The hard problem of consciousness

[Jeff Corey]

... Thus I would say that the organism is only "behaving" if a human is observing it. If another animal is observing it then it is no longer behaving, because "behaving" is a human construct...

Like "breathing"? Is that a human construct, too? If so, animals only breathe if there are humans observing. So no animals ever took a breath before humans evolved.

[Nick227]

This is what I've been trying to get out of Belz.

This is where the "materialism" becomes inconsistent, and the emotional reasoning starts.

It is quite an emotional process, I think, to really put yourself in the position of using the teletransporter. I mean, I have been quite getting into materialism recently but when I first put myself in there it was like "I'm going to die! I don't care about NickB because I won't be connected to NickB." But when I looked at it this was just a residual belief in persisting selfhood, which is bloody hard to substantiate as materialism. It's much clearer for me now that selfhood really is just a ongoing process which can be replicated.

Nick

[westprog]

Perhaps I misunderstood you and we’re talking slightly past each other.

I think that's inevitable with this subject. I try (without always succeeding) to avoid saying "you're wrong" because the person with whom I'm arguing may well have quite different views to what I'm assigning to him.

I don’t think it’s meaningful to say that the sensation of “I” is non existent. On the other hand, I’m not so sure how meaningful it is to infer it being more than a sensation, continuously being upheld by the organism. The organism could very well continue without such a sensation. There seems to be pauses from the sensation throughout the day, it’s just that when we think about stuff in relation to the organism, the sensation seems to always be present.

Maybe the arguments for or against the “I” being fictional is largely semantic? With the leg, we have something to point at, with the “I”, not so much. That’s probably why people refer to the “I” as fictional; as in existing only when there’s the sensation, otherwise it’s gone, until it’s there again :confused:.

It's the very existence of sensation which I'm interested in. It seems to me that to experience sensation necessarily implies an "I" - otherwise who is having the experiences? To that extent, I think Nick's reasoning is sound - though wrong.

[Nick227]

Like "breathing"? Is that a human construct, too? If so, animals only breathe if there are humans observing. So no animals ever took a breath before humans evolved.

No animals were considered as "breathing" until humans evolved. Of course they still drew breath. But "breathing" refers to a specific activity. Behaviour is entirely non-specific (assuming the organism is alive). It's purely a human construct.

Behaviourism is to me clearly a human science. Though when feeling a bit catty I have in the past questioned whether it's really a proper science!

Nick

[Nick227]

It's the very existence of sensation which I'm interested in. It seems to me that to experience sensation necessarily implies an "I" - otherwise who is having the experiences? To that extent, I think Nick's reasoning is sound - though wrong.

I would agree that to experience implies an experiencer. Though there are some who would claim that the former can exist without the latter, but not me. However I would dispute that you really experience "I" anyway. You can experience the body. You can have a sense of "other people." But I don't think you can have a sensation of "I." On an ontological level it begs the question "who then is sensing this "I?"" On a more experiential level it can be observed that any notion of "I" ceases when thoughts cease during normal consciousness. I would say that thinking narratives being identified with imply the existence of an "I" rather in the same way that coherent peripheral activity implies the existence of a centre.

Nick

[Jeff Corey]

...Behaviourism is to me clearly a human science. Though when feeling a bit catty I have in the past questioned whether it's really a proper science!

Nick
Maybe that's because you don't spell it correctly, the way Watson did.

[westprog]

I would agree that to experience implies an experiencer. Though there are some who would claim that the former can exist without the latter, but not me. However I would dispute that you really experience "I" anyway. You can experience the body. You can have a sense of "other people." But I don't think you can have a sensation of "I." On an ontological level it begs the question "who then is sensing this "I?"" On a more experiential level it can be observed that any notion of "I" ceases when thoughts cease during normal consciousness. I would say that thinking narratives being identified with imply the existence of an "I" rather in the same way that coherent peripheral activity implies the existence of a centre.

Nick


I'm not really concerned with the precise sensation of the existence of an "I". The "I" is implied by the existence of sensation. If sensation is happening, and there is not only sensation, but an apparent continuity of sensation, then that is sufficient to imply an "I".

A practical example of this is to stick a pin in one's own thumb, and compare the sensation with sticking a pin in someone else's thumb. The nature of the "I" will be quickly demonstrated.

