The hard problem of consciousness

[skiba]

If you contrast the brain here with a computer, you will see that the computer simply processes information. It does not identify with the information and start to imagine it has an "I." Likewise, I submit, the brain simply processes information. But, in constrast to the computer, there seems to also be a subsidiary function running in the brain that is monitoring the impressions being stored. This monitoring takes the form of thinking and the action of identification with these thoughts creates the sensation of there being an actual "I" who is experiencing them. Thus the sensation of duality (experiencer-experience) is created from a monist reality.



Doesn't this imply again a form of dualism when we say "Something is identifying with thought / processing?

[Nick227]

Doesn't this imply again a form of dualism when we say "Something is identifying with thought / processing?

It does. I try and choose my words carefully, but it can be hard here. For sure, no one and no-thing is identifying. But there is identification taking place and the side-effect of this is that the sensation of "I" arises. Thus a simple processing machine comes to imagine it has selfhood. Quite a clever trick really.

Nick

[Nick227]

I'm not having a personal go at you, I'm just pointing out that there is an innate level of implicit duality in the way we self-conceptualise and communicate.

Assuming for a moment that I grant you this, what's your point ?

My point is that, if you're not aware of this, it's easy to cross over into believing that there actually is an "I" somewhere who is doing all the stuff the body and brain do. Even philosophers and scientists are by no means immune to this. Descartes for example was fooled. Many "consciousness" researchers even these days can reel off all kinds of high-faluting complex flapdoodle, but actually have never even challenged the most basic premises from which they start their formulations.

If you contrast the brain here with a computer, you will see that the computer simply processes information. It does not identify with the information and start to imagine it has an "I."

How would you know, since you can't know its mind ?

Because a computer is not programmed to artificially create a sense of selfhood. If you simply sit and observe the workings of your own mind, you can see it doing it.

Likewise, I submit, the brain simply processes information. But, in constrast to the computer, there seems to also be a subsidiary function running in the brain that is monitoring the impressions being stored. This monitoring takes the form of thinking and the action of identification with these thoughts creates the sensation of there being an actual "I" who is experiencing them. Thus the sensation of duality (experiencer-experience) is created from a monist reality.

That's a fine set of words, but what does it mean ?

I'm trying to suggest a means by which a processing machine, such as the human brain, can, with a little ancilliary processing, come to create for itself the belief that it is "I."

Nick

[skiba]

For sure, no one and no-thing is identifying.



Yes. I think this needs to be made clear. It's no one and no-thing.

And this is exactly what makes it a hard problem.
If it's a "no-thing" how can we logically understand it? logic is only concerned with "things"

[nescafe]

How does this affect subjectivity and the HPC, do you think?

Nick
We are predisposed by evolution to think in terms of self/other (for reasons which I have already outlined), and that makes it really easy for us to see such dualisms where they are not useful, applicable, or even meaningful. It is the same sort of overeager pattern-matching and pattern-explanation that makes us see constellations, faces on Mars, shapes in clouds, coincidences, etc. and then try to attribute meaning to those found patterns. Our brain does this automatically, and it is not always what we would consider "rational" in doing so.

Subjectivity has been very useful to us in the past (in the whole not getting eaten/getting enough to eat/sowing your seed/protecting your offspring sense), but extending it until you get to the HPC is overextending the concept, and using reason to support the HPC is using reason to support an unreasoned (or unquestioned) intuition. Humans are very good at that, it seems.

[nescafe]

And this is exactly what makes it a hard problem.
If it's a "no-thing" how can we logically understand it? logic is only concerned with "things"

The HPC is a hard problem for us, right now, in the same way black body radiation was a Hard Problem for 19th century physics (read up on the Ultraviolet Catastrophe if you don't already know about it). In both cases, key facts are/were missing.

Logic is all well and good, but logic can only tell you what conclusions are consistent with the premises, and if your pool of premises is not complete enough, you will reach conclusions that, although consistent, are absurd and do not reflect reality. I consider the HPC to be one of those -- a chain of reasoning that, although consistent, is absurd, and the only reason it is consistent is because we are reasoning from inadequate premises.

[lupus_in_fabula]

There is a difference between saying "I did it" and saying "my body did it"; the second is dualistic language, but the first need not be. "I made up my mind", or "my body knows better than I do" are clearly dualistic, but "I decided to do X" does not create a controller/controlled relationship of separate parts of your body.

In stating "I did it" is there not a sense of someone who is doing? Where actually is this someone, as it is sensed, when speaking? To me, it clearly suggests a someone who, when sought, cannot be found.

What I find interesting in this whole identification-with-thinking business is how such identification arises in the first place. I don’t think it’s enough to simply presuppose there being a ‘sense of someone who is doing’ (having identification as the point of departure for understanding this); we must also try to explain how that kind of sensing forms. Thus, I suppose we’re back at language acquisition and use, where we learn to pragmatically use nouns in stead of verbs, hence creating a platform where dualism can thrive.

I don’t know if Alan Watts were correct, but I remember him presenting an example where the Amerindian Nootka used a language only consisting of verbs and adverbs. It would be interesting to know how much of a difference such context could have on presupposed dualism in everyday life.

[westprog]

So if you see a ghost, the ghost exists ?


The only judgement I can make as to whether the ghost exists or not is based on the effect it has on my conscious mind.

I tend to believe that when someone "sees" a ghost, they are seeing non-paranormal phenomena which they misinterpret. But the only way that I can form that conclusion is by what passes through my consciousness.

[westprog]

It does. I try and choose my words carefully, but it can be hard here. For sure, no one and no-thing is identifying. But there is identification taking place and the side-effect of this is that the sensation of "I" arises. Thus a simple processing machine comes to imagine it has selfhood. Quite a clever trick really.


To me, a machine imagining that it has selfhood, and actually having selfhood, are exactly the same thing. I can't see how there is any difference between them. If something is capable of imagining something about itself, then it already has the selfhood.

A non-conscious machine cannot imagine anything, or be decieved. If the language of "I" carries connotations, then so do the terms which have been used on this thread to explain away consciousness through the side door. They end up with a circular argument that doesn't actually explain anything.

An answer to how a human being becomes conscious will probably look very like the answer to how a machine imagines that it is conscious. It's the same, very hard, question.

[westprog]

Logic is all well and good, but logic can only tell you what conclusions are consistent with the premises, and if your pool of premises is not complete enough, you will reach conclusions that, although consistent, are absurd and do not reflect reality. I consider the HPC to be one of those -- a chain of reasoning that, although consistent, is absurd, and the only reason it is consistent is because we are reasoning from inadequate premises.


I think that the only correct answer to the HPC is that we don't know enough yet to form any definite conclusions.

[lupus_in_fabula]

The only judgement I can make as to whether the ghost exists or not is based on the effect it has on my conscious mind.

How do you know there’s a conscious mind that is affected? How do you make a separation between the ‘effect’ and what you call “your conscious mind”?

[Nick227]

Yes. I think this needs to be made clear. It's no one and no-thing.

And this is exactly what makes it a hard problem.
If it's a "no-thing" how can we logically understand it? logic is only concerned with "things"

I wouldn't be quite so hasty personally. Maybe "no-thing" was a bit over-the-top here. I meant only that no separate entity was doing it. There could be a biochemical reward associated with acting upon thought. Dopamine comes to mind, though I'm no expert on these things. Thus an organism could start to create a sense of selfhood through acting on thoughts because it learns that doing so makes it feel good. Not unlike lab rats learning to press levers for food.

Nick

[Nick227]

To me, a machine imagining that it has selfhood, and actually having selfhood, are exactly the same thing. I can't see how there is any difference between them. If something is capable of imagining something about itself, then it already has the selfhood.

You're saying that anything that can be imagined is real?

Nick

[Nick227]

What I find interesting in this whole identification-with-thinking business is how such identification arises in the first place. I don’t think it’s enough to simply presuppose there being a ‘sense of someone who is doing’ (having identification as the point of departure for understanding this); we must also try to explain how that kind of sensing forms. Thus, I suppose we’re back at language acquisition and use, where we learn to pragmatically use nouns in stead of verbs, hence creating a platform where dualism can thrive.

I think that saying there could be an evolutionary predisposition towards identification with thought is reasonable. The more basic aspects of selfhood - body-map for example - are anyway present in animals (or it's reasonable to assume so as their behaviour and brain structure infer this). With the development of animals capable of thought I don't see why they shouldn't develop "I"-type selfhood through evolutionary advantage.

As a mechanism all that would be required, imo, is that the animal receive some form of reward for acting upon the thought. The animal acts upon the thought, creates its sense of selfhood, and gets its little dopamine hit or whatever. Many people relate that self-expression makes them feel good.

Nick

[Beth]

You're saying that anything that can be imagined is real?

Nick

I don't think so. While I'm sure that Westprog will clarify this himself, I interpret it as meaning that a being capable of internal imagination about itself along with the ability to distinguish between those imaginings and external reality has acheived selfhood. Much like Piggy's claim that if a being is capable of abstact thought to the point of understanding the meaning of the word sentience, then that being is sentient.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Just my 2 cents.......

Sounds to me like another discussion turning on different levels of description/different vocabularies...........

We've been subjected to months and pages of vitriolic argument over the use of the word 'random' when discussing evolution and the existence/non-existence of free will.

All of these arguments seem, to me, to turn on different levels of description, similar to discussions of the "I". The language we use at micro and macro levels differ, so we create these confusions when mixing different levels of description. Do we know what the word "I" means? Well, yeah, at a macro level I think we have a pretty good idea what it means. We certainly use it in a fairly consistent way, which is probably as far as we can take definitions of any word.

But, at the micro level, where is this "I"? It doesn't exist (at that level), because it is an abstraction (and it really should not be a noun, but a verb) that "exists" only at a higher level, as an abstraction (a fiction, in other words, since it does not appear to have any reality at lower levels of description). The discussion about the existence of an "I" ultimately deals with the absence of any ontologically special category that the "I" constitutes (no soul); but, as a linguistic abstraction, it serves a very useful function, and we can largely agree on its use as a word.

If we deal only with the language issues, we can certainly leave it at that. But there is a sense in which the higher level abstraction -- the "I" -- does exist. It may not be what we think it *is*, but there certainly is a means by which individuals can interact and refer to themselves, and there is certainly a mechanism by which "self-reflection" occurs. I do not believe that it is completely integrated, so I do not believe that there is a separate category that we can discuss as an "I", just a linguistic abstraction that covers over several different neurological functions/behaviors that we label in a certain way.

[Nick227]

Just my 2 cents.......

Sounds to me like another discussion turning on different levels of description/different vocabularies...........

We've been subjected to months and pages of vitriolic argument over the use of the word 'random' when discussing evolution and the existence/non-existence of free will.

All of these arguments seem, to me, to turn on different levels of description, similar to discussions of the "I". The language we use at micro and macro levels differ, so we create these confusions when mixing different levels of description. Do we know what the word "I" means? Well, yeah, at a macro level I think we have a pretty good idea what it means. We certainly use it in a fairly consistent way, which is probably as far as we can take definitions of any word.

But, at the micro level, where is this "I"? It doesn't exist (at that level), because it is an abstraction (and it really should not be a noun, but a verb) that "exists" only at a higher level, as an abstraction (a fiction, in other words, since it does not appear to have any reality at lower levels of description). The discussion about the existence of an "I" ultimately deals with the absence of any ontologically special category that the "I" constitutes (no soul); but, as a linguistic abstraction, it serves a very useful function, and we can largely agree on its use as a word.

Personally, I wouldn't totally dispute the validity of the egoic reality, or phenomenal self, or whatever you want to call it.

One reason for this is that, whilst it's true that the "I" is basically illusory, this fact of itself undermines to a degree the very notion of there existing an objective reality. Thus, its illusory nature tends to undermine the very system which would label it "illusory."

IMO it's harder to have objectivity without an "I," as the solidity of the subject-object perceptual divide is weakened. I'm drifting a bit here though.

If we deal only with the language issues, we can certainly leave it at that. But there is a sense in which the higher level abstraction -- the "I" -- does exist. It may not be what we think it *is*, but there certainly is a means by which individuals can interact and refer to themselves, and there is certainly a mechanism by which "self-reflection" occurs. I do not believe that it is completely integrated, so I do not believe that there is a separate category that we can discuss as an "I", just a linguistic abstraction that covers over several different neurological functions/behaviors that we label in a certain way.

It seems to me that this process of identification with thoughts and feelings, and thus the creation of a phenomenal self, also brings our thinking and feeling life very much to the centre of what we consider "ourselves."

Nick

[Ichneumonwasp]

Personally, I wouldn't totally dispute the validity of the egoic reality, or phenomenal self, or whatever you want to call it.

One reason for this is that, whilst it's true that the "I" is basically illusory, this fact of itself undermines to a degree the very notion of there existing an objective reality. Thus, its illusory nature tends to undermine the very system which would label it "illusory."

IMO it's harder to have objectivity without an "I," as the solidity of the subject-object perceptual divide is weakened. I'm drifting a bit here though.

Nick

I don't totally dispute it. I suppose I did not communicate that effectively. There is a sense in which we can speak of an "I", as I tried to mention, not merely as a linguistic abstraction. There clearly is such a "process" as self-reflection, etc. There simply does not appear to be an actual integrated, separate category of 'being', no priveleged ontological 'thing' that we can treat as a unity (as is implied by the way we use the word "I").

[Dancing David]

So if you see a ghost, the ghost exists ?

As a perception, yes. As a valid model of reality, no.

[westprog]

Not by, say, whether or not you see it? Suppose you see two things, and one has an effect on your consciousness. How do you know? How do you know that A has had an effect on your consciousness? How do you know that you have seen B if it had no effect on your consciousness? What possible good does "consciousness" add to this explanation?


All I know are the conscious effects. And those effects are not direct - they are nerve signals generated by chemical reactions caused by light travelling from, say, an object percieved. There's no doubt that we live in Plato's cave. We get only the slightest hint of what the universe is. But what we do know is illuminated only by the conscious mind. Take out the conscious mind and we don't know anything. We are just reflex machines.

[westprog]

Doesn't this imply again a form of dualism when we say "Something is identifying with thought / processing?

If "I" implies dualism, then so does "imagine" and "illusion" and "awareness" and "mind". All the words we use to describe what's going on assume the "I". Either we deny the "I" any status at all, or we have something to explain.

[skiba]

I wouldn't be quite so hasty personally. Maybe "no-thing" was a bit over-the-top here. I meant only that no separate entity was doing it.

Yes, I agree. We dont need a separate entity, but IMO, theres missing part of the puzzle that is doing the identifying.

I remeber reading a QM theory about consciousness.
Essentially it is similar to the wave/particle duality, where there isn't actually any duality but wave/particle are the same. Its only two aspects of the same "thing".
A wave would represent the the undefinable no-thing, and the particle is the definable thing.

In easter philosophys and buddhism this no-thing is many time regarded as "space". Which, I think is the perfect analogy for no-thingness.
We know "space" exists, we just can't define it in anyway, we can't make it into a thing.

[westprog]

You're saying that anything that can be imagined is real?


No, I'm saying anything that can imagine is real.

[Nick227]

I don't totally dispute it. I suppose I did not communicate that effectively.

Sorry, didn't mean to imply that you were. Language, huh!

There is a sense in which we can speak of an "I", as I tried to mention, not merely as a linguistic abstraction. There clearly is such a "process" as self-reflection, etc. There simply does not appear to be an actual integrated, separate category of 'being', no priveleged ontological 'thing' that we can treat as a unity (as is implied by the way we use the word "I").

I think you have to consider what happens to objectivity if there is no "I." Personally, I'm not completely sure what happens to it, but it seems it must change at least somewhat and so the validity or invalidity of "I" might need to be reassessed in the light of this.

Secondly, I think if one accepts that "I" is a result of identification with thought, then some consideration has to be given to any possible reasons why this identification is taking place. Is it simply an artifact of our evolutionary history, or is some other force at work? One result of this identification, and the self-image we develop from it, is that our world becomes very thought- and feeling-centric.

Nick

[Nick227]

Yes, I agree. We dont need a separate entity, but IMO, theres missing part of the puzzle that is doing the identifying.

I remeber reading a QM theory about consciousness.
Essentially it is similar to the wave/particle duality, where there isn't actually any duality but wave/particle are the same. Its only two aspects of the same "thing".
A wave would represent the the undefinable no-thing, and the particle is the definable thing.

In easter philosophys and buddhism this no-thing is many time regarded as "space". Which, I think is the perfect analogy for no-thingness.
We know "space" exists, we just can't define it in anyway, we can't make it into a thing.

