The hard problem of consciousness

[Nick227]

We do not assume that; to the extent that we speak of selfhood at all, it is a conclusion, not an assumption.

Fair enough. Thinking about it a little more, I can't really see why the school of thought to which you subscribe, as I understand, should really generate a fear of teletransporters. You don't suggest that selfhood is related to uniqueness of the material of the body, do you?

Tell that to the people who find Nick227A's corpse.

I will.

You are still using "selfhood" in a very different, and fatally dualistic, manner. On first thought, I suppose my usage of it is darned close to simply "existence". Awareness is clearly a subset of selfhood, and not the reverse.

That depends on how you look at things, and how you define "duality." Would you consider the "Anatta" teaching in Buddhism dualistic? It's complex.

Dualistic theories of self usually assert the presence of a limited immaterial entity (frequently "soul" or similar) who is the experiencer, the homunculus. But Anatta asserts Brahman - the unlimited ground of being - as experiencer. This makes things trickier in that Brahman does not technically "exist," or it would not be Brahman. Is this really dualism? I don't consider it so. Awareness-based schools thus I would say are monist but not limited to traditional notions of self. It's horses for courses. CBT is great for behaviour. Awareness-based good for awareness.

Nick

[Belz...]

Each particle is replaced by a copy of it, a particle at a time. At the end of the process, your entire body will have been copied in situ.

Then again, no, I wouldn't step in it.

[Belz...]

In self-observation one can become aware of decision-influencing factors that one was not previously aware of. Maybe a guy is always attracted to certain kind of woman because there is something in her behaviour which unconsciously reminds him of an issue he had with his mother.

Uh oh. Freud's back from the dead. Unfortunately.

[Belz...]

In considering selfhood not as a given, innate to any thinking human, but as simply as an aspect of awareness

And again, your model seems to think that the awareness will, unlike the rest of the body, be conserved. Why ?

[leon_heller]

Then again, no, I wouldn't step in it.

What about the question I asked:

Consider a scenario where each particle in your body is teleported somewhere and then teleported back, effectively replacing each particle in your body with a copy of it.

What percentage of your body would have to be copied before "you" became "not you"? Is it a gradual process, or does it happen suddenly?

Leon

[Nick227]

And again, your model seems to think that the awareness will, unlike the rest of the body, be conserved. Why ?

My model doesn't assert that awareness will be conserved in the teletransporter. Nothing material is conserved.

Nick

[Dancing David]

But following an awareness-based model, whether actually Freudian or not, to my mind works better than functional analysis.

except for the fact that it is demonstrated to have little benefit to the client. there are no research papers which show a good improvement for the Freudian models.

meanwhile, CBT, which is awareness based and functional at the same time, has a proven track record and demonstrated benefit.

Pushing Neo-freudian technique is unethical and fleecing people. It should not be called therapy or treatment, it should be called spiritual counselintg.

It is bogus and very unethical.
For a start you functionalists still seem to be scared to get into a teletransporter, believing you are going to die.

overgeneralization and a total red herring.

the four humors make as much sense as that Freudian twaddle.

Someone following an awareness-based model, assuming they've followed it to a reasonable degree, is not going to be believing this.

So people following an awareness based model also believe in racism and bigfoot.


Perhaps you might say that these are simple features of the differing viewpoints of self created by the two models. But to my mind any model which offers no possibilities for self-transcendence is acutely limited, to say the least!

Nick

Maybe self transecendence is a goal, but being transecedent and fleeced, while still having life impairments, is what?

You can self transcend as a materialist.

[Dancing David]

Fair enough. Thinking about it a little more, I can't really see why the school of thought to which you subscribe, as I understand, should really generate a fear of teletransporters. You don't suggest that selfhood is related to uniqueness of the material of the body, do you?



I will.



That depends on how you look at things, and how you define "duality." Would you consider the "Anatta" teaching in Buddhism dualistic? It's complex.

Dualistic theories of self usually assert the presence of a limited immaterial entity (frequently "soul" or similar) who is the experiencer, the homunculus. But Anatta asserts Brahman - the unlimited ground of being - as experiencer.

That is not what the AHB taught at all!

that is not supported by the pali Canon or the teaching of many of the initiates. that is some sort of hinduvic/vedic teaching.

that is total hogwash. Find it in the Pali canon Nicck 227, or is this just more imagination?

This makes things trickier in that Brahman does not technically "exist," or it would not be Brahman. Is this really dualism? I don't consider it so. Awareness-based schools thus I would say are monist but not limited to traditional notions of self. It's horses for courses. CBT is great for behaviour. Awareness-based good for awareness.

Nick

That is not supported by any of the links I could find to the pali canon, that is some mahayana teaching, heavily influenced by the vedic tradition.

You are just promoting more tickets to Rock Candy Mountain, defend those unethical lifestyles.

[Nick227]

except for the fact that it is demonstrated to have little benefit to the client. there are no research papers which show a good improvement for the Freudian models.

meanwhile, CBT, which is awareness based and functional at the same time, has a proven track record and demonstrated benefit.


Don't get caught up on the word "Freud." I'm not really writing about classical psychoanalysis but about awareness-based models in general. One could equally point to Anatta in Buddhism.

There are constant unconscious thinking processes going on within the psyche and many can be made conscious through therapeutic endeavours. This is inevitably a personal subjective process but it is the backbone of many schools of therapeutic thought, and certainly appreciated by the humanists.

CBT is great and works well for many diagnosed psychiatric issues. But it is cerebral. It doesn't deal so directly with feelings and to my mind is more a surface rewiring. Nothing wrong with that but I like it that there is more on offer with the awareness schools. Check out the JoHari Window for an example.

"Those who seek should not stop seeking until they find. When they find, they will be disturbed. When they are disturbed, they will marvel, and will reign over all." Gospel of Thomas s2

Nick

[Belz...]

Consider a scenario where each particle in your body is teleported somewhere and then teleported back, effectively replacing each particle in your body with a copy of it.

Isn't that pretty much what happens every day ?

What percentage of your body would have to be copied before "you" became "not you"? Is it a gradual process, or does it happen suddenly?

There cannot be an answer to that question, even in principle.

[Belz...]

My model doesn't assert that awareness will be conserved in the teletransporter. Nothing material is conserved.

Ergo, you are killed by the machine.

[Nick227]

That is not what the AHB taught at all!

that is not supported by the pali Canon or the teaching of many of the initiates. that is some sort of hinduvic/vedic teaching.

OK, OK, look up dharmadhatu or similar phrases. Nirvana, dissolving into the ground of being. It's basically ground of being - as in signal and ground.

Nick

[Mercutio]

CBT is great and works well for many diagnosed psychiatric issues. But it is cerebral. It doesn't deal so directly with feelings and to my mind is more a surface rewiring. Nothing wrong with that but I like it that there is more on offer with the awareness schools. Check out the JoHari Window.

NickHaving just finished teaching my summer course in Behavior Modification & Therapy, I have to say that your understanding of CBT is ... flawed, at best. I don't blame you; the public perception has been actively distorted for decades. (And in truth, there are two vastly different things both called cognitive-behavior therapy, and the earlier of the two is not something I will defend at all.)

This is not the thread for discussing this, so I won't derail, but you might want to look into it before dismissing it. And the "surface rewiring" complaint is exactly analogous to the rest of this thread's arguments--you are presuming an underlying problem, rather than letting the evidence lead you.

[Nick227]

Ergo, you are killed by the machine.

The notion of self that your brain is utilising to work out what happens when you enter the teletransporter causes you to predict that you will die. This prompts an inevitable emotional response. If I were to use the same notion of self, which I can do, I would also predict that I would die. However, this is not the only notion of self that there is.

Nick

[Nick227]

Having just finished teaching my summer course in Behavior Modification & Therapy, I have to say that your understanding of CBT is ... flawed, at best. I don't blame you; the public perception has been actively distorted for decades. (And in truth, there are two vastly different things both called cognitive-behavior therapy, and the earlier of the two is not something I will defend at all.)

I have to say that it's not clear to me why you believe that you will die when you enter the teletransporter. Are there aspects of selfhood which your model indicates will not be recreated? Are there any experiential differences predicted between MercA and MercB at the point of transfer? Or is it simply that, on purely humanist grounds, you disagree with a body being killed? The more I think about it the less clear I become as to why MercA is concerned here. Can you explain me more?

I would like to read more of genuine CBT if you can link me also.

Nick

[Belz...]

The notion of self that your brain is utilising to work out what happens when you enter the teletransporter causes you to predict that you will die. This prompts an inevitable emotional response. If I were to use the same notion of self, which I can do, I would also predict that I would die. However, this is not the only notion of self that there is.

I don't see how the "notion of self" is useful for knowing if someone dies when I shoot them in the head with a .50 caliber. Explain this to me, and explain why it is different when I get desintegrated.

[Nick227]

I don't see how the "notion of self" is useful for knowing if someone dies when I shoot them in the head with a .50 caliber. Explain this to me, and explain why it is different when I get desintegrated.

The difference is that, experientially, all the things most people consider "you" get preserved. You wouldn't know the difference. It would appear that you got in the thing and walked out somewhere else.

Nick

[Darat]

Nick try this - DaratB steps out the teleporter only to find it's screwed-up and DaratA wasn't destroyed. So DaratB is told that when he eventually returns home he must look up DaratA and "not kill him just disintegrate his body". Do you think either DaratB or DaratA be happy with that scenario?

[Nick227]

Nick try this - DaratB steps out the teleporter only to find it's screwed-up and DaratA wasn't destroyed. So DaratB is told that when he eventually returns home he must look up DaratA and "not kill him just disintegrate his body". Do you think either DaratB or DaratA be happy with that scenario?

Is this the reason you don't want to get into it?

When Blackmore does her consciousness classes it's written out like this (http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Conferences/Berlin%20workshop%202005.htm)...


[Theories of Self - ego vs bundle]

.............

What do you think? Many people say they are intellectually bundle theorists but remain emotionally ego theorists. The next thought experiment may help you to find out.

Exercise 4. The teletransporter

Imagine a box with a big button which, when you press it, can transport you anywhere you want to go – and back again. When it does so it reads all the information from every cell in your body, destroying them in the process and rebuilding them exactly the same at the destination.

Would you go? Do not quibble over safety or any other details. This is, after all, a thought experiment, so we are not constrained by reality. The box is 100% safe and reliable. If you won’t go in, this has to be for some other reason than that it might go wrong.

So, if you're not allowed to cite safety or malfunction issues, would you get in?

Nick

[Mercutio]

I have to say that it's not clear to me why you believe that you will die when you enter the teletransporter. Are there aspects of selfhood which your model indicates will not be recreated? Are there any experiential differences predicted between MercA and MercB at the point of transfer? Or is it simply that, on purely humanist grounds, you disagree with a body being killed? The more I think about it the less clear I become as to why MercA is concerned here. Can you explain me more?
"Selfhood" is not something that is attached to, yet independent of, a body--as DD has hinted, there is no hardware/software distinction in the behavior of an organism; there is no "consciousness in a body", but rather a conscious, aware, thinking person. You can no more separate the "selfhood" from a person than you can separate the wetness from water. For purposes of this thought experiment, the person is precisely replicated, and I cannot see how MercB would experience anything other than what you said--walked into one box and out of another. That much we agree on. But since selfhood, or awareness, or consciousness, or any other fuzzy term you want, is not independent of the organism, there is no question at all that MercA is being killed. As MercA, I would just as soon not go gently into that good night. I have no problem creating a MercB; hell, I think there ought to be many more of me, to keep up with the obvious demand. But, to take another thought problem (the many-worlds parallel universe approach), the idea that there is another Merc somewhere who lives in Paris with Laetitia Casta is not reason for this Merc to be overwhelmed with joy.

I would like to read more of genuine CBT if you can link me also.

NickLet's start you out with philosophy, and then work you up to the science, and then the application thereof. Take a look here first (http://psych.athabascau.ca/html/Behaviorism/)... that ought to clear up a few misconceptions.

[Darat]

Is this the reason you don't want to get into it?

....snip...

Not asking me - I was asking you - in your view do you think either DaratB or DaratA be happy with that scenario?

[leon_heller]

Consider a scenario where each particle in your body is teleported somewhere and then teleported back, effectively replacing each particle in your body with a copy of it.

Isn't that pretty much what happens every day ?


Why do you object to quantum copying, then?

What percentage of your body would have to be copied before "you" became "not you"? Is it a gradual process, or does it happen suddenly?



There cannot be an answer to that question, even in principle.

Why not?

Leon

[Nick227]

"Selfhood" is not something that is attached to, yet independent of, a body--as DD has hinted, there is no hardware/software distinction in the behavior of an organism; there is no "consciousness in a body", but rather a conscious, aware, thinking person. You can no more separate the "selfhood" from a person than you can separate the wetness from water.

You might not be able to separate selfhood from the organism but this is not what we're discussing here.

There is the bodily sensation of integrity. There is a sense of personal individuality created by being around other humans. There is the sense of "I" created through thinking. Selfhood has different aspects, such as these, but they do not relate from any unique quality that cannot be replicated. Replicate the organism and you replicate selfhood. It's just a function of the organism that is being created through replicable neurological processes, albeit ones we haven't fully uncovered yet.

For purposes of this thought experiment, the person is precisely replicated, and I cannot see how MercB would experience anything other than what you said--walked into one box and out of another. That much we agree on. But since selfhood, or awareness, or consciousness, or any other fuzzy term you want, is not independent of the organism, there is no question at all that MercA is being killed. As MercA, I would just as soon not go gently into that good night. I have no problem creating a MercB; hell, I think there ought to be many more of me, to keep up with the obvious demand. But, to take another thought problem (the many-worlds parallel universe approach), the idea that there is another Merc somewhere who lives in Paris with Laetitia Casta is not reason for this Merc to be overwhelmed with joy.

This again is not really relevant, I suggest. What if MercA was being teletransported to France to be with La Casta? Could not MercA look forward to the pleasure he would no doubt be having there? Or are you caught up in the belief that MercA is going to die? Even when there will be no conscious difference felt in the transition.

eta: perhaps you could usefully work on your belief systems here!

Nick

[Nick227]

Not asking me - I was asking you - in your view do you think either DaratB or DaratA be happy with that scenario?

Well, I'm not in such a good position to comment! But I wouldn't be happy with it if it was me. However, in the original thought experiment Susan Blackmore uses, your responses thus far would have been unacceptable.

Nick

[Nosaj]

Nick,

Dualistic theories of self usually assert the presence of a limited immaterial entity (frequently "soul" or similar) who is the experiencer, the homunculus. But Anatta asserts Brahman - the unlimited ground of being - as experiencer. This makes things trickier in that Brahman does not technically "exist," or it would not be Brahman.

The teachings on anatta that are in the Pali Canon (e.g., SN 22.59 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.059.nymo.html)) assert no such thing.

OK, OK, look up dharmadhatu or similar phrases. Nirvana, dissolving into the ground of being. It's basically ground of being - as in signal and ground.

Nirvana (nibbana) is defined as the extinguishing of lust, hatred, and delusion (SN 38.1).

Jason

[Belz...]

The difference is that, experientially, all the things most people consider "you" get preserved.

If you're happy with a perfect replica of the Mona Lisa, fine. But you can't say that the original wasn't destroyed.

You wouldn't know the difference. It would appear that you got in the thing and walked out somewhere else.

It would appear so to the copy. Again, Nick, to the rest of the world it would make no difference, but to me ?