[lupus_in_fabula]

It's the very existence of sensation which I'm interested in. It seems to me that to experience sensation necessarily implies an "I" - otherwise who is having the experiences? To that extent, I think Nick's reasoning is sound - though wrong.

It seems that language breaks down before we get to the nitty gritty about this issue. Eventually nouns have to be abandoned, but then it gets awfully difficult to communicate in a meaningful way.

Surely the “I” who’s experiencing is a process too, depending on other processes, and creating other processes etc. How else could that which we call “I” come to be if not by constructing it by the process we call thinking?

So, from an experiential perspective, the question seems to be: Is the “I” anything more that a particular but persistent thinking process? (Or a ‘thought’ if one prefers to use a noun).

[Belz...]

You say there is no soul, Belz. Fair enough. But then you still seem to believe that there is some special untransferable "awareness" or "consciousness" that will be lost in BelzB. This is what I mean by talking materialism but not walking it. I think you have to admit your position does look suspect.

What about you (tu quoque alert) ? You seem to think that your "awareness" or "consciousness" will be magically transfered to the new host, but that it wouldn't if the old host didn't die simultaneously. I think you have to admit that your position is suspect.

[Belz...]

I seem to have missed it. Could you be bothered to explain it again ?

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=3969682#post3969682

Er... that would be the post where you said I needed to read what you said.

Instead of dancing around, why don't you explain, clearly, what the difference is between the malfunctioning machine scenario and the functioning machine scenario at the time of copying ?

[Belz...]

I don't think I'm making "tree falling" type reasoning. I'm not disputing that organisms "exist" without the need for observation. But "behaviour" is different here. It seems to me that to regard an organism's activity as "behavioiur" requires specifically human awareness.

That makes no sense whatsoever.

This is where the "materialism" becomes inconsistent, and the emotional reasoning starts.

Something's fishy, here. I've asked four different people in this thread about my malfunction scenario, and I've received NO answer whatsoever. If any one of you bothered to give me your thoughts about it, we might actually make some progress. Who knows ?

[Dancing David]

Like "breathing"? Is that a human construct, too? If so, animals only breathe if there are humans observing. So no animals ever took a breath before humans evolved.

The master has spoken...

DONG!

I am sure the fact that no verbal label was applied to the physical act of inhalation will be asserted by Nick227.

[westprog]

It seems that language breaks down before we get to the nitty gritty about this issue. Eventually nouns have to be abandoned, but then it gets awfully difficult to communicate in a meaningful way.

Surely the “I” who’s experiencing is a process too, depending on other processes, and creating other processes etc. How else could that which we call “I” come to be if not by constructing it by the process we call thinking?

So, from an experiential perspective, the question seems to be: Is the “I” anything more that a particular but persistent thinking process? (Or a ‘thought’ if one prefers to use a noun).

The key difference is that as far as we can tell, only the "I" process is actually aware. All the other processes effect each other, but we don't see any awareness in them. (And the distinction between the "I" process and other process may be invalid anyway).

We could follow the "aware thermostat" model, and assign awareness to anything that appears to do similar things to the brain, but I see this as merely a way of avoiding the problem. We have no reason to ascribe awareness to anything that doesn't claim awareness. Rocks, thermostats and bacteria may or may not be aware. We have no way to tell until we realise what makes us aware.

We don't actually understand what it is about the thinking process that produces awareness. We don't know if it is purely a matter of data processing, or of interaction with the physical environment, or some form of quantum activity, or something else entirely. I think that if nothing else, this thread has demonstrated the absence of a consensus of any kind.

[rocketdodger]

Something's fishy, here. I've asked four different people in this thread about my malfunction scenario, and I've received NO answer whatsoever. If any one of you bothered to give me your thoughts about it, we might actually make some progress. Who knows ?

Ok Belz (and others) I have been doing alot of thinking and this is what I have come up with.

There is one way a copy teletransporter will certainly preserve consciousness.

First, copy a particle from me and place it at the destination. Immediately simulate that particle at the source, so that the rest of the particles in me don't notice that it is gone. Furthermore, immediately simulate all the rest of the particles at the destination, so that the lone copied particle doesn't notice any difference either. Finally, sync all simulated particles with their real counterparts at both the source and destination.

Thus, at any given instant, there are both real and simulated particles at both locations. Initially, the source is 100% real and the destination is 100% simulated. At completion, the source is 100% simulated and the destination is 100% real. At which point, the source simulation can be terminated without affecting the real consciousness at the destination.