I think you're over-complicating things, but I could be wrong. There is nothing that needs to identify, if you ask me. It's not needed. If an organism experiences thoughts it seems to me that it would not bother acting on them unless it had a reason to do so. Evolution cuts corners, ergo feelings, and so it could simply have provided a biochemical reward to the organism for acting upon thought, for mentally identifying with thought. The thought passes through awareness, and becomes "my thought." There is a feeling of actual tangible investment in the thought from doing this, and it usually feels good. It's taking a position. Our aeons of evolutionary history have resulted in the possibility for us to feel "good" or feel "bad" and we inevitably move towards the good. All you'd need I think is a little dopamine.

I don't think anything more complex than this is needed. I could be wrong.

Nick

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Only when I consciously think about the world can I evaluate it.
You evaluate the world nonconsciously all the time. Where's the boundary between nonconscious and conscious evaluation?

~~ Paul

[nescafe]

Yes, I agree. We dont need a separate entity, but IMO, theres missing part of the puzzle that is doing the identifying.

I remeber reading a QM theory about consciousness.
Essentially it is similar to the wave/particle duality, where there isn't actually any duality but wave/particle are the same. Its only two aspects of the same "thing".
A wave would represent the the undefinable no-thing, and the particle is the definable thing.

In easter philosophys and buddhism this no-thing is many time regarded as "space". Which, I think is the perfect analogy for no-thingness.
We know "space" exists, we just can't define it in anyway, we can't make it into a thing.

Ugh, please do not drag quantum mechanics into this (again). No offense, and this applies to darn near everyone (including myself), but this sort of reasoning by analogy using quantum mechanics leads to all sorts of absurdities -- just accept that human intuition is ill-equipped to deal with reality at the quantum level and move on. If you want to try incorporating quantum mechanics into your analogies, be prepared to justify it (preferably with lots of delicious math),and even then you will be wrong (ala Penrose) most of the time.

[westprog]

You evaluate the world nonconsciously all the time. Where's the boundary between nonconscious and conscious evaluation?

~~ Paul

There's no boundary. But the consciousness is the theatre where the evaluation appears.

[westprog]

Ugh, please do not drag quantum mechanics into this (again). No offense, and this applies to darn near everyone (including myself), but this sort of reasoning by analogy using quantum mechanics leads to all sorts of absurdities -- just accept that human intuition is ill-equipped to deal with reality at the quantum level and move on. If you want to try incorporating quantum mechanics into your analogies, be prepared to justify it (preferably with lots of delicious math),and even then you will be wrong (ala Penrose) most of the time.

But the quantum world is the basis of reality. It's not an absurdity to suppose that consciousness has a quantum basis, since everything else does.

[Nick227]

But the quantum world is the basis of reality. It's not an absurdity to suppose that consciousness has a quantum basis, since everything else does.

Well, we haven't got a good definition for the word "consciousness" yet, so I think it's jumping the gun a little to say that (i) it exists, and (ii) that it has a basis in QM.

Besides, in the post Skiba made, the subject was the arising of the sensation of selfhood through identification with thought. I figure dragging QM into this particular area is pretty "conjectural" to say the least.

I figure people who've studied QM have made such an intellectual and emotional investment in the subject they have to find a use for it somewhere. A situation not unlike that which faces those who've studied "consciousness." Whaddya mean it doesn't exist? I've just been studying it for the last 10 years!

Nick

[westprog]

I figure people who've studied QM have made such an intellectual and emotional investment in the subject they have to find a use for it somewhere. A situation not unlike that which faces those who've studied "consciousness." Whaddya mean it doesn't exist? I've just been studying it for the last 10 years!


I think you could substitute a number of things for QM and the claim would be more justified. AFAIAA it's only Penrose interested in linking QM and consciousness. There's far more investment from the AI community.

[nescafe]

But the quantum world is the basis of reality. It's not an absurdity to suppose that consciousness has a quantum basis, since everything else does.
The basis bit I am fine with, it is the suggestion consciousness is somehow analogous to quantum mechanical phenomena or that consciousness is somehow tied to the quantum world an a way that is more direct or profound than any other middle world scale phenomenon that sets off little warning bells.

[leon_heller]

Theories of how the brain works have always followed technological and scientific developments: Freud based his theories on hydraulics, then came telephone systems, then computers, and now we have quantum theory.

Leon

[skiba]

If "I" implies dualism, then so does "imagine" and "illusion" and "awareness" and "mind". All the words we use to describe what's going on assume the "I". Either we deny the "I" any status at all, or we have something to explain.

We only need to see the fictional nature of "I". It exists only as a thought.
I don't think we need to deny the "I", but only to recognize it as fictional.


I think you're over-complicating things, but I could be wrong. There is nothing that needs to identify, if you ask me. It's not needed.

In that case im not sure what youre saying. In your earlier posts you
pointed out there can be thoughts without identification, with out an "I".
If "I" only arises when there is identificaction with though there has to be something that is doing it, or choosing to do it.

If consciousness/awareness is what is doing the identifying and it is only another form of processing, we again run into to the question of "why isn't it all happening in the dark" and the problem of infinite regression.

[Dancing David]

All I know are the conscious effects. And those effects are not direct - they are nerve signals generated by chemical reactions caused by light travelling from, say, an object percieved. There's no doubt that we live in Plato's cave. We get only the slightest hint of what the universe is. But what we do know is illuminated only by the conscious mind. Take out the conscious mind and we don't know anything. We are just reflex machines.


It seems that you are saying that there must be this thing called 'consciousness' for us to know something. What if knowing is a conditioned response, IE a 'reflex machine'?

What testable evidence would there be to demonstrate this extra thing being needed? IE what difference would it make?

[Dancing David]

If "I" implies dualism, then so does "imagine" and "illusion" and "awareness" and "mind". All the words we use to describe what's going on assume the "I". Either we deny the "I" any status at all, or we have something to explain.

There are bodies. They have thoughts, feelings, perceptions and habits. The *I* has no status, it is a referent to the behaviors of a body.

[Dancing David]

Yes, I agree. We dont need a separate entity, but IMO, theres missing part of the puzzle that is doing the identifying.

I remeber reading a QM theory about consciousness.
Essentially it is similar to the wave/particle duality, where there isn't actually any duality but wave/particle are the same. Its only two aspects of the same "thing".
A wave would represent the the undefinable no-thing, and the particle is the definable thing.

In easter philosophys and buddhism this no-thing is many time regarded as "space". Which, I think is the perfect analogy for no-thingness.
We know "space" exists, we just can't define it in anyway, we can't make it into a thing.


I think it might benefit you to study both physcis and buddhism.

[Dancing David]

There's no boundary. But the consciousness is the theatre where the evaluation appears.


The perceptions exist, the theatre is the human cortex? Evaluation is also occurs in the cortex.

[westprog]

There are bodies. They have thoughts, feelings, perceptions and habits. The *I* has no status, it is a referent to the behaviors of a body.

If something has feelings, that entitles it to "I".

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think you have to consider what happens to objectivity if there is no "I." Personally, I'm not completely sure what happens to it, but it seems it must change at least somewhat and so the validity or invalidity of "I" might need to be reassessed in the light of this.

Secondly, I think if one accepts that "I" is a result of identification with thought, then some consideration has to be given to any possible reasons why this identification is taking place. Is it simply an artifact of our evolutionary history, or is some other force at work? One result of this identification, and the self-image we develop from it, is that our world becomes very thought- and feeling-centric.

Nick


I'm not sure anything happens to "objectivity"; it is what it is -- that group of observations that are open to observation by more than one person.

It isn't that there is no "I" specifically, since there is still perception and self-awareness, the bases of "objectivity"; the only change is that the old conception of "I" as an integrated whole disappears. The processes don't disappear -- those processes that make objectivity possible -- only the interpretation of what it all means.

[Dancing David]

If something has feelings, that entitles it to "I".

Then we approach the grey behavioural line.

A dog has an *I* then?

Off topic: (I know they have *I* teeth.)

[Nick227]

In that case im not sure what youre saying. In your earlier posts you
pointed out there can be thoughts without identification, with out an "I".
If "I" only arises when there is identificaction with though there has to be something that is doing it, or choosing to do it.

If consciousness/awareness is what is doing the identifying and it is only another form of processing, we again run into to the question of "why isn't it all happening in the dark" and the problem of infinite regression.

I think you're going to have to let go of the notion that there must be "something that is doing the identifying." I think it is rather that the body gets pleasure from acting upon thoughts.

Nick

[Nick227]

I'm not sure anything happens to "objectivity"; it is what it is -- that group of observations that are open to observation by more than one person.

It isn't that there is no "I" specifically, since there is still perception and self-awareness, the bases of "objectivity"; the only change is that the old conception of "I" as an integrated whole disappears. The processes don't disappear -- those processes that make objectivity possible -- only the interpretation of what it all means.

The "I" is not the only aspect of selfhood, but I figure it is a major one. It seems to me to be arising almost completely as a result of identification with thought. As soon as there is less identification or there are simply less thoughts so the whole sensation of "I" dissipates.

Thus, in this state, self-awareness is pretty much reduced to body-map, some autonomous defence systems, and maybe a bit of mirroring if you're around other people. And, to me, what gives objectivity its real force is this compelling sensation and belief that this body is a closed system, an "I", dispassionately observing other things out there. I figure it definitely weakens objectivity to have the guts taken out of the sensation of "I."

Nick

[Nick227]

If something has feelings, that entitles it to "I".

The notion of something having feelings is just the way the brain constructs it. There are things. There are feelings. There may be a causal relationship between the body, for example, and the feelings but to make the statement that the body "has" feelings is a step down the rocky path to duality! It's totally fine to discuss like this, imo, as long as you're aware of the nuances of language and the kind of false relationships it can imply. But you seem to be making use of the nuances to try and corroborate a false relationship.

Nick

eta: maybe nuances is not really a good word. I think in some ways duality is really the business of language, it's raison d'etre.

[westprog]

Then we approach the grey behavioural line.

A dog has an *I* then?

Off topic: (I know they have *I* teeth.)

We don't know whether a dog has an "I". We go from reasonably certainty (My own sense of self) via some doubt (you and/or the dog) back to reasonable certainty again (the rock). I think that you are more certain to have an "I" than the dog, but I don't know for sure.

[westprog]

I think you're going to have to let go of the notion that there must be "something that is doing the identifying." I think it is rather that the body gets pleasure from acting upon thoughts.

Nick

How can a thing get pleasure? If pleasure is allowed, then so is experience and so is the "I".

[westprog]

The notion of something having feelings is just the way the brain constructs it. There are things. There are feelings. There may be a causal relationship between the body, for example, and the feelings but to make the statement that the body "has" feelings is a step down the rocky path to duality! It's totally fine to discuss like this, imo, as long as you're aware of the nuances of language and the kind of false relationships it can imply. But you seem to be making use of the nuances to try and corroborate a false relationship.

Nick

eta: maybe nuances is not really a good word. I think in some ways duality is really the business of language, it's raison d'etre.

Our experience of a body is our feelings.

[Nick227]

We don't know whether a dog has an "I". We go from reasonably certainty (My own sense of self) via some doubt (you and/or the dog) back to reasonable certainty again (the rock). I think that you are more certain to have an "I" than the dog, but I don't know for sure.

I would say that thoughts are a prerequisite for "I." You can have selfhood without thoughts, but I think the "I" is thought-based. Thus if the dog has thoughts, it may well have an "I," depending on its capacity to have beliefs.

Nick

[Ichneumonwasp]

The "I" is not the only aspect of selfhood, but I figure it is a major one. It seems to me to be arising almost completely as a result of identification with thought. As soon as there is less identification or there are simply less thoughts so the whole sensation of "I" dissipates.

Thus, in this state, self-awareness is pretty much reduced to body-map, some autonomous defence systems, and maybe a bit of mirroring if you're around other people. And, to me, what gives objectivity its real force is this compelling sensation and belief that this body is a closed system, an "I", dispassionately observing other things out there. I figure it definitely weakens objectivity to have the guts taken out of the sensation of "I."

Nick


Who said anything about taking the guts out of the sensation of "I"? The feeling of it persists no matter the reality. I am speaking of what really seems to be there.

If you are discussing the reality of 'objectivity' -- that there is simply no absolute firm ground on which anyone stands -- well, that's just the way the world works. It doesn't matter if we like it or not.

[3bz]

This discussion has been going on for a while but there has been very little references to the current state of consciousness research, so for those interested I'd suggest a recent review paper by Koch and Tononi who are now collaborating: The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: An Update (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/349/1/Tononi-Koch-08.pdf)

It's not a technical paper, but should you feel you need some more background Koch's "The Neuroscience of Consciousness " (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/307/1/562.pdf) is a nice introduction, I guess some will cringe at his use of dualist terminology although he isn't a dualist.

Paul and Mercutio have discussed the binding problem a bit and I still don't see how Mercutio has really provided an answer to the question. Giving an etiological explanation is good, but I think Paul is looking for a constitutive explanation. If we look at phenomena like Balint's syndrome, simultanagnosia, integrative agnosia and some cases of prosopagnosia, where there is some form of deficiency of unimodal binding, I don't see how looking at ontogeny, phylogeny or reinforcement history would provide any answer to how such things happen. Also, if we for example take a look at the "Neural correlates of cross-modal binding." (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=12496761&cmd=showdetailview) there seems to be something more to explain than the causal history of an organism, or in Paul's words: "There is a high level of integration of perception that is not satisfactorily answered by 'we practice a lot.'" Not that all aspects/formulations of the binding problem is even relevant to the study of consciousness as non-conscious percepts can also be bound.


It seems like some problems in the discussion stem from the fact that people don't really agree upon what would could actually be considered answers to questions regarding consciousness, one explanatory framework for consciousness that I find pretty attractive is briefly presented here: "Multilevel Mechanistic Models and Explanation of Consciousness" (jacob.disam.etsii.upm.es/public/events/moc/talks/Revonsuo.ppt), consciousness is treated as a biological phenomenon and it is suggested that a causal-mechanical framework should be employed to explain it.

I'd really recommend reading through at least the Tononi&Koch paper to get a grip on the current state of consciousness research within the neurosciences. If you want to read about the conceptual foundations for much of the research "Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions" (http://www.amazon.com/Neural-Correlates-Consciousness-Empirical-Conceptual/dp/0262133709) is recommended (hint: if you don't want to buy it, there's something called bittorrent).

Hopefully this will spark some new discussions. I'd also like to lodge a complaint: it's pretty tiresome to see some people put down philosophers in general and then in the next sentence refer to Dennett. He may have written an early popular style book on consciousness, but he's still just a philosopher. There are a number of (I'd venture to say up to ten) biologically/neuroscientifically based theories of conscoiusness expounded by people who actually have backgrounds within neuroscience, but I see few of them presented here, while appeals to science seem more frequent.

Anyway, for those having issues with grasping how reductionistic/eliminativistic accounts of consciousness could be suffcient in terms of explanatory value, an oft used analogy is life and how it was once considered necessary that something like elan vital existed in order to explain life. While this comparison might be fallacious and consciousness can't be explained in part by a decomposition to neural processes I still see it as the most fruitful venture and a highly interesting endeavor as we learn so much other fascinating stuff in the process.

[RandFan]

3bz,

Great post. Thank you for the resources. Good stuff.

[Dancing David]

We don't know whether a dog has an "I". We go from reasonably certainty (My own sense of self) via some doubt (you and/or the dog) back to reasonable certainty again (the rock). I think that you are more certain to have an "I" than the dog, but I don't know for sure.

So, to make my pedantic point:

1. Behavior that is ascribed to *I* or 'consciousness' is the method by which we determine if an object is 'conscious' or has an *I*.

2. The only means by which we ascribe consciousness to ourselves is through the same defintion of behaviors that we use to determine the quality 'consciousness' in other objects.

If you grant that 'me' (aka DD) might have an *I* more than a dog (not a point that I concede, they are equal), then you do so based upon the observable behaviors I exhibit.

3. There is no direct event called consciousness, there is only a scale of observable events which we use to scale 'consciousness'. And therefore we assume that we are 'consciouss' only because we have access to a greater amount of observable behaviors (internal/private).

[Dancing David]

The notion of something having feelings is just the way the brain constructs it. There are things. There are feelings. There may be a causal relationship between the body, for example, and the feelings but to make the statement that the body "has" feelings is a step down the rocky path to duality!

True the expression would most accurately be, there are internal states of sensation and perception which are labeled in verbal cognition as 'feelings'. Or there are process or the body which are sensed and perceived by other processes, which in turn are labeled and associate by other processes. the corect stament being The feelings are body.

It's totally fine to discuss like this, imo, as long as you're aware of the nuances of language and the kind of false relationships it can imply. But you seem to be making use of the nuances to try and corroborate a false relationship.

Nick

eta: maybe nuances is not really a good word. I think in some ways duality is really the business of language, it's raison d'etre.

Duality is implicit in the abstracted use of an idiomatic self referencing set of symbols employed by humans. there is the reality and there are the models of reality.

[Dancing David]

Our experience of a body is our feelings.

I would alter that and say that "The processes of our bodies are our feelings".

[Nick227]

How can a thing get pleasure? If pleasure is allowed, then so is experience and so is the "I".