[Belz...]

Why do you object to quantum copying, then?

Because I don't want the original to die. Specifically, because I'm the "original".

Why not?

Because there cannot be a point where you can say one and immediately after, the other. I thought that was self-evident.

[Belz...]

There is the bodily sensation of integrity. There is a sense of personal individuality created by being around other humans. There is the sense of "I" created through thinking. Selfhood has different aspects, such as these, but they do not relate from any unique quality that cannot be replicated. Replicate the organism and you replicate selfhood.

Indeed that is the word, here. Replicate. In so doing, you've created a COPY. And a copy cannot be the original. Sure, the copy has its own awareness, but that is also a copy. There's no way around it: the original was killed and replaced with an identical duplicate. As far as the original is concerned, it has stopped to experience.

What if MercA was being teletransported to France to be with La Casta? Could not MercA look forward to the pleasure he would no doubt be having there? Or are you caught up in the belief that MercA is going to die? Even when there will be no conscious difference felt in the transition.

I think you're confusing MercA with MercB.

[Jeff Corey]

Having just finished teaching my summer course in Behavior Modification & Therapy, I have to say that your understanding of CBT is ... flawed, at best. I don't blame you; the public perception has been actively distorted for decades. (And in truth, there are two vastly different things both called cognitive-behavior therapy, and the earlier of the two is not something I will defend at all.)

This is not the thread for discussing this, so I won't derail, but you might want to look into it before dismissing it. And the "surface rewiring" complaint is exactly analogous to the rest of this thread's arguments--you are presuming an underlying problem, rather than letting the evidence lead you.
Also, the previous mention of a "functional analysis" uses the term quite differently than in applied behavior analysis.
Just out of curiosity, what text do you use in that course? I use Martin & Pear.

[leon_heller]

Because I don't want the original to die. Specifically, because I'm the "original".



Because there cannot be a point where you can say one and immediately after, the other. I thought that was self-evident.

Does copying a single atom kill the original, then?

Leon

[Mercutio]

Just out of curiosity, what text do you use in that course? I use Martin & Pear.
This summer, I also used Martin & Pear, along with Watson & Tharp as a self-mod project. Last summer I used Cooper, Heron & Heward, which I also really like.

[Mercutio]

You might not be able to separate selfhood from the organism but this is not what we're discussing here.
Actually, it is. You are persisting in viewing the problem from the perspective of Nick227B, or perhaps Nick227C down at the pub. I am viewing the problem from the perspective of MercA, who has to make the decision to begin with.

This again is not really relevant, I suggest. What if MercA was being teletransported to France to be with La Casta? Could not MercA look forward to the pleasure he would no doubt be having there? Or are you caught up in the belief that MercA is going to die? Even when there will be no conscious difference felt in the transition.

NickThat is not the question. The original problem is not teleportation, but replication and destruction of the original. Since consciousness is a property of the whole person, it is also not preserved, but replicated (and again, the original is destroyed). MercB would be very happy indeed, but MercA is a grave man indeed.

[westprog]

Because I don't want the original to die. Specifically, because I'm the "original".



Because there cannot be a point where you can say one and immediately after, the other. I thought that was self-evident.

I think there might be some misunderstanding here, due to the nature of quantum teleportation. It's also possible that I'm misunderstanding the nature of quantum teleportation.

If I understand it correctly, though, using a quantum teleporter to go to the next room is no different in principle from walking to the next room. It really does move the person to somewhere else, rather than disintegrate him and reassemble him.

It still might have its dangers, of course. But all forms of transport do.

[Mercutio]

Does copying a single atom kill the original, then?

Leon

Two answers (out of many--the answers really depend on the assumptions held in the original question):

1) of course not--we have far more than that being replaced in our bodies every second; it is possible that not a single molecule in our bodies is the same as it was when we were young. Cell maintenance is an ongoing process; metabolism happens, and yet we do not die.

2) As has already been said in this thread (but they forgot to attribute!), I am not the same person I was when I started this sentence. If we define "original" as "exactly the same" (in the sense of the thought problem), then yes, the original has ceased to be; it is an ex-original.

(note that, although in #1, we replace the molecules of our body, we do retain our XYZ coordinates, and thus the continuity of perception, and of perceived self. This is not the case in any of the teleportation examples.)

[westprog]

MercB would be very happy indeed, but MercA is a grave man indeed.

A plague o' both your transporter booths!
They have made worms' meat of MercA.

[Nick227]

Actually, it is. You are persisting in viewing the problem from the perspective of Nick227B, or perhaps Nick227C down at the pub. I am viewing the problem from the perspective of MercA, who has to make the decision to begin with.

From an experiential perspective MercA walks into the teletransporter and walks out again. Actually, in terms of the material that makes his body up he is now MercB. But he is only aware of this because he knows of the experiment and what has taken place. On a purely experiential level, nothing has changed whatsoever for him.

As I've said before, you are just caught up in a belief system about the nature of self and of death. This is patently obvious to me. There is nothing intrinsically unique about self. It is simply a recreatable process, and if you recreate the materials at a functional level then self is identical. It matters not that the molecules have changed.


That is not the question. The original problem is not teleportation, but replication and destruction of the original. Since consciousness is a property of the whole person, it is also not preserved, but replicated (and again, the original is destroyed). MercB would be very happy indeed, but MercA is a grave man indeed.

The original questions are "Would you get in the teleporter? And what are the reasons for your choice?" Again here you are ascribing a degree of uniqueness to something that is simply the result of a recreatable process. You are afraid that you will die, but actually you will not. This is simply a belief thing. You cannot overwhelm your fear with rationality because you don't grasp that self is merely a process, and so-called "consciousness" very likely the same. As Blackmore puts it "Many people say they are intellectually bundle theorists but remain emotionally ego theorists."

Nick

[Mercutio]

A plague o' both your transporter booths!
They have made worms' meat of MercA.

:D

[Mercutio]

From an experiential perspective MercA walks into the teletransporter and walks out again. Actually, in terms of the material that makes his body up he is now MercB. But he is only aware of this because he knows of the experiment and what has taken place. On a purely experiential level, nothing has changed whatsoever for him.
Yes, I agree that this is MercB's experience. That is patently clear.

As I've said before, you are just caught up in a belief system about the nature of self and of death. This is patently obvious to me. There is nothing intrinsically unique about self. It is simply a recreatable process, and if you recreate the materials at a functional level then self is identical. It matters not that the molecules have changed.
It is not merely a process; it is a behaving organism. You have replicated this organism, but that does not suddenly make MercA expendable.

The original questions are "Would you get in the teleporter? And what are the reasons for your choice?" Again here you are ascribing a degree of uniqueness to something that is simply the result of a recreatable process. You are afraid that you will die, but actually you will not. This is simply a belief thing. You cannot overwhelm your fear with rationality because you don't grasp that self is merely a process, and so-called "consciousness" very likely the same. As Blackmore puts it "Many people say they are intellectually bundle theorists but remain emotionally ego theorists."

NickI am perfectly aware of your point of view, and of hers; I am not "afraid that I will die"; we all die, and I have given my criteria for getting in the transporter. This is not a matter of fear; this is a simple recognition that, from MercA's perspective, this is the end of the game.

The same organism, the same molecules, after a severe blow to the head, may not be "the same person"; it is not merely the same XYZ coordinates. But likewise, the same process in two different organisms is also not "the same person"; it is not merely the process. You are continuing to see just one aspect of personhood as the defining feature; I am not defining the person as you do. This is not fear; this is not ignorance; this is not wrong.

[Belz...]

Does copying a single atom kill the original, then?

No. How is that relevant ?

[Belz...]

If I understand it correctly, though, using a quantum teleporter to go to the next room is no different in principle from walking to the next room. It really does move the person to somewhere else, rather than disintegrate him and reassemble him.

From what Leon tells me, it's still a copying process, albeit with the twist that it kills you really slowly.

[leon_heller]

From what Leon tells me, it's still a copying process, albeit with the twist that it kills you really slowly.

The original quantum state is transferred to a particle at the new location. The original particle loses its quantum state, but nothing will have been killed at the end of the process. It's described as "teleportation, not replication" by the original researchers.

Leon

[Nick227]

This is not a matter of fear; this is a simple recognition that, from MercA's perspective, this is the end of the game.

Yes, from MercA's perspective, ie: your current perspective. This is all that is at stake here - a belief system. MercA is protecting his belief in unique inviolable selfhood. You're a Cartesian at heart.


The same organism, the same molecules, after a severe blow to the head, may not be "the same person"; it is not merely the same XYZ coordinates. But likewise, the same process in two different organisms is also not "the same person"; it is not merely the process.

Likewise, my foot! How is that a valid analogy? If MercA was not aware of the teletransporter, and thinks it just a phone booth, he wouldn't even know he'd been replicated. Because he has not changed, not experientially. The inner and outer worlds are the same as before.


You are continuing to see just one aspect of personhood as the defining feature; I am not defining the person as you do. This is not fear; this is not ignorance; this is not wrong.

I'm breaking down selfhood into its component elements, that's all. It's not so precious, just a routine function of the organism. You're not wrong, for sure. Just following an archaic belief.

Nick

[Belz...]

The original quantum state is transferred to a particle at the new location. The original particle loses its quantum state, but nothing will have been killed at the end of the process. It's described as "teleportation, not replication" by the original researchers.

Uh-huh, but it's still replication because:

a) What happens to the original particle, already ?

b) The "new" person is a copy composed of copies of particles.

[Belz...]

Yes, from MercA's perspective, ie: your current perspective. This is all that is at stake here - a belief system. MercA is protecting his belief in unique inviolable selfhood. You're a Cartesian at heart.

I think you're very confused, Nick.

We all agree that MercB is a copy of MercA, albeit an identical one. And I believe we all agree that, should MercA not be vapourised by the machine, MercA's awareness won't experience what MercB experiences. Ergo, both awarenesses are distinct, though identical.

For some reason, you seem to think that, once we DO vapourise MercA, his awareness magically gets carried on with MercB, although it wasn't the case if he didn't get vapourised. Doesn't that sound like dualism to you ?

One possibility is that you're assuming that all that matters is that information is preserved. But the topic of the thread is awareness. If we agree that the copy has a NEW consciousness, then how can you maintain your position ?

[Mercutio]

Yes, from MercA's perspective, ie: your current perspective. This is all that is at stake here - a belief system. MercA is protecting his belief in unique inviolable selfhood. You're a Cartesian at heart.
Not at all. It is you, Nick, who has separated behavior from the behaving organism, in a functional dualism. It is you who sees a separation here. And the question is phrased from MercA's perspective ("would you get in the machine?"), so I must address it from that perspective.

Likewise, my foot! How is that a valid analogy? If MercA was not aware of the teletransporter, and thinks it just a phone booth, he wouldn't even know he'd been replicated. Because he has not changed, not experientially. The inner and outer worlds are the same as before.
Thank you for illustrating my point. You are separating inner and outer worlds; I do not see a distinction. I cannot meaningfully separate behavior from a behaving organism.

I'm breaking down selfhood into its component elements, that's all. It's not so precious, just a routine function of the organism. You're not wrong, for sure. Just following an archaic belief.

Nick"A" routine function of the organism? No, it is everything the organism is and does. Your reductionist self is not just an assumption, but it is a functionally dualistic assumption that is fundamentally flawed. There is no "self" sub-routine.

[leon_heller]

Uh-huh, but it's still replication because:

a) What happens to the original particle, already ?

b) The "new" person is a copy composed of copies of particles.

It's not replication. The original particle loses its quantum state during the scanning process. The new particle has the quantum state transferred to it and is therefore the same particle. If it wasn't there would be a serious problem with quantum mechanics.

Leon

[Nick227]

Not at all. It is you, Nick, who has separated behavior from the behaving organism, in a functional dualism. It is you who sees a separation here. And the question is phrased from MercA's perspective ("would you get in the machine?"), so I must address it from that perspective.

Yes. You can only address it from your perspective. I submit, however, that your behaviour as demonstrated by your responses is entirely consistent with the Cartesian perspective. You won't get into the machine because you believe that you will die. This is Cartesian selfhood - the belief in a persisting unique self.


............

"A" routine function of the organism? No, it is everything the organism is and does.

Is....to a molecular level? How is selfhood uniquely expressed at a molecular level?

Give me one experiential aspect of selfhood that would be changed by the transporter.

Nick

[Darat]

...snip...

Give me one experiential aspect of selfhood that would be changed by the transporter.

Nick

The guilt of knowing someone had to die for you to live.

[Belz...]

It's not replication. The original particle loses its quantum state during the scanning process. The new particle has the quantum state transferred to it and is therefore the same particle.

Define "same", then.

[Nick227]

The guilt of knowing someone had to die for you to live.

Dear god, you're just taking a trip across the world. It's not War and Peace or bloody Therese Raquin. You die, you live. In the future people will use these things to go down the shops. This guilt arises only from your archaic vision of selfhood.

Nick

[leon_heller]

Define "same", then.

Same quantum state. In quantum theory that makes it the same particle.

Leon

[Mercutio]

Yes. You can only address it from your perspective. I submit, however, that your behaviour as demonstrated by your responses is entirely consistent with the Cartesian perspective. You won't get into the machine because you believe that you will die. This is Cartesian selfhood - the belief in a persisting unique self.
You have read a different Descartes than I have. This persisting unique Cartesian mind is separate of the body, interacting at the pineal gland (or at microtubules, if you are Chalmers). If you think I am anything close to this, you are misreading me badly.

Is....to a molecular level? How is selfhood uniquely expressed at a molecular level?
Again you extrapolate the wrong direction, but unless your photopigments bleach when someone shines a light in my eye, I gotta think our molecules are doing different things based solely on what the whole behaving organism is doing at the time.

Give me one experiential aspect of selfhood that would be changed by the transporter.
Darat aside, and the trivial bit of coming out of a transporter in a different location than you came in, there ain't much. But note that you are defining the person as only part--"the experiential aspect". As I said, you are functionally dualist. You are artificially separating out an aspect and claiming it is all that matters.

[Mercutio]

Dear god, you're just taking a trip across the world. It's not War and Peace or bloody Therese Raquin. You die, you live. In the future people will use these things to go down the shops. This guilt arises only from your archaic vision of selfhood.

NickUm... you have an interesting vision of the future. This is a thought problem, nothing more.

[Mashuna]

As a fascinated lurker on this thread, I would just like to say that I started out agreeing with Nick227 on this thought experiment, but have now swung round to Mercutio's view. I'm still enjoying the debate though.

[Belz...]

Same quantum state. In quantum theory that makes it the same particle.

Okay, assume I'm a complete ignoramus. What's a quantum state, exactly ?

A short while ago you said it was a copy, and now you claim it's the same. I wish I knew which I should believe.

[leon_heller]

Okay, assume I'm a complete ignoramus. What's a quantum state, exactly ?

A short while ago you said it was a copy, and now you claim it's the same. I wish I knew which I should believe.

With particles, if the quantum state is copied or applied to another particle, it is the same particle. The particle isn't copied, just the quantum state.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_state

Leon

[Mercutio]

As a fascinated lurker on this thread, I would just like to say that I started out agreeing with Nick227 on this thought experiment, but have now swung round to Mercutio's view. I'm still enjoying the debate though.

MercutioA or MercutioB?
:D

[Mashuna]

MercutioA or MercutioB?
:D

Same thing, surely?






