focus out a bit more, and realize there is precious little difference among the different instances (individuals) in a given class (say, humans).

Now you're talking: class heirarchies.

Since each of us changes constantly from moment to moment anyway, why not just have MercutioA step into the box, and have DaratA step out of the other box, and call it done? They are not the same instance, sure, but they are the same class. Roughly two arms, two legs, somewhat more than one ear, fewer than two noses... Sure, they don't share the same XYZ coordinates, but people here have been arguing that that doesn't matter anyway.

You're trying to make an argument ad absurdum but it just underlines my point: calling one instance "the same" as another instance requires a class definition under which they are "the same".

I want to know why the dimension of time does not factor into your equation when you get so emotive about MercA and MercB in different locations. cyborg-t0 and cyborg-t1 and cyborg-t2 and cyborg-t3 and cyborg-t4 etc... are waiting to know - but only cyborg-tn is going to get the answer.

(Or in other words I want to know under which criteria you can EVER call something the "same" in a constantly changing environment).

[Nick227]

It would indeed, and it would be something that the science of psychology has been chipping away at for some time.
.................

Well, the "I" imo is almost exclusively the result of thinking. It appears to be a side effect of the narratives the brain near ceaselessly creates. Where deeper to track it I'm not sure.

It seems to me that in creating the duality experiencer-experience from what is simple processing, the brain attempts to then resolve this experienced duality by leading itself to re-identify with "the experience" via the words "I" and "my." Without these terms there is a liklihood that a significant dissociation could occur between the created experiencer and the experience, a state better known in psychiatry as psychosis.

Your question, distinguishing "purely environmental" factors, is yet again a reductionistic dissection of a whole into arbitrary and artificial parts. No wonder your view is confusing.

I would say that if one is to really examine whether consciousness does have its basis in the materials of the brain, then one must accept confusion. It is not going to be intuitive. It is not going to be oh-i-always-knew-it-would-be-like-that, or that-makes-sense-to-me. Not a chance. If it were then we would have figured it out centuries ago. It is going to be confusing. It is going to challenge deeply held assumptions. One thing is clear, you can absolutely forget any notion that the reality of an issue like selfhood will make sense intuitively. It's patently obvious that it will not do. This to me is simply inevitable. Not that I'm justifying putting forward unsupportable claims, but just to mention.

And it sounds like you have made your decision, and are judging a science by how well it agrees with you. I don't think that's proper science, is it really?

I'm not a scientist. My background is far more psychological. I'm just interested in these things.

Nick

[Belz...]

Which pretty much undermines your argument when you say, "it's not *I* that copy because *I* am over here - a separate instance despite our identical patterns."

Huh ? How does it undermine anything ? I was trying to accomodate a different definition, but definitions don't change reality.

That's an emotive argument - not a reasoned one.

Who ever said it wasn't ? I don't want to die. That's not "logical", but it is true. I don't care much if "me" continues to exist as a separate instance. This instance doesn't want to die.

This sentence does not want to die.

This sentence does not want to die.

This sentence does not want to die.

Sentences cannot want or not. You're using colloquial speech as thought it meant something.

In short arguing that it's a different person because of some moral argument does not and cannot persuade me

I didn't dwell on the moral argument at any point of the thread. You're barking up the wrong tree, here.

[Nick227]

There is no substantial reductionist self. There, I have said it. That is not at all the same thing as saying there is no self. We use the word all the time, and meaningfully.

er, meaningfully within the social context of human behaviour. Imo you must accept the reductionist reality too, otherwise you risk closing off the possibility for deeper self-examination. It is fine to create whole big sciences and philosophies based on the assumption of selfhood, whole self-referencing fields which all agree with each other on certain assumptions. But at the end of the day, if you haven't checked out these assumptions for yourself, you will never really know whether one iota of it is actually meaningful.


.........
Do not confuse a different approach with an inadequate approach. It may well be a more useful approach, even though it is not what you are accustomed to.

Useful to who or what? Behaviourism might be useful in resolving some of the internal conflicts of the egoic reality, but if there is actually no self underneath all the posturing, what is really being served?

Nick

[cyborg]

Huh ? How does it undermine anything ? I was trying to accomodate a different definition, but definitions don't change reality.

Uh no - but you're not trying to describe reality, you're trying to describe "you".

At the end of the day "you" are no more distinct from the rest of the fabric of reality than a brick in a house, the clay in the brick, the minerals in the clay, the molecules in the minerals, the atoms in the molecules, the electrons in the atoms, the quarks in the electrons...

The very attempt to describe "you" means you are trying to slice one part of reality away from the rest of it. This is very much a definitional process since there is no place where one can go and pull out such a definition from reality. It must be being imposed upon it.

Who ever said it wasn't ? I don't want to die. That's not "logical", but it is true. I don't care much if "me" continues to exist as a separate instance. This instance doesn't want to die.

Why do you not mourn Belz-t0? He is dead by the same reasoning that you use - it's a separate instance of Belz that no longer exists.

In short if you didn't know "you" were teleported five minutes ago onto a replica Earth - in such a fashion that you couldn't tell it happened - "you" wouldn't care that there is some other instance of you that is "dead". "You" would be happily going along saying, "oh boy, am I glad I'm not dead."

Sentences cannot want or not. You're using colloquial speech as thought it meant something.

Right - so you expressing a want shouldn't have any consequences to this argument at all.

Whether or not you "want" to step through the teleporter because you fear "death" is irrelevant to the issue of how it is we decide what "Belz" is.

I didn't dwell on the moral argument at any point of the thread. You're barking up the wrong tree, here.

No - you're saying that the "death" of one "Belz" through a physical process implies that another "Belz" is not "Belz". Let me clarify - it is quasi-moralistic in that it is not dealing which how you talk about "Belz" - the pattern - but in consequences to "Belz" - something akin to: killing humans is wrong, killing a fetus is wrong, therefore a fetus is human.

[Nick227]

Who ever said it wasn't ? I don't want to die. That's not "logical", but it is true. I don't care much if "me" continues to exist as a separate instance. This instance doesn't want to die.

But you are not continuing to exist anyway, regardless of the teletransporter. There is no persisting self.

Nick

[Mercutio]

http://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/quantum_teleportation.png

From the inimitable xkcd.com (http://xkcd.com/465)

[Reinhard]

This is a great thread, people. I'm don't often post here, but hey ho - everyone has to start somewhere I guess.

I'm in the camp that says teleportation will kill you.

I've had a few discussions with my dad about it though, and he's of the opinion that there is no logical way to distinguish between 'person A', (the original) and 'person B' (the teleported 'copy'). He says that because consciousness is purely material (i.e arises purely and only from an arrangement of atoms) that to copy this arrangement IS to copy consciousness. By replicating all of the physical information contained in the original, the copy is necessarily physically identical to the original. Which must, (as consciousness = physical state) therefore, mean the exact same consciousness also.

The fact that people tend to disagree with this really shows how little we truely know about the nature of consciousness. Both explanations are derived from describing consciousness in a purely materialistic fashion; but both reach completely opposite conclusions. Consciousness as a phenomenon is one of the strangest things we know of in the universe, in my opinion.

[Mercutio]

er, meaningfully within the social context of human behaviour.Which is the proper level of analysis for this concept.
Imo you must accept the reductionist reality too, otherwise you risk closing off the possibility for deeper self-examination.It reduces perfectly well; my view is completely compatible with everything we know about brain and nerve function, about verbal behavior, about social behavior. There is no magic necessary. What does not reduce is your strawman underlying self. There is nothing there for that one, I agree completely.
It is fine to create whole big sciences and philosophies based on the assumption of selfhood, whole self-referencing fields which all agree with each other on certain assumptions. But at the end of the day, if you haven't checked out these assumptions for yourself, you will never really know whether one iota of it is actually meaningful.What have I ever said that gives you the notion that I have not checked out assumptions? To the extent that things are knowable, everything in my model is compatible with what we know about physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. To the extent that assumptions are unknowable (e.g., what is the nature of reality?), my view is neutral, and not dependent on any being true.

Your strawman version of my view, I have no responsibility for. If it doesn't work, that does not bother me.

Useful to who or what?Useful for describing, predicting and controlling behavior.
Behaviourism might be useful in resolving some of the internal conflicts of the egoic reality, Or in revealing that these conflicts are the result of making up fictional elements and then asking what they do.
but if there is actually no self underneath all the posturing, what is really being served?

NickI have already agreed--there is no self underneath all the posturing. Underneath is the wrong place to look, and I have explained that many times. Once again, "how an engine works" does not tell you directions to the store, although driving to the store is perfectly compatible with an internal combustion engine; reductionist explanations are quite simply not always appropriate. If you must insist on explaining the neurology behind fictional entities, please do not claim that behaviorism is inadequate to the task.

[skiba]

Amazing. So, if I tear down a building, and take the same bricks and build it right up again, it's the same building ?

The building is not the same, but it would "function" the same as the original.

Same applies to humans.
The process we call "I" would continue to go on.
The "I" is not the particles your body consists of, but the process of those particles. If we replicate the process, we can replicate the "I".


Before you say, "but the replica is not me"...... remember "me" is a computer program that claims to have some real exitence aside from the process itself.

[shuttlt]

Reinhard, I agree with your dad that there is no way to distingish the original from the copy in the teleporter (at least the one in my head).

>He says that because consciousness is purely material....
This is a reasonable assumption, but it is still an assumption. I guess it's probably a necessary one to keep consciousness within the scope of a scientific debate. But I don't see any reason why it must be so.

>....that to copy this arrangement IS to copy consciousness.
I agree that that follows from the assumption, though how one would test it? Logical proofs are all very well, but before stepping through the teleporter myself, I'd just as soon confirm it as not.

Do you suppose the JREF would expand the terms of the prize to include building a machine to test for consciousness? It would surely make a nice change from perpetual motion junk. All skeptical observers would of course have to be rendered unconscious before the test to avoid interfering with the sensitive mechanism.

>mean the exact same consciousness also.
I think that depends very much on what you mean by 'the same'.

>Consciousness as a phenomenon is one of the strangest things we know of >in the universe, in my opinion.
Agreed, either consciousness is in some sense a property of matter (which is pretty magical and surprising), or it isn't (which again, pretty magical and surprising).

[Dancing David]

I would say that it's hard in this particular case to distinguish purely environmental factors from developing neuroanatomy. With selfhood in general I think the nature-nuture issue is less clear. With the "I" aspect of selfhood specifically - is it neurological or environmental? That would be an interesting question.

So what happens to your developing neuroanatomy if you aren't exposed to an enviroment, it withers and dies. You can't learn language unless you are exposed to it.

The two are inseperable, more Helenistic duality Nick227?



Yes, but psychology isn't proper science, is it really? Let's face it. And even if we say it is then if people won't get in hypothetical teletransporters because of it then it sounds somewhat antiquated to me.

Nick

You are a fraud, you engage in unethical practices that have NOT A SHRED scientific basis, you call psychology something other than a science.

Back to IGNORE fowl fiend!

[Radrook]

Consciousness or self awareness and freewill are inextricably bound. The more instinctive an animal is the less choice it has and the less self-aware or conscious it is considered to be. Ants for example as veritable minute programmed machines and despite their farming, warfare and other seemingly conscious activities they are merely
reacting to predetermined stimuli response sequences and nothing more. Remove the stimulus and they founder due to inability to think. Monkeys are unable to recognize their own image in a mirror while the large apes can. Which of course makes them self aware and conscious to a greater extent than the reptiles, fish and other non-mammalian beasts.

[Darat]

...snip...

Monkeys are unable to recognize their own image in a mirror while the large apes can. Which of course makes them self aware and conscious to a greater extent than the reptiles, fish and other non-mammalian beasts.

And Magpies (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7570291.stm)...

[shuttlt]

Radrook,

>Consciousness or self awareness and freewill are inextricably bound
Maybe I'm being dense here, but why couldn't one be conscious, but not have free will? I was under the impression that a lot of brain processes took place below the level of conscious thinking and that the bit of the brain responsible for a unified sense of self did a bunch of stitching together after the fact.

Having reread, you post, it's clear that we are using the word consciousness to mean very different things.

[Belz...]

Uh no - but you're not trying to describe reality, you're trying to describe "you".

At the end of the day "you" are no more distinct from the rest of the fabric of reality than a brick in a house, the clay in the brick, the minerals in the clay, the molecules in the minerals, the atoms in the molecules, the electrons in the atoms, the quarks in the electrons...

The very attempt to describe "you" means you are trying to slice one part of reality away from the rest of it. This is very much a definitional process since there is no place where one can go and pull out such a definition from reality. It must be being imposed upon it.

:confused:

Why do you not mourn Belz-t0? He is dead by the same reasoning that you use - it's a separate instance of Belz that no longer exists.

Careful, now. Belz-t0 is gone, but not dead, unless you decide to also redefine "death". Neither is he an instance in and of himself.

In short if you didn't know "you" were teleported five minutes ago onto a replica Earth - in such a fashion that you couldn't tell it happened - "you" wouldn't care that there is some other instance of you that is "dead". "You" would be happily going along saying, "oh boy, am I glad I'm not dead."

Well, of course, the way you guys define "me". We seem to disagree on that. I'm arguing that "me" is the instance, not the pattern. Now, we can yap about Belz-t0 all day, but the fact of the matter is that there is a physical continuity between all "temporal instances" of "me" so long as I'm not broken down into my fundamental constituents.

Right - so you expressing a want shouldn't have any consequences to this argument at all.

Er... a person can want, cyborg.

Whether or not you "want" to step through the teleporter because you fear "death" is irrelevant to the issue of how it is we decide what "Belz" is.

Yes, but it isn't to the issue of whether I'd step into the damn thing or not.

No - you're saying that the "death" of one "Belz" through a physical process implies that another "Belz" is not "Belz".

Then you haven't been reading what I've written. That is definitely not what I'm saying.

Let me clarify - it is quasi-moralistic in that it is not dealing which how you talk about "Belz" - the pattern - but in consequences to "Belz" - something akin to: killing humans is wrong, killing a fetus is wrong, therefore a fetus is human.

Such an argument would be invalid. And I smell burning straw, here.

[Belz...]

But you are not continuing to exist anyway, regardless of the teletransporter. There is no persisting self.

Would you please stop bringing up this "persisting self" of yours as though it meant anything ?

Your dualistic belief that Belz...'s awareness would magically continue inside AlterBelz... is funny, at best. You agree to all the components of my argument, but disagree with its conclusion for a reason that seems unconnected to it. Frankly, it reminds me of fundies who agree that DNA exists, that it is reponsible for physical characteristics of lifeforms, that it mutates and that the environment decides which species make it, but somehow don't believe in evolution because of an unrelated reason i.e. religion.

So, you step into that thing, but don't expect me to do it.

[Jeff Corey]

Consciousness or self awareness and freewill are inextricably bound...
The assumption of free will is rejected by behavior analysts. It would be quite pointless to attempt to determine the causes of behavior if behavior was uncaused.

[Belz...]

The building is not the same, but it would "function" the same as the original.

Same applies to humans.
The process we call "I" would continue to go on.

Er... if the building is not the same, why would the "I" be the same ?

The "I" is not the particles your body consists of, but the process of those particles.

Again I ask: if you create a copy and NOT kill the original, will both of those "processes" be one ? And why should it make a difference if the original is no more ?

Before you say, "but the replica is not me"...... remember "me" is a computer program that claims to have some real exitence aside from the process itself.

No. That's what you claim. I don't need to remember something that I don't subscribe to.

[Belz...]

Consciousness or self awareness and freewill are inextricably bound.

Excuse me. What's free will ?

[cyborg]

Careful, now. Belz-t0 is gone, but not dead, unless you decide to also redefine "death".

I'm not "redefining" - I'm pushing you to be precise because I find the whole teleporter scenario forces one to re-examine the simplistic notions of such concepts that are carried around.

In short I'm saying that you're the one avoiding the issue by making spatial translocation key to the "death" in the teleporter scenario.

Neither is he an instance in and of himself.

Yes he is.

Well, of course, the way you guys define "me". We seem to disagree on that. I'm arguing that "me" is the instance, not the pattern.

Don't know precisely how you can tell what "instance" you are without knowing what pattern that is.

Now, we can yap about Belz-t0 all day, but the fact of the matter is that there is a physical continuity

Yet again I require a definition of continuity because there is a physical continuity in the teleporter example - it's just not a typical one.

Er... a person can want, cyborg.

So what?

Really - I don't care.

Yes, but it isn't to the issue of whether I'd step into the damn thing or not.

I just said that.

Then you haven't been reading what I've written. That is definitely not what I'm saying.

Then what are you saying?

Such an argument would be invalid. And I smell burning straw, here.

This is my interpretation of what you are saying.

[Mercutio]

So... we can replicate a machine perfectly. To the atom--to the quark--from the tip of the electrical cord to the yellow plastic tag that keeps falling off, to the capacitors to the transistors to the little box the elves live in, or whatever makes this machine work (for computers, it is elves, isn't it?). We plug it in, turn it on, chuck it into the machine, and obliterate machineA while replicating machineB at some remote location.

Have we replicated its processes? Its function? Let's look.

In this case, we have really emphasized the importance of the environment. This is not a strawman; it is quite clear that the environment is very important to consciousness. We do not act in a vacuum, after all; when we consciously respond, we are responding to something. And in the longer view, our responses have been shaped by the environment over the lifetime of the organism. For our machine, when it pops out of the replicator, it is no longer working. Why not? Simple--we have not replicated its environment, which in this case includes such things as a wall socket and an electrical infrastructure (a generator, at the very least).

Ok, let's make it a battery operated device. Have we maintained function? Let's make it one of those really cool battery operated power saws. Its function, of course, is to take one plank and make two shorter planks out of it, and to repeat this as long as the battery lasts. We pop it into the teleporter, and it comes out not in a woodworker's shop, but a nunnery, where it starts taking one nun and making two shorter nuns out of her. The function is not at all the same, when the environment is taken into account. And, I argue, it must be. The "life of the party" in one environment is a rude boor in another.