You don't need an "I" to feel something. Later on you use terminology and dualistic constructs to relate it.

Nick

[Nick227]

Who said anything about taking the guts out of the sensation of "I"? The feeling of it persists no matter the reality. I am speaking of what really seems to be there.

I can only relate that the "feeling of it" diminishes considerably with a lowering of either number of thoughts or the degree of identification with thought. The sensation of selfhood seems to tangibly dissipate in proportion to these two factors.

If you are discussing the reality of 'objectivity' -- that there is simply no absolute firm ground on which anyone stands -- well, that's just the way the world works. It doesn't matter if we like it or not.

I was more saying that the degree of sensation of selfhood appears to me proportional to the presence of other factors.

Nick

[Dancing David]

The "I" is not the only aspect of selfhood, but I figure it is a major one. It seems to me to be arising almost completely as a result of identification with thought. As soon as there is less identification or there are simply less thoughts so the whole sensation of "I" dissipates.

Thus, in this state, self-awareness is pretty much reduced to body-map, some autonomous defence systems, and maybe a bit of mirroring if you're around other people. And, to me, what gives objectivity its real force is this compelling sensation and belief that this body is a closed system, an "I", dispassionately observing other things out there. I figure it definitely weakens objectivity to have the guts taken out of the sensation of "I."

Nick


I disagree, that assumes the stance of separateness as part of objectivity. There are other definitions of the ‘objective’.

One is that we are part and parcel of the world and that there is a standard of replication in events and communication called the 'scientific method'.

But as I recall when I started to discuss the basis of objectivity in those terms, our conversation stopped. I can still perceive two visual fields that vary based upon which eye I cover with my hand.

As absurd as that may sound , it is a basis for the determination of 'objective' in terms of linked and interdependent 'objects; interacting in the 'reality', which is the basis for discussion of perceptions that leads to a definition of an 'objective' stance which does not involve the need for 'separateness' but just the idea of 'replication'. As a model for how the term 'objective reality' can be created between organisms that have an ability to communicate using idiomatic and self referencing language.

It is one subset of the available perceptions and models used by humans. It is co-occurring with the others ones, and does not have any 'better' qualities, except in one distinct area, a method of perhaps determining which models are 'better' at predicting the behavior of reality.

However due to my own ability to become confrontational, I shall try to abstain from the discussion as needed.

I am stating that you have set a predetermined meaning that requires this separateness to be ‘objective’, I am saying that there are other definitions that ignore conventions of *I*-ness. They are equally valid and are interdependent as well.

I grant that there are many who state that the duality is needed to be ‘objective’ but I disagree.

[Nick227]

I disagree, that assumes the stance of separateness as part of objectivity. There are other definitions of the ‘objective’.

One is that we are part and parcel of the world and that there is a standard of replication in events and communication called the 'scientific method'.

But as I recall when I started to discuss the basis of objectivity in those terms, our conversation stopped. I can still perceive two visual fields that vary based upon which eye I cover with my hand.

As absurd as that may sound , it is a basis for the determination of 'objective' in terms of linked and interdependent 'objects; interacting in the 'reality', which is the basis for discussion of perceptions that leads to a definition of an 'objective' stance which does not involve the need for 'separateness' but just the idea of 'replication'. As a model for how the term 'objective reality' can be created between organisms that have an ability to communicate using idiomatic and self referencing language.

It is one subset of the available perceptions and models used by humans. It is co-occurring with the others ones, and does not have any 'better' qualities, except in one distinct area, a method of perhaps determining which models are 'better' at predicting the behavior of reality.

However due to my own ability to become confrontational, I shall try to abstain from the discussion as needed.

I am stating that you have set a predetermined meaning that requires this separateness to be ‘objective’, I am saying that there are other definitions that ignore conventions of *I*-ness. They are equally valid and are interdependent as well.

I grant that there are many who state that the duality is needed to be ‘objective’ but I disagree.

You're saying there can be objectivity without a perceptual separation? Personally, I wouldn't dispute it so much, but I feel it's got to carry less weight. I still think that monism and objectivity make uneasy bedfellows.

Looking back on my former opinions on objectivity, I would say that I don't really have so many problems with objectivity itself. I more have issues with people who, unaware that "I" is simply a belief, invoke some fanciful, near magical status to objectivity, usually simultaneously decrying the value of subjectivity. Believing that objectivity is some magic key to knowing reality to me simply means that you are not very self-aware.

BTW, what do you think of subjectivity is the light of no "I," which is also closer to the OP?

Nick

[westprog]

I would alter that and say that "The processes of our bodies are our feelings".

We start with the feelings. From the feelings, we deduce the probable real existence of our bodies. From examining our bodies, we deduce that the feelings are very likely generated by processes within our bodies. But the feelings come first.

[westprog]

So, to make my pedantic point:


Behavior that is ascribed to *I* or 'consciousness' is the method by which we determine if an object is 'conscious' or has an *I*.
The only means by which we ascribe consciousness to ourselves is through the same defintion of behaviors that we use to determine the quality 'consciousness' in other objects. If you grant that 'me' (aka DD) might have an *I* more than a dog (not a point that I concede, they are equal), then you do so based upon the observable behaviors I exhibit.
There is no direct event called consciousness, there is only a scale of observable events which we use to scale 'consciousness'. And therefore we assume that we are 'conscious' only because we have access to a greater amount of observable behaviors (internal/private).



We derive our concept of "consciousness" from our own experience. This is not behaviour. It is something other than our behaviour.
This concept of consciousness is then associated with other people and animals due to similarities of behaviour. But, precisely because consciousness is not behaviour, it's impossible to isolate in anyone or anything else. Hence we merely surmise that other beings are conscious.
We do not assume our own consciousness by observing our own behaviour. There would be no reason to assume consciousness from behaviour. It's hard to consider anything that we could use as an irrevocable objective test for consciousness, for ourselves or anyone else. We start with the experience of consciousness, and from that observe the behaviours associated with it.

[3bz]

I just stumbled upon this article (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VH9-4SXC924-1&_user=10&_coverDate=08%2F31%2F2008&_alid=773899457&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=6061&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=1&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=d5388c68f29312cac86d5ffec9575686) and thought I'd share since there has been some discussion about how to infer that an organism/computer/whatever is conscious. If you don't have access to the journal you con download the paper from here (http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/users/anils/aks_newpapers2.htm) (along with a number of other interesting articles)

[Jeff Corey]

We derive our concept of "consciousness" from our own experience. This is not behaviour. It is something other than our behaviour...


It is private behavior, as Merc and DD have said before.

[Nick227]

I'd also like to lodge a complaint: it's pretty tiresome to see some people put down philosophers in general and then in the next sentence refer to Dennett. He may have written an early popular style book on consciousness, but he's still just a philosopher. There are a number of (I'd venture to say up to ten) biologically/neuroscientifically based theories of conscoiusness expounded by people who actually have backgrounds within neuroscience, but I see few of them presented here, while appeals to science seem more frequent.

Hi 3bz,

When I recently read Dennett's Multiple Draft theory it seemed to me eminently reasonable, and largely fitting with what I had perceived about my own mind. When I read neuroscience a lot of the time it does just seem to be Cartesian logic dressed up a bit to look monist. I mention that I'm not a big reader here. Discussing these things on internet forums like this one, it seems to me that a lot of the debaters can't really let go of dualism. They stick to this notion of an experiencer and it does seem to come up again and again, sometimes more subtly. Yes, there are lots of big words but you look under the curtain and there's old Rene peering out at you again. Thus for many of those interested and many of those who research, I find myself a bit skeptical of their ability to actually "go there" and start to conceptualise what monist reality really is/looks like.

Do you think I'm being unfair here?

Nick

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There's no boundary. But the consciousness is the theatre where the evaluation appears.
Except when the evaluation and resulting action are never in your awareness at all.

~~ Paul

[3bz]

Hi 3bz,

When I recently read Dennett's Multiple Draft theory it seemed to me eminently reasonable, and largely fitting with what I had perceived about my own mind. When I read neuroscience a lot of the time it does just seem to be Cartesian logic dressed up a bit to look monist. I mention that I'm not a big reader here. Discussing these things on internet forums like this one, it seems to me that a lot of the debaters can't really let go of dualism. They stick to this notion of an experiencer and it does seem to come up again and again, sometimes more subtly. Yes, there are lots of big words but you look under the curtain and there's old Rene peering out at you again. Thus for many of those interested and many of those who research, I find myself a bit skeptical of their ability to actually "go there" and start to conceptualise what monist reality really is/looks like.

Do you think I'm being unfair here?

Nick

I didn't say that every neuroscientist was philosophically informed enough to not fall into the trap of some form cartesian materialism/dualism or humoncular fallacy when they do research. Most of them that have focused or are focusing specifically on consciousness are aware of the discussions that ensued in the nineties when the larger part of the conceptual foundation for consciousness studies was laid out (and yes, Dennett was an important contributor).

I have no no idea if you are being unfair, I'm sure some people have trouble letting go of dualistic assumptions/language, as evident from this very thread. I think we have to be careful to not think there is an actual disagreement in opinion when it could merely be a semantic one, as often seems to be the case.

I'm not really sure what the last part is supposed to mean though, what are you suggesting is needed to be able to "conceptualize what monist reality is/looks like" ?

[Dancing David]

You're saying there can be objectivity without a perceptual separation? Personally, I wouldn't dispute it so much, but I feel it's got to carry less weight. I still think that monism and objectivity make uneasy bedfellows.

I don't, the end result is monism, either materialism or mental monism. each has a same stuff basis and the end result is the same.

Looking back on my former opinions on objectivity, I would say that I don't really have so many problems with objectivity itself. I more have issues with people who, unaware that "I" is simply a belief, invoke some fanciful, near magical status to objectivity, usually simultaneously decrying the value of subjectivity. Believing that objectivity is some magic key to knowing reality to me simply means that you are not very self-aware.

Fair enough, being subject to OCD, I question the validity of the subjective at times.


BTW, what do you think of subjectivity is the light of no "I," which is also closer to the OP?

Nick

I am not sure what your question is. I follow the AHB, there is the body (and the emotions, thoughts, perceptions and habits), those exist without the 'self'. The *I* is a common convention that refers to a physical transitory body.

[Dancing David]

We start with the feelings.

We start with sensation, from sensation comes perception?

From the feelings, we deduce the probable real existence of our bodies.

sensations appear to come from interaction with a frame outside the body.

From examining our bodies, we deduce that the feelings are very likely generated by processes within our bodies.

i have seen no evidence that the perception comes from outside my body. sensation involves interaction with the external referant.

But the feelings come first.

Sensation comes first?

[Dancing David]

We derive our concept of "consciousness" from our own experience. This is not behaviour. It is something other than our behaviour.
This concept of consciousness is then associated with other people and animals due to similarities of behaviour. But, precisely because consciousness is not behaviour, it's impossible to isolate in anyone or anything else. Hence we merely surmise that other beings are conscious.
We do not assume our own consciousness by observing our own behaviour. There would be no reason to assume consciousness from behaviour. It's hard to consider anything that we could use as an irrevocable objective test for consciousness, for ourselves or anyone else. We start with the experience of consciousness, and from that observe the behaviours associated with it.



This may take several passes to reach the point of discussion. So I am marking this post here.

[Dancing David]

We derive our concept of "consciousness" from our own experience. This is not behaviour. It is something other than our behaviour.

Hmm, have you read what Mercutio was posting. behavior is the action of an organic body.

So, if a photon enters my eye and it responds with a photo receptor, the change of state in the phototropin in a behavior, albeit a reactive one.

And so on:
:the photoreceptor 'fires'
:the nerve sends an impulse
:the impulse interacts with other impulses

ALL are behavior.


You have perceptions generated from sensations and 'see the color red", that is a behavior.

You have memories about times you have seen the color red, you have associations with the color red, you have thoughts, emotions and habits about the color red. those are all behaviors.

You deduce consciousness from the other process, there is no direct referent to "consciousness', which is why people avoid defining it. ( IMO )

This concept of consciousness is then associated with other people and animals due to similarities of behaviour.

But what are you referencing to derive that they are conscious, extrapolation of the 'theory of mind', is usually what people reference.

But, precisely because consciousness is not behaviour, it's impossible to isolate in anyone or anything else.

One can not reduce the internal events of another organism at this time, they are private behaviors, I(E all actions made by a biological organism are behavior). But there is not a current defintion of consciousness, we have been presented ;sensation, perception, thought or lack of thoughts, emotions, memories and association.

What is consciousness? Again i ask very seriously because i am making the repetitive point that it is a rubric, it is a rug under which much is swept. But it is just a bunch or actions/processes/behaviors.

Hence we merely surmise that other beings are conscious.

Hence we surmise our own consciousness.

We do not assume our own consciousness by observing our own behaviour.

How else do you *know* that you are conscious?

There would be no reason to assume consciousness from behaviour.

What makes you think you are conscious, please define and elaborate. Most people settle for perceptions.

It's hard to consider anything that we could use as an irrevocable objective test for consciousness, for ourselves or anyone else. We start with the experience of consciousness, and from that observe the behaviours associated with it.


Um, what is the experience of consciousness like?

is it perception?

[Mercutio]

We derive our concept of "consciousness" from our own experience. This is not behaviour. It is something other than our behaviour.
This concept of consciousness is then associated with other people and animals due to similarities of behaviour. But, precisely because consciousness is not behaviour, it's impossible to isolate in anyone or anything else. Hence we merely surmise that other beings are conscious.
We do not assume our own consciousness by observing our own behaviour. There would be no reason to assume consciousness from behaviour. It's hard to consider anything that we could use as an irrevocable objective test for consciousness, for ourselves or anyone else. We start with the experience of consciousness, and from that observe the behaviours associated with it.

Gotcha--if we assume dualism, we can conclude dualism. If we ignore the actual research, the actual research does not disagree with our dualism.

Thank you for illustrating my point.

You are, quite simply, wrong.

[Mercutio]

But the quantum world is the basis of reality. It's not an absurdity to suppose that consciousness has a quantum basis, since everything else does.

Yes, it is an absurdity. The action of neurotransmitters is several orders of magnitude hell and gone from a quantum level, and the firing of even a single action potential is dependent on an accumulation of neurotransmitter effects at the synapse. To suggest that quantum effects are somehow related to consciousness is to grasp at dualistic straws.

[westprog]

It is private behavior, as Merc and DD have said before.

They've called it behaviour a number of times. Calling it behaviour makes the problem go away, of course. But I don't accept that what I refer to as consciousness is behaviour. It's something else.

[westprog]

Except when the evaluation and resulting action are never in your awareness at all.

~~ Paul

Everything from the beating of the heart to returning a tennis serve are done without the conscious mind intervening. But the evaluation of the world is done via the conscious mind.

[westprog]

Sensation comes first?

I think so. Bear in mind that I'm not using terms as precisely as some of the people here.

[westprog]

Hmm, have you read what Mercutio was posting. behavior is the action of an organic body.

So, if a photon enters my eye and it responds with a photo receptor, the change of state in the phototropin in a behavior, albeit a reactive one.

And so on:
:the photoreceptor 'fires'
:the nerve sends an impulse
:the impulse interacts with other impulses

ALL are behavior.



Yes.


You have perceptions generated from sensations and 'see the color red", that is a behavior.


No.

I don't want to get too hung up on the word "behaviour". But the point I am trying to make is that the experience of 'seeing the colour red' is something quite different from photons striking the retina.


You have memories about times you have seen the color red, you have associations with the color red, you have thoughts, emotions and habits about the color red. those are all behaviors.

You deduce consciousness from the other process, there is no direct referent to "consciousness', which is why people avoid defining it. ( IMO )

But what are you referencing to derive that they are conscious, extrapolation of the 'theory of mind', is usually what people reference.

One can not reduce the internal events of another organism at this time, they are private behaviors, I(E all actions made by a biological organism are behavior). But there is not a current defintion of consciousness, we have been presented ;sensation, perception, thought or lack of thoughts, emotions, memories and association.

What is consciousness? Again i ask very seriously because i am making the repetitive point that it is a rubric, it is a rug under which much is swept. But it is just a bunch or actions/processes/behaviors.

Hence we surmise our own consciousness.

How else do you *know* that you are conscious?

What makes you think you are conscious, please define and elaborate. Most people settle for perceptions.


Um, what is the experience of consciousness like?

is it perception?

I don't think it is. I can think of the colour red. It isn't memory. It isn't perception. It may well depend on those things.

The capacity to experience 'red' is what I think of as consciousness. There are cameras which can do the rest of what is going on. They can exhibit all the behavior associated with percieving 'red'. They just can't have the 'red experience'.

[Belz...]

My point is that, if you're not aware of this, it's easy to cross over into believing that there actually is an "I" somewhere who is doing all the stuff the body and brain do. Even philosophers and scientists are by no means immune to this. Descartes for example was fooled. Many "consciousness" researchers even these days can reel off all kinds of high-faluting complex flapdoodle, but actually have never even challenged the most basic premises from which they start their formulations.