:boxedin:

[Mercutio]

I'm breaking down selfhood into its component elements, that's all. It's not so precious, just a routine function of the organism. You're not wrong, for sure. Just following an archaic belief.

Nick

To riff off of what Belz said above... It is clear that after ZAP, if we do not kill off MercA, we have two individuals, who share common memories, experiences, DNA, body odor, tooth plaque, predilection for limericks, and stunning good looks. I would not want to kill off MercA a moment or two before ZAP, of course, and neither would you. Nobody would--not even Darat. The only difference between before and after ZAP is that now there are two people. By your view, one of them is excess, and may be destroyed (providing we do it at ZAP, and not a heartbeat before or after).

Now, we do have over six and a half billion people sharing the planet with us. I hope I can assume that you do not consider any of them to be excess and disposable. But... each of them share a number of things with the disposable MercA: each has its own XYZ set of coordinates (that is, its own physical space), a history of behavior, a metabolism, approximately one heart, one brain, two kidneys, a social network, parents (whether present or absent)... Heck, I can't think of any way at all that MercA is different from any of these 6.7 Billion other people! What is it that allows him (er, me) to be expendable?

Apparently, you believe there is one thing that trumps all those others, enough so that you find it ethically sound to kill off MercA. One thing that is not even a thing, but a "ran", to use Darat's term.

I can't see your view as anything but dualistic.

[Mercutio]

Same thing, surely?






:boxedin:

Don't call me Shirley.

[skiba]

The guilt of knowing someone had to die for you to live.

You would feel guilty for killing yourself??

And yet, there you are, the same identical organism that made the decision to get into the teleporter in the first place.

DaratA wouldn't worrie about it because hes vapourised, only DaratB would create a moral dillema out of it,
which would be the same as feeling sorry for yourself.

[Mashuna]

Don't call me Shirley.

For that pun, you deserve the vapouriser.

[Jeff Corey]

For that pun, you deserve the vapouriser.

Shirley, you jest.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=midrADL_kHI

[Mercutio]

You would feel guilty for killing yourself??
The thing about killing yourself is, there isn't the possibility of feeling guilty afterward. Nor the possibility of, say, identifying your corpse, or burying it. All of these things are possible in the thought problem.

And yet, there you are, the same identical organism that made the decision to get into the teleporter in the first place.
Yeah, see, that's the thing--you are not the "same", although you are a perfect copy. If you were in fact the same, there would be no corpseA for you to identify and bury.

DaratA wouldn't worrie about it because hes vapourised, only DaratB would create a moral dillema out of it,
which would be the same as feeling sorry for yourself.
Only for those who A) artificially and arbitrarily separate out self from body, and B) choose to make this artificially dissected portion the "true self". Descartes would be proud.

[Darat]

Variation 57:

The teleport is still in its experimental stage and every so often there is a little mishap that results not in a DaratB being created in teleport podB but DaratB being created in teleport podA (where DaratA is).

So here we are a busy day in the lab, DaratA is being paid the usual amount for a lab rat, he's signed all the legal waivers and he climbs into the telepod. There's a flash and a bang and we see a technician rushing over to teleport podA.

The technical guy opens the door, shakes his head and shouts out

"Mary fetch the red vaporiser the glitch has happened again I need to get rid of one of the Darats. .....Yeah the red one....... oh I forgot you can't tell red from any other colour can you - it's the one on the right - no your right."



I take it Nick and skiba would argue it doesn't matter which Darat is vaporised and vaporising just one of them would not be considered "killing Darat". Of course this also means that DaratA and DaratB would just stand there waiting for the technician to decide which one would be vaporised because DaratA and DaratB are well aware that "I" will continue....

[skiba]

Yeah, see, that's the thing--you are not the "same", although you are a perfect copy. If you were in fact the same, there would be no corpseA for you to identify and bury.



It is not the "same", but do you think something is lost in the process?

Do you see the "self" as a specific set of molecules?

[Darat]

It is not the "same", but do you think something is lost in the process?

Do you see the "self" as a specific set of molecules?

I'm sure Merc can answer for himself but from your questions I don't think you have understood the "1 + 1 = 2" argument at all.

When you make an exact duplicate of me you get two mes because all "me" [I]is is the cylindrical package of chemicals with a hole through the middle. Once you have two mes getting rid of one is killing what we label a "person".

[skiba]

I'm sure Merc can answer for himself but from your questions I don't think you have understood the "1 + 1 = 2" argument at all.

When you make an exact duplicate of me you get two mes because all "me" [I]is is the cylindrical package of chemicals with a hole through the middle. Once you have two mes getting rid of one is killing what we label a "person".


Maybe certain people wouldn't be able to use the teleporter, because of their "belief" or fear of death.

I would gladly step in the teleporter. After I'm vaporised
skibaB would know skibaA was ok with being vaporised.

No moral dillemas, no problems created. As far as the world is concernd, it's the same person.

[Darat]

Maybe certain people wouldn't be able to use the teleporter, because of their "belief" or fear of death.

I would gladly step in the teleporter. After I'm vaporised
skibaB would know skibaA was ok with being vaporised.

No moral dillemas, no problems created. As far as the world is concernd, it's the same person.

So I was correct to say in this post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=3941676#post3941676) you'd have no problem in just picking a Darat at random to kill*?



*Merc remember you'd still be left with one Darat so you'd probably consider it rather a Hobson's choice.

[Nick227]

You have read a different Descartes than I have. This persisting unique Cartesian mind is separate of the body, interacting at the pineal gland (or at microtubules, if you are Chalmers). If you think I am anything close to this, you are misreading me badly.

But the Cartesian vision of selfhood is of a persisting entity. What you appear to me to be saying is that selfhood is an actual function of the whole, right down to a molecular level, and thus cannot be replicated. Yet all we have to even consider that selfhood exists is our apparent experience of it and this can be replicated.

So, in the thought experiment, even though there is no experiential difference, not for Merc or for anyone who knows him before and after, you are insisting that there has been a change in selfhood. This is fantasy. Selfhood is not innate to material substance, neither to life, neither to humans.

Darat aside, and the trivial bit of coming out of a transporter in a different location than you came in, there ain't much. But note that you are defining the person as only part--"the experiential aspect". As I said, you are functionally dualist. You are artificially separating out an aspect and claiming it is all that matters.

I am pointing out that the experience of selfhood arises simply out of brain function. It is not innate. You can experience the monitor in front of you irght now without selfhood, at least without "I" type selfhood. You don't need a sense of "I" to experience anything, merely it is created through thinking about it later.

Nick

[Nick227]

Now, we do have over six and a half billion people sharing the planet with us. I hope I can assume that you do not consider any of them to be excess and disposable. But... each of them share a number of things with the disposable MercA: each has its own XYZ set of coordinates (that is, its own physical space), a history of behavior, a metabolism, approximately one heart, one brain, two kidneys, a social network, parents (whether present or absent)... Heck, I can't think of any way at all that MercA is different from any of these 6.7 Billion other people! What is it that allows him (er, me) to be expendable?


What is it about material substance that gives it this sense of uniqueness you are ascribing to it? You're a monist, right?

Nick

[skiba]

So I was correct to say in this post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=3941676#post3941676) you'd have no problem in just picking a Darat at random to kill?

This is derailing from the point and making it into a moral issue. I can't say what would be the right thing to do. To let both live or just vaporise the other, I really dont know.

Maybe the experimenter should make you sign an agreement beforehand on what will be done if these "hiccups" were to happen.

[Nick227]

So I was correct to say in this post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=3941676#post3941676) you'd have no problem in just picking a Darat at random to kill*?

Well, problems and dilemmas arise only in the event of malfunction and the end result being two Darats. At this juncture things have changed considerably as there would be now two conscious beings experiencing different things.

Whilst the machine functions correctly and there is no point in time when two Darats exist there are no hassles.

Remember that, according to the terms of Blackmore's version of the experiment, you cannot submit answers of this nature. You have to answer on the basis of the machine functioning correctly. BTW, you still haven't said whether you would travel or not.

Nick

[Nick227]

This is derailing from the point and making it into a moral issue. I can't say what would be the right thing to do. To let both live or just vaporise the other, I really dont know.

Maybe the experimenter should make you sign an agreement beforehand on what will be done if these "hiccups" were to happen.

Yes, this is constantly the thing here. All sorts of emotive side-scenarios are imagined instead of actually focussing on whether one would travel or not. I imagine Susan Blackmore faced the same things when she worked with the experiment in her classes and this is why she words the experiment so tightly thus...

"Exercise 4. The teletransporter

Imagine a box with a big button which, when you press it, can transport you anywhere you want to go – and back again. When it does so it reads all the information from every cell in your body, destroying them in the process and rebuilding them exactly the same at the destination.

Would you go? Do not quibble over safety or any other details. This is, after all, a thought experiment, so we are not constrained by reality. The box is 100% safe and reliable. If you won’t go in, this has to be for some other reason than that it might go wrong."

Darat seems to put off actually answering the question with these diversions.

Nick

[leon_heller]

As I said a long time ago, my view is that if it could be guaranteed that MercA was disintegrated at the same time as MercB was created, I don't see that there is a problem. The particles in MercA would be identical to the particles in MercB with the same quantum states (location doesn't matter in quantum physics). I don't think that simultaneity in that sense is possible, though.

If we actually have MercA and MercB co-existing, they will instantly become two individuals because their experiences will immediately become different.

What Blackmore is proposing is actually my quantum teleportation device, which doesn't have any problems. The quantum states are preserved, therefore the teleported individual is the same as the person who stepped into the transmitter.

Leon

[Nick227]

As I said a long time ago, my view is that if it could be guaranteed that MercA was disintegrated at the same time as MercB was created, I don't see that there is a problem. The particles in MercA would be identical to the particles in MercB with the same quantum states (location doesn't matter in quantum physics). I don't think that simultaneity in that sense is possible, though.

If we actually have MercA and MercB co-existing, they will instantly become two individuals because their experiences will immediately become different.

Leon

Personally, I don't see why a monist should need a quantum teletransporter. What property could material have that can't be replicated aside of position?

Nick

[Darat]

This is derailing from the point and making it into a moral issue. I can't say what would be the right thing to do. To let both live or just vaporise the other, I really dont know.

...snip...

I disagree that it is derailing from the point - several of us in this thread have pointed out that because of our viewpoint of the world the flaw with this teleport scenario is that it involves someone dying. The fact that the two people are to all extents indistinguishable is irrelevant to this point. Something I may have mentioned a few hundreds of posts ago! :)

[leon_heller]

Personally, I don't see why a monist should need a quantum teletransporter. What property could material have that can't be replicated aside of position?

Nick

Because it guarantees that we will never create two individuals. As soon as a person is replicated the two entities will instantly become two individuals, because of their different perceptions and experiences. The quantum states of the particles in their brains will start to become different, at a fundamental level.

Leon

[Darat]

...snip...

Remember that, according to the terms of Blackmore's version of the experiment, you cannot submit answers of this nature. Y...snip..

Nick

Thankfully we are not discussing such a stifling thought experiment but the one that inserted this topic into this thread!

The fact that the destruction happens "instantly" after the teleport makes no difference to the fact that someone has to die. That the person that dies is indistinguishable from DaratB is irrelevant to that fact.

[leon_heller]

Thankfully we are not discussing such a stifling thought experiment but the one that inserted this topic into this thread!

The fact that the destruction happens "instantly" after the teleport makes no difference to the fact that someone has to die. That the person that dies is indistinguishable from DaratB is irrelevant to that fact.

As I said previously, I personally don't have a problem with that as long as the machine is 100% reliable. I will just step into the cubicle, select my destination, and press the button. I will then be in the destination cubicle, and I will still be "me".

Leon

[westprog]

As a fascinated lurker on this thread, I would just like to say that I started out agreeing with Nick227 on this thought experiment, but have now swung round to Mercutio's view. I'm still enjoying the debate though.

What I find interesting about Nick227 is that not only does he seem to see no need to preserve Nick226 or Nick228*, but given his arguments, there doesn't seem any pressing need to preserve Nick(anyvalue).

*Has Nick-n been through this machine? Is the 227 an actual index?

[Belz...]

With particles, if the quantum state is copied or applied to another particle, it is the same particle. The particle isn't copied, just the quantum state.

"Another particle" can't be "the same particle". Also, if you copy the quantum state, what happens to the original particle ?

[Belz...]

Don't call me Shirley.

Doesn't that bring back memories...

Of course not. I have it on DVD.

[Belz...]

I take it Nick and skiba would argue it doesn't matter which Darat is vaporised and vaporising just one of them would not be considered "killing Darat".

That's because they remove a part of the equation, and conflate pattern with object. As long as there is at least one copy of the pattern in the world, it isn't lost. Of course, that's true to a degree -- except for one person, that is. I can see the point they're trying to make, but it is misguided in my view because it either assumes that "awareness" is a magica property of the pattern, or that it's non-existent.

[Belz...]

Maybe certain people wouldn't be able to use the teleporter, because of their "belief" or fear of death.

Knowing that you were going to die, would you step into the teleporter, thinking "hey, at last I'll continue to exist in another copy..." ?

[Belz...]

But the Cartesian vision of selfhood is of a persisting entity. What you appear to me to be saying is that selfhood is an actual function of the whole, right down to a molecular level, and thus cannot be replicated.

Actually, I think we all agree that it is "replicated". In fact, that's the whole problem. If it COULDN'T be replicated, then I'd be fine with the idea: once your DaratA or MercutioA or Belz... was killed off, your awareness would magically encompass DaratB, MercutioB or AlterBelz..., respectively. It's the fact that it CAN be replicated that's the problem: I don't want THIS copy of my awareness to vanish, because it can't possibly, logically, physically be shared with any other copy.

Well, problems and dilemmas arise only in the event of malfunction and the end result being two Darats. [...] Whilst the machine functions correctly and there is no point in time when two Darats exist there are no hassles.

No hassles ? How about killing DaratA, MercutioA and Belz... ? Just because you kill them WHILE creating the copy makes no difference. Otherwise, murder would be OK if we could associate it with a childbirth, somewhere...

"Well, you did kill your wife.... but fortunately your cousin gave birth at the same moment, so you're free to go!"

All sorts of emotive side-scenarios are imagined instead of actually focussing on whether one would travel or not.

Can we agree that the emotive scenarios would determine whether I would travel or not ?

[leon_heller]

"Another particle" can't be "the same particle". Also, if you copy the quantum state, what happens to the original particle ?

It is the same particle if it has the same quantum state as the original. One can't distinguish two electrons with the same quantum state from one another.

The particle still exists, it loses its quantum state.

Leon

[skiba]

Knowing that you were going to die, would you step into the teleporter, thinking "hey, at last I'll continue to exist in another copy..." ?

If "I" is a bundle of atoms in a specific arragement, then yes.
It does not matter if it's the same atom as in the original, only the formation of those atoms.

[Dancing David]

Yes. You can only address it from your perspective. I submit, however, that your behaviour as demonstrated by your responses is entirely consistent with the Cartesian perspective. You won't get into the machine because you believe that you will die. This is Cartesian selfhood - the belief in a persisting unique self.

That is just silly. One may protect the biological organism due to conditioning. Duh, no need for an abtract self. More psychodynamic silliness. Does fly protect itself because it believe in a cartesian duality?




Is....to a molecular level? How is selfhood uniquely expressed at a molecular level?

Give me one experiential aspect of selfhood that would be changed by the transporter.

Nick
Um, I don't know what you mean by "experiential aspect of selfhood " but that would include the translocation of the organism.