Now, there is one problem that I can't seem to solve -- what happens when you reduce the duration to approach the limit of instantaneous? As long as the process takes some time, we are guaranteed a continuity between source and destination that will preserve consciousness. But what about if the process takes no time at all?

As best I can figure, it is simply impossible for the process to take no time at all, since instantaneous is simply a limit that our duration can approach but never reach. Am I wrong about this? If I am wrong, then what would it mean to copy something, simulate something, and then destroy the simulation, all instantaneously?

At any rate, even if we do reduce the duration to nothing, there is at least no possibility for the machine to malfunction such that a copy of me exists. If the machine malfunctions, I will simply exist in two places at once and each "me" will be continuous with pre-process "me" yet be different from each other, as in the multiverse interpretation (only here both of "me" are in the same universe).

[Darat]

rocketdodger - I think your idea fails because I don't think it makes sense to talk about a 1:1 simulation, a 1:1 simulation would still be a reproduction.

[Belz...]

Ok Belz (and others) I have been doing alot of thinking and this is what I have come up with.

There is one way a copy teletransporter will certainly preserve consciousness.

Your scenario makes, at the very least, a copy out of the original while transfering the original particles to their new location.

In any case, my question was specifically about this:

Nick, for instance, claims that MercA and MercB are the very same person. Not just identical: they are the same, because they cannot be distinguished. Somehow he forgets to take into account private behaviour, but that is my opinion.

But when asked about a teleporter which malfunctions, he says that MarcA and MercB are NOT the same person. What I want to know is why MercA and MercB are AND are not the same person, depending on whether the machine works or not.

[rocketdodger]

rocketdodger - I think your idea fails because I don't think it makes sense to talk about a 1:1 simulation, a 1:1 simulation would still be a reproduction.

Yes, which is why I stipulate that the simulation must be at the particle (or possibly neuron) level -- that way information flows both ways, rather than just from original --> reproduction, and in fact makes it improper to use the term "original" or "reproduction."

[rocketdodger]

Your scenario makes, at the very least, a copy out of the original while transfering the original particles to their new location.

No, because if the machine malfunctions, it must do so during a point in the process where both the source and destination are partially real and partially simulated. In effect, it takes a single person who was present at both locations at once and simply branches them into two different people. There is no "copy" made -- continuity is preserved!

In any case, my question was specifically about this:

Nick, for instance, claims that MercA and MercB are the very same person. Not just identical: they are the same, because they cannot be distinguished. Somehow he forgets to take into account private behaviour, but that is my opinion.

But when asked about a teleporter which malfunctions, he says that MarcA and MercB are NOT the same person. What I want to know is why MercA and MercB are AND are not the same person, depending on whether the machine works or not.

Right. And my point here is that some might argue that if you take a jake-style (that's my name) teleporter and reduce the duration to nothing, then it may up functioning like a normal copy-destroy teleporter. But if that is the case, then MercA and MercB are the same person when the machine works but different branches of the same person when it malfunctions. But although they are different brances, and hence different people, both of them are continuous with the original -- no copy was made.

I agree with you, though, that if they stipulate that the teleporter is "copy-destroy" then by definition the original consciousness must be destroyed...

[cyborg]

Er... that would be the post where you said I needed to read what you said.

Yes.

Instead of dancing around, why don't you explain, clearly, what the difference is between the malfunctioning machine scenario and the functioning machine scenario at the time of copying ?

In one the machine malfunctions and in the other the machine does not.

Otherwise I don't really get what is so difficult to grasp about the concept of a branch.

[rocketdodger]

Otherwise I don't really get what is so difficult to grasp about the concept of a branch.

So you are saying that MercB is merely a branch of MercA?

I don't see how you can get a branch from a copy rather than a continuation, though.

[cyborg]

So you are saying that MercB is merely a branch of MercA?

No. MercA and MercB are both branches of the previous Merc.

I don't see how you can get a branch from a copy rather than a continuation, though.

I don't see what the actual difference between a "continuation" and a "copy" is.

[rocketdodger]

No. MercA and MercB are both branches of the previous Merc.

Ok then you and I are in agreement there.


I don't see what the actual difference between a "continuation" and a "copy" is.