Pretty much what everybody's been saying from page 1. Why bring it up again ?

Because a computer is not programmed to artificially create a sense of selfhood.

And we are ? Who cares what it's "programmed" to do. What we care about is what it actually does. So, again, how would you know ?

If you simply sit and observe the workings of your own mind, you can see it doing it.

Can I ? That's a pretty bold statement. How do you see your mind do anything ?


I'm trying to suggest a means by which a processing machine, such as the human brain, can, with a little ancilliary processing, come to create for itself the belief that it is "I."

That's nice.

[Belz...]

Logic can only tell you what conclusions are consistent with the premises, and if your pool of premises is not complete enough, you will reach conclusions that, although consistent, are absurd and do not reflect reality.

I am so stealing this for some future opportunity. Take that, mister Spock!

[Belz...]

The only judgement I can make as to whether the ghost exists or not is based on the effect it has on my conscious mind.

I tend to believe that when someone "sees" a ghost, they are seeing non-paranormal phenomena which they misinterpret.

Don't you see that this is exactly what I've been talking about ? The very perception of self could be a misinterpretation. As I've been asking over and over and over again, without an answer, how would you know ?

[Belz...]

We don't know whether a dog has an "I". We go from reasonably certainty (My own sense of self) via some doubt (you and/or the dog) back to reasonable certainty again (the rock). I think that you are more certain to have an "I" than the dog, but I don't know for sure.

I jus tlove anthropocentrism.

How can a thing get pleasure? If pleasure is allowed, then so is experience and so is the "I".

What is this "I" of which you speak ?

[Belz...]

We derive our concept of "consciousness" from our own experience.

Do we ? That's a very interesting claim. How would you know ?

This is not behaviour.

Oh ? And how would you call it, then ?

It is something other than our behaviour.

Obviously, since you claim it's not behaviour.

We do not assume our own consciousness by observing our own behaviour. There would be no reason to assume consciousness from behaviour. It's hard to consider anything that we could use as an irrevocable objective test for consciousness

Dualist nonsense, right here.

[Belz...]

I don't think it is. I can think of the colour red. It isn't memory. It isn't perception.

Of course it is. What a silly thing to say.

[Mercutio]

They've called it behaviour a number of times. Calling it behaviour makes the problem go away, of course. But I don't accept that what I refer to as consciousness is behaviour. It's something else.

Calling it behavior does not make the problem go away.

Calling it "something else" creates the problem in the first place.

When you begin by assuming it is magic, it makes it rather difficult to explain by non-magical means. Yes, it keeps humans somehow special, if that is the goal; if the goal is understanding us, the magic step one is not helping.

[leon_heller]

In psychology, behaviour is observable. I wouldn't say that consciousness is observable behaviour.

Leon

[Mercutio]

In psychology, behaviour is observable. I wouldn't say that consciousness is observable behaviour.

Leon
Um... if it is unobservable, how do you know it exists at all?

Damn, there goes my Ph.D. in Psychology. I thought behavior was "what you do", and that it included both public behavior (observable by more than one person--what you describe) and private behavior (observable by only one person, even in principle).

But I agree, "consciousness" is not a behavior. It is a necessarily (because it includes some private behavior) fuzzy collection of behaviors; there is no single behavior one can point to and say "that is consciousness", nor should there be--just as there is not single building on my campus that one can point to and say "that is the University".

Consciousness is the label we attach to this set of behaviors. It is not the cause of those behaviors; it is those behaviors. And yes, some of those behaviors are observable only by one person; they are private.

[Dancing David]

But the evaluation of the world is done via the conscious mind.


And yet it could be a matter of definition, what is it comparable to?

A lack of defintion leads to a sort of 'god of the gaps' argument. (I am not trying to be rude. :) )

Please try to explain what you mean by

-evaluation of the world:

I can guess but I would rather not put words in your mouth.

It sounds a lot to me like verbal and non-verbal cognition, combined with memory and association all related to perceptions.

[Dancing David]

Yes.



No.

I don't want to get too hung up on the word "behaviour". But the point I am trying to make is that the experience of 'seeing the colour red' is something quite different from photons striking the retina.

Well there is all the stuff that occurs after the optic nerve.
( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_cortex)

So the sensations at some point are turned into the perceptions, I like to use the term, 'the brain manufactures the perception wholesale'.

So when you 'see the color red' there is this huge amount of processing that goes into the 'color red'.

Like this here:
(http://cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg.html/GroMinRoss97.pdf)

So yes it is much more than photons striking the retina, it is nothing at all like a camera in any way except at the photo receptor level.

There is this huge amount of processing to make the 'color red'.

So .... then there are thoughts, associations, memories, etc...




I don't think it is. I can think of the colour red. It isn't memory. It isn't perception. It may well depend on those things.

So the word there is think, so you can have cognition about a color.



The capacity to experience 'red' is what I think of as consciousness. There are cameras which can do the rest of what is going on. They can exhibit all the behavior associated with perceiving 'red'. They just can't have the 'red experience'.

I am pointing out that that experience is a process/behavior in your brain. (Quite likely)

[Dancing David]

In psychology, behaviour is observable. I wouldn't say that consciousness is observable behaviour.

Leon


Small point of order, it it isn't observed then it can't exist.

People observe the internal behavior and label it 'consciousness'. It can still be studied, like the visual perceptions.

[Dancing David]

Um... if it is unobservable, how do you know it exists at all?

Damn, there goes my Ph.D. in Psychology. I thought behavior was "what you do", and that it included both public behavior (observable by more than one person--what you describe) and private behavior (observable by only one person, even in principle).

But I agree, "consciousness" is not a behavior. It is a necessarily (because it includes some private behavior) fuzzy collection of behaviors; there is no single behavior one can point to and say "that is consciousness", nor should there be--just as there is not single building on my campus that one can point to and say "that is the University".

Consciousness is the label we attach to this set of behaviors. It is not the cause of those behaviors; it is those behaviors. And yes, some of those behaviors are observable only by one person; they are private.

A bunch of lumps under a rug may look like a gorilla but that does not a gorilla make.

Thanks Merc.

[leon_heller]

Small point of order, it it isn't observed then it can't exist.

People observe the internal behavior and label it 'consciousness'. It can still be studied, like the visual perceptions.

There is a logical difference. Perception can result in behaviour that can be observed by someone else. Does consciousness cause observable behaviour, in the same sense?

Leon

[INRM]

Nick227,

What's "Dennett's Multiple Draft theory"?


INRM

[Mercutio]

There is a logical difference. Perception can result in behaviour that can be observed by someone else. Does consciousness cause observable behaviour, in the same sense?

Leon

That is not a logical difference, it is a difference in number of observers. Period. Additional observers give us tools to combat some types of bias in observation--but without using these tools, additional observers are no help at all (many people can see a ghost, or a flying saucer, and all be seeing the same easily-explained stimulus; with a bit of observational control, one or all of the observers may see through the bias). We have other tools to combat bias in private behavioral observation (and have for over a century--psychophysics has explored perception since Fechner); if we use them, there is good reason to say that public and private behavior are observed in the same sense (that is, in a controlled manner, combatting perceptual biases). Again, they differ only in the number of observers.

[Dancing David]

There is a logical difference. Perception can result in behaviour that can be observed by someone else. Does consciousness cause observable behaviour, in the same sense?

Leon


I am saying that when people say

"But it is obvious I am conscious.", they are labeling the internal process/behavior.

they determine that they are conscious by saying "I have perceptions of my body".

And yes consciousness is a set of processes that can be observed, albeit to the detriment of the critter with the electrode in it's head.

[westprog]

Don't you see that this is exactly what I've been talking about ? The very perception of self could be a misinterpretation. As I've been asking over and over and over again, without an answer, how would you know ?

The idea of selfhood could be incorrect, certainly. I've said that the only thing that we directly experience is a momentary sensation. Everything else is surmise.

[westprog]

I am pointing out that that experience is a process/behavior in your brain. (Quite likely)


Experience/sensation/perception/whatever is the end result of a series of behaviours. I don't regard it as a behaviour in itself.

It may be that when/if the concept of sensation/experience is explained, the whole thing may reduce to behaviour. At present, it hasn't.

[Dancing David]

Experience/sensation/perception/whatever is the end result of a series of behaviours. I don't regard it as a behaviour in itself.

It may be that when/if the concept of sensation/experience is explained, the whole thing may reduce to behaviour. At present, it hasn't.

Um, we have a pretty good understanding of visual perception, what do you think is missing? Are you suggesting a god of the gaps, or just that there is incomplete knowledge. What evidence suggests that there is anything other than the organic structure of the nervous system?

[Jeff Corey]

Experience/sensation/perception/whatever is the end result of a series of behaviours. I don't regard it as a behaviour in itself.

It may be that when/if the concept of sensation/experience is explained, the whole thing may reduce to behaviour. At present, it hasn't.
So you say. It is still all behavior. That's all we have. It's behavior when we are talking to ourself, seeing and remembering, singing. It's all behavior. We have nothing more than that. There are no ghosts in the machine, no magical mind.

[westprog]

Um, we have a pretty good understanding of visual perception, what do you think is missing?

An explanation of how consciousness arises.

Are you suggesting a god of the gaps, or just that there is incomplete knowledge. What evidence suggests that there is anything other than the organic structure of the nervous system?

I'm not suggesting that there is anything other than the organic structure of the nervous system. I'm saying that we don't know how the nervous system's organic structure produces consciousness.

And how can I say that when such important work is being done on perception, etc? Because we still can't reproduce consciousness, or explain exactly how it happens.

[westprog]

So you say. It is still all behavior. That's all we have. It's behavior when we are talking to ourself, seeing and remembering, singing. It's all behavior. We have nothing more than that. There are no ghosts in the machine, no magical mind.


Until you can analyse and reproduce what's going on, you can't make any such claim. We don't know how consciousness arises yet. When we do know, we'll be able to reproduce it.

[Belz...]

And yes, some of those behaviors are observable only by one person; they are private.

Careful, now. One day they might be able to decode those with a machine.

[Belz...]

The idea of selfhood could be incorrect, certainly. I've said that the only thing that we directly experience is a momentary sensation. Everything else is surmise.

Huh ? Do I detect a bit of solipsism, here ?

I'm saying that we don't know how the nervous system's organic structure produces consciousness.

Which is like saying that no one has explained the existence of the Loch Ness monster in that ecological niche.

[westprog]

Huh ? Do I detect a bit of solipsism, here ?


Makes a change from being accused of dualism. It's a bit like a reeducational committee during the Cultural Revolution sometimes.

[Mercutio]

Careful, now. One day they might be able to decode those with a machine.

In which case, being observable by more than one person, they will be public. Nothing else about them will change.

[Mercutio]

An explanation of how consciousness arises.

And without an exact location of the Fountain of Youth, all maps of Florida are incomplete.

[leon_heller]

I am saying that when people say

"But it is obvious I am conscious.", they are labeling the internal process/behavior.

they determine that they are conscious by saying "I have perceptions of my body".

And yes consciousness is a set of processes that can be observed, albeit to the detriment of the critter with the electrode in it's head.

It's brain activity. How do we know that it is consciousness? We can't see anything from brain activity that tells us that the subject has a sense of "self" or any other aspect of consciousness. All we have is introspection.

Leon

[Mercutio]

It's brain activity. How do we know that it is consciousness? We can't see anything from brain activity that tells us that the subject has a sense of "self" or any other aspect of consciousness. All we have is introspection.

Leon

Wrong direction. Just as the observation of individual atoms cannot tell you if they are part of something alive or dead, neural activity cannot tell you if something is conscious or non-conscious (by any reasonable definition, we do many things non-consciously--examples in this thread include driving, for instance!). So far I agree with you.

We do not need to reduce to a lower level; consciousness is not to be found in molecular activity, let alone in quantum events. So far I believe we are still in agreement. I will go further and say that it is not merely "brain activity", either. The way we use the term "consciousness" is rarely in conjunction with any sort of brain activity readings; we usually simply conclude that someone is or is not conscious by observing their behavior.

And... if we are to call it "brain activity", introspection cannot help us, either. Introspection cuts us off from both sides; we cannot introspect brain activity, as there are no sensory neurons there. We simply do not have access to our own thinking, only to some portion of the results thereof. And introspection does not make use of the public behavior that is the only evidence we have that others are conscious (or others have that we are). Introspection merely reports on private behavior; why this subset of behavior should have any special status is simply an accident of history. It is certainly not "all we have".

Rather, the level of analysis appropriate for examining consciousness is that of the behaving organism in its environment. Both private and public behavior must be taken into account (with, arguably, public behavior having the upper hand, since we learn to label our private behavior through association with public behavior, and not independently of it). There is a fascinating place for neuroscience in this, but that is where we will find some pieces, not the solution to the puzzle.

[Nick227]

I'm not really sure what the last part is supposed to mean though, what are you suggesting is needed to be able to "conceptualize what monist reality is/looks like" ?

I guess what I'm trying to say is that in my personal experience, and from what I've seen from others, it is quite a jump to really take on board the notion of there being no persisting self. Maybe some people can just go there, but for many it seems that it's just so incredibly counter-intuitive they can't. I thus do find myself questioning the ability of many in the "consciousness" debate to make meaningful statements in areas that relate to selfhood, which is not all of the debate for sure, but a sizeable chunk of it, I think.

Of course, no one has proven that egoic, or persisting, selfhood is absolutely false, but it seems to me that for most monists from a scientific background, that can be taken as read. Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong here.

Nick

[Nick227]

I am not sure what your question is. I follow the AHB, there is the body (and the emotions, thoughts, perceptions and habits), those exist without the 'self'. The *I* is a common convention that refers to a physical transitory body.

I wouldn't call it a "convention" so much. To me that implies a degree of knowledge aforethought that is inconsistent with what people clearly believe. If there is no self, or no persisting self, then it seems to me that the HPC is reduced considerably, though like the issue with objectivity and the same phenomenon I'm not sure how much.

Nick

[leon_heller]

Wrong direction. Just as the observation of individual atoms cannot tell you if they are part of something alive or dead, neural activity cannot tell you if something is conscious or non-conscious (by any reasonable definition, we do many things non-consciously--examples in this thread include driving, for instance!). So far I agree with you.

We do not need to reduce to a lower level; consciousness is not to be found in molecular activity, let alone in quantum events. So far I believe we are still in agreement. I will go further and say that it is not merely "brain activity", either. The way we use the term "consciousness" is rarely in conjunction with any sort of brain activity readings; we usually simply conclude that someone is or is not conscious by observing their behavior.

And... if we are to call it "brain activity", introspection cannot help us, either. Introspection cuts us off from both sides; we cannot introspect brain activity, as there are no sensory neurons there. We simply do not have access to our own thinking, only to some portion of the results thereof. And introspection does not make use of the public behavior that is the only evidence we have that others are conscious (or others have that we are). Introspection merely reports on private behavior; why this subset of behavior should have any special status is simply an accident of history. It is certainly not "all we have".

Rather, the level of analysis appropriate for examining consciousness is that of the behaving organism in its environment. Both private and public behavior must be taken into account (with, arguably, public behavior having the upper hand, since we learn to label our private behavior through association with public behavior, and not independently of it). There is a fascinating place for neuroscience in this, but that is where we will find some pieces, not the solution to the puzzle.

I still maintain that consciousness is not observable behaviour. One day we might have the techniques to observe it, but we don't seem to have them at present. All we have is introspection.

Leon

[Nick227]

And we are ? Who cares what it's "programmed" to do. What we care about is what it actually does. So, again, how would you know ?


Observation. People belief in selfhood. They believe they have an "I." They believe they have a persisting "I." Yet, there is very little empiric evidence to suggest that this is true. Thus I think it's reasonable to say that the brain creates this sensation of a persisting "I" though aspects of its activity. Elsewise you're back in "soul" territory.


Can I ? That's a pretty bold statement. How do you see your mind do anything ?

Sit down and watch it. Thoughts can pass in and out unacted upon. I can catch myself in the process of about to take a course of action and think about what I'm really doing. I can experience that my sense of selfhood dissipates with reduced number of thoughts. I can become aware of how "experiences" are constructed by the mind and how interrogating the multiple streams of processing and demanding answers can do this. There's a lot that can be done.

Nick

[Darat]

I still maintain that consciousness is not observable behaviour. One day we might have the techniques to observe it, but we don't seem to have them at present. All we have is introspection.

Leon

This begs a question* - What do you mean by "conciousness"?





*Current informal usage

[leon_heller]

This begs a question* - What do you mean by "conciousness"?





*Current informal usage


A sense of "self", primarily.

Leon

[Mercutio]

A sense of "self", qualia, etc. All the usual stuff.

Leon

By this definition, how do you ever infer that someone else is or is not conscious? Do you simply give up on that usage of the term?