We do admit that our consciousness, our "I", is changed by extreme environmental changes. "Vietnam changed him", "marriage changed her", "becoming a JREF admin ruined him", that sort of thing. We even have scales to measure the extent to which people change from situation to situation (self-monitoring).

When we change the XYZ coordinates of an organism, we are doing much more than changing its location in space. We are changing its environment. Given a view of consciousness that defines it as (public and private) behaviors extended in time, and given that behaviors are a function of environmental stimuli (antecedent and consequent stimuli), the "persistant" physical location of the organism is inextricably bound to "self". Note that self is, as it should be, defined as the behaving organism in its environment. Not as some artificial fictional portion of the private behavior of that organism.

[Mashuna]

We do not act in a vacuum, after all.

Certainly not for more than a few seconds. . .

[shuttlt]

Mercutio,

surely the 'changed' in 'Vietnam changed him' isn't the antonym of the 'the same' that is being discussed in relation to this hypothetical teleporter. Any environmental change 'changes me', I am changed to some extent by a nice drive to the beach. I change from one moment to the next. A trip in a teleporter would almost certainly be an extremely changing event. The people watching it happen would be changed by it, let alone the person who actually did the teleporting.

[Belz...]

In short I'm saying that you're the one avoiding the issue by making spatial translocation key to the "death" in the teleporter scenario.

I'm doing no such thing, because the DEATH of the original IS the key to the DEATH of the original.

Yes he is.

Amusing. We don't have the same definition of "instance", then, and the word becomes useless.

Don't know precisely how you can tell what "instance" you are without knowing what pattern that is.

How is that relevant to what I said ?

Yet again I require a definition of continuity because there is a physical continuity in the teleporter example - it's just not a typical one.

No, there is a continuity of pattern, for sure, but it's like building an identical me with different (or the same, depending on the example) atoms. If there were two "me"s simultaneously I'm sure you wouldn't be saying the same thing.

So what?

Really - I don't care.

That's odd. I would've thought you'd care about a person's wishes. I know I do.

Then what are you saying?

I'm saying the opposite: that the fact that MercA is no longer with us has NOTHING to do with the fact that MercB is not MercA.

[skiba]

Again I ask: if you create a copy and NOT kill the original, will both of those "processes" be one ? And why should it make a difference if the original is no more ?

There would be two, I'm not disputing that, only the illusionary "I" (psychological I) that you are defending here.

The fact that you wouldn't get in the teleporter and that you think BelzB wouldn't be you, shows that you have not regocnized the illusionary nature of "I". You still think this "I-ness" is innate to matter.



No. That's what you claim. I don't need to remember something that I don't subscribe to.

Yes, but you claim you wouldnt be you after you go through the teleporter,
that means you claim the "I" is something other than a "processing machine". So far you definition of "I" have been rather vague or just simply "attached" to a certain set of matter.

[Mercutio]

Mercutio,

surely the 'changed' in 'Vietnam changed him' isn't the antonym of the 'the same' that is being discussed in relation to this hypothetical teleporter. Any environmental change 'changes me', I am changed to some extent by a nice drive to the beach. I change from one moment to the next. A trip in a teleporter would almost certainly be an extremely changing event. The people watching it happen would be changed by it, let alone the person who actually did the teleporting.

Certainly each experience changes us; and yet, certainly we remain the same person. Let's take a look at some of what changes and what stays the same: Our reactions may change, the things we know may change, the things we feel may change, the things we do may change... we do appear to be looking through the same set of eyes, hearing through the same ears, touching with the same fingers (certainly, molecules are replaced through cellular repair, but the continuity of the organism is maintained).

If "self" is defined as the organism in its environment, then the self, although changing, also remains the same--it changes as the environment changes, as we change. If the "self" is defined as some fictional portion of the organism, all is speculation.

Some here appear to think that, when we speak of "self" as the organism in its environment, we are speaking of some illusionary persistent self. This is not true, of course, but is their misunderstanding. They are imposing their definition of self on the problem.

[shuttlt]

>If the "self" is defined as some fictional portion of the organism, all is >speculation.
I'm not sure that I am completely comfortable with the word fictional here. Unknowable, non-scientific....? If you restrict what you mean by the 'self' to that which can be measured and tested externally, I'm probably in rough agreement with everything you have said up to now. However, there are more things in heaven and earth, Mercutio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy. ;-)

[Dancing David]

Self has an easy defintion, a body.

[cyborg]

Note that self is, as it should be, defined as the behaving organism in its environment.

So I reiterate my last point - when can one EVER say this is the same?

[shuttlt]

Dancing David,

>Self has an easy definition, a body.
That certainly is an easy definition. Is the teleported body the same body, or a different one? Also, what counts as a body?

[shuttlt]

>>Note that self is, as it should be, defined as the behaving organism in its environment.
>So I reiterate my last point - when can one EVER say this is the same?
One can't, so if you choose to define the self in this way, teleportation is just one change amongst uncountably many changes. This answer like any other answer depends on imposing a particular definition of 'self', or 'consciousness'.

If you ask me, the definition of 'self' is an axiom here.

[Mercutio]

>If the "self" is defined as some fictional portion of the organism, all is >speculation.
I'm not sure that I am completely comfortable with the word fictional here. Unknowable, non-scientific....?
Sorry, it's a technical term, short for "explanatory fiction". It refers to a circularly inferred but allegedly causal entity. "Willpower" is another example--if we say that someone survived an illness because of their willpower, but the only evidence of their willpower is their survival, "willpower" adds nothing at all to the explanation. See this thread (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=34330) for a very thorough discussion of the concept.
If you restrict what you mean by the 'self' to that which can be measured and tested externally, I'm probably in rough agreement with everything you have said up to now.I do restrict what I mean to natural events--however, those may be public or private. Thinking is something that we do, that no one else can observe--but I have read arguments here that assert "well, if I didn't have a self, I couldn't think!", which asserts a causal status to "self" and infers its existence purely from the fact that we think, and purely circularly.
However, there are more things in heaven and earth, Mercutio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy. ;-)
Hmph. Hamlet always did get better press. Whiny prat.

[Mercutio]

So I reiterate my last point - when can one EVER say this is the same?

In which case, what is wrong with my "MercA goes into the machine, DaratA comes out" scenario?

Clearly, one can say that "this is the same" when the context of the question allows it. Which is not all the time, of course. When we ask "did I see you at the market yesterday with that strange blonde?", an answer of "no--there are several million molecules difference between that person and me, as well as nearly 24 hours of experience!" is weasel-like.

[cyborg]

In which case, what is wrong with my "MercA goes into the machine, DaratA comes out" scenario?

If it were within the parameters of the device then nothing.

It is not however - since the parameters of the device are such that it is impossible to distinguish between the entities at the entry and exit point of the device without prior knowledge.

Clearly, one can say that "this is the same" when the context of the question allows it. Which is not all the time, of course. When we ask "did I see you at the market yesterday with that strange blonde?", an answer of "no--there are several million molecules difference between that person and me, as well as nearly 24 hours of experience!" is weasel-like.

No - it's a matter of definitional precision.

A "behaving organism in its environment," includes an environment where that behaving organism finds its environment drastically altered by a teleportation device.

You have tacitly chosen some definition of "the same" that you are quite comfortable with but you're just not sharing it.

[Belz...]

There would be two, I'm not disputing that, only the illusionary "I" (psychological I) that you are defending here.

The fact that you wouldn't get in the teleporter and that you think BelzB wouldn't be you, shows that you have not regocnized the illusionary nature of "I".

Well, perhaps you can educate me, professor. Where did you learn this universal truth ?

What I'm saying is that I have awareness, as I believe no one is disputing. I simply don't believe that this awareness will be the same in the copy, as everybody seems to be agreeing, up to a certain point.

Yes, but you claim you wouldnt be you after you go through the teleporter

Wrong, I said that whoever comes out isn't me.

So far you definition of "I" have been rather vague or just simply "attached" to a certain set of matter.

My position has been very clear since the beginning.

[cyborg]

I'm doing no such thing, because the DEATH of the original IS the key to the DEATH of the original.

Tautological.

Amusing. We don't have the same definition of "instance", then, and the word becomes useless.

The definition of instance is quite clear - a temporal instance is as much an instance as a spatial one - it's just one people here seem happy to blissfully overlook.

No, there is a continuity of pattern,

I need that definition of "continuity" again.

That's odd. I would've thought you'd care about a person's wishes. I know I do.

"I don't wish to die in the teleporter," is not relevant to the discussion. I don't care about that wish - at all.

I'm saying the opposite: that the fact that MercA is no longer with us has NOTHING to do with the fact that MercB is not MercA.

Then why are you banging on about not wanting to "die" in the teleporter?

[Mercutio]

If it were within the parameters of the device then nothing.

It is not however - since the parameters of the device are such that it is impossible to distinguish between the entities at the entry and exit point of the device without prior knowledge.
...in terms of the original problem, it is very easy to distinguish between the entities--simply ask "is this the same location where you entered the machine?" If the answer is "yes", then either it is MercA, or you have also replicated the environment, in which case we are back to the case where it is impossible to know, even in principle.

No - it's a matter of definitional precision.

A "behaving organism in its environment," includes an environment where that behaving organism finds its environment drastically altered by a teleportation device.
That would define MercB, wouldn't it? MercA's environment is no longer being interacted with, as he is dead.

You have tacitly chosen some definition of "the same" that you are quite comfortable with but you're just not sharing it.
No, I have explicitly stated that the definition of "the same" depends on context.

[Belz...]

Tautological.

All the more reason why I'm confused that you don't understand it.

The definition of instance is quite clear - a temporal instance is as much an instance as a spatial one - it's just one people here seem happy to blissfully overlook.

I need that definition of "continuity" again.

I'll summon that up when I have more time.

"I don't wish to die in the teleporter," is not relevant to the discussion. I don't care about that wish - at all.

Fine.

Then why are you banging on about not wanting to "die" in the teleporter?

Because I'm the equivalent of MercA, and MercB isn't me. How hard is that to understand ?

[Mercutio]

Because I'm the equivalent of MercA, and MercB isn't me. How hard is that to understand ?

well, we do have a machine here that could turn you into Darat, if that's any better.

[Darat]

As long as it's DaratA they are turned into and not that DaratA murdering DaratB!

[Dancing David]

Dancing David,

>Self has an easy definition, a body.
That certainly is an easy definition. Is the teleported body the same body, or a different one? Also, what counts as a body?


I am one who beleives in only limited continuity of the self. The only coherent one is the body.

I am in the Star Trek camp. If you disassemble the body and reassemble the body, it is as much 'my body' as it was 'my body' five minutes ago.

I am only the same 'person' I was five minutes ago in a sense that there is a continuity by some biological structures.

Biological organsism has a surface layer (not always) that would tend to denote a body, but the spectrum applies. Viruses may be life but they aren't likely to be bodies.

[cyborg]

...in terms of the original problem, it is very easy to distinguish between the entities--simply ask "is this the same location where you entered the machine?"

They speak French.

Now what?

That would define MercB, wouldn't it? MercA's environment is no longer being interacted with, as he is dead.

Fundamentally:


cyborgA -time-> cyborgB

cyborgA -time-> cyborgB0
|-> cyborgB1

cyborgA -space-> cyborgB

cyborgA -space-> cyborgB0
|-> cyborgB1 - time -> cyborgC


As far as I'm concerned if I can construct a path between two nodes that's a "continuity of existence" and "I" have BOTH been teleported and have not been teleported since the process causes a branch.

If cyborgB0 dies then so does cyborgB1.

No, I have explicitly stated that the definition of "the same" depends on context.

Then you're making up as you go along.

Good to know.

[cyborg]

Because I'm the equivalent of MercA, and MercB isn't me. How hard is that to understand ?

It's perfectly simple to understand - I'm just pointing out that it's inconsistent no matter which way you slice it. Something you people are going to refuse to accept or attempt to construct fantastically convoluted "continuity of existence" definitions for that exclude the teleporter "just because" it's not a vanilla physical process.

[shuttlt]

Mercutio,

Thanks for your explanation. I certainly disagree with the 'if I didn't have a self, I couldn't think!' position that you quote. It goes back to what you mean by 'self' and 'think', I suppose. Why we don't all talk in predicate logic I don't know!

Out of curiosity, would me being conscious count as an explanatory fiction from your point of view? Would it also count as an explanatory fiction to me, given that hopefully, I do have direct experience of it? Hopefully you've got the gist of what I mean by conscious by now as it's hell to try to put into words. Perhaps that's the hard problem of consciousness?

[shuttlt]

Dancing David,
Cool! Star Trek was how I got into this debate the first time around 10 years ago, give or take. The episode in question was a Voyager one where Neelix got merged with Tuvok (appologies for the spelling, I'm more Star Wars than Star Trek and too lazy to Google it) in a transporter accident. The episode ended with the new combined entity getting forcibly seperated.

If we are saying what we believe, I believe that everything that is most interesting about consciousness falls outside the scope of science. I don't see anything in atoms and all the rest of the physical world that is incompatable with it being all you need to make a consciousness, but I guess if thats all it is, then there is something about atoms and all the rest of the physical world that also falls outside science. I'm also of the view that there is insufficient agreement in the definition of the terminology to say whether going through a hypothetical teleporter will kill you. That being said, I think I'll give the teleporter a miss and walk.

[Mercutio]

Out of curiosity, would me being conscious count as an explanatory fiction from your point of view? Would it also count as an explanatory fiction to me, given that hopefully, I do have direct experience of it? Hopefully you've got the gist of what I mean by conscious by now as it's hell to try to put into words. Perhaps that's the hard problem of consciousness?

There are a few ways to talk about consciousness; if you, as some do, say that consciousness is the thing that allows you to think, feel, remember, etc., then yes, "consciousness" is circular. If, on the other hand, you use "consciousness" as a categorical noun referring to the actual behaviors of thinking, feeling, remembering, etc., then "consciousness" is simply a summary label for a set of behaviors. For myself, it seems quite clear that "consciousness" is a fuzzy set of public and private behaviors; as such, it certainly does exist, but it is not a cause. Being conscious does not allow me to do all the things that conscious people do, it simply describes the fact that I do all the things that we label "conscious".

[Reinhard]

>....that to copy this arrangement IS to copy consciousness.
I agree that that follows from the assumption, though how one would test it? Logical proofs are all very well, but before stepping through the teleporter myself, I'd just as soon confirm it as not.

Quite. I agree. Which is why I'll never be getting into a teleporter until someone can prove to me that the consciousness I label 'me' won't be destroyed... and that's never going to happen until we can somehow work out a method of objectively testing purely subjective conscious experience. I mean, how would one test it indeed? Say we ask Copied Person Who Just Stepped Out Of The Teleporter (she's got a catchy name): "are you X?" (where X denotes her name - see, told you it was catchy :D). But even if Xcopy was not Xoriginal, and Xoriginal had been killed at the moment of transportation, Xcopy would still answer, "yes, I am! WOOHOO TELEPORTATION ROCKS!". She'd have all the same memories, the same emotions, the exact same genetics, the exact same upbringing, the exact same everything.

But to my mind, it still seems possible that she is not, in fact, the same consciousness, but a new entity altogether; physically identical, but a separate consciousness... because, after all, the original copy was erased. Destroyed. No more. You get the picture. :) And yet if consciousness is truely entirely material - as I currently believe it is in lieu of a better explanation - then my view must be incorrect!

I guess that's why they call it the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Because it's hard.

>mean the exact same consciousness also.
I think that depends very much on what you mean by 'the same'.
This is certainly something that needs defining. In the above example, Xcopy is the same person physically, because there is absolutely no real way at all to distinguish them. Same memory, same tastes, same family, genetics, upbrining and so on. So is it therefore possible for her to have a different consciousness? If it is NOT, then what the hell happens if Xoriginal is not erased - as would happen in a normal teleportation procedure - but left fully intact as an observer? Would there now be two consciousnesses? I guess there must be. But why would there be two consciousness in this scenario but only one in the original? It doesn't make sense to me that, by not erasing Xoriginal, you cause a new consciousness to be created in Xcopy. After all, the two are not bound at all; they are totally separate physical instances. From Xcopy's perspective, it should not (theoretically) matter what happens to Xoriginal in the slightest.

My brain is in knots already... I'm going to stop. It sure is fun to think about though :)

[Mercutio]

They speak French.

Now what?
Now I thank you for acknowledging that they are, in fact, discernibly different, and that an additional layer of ignorance would be required in order to deny this.

Fundamentally:


cyborgA -time-> cyborgB

cyborgA -time-> cyborgB0
|-> cyborgB1

cyborgA -space-> cyborgB

cyborgA -space-> cyborgB0
|-> cyborgB1 - time -> cyborgC


As far as I'm concerned if I can construct a path between two nodes that's a "continuity of existence" and "I" have BOTH been teleported and have not been teleported since the process causes a branch.

If cyborgB0 dies then so does cyborgB1.
So, by ripping apart timespace. In the real world, cyborgA progresses through time and space at once.


Then you're making up as you go along.

Good to know.
An unchanging policy in changing times is foolishness. Indeed, it is part of the problem of this thread. There are operational definitions of consciousness, and there are colloquial definitions of consciousness; the "hard problem" comes from treating the latter as the former, and trying to find a reductionist solution to a fictional problem. The plain simple truth is that there are different contexts in which "the same"... varies.

[skiba]

Well, perhaps you can educate me, professor. Where did you learn this universal truth ?

Through very simple reasoning.
The brain is a machine, that creates an experience of "I". A replica will create the same experience.

Maybe some day we can build robots that experience something similar as we do. Maybe we could even build programs that truly believe that somebody actually dies when the power is turned off.



What I'm saying is that I have awareness, as I believe no one is disputing. I simply don't believe that this awareness will be the same in the copy, as everybody seems to be agreeing, up to a certain point.


Yes, the keyword being "believe".
I think your letting your emotions do the thinking, not rational thought.



Wrong, I said that whoever comes out isn't me.

hmmm...Same difference

I understand what you mean when you say "it's no longer me" and I agree on a certain level.
Just as two hydrogen atoms are identical but not the same.
But again, the atoms are not you, there merely building blocks for the "I".
Maybe we should think of in terms of energy and not matter, to make the boundary more elusive.