With a copy, there can be a period of time were both the original and copy are present in reality. With a continuation, there can be no such time.

That is why I was troubled (see my post just a little bit ago) about an instantaneous continuation -- because the delta time is zero, is such a thing the same as an instantaneous copy?

[Belz...]

Yes.

So you deliberately refused to answer the question. Nice.

In one the machine malfunctions and in the other the machine does not.

Otherwise I don't really get what is so difficult to grasp about the concept of a branch.

So you are still deliberately avoiding the question.

I find that odd. I usually find you easy to understand and rather agreeable in other threads. Is something wrong, here ?

I'm going to ask one last time, in case one of you guys decides to answer. Otherwise I'm just going to assume that nobody has an answer, and that your position is inconsistent.

Given the two scenarios:

A) The teleporter works perfectly. Belz... steps into the machine and is desintegrated, and AlterBelz... steps out of the other machine.

B) The teleporter malfunctions. Belz... steps into the machine and is not vapourised, and AlterBelz... steps out of the other machine.

It was said that in scenario A), AlterBelz... is the same person as Belz..., not just a copy of the same pattern, but the same person. So far, it was also said that, in scenario B), they are NOT the same person. I'd like to know what makes Belz... and AlterBelz... the same person in scenario A) but not in scenario B).

This shouldn't be too hard to answer, people.

My opinion, is that there IS no difference between the two scenarios. Belz... and AlterBelz... are NEVER the same person. They are identical copies of the same pattern, sure, and from the point of view of everybody, including AlterBelz..., they are the same person and there was never any change. Belz..., however, is dead, and his very point of view no longer exists. AlterBelz... has his own "awareness". This, I think, applies to all variants of the technology so far described.

[Belz...]

No, because if the machine malfunctions, it must do so during a point in the process where both the source and destination are partially real and partially simulated. In effect, it takes a single person who was present at both locations at once and simply branches them into two different people. There is no "copy" made -- continuity is preserved!

Er... but if the machine malfunctions at ANY point, the transfer isn't complete. You have MercutioA, with some parts replaced ("simulated", whatever), and MercutioB, essentially a small pool of goo made up of the original particles.

Personally I don't think the exact particles make any difference.

But if that is the case, then MercA and MercB are the same person when the machine works but different branches of the same person when it malfunctions.

Define "branch".

I agree with you, though, that if they stipulate that the teleporter is "copy-destroy" then by definition the original consciousness must be destroyed...

Well, at least I'm making some sense, then.

[lupus_in_fabula]

So you deliberately refused to answer the question. Nice.



So you are still deliberately avoiding the question.

I find that odd. I usually find you easy to understand and rather agreeable in other threads. Is something wrong, here ?

I'm going to ask one last time, in case one of you guys decides to answer. Otherwise I'm just going to assume that nobody has an answer, and that your position is inconsistent.

Given the two scenarios:

A) The teleporter works perfectly. Belz... steps into the machine and is desintegrated, and AlterBelz... steps out of the other machine.

B) The teleporter malfunctions. Belz... steps into the machine and is not vapourised, and AlterBelz... steps out of the other machine.

It was said that in scenario A), AlterBelz... is the same person as Belz..., not just a copy of the same pattern, but the same person. So far, it was also said that, in scenario B), they are NOT the same person. I'd like to know what makes Belz... and AlterBelz... the same person in scenario A) but not in scenario B).

This shouldn't be too hard to answer, people.

My opinion, is that there IS no difference between the two scenarios. Belz... and AlterBelz... are NEVER the same person. They are identical copies of the same pattern, sure, and from the point of view of everybody, including AlterBelz..., they are the same person and there was never any change. Belz..., however, is dead, and his very point of view no longer exists. AlterBelz... has his own "awareness". This, I think, applies to all variants of the technology so far described.

I’ve been thinking about this issue for a while too, and I’m also interested in how people answer this question.

I would say that, from a mechanical perspective, it might not make sense to ascribe ownership to awareness in the first place. Thus original Belz does not ‘own’ awareness; awareness is just a label attached to processes happening, although one of those processes is that Belz thinks he is aware and that that awareness must be something special from other beings. But this kind of thinking has not necessary any other truth value outside the mechanistic process that creates it. Thus, thinking “I’m aware” has no semantic value because it’s merely syntax; it’s just a process that creates thoughts of uniqueness, continuation and ownership.