[Dancing David]

What is it about material substance that gives it this sense of uniqueness you are ascribing to it? You're a monist, right?

Nick

Contingent history.

prove me wrong, step in front of a bus. If you would blithley kill yourself, as opposed to just tranlate atoms, then step in front of a bus.

You are a monist aren't you?

[Dancing David]

If "I" is a bundle of atoms in a specific arragement, then yes.
It does not matter if it's the same atom as in the original, only the formation of those atoms.

Yes but belief and knowledge are two seperate sets of feelings and thoughts.

I have no qualms about using the transporter.

It is a thought experiment. If a copy was made, then i would not use it to travel to the stars, that would be abandoning copies of myself to die at the waystations.

I would no more do that than I would starve a dog or cat. I would not make copies of a dog or cat and then just vaporise one.

You can be a materialist and have a belief that vaporizing animals is wrong.

[Mercutio]

But the Cartesian vision of selfhood is of a persisting entity. What you appear to me to be saying is that selfhood is an actual function of the whole, right down to a molecular level, and thus cannot be replicated. Yet all we have to even consider that selfhood exists is our apparent experience of it and this can be replicated.
The key here is replicated. Not transferred. After ZAP, you have two people; killing one of them is still killing, and that person's life ends.

So, in the thought experiment, even though there is no experiential difference, not for Merc or for anyone who knows him before and after, you are insisting that there has been a change in selfhood. This is fantasy. Selfhood is not innate to material substance, neither to life, neither to humans.
Not a change in selfhood--a replication. There are two selfs now. Two Mercutios (a dream come true, I know). Either of whom might agree to having the other one offed, but each of whom would want Laetitia for himself.

I am pointing out that the experience of selfhood arises simply out of brain function. It is not innate. You can experience the monitor in front of you irght now without selfhood, at least without "I" type selfhood. You don't need a sense of "I" to experience anything, merely it is created through thinking about it later.

NickAnd where does brain function arise from? Self is not merely a brain state, it is the lifetime of experience of the whole person which leads to that brain (more than brain, actually) state. Once again you are neglecting the real world in your version of the thought experiment.

[Mercutio]

What is it about material substance that gives it this sense of uniqueness you are ascribing to it? You're a monist, right?

Nick
No, I am not a monist. Nor am I a dualist. I am a pragmatist.

There is nothing about the material substance that gives it a sense of uniqueness (I'll let you parse out the explanatory fictions in your sentence yourself). It does not matter a bit whether we are ontologically matter, mind, or cheese puffs. Pragmatically, it is tremendously useful to look at the self-contained, behaving organism as a whole, in its functional relation to the environment it is embedded in.

[Belz...]

It is the same particle if it has the same quantum state as the original. One can't distinguish two electrons with the same quantum state from one another.

The particle still exists, it loses its quantum state.

I can't brain that. Can you or can you not have two particles with the same quantum state ?

It does not matter if it's the same atom as in the original, only the formation of those atoms.

So... let me get this straight... you think that if you create a copy of yourself, then kill yourself, your awareness will magically move to the copy ?

[leon_heller]

I can't brain that. Can you or can you not have two particles with the same quantum state ?


Of course you can. They will be identical, of course.

Leon

[Nick227]

Thankfully we are not discussing such a stifling thought experiment but the one that inserted this topic into this thread!

No. Blackmores' is identical, she's just had more experience of people trying to wriggle out of answering it than we had!

The fact that the destruction happens "instantly" after the teleport makes no difference to the fact that someone has to die. That the person that dies is indistinguishable from DaratB is irrelevant to that fact.

I'm surprised you aren't already organising a protest outside her home with placards reading "More Rights for the Victims of Thought Experiments!"

Nick

[Nick227]

What I find interesting about Nick227 is that not only does he seem to see no need to preserve Nick226 or Nick228*, but given his arguments, there doesn't seem any pressing need to preserve Nick(anyvalue).

*Has Nick-n been through this machine? Is the 227 an actual index?

Not as far as I'm aware but I look forward to the day when we can travel this way in speed and without having to pollute our planet.

Nick

[Nick227]

That is just silly. One may protect the biological organism due to conditioning. Duh, no need for an abtract self. More psychodynamic silliness. Does fly protect itself because it believe in a cartesian duality?

Flies have nothing to do with it. A fly is not capable of grasping the fact that an identical replica will be created, thus any fear of death it has cannot be assuaged by a rational reinterpretation of the situation.

Merc won't get in the machine because he believes it will kill him. He is to me thus demonstrating belief in a persisting self. Actually he seems to believe that selfhood is innate to the physical substance of his body and thus it cannot be recreated, which if you ask me is even weirder, but for sure everyone is free to believe as they wish.

Nick

[Nick227]

No, I am not a monist. Nor am I a dualist. I am a pragmatist.

There is nothing about the material substance that gives it a sense of uniqueness (I'll let you parse out the explanatory fictions in your sentence yourself). It does not matter a bit whether we are ontologically matter, mind, or cheese puffs. Pragmatically, it is tremendously useful to look at the self-contained, behaving organism as a whole, in its functional relation to the environment it is embedded in.

I agree with your last sentence. But the situation that the thought experiment is creating is imo outside of the domain in which your pragmatic stance is relevant. The possibility to recreate perfectly the individual changes things.

Nick

[Belz...]

They will be identical, of course.

Identical, but not "the same", because there are two of them.

Now, why would there being ONE of them change anything to the fact that they are not "the same" ?

[leon_heller]

Identical, but not "the same", because there are two of them.

Now, why would there being ONE of them change anything to the fact that they are not "the same" ?

With quantum teleportation the two particles aren't identical. The quantum state of the first one has been transferred to the second one and the first one's state has been disrupted (one can't say what it is).

Leon

[Nick227]

So... let me get this straight... you think that if you create a copy of yourself, then kill yourself, your awareness will magically move to the copy ?

Debating with you for a little, Belz, and death soon loses its sting. I've rarely encountered a question that so perfectly demonstrates that the writer just does not grasp the scenario portrayed.

"Your awareness," if you must call it that, will be whatever it is wherever it is. It isn't moving anywhere. It's entirely dependent on the organism and its environment. It isn't special. It's totally ordinary. Are you sure you're not really DescartesZ, preserved from the past to torture us?

Nick

[Mercutio]

Debating with you for a little, Belz, and death soon loses its sting. I've rarely encountered a question that so perfectly demonstrates that the writer just does not grasp the scenario portrayed.
I suspect that there are several here who share that opinion. I can only hope that does not make some of us expendable.

"Your awareness," if you must call it that, will be whatever it is wherever it is. It isn't moving anywhere. It's entirely dependent on the organism and its environment. It isn't special. It's totally ordinary. Are you sure you're not really DescartesZ, preserved from the past to torture us?

NickSo, then, you agree that this scenario kills a perfectly aware person--just one whom you consider to be superfluous.

[Belz...]

With quantum teleportation the two particles aren't identical. The quantum state of the first one has been transferred to the second one and the first one's state has been disrupted (one can't say what it is).

Ergo, it isn't the same.

[Belz...]

Debating with you for a little, Belz, and death soon loses its sting.

That's because I AM death, and spending time with me makes the concept more palatable.

I've rarely encountered a question that so perfectly demonstrates that the writer just does not grasp the scenario portrayed.

It's not my fault if your position reeks of dualism. Mercutio seems to think so, too. Perhaps if you use smaller words...

"Your awareness," if you must call it that, will be whatever it is wherever it is. It isn't moving anywhere.

Therefore you agree that it has been destroyed and replaced by a copy.

It's entirely dependent on the organism and its environment. It isn't special. It's totally ordinary.

Indeed.

Are you sure you're not really DescartesZ, preserved from the past to torture us?

Oh, heavens no! I'd be far more annoying. Besides I disagree with Descartes.

[Nick227]

So, then, you agree that this scenario kills a perfectly aware person--just one whom you consider to be superfluous.

This scenario could be said perhaps to kill a body. Depending on how you look at things. It is not ordinary to encounter this situation with the teletransporter. I think any rational individual would consider re-writing moral rules in this kind of situation. Moses didn't have to contend with teletransporters when he was delivering his sermon.

Nick

[Darat]

About time you acknowledged that there may well be some moral issues in killing people for your convenience!

[Nick227]

About time you acknowledged that there may well be some moral issues in killing people for your convenience!

Well, with killing myself for my convenience!

Maybe to podB we could fit some side box full of wailing women where the various B's could mourn their losses, should they feel a need to. Would this help you?

Nick

[Darat]

Well, with killing myself for my convenience!

Apart from of course the fact that you aren't killing yourself you are killing someone else. The only way the two bodies can be considered the same person is if you want to hold some strange idea such as they will share one conciousness.

[Nick227]

Apart from of course the fact that you aren't killing yourself you are killing someone else.

NickA pushes the button. NickA "dies."

Nick

[Darat]

NickA pushes the button. NickA "dies."

Nick

Ah now if you want to tweak the thought experiment so it goes:

DaratA enters cubicle > DaratA presses button > Scan happens > DaratA is destroyed > then DaratB is created

Then I agree with you it is DaratA's choice to use the device or not so then there isn't any moral dilemma involved.

[leon_heller]

Ergo, it isn't the same.

The teleported particle is identical to the original but the process of teleportation disrupts the original.

Leon

[rocketdodger]

Everyone ignored my post about a teleporter that doesn't destroy the original.

Or is the argument specifically about the one that destroys the original?

[Nick227]

Everyone ignored my post about a teleporter that doesn't destroy the original.

Or is the argument specifically about the one that destroys the original?

Well, this is Susan Blackmore's version, and it's the one I'm going with...

"Exercise 4. The teletransporter

Imagine a box with a big button which, when you press it, can transport you anywhere you want to go – and back again. When it does so it reads all the information from every cell in your body, destroying them in the process and rebuilding them exactly the same at the destination.

Would you go? Do not quibble over safety or any other details. This is, after all, a thought experiment, so we are not constrained by reality. The box is 100% safe and reliable. If you won’t go in, this has to be for some other reason than that it might go wrong."

Would you travel?

Nick

[rocketdodger]

Well, this is Susan Blackmore's version, and it's the one I'm going with...

"Exercise 4. The teletransporter

Imagine a box with a big button which, when you press it, can transport you anywhere you want to go – and back again. When it does so it reads all the information from every cell in your body, destroying them in the process and rebuilding them exactly the same at the destination.

Would you go? Do not quibble over safety or any other details. This is, after all, a thought experiment, so we are not constrained by reality. The box is 100% safe and reliable. If you won’t go in, this has to be for some other reason than that it might go wrong."

Would you travel?

Nick

No, for the reasons Belz has been arguing.

But like I said, if you change the teleporter so that it continually updates the neural states of the original during teleportation to reflect those of the copy, and does it slowly, then the original will be the copy because continuity is preserved. In such a case, there is no reason not to travel, because you really are the same information rather than just a copy afterwards.

[Nick227]

But like I said, if you change the teleporter so that it continually updates the neural states of the original during teleportation to reflect those of the copy, and does it slowly, then the original will be the copy because continuity is preserved. In such a case, there is no reason not to travel, because you really are the same information rather than just a copy afterwards.

I don't quite follow. Why do you need to update the neural states? Who would notice? Can you explain more?

Nick

[rocketdodger]

I don't quite follow. Why do you need to update the neural states? Who would notice? Can you explain more?

Nick

Because according to the computational model of consciousness, we are the flow of information rather than simply just information.

That is why the standard teleporter is a killer -- information only flows one way, if any, during its use. If information flows both ways, fully, then there is no problem.

Think of the modified teleporter as a "force manipulator" that convinces atoms in one location that they are being affected by nearby atoms when in fact they are being affected by the atoms across space at the other side of the teleporter.

In other words, the user is partially in both places at once but the teleporter makes it impossible for the user (or the user's atoms) to tell. Other than the fact that they will be receiving mixed sensory input from both partial locations!

[Dancing David]

This scenario could be said perhaps to kill a body. Depending on how you look at things. It is not ordinary to encounter this situation with the teletransporter. I think any rational individual would consider re-writing moral rules in this kind of situation. Moses didn't have to contend with teletransporters when he was delivering his sermon.

Nick

Moses could use the teleporter, he is a fictional character. Oh wait, it is fictional too.

never mind.

[Dancing David]

Flies have nothing to do with it. A fly is not capable of grasping the fact that an identical replica will be created, thus any fear of death it has cannot be assuaged by a rational reinterpretation of the situation.

Merc won't get in the machine because he believes it will kill him. He is to me thus demonstrating belief in a persisting self. Actually he seems to believe that selfhood is innate to the physical substance of his body and thus it cannot be recreated, which if you ask me is even weirder, but for sure everyone is free to believe as they wish.

Nick

Well, you certainly seem to believe in your straw man.

[Dancing David]

I agree with your last sentence. But the situation that the thought experiment is creating is imo outside of the domain in which your pragmatic stance is relevant. The possibility to recreate perfectly the individual changes things.

Nick

That makes about as much sense as the possibility of god frees the soul.

[Mercutio]

Well, this is Susan Blackmore's version, and it's the one I'm going with...

"Exercise 4. The teletransporter

Imagine a box with a big button which, when you press it, can transport you anywhere you want to go – and back again. When it does so it reads all the information from every cell in your body, destroying them in the process and rebuilding them exactly the same at the destination.

Would you go? Do not quibble over safety or any other details. This is, after all, a thought experiment, so we are not constrained by reality. The box is 100% safe and reliable. If you won’t go in, this has to be for some other reason than that it might go wrong."

Would you travel?

NickOops! My bad! If this is the scenario (and, like Darat, I thought it was a different one, as my answers show), then there is not the death of MercA to worry about.

Rather, there is the death of MercA and MercB to worry about, and MercC walks out of the original machine at the end. This one also is one that does not fit my original criteria for agreement. My understanding was that it was a one-way trip (was that also your understanding, Darat?). In this "there-and-back-again" scenario, does MercA (who dies) choose when MercB comes back? Or does MercB choose that? I mean, cos I would not want to be in mid-something with Ms. Casta when I suddenly get called back, if it was a time span chosen by MercA. And if MercB decides I like it with L.C., and does not want to return, can the relatives of MercA sue for breach of contract?

Which brings up another point. If MercA is replicated, is Mrs. Merc now married to MercB? What if MercA is not destroyed--is she a bigamist? What if MercA only agreed to the machine because he mistakenly thought that MercB stood a chance with Laetitia Casta? What if MercB decides to push the destroy button early after my miserable failure, and fails to uphold the deal MercA agreed to?

Inquiring minds want to know!

[Dancing David]

Well, this is Susan Blackmore's version, and it's the one I'm going with...

"Exercise 4. The teletransporter

Imagine a box with a big button which, when you press it, can transport you anywhere you want to go – and back again. When it does so it reads all the information from every cell in your body, destroying them in the process and rebuilding them exactly the same at the destination.

Would you go? Do not quibble over safety or any other details. This is, after all, a thought experiment, so we are not constrained by reality. The box is 100% safe and reliable. If you won’t go in, this has to be for some other reason than that it might go wrong."

Would you travel?

Nick

This is different from the vaporizer scenario, in this one the body is destroyed as it is transported. So the moral dilema of which Nick is making such a fuss does not arise. In this scenario the body is destroyed and recreated, there are not two bodies, one of which is destroyed.