Cyborg asked you a question earlier that you didn't answer or I just missed it..... something like, what if you were teleported on to a replica earth with out you knowing about it.
I mean how do you know at this very moment that your not belzB, C, D, or E. You dont, and it makes no difference to anyone. Not to you or to the previous ones.



My position has been very clear since the beginning.

Not really. I remember you saying something that "behaviour" is "I", which made no sense to me.

[Reinhard]

So, by ripping apart timespace. In the real world, cyborgA progresses through time and space at once.

So are you saying that 'timespace' has something to do with consciousness? What exactly would this entail? If you've explained it before, sorry; I didn't understand. I mean that if you believe that consciousness = computation, (I think this is your position; if not then... I sorry again) how do temporal considerations fit into this? If the material in my brain has the same structure as it had before, and therefore fulfills a completely identical function, is not then my consciousness the same regardless of where it's suddenly been moved to? Why would time make a difference exactly?

[Dancing David]

Dancing David,
Cool! Star Trek was how I got into this debate the first time around 10 years ago, give or take. The episode in question was a Voyager one where Neelix got merged with Tuvok (appologies for the spelling, I'm more Star Wars than Star Trek and too lazy to Google it) in a transporter accident. The episode ended with the new combined entity getting forcibly seperated.

If we are saying what we believe, I believe that everything that is most interesting about consciousness falls outside the scope of science.

Really? Nothing falls outside the scope of scince.

What do you have in mind?


I don't see anything in atoms and all the rest of the physical world that is incompatable with it being all you need to make a consciousness, but I guess if thats all it is, then there is something about atoms and all the rest of the physical world that also falls outside science.

See above.

I'm also of the view that there is insufficient agreement in the definition of the terminology to say whether going through a hypothetical teleporter will kill you. That being said, I think I'll give the teleporter a miss and walk.

I am saying that the one on the old old star trek, i would take. Not one that makes a copy and then kills the DavidA.

Except I really don't want to go to the universe where Spock has a beard.

[Mercutio]

Through very simple reasoning.
The brain is a machine, that creates an experience of "I". A replica will create the same experience.

That's simple reasoning, all right. Given your first assertion, I'd come to that conclusion too.

Of course, I'd completely disagree with your first assertion, but hey.

[Dancing David]

Quite. I agree. Which is why I'll never be getting into a teleporter until someone can prove to me that the consciousness I label 'me' won't be destroyed... and that's never going to happen until we can somehow work out a method of objectively testing purely subjective conscious experience. I mean, how would one test it indeed? Say we ask Copied Person Who Just Stepped Out Of The Teleporter (she's got a catchy name): "are you X?" (where X denotes her name - see, told you it was catchy :D). But even if Xcopy was not Xoriginal, and Xoriginal had been killed at the moment of transportation, Xcopy would still answer, "yes, I am! WOOHOO TELEPORTATION ROCKS!". She'd have all the same memories, the same emotions, the exact same genetics, the exact same upbringing, the exact same everything.

But to my mind, it still seems possible that she is not, in fact, the same consciousness, but a new entity altogether; physically identical, but a separate consciousness... because, after all, the original copy was erased. Destroyed. No more. You get the picture. :) And yet if consciousness is truely entirely material - as I currently believe it is in lieu of a better explanation - then my view must be incorrect!

I guess that's why they call it the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Because it's hard.

it should really be called the Fuzzy lack of definition!




This is certainly something that needs defining. In the above example, Xcopy is the same person physically, because there is absolutely no real way at all to distinguish them. Same memory, same tastes, same family, genetics, upbrining and so on. So is it therefore possible for her to have a different consciousness? If it is NOT, then what the hell happens if Xoriginal is not erased - as would happen in a normal teleportation procedure - but left fully intact as an observer? Would there now be two consciousnesses? I guess there must be. But why would there be two consciousness in this scenario but only one in the original? It doesn't make sense to me that, by not erasing Xoriginal, you cause a new consciousness to be created in Xcopy. After all, the two are not bound at all; they are totally separate physical instances. From Xcopy's perspective, it should not (theoretically) matter what happens to Xoriginal in the slightest.

My brain is in knots already... I'm going to stop. It sure is fun to think about though :)

Perhaps the solution lies in consciousness not being continuous in the first place, it sure is different when I sleep and I don't think it is contnuous across my day.

[Mercutio]

So are you saying that 'timespace' has something to do with consciousness? What exactly would this entail? If you've explained it before, sorry; I didn't understand. I mean that if you believe that consciousness = computation, (I think this is your position; if not then... I sorry again) how do temporal considerations fit into this? If the material in my brain has the same structure as it had before, and therefore fulfills a completely identical function, is not then my consciousness the same regardless of where it's suddenly been moved to? Why would time make a difference exactly?

Actually, I am not in the consciousness = computation camp. Sadly, I have real world obligations right now (suppertime!), but very briefly--consciousness is, as I said, a summary label for a bunch of public and private behaviors; behaviors, as they always are, are extended in time and embedded in an environmental context. We learn to label the things we call "consciousness" through interaction with our verbal community, which has no access to our private behavior and thus must rely on public referents in teaching us. Our sense of self comes from a history of interaction with this (mostly social, in this context) environment; rather than being reducible to some part of our brain, or even our whole brain, consciousness is understood at the level of the behaving person in his/her (mostly social, mostly verbal) environment.

[Reinhard]

Actually, I am not in the consciousness = computation camp. Sadly, I have real world obligations right now (suppertime!), but very briefly--consciousness is, as I said, a summary label for a bunch of public and private behaviors; behaviors, as they always are, are extended in time and embedded in an environmental context. We learn to label the things we call "consciousness" through interaction with our verbal community, which has no access to our private behavior and thus must rely on public referents in teaching us. Our sense of self comes from a history of interaction with this (mostly social, in this context) environment; rather than being reducible to some part of our brain, or even our whole brain, consciousness is understood at the level of the behaving person in his/her (mostly social, mostly verbal) environment.
Ah, of course! Thankyou. I recall now that you're a Behaviourist of some stripe (was it Radical?). Though I don't think this actually changes my point... if we accept that your view is correct (I don't, but what the hey - I'll run with it) then the teleported copy will still possess the exact same history of public interactions as the original.

I assume that this history of interaction is stored in the brain (not in any specific location, sure, but in some systematic informational way nonetheless - I mean, where else are they being stored)? Therefore, if the construction of the brain is precisely replicated, so are these learned patterns. And so therefore the pattern association of the individual is identical. As this pattern of learned labels is the only thing that stops me seeing everything through your eyes, (aside: is that really what you're saying? It seems odd) then to replicate these behaviours exactly would create a new being whose experiences are logically indistinguishable from the subjetive experience of the original person.

Right? Wrong? I guess I still don't get where a temporal separation comes into it. As long as the brain's structure is precisely replicated, so is all of its content. Unless you're suggesting that these learned associations exist only the actual molecules themselves? Or that consciousness doesn't actually exist? You can't be, surely.

[Mercutio]

I assume that this history of interaction is stored in the brain (not in any specific location, sure, but in some systematic informational way nonetheless - I mean, where else are they being stored)?

Thank you for phrasing it so succinctly--please note that you, as many others here, are assuming a model based on a computer or file storage model; it makes perfect sense to ask where something is being stored, given this model. Of course, it is not at all the only way to look at it at all (let alone the correct way); as we have said in this thread, one cannot meaningfully "store" a behavior. Where is your walk, when you are sitting down? Where is your run, when you are standing still? We use the nouns "memory" and "thought" when we mean the behaviors of remembering and thinking--where is a memory when you are not remembering, or a thought when you are not thinking? We certainly speak of "memories" or "thoughts" as if they had some sort of existence apart from the behavior, but there is no more reason to think of them as stored than there is to think that a walk or run is stored. The storage metaphor you (and most people) use is a holdover from Platonian copy theory--why people are so reluctant to question this bronze-age belief is beyond me.

[skiba]

That's simple reasoning, all right. Given your first assertion, I'd come to that conclusion too.

Of course, I'd completely disagree with your first assertion, but hey.

What else is there to create an experience of "I", other than the brain?

[Mashuna]

What else is there to create an experience of "I", other than the brain?

If I've managed to follow any of Mercutio's reasoning, the organsim as a whole, including input from external sources (i.e. context).

[Darat]

Ah, of course! Thankyou. I recall now that you're a Behaviourist of some stripe (was it Radical?). Though I don't think this actually changes my point... if we accept that your view is correct (I don't, but what the hey - I'll run with it) then the teleported copy will still possess the exact same history of public interactions as the original.

...snip...

I think Merc would agree with that - in fact he has said that as far as MercB is concerned he will be the same in this repect but that does not make MercB the same as MercA.


I assume that this history of interaction is stored in the brain (not in any specific location, sure, but in some systematic informational way nonetheless - I mean, where else are they being stored)?

...snip...

I'd say the evidence is against this view although it can be a handy little convenience to say "the body/brain is me" however consider how you can go to a location and something at that location "triggers" a memory. Given that we know that memory is not a storage system (in the way say a computer file is a stored representative pattern), that environmental trigger is very much a part of that memory - the "memory" would not have existed without that trigger.

It's a mistake to try and isolate what we are from the environment, they are in fact one and the same. All that there is, is the environment a.k.a. reality. Yes we often, to try and help us understand the world around us, subdivide the environment into neat little packages but we have to be careful that we don't forget that we created these arbitrary divisions!

[skiba]

If I've managed to follow any of Mercutio's reasoning, the organsim as a whole, including input from external sources (i.e. context).

Yes, the organism as a whole.
I dont see why we have to include external stimuly or the context the organism exists in, this is irrelevant in the thought experiment. I'm talking about making a copy that happens in an instant, and if the subjective experience of "I-ness" is preserved.

[lupus_in_fabula]

I think Merc would agree with that - in fact he has said that as far as MercB is concerned he will be the same in this repect but that does not make MercB the same as MercA.


I'd say the evidence is against this view although it can be a handy little convenience to say "the body/brain is me" however consider how you can go to a location and something at that location "triggers" a memory. Given that we know that memory is not a storage system (in the way say a computer file is a stored representative pattern), that environmental trigger is very much a part of that memory - the "memory" would not have existed without that trigger.

It's a mistake to try and isolate what we are from the environment, they are in fact one and the same. All that there is, is the environment a.k.a. reality. Yes we often, to try and help us understand the world around us, subdivide the environment into neat little packages but we have to be careful that we don't forget that we created these arbitrary divisions!

I completely agree with that. However, in order to study ‘something’, we’re already making such divisions, and more so when intending to communicate about it. Perhaps the first thing about illuminating the problem is by clearing up the language used, thus such things as “memories are stored in the brain” have to be revaluated, or that “the brain creates the sensation of ‘I’.” On the other hand, I’m not sure where the pragmatic line between holism and particularism in this sense should be drawn; there’s always the danger of not being able to say anything meaningful, only one truism after another. It’s indeed a tricky situation, and I’m as lousy in my language use as many other, if not more so.

In this thread, the term consciousness has already been substituted by awareness without adding too much, since the same questions seems to arise nonetheless; “if lupusA isn’t killed and stands beside lupusB, then, do they have the same awareness?”; when lupusA is killed, does lupusB have the same awareness as lupusA had?...etc. I’m afraid we’re at a standstill because no one really agrees upon what awareness seems to suggest for the whole context.

Is hunger a sensation created in the brain that we become aware of (forget the use of language when illustrating this, i.e. “who’s becoming aware”)? Is it is a sensation of the whole organism that the brain is simply apart of, and dividing the sensation from other sensations – I clearly feel it in my stomach, but it’s not the same as stomach ache; how do I know the difference? Or, is hunger a result from lack of food? All three questions seem to require an answer on different levels of explanation. Is it already a mistake to ask for a universal explanation without acknowledging that the context for each of the three questions is different? I think the whole teletransporter issue is similarly obtuse.

[shuttlt]

Dancing David,

Science isn't necessarily everything. I think a lot of the problems in this thread come from poeple simultaneously holding private concepts of consciousness, mind, death etc... that go beyond the scope of Science and at the same time reasoning about those concepts as if they were public phonomena that Science didn't have a problem with. Divide by zero errors galore!

To take an extreme example, that I hope doesn't sidetrack things too much by it's silliness, if I claim that a miracle occured and the Coke can in front of me wept tears of blood... One of the basic assumptions of Science is that the Universe follows a bunch of laws without any special cases or exceptions so that you can reason by induction. If I claim an event took place outside of those laws then Science doesn't have much to say about it. You can tell me I'm talking crap, but what's really going on is the following:

Person A:I claim event X is a special case
Person B:It can't be a special case.
person A:Why not?
person B:There aren't any special cases.
person A:Why aren't there any special cases?
Person B:Because they aren't helpful in understanding the world from a scientific point of view.
Person A:What is a scientific point of view? One with no special cases.

It's an argument that all there is is Science, because everything else is unscientific. I'm an atheist, but... God may or may not exist and Science isn't a whole lot of help in deciding the matter, whatever Richard Dawkins may say. About the most Science can do is to say God isn't necessary to explain the external world. If you want to say that it isn't necessary to introduce the concept of consciousness, as a private experience, to understand the external world, then I agree with you completely. If you argue from that there is no private experience, then I don't.

Like I say, a bit of a silly example and I've never seen anything that looked much like a miracle. Anyway, I think consciousness (at least in the sense I'm using it) is kind of a special case. We each only have access to one instance of it and so far as I can see it doesn't lend itself to inductive reasoning. I could claim you aren't actually conscious because my miracle Coke can told me so, what evidence could provide that you are? Obviously I don't often listen to my Coke can, but it just seems to me that a bunch of assumptions keep getting glossed over, some of which, in no particular order are:

1. Everybody else is conscious in just the same way I am.
2. Thinking is necessary for consciousness.
3. Acting like you are conscious => You are conscious (by no means everybody seems to make this assumption).
4. Consciousness is continuous/discontinuous (different people seem to make a different assumption).
5. The private experience of being conscious IS a physical process.

I've got a nasty feeling I've come across here as if I spend my weekends dowsing for crystals to rebalance my energy field. Hopefully that is a result of how hard it is to explain what one is talking about on this topic. To clarify my position a little, I hold assumption 1 and err on the side of assumption 5, I disagree with 2 and 3 and hold no opinion on 4.

[shuttlt]

Allow me to rephrase things a little. There are, I think, two ways in which something may be non-Scientific.

1. If it is a special case, in the sense given previously.
2. If it has no physical consequences (I think the Ether might fall into this class).

To me consciousness kind of fits 1, but certainly fits 2.

[Belz...]

It's perfectly simple to understand - I'm just pointing out that it's inconsistent no matter which way you slice it. Something you people are going to refuse to accept or attempt to construct fantastically convoluted "continuity of existence" definitions for that exclude the teleporter "just because" it's not a vanilla physical process.

Fine, then. Perhaps YOU can answer my question, since nobody's done so thus far:

Assume the machine malfunctions and doesn't kill DaratA. So now, we have DaratA and DaratB.

1) Do we have only one person ? Or do you consider them two people ?
2) Does DaratA's awareness now include DaratB's ? I mean, does DaratA see and feel what DaratB does ?
3) If not, why do you think it's different if the machine doesn't malfunction ?

[Belz...]

Through very simple reasoning.
The brain is a machine, that creates an experience of "I". A replica will create the same experience.

This "simple reasoning" of yours is based on incomplete knowledge that you seem to think is sufficient.

Yes, the keyword being "believe".
I think your letting your emotions do the thinking, not rational thought.

I believe I'll be breathing in five minutes. Is that emotions talking ? Or is my belief based on past experience ?

Why don't you try answering my questions in my previous post ?

hmmm...Same difference

I wouldn't think so. The way you worded it made it a clear contradiction. I had never said that.

Maybe we should think of in terms of energy and not matter, to make the boundary more elusive.

In order to agree with your position, you mean ?

Cyborg asked you a question earlier that you didn't answer or I just missed it..... something like, what if you were teleported on to a replica earth with out you knowing about it.

I don't remember such a question, but the answer is obvious. If I'm right, then Belz... is dead and AlterBelz... never sees the difference. If I'm wrong, then Belz... is alive and well and never sees the difference.

I mean how do you know at this very moment that your not belzB, C, D, or E. You dont, and it makes no difference to anyone. Not to you or to the previous ones.

Of course not, but my problem with your argument, and Nick's and Cyborg's, is that it seems to me like it assumes that what we seem to agree exists -- awareness -- somehow manages to survive, unscathed, the teleporting process. I think the copy has its own awareness. Indistinguishable from the original, sure, from anybody else's point of view, including AlterBelz..., but the fact remains that the original, me, is dead, and its awareness with it.

Not really. I remember you saying something that "behaviour" is "I", which made no sense to me.

That was Mercutio, I believe.

[shuttlt]

Belz,

My answer to your questions:

1) Two people.
2) I would be very much surprised if DaratA could see out of DaratB's eyes. I struggle to imagine how this would be possible or what the consequences would be if it was.
3) I am inclined to believe that there is no difference between the two machines, but my head starts to hurt when I think about it. It's a bit of a what-would-happen-if-you-went-back-in-time-and-killed-your-father-before-he-met-your-mother type question. Div by zero error, the universe general protection faults and God has to reboot it.

In some ways, I think this depends on where you stand in the teleportation scenario.

Post teleporter accident I would say that both DaratA and DaratB have just as much justification to claim to be the original DaratA. I'm not sure that things are quite so clear for the perspective of pre-teleporter accident DaratA. Allow me to change our hypothetical example to put a bit more strain on this way of thinking.

Hypothetical ShuttltA and hypothetical DaratA are trapped. Poor ShuttltA, poor DaratA! They are in a room with walls 100 metres thick, their only exit is blocked by a deep pit filled with spikes. Over the pit is a malfunctioning teleporter of the type you describe that will create a B version of Darat, or Shuttlt back in the centre of the room. ShuttltA realizes that if DaratA throws himself into the pit enough times then ShuttltA and DaratZ will be able to walk across on Darat corpses. ShuttltA would like to throw himself in as well, but has a note from him mother. How should DaratA feel about this escape plan? I would probably sit tight and wait for rescue.