Alluding to what Dancing David has said: the Belz who wrote the question does not have the same awareness as the Belz reading this post because Belz does not have any awareness in the first place (that would only be a linguistic construct, i.e. the map is not the territory), there are only processes that create the thinking “I’m aware.” But that’s nothing more than a dace of quarks which is changing all the time.

I find this to be somewhat weird and unsatisfying, but that’s the only answer I could come up with. It would be interesting to hear other voices about this curious issue. I think it’s unsatisfying because my answer kind of requires one to abandon use of normal language, thus abandoning concepts such as ‘there’s no awareness in the first place’. I also think I’m awfully close to meaningless blabber if I continue… :o

[Darat]

Not meaningless blabber but meaningful blabber. :)

I'm not too sure how much of the different views of this matter are just semantic or are because of different world-views?

I think it is quite clear that everyone agrees that in the malfunctioning scenarios we have two people (and I'm using people rather than "I"s or specific labels as DaratA and DaratB to try and remove any semantic issues).

I also think that everyone has agreed that at the instant of duplication the two people are (in principle) indistinguishable from each other - both to themselves and to outside observers (apart from their locations). If we separated the two people at this point they could both live a very happy life and in every sense are unique and individual people.

Now that I've used the word "people" can anyone explain to me how destroying one of the two people in the teleport experiment is not killing a person?

[skiba]

Alluding to what Dancing David has said: the Belz who wrote the question does not have the same awareness as the Belz reading this post because Belz does not have any awareness in the first place (that would only be a linguistic construct, i.e. the map is not the territory), there are only processes that create the thinking “I’m aware.” But that’s nothing more than a dace of quarks which is changing all the time.



Yes, exactly. To make it more clear we could teleport a computer that has similar consciousness as humans(assuming this kind of machine could be built). I'm sure most of us would agree that nobody in this scenario would die, only microchips are being vaporized. The computer might think otherwise, but we all know it is an illusion created by the processing.

Ofcourse it's no longer the "same". The reasoning "it's no longer me" comes up alot, but when there's no real "I" to begin with it makes no real difference.


Now that I've used the word "people" can anyone explain to me how destroying one of the two people in the teleport experiment is not killing a person?

Well it is killing a person, but not in the sense we usually use the word.
Because it makes no difference to the world and to the one teleported.
A is dead, he does not worry about it anymore, B might worry about it depending on hes/her definition and understanding of the "I".
If one sees it as a continuation of the same process that we call "I" then theres no problem. As I said earlier to Belz, the "I" is continuesly re-created, so there is no persisten self, only a process that makes the "I" seem as something substantial. (Similar to your "ran")
The process will continue to re-create the "I" wheter you sit there or take a ride on the teleporter.

[rocketdodger]

Er... but if the machine malfunctions at ANY point, the transfer isn't complete. You have MercutioA, with some parts replaced ("simulated", whatever), and MercutioB, essentially a small pool of goo made up of the original particles.

Well, yes, if it malfunctions as in simply shuts off (or any other strange malfunction, that could produce brundle-fly).

For the purpose of our discussion I meant malfunction as in "replace the simulated particles at source and destination with real ones, thereby producing two people."


Define "branch".

A continuation with the previous that is different from other continuations.

[cyborg]

So you deliberately refused to answer the question. Nice.

No, I answered the question. You refuse to accept the answer.

is the same person as Belz..., not just a copy of the same pattern, but the same person.

Under what definition of "same"?

Belz... and AlterBelz... are NEVER the same person..

What makes you the same person you were a minute ago? A second ago? A microsecond ago?

[cyborg]

That is why I was troubled (see my post just a little bit ago) about an instantaneous continuation -- because the delta time is zero, is such a thing the same as an instantaneous copy?

Your language is incomplete because there isn't anything else you can differentiate a "copy" and a "continuation" with - it is arbitrary what you call it.

[rocketdodger]

Your language is incomplete because there isn't anything else you can differentiate a "copy" and a "continuation" with - it is arbitrary what you call it.

Really? I think I was quite clear -- in a continuation, information moves both ways. In a copy, only one way.

When the backwards information is zero, then a continuation must be a copy (since information only moved one way even though it was allowed to move both ways). This much is obvious to me.

But, since by definition the information that can move across a time interval of zero is also zero, then a continuation and a copy become the same thing? That is what I am confused about.