[Mercutio]

This scenario could be said perhaps to kill a body. What a strange thing for a claimed non-dualist to say. If it kills the person, it kills the person. It cannot kill the body and not some other part, or some other part and not the body. It can damage a body, or change behavior, but dead is dead.
Depending on how you look at things. A living person is now a corpse. How else do I look at it?
It is not ordinary to encounter this situation with the teletransporter. Thus, the thought experiment.
I think any rational individual would consider re-writing moral rules in this kind of situation. Moses didn't have to contend with teletransporters when he was delivering his sermon.

It does not take a Moses to have a moral imperative.

If teletransporters result in excess bodies, perhaps the moral code will change. Perhaps human life will be looked at in terms of costs and benefits, and we will be able to have two or three copies of a Darat (so we can have better forum admin coverage), four Michael Phelpses (for an unbeatable medley team), emergency replacements for heads of state (naturally), an army of self-sacrificing super-soldier medal of honor winners (for national security reasons)... and to make up for this (think of it as the "carbon neutral" of teletransportation), we can destroy a bunch of homeless people, mental defectives, people who stay on unemployment for over 6 months, and poets.

After all, you are killing MercA simply because we have a MercB. What if we can make a convincing argument that two Mercutios are better than one Mercutio and one Darat? Yeah, Moses would disagree, but "I think any rational individual would consider re-writing moral rules in this kind of situation."

[Mercutio]

This is different from the vaporizer scenario, in this one the body is destroyed as it is transported. So the moral dilema of which Nick is making such a fuss does not arise. In this scenario the body is destroyed and recreated, there are not two bodies, one of which is destroyed.

I disagree, DD (see above). Not two bodies, one of which is destroyed... rather, three bodies, two of which are destroyed.

[Nick227]

What a strange thing for a claimed non-dualist to say. If it kills the person, it kills the person. It cannot kill the body and not some other part, or some other part and not the body. It can damage a body, or change behavior, but dead is dead.
A living person is now a corpse. How else do I look at it?

What I'm pointing out is that this situation would be very new for us. It is not normal for someone to be killed and instantly be recreated at another place. Thus, the usual moral codes around killing would have, in my opinion, to be re-evaluated.

If one imagines that teletransporters had been around for thousands of years, I doubt that our existing moral codes around killing would be the same.

To my mind, if teletransporters were available, one would have to discuss whether in actuality anyone is being killed when they are properly used. If there is no point in time at which 2 Mercs simultaneously exist then I think it's questionable whether anyone is really dying. As I see it, the answer mostly depends on your view of selfhood.

Nick

[Belz...]

The teleported particle is identical to the original but the process of teleportation disrupts the original.

Ergo, not the same again. So why do you keep arguing that it is ?

[Belz...]

I wasn't kidding, Nick. Please explain how your position ISN'T dualistic.

[Nick227]

Because according to the computational model of consciousness, we are the flow of information rather than simply just information.

That is why the standard teleporter is a killer -- information only flows one way, if any, during its use. If information flows both ways, fully, then there is no problem.

Think of the modified teleporter as a "force manipulator" that convinces atoms in one location that they are being affected by nearby atoms when in fact they are being affected by the atoms across space at the other side of the teleporter.

In other words, the user is partially in both places at once but the teleporter makes it impossible for the user (or the user's atoms) to tell. Other than the fact that they will be receiving mixed sensory input from both partial locations!

I don't completely follow but this seems vaguely reasonable. Not really sure what a "force manipulator" is!

Nick

[Belz...]

What I'm pointing out is that this situation would be very new for us. It is not normal for someone to be killed and instantly be recreated at another place. Thus, the usual moral codes around killing would have, in my opinion, to be re-evaluated.

I don't see that the most basic rights we grant ourselves need to be reviewed.

[Nick227]

I wasn't kidding, Nick. Please explain how your position ISN'T dualistic.

Because I'm not actually disputing that MercA would cease to be. I'm questioning whether, morally, the same rules apply in this situation and we could really say he's been killed. The situation with the transporter is new. So I'm saying certain moral precepts that we currently take for granted, such as that killing people is innately bad, might need to be re-examined.

Nick

[Nick227]

I don't see that the most basic rights we grant ourselves need to be reviewed.

Well, chatting with people I note that many people seem to have no qualms about using the teletransporter. "You are being killed", I pointed out to my girlfriend. "So? You're coming straight back to life. What does it matter?"

I'd have to test it more widely but I have mentioned it to a few people recently and they don't seem excessively bothered about it. Maybe someone could do one of those polls or something here.

So, from my limited sample, it seems like people aren't overly-worried about it and clearly don't regard it the same as being killed. I think if they saw someone go in and come out saying "It's OK" most people would probably be happy to use it.

Nick

[leon_heller]

Ergo, not the same again. So why do you keep arguing that it is ?

Because that's how quantum mechanics works! Particles with the same quantum state are identical.

Quantum teleportation has actually been achieved, many times.

Leon

[Darat]

Since we all seem to have ended up on agreeing that it is a moral problem, perhaps this story (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7559150.stm)may start a little bit more discussion regarding conciousness.

[westprog]

Well, chatting with people I note that many people seem to have no qualms about using the teletransporter. "You are being killed", I pointed out to my girlfriend. "So? You're coming straight back to life. What does it matter?"

I'd have to test it more widely but I have mentioned it to a few people recently and they don't seem excessively bothered about it. Maybe someone could do one of those polls or something here.

So, from my limited sample, it seems like people aren't overly-worried about it and clearly don't regard it the same as being killed. I think if they saw someone go in and come out saying "It's OK" most people would probably be happy to use it.

Nick

If the bodies were instantly disintegrated, that would be one thing. If they were shot at the moment of transportation instead, and people saw piles of bodies being wheeled away from the transporters and dumped in piles by the side of the road, then their attitude might be entirely different.

Then maybe the occasional misfire would result in one of the transportees fleeing for his life and being hunted down by the Transporter Police.

The moral position would be exactly the same. The sensibilities would be different.

Here's a different view - suppose that instead of an identical copy, the Nick228 or MercB is one part in a billion different. The difference is undetectable, but it is undoubtedly there. Would that matter?

[Mercutio]

I don't see that the most basic rights we grant ourselves need to be reviewed.

I think they should constantly be reviewed. I just think that this particular right holds up under review.

[Belz...]

Because I'm not actually disputing that MercA would cease to be. I'm questioning whether, morally, the same rules apply in this situation and we could really say he's been killed. The situation with the transporter is new. So I'm saying certain moral precepts that we currently take for granted, such as that killing people is innately bad, might need to be re-examined.

Killing people is not innately bad. I have no qualms about killing somebody who's trying to kill me. What I'm saying, is that _I_ wouldn't step into that device, because I don't want to die. If it's a wormhole effect, say, and I'm simply being moved to another location, then fine.

"You are being killed", I pointed out to my girlfriend. "So? You're coming straight back to life. What does it matter?"

She does seem to be a dualist. Perhaps she doesn't understand the implications.

Most people are believers, anyway. The way they see it, the "soul" can't be killed. Ergo, no problem. Materialists don't have that comfort.

[Belz...]

Because that's how quantum mechanics works! Particles with the same quantum state are identical.

Leon, I didn't ask you why you claimed they were identical. I asked you why you claimed they were THE SAME OBJECT, since they clearly aren't.

[leon_heller]

Leon, I didn't ask you why you claimed they were identical. I asked you why you claimed they were THE SAME OBJECT, since they clearly aren't.

How would you distinguish between them? They have the same quantum state.

Leon

[Nick227]

If the bodies were instantly disintegrated, that would be one thing. If they were shot at the moment of transportation instead, and people saw piles of bodies being wheeled away from the transporters and dumped in piles by the side of the road, then their attitude might be entirely different.

Then maybe the occasional misfire would result in one of the transportees fleeing for his life and being hunted down by the Transporter Police.

The moral position would be exactly the same. The sensibilities would be different.

Well, like Darat says, the issue is clearly more moral than anything else right now. Personally, it's clear for me that the moral position changes if you end up with 2 versions of someone. You couldn't just go around killing one. I also rather doubt that people would get into a machine if they thought they would be shot rather than disintegrated.

BTW, did you say whether you'd get in the thing or not yet, WP?

Nick

[Belz...]

How would you distinguish between them? They have the same quantum state.

That's not my question. Why do you say they are THE SAME, when they are merely IDENTICAL. To avoid any confusion, by THE SAME, I mean that they are ONE object. Since they are TWO, it is clearly not the case.

[leon_heller]

That's not my question. Why do you say they are THE SAME, when they are merely IDENTICAL. To avoid any confusion, by THE SAME, I mean that they are ONE object. Since they are TWO, it is clearly not the case.

According to quantum mechanics, the teleported particle is the same particle as the original one.

There are several other counter-intuitive findings in QM. For instance, in the Young's double-slit experiment, a particle passes through two slits in a screen at the same time.

Leon

[rocketdodger]

According to quantum mechanics, the teleported particle is the same particle as the original one.

There are several other counter-intuitive findings in QM. For instance, in the Young's double-slit experiment, a particle passes through two slits in a screen at the same time.

Leon

In case you have missed my posts on the matter, let me reiterate:

The computational model of consciousness does not assert that we are merely information but rather the flow of information.

So it is not enough to teleport the particles. You also have to teleport the interactions between particles, and you have to do it both ways, for the consciousness to remain the same.

[leon_heller]

In case you have missed my posts on the matter, let me reiterate:

The computational model of consciousness does not assert that we are merely information but rather the flow of information.

So it is not enough to teleport the particles. You also have to teleport the interactions between particles, and you have to do it both ways, for the consciousness to remain the same.

Why isn't it sufficient merely to teleport all the particles? According to the people who first performed quantum teleportation nothing else is required. What is so special about the human body?

Leon

[Belz...]

According to quantum mechanics, the teleported particle is the same particle as the original one.

You seem to be rather confused about that. You keep saying they're copies, but not, the same, but not, etc. I can't follow your argument, honestly.

[Darat]

Belz... I think leon is expanding on this concept: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_teleportation

[leon_heller]

You seem to be rather confused about that. You keep saying they're copies, but not, the same, but not, etc. I can't follow your argument, honestly.

In QM, there is no way to distinguish between particles with the same quantum state. Particles don't have memories, what is the difference between the original particle and the one that results from the teleportation?

Here is the original paper: http://www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation/teleportation.html

Leon

[rocketdodger]

Why isn't it sufficient merely to teleport all the particles? According to the people who first performed quantum teleportation nothing else is required. What is so special about the human body?

Leon

If the teleportation is instantaneous -- as in, infinitessimaly short -- then maybe it might not matter. But any length of time over that, and you need to insure that any forces exerted by the particles at the destination affect all relevant particles at the source and vica versa.

A copy of information is the same information. But a copy of a flow of information isn't. The flow must be continuous.

[skiba]

In QM, there is no way to distinguish between particles with the same quantum state.



This is exactly why there really isn't a person A and a person B,
when you go thru the teleporter.

The "I" is a bundle of particles, you cant attach an "I" to a certain set of particles. It is the formation of particles that makes the "I".

[leon_heller]

If the teleportation is instantaneous -- as in, infinitessimaly short -- then maybe it might not matter. But any length of time over that, and you need to insure that any forces exerted by the particles at the destination affect all relevant particles at the source and vica versa.

A copy of information is the same information. But a copy of a flow of information isn't. The flow must be continuous.

The transfer of every particle has to be done instantaneously, otherwise the already teleported particles missing from the original object (their quantum states are indeterminate) will have changed the quantum states of the ones waiting to be teleported.

Leon

[Belz...]

In QM, there is no way to distinguish between particles with the same quantum state. Particles don't have memories, what is the difference between the original particle and the one that results from the teleportation?

I understand that. However, the fact that an observer can't distinguish between two objects does not mean that they are, in fact, one object. They are still two.

[Belz...]

This is exactly why there really isn't a person A and a person B,
when you go thru the teleporter.

The "I" is a bundle of particles, you cant attach an "I" to a certain set of particles. It is the formation of particles that makes the "I".

What's funny is, so far, all that the pro-teleportation side has argued so far has been from, say, MercutioB's point of view. Nobody on that side has adressed what MercutioA experiences. There can't be a continuity of awareness for MercutioA, because he's been destroyed. How does that work ?

[Dancing David]

I disagree, DD (see above). Not two bodies, one of which is destroyed... rather, three bodies, two of which are destroyed.


Hmm, I was seeing it as 'scan, disassociate, move, reassociate, descan', maybe I should re read it, I thought is was like taking the car apart and moving it to the roof.

[Dancing David]

Because I'm not actually disputing that MercA would cease to be. I'm questioning whether, morally, the same rules apply in this situation and we could really say he's been killed. The situation with the transporter is new. So I'm saying certain moral precepts that we currently take for granted, such as that killing people is innately bad, might need to be re-examined.

Nick

The first copy is either disassociated and recreated, or the first body iis copied and destroyed. In the first scenario since the original body is translocated while destroyed, it is death of a sort (disruption of the body), in the second it is certainly killing.

Now I had thought of the first scenario as disruption through scanning and then replication. I think that is very grey as to being 'killing', now again we can parse it out:

1. scanning the body which destroys it a piece at a time as the body is scanned. Then replication.
2. scanning the body, after the scan then destroying the body and prior to replication.

But it is similar to a Xerox machine, if we insert paper A and the original is disassembled a molecule at a time and the paperA is reconstructed from the individual molecules at the destination, then yes the paper is what i would call paperA*, in that it is exactly like the original but it has been disrupted and recreated from the original pieces.

However if we have paperA, it goes in and shreded and then an exact copy is made, then we have paperB at the destination, it is not paperA, it is a copy of paperA but has no continuity with paperA.


With humans and other living organisms there is a convention in the use of speach which would say that disruption and recreation is destroying the body, so in one sense it is death. the second scenario is certainly death.

Now see, I always thought that the Star Trek transporter just moved the individual molecules in process, so it was not death.

the ethics of the situation are not any that will matter for millenia.

Since the living body is the only self, i would say that it is a grey area.

[Nick227]

What's funny is, so far, all that the pro-teleportation side has argued so far has been from, say, MercutioB's point of view. Nobody on that side has adressed what MercutioA experiences. There can't be a continuity of awareness for MercutioA, because he's been destroyed. How does that work ?

Personally, I would challenge whether this "continuity of awareness" really exists or simply appears to. Are you actually continually aware? To be so really requires an egoic model of self and, whilst undeniably intuitive, the monist materialist perspective, as I see it, is incompatible with this.

This is why I asked you early on how you would know if your body had been replaced by a replica whilst in deep sleep last night. How do you know there is actually any continuity of awareness, aside of it seeming so?

Nick

[Dancing David]

This is exactly why there really isn't a person A and a person B,
when you go thru the teleporter.

The "I" is a bundle of particles, you cant attach an "I" to a certain set of particles. It is the formation of particles that makes the "I".

Which is why the only currently coherent defintion of the self is the physical body. there is a continuity of particles in the organsism, but not in the pattern or flow of processes (i prefer that to 'information').

The definition can not rest with the 'flow of processes' because there is always a flow there. Bodystate6785433892 is preceded by Bodystate6785433891 and followed by Bodystate6785433893, each one is a discrete *I* but the only continuity is in the body.

[skiba]

What's funny is, so far, all that the pro-teleportation side has argued so far has been from, say, MercutioB's point of view. Nobody on that side has adressed what MercutioA experiences. There can't be a continuity of awareness for MercutioA, because he's been destroyed. How does that work ?