[shuttlt]

Belz,

>Of course not, but my problem with your argument, and Nick's and Cyborg's,
>is that it seems to me like it assumes that what we seem to agree exists --
>awareness -- somehow manages to survive, unscathed, the teleporting
>process. I think the copy has its own awareness. Indistinguishable from the
>original, sure, from anybody else's point of view, including AlterBelz..., but the
>fact remains that the original, me, is dead, and its awareness with it.
YES!!!!!!!

[Dancing David]

Yes, the organism as a whole.
I dont see why we have to include external stimuly or the context the organism exists in, this is irrelevant in the thought experiment. I'm talking about making a copy that happens in an instant, and if the subjective experience of "I-ness" is preserved.


1.You have a lamp, you have a room.

The lamp is lit and illuminates the room.


2.You have the lamp, you have another room, exactly like the first, except for translocation in space.

The lamp is lit and illuminates another room.


3.The lamp is returned to the first room. (Translocation in time.)

The lamp is lit and illuminates the first room.



a. Is the flame the same is any of the three situations?
b. Does the flame illuminate the same in room in situation one and two? The experience is the same. (Excluding the fact that the flame is not.)
c. Does the flame illuminate the same room in one and three?

[Dancing David]

Dancing David,

Science isn't necessarily everything. I think a lot of the problems in this thread come from poeple simultaneously holding private concepts of consciousness, mind, death etc... that go beyond the scope of Science and at the same time reasoning about those concepts as if they were public phonomena that Science didn't have a problem with. Divide by zero errors galore!

To take an extreme example, that I hope doesn't sidetrack things too much by it's silliness, if I claim that a miracle occured and the Coke can in front of me wept tears of blood... One of the basic assumptions of Science is that the Universe follows a bunch of laws without any special cases or exceptions so that you can reason by induction. If I claim an event took place outside of those laws then Science doesn't have much to say about it. You can tell me I'm talking crap, but what's really going on is the following:

Person A:I claim event X is a special case
Person B:It can't be a special case.
person A:Why not?
person B:There aren't any special cases.
person A:Why aren't there any special cases?
Person B:Because they aren't helpful in understanding the world from a scientific point of view.
Person A:What is a scientific point of view? One with no special cases.

It's an argument that all there is is Science, because everything else is unscientific. I'm an atheist, but... God may or may not exist and Science isn't a whole lot of help in deciding the matter, whatever Richard Dawkins may say. About the most Science can do is to say God isn't necessary to explain the external world. If you want to say that it isn't necessary to introduce the concept of consciousness, as a private experience, to understand the external world, then I agree with you completely. If you argue from that there is no private experience, then I don't.

Like I say, a bit of a silly example and I've never seen anything that looked much like a miracle. Anyway, I think consciousness (at least in the sense I'm using it) is kind of a special case. We each only have access to one instance of it and so far as I can see it doesn't lend itself to inductive reasoning. I could claim you aren't actually conscious because my miracle Coke can told me so, what evidence could provide that you are? Obviously I don't often listen to my Coke can, but it just seems to me that a bunch of assumptions keep getting glossed over, some of which, in no particular order are:

1. Everybody else is conscious in just the same way I am.
2. Thinking is necessary for consciousness.
3. Acting like you are conscious => You are conscious (by no means everybody seems to make this assumption).
4. Consciousness is continuous/discontinuous (different people seem to make a different assumption).
5. The private experience of being conscious IS a physical process.

I've got a nasty feeling I've come across here as if I spend my weekends dowsing for crystals to rebalance my energy field. Hopefully that is a result of how hard it is to explain what one is talking about on this topic. To clarify my position a little, I hold assumption 1 and err on the side of assumption 5, I disagree with 2 and 3 and hold no opinion on 4.


:cool:

I barely have time to read this and will respond at different times!

I doubt you are a wooly headed adherent of Rock Candy Mountain.

I happen to believe that while science is not every thing, it can be used to study every thing.

Sometimes people don't like the answers.

[shuttlt]

Dancing David ,

doesn't your argument assume that flames and people are both identical in terms of the argument Belz was making. I think one of Belz's points is that people have an internal experiences. If flames have internal experiences then OK, if not then flames can't be substituted for people in Belz's argument.

[Darat]

...snip...

On the other hand, I’m not sure where the pragmatic line between holism and particularism in this sense should be drawn; there’s always the danger of not being able to say anything meaningful, only one truism after another. It’s indeed a tricky situation, and I’m as lousy in my language use as many other, if not more so.

...snip...



You are right - if we take the extreme holistic position we end up with something as useless as solipsism!

I don't think there is a "right" level as it all depends on what we are trying to understand. For instance if I want to describe the orbits of the planets of the solar system doing so at the level of human interaction on the planet earth (sending rockets up, gravity-sling-bys and the like) would just not be a sensible scale to choose.

A point I was trying to make I (and I realise I didn't make it very clear) is that what we need to ensure is that we are not confusing an artefact that is just a consequence of the scale/division we have decided to use with something that is real.

[Radrook]

And Magpies (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7570291.stm)...

Thanx for the update and the very useful link! I always suspected the the term "Bird brain!" is unjustified. : )

[Belz...]

3) I am inclined to believe that there is no difference between the two machines

If DaratA and DaratB are two distinct people in the malfunction scenario, then they should be two distinct people in the everything-works-perfectly scenario, as well.

Do you agree with that statement ?

[Radrook]

[quote]"Consciousness or self-awareness and freewill are inextricably bound."
Maybe I'm being dense here, but why couldn't one be conscious, but not have free will? I was under the impression that a lot of brain processes took place below the level of conscious thinking and that the bit of the brain responsible for a unified sense of self did a bunch of stitching together after the fact. Having reread, you post, it's clear that we are using the word consciousness to mean very different things.

You are right. Perhaps we are referring to two different concepts. I was referring to normal wakeful human consciousness with its attendant freedom of choice under normal circumstances. Not to consciousness after central-nervous-system damage, or cerebral neurotransmitter insufficiency leading to muscular paralyses, or forced restrictions-or delusional hallucinatory drug-induced consciousness, or subconsciousness, REM consciousness, or comatose consciousness with their restrictions on free will

[shuttlt]

[QUOTE=shuttlt;3964468]



You are right. Perhaps we are referring to two different concepts. I was referring to normal wakeful human consciousness with its attendant freedom of choice under normal circumstances. Not to consciousness after central-nervous-system damage, or cerebral neurotransmitter insufficiency leading to muscular paralyses, or forced restrictions-or delusional hallucinatory drug-induced consciousness, or subconsciousness, REM consciousness, or comatose consciousness with their restrictions on free will

Not your fault, but my explanation was clearly not up to snuff. In my defence I don't think it is possible to define these terms. The best we can do is circle round and round saying yes but not quite. At the risk of digressing, this reminds me of trying to translate an email into German using BabelFish. I ended up writing it and rewriting it until BabelFish could translate it from English to German and back into English while keeping the sense intact.

As an example of where I would disagree with your summary of my viewpoint... I wouldn't have said that an altered-state-of-consciousness actually alters Consciousness. I'd have said it alters perception, memory, reasoning, etc... Lost in the posts above I said something along the lines of what I mean by Consciousness has no external consequences. By external I mean outside of the Conscious entities experience of itself.

Another point of divergence with what you said is freedom of choice. What is doing the choosing? I don't see that I am any more or less free to choose after drinking my grandads rubbing alcohol than I am now. Again, my reasoning, perception and memory are all altered.... but in either case my actions come down through a bunch of neurons sitting in a chemical soup. Where is the free will? I know there is indeterminacy at the quantom level, but free will always seems to me like an assumption.

[Dancing David]

Dancing David ,

doesn't your argument assume that flames and people are both identical in terms of the argument Belz was making. I think one of Belz's points is that people have an internal experiences. If flames have internal experiences then OK, if not then flames can't be substituted for people in Belz's argument.

I am trying address the 'consciousness as process' argument, which is the point.

I think consciousness does not exist, it is just a rug under which other processes are swept.

[Reinhard]

If DaratA and DaratB are two distinct people in the malfunction scenario, then they should be two distinct people in the everything-works-perfectly scenario, as well.

Do you agree with that statement ?
No. ;) Well, to be precise, my intuition is that I agree with you. However, there are problems with this that we have to acknowledge...

In the malfunction scenario, it is obvious (and uncontroversial) that DaratA and DaratB are two distinct people. This is because, if at any point DaratA and DaratB both exist simultaneously, they are no longer exact copies. DaratB is structurally a different instance to DaratA, because the content of DaratA's experience - from the moment that DaratB was created - is different to DaratB's. We now have a Darat who stepped into a teleporter and nothing happened, and a Darat who stepped into a teleporter and was successfully transported as intended. Two separate people. We can point to one or the other and say "look! There's DaratA! And over there is DaratB!" And both are able to respond independantly of each other.

However (and here's the kicker!), if DaratA were erased before DaratB were reconstructed, there would be no point at which two instances of Darat simultaneously exist - thus, the above explanation does not apply. In the 'teleporter functioning perfectly' scenario, there are two possible outcomes:

1) Darat disappeared from location A and reappeared in location B, successfully travelling between two points.
2) Darat was destroyed at location A, and died. Shortly afterward, an identical copy of him appeared at location B.

The problem is that we currently have no systematic or objective way of distinguishing between these two cases. As far as the copied Darat is concerned, he is the same person. As far as any current scientific analysis can tell us, he is identical; he exhibits the same responses to all and every stimuli we can think to test. Whilst in the malfunction scenario it is trivially easy to distinguish the original from the copy, in this scenario it is currently impossible.

And that strikes right at the heart of the problem with all current scientific theories of consciousness.

[Reinhard]

It's a mistake to try and isolate what we are from the environment, they are in fact one and the same. All that there is, is the environment a.k.a. reality. Yes we often, to try and help us understand the world around us, subdivide the environment into neat little packages but we have to be careful that we don't forget that we created these arbitrary divisions!
In one sense, I agree with you. At the fundamental level, there are only atoms jiggling about (or whatever it is that makes up atoms - noodly appendages or some such I gather ;))

However, I don't agree that we 'create' consciousness as a neat label for something that actually doesn't exist (if that's what your saying - if I'm honest this holistic stuff mostly goes way over my head). Try as I might, I can't change my perception of blue to red, or change the subjective experience of the chair I'm sitting on into the subjective experience of a duck-eating snurb. 'I' cannot consciously create anything that 'I' perceive of reality. It is merely presented to whatever it is that I call 'me', and I use this information to navigate my environment (with reasonable success).

I mean, it seems rather obvious to me that my consciousness forms a discrete entity in exactly the same way a rock, or the sea, or a cloud; however, we don't tend to say that, just because a single cloud is an ill-defined object, that single clouds do not exist or are illusions. And even if consciousness is in fact not anything real at all, it still needs to be explained why it appears to be real, and not just pushed stealthily under the carpet. :)

[shuttlt]

I am trying address the 'consciousness as process' argument, which is the point.

I think consciousness does not exist, it is just a rug under which other processes are swept.

And there in lies the problem. It seems to me that Consciousness is the 'I' that experiences the thinking that therefore it is. I struggle to understand how one could doubt that Consciousness exists, though that is my failing as a very great many people clearly share your views. The funny thing is I used to argue just as you do, I just can't now see how I could think that way.

Anyway, since you don't believe that Consciousness in the sense that I mean it exists, and Consciousness in the sense I mean it is my only objection to stepping in a teleporter, then we may have hit on why we don't agree on whether DaratA and DaratB are 'the same'. What I think is 'dies' in the teleporter, you don't think existed to begin with.

[shuttlt]

The problem is that we currently have no systematic or objective way of distinguishing between these two cases. As far as the copied Darat is concerned, he is the same person. As far as any current scientific analysis can tell us, he is identical; he exhibits the same responses to all and every stimuli we can think to test. Whilst in the malfunction scenario it is trivially easy to distinguish the original from the copy, in this scenario it is currently impossible.

And that strikes right at the heart of the problem with all current scientific theories of consciousness.
Yes! I agree completely. To restate your argument a different way, saying DaratA and DaratB are indistinguishable is not equivalent to saying that DaratB IS DaratA. What makes them different is the Consciousness I've been discussing with my good friend Dancing David.

[Nick227]

If "self" is defined as the organism in its environment, then the self, although changing, also remains the same--it changes as the environment changes, as we change. If the "self" is defined as some fictional portion of the organism, all is speculation.

Some here appear to think that, when we speak of "self" as the organism in its environment, we are speaking of some illusionary persistent self. This is not true, of course, but is their misunderstanding. They are imposing their definition of self on the problem.

You create a definition of selfhood, Merc, but, I submit, you do not look - what actually is selfhood? How does it seem? How does it appear? And what are the biological processes which create this apparent experience? It is not a question of differing definitions clashing, but of actual examination clashing with a rigidly defined position. The school of thought you deal with may be great for many things, but it cannot address any of this because it has already decided what selfhood is. It has made its mind up.

You take the experience of selfhood as a priori valid, and surprise surprise everything makes sense....up to a point...until you start to question the experience itself. And then, at that point, your behaviourism can do nothing, because it has defined its position already.

Nick

[Nick227]

Yes! I agree completely. To restate your argument a different way, saying DaratA and DaratB are indistinguishable is not equivalent to saying that DaratB IS DaratA. What makes them different is the Consciousness I've been discussing with my good friend Dancing David.

Well, mostly in the debate so far what has proven the sticking point is not any "consciousness" ascribed to DaratA (though Belz is concerned about "awareness") but rather the physical substance of his body. The molecules are not the same after teleportation and it's been this which has caused most of the debate.

Nick

[Nick227]

Would you please stop bringing up this "persisting self" of yours as though it meant anything ?

Your dualistic belief that Belz...'s awareness would magically continue inside AlterBelz... is funny, at best. You agree to all the components of my argument, but disagree with its conclusion for a reason that seems unconnected to it. Frankly, it reminds me of fundies who agree that DNA exists, that it is reponsible for physical characteristics of lifeforms, that it mutates and that the environment decides which species make it, but somehow don't believe in evolution because of an unrelated reason i.e. religion.

So, you step into that thing, but don't expect me to do it.

Define awareness. Your usage here sounds acutely dualistic to me. Are you ascribing some magical property to this word? What is it about your awareness that will not be replicated in the experiment?

Your "awareness" is defined by your neurology and your environment. Both can be identically replicated.

Nick

[shuttlt]

Well, mostly in the debate so far what has proven the sticking point is not any "consciousness" ascribed to DaratA (though Belz is concerned about "awareness") but rather the physical substance of his body. The molecules are not the same after teleportation and it's been this which has caused most of the debate.

Nick
OK. I had been reading it as different molecules => different instance of the Darant consciousness. Where the different consciousness was the important thing and we were only discussing molecules because they could be touched and measured. I may need to do a bit of rereading.

For me, I don't care whether my molecules are different, so long as my consciousness is the same. Clearly the molecules in my body change over time (at least some of them do). I don't think I would object to every atom in my body being substituited for identical ones one at a time. Would this not be the same molecular change your talking about, only done by degrees?

[cyborg]

1) Do we have only one person ? Or do you consider them two people ?

They are two people. That's a matter of counting.

2) Does DaratA's awareness now include DaratB's ? I mean, does DaratA see and feel what DaratB does ?

Nope. That would be ludicrous.

3) If not, why do you think it's different if the machine doesn't malfunction ?
It's not.

I think you need to re-read what I said.

[Mercutio]

You create a definition of selfhood, Merc, but, I submit, you do not look - what actually is selfhood? How does it seem? How does it appear? And what are the biological processes which create this apparent experience? It is not a question of differing definitions clashing, but of actual examination clashing with a rigidly defined position. The school of thought you deal with may be great for many things, but it cannot address any of this because it has already decided what selfhood is. It has made its mind up.

You take the experience of selfhood as a priori valid, and surprise surprise everything makes sense....up to a point...until you start to question the experience itself. And then, at that point, your behaviourism can do nothing, because it has defined its position already.

NickUm... take a breath, Nick.

Under my view, I see the trees, smell the flowers, hear the music, taste the wine, touch the baby's cheek, just like anyone else. The fact that all these neato experiences happen to be focused on this body which I also am able to feel, and which hurts when I bump it too hard or burn it (as opposed to the rest of the world, which I cannot feel pain in when I hit it), allows me to infer a self. The biological processes have been studied for over a century--there is still much to learn, no doubt, but there is much that has already been learned.

My "rigidly defined position" is actually a conclusion based on quite a lot of investigation--as I said before, it is perfectly consistent with what we know of biology, neurochemistry, and physics. You keep thinking it is not, but assertion of disbelief is not evidence.

(BTW, I love "It has made its mind up". If you did not mean it as a joke, you really should pretend that you did.)

I do not take experience of selfhood as a given. I note sensation and perception, and suggest that the locus of sensation and perception in the behaving organism may well explain the inference of "self" as a persistent entity. This is consistent with our experience of self, and has the advantage of not being fictional.

You really need to start demonstrating that you understand my position in the first place, before you start pointing out areas where it "can do nothing".

[Mercutio]

I thought of something while on a bike ride today--not a big change, just a way to punch up the emotional content and see if people still find it irrelevant.

Suppose that the machine works exactly as Blackmore's example claims, with one small difference. The destruction of DaratA (no way am I doing this with MercA) is excruciatingly painful, and takes at least a minute or two, perhaps more, for his lingering, screaming, twitching, horrific death, none of which is experienced by DaratB. DaratB, in fact, will have absolutely no memory of this death; the copying process does not produce him until each of DaratA's component molecules have been tortured to death. (Think "The Prestige", but something far worse than drowning.)

DaratB emerges, the precise replica of DaratA at the point where he entered the machine (before the agonizing destruction begins). For the purposes of this thought experiment, let us assume that "thoughts", "memories" and the like are storable and are reproduced exactly in DaratB (and no, I am not ceding this point for the larger discussion).

Would it matter to you? Why or why not?

[cyborg]

So, by ripping apart timespace.

So, by ripping apart timespace... what?