[Nick227]

And yes, some of those behaviors are observable only by one person; they are private.

Assuming that anyone observes subjective phenomena seems to me pretty dualist.

Nick

[Mercutio]

I guess what I'm trying to say is that in my personal experience, and from what I've seen from others, it is quite a jump to really take on board the notion of there being no persisting self. Maybe some people can just go there, but for many it seems that it's just so incredibly counter-intuitive they can't. I thus do find myself questioning the ability of many in the "consciousness" debate to make meaningful statements in areas that relate to selfhood, which is not all of the debate for sure, but a sizeable chunk of it, I think.

Of course, no one has proven that egoic, or persisting, selfhood is absolutely false, but it seems to me that for most monists from a scientific background, that can be taken as read. Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong here.

NickPerhaps you need to define "persisting self"; I do not see what is so remarkable about spending a lifetime looking out of the same set of eyes, and inferring that this consistent perspective might just mean I am the same person from time A to time B. Perhaps, like Paul's question about the binding problem, I am simply not seeing what the problem is to be answered.

[Nick227]

And yes, some of those behaviors are observable only by one person; they are private.

Assuming that anyone observes subjective phenomena seems to me pretty dualist.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Assuming that anyone observes subjective phenomena seems to me pretty dualist.

Nick

I did not say they were subjective; I said they were private. They do not differ in kind, but only in number of observers. To quote Skinner (quoted by Catania, quoted by Sidman): "Private events ... remain inferences to the experimenter or philosopher, but they are just as directly observed by the person in whose skin they exist as any environmental stimulus."

If ten people are watching a show, and one leaves, is the show qualitatively different? How about if 2, or 5, or 8 more leave? Number of observers is irrelevant to what is being observed. Private events are observed by one person. That does not make them "subjective" (which is always contrasted with "objective", and implies a difference in kind), it just makes them private.

If you wish to say things are qualitatively different when observed by one person only, you will have to provide some evidence that they are so.

[Nick227]

Perhaps you need to define "persisting self"; I do not see what is so remarkable about spending a lifetime looking out of the same set of eyes, and inferring that this consistent perspective might just mean I am the same person from time A to time B. Perhaps, like Paul's question about the binding problem, I am simply not seeing what the problem is to be answered.

For most people, the sensation of selfhood is that there is some persistent "I" - some constant self or observer who is experiencing what the brain processes. Of course, I don't know how you personally relate to selfhood but the image of some little guy watching a theatre show inside the head and deciding how to direct it is how most people do.

We know pretty much conclusively that this, intuitive vision of selfhood isn't so. There's no central point where all the info goes back to and no one can find an "I" spot in the brain. Thus, metaphysical theories aside there is no persisting self and one is left to ponder whether the experience-experiencer duality is even real or simply constructed, or what transitory selfhood looks like.

It seems to me that you have a different sensation of selfhood from most. Fair enough.

Nick

[Nick227]

If you wish to say things are qualitatively different when observed by one person only, you will have to provide some evidence that they are so.

I'm more questioning whether anyone is actually observing them. There is the sensation of there being someone there, but is it real or illusion?

Nick

[Mercutio]

I'm more questioning whether anyone is actually observing them. There is the sensation of there being someone there, but is it real or illusion?

Nick

I really, really really don't get what you continue to say about this "someone" who is observing. We are active, perceiving organisms. Do you really think it feels like you are a homunculus stuck inside a meat puppet?

I see trees, and cats, and my laptop computer. I am not "an observer, viewing the images my body sends to my brain as qualia of trees, cats..." frankly, I don't even know how to express that, it is so foreign to me.

I feel I should blame Descartes, or maybe even Plato. This prescientific mentalistic vocabulary that reifies actions, then tries to locate the metaphorical nouns in some other-space, has been a part of our language for centuries. But seriously--do you actually *feel* like there is a you inside of the you that is you? That way madness lies...

If your meatpuppet body needs a homunculus to perceive for it, then how does the homunculus do it? Does it get its own hemihomunculus? And it, its own hemidemihomunculus?

Turtles.

[Dancing David]

An explanation of how consciousness arises.

Somehow I missed the defintion of what you think we can't explain.

Have you offered a definition of the word 'conscioisness' yet. I missed it if you have. What is it that has not been explained?




I'm not suggesting that there is anything other than the organic structure of the nervous system. I'm saying that we don't know how the nervous system's organic structure produces consciousness.

If you define what you mean by consciousness that would help. :)


And how can I say that when such important work is being done on perception, etc? Because we still can't reproduce consciousness, or explain exactly how it happens.

Um, have you offered an exact defintion of consciousness yet?

:)

[Mercutio]

It seems to me that you have a different sensation of selfhood from most. Fair enough.

Nick

How would you even begin to conclude this? What data do you have about mine? What data do you have about "most"?

[Dancing David]

It's brain activity. How do we know that it is consciousness? We can't see anything from brain activity that tells us that the subject has a sense of "self" or any other aspect of consciousness. All we have is introspection.

Leon

Interesting, hmmm.

What is "sense of "self" "? How would you describe it, is it perceptions of a body?

What is "other aspect of consciousness" ?

i grant you that people talk a lot about these things but when they begin to actualy define them, then the discussion is interesrting.

try to explain your terms please, use metaphors and analogies if needed. :)

[Dancing David]

I guess what I'm trying to say is that in my personal experience, and from what I've seen from others, it is quite a jump to really take on board the notion of there being no persisting self. Maybe some people can just go there, but for many it seems that it's just so incredibly counter-intuitive they can't. I thus do find myself questioning the ability of many in the "consciousness" debate to make meaningful statements in areas that relate to selfhood, which is not all of the debate for sure, but a sizeable chunk of it, I think.

Of course, no one has proven that egoic, or persisting, selfhood is absolutely false, but it seems to me that for most monists from a scientific background, that can be taken as read. Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong here.

Nick


There are many reasons to believe that the self is a fiction imposed upon a transitory state of being.

[westprog]

If you wish to say things are qualitatively different when observed by one person only, you will have to provide some evidence that they are so.

The problem with the observation of consciousness is that what is being observed is the act of observation itself. Whenever we think about consciousness, what we observe is what are consciousness is like when we are thinking about consciousness.

I know it might seem like it, but I don't think about consciousness all of the time. The very fact of observing the state of one's mind is likely to alter the state of one's mind. That is why I believe very little about consciousness except that it exists.

[westprog]

Somehow I missed the defintion of what you think we can't explain.

Have you offered a definition of the word 'conscioisness' yet. I missed it if you have. What is it that has not been explained?

If you define what you mean by consciousness that would help. :)
Um, have you offered an exact defintion of consciousness yet?

:)

What exactly are you asking for here? Is it that you want me to define consciousness? Is that it? Look, just say so.

Defining consciousness is step one of the problem. So far I've gotten a non-behavioural mental state, but that doesn't really narrow it down enough.

[Mercutio]

Defining consciousness is step one of the problem. So far I've gotten a non-behavioural mental state, but that doesn't really narrow it down enough.
With this definition as your starting point, there is no other conclusion but dualism, and the HPC remains the HPC, and consciousness remains magic.

There. That was easy. It always is, when one assumes one's conclusions.

[westprog]

There are many reasons to believe that the self is a fiction imposed upon a transitory state of being.

There are many reasons to believe that the Universe is a fiction imposed upon a transitory state of being.

[Nick227]

I really, really really don't get what you continue to say about this "someone" who is observing. We are active, perceiving organisms. Do you really think it feels like you are a homunculus stuck inside a meat puppet?

I see trees, and cats, and my laptop computer. I am not "an observer, viewing the images my body sends to my brain as qualia of trees, cats..." frankly, I don't even know how to express that, it is so foreign to me.

I feel I should blame Descartes, or maybe even Plato. This prescientific mentalistic vocabulary that reifies actions, then tries to locate the metaphorical nouns in some other-space, has been a part of our language for centuries.

Then, I submit, your sensation of selfhood is different from that of most and I guess likely influenced by your own learnings in this area. Like I said, fair enough.

However, for most people, and I mean those who barely know who Descartes and Plato were (no disrespect), their intuitive sensation of selfhood is close to what I described. Descartes' "homunculus" is how people, in my experience, figure selfhood because, intuitively, this is what it feels like. They report that it feels as though there is some enduring self watching what's going on around them and taking decisions.

This matter aside, it still seems to me that you are asserting a qualitative difference to your brain, when contrasted with a computer, in that you conclude that someone is experiencing, as opposed to a machine simply processing data. Does it not seem more likely that the brain has developed a means to create an illusory sense of self as opposed to being qualitatively different? Can you explain me more here?

Nick

[Nick227]

How would you even begin to conclude this? What data do you have about mine? What data do you have about "most"?

From you I just have what you write. From others I have experience derived from years of various therapy, satsang and awareness intensives where people's intuitive understanding of selfhood very frequently comes up or is just openly discussed. I've also been reading Blackmore's "Consciousness - An Introduction" where she also formulates this "standard" sense of selfhood.

Nick

[westprog]

With this definition as your starting point, there is no other conclusion but dualism, and the HPC remains the HPC, and consciousness remains magic.

There. That was easy. It always is, when one assumes one's conclusions.

We can assume that consciousness is behavioural, or non-behavioural - each is an assumption.

My observation of consciousness is that it isn't a behaviour. If that leads to unpalatable conclusions, so be it. I'm not going to alter my view of what consciousness is* in order to derive answers that come easier.

*while accepting that consciousness remains elusively undefined, if not definable.

[leon_heller]

By this definition, how do you ever infer that someone else is or is not conscious? Do you simply give up on that usage of the term?

I'm quite sure that I'm conscious but I don't have any way of establishing that anyone else is. I assume that they are, though.

One day we will have something observable, but we definitely don't at present.

Leon

[Nick227]

How would you even begin to conclude this? What data do you have about mine? What data do you have about "most"?

From you I just have what you write. From others I have experience derived from years of various therapy, satsang and awareness intensives where people's intuitive understanding of selfhood very frequently comes up. I've also been reading Blackmore's "Consciousness - An Introduction" where she also formulates this "standard" sense of selfhood.

So what I'm basically asking, in my post to 3bz, is whether many consciousness researchers have themselves adequately grasped models of selfhood consistent with data to make meaningful statements about the subject? Dennett himself, I've read, points out that there are many who claim to be thoroughly materialist yet who, on examination, still reveal in their thinking traces of the Cartesian vision of self. Presumably this occurs because the intuitive model of selfhood is so entrenched in our perspective it is not so easy to shake as one assumes. I am just concerned that you are not one of these.

Nick

[westprog]

I really, really really don't get what you continue to say about this "someone" who is observing. We are active, perceiving organisms. Do you really think it feels like you are a homunculus stuck inside a meat puppet?

I see trees, and cats, and my laptop computer. I am not "an observer, viewing the images my body sends to my brain as qualia of trees, cats..." frankly, I don't even know how to express that, it is so foreign to me.

I feel I should blame Descartes, or maybe even Plato. This prescientific mentalistic vocabulary that reifies actions, then tries to locate the metaphorical nouns in some other-space, has been a part of our language for centuries. But seriously--do you actually *feel* like there is a you inside of the you that is you? That way madness lies...

If your meatpuppet body needs a homunculus to perceive for it, then how does the homunculus do it? Does it get its own hemihomunculus? And it, its own hemidemihomunculus?

Turtles.

The concept of the homunculus inside the body already assumes the body and the world as being as we see them. As has been pointed out, the continuous world and the continuous self are illusory - constructed anew from memory every instant. The world we percieve is not the same as the "real" world.

[Darat]

...snip...

However, for most people, and I mean those who barely know who Descartes and Plato were (no disrespect), their intuitive sensation of selfhood is close to what I described. Descartes' "homunculus" is how people, in my experience, figure selfhood because, intuitively, this is what it feels like.


...snip...

I strongly disagree but I better admit up front this is not something that I can support with a quick paste of a link to a website.

It was the affect of works by the likes of Descartes that helped shape our current language usage and resulted in the inherent dualism in the language we use to talk about "our minds". If you read works prior to around the 1500 people do not talk about this separate/dualism in anything approaching the terms of a separate experience and the like.

An opinion I have is that this helps demonstrates some of what Merc has been posting about. I.e. one of the reasons we struggle with the concept of conciousness is because we have learnt because of the constraints of our language to describe the world around us (and by that I mean "both" private (nee subjective) and public (nee objective) behaviours) in a dualistic manner. The apparent dualism arises completely and utterly from the language we have acquired and then use to describe the world around us. This is why we struggle to describe the world around us in our every day language. As a "for instance" the problems we have of being able to conceptualise what is going on with the dual-slit experiment in physics.

[Mercutio]

We can assume that consciousness is behavioural, or non-behavioural - each is an assumption.
Actually, no. We do start off with some assumptions, but we do not need to start off by assuming the very thing we eventually conclude. I do not start off assuming that consciousness is behavioral, for instance. (What I do assume, and what I conclude, has been posted already; I don't know how I can make it clearer.)

My observation of consciousness is that it isn't a behaviour. If that leads to unpalatable conclusions, so be it. I'm not going to alter my view of what consciousness is* in order to derive answers that come easier.
It is not so much that they are unpalatable, as that they are illogical and at odds with observable evidence. But don't let that alter your view.

*while accepting that consciousness remains elusively undefined, if not definable.Sometimes keeping a moving target is useful, if your aim is not to hit it.

[Mercutio]

Much as I hate to say it, I agree with Darat completely.

[westprog]

I strongly disagree but I better admit up front this is not something that I can support with a quick paste of a link to a website.

It was the affect of works by the likes of Descartes that helped shape our current language usage and resulted in the inherent dualism in the language we use to talk about "our minds". If you read works prior to around the 1500 people do not talk about this separate/dualism in anything approaching the terms of a separate experience and the like.


I have read that the ancient Greeks referred to emotions in terms of being literally possessed by the personification of the emotion being felt. I don't know for sure if this it true, but it would certainly imply a different way to feel about it.

[leon_heller]

Interesting, hmmm.

What is "sense of "self" "? How would you describe it, is it perceptions of a body?

What is "other aspect of consciousness" ?

i grant you that people talk a lot about these things but when they begin to actualy define them, then the discussion is interesrting.

try to explain your terms please, use metaphors and analogies if needed. :)

I was thinking of qualia, for instance, as another aspect.

A simple thought experiment should illustrate what I mean by "self". I saw this argument in a TV programme about consciousness some years ago.

Let's assume that a matter transporter has been invented, with every atom etc. in a person being scanned and the data transmitted to a remote location where the person is reconstructed. To avoid a proliferation of identical people it will be necessary to destroy the original person. Although the copy will be identical in every way to the original, with all its memories intact, most people would not want to use the machine, because they will feel that something - what could be termed their "self" - is going to be destroyed.

Leon

[Mercutio]

I was thinking of qualia, for instance, as another aspect.

A simple thought experiment should illustrate what I mean by "self". I saw this argument in a TV programme about consciousness some years ago.

Let's assume that a matter transporter has been invented, with every atom etc. in a person being scanned and the data transmitted to a remote location where the person is reconstructed. To avoid a proliferation of identical people it will be necessary to destroy the original person. Although the copy will be identical in every way to the original, with all its memories intact, most people would not want to use the machine, because they will feel that something - what could be termed their "self" - is going to be destroyed.

LeonBut the original person *is* destroyed. You say so right there: "destroy the original person". Something--what could be termed their "self"--is, in fact destroyed. Something else entirely--what could be termed their "self"--is also being created. This thought experiment does not point to anything at all that actually *is* somehow distinct from the person and could be termed their "self".

[leon_heller]

But the original person *is* destroyed. You say so right there: "destroy the original person". Something--what could be termed their "self"--is, in fact destroyed. Something else entirely--what could be termed their "self"--is also being created. This thought experiment does not point to anything at all that actually *is* somehow distinct from the person and could be termed their "self".

Although it's illogical, I'm quite sure that most people would refuse to use such a system. If asked, they would probably say that something like their "self" has been destroyed. The fact that it would, in fact, survive, would be immaterial. Would you use it?

Leon

[Darat]

And many people won't fly in a plane even today. However I don't think objections to something that given our current understanding of the universe is in fact impossible forms a good basis for an argument of the existence of ideas such as qualia.

[Nick227]

I strongly disagree but I better admit up front this is not something that I can support with a quick paste of a link to a website.

It was the affect of works by the likes of Descartes that helped shape our current language usage and resulted in the inherent dualism in the language we use to talk about "our minds". If you read works prior to around the 1500 people do not talk about this separate/dualism in anything approaching the terms of a separate experience and the like.

I hear your disagreement. Fair enough. I must admit I had not thought much about the cultural element in selfhood from this specific perspective.

It's seems to me that there are clear biological factors for aspects of selfhood - body map and mirroring for example. But the "I" is much more from language, I think. This whole subject, how the various forces of the body and culture interweave would make for interesting debate.