[cyborg]

Really? I think I was quite clear -- in a continuation, information moves both ways. In a copy, only one way.

Looking back at your posts that is not clear at all.

[Belz...]

No, I answered the question. You refuse to accept the answer.

I what ? Come on, now. You said I didn't read your answer, then I asked for a link or for you to repeat it, then you linked to the post you said I didn't read your answer. How is that answering the question ? I still don't have a clue what you said that I supposedly didn't read or accept.

Under what definition of "same"?

As in "two electrons are identical but not the same electron" ?

What makes you the same person you were a minute ago? A second ago? A microsecond ago?

Why don't you answer my questions about the malfunctioning scenario, then. Maybe we can agree on something.

[westprog]

Yes, exactly. To make it more clear we could teleport a computer that has similar consciousness as humans(assuming this kind of machine could be built). I'm sure most of us would agree that nobody in this scenario would die, only microchips are being vaporized. The computer might think otherwise, but we all know it is an illusion created by the processing.

Ofcourse it's no longer the "same". The reasoning "it's no longer me" comes up alot, but when there's no real "I" to begin with it makes no real difference.



Well it is killing a person, but not in the sense we usually use the word.
Because it makes no difference to the world and to the one teleported.
A is dead, he does not worry about it anymore, B might worry about it depending on hes/her definition and understanding of the "I".
If one sees it as a continuation of the same process that we call "I" then theres no problem. As I said earlier to Belz, the "I" is continuesly re-created, so there is no persisten self, only a process that makes the "I" seem as something substantial. (Similar to your "ran")
The process will continue to re-create the "I" wheter you sit there or take a ride on the teleporter.

Clearly it makes a considerable difference to the world.

If we kill A, he can't go home to his wife and children, and go in to work the next day. The fact that he has a similar counterpart in Japan has nothing to do with it.

Even if A is a computer, we either have a working computer, or a pile of junk.

[cyborg]

I still don't have a clue what you said that I supposedly didn't read or accept.

If I were to split you by mitosis then either the resulting individuals can be said to be completely unrelated or you can't say that one or the other is somehow a more legitimate sucessor. Hence, cyborgA and cyborgB are both cyborg or neither are.

As in "two electrons are identical but not the same electron" ?

Then we're back to being able to count.

Why don't you answer my questions about the malfunctioning scenario, then. Maybe we can agree on something.

There's nothing more to answer.

[Belz...]

If I were to split you by mitosis then either the resulting individuals can be said to be completely unrelated or you can't say that one or the other is somehow a more legitimate sucessor. Hence, cyborgA and cyborgB are both cyborg or neither are.

Yeah because inheritance has everything to do with sameness.

Then we're back to being able to count.

1 Electron + 1 Electron = 2 Electrons. Remove the first and you still have the first ? That makes no sense to me.

There's nothing more to answer.

Indeed. You either can't keep track of the conversation or you are just bad at expressing yourself. Either way, I'm done here. I'm tired of asking for clarifications and getting nothing out of you.

[Dancing David]

Um, poor sentient computer, I protest!

How about if we stop the *I* language and switch to *ME*.

Me dies in the teleporter. (Not Blackmore's the vaporizer one.)

[cyborg]

Yeah because inheritance has everything to do with sameness.

Well yes it does actually.

1 Electron + 1 Electron = 2 Electrons. Remove the first and you still have the first ? That makes no sense to me.

That makes no sense to me either.

[Mercutio]

Dumb question--I thought of this while observing a particular individual on 7th Avenue in New York City two days ago.... If I were to replicate her in Susan Blackmore's machine, would she still have the same boobs? The same cheekbones? The same lips? None of them are purely human--in the case of some of her parts, there is more silicone than there is flesh. Does she come out of the machine as a double-D, or as an A?

(This may seem flippant, but it is actually very key to the argument. Blackmore's machine, de facto, defines the human being as what is replicated. It is a bit of a cheat, to claim that X matters and Y does not, but I will, for present purposes, give her that. I argue that this momentary replication is no more "the person" than any given frame of a movie is "the movie"; there is no meaningful "storage" of the earlier frames of the movie in any frame, nor any necessary connection to the later scenes.)

[westprog]

A problem with the experiment is that it assumes that it doesn't matter where you are. (This has been pointed out several times).