In the real world, cyborgA progresses through time and space at once.

cyborgA progresses nowhere - cyborgA undergoes a state change. cyborgB is the progression of cyborgA. cyborgA is a transitory element.

I'm still waiting for you to explain to me why this situation is so vastly different in character in space than it is in time. Thus far I get:

The plain simple truth is that there are different contexts in which "the same"... varies.

Thus far you've pretty much boiled down what an "I" is down to some sort of identifiable location that isn't the rest of the universe which is affected by the rest of the universe.

[cyborg]

I thought of something while on a bike ride today--not a big change, just a way to punch up the emotional content and see if people still find it irrelevant.

You can involve drowning kittens if you like - I'll find it as irrelevant as ever.

Would it matter to you? Why or why not?

An emotional reaction would likely be involved. It's irrelevant of course to the models at hand.

Would it matter if DaratA had repeated orgasms induced by going through the teleporter that no future Darat would ever experience no matter how many times he went through a teleporter?

Doesn't change the issue of how we deal with the notion of identification. As far as I'm concerned it's a branch - DaratB is as much a propagation of DaratA in space as he could have been in time. He is as legitimate a trajectory of energy through space and time.

Cause -> Effect. Darat0 causes DaratA. Darat0 causes DaratB.

[cyborg]

Of course not, but my problem with your argument, and Nick's and Cyborg's, is that it seems to me like it assumes that what we seem to agree exists -- awareness -- somehow manages to survive, unscathed, the teleporting process.

Nope. My argument is that I just don't see any particularly legitimate reason for considering the entity at the exit any more or less a bona fide successor to the entity that first entered the machine.

And if we are going to talk about one as being the "same" self then we better talk about the other one as being the "same" self and deal with the paradox.

[Mercutio]

So, by ripping apart timespace... what?

cyborgA progresses nowhere - cyborgA undergoes a state change. cyborgB is the progression of cyborgA. cyborgA is a transitory element.
I understand. You define it that way axiomatically. Odd, though. Yes, it allows you to get to the conclusion you want, but only by saying that a particular organism, developing over a lifespan, interacting with an environment (including a social environment), conveniently packaged inside its skin, easily distinguished from its environment... is purely illusion, and that reality is that this is an infinite set of completely different cyborg#s at each time and each place (time and place, of course, considered separately, for whatever reason).

You may assume axiomatically that this Mercutio is a natural object, an organism with an extended existence and interaction with its environment (as I assume), or you may assume axiomatically that this Mercutio is an infinite set of unrelated objects, the perceived relationship among which is purely illusionary and a hard problem to explain. What you may not do, is assert that your axiomatic assumptions are reality instead of assumption.

I'm still waiting for you to explain to me why this situation is so vastly different in character in space than it is in time. Thus far I get:
If you would prefer that I lie to you, you will have to ask me specifically to do so.

Thus far you've pretty much boiled down what an "I" is down to some sort of identifiable location that isn't the rest of the universe which is affected by the rest of the universe.Well, actually, it is part of the universe. "The skin isn't all that important as a boundary", as Skinner put it. The universe is a vast place... and part of it is inside your skin. That does not mean that the part inside your skin is subject to different rules, though; private stimuli and behaviors are subject to the same scientific analyses as any other stimuli or behaviors.

And yes, the complete "I" is a fuzzy set. As I tell my students, there is not complete definition of me that does not include them in some fashion. They influence me, and I influence them; we are interdependent, and some definitions of me include tens of thousands of people. Other definitions of me include only what is in my skin. Other definitions exclude the vast majority of cells within my skin, and other definitions still more.

Your definition of me infers a me-er, a portion of my brain (at least you don't always say "mind") that somehow magically generates a feeling. My fuzzy set has one slight advantage--the members of that set actually exist.

[Mercutio]

You can involve drowning kittens if you like - I'll find it as irrelevant as ever.



An emotional reaction would likely be involved. It's irrelevant of course to the models at hand.

Would it matter if DaratA had repeated orgasms induced by going through the teleporter that no future Darat would ever experience no matter how many times he went through a teleporter?

Doesn't change the issue of how we deal with the notion of identification. As far as I'm concerned it's a branch - DaratB is as much a propagation of DaratA in space as he could have been in time. He is as legitimate a trajectory of energy through space and time.

Cause -> Effect. Darat0 causes DaratA. Darat0 causes DaratB.

As an aside, a similar ethical debate can be had over Propofol, or "Milk of Amnesia", as an anesthetic. Kinda neat, that such completely impossible thought problems can actually apply to very real problems in real life.

[Nick227]

OK. I had been reading it as different molecules => different instance of the Darant consciousness. Where the different consciousness was the important thing and we were only discussing molecules because they could be touched and measured. I may need to do a bit of rereading.

For me, I don't care whether my molecules are different, so long as my consciousness is the same. Clearly the molecules in my body change over time (at least some of them do). I don't think I would object to every atom in my body being substituited for identical ones one at a time. Would this not be the same molecular change your talking about, only done by degrees?

Well, personally, I'm unconcerned with the actual molecules. I don't have problem with taking the teletransporter. So, I figure "consciousness" has only two ingredients - your personal neurological orientation, and the environment you find yourself in.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Nope. My argument is that I just don't see any particularly legitimate reason for considering the entity at the exit any more or less a bona fide successor to the entity that first entered the machine.

And if we are going to talk about one as being the "same" self then we better talk about the other one as being the "same" self and deal with the paradox.

For those (I don't know whether that includes you) who consider the "pattern of thought" as the self--if we could replicate that pattern in a computer (think Rimmer on Red Dwarf), would that computer consciousness be "any more or less a bona fide successor to the entity that first entered the machine"?

[moon1969]

David Icke says that the world is a matrix. :D

[cyborg]

is purely illusion,

Yes. It's purely an illusion. Your problem with this exactly is what? As you have continually said there is no magic location of "I".

and that reality is that this is an infinite set of completely different cyborg#s at each time and each place (time and place, of course, considered separately, for whatever reason).

Err, careful with your adjectives there - at no point did I imply that there were "completely different" cyborgs - that would entail no relationship between them at all whereas we are entailing a very strong relationship indeed.

You may assume axiomatically that this Mercutio is a natural object, an organism with an extended existence and interaction with its environment (as I assume), or you may assume axiomatically that this Mercutio is an infinite set of unrelated objects, the perceived relationship among which is purely illusionary and a hard problem to explain.

The "hard problem to explain" part is a non-sequitur and the "unrelated objects" is a strawman of your devising. I've made the relations quite clear.

Not that I can see how the phrase, "extended existence and interaction with its environment," does anything more than label a set of transitions in context with the wider universe.

It's not a model you present: it's a description.

What you may not do, is assert that your axiomatic assumptions are reality instead of assumption.

So, where did I do that then?

Well, actually, it is part of the universe.

Yes, because my statement said: "the I isn't a part of the universe."

It's would be a lot easier to communicate if you would stop placing the arguments you want me to be making on top of me.

Your definition of me infers a me-er, a portion of my brain (at least you don't always say "mind") that somehow magically generates a feeling.

No it doesn't - not even slightly.

[cyborg]

For those (I don't know whether that includes you) who consider the "pattern of thought" as the self--if we could replicate that pattern in a computer (think Rimmer on Red Dwarf), would that computer consciousness be "any more or less a bona fide successor to the entity that first entered the machine"?

I don't see any reason why not.

[Nick227]

Um... take a breath, Nick.

Under my view, I see the trees, smell the flowers, hear the music, taste the wine, touch the baby's cheek, just like anyone else. The fact that all these neato experiences happen to be focused on this body which I also am able to feel, and which hurts when I bump it too hard or burn it (as opposed to the rest of the world, which I cannot feel pain in when I hit it), allows me to infer a self. The biological processes have been studied for over a century--there is still much to learn, no doubt, but there is much that has already been learned.

There is still much to learn about the biological processes which create apparent selfhood and apparent experiencing, no doubt about it. However, I submit, if you are from the materialist mindset, then you must reject the notion that experiencer-experience is a priori valid in the way that sensory phenomena are. Selfhood likewise. These experiential dualities must be simply the result of the brain's processing.

As I see it, you are examining selfhood and experience on a functional level, as these things relate to the whole organism. That's fair enough. But to do so in disregard of the underlying neurological reality I find very odd. I do not for a second dispute the validity of the behavioural position, as it relates to our day-to-day functioning as social beings. But I also accept the underlying reality that materialism points us towards - the body is a machine which creates selfhood and "experience" as aspects of its processing.

To cut to the chase, I think you should get in the teletransporter as I'm sure it's clear to you that nothing is actually being lost. I don't understand why you cling to a position which simply does not relate on the level to which the experiment applies.

Nick

[Nick227]

You can involve drowning kittens if you like - I'll find it as irrelevant as ever.



An emotional reaction would likely be involved. It's irrelevant of course to the models at hand.

Would it matter if DaratA had repeated orgasms induced by going through the teleporter that no future Darat would ever experience no matter how many times he went through a teleporter?

Doesn't change the issue of how we deal with the notion of identification. As far as I'm concerned it's a branch - DaratB is as much a propagation of DaratA in space as he could have been in time. He is as legitimate a trajectory of energy through space and time.

Cause -> Effect. Darat0 causes DaratA. Darat0 causes DaratB.

Oh dear, you've pre-empted Merc and Darat's "drowning kittens" scenario. I think they were saving that one for later.

Nick

[Jeff Corey]

[QUOTE=shuttlt;3964468]



You are right. Perhaps we are referring to two different concepts. I was referring to normal wakeful human consciousness with its attendant freedom of choice under normal circumstances...

There you go with your assumption of free will again. It forms no part of the definition of consciousness in radical behaviorism, and possibly some other viewpoints here.

[Nick227]

I do not take experience of selfhood as a given. I note sensation and perception, and suggest that the locus of sensation and perception in the behaving organism may well explain the inference of "self" as a persistent entity. This is consistent with our experience of self, and has the advantage of not being fictional.

You really need to start demonstrating that you understand my position in the first place, before you start pointing out areas where it "can do nothing".

I apologise if I am misrepresenting your position.

In your statement above do you also note that without the thoughts that made up the paragraph, there is no "I?" Without thinking or without identification with thinking there is no "I." It has ceased to be. This is how substantial this particular aspect of selfhood is.

Nick

[Mercutio]

I apologise if I am misrepresenting your position.

In your statement above do you also note that without the thoughts that made up the paragraph, there is no "I?" Without thinking or without identification with thinking there is no "I." It has ceased to be. This is how substantial this particular aspect of selfhood is.

Nick

Exactly. The "illusory I" is an inference made based on the thinking, sensing, feeling, etc. The thinking, sensing, feeling etc. are behaviors performed by the organism in its environmental context. It does not require a sense of self in order to think, feel, sense, etc.; it does, however, require an organism and a context. Change the context, change the thinking. Change the organism, change the thinking.

Since the "sense of self" is inferred, it cannot also be causal (that would be circular). But the organism itself, in its context, is responsible for thinking, sensing, feeling, etc., and the neurobiology and neurochemistry of this is better understood each day. The inferred self is an illusion, but organism as self is just fine.

It also makes no sense to speak of "storage"--experience changes the organism, it does not change something that is stored in the organism. The storage metaphor is misleading; for instance, we do not retrieve stored memories, we recreate events, using portions of the same neural areas that originally were active in processing the environmental stimuli. Once again, a whole organism approach simply makes sense.

[Nick227]

Exactly. The "illusory I" is an inference made based on the thinking, sensing, feeling, etc. The thinking, sensing, feeling etc. are behaviors performed by the organism in its environmental context. It does not require a sense of self in order to think, feel, sense, etc.; it does, however, require an organism and a context. Change the context, change the thinking. Change the organism, change the thinking.

I would say that it is not only an inference, which to me implies a conscious assumption, but also an unconsciously-mediated state of identification.

In fact, I would be inclined to dispute that there is any real inference, as to me that implies that this illusory "I" has capacity to be causal, to invoke action. This is where I consider your behavioural theory falls flat. It is a rationalisation which implies causal capacity to that which does not even exist!

You are not examining thinking and feelings and making assumptions. This is not what is happening. It is simply an unconsciously-mediated state of identification which simultaneously creates a conscious rationalisation.


Since the "sense of self" is inferred, it cannot also be causal (that would be circular). But the organism itself, in its context, is responsible for thinking, sensing, feeling, etc., and the neurobiology and neurochemistry of this is better understood each day. The inferred self is an illusion, but organism as self is just fine.

Er, it's fine until you start to infer it has choice, which to me you are doing here.

Nick

[Radrook]

[QUOTE=Radrook;3968337]

Not your fault, but my explanation was clearly not up to snuff. In my defense I don't think it is possible to define these terms. The best we can do is circle round and round saying yes but not quite. At the risk of digressing, this reminds me of trying to translate an email into German using BabelFish. I ended up writing it and rewriting it until BabelFish could translate it from English to German and back into English while keeping the sense intact.

It certainly isn't easy to pin down. Maybe we are simply the sum of our parts. How self aware can a person be if he for example he is totally deprived of can't sight, tactile sensations, ability to hear, taste, or smell? If indeed self awareness is altered when these are missing, then it seems they must enter significantly into the self awareness equation.




As an example of where I would disagree with your summary of my viewpoint... I wouldn't have said that an altered-state-of-consciousness actually alters Consciousness. I'd have said it alters perception, memory, reasoning, etc... Lost in the posts above I said something along the lines of what I mean by Consciousness has no external consequences. By external I mean outside of the Conscious entities experience of itself.


Isn't a person experiencing himself differently while under the influence of drugs? If indeed we define consciousness as experiencing ourselves then the conclusion that an altered self experience is an alteration of consciousness seems inevitable. Or am I missing something?

Another point of divergence with what you said is freedom of choice. What is doing the choosing? I don't see that I am any more or less free to choose after drinking my grandads rubbing alcohol than I am now.

I guess that would depend on how we define the term "free" There are patients who are considered not capable of making their own decisions. So the decision has to be made by someone else. Haven't they lost their freedom to choose?


Again, my reasoning, perception and memory are all altered... but in either case my actions come down through a bunch of neurons sitting in a chemical soup. Where is the free will? I know there is indeterminacy at the quantom level, but free will always seems to me like an assumption.

All asumptions have a premise. The premise for the free will assumption is the follwoing:

Ability to choose among many possibilities using reasoning faculties constitutes human free will.


In normal humans the choosing is preceded by an intellectual and emotionally-oriented evaluation of pros and cons. Correct? If so then freedom of choice would be either enhanced or diminished with the altering of the quality intellect and emotion via drug usage. In short free will is in the ability to choose or not choose among diverse courses of action. Lack of free will is the inability to choose or not choose from among a diversity of possible actions.

[Jeff Corey]

In normal humans the choosing is preceded by an intellectual and emotionally-oriented evaluation of pros and cons. Correct? ...

No.

[Mercutio]

I would say that it is not only an inference, which to me implies a conscious assumption, but also an unconsciously-mediated state of identification.
To you. You'd be wrong, though.

In fact, I would be inclined to dispute that there is any real inference, as to me that implies that this illusory "I" has capacity to be causal, to invoke action. This is where I consider your behavioural theory falls flat. It is a rationalisation which implies causal capacity to that which does not even exist!
Do you consider the thermostat to be causal? How many times have I said that behavior is a function of the environmental antecedents and consequences? How many times have I chastised someone in this thread for asserting a causal consciousness? You really must work at distorting my meaning, to get what you just did out of my post.

You are not examining thinking and feelings and making assumptions. This is not what is happening. It is simply an unconsciously-mediated state of identification which simultaneously creates a conscious rationalisation.
And I did not say that that was what was happening. Also, your "unconsciously-mediated" could just as easily (I would say much more easily) imply a causal unconscious.

Er, it's fine until you start to infer it has choice, which to me you are doing here.

NickIt does make choices. Any time there are two or more possible behaviors, organisms choose among those choices. The trick is, they do not do so freely. Behavior Analysts make their living examining the contingencies of reinforcement and punishment that determine why an organism will choose one option over the other.

From Ambrose Bierce's Devil's Dictionary:
DECIDE, v.i. To succumb to the preponderance of one set of influences over another set.

A leaf was riven from a tree,
"I mean to fall to earth," said he.

The west wind, rising, made him veer.
"Eastward," said he, "I now shall steer."

The east wind rose with greater force.
Said he: "'Twere wise to change my course."

With equal power they contend.
He said: "My judgment I suspend."

Down died the winds; the leaf, elate,
Cried: "I've decided to fall straight."

"First thoughts are best?" That's not the moral;
Just choose your own and we'll not quarrel.

Howe'er your choice may chance to fall,
You'll have no hand in it at all.
—G. J.

[Mercutio]

No.

On the other hand, we are really really good at making up reasons after the fact!

[shuttlt]

Radbrook,

>How self aware can a person be if he for example he is totally deprived of can't sight..
I still don't think we mean the same thing by consciousness, but anyway... your question. On one level, I don't know. People 'deprived of can't sight, tactile sensations, ability to hear, taste, or smell' tell very few tales. How do we know they aren't? What kind of mind they'd have I've no idea. They'd certainly lack the language to form any 'thoughts'.

>If indeed self awareness is altered when these are missing, then it seems they must enter significantly into the self awareness equation.
If I put on dark glasses the sun appears to change, if I get drunk my consciousness appears to change. For me the problem is that with all of these things we a mucking with

>I guess that would depend on how we define the term "free" There are patients who are considered not capable of making their own decisions. So the decision has to be made by someone else. Haven't they lost their freedom to choose?

It depends at what level you answer the question. It makes no sense to run a society on the basis that there is no free will - I'm pretty sure even if we were all to agree there was no free will, it would still make pragmatic sense to act as if that wasn't the case.

>All asumptions have a premise. The premise for the free will assumption is the follwoing:
>Ability to choose among many possibilities using reasoning faculties constitutes human free will.
The funny thing is, I agree with your premise, but I don't think I'm understanding it the same as you. You probably need to define what you mean by 'choose'. I don't see in what sense one is really choosing if the process of choosing comes down to physical processes. Does a uranium atom 'choose' when to decay?