Nick

[Belz...]

In which case, being observable by more than one person, they will be public. Nothing else about them will change.

Precisely.

[Nick227]

But the original person *is* destroyed. You say so right there: "destroy the original person". Something--what could be termed their "self"--is, in fact destroyed. Something else entirely--what could be termed their "self"--is also being created. This thought experiment does not point to anything at all that actually *is* somehow distinct from the person and could be termed their "self".

Yes, but if you say that it's replicated entirely, like that thing they used to have on Star Trek (I appreciate that this is not science fact), then this seems to me a reasonable basis for a thought experiment.

Would you take the teleport challenge? Just imagine getting into the machine and pushing the switch. What's the gut feeling? For me it would be the belief that continuity of self would somehow be broken by my body being deconstructed. It seems crazy that what appears to be the centre of the narrative, my very own "I," could survive my body being deconstituted and reappearing a few thousand miles away. Yet this is irrational in the face of the likely reality that there is no persisting self anyway. Our sense of selfhood is constantly being constructed and destroyed and it only seems continuous because of memories, repetitive behaviours and other phenomenas.

I think it's a good thought experiment.

Nick

[Belz...]

Observation. People belief in selfhood. They believe they have an "I." They believe they have a persisting "I." Yet, there is very little empiric evidence to suggest that this is true. Thus I think it's reasonable to say that the brain creates this sensation of a persisting "I" though aspects of its activity. Elsewise you're back in "soul" territory.

Unfortunately that also works for a whole set of non-existent things.

People believe in homeopathy. They believe that homeopathy works. They believe that it works consistently. Yet, there is very little empiric evidence to suggest that this is true. This I think it's reasonable to say that the brain creates this sensation of a consistent homeopathy...

And yet it doesn't exist.

Sit down and watch it.

Sure thing, Nick. Yep. Watch my mind.

I can catch myself in the process of about to take a course of action and think about what I'm really doing.

Nope. Your "conscious experience", assuming we all agree on what it means if extant, simply reflects what's already occured. So you don't catch yourself doing anything. You just notice the result.

[Belz...]

I feel I should blame Descartes, or maybe even Plato. This prescientific mentalistic vocabulary that reifies actions, then tries to locate the metaphorical nouns in some other-space, has been a part of our language for centuries. But seriously--do you actually *feel* like there is a you inside of the you that is you?

I agree. In fact, I couldn't even tell you where "me" stops and "the rest" begins.

[Dancing David]

I wouldn't call it a "convention" so much. To me that implies a degree of knowledge aforethought that is inconsistent with what people clearly believe.

Oh sure, i agree, but that leads to the issue of, what are people worry-ing about when they worry about what will happen a year from now.
It is good to provide food and shelter for the body.

People worry alot about about illusiory things like "What will other people think".

If there is no self, or no persisting self, then it seems to me that the HPC is reduced considerably, though like the issue with objectivity and the same phenomenon I'm not sure how much.

Nick

Well the real issue is that some people don't want to define what they mean by consciousness.

(Mainly for the reasons most people don't think about things, convention.)

[westprog]

And yet it doesn't exist.



Your "conscious experience", assuming we all agree on what it means if extant


Well, does it or doesn't it?

[Mercutio]

Yes, but if you say that it's replicated entirely, like that thing they used to have on Star Trek (I appreciate that this is not science fact), then this seems to me a reasonable basis for a thought experiment.
[snip]
I think it's a good thought experiment.

Nick

Except that it does not make the distinction you need it to. You say that it would be "the self" that is destroyed, but your thought experiment also quite clearly destroys more than that, while simultaneously creating a replacement. There is no reason, even in the thought experiment, to suggest that any effect at all could not be accounted for by the process.

Which leaves us with "if you assume there is more, there is more. If you assume there is not, there is not." And, to me, that is not interesting at all.

[Belz...]

There are many reasons to believe that the Universe is a fiction imposed upon a transitory state of being.

Actually, there isn't. Name one.

[Nick227]

And many people won't fly in a plane even today. However I don't think objections to something that given our current understanding of the universe is in fact impossible forms a good basis for an argument of the existence of ideas such as qualia.

It's still valid, imo, as a thought experiment. You can ask people to articulate their objections. If it's because no one's made one yet then fair enough. I'm sure other people would find they have selfhood issues. I think a lot of useful data could still be got and, on a personal level, you do get to find out if there is still a closet Cartesian lurking beneath the surface.

Nick

[Dancing David]

I'm more questioning whether anyone is actually observing them. There is the sensation of there being someone there, but is it real or illusion?

Nick

Illusion, trick of language, associative network.

It is like the fast car.

is a car fast when it is not moving?

[Belz...]

However, for most people, and I mean those who barely know who Descartes and Plato were (no disrespect), their intuitive sensation of selfhood is close to what I described.

People are notoriously bad at intuition.

I'm quite sure that I'm conscious

Yeah, but ARE you ?

[Belz...]

Although it's illogical, I'm quite sure that most people would refuse to use such a system. If asked, they would probably say that something like their "self" has been destroyed. The fact that it would, in fact, survive, would be immaterial. Would you use it?

I wouldn't. Because, in fact, there is nothing beyond the physical "self". If you break it up into little molecules and put it back together in the same way, you still get another instance of the person, not the person you had in the beginning. It'll act the same way, though.

Otherwise, do you believe that, if we instead COPY the person rather than teleport him, the "consciousness" will be present in both bodies ? I don't think so.

[Dancing David]

The problem with the observation of consciousness is that what is being observed is the act of observation itself. Whenever we think about consciousness, what we observe is what are consciousness is like when we are thinking about consciousness.

I know it might seem like it, but I don't think about consciousness all of the time. The very fact of observing the state of one's mind is likely to alter the state of one's mind. That is why I believe very little about consciousness except that it exists.


Lets try this

The problem with the observation of organic process is that what is being observed is the act of observation itself. Whenever we think about organic process, what we observe is what our organic process is like when we are thinking about organic process.

I know it might seem like it, but I don't think about organic process all of the time. The very fact of observing the state of one's mind is likely to alter the state of one's mind. That is why I believe very little about organic process except that it exists.

[Belz...]

Well, does it or doesn't it?

Not really. I was using it for the sake of argument. Please try to keep up.

[Dancing David]

What exactly are you asking for here? Is it that you want me to define consciousness? Is that it? Look, just say so.

Defining consciousness is step one of the problem. So far I've gotten a non-behavioural mental state, but that doesn't really narrow it down enough.

I think I jave asked for a defintion of what this 'experience of consciousness' is like, quite repeatedly.

:)

[Dancing David]

*while accepting that consciousness remains elusively undefined, if not definable.

So the hard problem of consciousness becomes the
hard problem of elusively undefined, if not definable.

[Mercutio]

Otherwise, do you believe that, if we instead COPY the person rather than teleport him, the "consciousness" will be present in both bodies ? I don't think so.

Why not? Each person would be conscious, and that person's consciousness would be inferred from their public and private behavior, which is reducible to their copied bodies in their environments. Of course, their experiences would start to diverge at the moment of copying, so they would not "share one consciousness" (Interesting Ian assumed that materialism means that they would; he was wrong).

Have you seen The Prestige?

[Dancing David]

I was thinking of qualia, for instance, as another aspect.

A simple thought experiment should illustrate what I mean by "self". I saw this argument in a TV programme about consciousness some years ago.

Let's assume that a matter transporter has been invented, with every atom etc. in a person being scanned and the data transmitted to a remote location where the person is reconstructed. To avoid a proliferation of identical people it will be necessary to destroy the original person. Although the copy will be identical in every way to the original, with all its memories intact, most people would not want to use the machine, because they will feel that something - what could be termed their "self" - is going to be destroyed.

Leon


happens everyday, every moment, the self in an illusion, i am not the person who started the post when I finish typing it. the self that wakes in the morning is not the self that went to sleep.

the persistance of memory is part of the illusion of selfhood. the ship of praxis is replaced piece by piece, is it the same ship?

they fear transportation for the same reason some people fear a photograph will capture the soul.

[leon_heller]

I wouldn't. Because, in fact, there is nothing beyond the physical "self". If you break it up into little molecules and put it back together in the same way, you still get another instance of the person, not the person you had in the beginning. It'll act the same way, though.

Otherwise, do you believe that, if we instead COPY the person rather than teleport him, the "consciousness" will be present in both bodies ? I don't think so.

You seem to be implying that a zombie, in the philosophical sense, is created at the remote location. Is that the case?

Leon

[Darat]

The HPC in fact becomes:

If something (that we can't provide a definition for) existed and that something turned out to be not explainable by science then there would be a problem.

[Nick227]

In which case, being observable by more than one person, they will be public. Nothing else about them will change.
Nope. Your "conscious experience", assuming we all agree on what it means if extant, simply reflects what's already occured. So you don't catch yourself doing anything. You just notice the result.

I doubt if in actuality it's even as strong as that! If we take, for example, Dennett's answer to the issue of non-persisting self (Multiple Drafts Theory), then probing the stream of multiple narratives the brain is constantly constructing and asking "what's going on" will for sure produce a result. Whether that result bears any semblance to what is actually going on depends on a variety of factors hard to assess.

However, given our current lack of neuroscientific data from the wonderful world of human ideation, then such techniques seem to at least offer something.

Nick

[Nick227]

I agree. In fact, I couldn't even tell you where "me" stops and "the rest" begins.

You don't have a sense of where your body stops?

Nick

[Nick227]

Except that it does not make the distinction you need it to. You say that it would be "the self" that is destroyed, but your thought experiment also quite clearly destroys more than that, while simultaneously creating a replacement. There is no reason, even in the thought experiment, to suggest that any effect at all could not be accounted for by the process.

Which leaves us with "if you assume there is more, there is more. If you assume there is not, there is not." And, to me, that is not interesting at all.

I'm not saying the self would be destroyed, I'm using the proposed thought experiment as a means to gauge actual belief in persisting, Descartes-style selfhood.

If one is, at some level, clinging to the notion of a homunculus or similar, then there will be anxiety coming up if one puts oneself in the position of using this transporter. This is because there will still be the belief that there is something intrinsic to selfhood that is not material, something that could be lost here.

Nick

[Nick227]

I wouldn't. Because, in fact, there is nothing beyond the physical "self". If you break it up into little molecules and put it back together in the same way, you still get another instance of the person, not the person you had in the beginning. It'll act the same way, though.

Otherwise, do you believe that, if we instead COPY the person rather than teleport him, the "consciousness" will be present in both bodies ? I don't think so.

If there's nothing beyond the physical self I don't see the problem. Can you articulate your issue more here?

What's the problem with creating two? And what "consciousness?" Seems to me you still believe in the persisting self. {transport room to Kirk, transport room to Kirk. He's refusing to get in the teleporter, Captain. I think we may have a dualist on board}

Nick

[westprog]

I think I jave asked for a defintion of what this 'experience of consciousness' is like, quite repeatedly.

:)

I know you jave.

Try thinking about "red" for a second. That will give you a flavour of what it's like.

[Mercutio]

Try thinking about "red" for a second.

I thought about "red" for a second.

Then I had the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the perception of the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the quale of the perception of the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.
That will give you a flavour of what it's like.Tastes like turtle soup.

[leon_heller]

Yes, but if you say that it's replicated entirely, like that thing they used to have on Star Trek (I appreciate that this is not science fact), then this seems to me a reasonable basis for a thought experiment.

Would you take the teleport challenge? Just imagine getting into the machine and pushing the switch. What's the gut feeling? For me it would be the belief that continuity of self would somehow be broken by my body being deconstructed. It seems crazy that what appears to be the centre of the narrative, my very own "I," could survive my body being deconstituted and reappearing a few thousand miles away. Yet this is irrational in the face of the likely reality that there is no persisting self anyway. Our sense of selfhood is constantly being constructed and destroyed and it only seems continuous because of memories, repetitive behaviours and other phenomenas.

I think it's a good thought experiment.

Nick

Nick, I think you've hit the nail on the head. That seems to be the reason why people would be averse to being teleported.

Ken Campbell's Channel 4 Brainspotting 1996 series about consciousness was very good. Someone has put it on Youtube:

http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=7txnzRPHjF4

Leon

[westprog]

So the hard problem of consciousness becomes the
hard problem of elusively undefined, if not definable.


Getting a good definition is a necessary step, yes.

[westprog]

Actually, there isn't. Name one.


If we only experience the universe through our conscious mind, and the mind can't be relied on, then how can the universe be considered real?

If the mind through which we percieve the universe and the passage of time is illusory, then how can it be a reliable tool with which to judge the existence of something else?

[westprog]

Tastes like turtle soup.


And the apparently entirely unnecessary experience of tasting turtle soup is at the heart of the problem. Why taste turtle soup? The system all works fine without that taste experience.

[skiba]

I thought about "red" for a second.

Then I had the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the perception of the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the quale of the perception of the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.


I think you're stuck between infinite regression and the magic of consciousness

[leon_heller]

Yes, but if you say that it's replicated entirely, like that thing they used to have on Star Trek (I appreciate that this is not science fact), then this seems to me a reasonable basis for a thought experiment.

Would you take the teleport challenge? Just imagine getting into the machine and pushing the switch. What's the gut feeling? For me it would be the belief that continuity of self would somehow be broken by my body being deconstructed. It seems crazy that what appears to be the centre of the narrative, my very own "I," could survive my body being deconstituted and reappearing a few thousand miles away. Yet this is irrational in the face of the likely reality that there is no persisting self anyway. Our sense of selfhood is constantly being constructed and destroyed and it only seems continuous because of memories, repetitive behaviours and other phenomenas.

I think it's a good thought experiment.

Nick

I've been thinking about this some more.

As far as the teleportee is concerned, I believe that as far as he is concerned, he will instantly be in the remote location, with his consciousness intact. I don't think I'd have any reservations about this mode of travel.

Leon

[Mercutio]

And the apparently entirely unnecessary experience of tasting turtle soup is at the heart of the problem. Why taste turtle soup? The system all works fine without that taste experience.

Yes, it does, I agree. The addition of any "consciousness" baggage does not help whatsoever. Not even the first turtle.

[westprog]

I've been thinking about this some more.

As far as the teleportee is concerned, I believe that he will instantly be in the remote location, with his consciousness intact, and still be himself. I don't think I'd have any reservations about this mode of travel after all.

Leon

What you didn't realise when you made these posts was that you were actually left behind and a perfect copy arrived at your destination in Hawaii. There are now two of you - hence the two posts.

Now you're told that the system has been fixed, and you can return home. This time a copy of you will arrive back in Venice, but the one in Hawaii will be disintegrated. Now what?

[westprog]

Yes, it does, I agree. The addition of any "consciousness" baggage does not help whatsoever. Not even the first turtle.

It isn't necessary except for the fact that I can taste turtle soup.

Strangely enough, I'm fairly sure that Nick, Belz, Mercutio and Dancing David can also taste their soup. I find it odd that they aren't as baffled by the concept as I am.

[Darat]

What you didn't realise when you made these posts was that you were actually left behind and a perfect copy arrived at your destination in Hawaii. There are now two of you - hence the two posts.

Now you're told that the system has been fixed, and you can return home. This time a copy of you will arrive back in Venice, but the one in Hawaii will be disintegrated. Now what?

Now what, what?

[Mercutio]

It isn't necessary except for the fact that I can taste turtle soup.

Strangely enough, I'm fairly sure that Nick, Belz, Mercutio and Dancing David can also taste their soup. I find it odd that they aren't as baffled by the concept as I am.

That's because they taste the soup. They don't taste the experience.

It is, as Darat suggested, the additional layer of verbal "explanation" that remains unexplained.

[Darat]

It isn't necessary except for the fact that I can taste turtle soup.

Strangely enough, I'm fairly sure that Nick, Belz, Mercutio and Dancing David can also taste their soup. I find it odd that they aren't as baffled by the concept as I am.

Why doesn't the fact that you can't find my "ran" once I stopped baffle you? The concept is after all the same.

[Jeff Corey]

If we only experience the universe through our conscious mind, and the mind can't be relied on, then how can the universe be considered real?

If the mind through which we percieve the universe and the passage of time is illusory, then how can it be a reliable tool with which to judge the existence of something else?

Now, in addition to "consciousness" you've added a "mind"?
Clearly dualistic.

[leon_heller]

What you didn't realise when you made these posts was that you were actually left behind and a perfect copy arrived at your destination in Hawaii. There are now two of you - hence the two posts.

Now you're told that the system has been fixed, and you can return home. This time a copy of you will arrive back in Venice, but the one in Hawaii will be disintegrated. Now what?

The teleportation machine will have to be constructed so that scenario can't happen. Perhaps the data can be buffered and not transmitted until the old version of me has been destroyed. :)

Leon

[westprog]

The HPC in fact becomes:

If something (that we can't provide a definition for) existed and that something turned out to be not explainable by science then there would be a problem.