Would you use a teleporter where you are destoyed and then restored exactly the same from the original particles?

There wouldn't be a BelzB, only BelzA that goes through.

[leon_heller]

I understand that. However, the fact that an observer can't distinguish between two objects does not mean that they are, in fact, one object. They are still two.

The first one has been disrupted (entangled), though. At no time do we have two identical particles in the experiment.

Leon

[skiba]

The definition can not rest with the 'flow of processes' because there is always a flow there. Bodystate6785433892 is preceded by Bodystate6785433891 and followed by Bodystate6785433893, each one is a discrete *I* but the only continuity is in the body.

So, the problem is theres a discontinuation for.... let's say 0.00001seconds.

I don't know how fast this imaginary teleporter would work. What would be fast enough?

[cyborg]

A copy of information is the same information. But a copy of a flow of information isn't. The flow must be continuous.

As with the above I want a definition of "continuous".

[Belz...]

Personally, I would challenge whether this "continuity of awareness" really exists or simply appears to.

Oh, I'm sure it's the latter.

Trouble is, it "appears" that way to itself, not to its hypothetical copies.

[Belz...]

Would you use a teleporter where you are destoyed and then restored exactly the same from the original particles?

There wouldn't be a BelzB, only BelzA that goes through.

I am DESTROYED, but somehow the new construct is NOT an AlterBelz... ?

How come ?

[Belz...]

The first one has been disrupted (entangled), though. At no time do we have two identical particles in the experiment.

Irrelevant. We COULD have identical particles. Just because we kill A before creating B makes no difference whatsoever.

[Nick227]

Oh, I'm sure it's the latter.

Trouble is, it "appears" that way to itself, not to its hypothetical copies.

Well, it appears that way, and the phenomenon of selfhood is simultaneously created.

This issue is really the crux of it, if you ask me, as Blackmore points out. The moral issues and the what-if-it-goes-wrong issues are all, I think, a bit of a sideshow.

What is challenged directly by the teletransporter experiment is our notion of a persisting self. It seems as though it's the same "me" now......as now......as now, but this could well be an illusion created by the constancy of memories and other brain goings-on, and indeed this is the inference of materialism, borne out by considering cases like C.W., mentioned earlier in the thread. There is likely no persisting self, merely a sense of continuing selfhood constantly being created by various brain processes, sometimes as a adjunct to their actual activity.

Nick

[leon_heller]

Irrelevant. We COULD have identical particles. Just because we kill A before creating B makes no difference whatsoever.

There is a difference - according to QM, the two can't co-exist. That means that they are the same particle.

Leon

[skiba]

I am DESTROYED, but somehow the new construct is NOT an AlterBelz... ?

How come ?

It's not an alterBelz, why do you think that?
Every particle is the original and is in its original place.

what has changed, other than your location?

[Belz...]

What is challenged directly by the teletransporter experiment is our notion of a persisting self. It seems as though it's the same "me" now......as now......as now, but this could well be an illusion created by the constancy of memories and other brain goings-on, and indeed this is the inference of materialism, borne out by considering cases like C.W., mentioned earlier in the thread. There is likely no persisting self, merely a sense of continuing selfhood constantly being created by various brain processes, sometimes as a adjunct to their actual activity.

I agree with you, as I've stated before. However, I fail to see how a copy of me can be seen as a continuation of my "self" in the same sense as what you mention above. The first "me" is still killed.

A copy of an apple will be identical to the first one, but its taste, although identical as well, is not a continuation, it's a new thing.

[Belz...]

There is a difference - according to QM, the two can't co-exist. That means that they are the same particle.

That doesn't follow.

P1) They are indistinguishable
P2) They cannot coexist
C) They are the same object

What ?

[Belz...]

It's not an alterBelz, why do you think that?
Every particle is the original and is in its original place.

Wrong. Every particle is a copy of the original, either because it's another particle put in "the same place", relative to the other particles, or because it's been modified to have the same "quantum state", whatever that means. They are not the original particles. Hence, MercutioB, DaratB, and AlterBelz...

what has changed, other than your location?

Everything, actually. I am dead, I've been replaced by a copy who now happily drives my car and uses my money, and although he is identical to me from time T, he is not me, since I am dead.

[leon_heller]

That doesn't follow.

P1) They are indistinguishable
P2) They cannot coexist
C) They are the same object

What ?

All those apply, at different times.

The original particle is the same as the teleported particle.

The original particle is disrupted by the teleportation

The original particle has been teleported to a new location.

Perhaps we should agree to differ on this. I believe in QM which doesn't distinguish between particles with the same quantum state, whilst you obviously don't.

Leon

[skiba]

Wrong. Every particle is a copy of the original, either because it's another particle put in "the same place", relative to the other particles, or because it's been modified to have the same "quantum state", whatever that means. They are not the original particles. Hence, MercutioB, DaratB, and AlterBelz...


I asked you about a slightly different variation of the experiment.

The teleporter actually transfers the original particles to the destination and reconstructs you from those. Again, every particle is the original and is in its original place.
You'll simply be "disasebled" and put together again.
There is no AlterBelz in this one.

Would you go? If not, why?

[Belz...]

Perhaps we should agree to differ on this. I believe in QM which doesn't distinguish between particles with the same quantum state, whilst you obviously don't.

Perhaps we simply do not use "distinguish", "identical" and "same" in the same way.

As I've stated before, this "quantum state" of yours is irrelevant. I'm sure my quantum states change all the time, and yet I'm me, more or less. The fact they are identical pretty much means that we can't distinguish them. However, "same", as far as I'm concerned, doesn't mean "identical" but "the same object". Ergo, the teleported particle cannot be the SAME, although it is IDENTICAL, unless you physically move it.

[Belz...]

I asked you about a slightly different variation of the experiment.

The teleporter actually transfers the original particles to the destination and reconstructs you from those. Again, every particle is the original and is in its original place.
You'll simply be "disasebled" and put together again.
There is no AlterBelz in this one.

Would you go? If not, why?

No, I wouldn't. I don't want to be killed and a copy of me being made, even if that copy is built from the same bricks.

[skiba]

No, I wouldn't. I don't want to be killed and a copy of me being made, even if that copy is built from the same bricks.

And how exactly does that make you a "copy"?

[Belz...]

Because it isn't me. A new instance, perhaps.

[Nick227]

I agree with you, as I've stated before. However, I fail to see how a copy of me can be seen as a continuation of my "self" in the same sense as what you mention above. The first "me" is still killed.

Well, as you infer by using the quote marks, it all depends on what you call "self" or "me." If you assume persisting selfhood then of course "self" is killed when BelzA pushes the button. If you follow more the materialist line then it isn't.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Well, as you infer by using the quote marks, it all depends on what you call "self" or "me." If you assume persisting selfhood then of course "self" is killed when BelzA pushes the button. If you follow more the materialist line then it isn't.

Nick

Or if you refuse to artificially dissect the "experience" from the experiencing organism, which in this thought problem is destroyed. Come on, Nick--there is no need to project false beliefs on those who disagree with you. One can be a materialist and define "self" differently than you do; indeed, many here are having difficulty seeing your definition as monistic at all.

[Belz...]

Well, as you infer by using the quote marks, it all depends on what you call "self" or "me." If you assume persisting selfhood then of course "self" is killed when BelzA pushes the button.

Actually, it would be the opposite. This "persisting selfhood", if it was so "persisting", couldn't be destroyed. That's the whole point.

If you follow more the materialist line then it isn't.

No True Scottsman fallacy.

[Nick227]

Or if you refuse to artificially dissect the "experience" from the experiencing organism, which in this thought problem is destroyed. Come on, Nick--there is no need to project false beliefs on those who disagree with you. One can be a materialist and define "self" differently than you do; indeed, many here are having difficulty seeing your definition as monistic at all.

Let them put their case on the table, and then we can see.

I don't consider that I'm projecting false beliefs. I am not dissecting the "experience" from the "experiencing organism." I would point out that such a construct is inconsistent with monism in the first place, unless you accept non-persisting selfhood.

I would say that in considering that there is an experiencing organism having experiences you are creating a duality from that which is simply the processing of information. I submit that in reality there is no experiencer and there is no experience. The sensation that there might be is being constructed by the brain.

Anyway, let this "many" speak up and then we can look.

Nick

[Nick227]

Actually, it would be the opposite. This "persisting selfhood", if it was so "persisting", couldn't be destroyed. That's the whole point.


OK, fair enough. If you're dualist and you believe in persisting selfhood then it wouldn't be destroyed.

If you're monist and you believe in persisting selfhood then you die, + if you ask me there are quite a few doubts as to how monist such a person really is.

If you ask me the only really valid materialist monist perspective is to accept that selfhood is essentially non-persisting and arising just from recreatable brain process.

You can also be in Merc's camp where it appears one believes that selfhood is innate to the actual physical material of the body. It seems to me that you are in this camp. You appear to identify yourself as the actual unique physical substance of your body. In such a belief, yes you die in the teletransporter, though like I say above I would question just how monist such a belief is.

Nick

[Mercutio]

You can also be in Merc's camp where it appears one believes that selfhood is innate to the actual physical material of the body. It seems to me that you are in this camp. You appear to identify yourself as the actual unique physical substance of your body. In such a belief, yes you die in the teletransporter, though like I say above I would question just how monist such a belief is.

Nick
You continue to misunderstand, and thus misrepresent, my position. Your reply here attempts to impose dualistic language on my view; I cannot help but think you see the world in those terms.

I can see that others understand what I have been saying; I do not know what stands in your way.

[Nick227]

You continue to misunderstand, and thus misrepresent, my position. Your reply here attempts to impose dualistic language on my view; I cannot help but think you see the world in those terms.

I can see that others understand what I have been saying; I do not know what stands in your way.

Apologies if I misrepresent you.

Could you explain to me in clear materialist terms what it is that you believe will be lost if the body ceases to be and is then recreated identically?

Nick

[Mercutio]

I don't consider that I'm projecting false beliefs. I am not dissecting the "experience" from the "experiencing organism." I would point out that such a construct is inconsistent with monism in the first place, unless you accept non-persisting selfhood.
That's what I get for trying to use your language. Oh, well.

I would say that in considering that there is an experiencing organism having experiences you are creating a duality from that which is simply the processing of information. I submit that in reality there is no experiencer and there is no experience. The sensation that there might be is being constructed by the brain.

NickI agree, "having experiences" is dualistic language. In truth, it is a behaving organism, behaving. A large and fuzzy set of these behaviors are what we have labeled "conscious" behaviors; the only entity that maintains a continuity--that "persists"--is the behaving organism, the organism destroyed in this thought experiment.

Behavior does not and cannot occur without a behaving organism; there is no duality between behavior and organism. Behavior is also not "innate to the actual physical material of the body"; rather it is what the organism does. Dead organisms have the same physical material, and are not conscious, not behaving. Indeed, the quoted phrase makes no sense unless you see consciousness, like mass, to be a property of matter--no, it still doesn't make sense then either. I would hope that if it were an accurate description of my position, that I would actually recognize it.

Blackmore's use of the term "illusion" merely says that consciousness is not what it appears to be. There is no persisting property of the brain that *is* consciousness--this is the nature of the illusion. But. Unless you wish to maintain that the organism itself does not exist, then there is a persistence that is not illusory. The whole organism (and no, I do not mean "the body" or "the brain" or any other subset). The notion that "there is no experiencer" is true if by experiencer you mean a subset of the whole organism. You apparently do mean that, and that is dualistic language.

[Mercutio]

Apologies if I misrepresent you.

Could you explain to me in clear materialist terms what it is that you believe will be lost if the body ceases to be and is then recreated identically?

Nick
The first organism is lost. By definition. You even said so yourself, in red. As Darat has noted, it is a moral issue. And nice--"ceases to be" is so much easier than "is destroyed".

[Nick227]

I agree, "having experiences" is dualistic language. In truth, it is a behaving organism, behaving. A large and fuzzy set of these behaviors are what we have labeled "conscious" behaviors; the only entity that maintains a continuity--that "persists"--is the behaving organism, the organism destroyed in this thought experiment.

Destroyed and identically recreated, in terms of behaviour.

Behavior does not and cannot occur without a behaving organism; there is no duality between behavior and organism.

Well, in reality I submit, the organism is just, well....organism'ing. Merc is just Merc'ing. Nick is just Nick'ing. Identifying its actions as "behaviour" has to me an element of dualism in it. It's creating a purposeful perspective. The organism cannot avoid being itself. Thus I don't see that there can be considered any extinction at all at a behavioural level in the teletransporter.

Behavior is also not "innate to the actual physical material of the body"; rather it is what the organism does. Dead organisms have the same physical material, and are not conscious, not behaving. Indeed, the quoted phrase makes no sense unless you see consciousness, like mass, to be a property of matter--no, it still doesn't make sense then either. I would hope that if it were an accurate description of my position, that I would actually recognize it.

OK, so if selfhood is not innate to the actual physical material of the body then what is lost in MercA's subjective experience as he uses the transporter? And what is observably different from an objective viewpoint?

Blackmore's use of the term "illusion" merely says that consciousness is not what it appears to be. There is no persisting property of the brain that *is* consciousness--this is the nature of the illusion. But. Unless you wish to maintain that the organism itself does not exist, then there is a persistence that is not illusory. The whole organism (and no, I do not mean "the body" or "the brain" or any other subset). The notion that "there is no experiencer" is true if by experiencer you mean a subset of the whole organism. You apparently do mean that, and that is dualistic language.

There is a persistence to the organism. I am disputing that there is a persistence of its sense of selfhood.

Nick

[Nick227]

The first organism is lost. By definition. You even said so yourself, in red. As Darat has noted, it is a moral issue. And nice--"ceases to be" is so much easier than "is destroyed".

Well, given that all aspects of it are being instantly recreated I see no need to use unnecessarily emotive language.

Nick

[skiba]

Because it isn't me. A new instance, perhaps.

The "me" your refering to, is a construct of the brain, a mental image of yourself, your body, memories, thoughts etc. The brain that creates the "I" is reconstructed to the same state, there fore the same "I" continues to exist.

Maybe you have a different definition for "I".
It seem its something that cannot go through the teleporter or something that cannot be reconstructed.

[Mercutio]

Destroyed and identically recreated, in terms of behaviour.
Replicated, not recreated. Your choice of words assumes the conclusion that is being debated.

Well, in reality I submit, the organism is just, well....organism'ing. Merc is just Merc'ing. Nick is just Nick'ing. Identifying its actions as "behaviour" has to me an element of dualism in it. It's creating a purposeful perspective. The organism cannot avoid being itself. Thus I don't see that there can be considered any extinction at all at a behavioural level in the teletransporter.
"Organisming"? Come on. "Behaving" is not just the technically proper term, it is also (oddly enough) the colloquially accepted term. There is no reason for you to see an element of dualism in it, other than ignorance of the technical vocabulary. A dead organism does not behave, and yet it still "organisms"--it cannot avoid being itself.

OK, so if selfhood is not innate to the actual physical material of the body then what is lost in MercA's subjective experience as he uses the transporter? And what is observably different from an objective viewpoint?
Everything is lost in MercA's private experience (please, not "subjective"). Remember, MercA is destroyed. No MercA, no MercA behavior.

As far as I can tell, nothing at all is lost from MercB's perspective. He would remember MercA's life up to ZAP, and (the thought experiment says it is instantaneous) his own experience since then, as one continuous experience.