[articulett]

On the other hand, we are really really good at making up reasons after the fact!


Indeed. --and telling ourselves that these post hoc reasons we confabulate on the spot are the real reasons for deciding whatever we decided.

The human brain appears to invent reasons on the spot when asked why a specific decision was made. We often are unaware of why we do what we do, but we sure are good at inventing reasoning as needed when asked about it. We often do what "feels" right... and then rationalize, if confronted or questioned.

I think this is one of the most interesting topics coming out of neurology in recent years.

[shuttlt]

Sorry, I meant to finish that thought.

>If indeed self awareness is altered when these are missing, then it seems they must enter significantly into the self awareness equation.
If I put on dark glasses the sun appears to change, if I get drunk my consciousness appears to change. For me the problem is that we are unquestionably mucking about with the tools we are using to observer the object in question, as well as posibly mucking about with the object itself.

[Jeff Corey]

...
It does make choices. Any time there are two or more possible behaviors, organisms choose among those choices. The trick is, they do not do so freely. Behavior Analysts make their living examining the contingencies of reinforcement and punishment that determine why an organism will choose one option over the other...[/I]:

For example, rats, pigeons or people with presented with a Multiple VI 20- VI 40 schedule. The rats and pigeons will match rates of behavior to ratios of reinforcement, as will people. People will make up reasons for it.

[articulett]

For example, rats, pigeons or people with presented with a Multiple VI 20- VI 40 schedule. The rats and pigeons will match rates of behavior to ratios of reinforcement, as will people. People will make up reasons for it.

When asked, the brain will confabulate a reason on the spot giving us the illusion that we are always making logical and "thoughtful" decisions... when most of the time we probably don't have a strong degree of awareness as to what is in influencing our decisions.

If you give someone a stimulant or a "dopamine burst" without them being aware of it while they are engaged in an activity, they will think of the activity as more exciting than it was...

The human brain appears to have evolved to "deceive" it's owners in some very particular ways.

I wonder what an animal perceives as it makes choices... the cat decides it wants to go out... but maybe not... maybe it just wants to see if it can get you to open the door... etc.
Why did the dog decide to curl up in the spot it chose... why does one dog always sleep at my feet--the other near my head? As you note, animals clearly make choices-- but they don't have this second layer--the narrator which weaves their choices into this narrative of the story they tell themselves about themselves. It's hypothesized that it's our narrator self-- our use of language and drama (and empathy) which gives rise to this idea that we are separate from brains. This turns out to be a fabulous way to transmit information and form social communities, but it makes us vulnerable to those who manipulate using this illusion of a "soul".

[Radrook]

I still don't think we mean the same thing by consciousness, but anyway... your question. On one level, I don't know. People 'deprived of sight, tactile sensations, ability to hear, taste, or smell' tell very few tales. How do we know they aren't? What kind of mind they'd have I've no idea. They'd certainly lack the language to form any 'thoughts'.

Since awareness of the self depends on sensations, then it would seem to follow that tampering with the sensations would tamper with self awareness. Actually, the total deprivation of sensation is death-or unconsciousness. Or lack of being conscious of self due to total sensory deprivation.

If I put on dark glasses the sun appears to change, if I get drunk my consciousness appears to change. For me the problem is that with all of these things we a mucking with....about with the tools we are using to observer the object in question, as well as possibly mucking about with the object itself

We don't observe consciousness with sight, hearing, taste smell,
touch, We perceive consciousness as a compendium or sum-total of all these things. We are conscious that we are conscious because we receive feedback via neural impulses from all these faculties. We can delve on this because we are able to reason. Remove reasoning ability and our awareness or appreciation of our own awareness would disappear. That's why animals don't worry about past present or future. It would require human awareness coupled with reasoning for that to be possible.

So it might very well be that our awareness of self is a byproduct of our ability to reason. That is, ability to give reasons for our behavior. Reasons for what we observe. Reasons for what we experience. This ceaseless reasoning could very well be awareness itself.



It depends at what level you answer the question. It makes no sense to run a society on the basis that there is no free will - I'm pretty sure even if we were all to agree there was no free will, it would still make pragmatic sense to act as if that wasn't the case.

You chose to respond to my post. You could have chosen otherwise. No?


The funny thing is, I agree with your premise, but I don't think I'm understanding it the same as you. You probably need to define what you mean by 'choose'. I don't see in what sense one is really choosing if the process of choosing comes down to physical processes. Does a uranium atom 'choose' when to decay?

A Uranium atom isn't conscious, can't reason, weigh pros and cons. It's merely undergoing a decaying process of which it itself is unaware.

[Mark Felt]

You chose to respond to my post. You could have chosen otherwise. No?

No. The chance that he responded to your post is 100%.

[shuttlt]

No. The chance that he responded to your post is 100%.
The only lack of determinacy comes in at the quantum level, hence in my view, my decision to post, or not to post differs only from the decay of a uranium atom regards choice in regard to the post-hoc rationalization.

Radrook, I think perhaps what I mean by Consciousness is closer to what you mean by self, than self-awareness.

[Nick227]

To you. You'd be wrong, though.
Do you consider the thermostat to be causal? How many times have I said that behavior is a function of the environmental antecedents and consequences? How many times have I chastised someone in this thread for asserting a causal consciousness? You really must work at distorting my meaning, to get what you just did out of my post.
And I did not say that that was what was happening. Also, your "unconsciously-mediated" could just as easily (I would say much more easily) imply a causal unconscious.
It does make choices. Any time there are two or more possible behaviors, organisms choose among those choices. The trick is, they do not do so freely. Behavior Analysts make their living examining the contingencies of reinforcement and punishment that determine why an organism will choose one option over the other.

The organism is processing data. On a base materialistic level this is all that is happening. You repeatedly take everything back to the level of the organism's functionality as an individual whole, which to me would be fair enough in many debates, but with regard to the teletransporter I simply do not see how it is useful.

I still don't see why you won't get in the teletransporter. It appears to me that you are so wrapped up in your behavioural theory that you are not able to see that it does not usefully apply in all scenarios. Because it is useful and valid to consider the organism as a functioning self immersed in a social environment so you seem to have persuaded yourself that this model of selfhood is actually empirically valid at any level of examination. So you attempt to apply it to the teletransporter experiment and end up convincing yourself you are going to die if you travel this way. At some point, well maybe eventually, you have to grasp that what is a valid way to perceive reality at one level is not necessarily valid at another.

Nick

[Nick227]

Indeed. --and telling ourselves that these post hoc reasons we confabulate on the spot are the real reasons for deciding whatever we decided.

The human brain appears to invent reasons on the spot when asked why a specific decision was made. We often are unaware of why we do what we do, but we sure are good at inventing reasoning as needed when asked about it. We often do what "feels" right... and then rationalize, if confronted or questioned.


Merc's behavioural model of self is an excellent example of this.

Nick

[Nick227]

When asked, the brain will confabulate a reason on the spot giving us the illusion that we are always making logical and "thoughtful" decisions... when most of the time we probably don't have a strong degree of awareness as to what is in influencing our decisions.

If you give someone a stimulant or a "dopamine burst" without them being aware of it while they are engaged in an activity, they will think of the activity as more exciting than it was...

The human brain appears to have evolved to "deceive" it's owners in some very particular ways.

Creating the notion of there being an "owner" being one of its most cunning!

Nick

[Dancing David]

And there in lies the problem. It seems to me that Consciousness is the 'I' that experiences the thinking that therefore it is.

I find it easier to think of it as the aggregate of brain processes. The 'I' of perception or cognition is like the lamp flame, a transitional and fleeting state of being. It exists , yes, as do the thoughts and perceptions. But the philosophical baggage associated with it is tremendous.

If you substitute the word 'coffee maker' for many things that people say about 'consciousness' then the baggage becomes more apparent.

I struggle to understand how one could doubt that Consciousness exists, though that is my failing as a very great many people clearly share your views.

I do not doubt that what people call 'consciousness' is a common perception, but it is like an 'orchestra' or a 'flock of birds' it has more meaning as an abstracted concept which performs as a placeholder to denote a unity of processes that exists as a language convention. the perceptions, thoughts, emotions, memories, associations and habits exist. But there is a rubric of conflation when people refer to the Consciousness. That is about the same as referring to the United Nations. An abstracted convention of language.

The funny thing is I used to argue just as you do, I just can't now see how I could think that way.

I came the other way. perceptions exist, they are very real to the person who has them, but they are a model of reality produced from the sensations. there are times where they have a very high validity, there are times where it is less or absent.



Anyway, since you don't believe that Consciousness in the sense that I mean it exists, and Consciousness in the sense I mean it is my only objection to stepping in a teleporter, then we may have hit on why we don't agree on whether DaratA and DaratB are 'the same'. What I think is 'dies' in the teleporter, you don't think existed to begin with.

I don't agree for very abstracted and picky points of description.

the two are the same at the moment of that the copy is made and after that they immediately diverge. In one sense the temporaly/spatial translocated lamp is 'like' the lamp in the first state.

But in another they are not the 'same'. Either the flame (processes), the lamp (the organism) or the room (environment) are very different.

As I said these are very abstracted and concrete points of difference. the organism DaratA is exactly the same as DaratB at the point of the copy. But if DaratA continues to exist and DaratB continues to exist they will immediately diverge and be 'different'.

So too DaratA(*) at the moment of the copy is not the DaratA right before the copy of right after the copy.

[Dancing David]

For example, rats, pigeons or people with presented with a Multiple VI 20- VI 40 schedule. The rats and pigeons will match rates of behavior to ratios of reinforcement, as will people. People will make up reasons for it.

:thunder: But *I* am not a rat or pigeon *I* have free will! :thunder:

Or at least the illusion of it!

;)

[articulett]

Creating the notion of there being an "owner" being one of its most cunning!

Nick

I think most people understand what I meant... we are humans that possess a brain that give rise to our consciousness. I'm not sure anyone is really following you, however.

No, I don't believe in the "collective consciousness" that people channel or whatever hodgepodge of quantum woo you babble on about. I think time machines are silly analogies oft used by those trying to prove what is, in essence, duality (though I know you insist that it's not.). I think Dancing David's explanation to Shuttit was good.

Neuorscientists have an increasing understanding of consciousness, and you could gain from what we are learning if you didn't have this need to prove that you already understand more than everyone else on the topic. Instead of abstract time machine scenarios, we have real life people and real life tests and data collected over years of people with varying degrees of brain damage and perception altered by external stimuli.

BTW, you got rid of your Rajneesh quote--how come? Too woo?

[Nick227]

I think most people understand what I meant... we are humans that possess a brain that give rise to our consciousness. I'm not sure anyone is really following you, however.

Hi articulett,

I wasn't having a go at you, merely remarking on this term "owner." We all use this type of terminology in everyday communication but that doesn't give it any empiric validity.

It often amuses me to see "wannabe materialists" on this forum and elsewhere deride various god-botherers for their belief in the "soul," whilst merrily demonstrating their own belief in equally tentative entities.

No, I don't believe in the "collective consciousness" that people channel or whatever hodgepodge of quantum woo you babble on about. I think time machines are silly analogies oft used by those trying to prove what is, in essence, duality (though I know you insist that it's not.). I think Dancing David's explanation to Shuttit was good.

Neuorscientists have an increasing understanding of consciousness, and you could gain from what we are learning if you didn't have this need to prove that you already understand more than everyone else on the topic. Instead of abstract time machine scenarios, we have real life people and real life tests and data collected over years of people with varying degrees of brain damage and perception altered by external stimuli.[

Well, I got the teletransporter scenario from Susan Blackmore, who I think got it from Derek Parfit. I don't know that they're regarded as being so woo, really. Would you consider Dan Dennett woo, for example?

Might I ask you, would you use the teletransporter?

BTW, you got rid of your Rajneesh quote--how come? Too woo?

Well, the Zorba one is pretty much Osho really. Look it up if you're interested. Good to see you've managed to complete a post without mentioning Tom Cruise, btw.

Nick

[articulett]

Hi articulett,

I wasn't having a go at you, merely remarking on this term "owner." We all use this type of terminology in everyday communication but that doesn't give it any empiric validity.

It often amuses me to see "wannabe materialists" on this forum and elsewhere deride various god-botherers for their belief in the "soul," whilst merrily demonstrating their own belief in equally tentative entities.



Well, I got the teletransporter scenario from Susan Blackmore, who I think got it from Derek Parfit. I don't know that they're regarded as being so woo, really. Would you consider Dan Dennett woo, for example?

Might I ask you, would you use the teletransporter?



Well, the Zorba one is pretty much Osho really. Look it up if you're interested. Good to see you've managed to complete a post without mentioning Tom Cruise, btw.

Nick

I'm not a wannabe anything... I have no problems understanding Blackmore or Dennett. I don't know who Parfit is. I don't see you as capable of engaging in a successful dialogue with anyone... including those I can read and understand readily (Mercutio for example). Moreover, you talk down to people who understand the topic of consciousness and talk about it much better than you. I don't care about the teletransporter. And I think you are a woo. I don't talk to woo because I think they post here to build up their own delusions in their heads. It's just that you commented on something I posted in response to others.

I will put you on ignore so you can concentrate your verbiage on addressing those who still "believe in" your capacity to engage in dialogue and/or those who can make sense of your self-aggrandizing nonsense. I don't fit either of those categories. I prefer to skip through the "commercials" and read those who have something valuable to add to my understanding, as my time is valuable to me.

And, for the record... let me add that your verbiage is on par with the Tom Cruise's Scientology video in regards to clarity, delusion, arrogance, nothingness. If you've heard it once, you've gotten a good feel for almost everything that comes from Nick. Per my opinion of course. :p

Stay on topic and be civil. Thank you.

[Nick227]

I'm not a wannabe anything... I have no problems understanding Blackmore or Dennett. I don't know who Parfit is.

So....would you get in the teletransporter or not? Here's the actual question from Blackmore's course...

"Exercise 4. The teletransporter

Imagine a box with a big button which, when you press it, can transport you anywhere you want to go – and back again. When it does so it reads all the information from every cell in your body, destroying them in the process and rebuilding them exactly the same at the destination.

Would you go? Do not quibble over safety or any other details. This is, after all, a thought experiment, so we are not constrained by reality. The box is 100% safe and reliable. If you won’t go in, this has to be for some other reason than that it might go wrong."

I hope you're not another one of these lurkers who will not commit either way!

Nick

[shuttlt]

Dancing David, I wonder whether we don't have equally consitent views of consciousness that make identical predictions in terms of everything that can be measured, or observed externally.

[shuttlt]

Dancing David, I wonder whether we don't have equally consitent views of consciousness that make identical predictions in terms of everything that can be measured, or observed externally.

>the two are the same at the moment of that the copy is made and after
>that they immediately diverge
If by the 'same' you mean 'identical', I agree.

>But in another they are not the 'same'. Either the flame (processes), the
>lamp (the organism) or the room (environment) are very different.
My take on this would be that they differ in two ways, first that they are different instances, second that the environment, or whatever are different. My objection is on the basis of them being different instances. So long as it's the same instance, I'm not so bothered about the odd change (depending on the change of course).

>but it is like an 'orchestra' or a 'flock of birds'...
This is an assumption that I'm not entirely comfortable with, but I'm not sure that I can offer anything better. Where as all of the properties of an orchestra or a flock are clearly the result of combining the properties of the players, or the birds I am not convinced that that is the case with consciousness. Equally, if you are right, then to some degree matter/energy etc contains all the properties of consciousness. I don't seriously doubt this last point. I still think this leaves the question of whether it is the same, or a different instance.

[articulett]

Not really, shuttit. Music is created via instruments, transmitted through the air, received by ears and perceived by brains...but that doesn't really mean that matter/energy contains all the same properties of music, does it? I'd say, this is true of consciousness too.

[shuttlt]

Not really, shuttit. Music is created via instruments, transmitted through the air, received by ears and perceived by brains...but that doesn't really mean that matter/energy contains all the same properties of music, does it. I'd say, this is true of consciousness too.

I though you might say that. Post Hoc one can see where all the properties of an orchestra come from given the properties of the musicians. It's not as if they turn lead into gold.

Instruments are made of matter that can store potential energy in their strings etc... I don't see, given enough time I couldn't explain the whole thing on the level of matter and energy.

[Nick227]

I though you might say that. Post Hoc one can see where all the properties of an orchestra come from given the properties of the musicians. It's not as if they turn lead into gold.

Instruments are made of matter that can store potential energy in their strings etc... I don't see, given enough time I couldn't explain the whole thing on the level of matter and energy.

I think it was back in the 1800s that a famous philosopher stated that it would be impossible to easily recreate the effect of an orchestra. How could you recreate all these idiosyncratic individuals playing individual instruments together? Surely it would be totally impossible? A few years later someone invented the gramophone!

In like manner, I believe that when you really get down to it consciousness will be found to be not as complex as it can seem. The brain makes things seem complex. It's just a machine processing data at the end of the day. It creates a sense of selfhood. The passing of thought creates a sense of "I." This is simply observable. A concept that has bogged down philosophy for centuries can now be pretty much uncovered. How it comes to actually create consciousness itself, as in actual phenomenology, is still unsolven, but I think this too will come.

I think the real main hurdle is the actual personal "taking on board" of the likely underlying reality of the situation. This reality will inevitably be extremely counter-intuitive. The machine has managed to convince itself so effectively of the truth of certain delusional propositions that it frequently does not want understanding if that means it has to give up its intuitive notions of what it is. This is why I like the teletransporter experiment. It gets in there behind the mask of materialism some researchers like to present to the world. What's your position on it, btw?

Nick

[rocketdodger]

So it might very well be that our awareness of self is a byproduct of our ability to reason. That is, ability to give reasons for our behavior. Reasons for what we observe. Reasons for what we experience. This ceaseless reasoning could very well be awareness itself.


*applause*

[shuttlt]

>What's your position on it, btw?
I wouldn't use the teleporter.

[Nick227]

>What's your position on it, btw?
I wouldn't use the teleporter.

Why's that?