There's no reason to think that consciousness isn't explicable by science. There's every reason to think that it hasn't been explained by science.

[westprog]

Why doesn't the fact that you can't find my "ran" once I stopped baffle you? The concept is after all the same.

We could call "consciousness" the process of what goes on, behaviourally, with a human being's mentality. If we do that, it's equivalent to "ran" - just a name for something we observe. But that's not what it is.

[Mercutio]

We could call "consciousness" the process of what goes on, behaviourally, with a human being's mentality. If we do that, it's equivalent to "ran" - just a name for something we observe. But that's not what it is.

Looks like there was a forum glitch (Damn you, Darat!) before you could finish. My guess is it was supposed to begin with "We know this because...".

[Mercutio]

We could call "consciousness" the process of what goes on, behaviourally, with a human being's mentality.

You are still not getting the full picture. You are trying to use the vocabulary of one level (the behavior of the organism in its environment) on the reductionistic (if I charitably assume that by "mentality" you mean brain activity) or dualistic (if you actually did mean mind) explanations of a whole different level.

Perhaps "that's not what it is" is simply a reflection of this confusion of levels of explanation.

[westprog]

That's because they taste the soup. They don't taste the experience.


No, they taste the experience.

It is, as Darat suggested, the additional layer of verbal "explanation" that remains unexplained.

Until physics can explain what tasting soup feels like, then we have a gap in our knowlege.

[Mercutio]

No, they taste the experience.
Thank you for illustrating my (and Darat's) point. "The experience" is a reified metaphor; there is no entity called "the experience". We taste soup, we smell roses, we see smiling faces, we hear music. We create, in our language, a category to encompass all these verbs and more--experiencing--and then, because our language works this way, we take this action and make a noun out of it. You can talk about "experiencing the taste of soup", or of "tasting soup"; in the latter case, the object is real, and the verb is a specific activity (or behavior), while in the former, the noun is a reified verb, and the verb is one step removed from what is actually happening. (And what you are looking at is yet once again removed, as experiencing taste has been changed to grokking the experience of the taste of the soup.)

You have been suckered by your language community; you are looking for things that do not exist.

Until physics can explain what tasting soup feels like, then we have a gap in our knowlege. Do you give directions on how to drive to the store in terms of the chemistry of combustion? There is a reason for different levels of explanation; reductionism is not explanation, if the question is at a different level. The chemistry of combustion is the same whether you drive East or West; the explanation you want is not something physics can ever give you, nor should it.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Everything from the beating of the heart to returning a tennis serve are done without the conscious mind intervening. But the evaluation of the world is done via the conscious mind.
Yes, if you define evaluation as only pertaining to conscious decision making. However, I appear to be evaluating and responding to the environment continuously, with no need for most of it to be conscious.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No, they taste the experience.
Experience has a taste? Are you a synesthete?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You seem to be implying that a zombie, in the philosophical sense, is created at the remote location. Is that the case?
That's what Interesting Ian thinks. And he thinks the zombie would be dead.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And the apparently entirely unnecessary experience of tasting turtle soup is at the heart of the problem. Why taste turtle soup? The system all works fine without that taste experience.
I don't think I would do as good a job planning ahead for the next predator attack if I didn't have the sense that it was "me" that was responding to the predator. I might just sit around and let my buddy Fred respond for me.

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

I know you jave.

Try thinking about "red" for a second. That will give you a flavour of what it's like.

Thinking about red, that doesn't say much.

Verbal cognition about red, association of objects that are red, weak visualization of the color red (I am not able to create misualizations well), memories about the color red. Which part is the consciousness, it is starting to sound rather like, um, something that doesn't exist.

So you still avoid the defintion.

No hard problem of consciousness here, just a lack of defintion.

[Dancing David]

I'm not saying the self would be destroyed, I'm using the proposed thought experiment as a means to gauge actual belief in persisting, Descartes-style selfhood.

If one is, at some level, clinging to the notion of a homunculus or similar, then there will be anxiety coming up if one puts oneself in the position of using this transporter. This is because there will still be the belief that there is something intrinsic to selfhood that is not material, something that could be lost here.

Nick


And there is also a belief that the Big Burrito lost the Cosmic Cafe to the Flying Spaghetti Monster. Not much use besides an analogy there.

Belief is what it is. Belief in the self does not make it so, I would hop in the transporter, I do every second and every time I fall asleep.

[Dancing David]

If we only experience the universe through our conscious mind, and the mind can't be relied on, then how can the universe be considered real?

If the mind through which we percieve the universe and the passage of time is illusory, then how can it be a reliable tool with which to judge the existence of something else?


It can't, it just appears to be self consistent. regardless of it being material monism or mental monism.

Objects fall towards the surface of the earth at 16 feet/sec2.

It could all be illusion but the appearance of isotropy is cool. No deviation in the behavior of the objects in the apparent world.

[Dancing David]

You don't have a sense of where your body stops?

Nick

Not when I am off my medication, then I have all sorts of intrusive thoughts, loose associations and magical emotion/thoughts of association. My perceptual bounds are consistent but the emotional, intuitive, cognitive ones get blown.

[Dancing David]

It isn't necessary except for the fact that I can taste turtle soup.

Strangely enough, I'm fairly sure that Nick, Belz, Mercutio and Dancing David can also taste their soup. I find it odd that they aren't as baffled by the concept as I am.

I'm not baffled, I perceive through sensations.

Any luck ripping out your tounge, will the soup taste better?

Maybe you are possesed by the magic words that lack referents to communication. Such solipism is the equivalent of staring into the flashlight of enlightenment.

[Darat]

Getting a good definition is a necessary step, yes.


So come up with a good definition and then plug it into the HPC and see if the HPC "argument" still stands.

[Darat]

There's no reason to think that consciousness isn't explicable by science. There's every reason to think that it hasn't been explained by science.

Which doesn't alter the incoherence inherent in the formulation of the HPC as it is. If you wish to drop the HPC and swap to what I called the DPC (Difficult Problem of Consciousness) I doubt anyone would be arguing with you.

[Nick227]

I've been thinking about this some more.

As far as the teleportee is concerned, I believe that as far as he is concerned, he will instantly be in the remote location, with his consciousness intact. I don't think I'd have any reservations about this mode of travel.

Leon

As I see it, I would walk into the teleport pod and push the button. My body would dematerialise. As my still somewhat Cartesian mind sees it, I would at that point die. However, an exact copy of my body would emerge at the destination pod. It would have all my memories. It would recall my getting into the pod. It would recall my anxiety at pushing the button. It would no doubt emerge and say "Hey, this is OK!"

Nothing has actually been lost. For me it is simply my irrational belief in a persisting self that causes me to consider that I have died in this process. In actuality, I do not think it is much different from going to sleep or being under general anaesthetic for a few hours.

This suggests to me another, similar thought experiment. If you consider that you are in deep sleep and someone takes away your body and replaces it with an identical one, what would be really lost? The new body would wake up. It would remember going to sleep. It would form its usual transitory sense of selfhood and experience continuity in this from memory and its similar traits. It would get up and go about its daily business none the wiser. No one around would notice a difference and its inner world would just be the same as usual.

It seems to me that the only thing that's likely to create anxiety in considering these experiments, aside from issues around the machine maybe not working in the first one, is the belief in a persisting self.

Nick

[Nick227]

I thought about "red" for a second.

Then I had the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the perception of the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Then I had the quale of the perception of the awareness of the experience of consciousness of thinking about red.

Tastes like turtle soup.

How do you assess to what degree the results of this investigating of what is going on resembles what actually is going on? It seems to me you are taking selfhood, and the notion of an experiencer, to be a given. Tastes more like duality soup than turtle to me!

Nick

[Nick227]

I've been thinking about this some more.

As far as the teleportee is concerned, I believe that as far as he is concerned, he will instantly be in the remote location, with his consciousness intact. I don't think I'd have any reservations about this mode of travel.

Leon

Could you explain this a bit more. What do you mean by "his consciousness?" Does it have to be instant?

Nick

[Belz...]

You seem to be implying that a zombie, in the philosophical sense, is created at the remote location. Is that the case?

That would imply dualism.

What I said, is that through the teleporting event, the "you" that is reassembled at the destination is not the same you. Sure enough, he shares all your traits and memories, but "you" ceased to exist at the start of the procedure. If you believe otherwise, then you must believe that a copy of you created by a similar device would share your consciousness, which makes no sense at all.

[Belz...]

You don't have a sense of where your body stops?

By "your body" you of course mean "you", right ?

What I said, actually, is that I have no clear indication of the separating line between "me" and the world around me. My "mind", so to speak, is not something I feel I could pull out and put in a bottle, contra what other posters have implied.

I think a lot of people think of their "consciousness" as being far more distinct from other perceptions than is justifiable.

[Belz...]

If there's nothing beyond the physical self I don't see the problem. Can you articulate your issue more here?

What's the problem with creating two? And what "consciousness?" Seems to me you still believe in the persisting self. {transport room to Kirk, transport room to Kirk. He's refusing to get in the teleporter, Captain. I think we may have a dualist on board}

If you had bothered to actually read my post, you wouldn't have said something like that. I was saying the exact opposite.

[Belz...]

If we only experience the universe through our conscious mind, and the mind can't be relied on, then how can the universe be considered real?

1) Consistency. Anything you imagine, dream or hallucinate will present discrepancies. Reality doesn't.

2) If solipsism is true, and since we also experience our mind, then nothing, even the self, can be considered real.

Solipsism is a bankrupt philosophy because of those two points. You HAVE to start with an assumption, one way or another, and the best assumption is that something exists.

If the mind through which we percieve the universe and the passage of time is illusory, then how can it be a reliable tool with which to judge the existence of something else?

Does it really make a difference ?

[Nick227]

That would imply dualism.

What I said, is that through the teleporting event, the "you" that is reassembled at the destination is not the same you. Sure enough, he shares all your traits and memories, but "you" ceased to exist at the start of the procedure. If you believe otherwise, then you must believe that a copy of you created by a similar device would share your consciousness, which makes no sense at all.

It's not the same "you." This is correct. The teleport device might be able to construct a scientifically-indistinguishable version of your body but it is not the same body. Thus, when you hit the "teleport now" button, if you still believe in Cartesian-style selfhood then you will believe that you will die.

Only a true monist will get in the device, or otherwise someone who just doesn't understand the implications.

Nick

[Belz...]

No, they taste the experience.

And I thought we had gotten rid of those damn "qualias".

What's an experience made of, exactly ?

[Belz...]

It's not the same "you." This is correct. The teleport device might be able to construct a scientifically-indistinguishable version of your body but it is not the same body. Thus, when you hit the "teleport now" button, if you still believe in Cartesian-style selfhood then you will believe that you will die.

And I will be right. From another person's point of view it doesn't matter, but to me it sure as hell does.

I'll take the shuttlecraft, thank you.

[Nick227]

If you had bothered to actually read my post, you wouldn't have said something like that. I was saying the exact opposite.

I read your post. As I saw it, it was entrenched in dualism. You won't get in the teleporter because you seem to believe there is a persisting self, or consciousness, that will be lost. That's how I read it.

I think I'm starting to sound like Senator McCarthy now! The great duality witch-hunt!

Nick

[Nick227]

And I will be right. From another person's point of view it doesn't matter, but to me it sure as hell does.

I'll take the shuttlecraft, thank you.

Then I think you either need to admit your lifelong affiliation to dualism, despite presenting yourself otherwise, or else explain how there can be a persisting self ("I") without duality. As I see it, only a true monist will use the teleport.

You woke up this morning, or at least I assume you did. How do you know it was the same body as the one that went to sleep the night before? How could you know?

Also, consider the environment. The teleporter could diminish our carbon footprint big-time [/emotional blackmail]

Nick

[Darat]

It's not the same "you." This is correct. The teleport device might be able to construct a scientifically-indistinguishable version of your body but it is not the same body. Thus, when you hit the "teleport now" button, if you still believe in Cartesian-style selfhood then you will believe that you will die.

...snip...

Only because you're not quite thinking the experiment through. (Have to say I often think is one of the most "unprofound but meant to be profound" thought experiments there is.)


DaratA enters teleporterA

DaratB is created by teleporterB


There are now two people - DaratA and DaratB.


Whether DaratB is indistinguishable from DaratA is totally irrelevant to the fact that destroying either of the Darats means that someone will have died.

[Nick227]

Only because you're not quite thinking the experiment through. (Have to say I often think is one other most "unprofound but meant to be profound" thought experiments there is.)


DaratA enters teleporterA

DaratB is created by teleporterB


There are now two people - DaratA and DaratB.


Whether DaratB is indistinguishable from DaratA is totally irrelevant to the fact that destroying either of the Darats means that someone will have died.

No one will have died. A body will have ceased to be.

Again, how do you know that the body called Darat that woke up this morning is the same one that went to sleep? If it had been replaced in the night by an identical version how would you know?

Nick

[Darat]

Sorry but your arithmetic is failing you! Remember 1 + 1 = 2 :D

This is what happens in your teleporter:

DaratA > DaratA & DaratB > DaratB

Where is DaratA at the end of it?

[leon_heller]

Could you explain this a bit more. What do you mean by "his consciousness?" Does it have to be instant?

Nick


His brain state, if you like.

It will seem to be instant to the teleportee.

Leon

[Nick227]

Sorry but your arithmetic is failing you! Remember 1 + 1 = 2 :D

This is what happens in your teleporter:

DaratA > DaratA & DaratB > DaratB

Where is DaratA at the end of it?

Darat A has ceased to be. You could say that Darat A has died, but I find this potentially a misleading (or over-emotive) term here in that usually identical replicas are not created in death.

Your belief that someone has died here to me indicates that you are still considering selfhood as something inviolable and not simply a recreatable process. If there is, in actuality, no persisting self, as evidence strongly suggests, then no one is dying here.

Nick

[leon_heller]

That would imply dualism.

What I said, is that through the teleporting event, the "you" that is reassembled at the destination is not the same you. Sure enough, he shares all your traits and memories, but "you" ceased to exist at the start of the procedure. If you believe otherwise, then you must believe that a copy of you created by a similar device would share your consciousness, which makes no sense at all.

The brain will be identical, with all the neurones having the same connections, etc. I'm quite sure that it will still be "me". Are you suggesting that I have a soul?

Leon

[Nick227]

His brain state, if you like.

It will seem to be instant to the teleportee.

Leon

The brain state should be instantly recreated, I guess. Would it matter if there was a bit of a delay?

eta: ah, misreading you a bit. Sorry. Yes, it would seem instant. Or maybe like waking up perhaps. I'm not sure.

Nick

[Darat]

Darat A has ceased to be. You could say that Darat A has died, but I find this potentially a misleading (or over-emotive) term here in that usually identical replicas are not created in death.



Not over emotive - consider this as a slight variation, just before DaratA is destroyed a fuse blows and the machine doesn't destroy DaratA. DaratB has already been created. DaratA steps out of the smoking cubical only to be met by someone with a gun who says "Sorry for the inconvenience sir but the machine malfunctioned so I've got to manually kill you."...


Your belief that someone has died here



It isn't a belief it's a fact given that in your example you clearly create DaratB before DaratA is killed so two people exist for at least a moment, DaratA and DaratB.

Again it's just simple addition: 1 person + 1 person = 2 people!

I said this right at the start of this exchange but the fact that A & B are for all extent and purposes identical or even indistinguishable is irrelevant to the fact that there are at one point in your experiment two people.



to me indicates that you are still considering selfhood as something inviolable and not simply a recreatable process. If there is, in actuality, no persisting self, as evidence strongly suggests, then no one is dying here.

Nick

Not at all, all I am doing is understanding that duplicating me (by whatever process) is in fact creating an additional person.

[Nick227]

Not over emotive - consider this as a slight variation, just before DaratA is destroyed a fuse blows and the machine doesn't destroy DaratA. DaratB has already been created. DaratA steps out of the smoking cubical only to be met by someone with a gun who says "Sorry for the inconvenience sir but the machine malfunctioned so I've got to manually kill you."...

Well, the machine's failure would put the attendant in a difficult position for sure. But, this aside, I don't see how this creates a problem for the experiment. For a start there's nothing existentially wrong with there being 2 Darats. Socially, family get-togethers, and income tax and all that, it could be a bit of a drama, but that's all.

It isn't a belief it's a fact given that in your example you clearly create DaratB before DaratA is killed so two people exist for at least a moment, DaratA and DaratB.

Again it's just simple addition: 1 person + 1 person = 2 people!

I said this right at the start of this exchange but the fact that A & B are for all extent and purposes identical or even indistinguishable is irrelevant to the fact that there are at one point in your experiment two people.

For sure. I don't see the problem. They can both carry on existing if you want. I don't see how this affects the experiment itself.

Not at all, all I am doing is understanding that duplicating me (by whatever process) is in fact creating an additional person.

Yes it is. How does this affect the experiment?