There is a persistence to the organism. I am disputing that there is a persistence of its sense of selfhood.

Nick
Once again, you define "self" as a subset of the organism--in this case, it is worse than that; you are looking for a "sense of selfhood". Of course if you are looking for this, you will not find it. It is not the fault of reality, but the fault of your model. The persistence to the organism is the persistence of self. It is not any subset. "Consciousness" is not one identifiable subset of neurons. Many different competing neural networks comprise the mechanisms underpinning different behaviors; these behaviors are often (by adulthood, usually) shaped by many trials of organismic learning.


A stonemason may hit a chisel with a hammer perhaps a hundred times before the stone splits; it is not the last blow that did it, but the accumulated effect of the hundred. You are artificially copying the stone after 99 blows, and claiming that one blow is all it takes. If you copy the stone perfectly, then yes, one blow is all it will take--but that does not make you any less wrong. The organism's experience with the environment is indispensable; you are ignoring that in your de facto dualism. The entire organism is the self, and the illusion is your fictional "sense of selfhood".

[Jeff Corey]

Maybe I am just too dense to get some of these gedankenexperiments. Yes, I felt somewhat sad about the cat, but pzombies and teleportation escape me. Let us crank this up a bit. Assume a transporter has been constructed. The first brave volunteer has been sent and just arrived at the new location.
Dr. Oliver Sachs interviews the volunteer, asking, "Who are you, how do you feel, who is the President of the US?"
"Fragged if I know. Confused. Tricky Dick?"
You are next. Want to try it?

[Mercutio]

Assume a transporter has been constructed. The first brave volunteer has been sent and just arrived at the new location.
Dr. Oliver Sachs interviews the volunteer, asking, "Who are you, how do you feel, who is the President of the US?"
"Fragged if I know. Confused. Tricky Dick?"
You are next. Want to try it?

Hell, I have students who pay a lot of money for stuff that makes them feel like that.

[Jeff Corey]

Ok, but after they trashed their consciousness, were they the same after that?

[Nick227]

Maybe I am just too dense to get some of these gedankenexperiments. Yes, I felt somewhat sad about the cat, but pzombies and teleportation escape me. Let us crank this up a bit. Assume a transporter has been constructed. The first brave volunteer has been sent and just arrived at the new location.
Dr. Oliver Sachs interviews the volunteer, asking, "Who are you, how do you feel, who is the President of the US?"
"Fragged if I know. Confused. Tricky Dick?"
You are next. Want to try it?

I doubt if I'd get in, if this was the situation. I prefer empiric demonstration over theorising anyday with stuff like this. Who knows, maybe there are souls and teleporting mashes them up!

Nick

[Nick227]

Replicated, not recreated. Your choice of words assumes the conclusion that is being debated.

Fair enough. Good point.

"Organisming"? Come on. "Behaving" is not just the technically proper term, it is also (oddly enough) the colloquially accepted term. There is no reason for you to see an element of dualism in it, other than ignorance of the technical vocabulary. A dead organism does not behave, and yet it still "organisms"--it cannot avoid being itself.

I'm not so sure. Behaviour implies observation to me. The organism is itself. It can't help being itself. Fundamentally it does not "behave." Fundamentally it "is." To me, to speak of the "organism's behaviour" implies that there is an observer, an experiencer. It's definitely drifting off into duality, though I would have to ponder this more to get clearer.

The notion of behaviour only arises through post hoc self-observation or through third party observation.

Everything is lost in MercA's private experience (please, not "subjective"). Remember, MercA is destroyed. No MercA, no MercA behavior.

I disagree with the last sentence. MercA's behaviour is replicated identically. I can't see how it is intrinsic to the substance of MercA's body.

As far as I can tell, nothing at all is lost from MercB's perspective. He would remember MercA's life up to ZAP, and (the thought experiment says it is instantaneous) his own experience since then, as one continuous experience.

Yes.

Once again, you define "self" as a subset of the organism--in this case, it is worse than that; you are looking for a "sense of selfhood". Of course if you are looking for this, you will not find it. It is not the fault of reality, but the fault of your model. The persistence to the organism is the persistence of self. It is not any subset. "Consciousness" is not one identifiable subset of neurons. Many different competing neural networks comprise the mechanisms underpinning different behaviors; these behaviors are often (by adulthood, usually) shaped by many trials of organismic learning.

Well, observation can take place without a sense of "I." This is clear for me. Thus I do consider selfhood a subset of the overall processes of the organism.


A stonemason may hit a chisel with a hammer perhaps a hundred times before the stone splits; it is not the last blow that did it, but the accumulated effect of the hundred. You are artificially copying the stone after 99 blows, and claiming that one blow is all it takes. If you copy the stone perfectly, then yes, one blow is all it will take--but that does not make you any less wrong. The organism's experience with the environment is indispensable; you are ignoring that in your de facto dualism. The entire organism is the self, and the illusion is your fictional "sense of selfhood".

So, what percentage of cells would need to be changed for Self to be changed? 0.00001% 10%? 50% 100%?

Nick

[Dancing David]

So, the problem is theres a discontinuation for.... let's say 0.00001seconds.

I don't know how fast this imaginary teleporter would work. What would be fast enough?


It doesn't matter, I was talking about the defintion of *I* as a 'flow of information', and pointing out that it is only coherent for the brief momnet of time that a state exists. The continuity of the body is what provides the basis for the sense of *I*. The flow of 'information' changes and would not count as *I*, the *I* that started this paragraph is not the *I* that finishes the paragraph by that defintion.

[Dancing David]

Apologies if I misrepresent you.

Could you explain to me in clear materialist terms what it is that you believe will be lost if the body ceases to be and is then recreated identically?

Nick


The continuity of the body.

One can be a materialist and have sentimental attachment to objects.

[Dancing David]

Well, given that all aspects of it are being instantly recreated I see no need to use unnecessarily emotive language.

Nick

Why?

Is this the language police as well, materialism need not meet the constraints other people put upon the use of language. One can be a materialist and have all sorts of beliefs. Humans are more than just the rational thought constructs of verbal cognition. There is a fair amount of attachment that comes from conditioning before we consider the emotional processes of attachment and bonding.

Just because I believe that all matter is matter and not possessed of a soul, does not mean that I don't treasure the pieces of matter I have from my childhood. Yes most of the attachment is process based (IR memories, emotions and conditioning) and no I could not tell the objects from an exact copy. However the contingent history of the objects from my paternal grandfather or my trips to Mexico are important to the processes that are *I*.

Just because the chunk of obsidian could be recreated does not mean that I don't have an attachment to the obsidian core that I picked up in that field in 1974. It is dead matter (unless we are all just thoughts of god, same difference) and could be exchanged for exactly a similar piece, but the contingent history is what gives it 'meaning' to me.

This is a fault of projection upon materialism. I can say that there is no self, and practice the eightfold path and yet retain sentimental; attachment to objects, like my wife and children.

Emotive processes are a large part of human ‘consciousness’.

[Dancing David]

Maybe I am just too dense to get some of these gedankenexperiments. Yes, I felt somewhat sad about the cat, but pzombies and teleportation escape me. Let us crank this up a bit. Assume a transporter has been constructed. The first brave volunteer has been sent and just arrived at the new location.
Dr. Oliver Sachs interviews the volunteer, asking, "Who are you, how do you feel, who is the President of the US?"
"Fragged if I know. Confused. Tricky Dick?"
You are next. Want to try it?


Um, you mean after they come out of the coma and stop barfing?

[Mercutio]

Fair enough. Good point.
It's a point that keeps coming back. For instance...

I'm not so sure. Behaviour implies observation to me. The organism is itself. It can't help being itself. Fundamentally it does not "behave." Fundamentally it "is." To me, to speak of the "organism's behaviour" implies that there is an observer, an experiencer. It's definitely drifting off into duality, though I would have to ponder this more to get clearer.

The notion of behaviour only arises through post hoc self-observation or through third party observation.
...for instance, your definition of behavior here is the same as Interesting Ian used to use, and it carries with it a whole bunch of inherent dualism. Behavior is "what you do"; it may be observed by another or only by the behaver, but of course if it is not observable at all--even in principle--then by what criteria are you claiming it is part of what "is" in the first place? And your last sentence is just plain wrong, and once again assumes your conclusions.

I disagree with the last sentence. MercA's behaviour is replicated identically. I can't see how it is intrinsic to the substance of MercA's body.
I never said it was "intrinsic to the substance"; I said it was what MercA does. The difference is substantial (pun intended).

Yes.
Which does all of nothing for MercA.

Well, observation can take place without a sense of "I." This is clear for me. Thus I do consider selfhood a subset of the overall processes of the organism.
Thank you for illustrating my point. You are artificially defining the self as a subset of the whole person, and as a subset (sense of "I") that is a circularly inferred fictional entity.

So, what percentage of cells would need to be changed for Self to be changed? 0.00001% 10%? 50% 100%?

NickDepends on what you mean by changed, of course. This is a very pragmatic question, with different answers in different contexts. I am the same person who had a crush on a first-grade classmate, and I am a different person than I was when I started this sentence. Your question, if you were expecting a serious answer, presupposes a persistent self that is a separate and causal, and is thus completely dualistic.

[Nick227]

...for instance, your definition of behavior here is the same as Interesting Ian used to use, and it carries with it a whole bunch of inherent dualism. Behavior is "what you do"; it may be observed by another or only by the behaver,

Is there behaviour without thinking? From one perspective one might say there is. Yet to me for "behaviour" to exist someone, either the person behaving or a third party, has to think about it. Thus, to me, behaviour is not a priori. It's simply a conceptual vessel into which one may frame action. It requires thinking about.

Behaviour is not "what you do." It is what you or others think you do. Ergo, there will be nothing that changes at the level of behaviour through using the teletransporter.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Is there behaviour without thinking?Thinking is a set of private behaviors. There are conscious and non-conscious behaviors. Consciousness of contingencies is not at all necessary for learning to take place, or for one to learn an association between environmental stimuli.
From one perspective one might say there is.From many perspectives, actually.
Yet to me for "behaviour" to exist someone, either the person behaving or a third party, has to think about it. You would be wrong about this, if "thinking about it" is conscious. You would be circular about this, if "thinking about it" includes non-conscious thought. In Libet's experiment, for instance, would you call the spike prior to conscious decision-making "thinking"?
Thus, to me, behaviour is not a priori. It's simply a conceptual vessel into which one may frame action. It requires thinking about.
Fortunately, not everybody follows this view; rather, they use the agreed-upon vocabulary to do valuable research.

Behaviour is not "what you do." It is what you or others think you do.What the hell does that mean? Behavior is indeed what you do. "What you think you do" is a subset of "what you think" which is a subset of private behavior, which is a subset of behavior. You are once again trying to define things too narrowly and at the wrong level of explanation. It is no wonder you disagree with it; it is a strawman.
Ergo, there will be nothing that changes at the level of behaviour through using the teletransporter.

Nick
"Ergo", indeed. If you redefine enough elements, you can fit a square peg in a round hole.

I have already said that MercB experiences a continuity of behavior. It is MercA who is dead. Your "Ergo" does nothing to change this.

[Nick227]

Thinking is a set of private behaviors.

Well, thoughts might describe it as such. But "behaviour" is purely a mental construct.

There are conscious and non-conscious behaviors. Consciousness of contingencies is not at all necessary for learning to take place, or for one to learn an association between environmental stimuli.

Undeniably so. But to articulate this as "behaviour", to conceptualise this as "behaviour" so conscious thinking needs to occur. Behaviour is clearly not a priori and is inevitably unaffected by the teletransporter. There exist words like "being" to refer to direct experience. "Behaviour" is clearly secondary. Of course, all we have is the language of thoughts to articulate these things, and so any sense of separation is at least a little illusory here, but it's clear for me that there is a tangible separation.

If you were to argue that MercA is not the same as MercB, then I would certainly agree, but at a level of behaviour they are identical and at a level of selfhood they are identical. You seem to be confusing what is with that which is articulated by thought.

...........

What the hell does that mean?

It means to distinguish that which is from that which you think is. Without a perspective on thought itself it may be hard to make a separation. If you can appreciate what "experience" is without thought, so you can appreciate that selfhood is merely a process.

Behavior is indeed what you do. "What you think you do" is a subset of "what you think" which is a subset of private behavior, which is a subset of behavior. You are once again trying to define things too narrowly and at the wrong level of explanation. It is no wonder you disagree with it; it is a strawman.

"Ergo", indeed. If you redefine enough elements, you can fit a square peg in a round hole.

I have already said that MercB experiences a continuity of behavior. It is MercA who is dead. Your "Ergo" does nothing to change this.

MercA is dead. Long live MercA! Whether one considers MercA alive or dead, you will not have died.

[Mercutio]

Well, thoughts might describe it as such. But "behaviour" is purely a mental construct.
No. You may call it many things, but one thing it is most certainly not is a "mental construct". If you honestly think this is a reasonable position, then you are more mistaken than I thought you were.


Undeniably so. But to articulate this as "behaviour", to conceptualise this as "behaviour" so conscious thinking needs to occur.No. This is purely circular reasoning.
Behaviour is clearly not a priori and is inevitably unaffected by the teletransporter.Assumes conclusions.
There exist words like "being" to refer to direct experience. No. "Being" refers to existence. A corpse "is". To suggest that "being" refers to anything more ("this parrot has ceased to be") is to suggest some non-corporeal, dualistic "self"--which again assumes the conclusion.
"Behaviour" is clearly secondary. Behavior is what we do. If we are not behaving, we still exist. But unless you think that I am claiming that corpses are conscious, there is a distinction between being and behaving, and that difference is important.
Of course, all we have is the language of thoughts to articulate these things, and so any sense of separation is at least a little illusory here, but it's clear for me that there is a tangible separation.
The "language of thoughts"? In other words, the prescientific vocabulary unchanged since Plato? The dualistic language of Descartes? We can understand one another when we speak of "sunrise", but when we wish to be technically correct, we need to abandon colloquial speech and be clear.

If you were to argue that MercA is not the same as MercB, then I would certainly agree, but at a level of behaviour they are identical and at a level of selfhood they are identical.If and only if you define "self" as something other than the whole organism. Why you would do this is beyond me.
You seem to be confusing what is with that which is articulated by thought.
"Articulated by thought"? Have you been paying attention? Again, you use the prescientific vocabulary inherited from Descartes.

It means to distinguish that which is from that which you think is. Without a perspective on thought itself it may be hard to make a separation. If you can appreciate what "experience" is without thought, so you can appreciate that selfhood is merely a process.
If I remove the circularity from your language, I have nothing to respond to.

MercA is dead. Long live MercA! Whether one considers MercA alive or dead, you will not have died.Assumes conclusions. The maggots feasting on my bloated corpse thank you for your opinion.

The metaphor of "storage" (that a representation of thought, or personality, or whatever, is preserved) is just that--a metaphor. IF you assume that metaphorical stance, you are justified in killing off MercA. Please understand, though, that the storage metaphor has its limitations. Darat's "ran" is not stored anywhere; it exists only as behavior, and not as any storable thing. There is no "walk" stored when you sit down. There is no "thought" apart from thinking, no "memory" apart from remembering, and no "consciousness" apart from behaving. When you destroy a behaving organism, that consciousness is no more. That a consciousness is replicated (assuming the thought problem works as advertised, which all thought problems do) does not mean that the original is not gone, and certainly does not mean that "it" is a separate entity.