Nick

[Nick227]

So it might very well be that our awareness of self is a byproduct of our ability to reason. That is, ability to give reasons for our behavior. Reasons for what we observe. Reasons for what we experience. This ceaseless reasoning could very well be awareness itself.


*applause*

I think the organism learns to regard the narratives of thought as reflecting "itself" through a dopaminergic process. It thus "feels good" to construct this aspect of selfhood. Identifying with the near-constant thought narratives creates this sense of "I" as an apparent centre constantly being referred to.

Thus the dualistic nature of self, that of an experiencer having experiences, is manufactured and simultaneously reconciled preventing disaffection or psychosis. Logically there is no reason why an organism would not regard the narratives of thought as third-person material but biologically it could be unhealthy to do so, and so evolution has taught the organism to identify by making the process pleasureable.

Nick

[Jeff Corey]

I think the organism learns to regard the narratives of thought as reflecting "itself" through a dopaminergic process. It thus "feels good" to construct this aspect of selfhood...


You think?Don't be silly. Everybody knows that the endorphins do that.

[rocketdodger]

Logically there is no reason why an organism would not regard the narratives of thought as third-person material


Except for the fact that an organism's experiences arrive in the first person...

[Nick227]

Except for the fact that an organism's experiences arrive in the first person...

The organism is not actually experiencing.

It is simply processing data. It constructs selfhood as a part of this processing and thus the duality of being an experiencer having an experience. Experience is thus not a priori real in the sense that materiality is. There is no actual third or first person, this is mere construction. It seems to me to be driven to do this - to identify with the narratives of thought and regard them as reflecting "itself" - simply through a neurobiological reward system a la dopamine, which is mediated out of conscious awareness. Because it is not aware of the process, it simply comes to believe it has an "I" and behaves accordingly. Without this process, and other processes which create other aspects of selfhood, it could not even regard itself as a separate entity.

The organism does not actually have selfhood. It merely learns to act as though it does.

Nick

[Nick227]

You think?Don't be silly. Everybody knows that the endorphins do that.

Well, endorphins create identification with thought.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

The organism is not actually experiencing.

It is simply processing data. It constructs selfhood as a part of this processing and thus the duality of being an experiencer having an experience. Experience is thus not a priori real in the sense that materiality is.

I find it curious that you are lecturing me on this position, of which I (and a few others here) were the original proponents. And, incidentally, you were vehemently opposed to. Have you decided that we are probably correct?

There is no actual third or first person, this is mere construction.

This does not follow.

The organism does not actually have selfhood. It merely learns to act as though it does.

This only follows if your definition of selfhood is some kind of immaterial babblygook.

On the other hand, it is perfectly acceptable (at least to materialists like me) to define selfhood in terms of information processing and behavior -- in which case, the organism really does have it.

[articulett]

How about some Steven Pinker and Dawkins for a quick dash of coherence on the subject.

8LE4uu49SU8

[westprog]

The organism is not actually experiencing.

It is simply processing data. It constructs selfhood as a part of this processing and thus the duality of being an experiencer having an experience. Experience is thus not a priori real in the sense that materiality is. There is no actual third or first person, this is mere construction. It seems to me to be driven to do this - to identify with the narratives of thought and regard them as reflecting "itself" - simply through a neurobiological reward system a la dopamine, which is mediated out of conscious awareness. Because it is not aware of the process, it simply comes to believe it has an "I" and behaves accordingly. Without this process, and other processes which create other aspects of selfhood, it could not even regard itself as a separate entity.

The organism does not actually have selfhood. It merely learns to act as though it does.


I find it odd that I am expected to discard direct evidence - that I exist, that I experience events, and that I have a real selfhood. I would want some very solid evidence to demonstrate that "selfhood" is impossible.

In order to demonstrate this, it's not sufficient to express a philosophical position and claim that selfhood is incompatible with such a position. Since the existence of selfhood is part of the experience we have of the world, we should be choosing our philosophical positions based on our experience, not discarding the experience we don't care for in order to suit our philosophy.

I don't find the fact that physics has nothing to say about subjective experience as necessarily meaning that such experience isn't real. It simply means that the theory isn't there yet. It may never be.

I also can't accept that selfhood/awareness is a macro phenomenon, simply arising from small scale processes. The comparision given was with running. We don't expect to be able to analyse "running" at a macro scale and see lots of little legs moving around at an atomic level.

But I see awareness as being sufficiently unique as a phenomenon that it is more comparable to magnetism, say - where the existence of a magnet on a macro scale required an explanation on the micro level.

But such an explanation cannot be simple the assertion that tiny mechanisms possess tiny quanta of consciousness, and that by combining them together, we would be able to create something with an identical awareness to ourselves. That is not science, that is assertion. Claiming "awareness" for a thermostat doesn't explain anything about the thermostat, on a macro or micro level. It's a rhetorical trick to pretend that awareness is something we understand, when we clearly don't.

I also don't accept that awareness is a private behaviour. It isn't, as far as I can tell, a behaviour at all. Even in the absence of any form of free will - even if human behaviour is entirely deterministic - I am still observing what is going on. It is the observer who needs explaining.

I continue to maintain, therefore, that consciousness is still the hard problem. We don't know how it arises, or what it is. I also believe that if the problem is soluble, and if it is solved, it will be solved as most of the big problems are, by the physicists, rather than philosophers, biologists, behaviourists, psychologists or neurologists.

It follows from this that I won't be going near that machine. Assertions based on fundamental ignorance don't seem, to me, to be a sound basis for allowing myself to be disintegrated.

I also realise that this is merely a summary of what I've said already, and what I'm likely to say in the future. The thread has divided into a number of mutually incompatible positions, and I don't see anyone giving way. The best we can hope for is to state positions as clearly as we can.

MercA:

http://www.visimag.com/movieidols/images/m32_feat01.jpg




MercB

http://cache01-videos02.myspacecdn.com/5/thumb1_a7f846f443e1f9dab341cf83e1652e0c.jpg

MercC

http://www.madbeast.com/images/100_shakespeare/100_Mercutio_Gielgud.jpg

[Belz...]

In the malfunction scenario, it is obvious (and uncontroversial) that DaratA and DaratB are two distinct people. This is because, if at any point DaratA and DaratB both exist simultaneously, they are no longer exact copies.

I didn't mention any time period following the copy itself. Assume we freeze time at the very moment DaratB is completed, and DaratA is frozen in time at the moment of the scanning. They are identical, and impossible to distinguish apart from their location. If they can't be distinguished in principle, does that make them one person ?

[cyborg]

If they can't be distinguished in principle, does that make them one person ?

As I said previously:

ONLY IF YOU CAN'T COUNT.

[Belz...]

Your dualistic belief that Belz...'s awareness would magically continue inside AlterBelz... is funny, at best.

Define awareness. Your usage here sounds acutely dualistic to me.

If you are not interested in debating this issue seriously then I have nothing else to say to you.

[Belz...]

As I said previously:

ONLY IF YOU CAN'T COUNT.

Excellent. Now, assuming the machine DOESN'T malfunction and we have only DaratB. Is he the same person as DaratA, now ? And, if so, why ? What's the difference ?

[Belz...]

cyborgA progresses nowhere - cyborgA undergoes a state change. cyborgB is the progression of cyborgA. cyborgA is a transitory element.

There is such a thing as being too objective.

I don't think for a second that there would be a continuity of awareness between Belz... and AlterBelz.... AlterBelz... wouldn't notice the difference, and nobody else would, either. However, Belz...'s awareness would be destroyed along with the organism. Why in the blue hell would I want that to happen ? If it did, I couldn't see those very fun movies that are coming out in the years to come! Why should AlterBelz... have all the fun ?

[Dancing David]

Dancing David, I wonder whether we don't have equally consitent views of consciousness that make identical predictions in terms of everything that can be measured, or observed externally.

>the two are the same at the moment of that the copy is made and after
>that they immediately diverge
If by the 'same' you mean 'identical', I agree.

>But in another they are not the 'same'. Either the flame (processes), the
>lamp (the organism) or the room (environment) are very different.
My take on this would be that they differ in two ways, first that they are different instances, second that the environment, or whatever are different. My objection is on the basis of them being different instances. So long as it's the same instance, I'm not so bothered about the odd change (depending on the change of course).

Again I have noted I am drawing a fine point.

There are lelevls of measurement or sameness.

The flame is absolutely not the same, it is drawn from different oil, different molecules. It burns differentialy in that respect no matter what.

Two rooms can not be identical, except in a thought experiement. There will always be differences in the rooms.

Even the exact placement of the lamp and the burning of the flame, convection, breezes will alter the burning of the flame.

So to draw my too fine a point.

The events are 'similar' but they are not the 'same'.


>but it is like an 'orchestra' or a 'flock of birds'...
This is an assumption that I'm not entirely comfortable with, but I'm not sure that I can offer anything better. Where as all of the properties of an orchestra or a flock are clearly the result of combining the properties of the players, or the birds I am not convinced that that is the case with consciousness. Equally, if you are right, then to some degree matter/energy etc contains all the properties of consciousness. I don't seriously doubt this last point. I still think this leaves the question of whether it is the same, or a different instance.

Matter exhibits all the properties we define as conscious?

[Dancing David]

On the other hand, it is perfectly acceptable (at least to materialists like me) to define selfhood in terms of information processing and behavior -- in which case, the organism really does have it.

Behavior is all that there is.

P-zombies of the world, Unite!

:D

[Belz...]

There is still much to learn about the biological processes which create apparent selfhood and apparent experiencing, no doubt about it. However, I submit, if you are from the materialist mindset, then you must reject the notion that experiencer-experience is a priori valid in the way that sensory phenomena are. Selfhood likewise. These experiential dualities must be simply the result of the brain's processing.

What if your assumptions are wrong ? What is selfhood and experiencing are not "apparent" or are not simply the result of brain processing ?

[lupus_in_fabula]

I find it odd that I am expected to discard direct evidence - that I exist, that I experience events, and that I have a real selfhood. I would want some very solid evidence to demonstrate that "selfhood" is impossible.

In order to demonstrate this, it's not sufficient to express a philosophical position and claim that selfhood is incompatible with such a position. Since the existence of selfhood is part of the experience we have of the world, we should be choosing our philosophical positions based on our experience, not discarding the experience we don't care for in order to suit our philosophy.

Well, we can manipulate the sensation of ”I” in many ways; general anaesthesia or psychotropic drugs for example; by being totally engulfed in a activity; by meditation etc. The sensation of self is a sensation among many other sensations, that’s how far evidence seems to suggest, not much more.

Heck, it’s not even sure that everyone senses “I” in the same way. For instance Jill Bolte Taylor (a brain scientist) explains how her brain stroke completely shattered her previous sense of self, so that no boundaries between here body and the surrounding could be experienced. Did the “I” somehow disappear during her stroke – where did it go? Or was it just that those particular processes creating the sensation of “I” weren’t happening or registering during the stroke (which seems to suggest no fictional entity in the first place)?

[skiba]

I don't think for a second that there would be a continuity of awareness between Belz... and AlterBelz.... AlterBelz... wouldn't notice the difference, and nobody else would, either. However, Belz...'s awareness would be destroyed along with the organism. Why in the blue hell would I want that to happen ? If it did, I couldn't see those very fun movies that are coming out in the years to come! Why should AlterBelz... have all the fun ?


The brain creates an illusion of continuity of self(psychological "I"). The Belz 2 seconds ago is "dead" now, because it exists only as an on going process. It is no different if you just sit there or take a ride on the teleporter, the same processes will continue to re-create the "I". This is what is meant by "theres no persisting self", it is re-created continuously.

The more I read your posts, the more it seems your a closet dualist.

[lupus_in_fabula]

The brain creates an illusion of continuity of self(psychological "I"). The Belz 2 seconds ago is "dead" now, because it exists only as an on going process. It is no different if you just sit there or take a ride on the teleporter, the same processes will continue to re-create the "I". This is what is meant by "theres no persisting self", it is re-created continuously.

The more I read your posts, the more it seems your a closet dualist.

On one level you should be right; a new re-creation of the illusion of a continuous self should take place in AlterBelz, and AlterBelz might think he’s the original. But that’s just from a narrow perspective by which we make a more or less arbitrary distinction between an organism and its environment.

Why should we ascribe to this framework, where the boundary seems to be the area of an organism’s skin? What if we could see every atom in our body and around us: where would the boundary be now; would it make it more difficult to make such a distinction?

The whole teletransporter scenario seems to require a quite narrow set of distinguishable elements we treat as entities in their own right. If there’s no way of making a meaningful distinction between an organism and its environment (in one way the organism is the environment), the whole teletransporter scenario makes lesser sense. The whole intent for the scenario – weeding out hidden dualistic beliefs – falls short.

We don’t know enough about what role the environment plays.

[westprog]

What if your assumptions are wrong ?


This is the one essential meta-question of the Hard Problem. Everything posted so far deals in assumptions. (I don't except myself from this).

[westprog]

Well, we can manipulate the sensation of ”I” in many ways; general anaesthesia or psychotropic drugs for example; by being totally engulfed in a activity; by meditation etc. The sensation of self is a sensation among many other sensations, that’s how far evidence seems to suggest, not much more.

Heck, it’s not even sure that everyone senses “I” in the same way. For instance Jill Bolte Taylor (a brain scientist) explains how her brain stroke completely shattered her previous sense of self, so that no boundaries between here body and the surrounding could be experienced. Did the “I” somehow disappear during her stroke – where did it go? Or was it just that those particular processes creating the sensation of “I” weren’t happening or registering during the stroke (which seems to suggest no fictional entity in the first place)?

I don't find it strange that something we presume to be created and maintained (largely) by the activities of the brain should be damaged or destroyed when the brain is damaged.

I think the fact that she had a sense of "I", and that she lost it when she suffered brain damage, doesn't imply that the sense of "I" is fictional, or unreal. If she'd been in a car crash and lost her legs, we wouldn't therefore presume that legs are a fictional entity. Indeed, the fact that she used to have legs and doesn't have them any more would tend to lead us to a presumption that legs are something real.

[westprog]

There is such a thing as being too objective.

I don't think for a second that there would be a continuity of awareness between Belz...

http://media.kcby.com/images/080314_Ledger_Joker.jpg
and AlterBelz....

http://content.answers.com/main/content/wp/en/6/65/Cesar_Romero_Joker.gif

[Jeff Corey]

http://polivox.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/jack-nicholson_joker.jpg

[lupus_in_fabula]

I don't find it strange that something we presume to be created and maintained (largely) by the activities of the brain should be damaged or destroyed when the brain is damaged.

I think the fact that she had a sense of "I", and that she lost it when she suffered brain damage, doesn't imply that the sense of "I" is fictional, or unreal. If she'd been in a car crash and lost her legs, we wouldn't therefore presume that legs are a fictional entity. Indeed, the fact that she used to have legs and doesn't have them any more would tend to lead us to a presumption that legs are something real.

Perhaps I misunderstood you and we’re talking slightly past each other. I don’t think it’s meaningful to say that the sensation of “I” is non existent. On the other hand, I’m not so sure how meaningful it is to infer it being more than a sensation, continuously being upheld by the organism. The organism could very well continue without such a sensation. There seems to be pauses from the sensation throughout the day, it’s just that when we think about stuff in relation to the organism, the sensation seems to always be present.

Maybe the arguments for or against the “I” being fictional is largely semantic? With the leg, we have something to point at, with the “I”, not so much. That’s probably why people refer to the “I” as fictional; as in existing only when there’s the sensation, otherwise it’s gone, until it’s there again :confused:.

[cyborg]

Why in the blue hell would I want that to happen ?

Why should you? Why should that matter to the question?

[cyborg]

Excellent. Now, assuming the machine DOESN'T malfunction and we have only DaratB. Is he the same person as DaratA, now ? And, if so, why ? What's the difference ?

Look, if you're going to keep switching the context of "person" from number to type then I can't really give you any consistent answers.

[shuttlt]

Why's that?

Nick
I won't use the teleporter because the chain of assumptions and reasonable, but unsupported claims is way too long. I don't know much, but I know that I'm not even close to knowing it is safe.

[shuttlt]

I've been thinking about our assumptions re-the teleporter and I'm not sure that I'm happy with them. We are asking a practical question about a potentially real thing (Consciousness) in relation to a teleporter that clearly could never be built.

For one thing, the teleporter as it stands takes zero time to make a copy, for another we keep saying that the copy is 'exact'. Are either of these plausible? The second of these bothers me most. Surely we can only actually copy, in the way we've been discussing, down until the Uncertainty Principle stops us. How are we taking this 'exact' copy. The best that I've managed to think of is some kind of teleporter based on quantum entaglement. In that case there would seem to be a non-zero period of time when both original and copy are the same. You couldn't download yourself to a computer with this teleporter though - so much for being imortal.

I would be somewhat more comfortable using a teleporter of the type described above.

[rocketdodger]

Behavior is all that there is.

P-zombies of the world, Unite!

:D

Ah, but can you find a way to define behavior that is not in some way equivalent to information processing?

Hence I think they are the same thing, just viewed in two different ways.

[Nick227]

I find it curious that you are lecturing me on this position, of which I (and a few others here) were the original proponents. And, incidentally, you were vehemently opposed to. Have you decided that we are probably correct?

Hi RD,

Care to link me to where you do that. I find you talk the talk of materialism but you seem to me not to really walk the walk, certainly not on a real reductionist level.

Apologies if I lectured you, but you did seem to me to be in some considerable confusion and using words like "experience" and "first person" as though they were a priori valid. You quoted me the following yesterday Material is simply that which can be mathematically described. Perhaps you'd care to apply this to these concepts of yours.


..................

On the other hand, it is perfectly acceptable (at least to materialists like me) to define selfhood in terms of information processing and behavior -- in which case, the organism really does have it.

Yes, it is valid. You can consider the organism a self-contained whole embedded within a social environment. It's a valid paradigm, no doubt about it. You can say that all the neurological and other processes which go on are aspects of its functioning. It's cool. But if you're into reductionist science then it's also cool to look beneath the bonnet I think. That's all I'm doing here.

Nick

[Belz...]

http://media.kcby.com/images/080314_Ledger_Joker.jpg


http://content.answers.com/main/content/wp/en/6/65/Cesar_Romero_Joker.gif

Crap. And things were going so well for me.