Let's assume that the experiment involves a couple of rival companies sending volunteers on a one-way journey to a colony on the far side of the galaxy. Once the volunteers depart, there will be no communication with them, ever. The sending machines are huge and expensive, and nobody can ever return once sent.

Conditions on the colony are harsh, but there's the prospect of creating a wonderful new world at some time in the future. An idealistic young woman decides, in spite of having a happy and fullfilling life at home, to volunteer the special expertise that only she has, to help the colony.

Her parents decide to check out the two options. At the first place, a young man explains the principle of the device. When their daughter is scanned, a perfect duplicate appears on the other side of the galaxy. She will be able to go to work in the confidence that she is helping humanity. But she will not be disintegrated, and as far as she is concerned, she can just walk home, and continue her life with her fiancé, family and friends.

Then they go to the second company. A slightly more anxious and jumpy young man explains the principles of the second machine. It works in exactly the same way as the other. "Then, when your daughter has been scanned and sent to Omicron VII, this guy" he gestures to a burly man sitting quietly in the corner "whacks the redundant copy on the head with a baseball bat, and we throw it out back." The parents show some distress at this. "I think you have a very confused idea of selfhood" the young man says. "There would be no purpose in keeping the second copy. She wants to serve on Omicron VII, and we can send her there."

Which option are the parents likely to recommend to their daughter?

[Nick227]

What about you (tu quoque alert) ? You seem to think that your "awareness" or "consciousness" will be magically transfered to the new host, but that it wouldn't if the old host didn't die simultaneously. I think you have to admit that your position is suspect.

HI Belz,

What actually is there that needs transferring? All that is experienced (apparently experienced) is a result of the body's replicable processes interacting with their environment. No magic is needed because imo there is nothing magical about awareness or consciousness.

Nick

[Nick227]

It seems that language breaks down before we get to the nitty gritty about this issue. Eventually nouns have to be abandoned, but then it gets awfully difficult to communicate in a meaningful way.

Surely the “I” who’s experiencing is a process too, depending on other processes, and creating other processes etc. How else could that which we call “I” come to be if not by constructing it by the process we call thinking?

So, from an experiential perspective, the question seems to be: Is the “I” anything more that a particular but persistent thinking process? (Or a ‘thought’ if one prefers to use a noun).

The "I" is a thinking process, yes. I like Dennett's notion of I being a "centre of narrative gravity." He seems to hold pretty firm to the behaviourist notion of it being entirely the legitimate and necessary result of neurological and social processing, which is fair enough. Though, as you seem to me to intimate above, there is another path which could be taken. For if one considers "I" (and other aspects of selfhood) as simply the result of neurological function, as the materialist perspective imo certainly does, then to me this can lead to the question - is materialism itself really valid without this neurological process? Does it survive? Without this ability to divide my phenomenological world into I/not I and my/not my, what becomes of objectivity? And if objectivity struggles without this neurological function, then does tlop really survive? Does materialism itself continue to hold water? It seems kind of odd that a whole worldview should seem to rely on a couple of neurological processes to have legitimacy, but I can't seem to conclude other than that this is so.

Nick

[Nick227]

Dumb question--I thought of this while observing a particular individual on 7th Avenue in New York City two days ago.... If I were to replicate her in Susan Blackmore's machine, would she still have the same boobs? The same cheekbones? The same lips? None of them are purely human--in the case of some of her parts, there is more silicone than there is flesh. Does she come out of the machine as a double-D, or as an A?

(This may seem flippant, but it is actually very key to the argument. Blackmore's machine, de facto, defines the human being as what is replicated. It is a bit of a cheat, to claim that X matters and Y does not, but I will, for present purposes, give her that. I argue that this momentary replication is no more "the person" than any given frame of a movie is "the movie"; there is no meaningful "storage" of the earlier frames of the movie in any frame, nor any necessary connection to the later scenes.)

If you argue that "this momentary replication is no more the person than any given frame of a movie", then fair enough. But then there is nothing that could be captured that is the person. As I see it, assuming the machine functions correctly, then personB is a completely legitimate trajectory in space and time of personA. In fact if it is personA's intention to travel in this way then I would say that personB is in some ways a more legitimate trajectory of personA than personA would be in the event that he or she survives the teleporter through malfunction. Before you ask, this doesn't mean I'm advocating killing them!

Nick