Nick

[leon_heller]

Only because you're not quite thinking the experiment through. (Have to say I often think is one of the most "unprofound but meant to be profound" thought experiments there is.)


DaratA enters teleporterA

DaratB is created by teleporterB


There are now two people - DaratA and DaratB.


Whether DaratB is indistinguishable from DaratA is totally irrelevant to the fact that destroying either of the Darats means that someone will have died.

The instant we have two Darats they will be effectively two different people, but my suggestion of buffering the data before transmission avoids that problem. At any one time there is only one Darat. No-one has been killed.

Leon

[Darat]

....snip...

Yes it does. How does this affect the experiment?

Nick

It helps expose what is actually going on in the thought experiment. Whilst DaratB will "have the experience" ;) of being a continuation of the person that everyone (and him) would have called Darat prior to the teleport the original Darat has been destroyed.

[leon_heller]

Not over emotive - consider this as a slight variation, just before DaratA is destroyed a fuse blows and the machine doesn't destroy DaratA. DaratB has already been created. DaratA steps out of the smoking cubical only to be met by someone with a gun who says "Sorry for the inconvenience sir but the machine malfunctioned so I've got to manually kill you."...



It isn't a belief it's a fact given that in your example you clearly create DaratB before DaratA is killed so two people exist for at least a moment, DaratA and DaratB.

Again it's just simple addition: 1 person + 1 person = 2 people!

I said this right at the start of this exchange but the fact that A & B are for all extent and purposes identical or even indistinguishable is irrelevant to the fact that there are at one point in your experiment two people.



Not at all, all I am doing is understanding that duplicating me (by whatever process) is in fact creating an additional person.

But buffering the data will avoid any problems like that. As soon as the data have been stored DaratA can be destroyed. Then he is transmitted to the remote location. He will still be DaratA when he arrives and we don't need to invent a DaratB.

Leon

[Nick227]

It helps expose what is actually going on in the thought experiment. Whilst DaratB will "have the experience" ;) of being a continuation of the person that everyone (and him) would have called Darat prior to the teleport the original Darat has been destroyed.

The original Darat will have been destroyed, yes. But I still don't see an issue here, unless of course you believe that there is some persisting self, or some other aspect of being alive that is immaterial. Aside of the actual molecules of the body, what tangibly has changed?

Nick

[Darat]

The instant we have two Darats they will be effectively two different people, but my suggestion of buffering the data before transmission avoids that problem. At any one time there is only one Darat. No-one has been killed.

Leon

All these tweaks are just variants and they only really pose a problem for those that hold there is something other than the "physical" involved in identity/conciousness. If there is only the physical than an accurate duplication will create a person that to that person will seem to be a continuous continuation of the person they've always been. This would hold no matter what intermediate steps there are from the scanning to the duplication or indeed how long between the scanning and duplication.

Perhaps its because I've been an avid science fiction reader pretty much all my reading life and all the various variants on these ideas have been done to death over the decades by many very bright and talented authors that to me this thought experiment is as dull as and as profound as ditchwater!

[Nick227]

But buffering the data will avoid any problems like that. As soon as the data have been stored DaratA can be destroyed. Then he is transmitted to the remote location. He will still be DaratA when he arrives and we don't need to invent a DaratB.

Leon

Completely. I mean socially the system could well be open to abuse, with the possibility of creating multiple versions of the same person, perhaps with slight personality changes present. We might suddenly find myriad Jessica Alba's walking around the place, hanging onto the arms of older guys. And it would be pretty weird meeting someone who looked the same as you and who had all the same memories as you prior to being uploaded. But, as a thought experiment, I think it's a pretty valid way of determining how monist you really are.

Nick

[Mercutio]

How do you assess to what degree the results of this investigating of what is going on resembles what actually is going on? It seems to me you are taking selfhood, and the notion of an experiencer, to be a given. Tastes more like duality soup than turtle to me!

Nick
You are projecting, perhaps. There is only a problem with selfhood or experiencing if you (yes, you, not me) assume that it requires something other than the organism to be a self or an experiencer. Why on earth you would have to assume that is beyond me, but I never thought dualists made much sense.

As for "actually" going on--I am a pragmatist. The "problem" you see here is an utter irrelevance; if it is something that cannot be, even in principle, investigated, then it is not worth wasting the time. When you (or anyone) can come up with a way for making the distinction, then it becomes relevant. Until then, it does not matter a bit.

[Mercutio]

Objects fall towards the surface of the earth at 16 feet/sec2.


You, sir, must have incredibly big feet.

[Dancing David]

His brain state, if you like.

It will seem to be instant to the teleportee.

Leon


I always figured you were going to be very sick when you stepped off the transporter.

Sure makes those alien encounters exciting.

"I greet you in the name of the .... blaaarph".

I think that as a thought experiement it can copy exactly but in reality I think everything is going to be a little off, I get sick on swings at the park.

[Nick227]

Perhaps its because I've been an avid science fiction reader pretty much all my reading life and all the various variants on these ideas have been done to death over the decades by many very bright and talented authors that to me this thought experiment is as dull as and as profound as ditchwater!

Fair enough. It's quite new to me so I find it more exciting. It also does seem to effectively weed out the genuine monists from the more dubious ones.

Nick

[Dancing David]

And I thought we had gotten rid of those damn "qualias".

What's an experience made of, exactly ?


Sensations, perceptions and a vague defintion?

;)

[Nick227]

You are projecting, perhaps. There is only a problem with selfhood or experiencing if you (yes, you, not me) assume that it requires something other than the organism to be a self or an experiencer. Why on earth you would have to assume that is beyond me, but I never thought dualists made much sense.

Would you get in the teleporter?

As for "actually" going on--I am a pragmatist. The "problem" you see here is an utter irrelevance; if it is something that cannot be, even in principle, investigated, then it is not worth wasting the time. When you (or anyone) can come up with a way for making the distinction, then it becomes relevant. Until then, it does not matter a bit.

That's why I asked what steps you took to assess this variable. I'm not assuming either way.

Nick

[Darat]

But buffering the data will avoid any problems like that. As soon as the data have been stored DaratA can be destroyed. Then he is transmitted to the remote location. He will still be DaratA when he arrives and we don't need to invent a DaratB.

Leon

I would argue that he would be a copy of DaratA but otherwise I agree.

The original Darat will have been destroyed, yes. But I still don't see an issue here, unless of course you believe that there is some persisting self, or some other aspect of being alive that is immaterial. Aside of the actual molecules of the body, what tangibly has changed?

Nick

I was more trying to point out that your idea that only if someone was a closet dualist would they have problems with your set-up. However as I've shown there are very rational grounds for even a monist to be slightly concerned about your thought experiment. As a variant on the faulty machine consider this:

DaratA enters the teleport console.

DaratA presses the button marked "Start teleport"

A beep sounds and a screen comes to life and in that screen DaratA sees DaratB smiling. DaratB says, with a laugh in his voice "Everything went smoothly - thanks and don't forget to press the red button!"

DaratA glances down at the red button which is labelled "Vaporise!" and of course unhesitatingly presses it, after all DaratA knows DaratB will continue to live.

[Dancing David]

You, sir, must have incredibly big feet.

And they get bigger all the time!

[Dancing David]

Fair enough. It's quite new to me so I find it more exciting. It also does seem to effectively weed out the genuine monists from the more dubious ones.

Nick


Um belief is different from critical thought. I could be a monist and afraid to go to sleep because I will be different when I awake.

there is a scifi story where the people are still there at both ends of the transporter. And to cover great distances they strand copies of themselves at the way stations (in the middle of deep dark nowhere).

[leon_heller]

Arthur C Clarke had a novel in which everyone is stored inside a computer system and a limited number are reincarnated at intervals.

Leon

[Mercutio]

The original Darat will have been destroyed, yes. But I still don't see an issue here, unless of course you believe that there is some persisting self, or some other aspect of being alive that is immaterial. Aside of the actual molecules of the body, what tangibly has changed?

NickDid you see "The Prestige"?

Darat is, sadly, quite right. In your scenario, you are killing someone (did you really say it was to keep the population from exploding?). Self-preservation being what it is, it will matter to Darat A (hell, I even fight the effects of anesthesia, when I know the operation is necessary). Sure, a "right to life" is a social construct (unless you ask Shanek), but it codifies a basic biological necessity (if we don't live, we don't get to reproduce, and selfish gene wants to reproduce for itself--not for a copy, even an identical one).

If you ask Darat B, he should be all in favor of the machine. Perhaps even Darat C, standing in the distance observing, might see no problem. But Darat A has billions of years of evolution whispering in his ear, saying that it is not group selection, but selfish genes, that got him this far, and they did not get here by voluntarily laying down his life for an identical twin.

[leon_heller]

Completely. I mean socially the system could well be open to abuse, with the possibility of creating multiple versions of the same person, perhaps with slight personality changes present. We might suddenly find myriad Jessica Alba's walking around the place, hanging onto the arms of older guys. And it would be pretty weird meeting someone who looked the same as you and who had all the same memories as you prior to being uploaded. But, as a thought experiment, I think it's a pretty valid way of determining how monist you really are.

Nick

I'm 100% monist.

Leon

[Nick227]

I was more trying to point out that your idea that only if someone was a closet dualist would they have problems with your set-up. However as I've shown there are very rational grounds for even a monist to be slightly concerned about your thought experiment. As a variant on the faulty machine consider this:

DaratA enters the teleport console.

DaratA presses the button marked "Start teleport"

A beep sounds and a screen comes to life and in that screen DaratA sees DaratB smiling. DaratB says, with a laugh in his voice "Everything went smoothly - thanks and don't forget to press the red button!"

DaratA glances down at the red button which is labelled "Vaporise!" and of course unhesitatingly presses it, after all DaratA knows DaratB will continue to live.

It's true that you can create variations of the thought experiment which would present moral dilemmas and strong emotions to even the most ardent monist.

Nick

[leon_heller]

Sensations, perceptions and a vague defintion?

;)

And memory. Perception doesn't work without it.

Leon

[leon_heller]

It's true that you can create variations of the thought experiment which would present moral dilemmas and strong emotions to even the most ardent monist.

Nick

I think I might find that difficult.

Leon

[Darat]

Memory! That's what I was trying to remember. Seriously I had a thought about this earlier on today but couldn't remember what it was and you've just reminded me.

Memory I think offers a very good example to show us that how we "feel/experience" something is not an accurate representation of the underlying reality i.e. another "illusion". Our personal experience of memory and the language we use to describe it is now known to be at odds to what memory actually is.

[Nick227]

Did you see "The Prestige"?

Darat is, sadly, quite right. In your scenario, you are killing someone (did you really say it was to keep the population from exploding?). Self-preservation being what it is, it will matter to Darat A (hell, I even fight the effects of anesthesia, when I know the operation is necessary). Sure, a "right to life" is a social construct (unless you ask Shanek), but it codifies a basic biological necessity (if we don't live, we don't get to reproduce, and selfish gene wants to reproduce for itself--not for a copy, even an identical one).

If you ask Darat B, he should be all in favor of the machine. Perhaps even Darat C, standing in the distance observing, might see no problem. But Darat A has billions of years of evolution whispering in his ear, saying that it is not group selection, but selfish genes, that got him this far, and they did not get here by voluntarily laying down his life for an identical twin.

I saw the movie, yes. Albeit on a long-haul flight so I didn't totally concentrate but I recall Tesla had created a box to replicate people and stage magicians were using multiple versions of themselves to impress their audiences. Various dramas inevitably ensued. I found it an interesting movie.

I don't think I mentioned population explosion! I do think that if there was a teleporter it could save a lot of carbon emissions! No more cars and planes needed for a start. This was more of an aside.

Personally, when considering myself getting in to the teleporter I definitely get anxious. Looking at it one way, it seems that I am laying down my life for a twin. But I find this way of looking at it to be my dualistic and irrational side. I have no way of knowing that the body that woke up this morning is actually the same as the one that went to sleep last night. It seems to me grossly unlikely that it could have been swapped for a replica but I have actually no way of knowing. All I recall is waking up and feeling my brain rumble though its usual motions of reinstating selfhood. Thus, I ask myself, does anything meaningful really die in the teleporter?

We are evolutionarily disposed to favour survival, no doubt about it. But if you're truly a monist I think one can overcome one's fear here. I figure that rationally there is no persisting self. It's an illusion. Selfhood seems to be constantly dying and being recreated. It seems persisting because memories stay the same. A number of pages back there was the case of C.W. The damage to his brain prevented him from laying down new memories and he thus existed in a world where every half an hour he referred to himself as realising he was conscious for the first time.

As to Darat B - would he really be more up for getting in the machine again? It's an interesting question. Darat B would recall getting into the machine before and coming out the other side, so he would have the apparent experience here, but he might still fear getting in again. Then again, if he did it once...

Nick

[Mercutio]

Personally, when considering myself getting in to the teleporter I definitely get anxious. Looking at it one way, it seems that I am laying down my life for a twin. But I find this way of looking at it to be my dualistic and irrational side. I have no way of knowing that the body that woke up this morning is actually the same as the one that went to sleep last night. It seems to me grossly unlikely that it could have been swapped for a replica but I have actually no way of knowing. All I recall is waking up and feeling my brain rumble though its usual motions of reinstating selfhood. Thus, I ask myself, does anything meaningful really die in the teleporter?

We are evolutionarily disposed to favour survival, no doubt about it. But if you're truly a monist I think one can overcome one's fear here. I figure that rationally there is no persisting self. It's an illusion. Selfhood seems to be constantly dying and being recreated. It seems persisting because memories stay the same. A number of pages back there was the case of C.W. The damage to his brain prevented him from laying down new memories and he thus existed in a world where every half an hour he referred to himself as realising he was conscious for the first time.

Red bit--why dualist? It is what you are doing, whether monist, dualist, pragmatist, or Daratist.

Green bit--why should monists differ in this? Are they not the product of evolution? If you prick them, do they not bleed? If you "destroy" them, are they not dead? And a dualist might be more able to overcome fear, given a belief that the mind part persists after death, and cannot be destroyed so simply.

[Nick227]

Red bit--why dualist? It is what you are doing, whether monist, dualist, pragmatist, or Daratist.

Well, my brain is examining the issue from various perspectives. Believing that there is a persisting self is intuitive but on examination seems irrational, given what's known about the brain. I consider it dualist because it's hard to explain an enduring self that doesn't come about through dualist construction.

Green bit--why should monists differ in this? Are they not the product of evolution? If you prick them, do they not bleed? If you "destroy" them, are they not dead? And a dualist might be more able to overcome fear, given a belief that the mind part persists after death, and cannot be destroyed so simply.

I couldn't see the green but anyway, it is not so much that I am invalidating the emotional reactions of the monist, rather I am considering that the line of action the emotions lead to - not getting in - can be overcome by rational thought.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Well, my brain is examining the issue from various perspectives. Believing that there is a persisting self is intuitive but on examination seems irrational, given what's known about the brain. I consider it dualist because it's hard to explain an enduring self that doesn't come about through dualist construction.
Unless by "enduring" you mean persisting after death, I don't find it hard at all. But thank you for the explanation--it makes more sense now.


I couldn't see the green but anyway, it is not so much that I am invalidating the emotional reactions of the monist, rather I am considering that the line of action the emotions lead to - not getting in - can be overcome by rational thought.

NickSorry about the green, then. And are you saying dualists are incapable of rational thought?

[Nick227]

Unless by "enduring" you mean persisting after death, I don't find it hard at all.

No. I can see that!


And are you saying dualists are incapable of rational thought?

No. I'm sure dualists are highly capable of rational thought.

BTW, I'm still wondering if you would get in the teleporter.

Nick

[Belz...]

I read your post. As I saw it, it was entrenched in dualism. You won't get in the teleporter because you seem to believe there is a persisting self, or consciousness, that will be lost. That's how I read it.

And the fact that I'm not a dualist doesn't seem to matter ? I won't get into the teleporter because I will be destroyed, and another me created. How is that complicated ?

Then I think you either need to admit your lifelong affiliation to dualism, despite presenting yourself otherwise, or else explain how there can be a persisting self ("I") without duality.

What in the blue hell do you mean by "persisting self" ? My body IS me. The BODY is DESTROYED by the teleporter. Do you even understand what this hypothetical technology does ?

[Belz...]

You woke up this morning, or at least I assume you did. How do you know it was the same body as the one that went to sleep the night before? How could you know?

Because I was never dead in the time in between. You DO know that, when you sleep, you're still somewhat aware, right ?

Do you have any idea what we're talking about, here ?

No one will have died.

You deny that people exist ?

[Belz...]

The brain will be identical, with all the neurones having the same connections, etc. I'm quite sure that it will still be "me". Are you suggesting that I have a soul?

Your conclusion is illogical. If I believe in a soul then I would happily step into the teleporter because a soul can't be destroyed, and it would probably simply "switch" to the new body, or some nonsense.

It is precisely because I am a materialist that I wouldn't even use the damn contraption.