[Belz...]

The brain creates an illusion of continuity of self(psychological "I"). The Belz 2 seconds ago is "dead" now, because it exists only as an on going process. It is no different if you just sit there or take a ride on the teleporter, the same processes will continue to re-create the "I". This is what is meant by "theres no persisting self", it is re-created continuously.

Even were that true, which I suspect it is but, unlike you, cannot claim it, it still would be illogical to assume that this illusion of self in AlterBelz... will be the same as in Belz.... Therefore, Belz... is dead, "self" and all, and a new one takes his place. This is why I don't want to step into that damn contraption. Anyone else would neither notice nor mind, but I don't want Belz... to die.

The more I read your posts, the more it seems your a closet dualist.

The more I read your posts, the more it seems you don't read mine.

[Belz...]

Look, if you're going to keep switching the context of "person" from number to type then I can't really give you any consistent answers.

Evasion noted.

Basically, you guys are saying this:

1) If I take an apple, and copy it while desintegrating it, the copy IS the original. The one I used to make the copy and the copy are the same apple.

2) If I take an apple and copy it, I have two apples and they're not the same apple.

That is a contradiction. Either the copy is the same or it isn't. The fate of the original apple (or Belz... or DaratA or MercutioPrime) doesn't matter.

[Nick227]

I find it odd that I am expected to discard direct evidence - that I exist, that I experience events, and that I have a real selfhood. I would want some very solid evidence to demonstrate that "selfhood" is impossible.

I'm not telling you to discard them. I'm pointing out that if you look at the human brain as simply a data processor, and from a purely materialistic level, then you will see that these things are not a priori present. Selfhood, experiencer and experience are manufactured by the brain. They are thus not as real as, say, sensory information.

No one is experiencing. No one has ever experienced and no one ever will experience. There is in actuality no one even on the planet and there never has been nor will be. All that is happening is that machines are processing data and creating from that data the sensations and thoughts of selfhood. Imo if you take a real hard materialist stance then this is simple truth.

Nick

[Nick227]

What if your assumptions are wrong ? What is selfhood and experiencing are not "apparent" or are not simply the result of brain processing ?

Well, if I'm wrong I'm wrong. Simple as that. However, brain scientists have already tracked down several aspects of selfhood to specific brain functions, and the creation of "I" is experientially evident.

Nick

[Nick227]

The brain creates an illusion of continuity of self(psychological "I"). The Belz 2 seconds ago is "dead" now, because it exists only as an on going process. It is no different if you just sit there or take a ride on the teleporter, the same processes will continue to re-create the "I". This is what is meant by "theres no persisting self", it is re-created continuously.

The more I read your posts, the more it seems your a closet dualist.

Yup. There's a lot of it about, as Dennett and others have remarked. Talking the talk but not yet walking the walk. At least Belz has the honesty to actually put his position out and be challenged.

Nick

[Nick227]

On one level you should be right; a new re-creation of the illusion of a continuous self should take place in AlterBelz, and AlterBelz might think he’s the original. But that’s just from a narrow perspective by which we make a more or less arbitrary distinction between an organism and its environment.

Without certain neurological functions there would be no distinction.

Why should we ascribe to this framework, where the boundary seems to be the area of an organism’s skin? What if we could see every atom in our body and around us: where would the boundary be now; would it make it more difficult to make such a distinction?

The whole teletransporter scenario seems to require a quite narrow set of distinguishable elements we treat as entities in their own right. If there’s no way of making a meaningful distinction between an organism and its environment (in one way the organism is the environment), the whole teletransporter scenario makes lesser sense. The whole intent for the scenario – weeding out hidden dualistic beliefs – falls short.

We don’t know enough about what role the environment plays.

What difference does it make? Only if you ascribe some functional role to the actual molecules of your body is there anything which could be changed. At the point of replication everything is functionally identical.

Nick

[Nick227]

I won't use the teleporter because the chain of assumptions and reasonable, but unsupported claims is way too long. I don't know much, but I know that I'm not even close to knowing it is safe.

In Blackmore's version of the experiment you can't use this as a reason for not travelling. Just so you know.

Nick

[cyborg]

Evasion noted.

:rolleyes:

I have explained it before. It is really not my issue if you refuse to note the distinction.

[Nick227]

Ah, but can you find a way to define behavior that is not in some way equivalent to information processing?

Hence I think they are the same thing, just viewed in two different ways.

Behaviour requires an observer. There's a level of inherent duality. Organisms fundamentally are. Processors just process.

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

What difference does it make? Only if you ascribe some functional role to the actual molecules of your body is there anything which could be changed. At the point of replication everything is functionally identical.

Nick

It would expand the though experiment to whether it would be safe or not (as shuttit said). Blackmore’s original rules for the experiment seem to be insufficient in the sense that she simply won’t allow such considerations. If we ascribe to a broader view, it seems increasingly more problematic to distinguish an organism from the environment.

The whole assumption that “it would be 100% safe” doesn’t tell us much. What exactly is it that would be safe? How does one meaningfully weed out “my” body from anything else, without loosing a monist standpoint?

[Nick227]

It would expand the though experiment to whether it would be safe or not (as shuttit said). Blackmore’s original rules for the experiment seem to be insufficient in the sense that she simply won’t allow such considerations. If we ascribe to a broader view, it seems increasingly more problematic to distinguish an organism from the environment.

The whole assumption that “it would be 100% safe” doesn’t tell us much. What exactly is it that would be safe? How does one meaningfully weed out “my” body from anything else, without loosing a monist standpoint?

Well, I can't see that it would matter unless you ascribe some functional capacity to the actual molecules of your body that cannot be replicated. You have Body and Environment pre-teletransporter and Body and Environment post-teletransporter. The environment will be changed at least slightly, depending on where you put the destination pod, but how can this matter?

The organism distinguishes itself from its environment (validly if you're a behaviourist, or illusionarily if you're a hard monist or non-dualist) through specific neurological mechanisms. Those mechanisms will be replicated by the machine.

Thus, your personal capacity to consider this issue of '"my" body' will be replicated because it is reliant on brain function to occur, yet can happen in any environment. So LupusB will have the same questions!

Nick

[Jeff Corey]

Behaviour requires an observer...
Unicellular organisms behave. Do they require an observer?

[lupus_in_fabula]

The organism distinguishes itself from its environment (validly if you're a behaviourist, or illusionarily if you're a hard monist or non-dualist) through specific neurological mechanisms. Those mechanisms will be replicated by the machine.

Thus, your personal capacity to consider this issue of '"my" body' will be replicated because it is reliant on brain function to occur, yet can happen in any environment. So LupusB will have the same questions!

Nick

Oh I’m sure LupusB would have the same considerations. I don’t think that’s the interesting question thou. Our personal capacity to consider this issue of “my” body also includes capacity to question if a meaningful distinction between the ‘body’ and the ‘surrounding’ should be made in the first place. Sure, the organism seems to do it (very useful for everyday life), yet this organism also has the capacity to think such a distinction would ultimately be like a line drawn in water.

[Nick227]

Unicellular organisms behave. Do they require an observer?

Good question. Well, language ties things up a bit but for me behaviour definitely requires an observer, unicellular regardless.

Nick

[Nick227]

Oh I’m sure LupusB would have the same considerations. I don’t think that’s the interesting question thou. Our personal capacity to consider this issue of “my” body also includes capacity to question if a meaningful distinction between the ‘body’ and the ‘surrounding’ should be made in the first place. Sure, the organism seems to do it (very useful for everyday life), yet this organism also has the capacity to think such a distinction would ultimately be like a line drawn in water.

Yet this capacity of which you write is entirely reliant for its occurrence on systems enclosed within the body, unless you're questioning basic materialism. For sure it needs an environment to consider the boundaries of selfhood against, but pretty much any environment will do for this. Thus, it may consider all sorts of weird and wonderful things and InstanceB will continue to do so.

Nick

[westprog]

I'm not telling you to discard them. I'm pointing out that if you look at the human brain as simply a data processor, and from a purely materialistic level, then you will see that these things are not a priori present. Selfhood, experiencer and experience are manufactured by the brain. They are thus not as real as, say, sensory information.

No one is experiencing. No one has ever experienced and no one ever will experience. There is in actuality no one even on the planet and there never has been nor will be. All that is happening is that machines are processing data and creating from that data the sensations and thoughts of selfhood. Imo if you take a real hard materialist stance then this is simple truth.


I'm not claiming that my position is compatible with strict materialism. However, I think that the claim that experience does not exist is simple falsehood, and I'm confident that I am disproving it right this second.

[lupus_in_fabula]

Yet this capacity of which you write is entirely reliant for its occurrence on systems enclosed within the body, unless you're questioning basic materialism. For sure it needs an environment to consider the boundaries of selfhood against, but pretty much any environment will do for this. Thus, it may consider all sorts of weird and wonderful things and InstanceB will continue to do so.

Nick

But herein seems to be the problem where assumptions go unnoticed without being reflected upon. The most important being of course: “entirely reliant for its occurrence on systems enclosed within the body.” If we cannot be absolutely sure about the boundaries, then how do we know about this reliance you speak of?

Perhaps we know enough about the organism in order to be pretty confident it doesn’t make any difference at all, but let’s not pretend we know for sure. Especially since we speak about a though experiment that seems to slice away part of the environment (that’s already mind boggling) by the standards we have learned to rely on through our rudimentary senses.

[rocketdodger]

Hi RD,

Care to link me to where you do that. I find you talk the talk of materialism but you seem to me not to really walk the walk, certainly not on a real reductionist level.

You are either insane or else not the same Nick227 who participated in the first half of this thread.

I have made posts regarding the origin of consciousness in a material context on nearly every page of this thread up till about page 30 or so.

You have made just as many posts, back then, in favor of dualism or idealism. You don't remember any of this?

Apologies if I lectured you, but you did seem to me to be in some considerable confusion and using words like "experience" and "first person" as though they were a priori valid. You quoted me the following yesterday Material is simply that which can be mathematically described. Perhaps you'd care to apply this to these concepts of yours.

Again, you have obviously either forgotten the entire first half of this thread or else you are a different person posting under the same name.

Yes, it is valid. You can consider the organism a self-contained whole embedded within a social environment. It's a valid paradigm, no doubt about it. You can say that all the neurological and other processes which go on are aspects of its functioning. It's cool. But if you're into reductionist science then it's also cool to look beneath the bonnet I think. That's all I'm doing here.

Nick

Are you crazy? Of all the people on this thread, I have made the strongest claims about exactly how consciousness arises from simple mathematics. You actually argued with me about it! Remember my claim that our consciousness not only requires reasoning but in fact is nothing but reasoning, which you summarily rejected?

[Belz...]

Well, if I'm wrong I'm wrong. Simple as that. However, brain scientists have already tracked down several aspects of selfhood to specific brain functions, and the creation of "I" is experientially evident.

I have no problem with that, although I will sometimes react when someone makes an absolute claim about something we're not sure about, yet.

Yup. There's a lot of it about, as Dennett and others have remarked. Talking the talk but not yet walking the walk. At least Belz has the honesty to actually put his position out and be challenged.

Fine, insult me if you want. My position on the matter is clear. There is no soul. The thought experiment is worthless, anyway, because there is no way, even in principle, to determine if the copy's "self" is the same as the original's. I'm simply using the malfunction scenario to point out how inconsistent your claim is.

[Belz...]

:rolleyes:

I have explained it before. It is really not my issue if you refuse to note the distinction.

I seem to have missed it. Could you be bothered to explain it again ?

[Belz...]

Good question. Well, language ties things up a bit but for me behaviour definitely requires an observer, unicellular regardless.

Who sounds like a dualist, now ?

Without an observer, an amoeba has no behaviour ? Or did you mean something else ?

[Nick227]

I'm not claiming that my position is compatible with strict materialism. However, I think that the claim that experience does not exist is simple falsehood, and I'm confident that I am disproving it right this second.

It depends whether you are examining the human organism on a mechanical level or a functional one. On the latter level experience and selfhood clearly exist, or seem to.

Nick

[Nick227]

But herein seems to be the problem where assumptions go unnoticed without being reflected upon. The most important being of course: “entirely reliant for its occurrence on systems enclosed within the body.” If we cannot be absolutely sure about the boundaries, then how do we know about this reliance you speak of?

We don't. But to me the materialist perspective is that conscious perception arises as a result of processes enclosed within the body.

Perhaps we know enough about the organism in order to be pretty confident it doesn’t make any difference at all, but let’s not pretend we know for sure. Especially since we speak about a though experiment that seems to slice away part of the environment (that’s already mind boggling) by the standards we have learned to rely on through our rudimentary senses.

Well, one aspect of the experiment, according to Blackmore, is that it does root out certain of those who assert themselves materialist but who's core belief system seems to not reflect this. So, for this aspect at least, I would say the experiment is reasonably valid.

Nick

[Nick227]

Fine, insult me if you want. My position on the matter is clear. There is no soul. The thought experiment is worthless, anyway, because there is no way, even in principle, to determine if the copy's "self" is the same as the original's. I'm simply using the malfunction scenario to point out how inconsistent your claim is.

You say there is no soul, Belz. Fair enough. But then you still seem to believe that there is some special untransferable "awareness" or "consciousness" that will be lost in BelzB. This is what I mean by talking materialism but not walking it. I think you have to admit your position does look suspect.

Nick

[Nick227]

Who sounds like a dualist, now ?

Without an observer, an amoeba has no behaviour ? Or did you mean something else ?

Well, the case does sound different for a single-celled organism for sure. I can feel that myself. However, originally we were talking about humans and whilst it's fair enough perhaps to say that very simple organisms also have behaviour, personally I think it's more that we see them in the same way as more complex organisms.

Language anyway inevitably fails somewhat here. How to express what something simply is being with this dialectical tool? It's not always so easy.

To me I still consider behaviour considerably different from being.

Nick

[cyborg]

I seem to have missed it. Could you be bothered to explain it again ?

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=3969682#post3969682

[Jeff Corey]

Well, the case does sound different for a single-celled organism for sure. I can feel that myself. However, originally we were talking about humans and whilst it's fair enough perhaps to say that very simple organisms also have behaviour, personally I think it's more that we see them in the same way as more complex organisms.

Language anyway inevitably fails somewhat here. How to express what something simply is being with this dialectical tool? It's not always so easy.

To me I still consider behaviour considerably different from being.

Nick

How about paramecia? They're not single-celled and can be classically conditioned. They are about the size of this comma ->,

[Nick227]

You are either insane or else not the same Nick227 who participated in the first half of this thread.

Oh, you mean Nick227A?

I have made posts regarding the origin of consciousness in a material context on nearly every page of this thread up till about page 30 or so.

You have made just as many posts, back then, in favor of dualism or idealism. You don't remember any of this?

Again, you have obviously either forgotten the entire first half of this thread or else you are a different person posting under the same name.

Well, I change my position a bit through learning and also through just trying out different positions to see what happens. I've been getting more into materialism over the last few months. I've made posts in this thread commenting on Buddhist perspectives but I think that's about it on the idealist level. And then it was more just asides, if I recall.

Are you crazy? Of all the people on this thread, I have made the strongest claims about exactly how consciousness arises from simple mathematics. You actually argued with me about it! Remember my claim that our consciousness not only requires reasoning but in fact is nothing but reasoning, which you summarily rejected?

Well, you didn't provide much in terms of mechanistic explanation of how reasoning leads to consciousness, if I recall, and you also seemed to come out with some pretty odds things about self-awareness. That's what sticks in my memory. It certainly didn't seem to me that you were really very clear about it. I mean, the nature of language holds us up a bit but you still seemed to me then, and now, to be proceeding from some fairly major assumptions about the nature of selfhood. I could be wrong. Point me back to some earlier posts. Maybe I can learn something. Having said this I'm going to be away from the pc for a week or so but I would like to check it out later.

Nick

[Nick227]

How about paramecia? They're not single-celled and can be classically conditioned. They are about the size of this comma ->,

It still seems to me that the notion of "behaviour" requires human interpretation of the organism. On its own the organism simply is.

Nick

[Jeff Corey]

It still seems to me that the notion of "behaviour" requires human interpretation of the organism. On its own the organism simply is.

Nick

I'm positive that biologists and psychologists who study non-human animal behavior would disagree.

[Nick227]

I'm positive that biologists and psychologists who study non-human animal behavior would disagree.

It seems to me reasonable that one can consider that something is without human interpretation. Of course, I cannot prove this, though animals clearly react as though they are aware of other animals. However, to create "behaviour" you need human awareness and interpretation. No human observer = no behaviour.

Nick

[Jeff Corey]

It seems to me reasonable that one can consider that something is without human interpretation. Of course, I cannot prove this, though animals clearly react as though they are aware of other animals. However, to create "behaviour" you need human awareness and interpretation. No human observer = no behaviour.

Nick

It doesn't matter whether they are "aware of other animals" or not. What they do is called behavior, and "tree falling in the forest making no sound" reasoning strikes me as downright silly here.

[Nick227]

It doesn't matter whether they are "aware of other animals" or not. What they do is called behavior, and "tree falling in the forest making no sound" reasoning strikes me as downright silly here.

I don't think I'm making "tree falling" type reasoning. I'm not disputing that organisms "exist" without the need for observation. But "behaviour" is different here. It seems to me that to regard an organism's activity as "behavioiur" requires specifically human awareness. Thus I would say that the organism is only "behaving" if a human is observing it. If another animal is observing it then it is no longer behaving, because "behaving" is a human construct.

Like I say, I can't prove this, because I can't take human consciousness out of the picture. But this seems reasonable to me. To me materialism indicates that the organism exists regardless of observation. But in order for it to behave it must be observed by a human.

Nick

[skiba]

You say there is no soul, Belz. Fair enough. But then you still seem to believe that there is some special untransferable "awareness" or "consciousness" that will be lost in BelzB. This is what I mean by talking materialism but not walking it. I think you have to admit your position does look suspect.

Nick

This is what I've been trying to get out of Belz.

This is where the "materialism" becomes inconsistent, and the emotional reasoning starts.