You ask "what percentage must change to change the self?" We know that our cells are replaced constantly; do you think (this is a direct question, for your opinion) that we could transfer "self" into a markedly different body? (for the record, I do not.)

[Nick227]

Behavior is what we do. If we are not behaving, we still exist. But unless you think that I am claiming that corpses are conscious, there is a distinction between being and behaving, and that difference is important.

This is precisely what I'm saying. There is a distinction between behaving and being. You cannot to my mind transfer being through the machine, but behaviour is transferred.


........

The metaphor of "storage" (that a representation of thought, or personality, or whatever, is preserved) is just that--a metaphor. IF you assume that metaphorical stance, you are justified in killing off MercA. Please understand, though, that the storage metaphor has its limitations. Darat's "ran" is not stored anywhere; it exists only as behavior, and not as any storable thing. There is no "walk" stored when you sit down. There is no "thought" apart from thinking, no "memory" apart from remembering, and no "consciousness" apart from behaving. When you destroy a behaving organism, that consciousness is no more.

But it is no more anyway. How does it matter if the body has been through a teletransporter or not? All Darat's "ran" is now is an idea relating to a way of examining life. This can be replicated.


That a consciousness is replicated (assuming the thought problem works as advertised, which all thought problems do) does not mean that the original is not gone, and certainly does not mean that "it" is a separate entity.

You ask "what percentage must change to change the self?" We know that our cells are replaced constantly; do you think (this is a direct question, for your opinion) that we could transfer "self" into a markedly different body? (for the record, I do not.)

The new body, markedly different or not, will have its own selfhood, given to it by neurological process. If the body is identical its selfhood will be identical (aside of changes in exterior environment) because there is no property of selfhood which is not ascribed to these processes. It will feel its body the same. It will mirror the same. It will think the same.

Nick

[Mercutio]

If you throw a ball, and replicate every atom in mid-flight, have you also replicated its motion?

[Nick227]

If you throw a ball, and replicate every atom in mid-flight, have you also replicated its motion?

Motion is not an internal function of the ball, thus I don't see the comparison.

Selfhood is not an innate property of an organism. It is acquired through internal processing, or may be projected onto other organisms by those already experiencing selfhood. It is not innate.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Are you assuming your conclusions again?

Behavior is determined by environment--elicited or selected, over the short and long term. Decades of research bears this out. Replicating an organism into a different context is like replicating the ball--it takes the copy out of its active context. You are claiming that "behavior is transferred", but there is no way to transfer Darat's "ran"; it is Darat's "ran", and does not exist unless he is running. It is not stored in him (the storage metaphor, once again, leads nowhere), and it is not transferred to another person.

[Dancing David]

MercA is dead. Long live MercA! Whether one considers MercA alive or dead, you will not have died.


What sense of 'you' are you using. I can't think of a coherent one where this statement is true.

1. The body is a process: the Merc* that you replicate is just a replication of a state is a series of states. there is no contingent history to say that 'this is Merc', you can say 'this is a replication of Merc at Point*'.
2. One can make a particle for particle copy of Merc, however it will lack the contingent history of Merc and will diverge right away, therefore you have created another Merc, it is not the 'orginal Merc'. It is totaly divergent the moment it is made.


It seems to me that the only coherent basis for continuity and identification (as in the common usage) is the body. The self as an abstract process does not exists due to the finite nature of numerous states. A copy is not the same due to the lack of contingent history. It is the continuity of particles in the body, and the enduring nature of physical stuff (be is energy or thoughts) that allows for the identification of individuals.

[Nick227]

You are claiming that "behavior is transferred", but there is no way to transfer Darat's "ran"; it is Darat's "ran", and does not exist unless he is running. It is not stored in him (the storage metaphor, once again, leads nowhere), and it is not transferred to another person.

In a materialist universe this "ran" exists only as an idea.

A organism can exist without selfhood. Selfhood is not an innate property of the organism.

Nick

[Mercutio]

In a materialist universe this "ran" exists only as an idea.

Nick

It is a metaphorical reification of a behavior, an action, into a noun. Precisely as we reify thinking into thoughts, remembering into memories, and a fuzzy set of public and private behaviors into consciousness.

So if you are agreeing that we cannot transfer Darat's ran, then by what logic do you claim we would be able to transfer other behavior?

[Mercutio]

You edited...

A organism can exist without selfhood. Selfhood is not an innate property of the organism.

Nick

Gee, you will have to define selfhood now. My definition works--does yours?

[Nick227]

It is a metaphorical reification of a behavior, an action, into a noun. Precisely as we reify thinking into thoughts, remembering into memories, and a fuzzy set of public and private behaviors into consciousness.

So if you are agreeing that we cannot transfer Darat's ran, then by what logic do you claim we would be able to transfer other behavior?

Darat's "ran" does not anyway substantially exist. It merely exists in the minds of those who have followed this thread, followed its conceptualisation, and remembered it. This can be replicated. MercB would be fully able to articulate the same argument that MercA is.

An organism does not require selfhood in order to exist. It could have no sense of self and no sense of "I," yet still live. Selfhood is thus not innate to life or to organisms.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Darat's "ran" does not anyway substantially exist. It merely exists in the minds of those who have followed this thread, followed its conceptualisation, and remembered it. This can be replicated. MercB would be fully able to articulate the same argument that MercA is.

An organism does not require selfhood in order to exist. It could have no sense of self and no sense of "I," yet still live. Selfhood is thus not innate to life or to organisms.

NickI agree--selfhood as you define it is not innate to anything, nor is there any evidence that it exists at all as anything but an explanatory fiction, a label we put on a narrow category of private behaviors.

It is clearly an illusion, as Blackmore would say. It is not what it appears to be.

It is when we use such a flawed definition of selfhood that we get into some of the "hard problems", like the illusory persistence of self, and all that jazz.

There is at least one much better way of defining self. Gee...

[Nick227]

My definition works--does yours?

Selfhood may be experienced directly or projected onto other organisms by those who experience it. Experiencing selfhood oneself it can appear that other organisms innately possess it.

To me, it is a sense of individuality and that of being connected to thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations. It arises as a result of various neurological processes including those of the somatosensory cortex, mirroring functions, and thinking. Without these, and maybe a few others, it would not be possible to distinguish, from one's ongoing experience of the world, that which is "I" from that which is not.

Nick

[Nick227]

I agree--selfhood as you define it is not innate to anything, nor is there any evidence that it exists at all as anything but an explanatory fiction, a label we put on a narrow category of private behaviors.

It is clearly an illusion, as Blackmore would say. It is not what it appears to be.

It is when we use such a flawed definition of selfhood that we get into some of the "hard problems", like the illusory persistence of self, and all that jazz.

There is at least one much better way of defining self. Gee...

Well, I wouldn't personally consider selfhood a real hard problem. I think scientists have made enough inroads to at least get an idea of what's going on. I don't think it needs re-evaluating. The issue, if you ask me, is that many people simply can't get their heads around the possibility that selfhood is just the result of bodily processing. It seems counter-intuitive to such a degree they seek any means they can to throw the suggestion out of awareness.

You can define self as you appear to be doing, on a behavioural level, but this then creates issues with just what actually does constitute me and when do I stop being me if parts of my body are changed or re-newed.

I figure the version from the bundle theorists, like Blackmore, Dennett and Parfit is thus stronger, if hard for many to digest.

Nick

[Nick227]

I agree--selfhood as you define it is not innate to anything, nor is there any evidence that it exists at all as anything but an explanatory fiction, a label we put on a narrow category of private behaviors.

A label we stick on the whole world too. Without a sense of selfhood there would be nothing to distinguish the room around me from me!

Nick

[Mercutio]

A label we stick on the whole world too. Without a sense of selfhood there would be nothing to distinguish the room around me from me!

Nick

Sorry, but once again you are using circular language. A sense of selfhood does not allow you to distinguish the room around you from you; rather, distinguishing the room around you from you is what gives you a sense of selfhood. (eta: same comment applies to post 2212)

Imprecise language does not help.

[Mercutio]

You can define self as you appear to be doing, on a behavioural level, but this then creates issues with just what actually does constitute me and when do I stop being me if parts of my body are changed or re-newed.

Nick

Not at all--if the questions are meaningful, they are asked in a particular context, and an answer exists in that context. Again, it is perfectly meaningful to say that I am the same person I was when I was 12, but different from when I started this sentence. The seeming discrepancy is because I am addressing two different questions.

[Nick227]

Sorry, but once again you are using circular language. A sense of selfhood does not allow you to distinguish the room around you from you; rather, distinguishing the room around you from you is what gives you a sense of selfhood. (eta: same comment applies to post 2212)


There are biological processes which create this distinguishing. The feeling of your body, the sense of "other people" through mirroring, the sense of "I" created through thinking - these are all bodily processes. On a perceptual level there is the constancy of your body. All of this will be recreated exactly in using the teletransporter. There is nothing innate in any of this. It is all recreatable, though of course a new environment will make slight changes.

Nick

[Nick227]

You can define self as you appear to be doing, on a behavioural level, but this then creates issues with just what actually does constitute me and when do I stop being me if parts of my body are changed or re-newed.

Nick

Not at all--if the questions are meaningful, they are asked in a particular context, and an answer exists in that context. Again, it is perfectly meaningful to say that I am the same person I was when I was 12, but different from when I started this sentence. The seeming discrepancy is because I am addressing two different questions.

You appear to be wandering off the actual issue. The model of self you're using cannot deal with issues around parts of the body being changed or re-newed. These issues may be more theoretical rather than practical but they still demonstrate the problems that exist with conceptualising self in the way you do. IMO bundle theory is much stronger. It fits with what scientists are learning about the brain and does not create the kind of dramas that egoic theories and your model does.

Neurological research undermines ego or other persisting-self theories.

Nick

[Mercutio]

I am not meandering--I am trying to triangulate on a point. That point being that the teleporter problem presupposes the storage metaphor, which may be inadequate for the task. If "consciousness" is inferred from a fuzzy set of public and private behavior (of course this includes thinking, feeling, etc.), and behavior is (as it necessarily is) extended in time (again, there is no "ran" when Darat is standing still) and not something that can be "stored", then it makes absolutely no sense to use a storage metaphor. The metaphor we are using in this problem has shaped the vocabulary of the debate, and if past experience tells me anything, most people are unaware of the underlying assumptive metaphor.

[Nick227]

I am not meandering--I am trying to triangulate on a point. That point being that the teleporter problem presupposes the storage metaphor, which may be inadequate for the task. If "consciousness" is inferred from a fuzzy set of public and private behavior (of course this includes thinking, feeling, etc.), and behavior is (as it necessarily is) extended in time (again, there is no "ran" when Darat is standing still) and not something that can be "stored", then it makes absolutely no sense to use a storage metaphor. The metaphor we are using in this problem has shaped the vocabulary of the debate, and if past experience tells me anything, most people are unaware of the underlying assumptive metaphor.

I have to say that I can't see any issue here with the teletransporter experiment. I think it is simply that it challenges your own particular worldview.

Nick

[Mercutio]

Challenging my world view is fine by me. Happens all the time.

If you cannot see an issue there with the transporter, might I humbly suggest that you don't understand the role of the underlying metaphor.

[Nick227]

Challenging my world view is fine by me. Happens all the time.

If you cannot see an issue there with the transporter, might I humbly suggest that you don't understand the role of the underlying metaphor.

In what way does the underlying metaphor exist aside of our conception of it? In what way will it not be transported to MercB?

Nick

[Belz...]

OK, fair enough. If you're dualist and you believe in persisting selfhood then it wouldn't be destroyed.

It's about time I got that through.

If you're monist and you believe in persisting selfhood then you die, + if you ask me there are quite a few doubts as to how monist such a person really is.

You're contradicting yourself.

Plus, I DID say I don't believe in a persisting selfhood, so I wonder why you continue beating on that dead strawhorse.

If you ask me the only really valid materialist monist perspective is to accept that selfhood is essentially non-persisting and arising just from recreatable brain process.

A copy can't be the original. That's almost too simple.

You can also be in Merc's camp where it appears one believes that selfhood is innate to the actual physical material of the body. It seems to me that you are in this camp.

I am in no camp but my own, and your attempts to label me as anything else than "Belz..." will ultimately fail <insert evil laughter>.

You appear to identify yourself as the actual unique physical substance of your body.

Quite the opposite. I identify myself with everything that is my body, including the fact that it's my body, and not a copy of it.

[Belz...]

I agree, "having experiences" is dualistic language. In truth, it is a behaving organism, behaving. A large and fuzzy set of these behaviors are what we have labeled "conscious" behaviors; the only entity that maintains a continuity--that "persists"--is the behaving organism, the organism destroyed in this thought experiment.

Ah! Much better said than I did so far.

[Belz...]

Destroyed and identically recreated, in terms of behaviour.

What you're doing, Nick, is using language to make it appear as though something different is transpiring.

In truth, the original is destroyed, and an identical replica is created. That is different from what you wrote above.

There is a persistence to the organism. I am disputing that there is a persistence of its sense of selfhood.

Mercutio was pretty clear about this. "Selfhood" is behaviour. You destroy the original, and you destroy that set of behaviours because the organism is no more. That you have a copy of it changes nothing about that.

[Belz...]

The "me" your refering to, is a construct of the brain, a mental image of yourself, your body, memories, thoughts etc. The brain that creates the "I" is reconstructed to the same state, there fore the same "I" continues to exist.

That is nonsense. As Mercutio and I said, it is replicated, not reconstructed. Your use of words is deceptive.

The organism is itself. It can't help being itself. Fundamentally it does not "behave." Fundamentally it "is."

Er... I don't think it's an organism until it does something. Everything "behaves".

[Belz...]

Well, thoughts might describe it as such. But "behaviour" is purely a mental construct.

So organisms don't do stuff ?

MercA is dead. Long live MercA! Whether one considers MercA alive or dead, you will not have died.

Oh, please, Nick. Don't tell me that you think that the copy is still MercA.

I think we all agreed that, should MercA not be vapourised, we have TWO people each with their own set of private experiences. If MercA and MercB are two distinct people when they exist simultaneously, then they are two distinct people even when they don't.

[Dancing David]

Selfhood may be experienced directly or projected onto other organisms by those who experience it. Experiencing selfhood oneself it can appear that other organisms innately possess it.

To me, it is a sense of individuality and that of being connected to thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations. It arises as a result of various neurological processes including those of the somatosensory cortex, mirroring functions, and thinking. Without these, and maybe a few others, it would not be possible to distinguish, from one's ongoing experience of the world, that which is "I" from that which is not.

Nick

That is about as vague a defintion as you could get, I don't really see a defintion in there, just a basket of ideas.

Maybe you could expand and define: being connected to thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations.

Those things exist as they are, what are you pointing to?

[Dancing David]

A label we stick on the whole world too. Without a sense of selfhood there would be nothing to distinguish the room around me from me!

Nick

Not really, there is still a distinction to be made, and one that can be made. creatures which aren't assumed to have a sense of 'selfhood' do not smash into walls.

As i said a long time ago, each eye has a different perspective, pressure receptors denote 'contact' with other objects, etc...

The high level abstraction of self hood is not required to have an organism that does not assume it is part of the walls.

[skiba]

That is nonsense. As Mercutio and I said, it is replicated, not reconstructed. Your use of words is deceptive.


Yes, it it reconstructed. As I already said, in this version the original particles are transfered. You are disasembled and put together again.

You insist that "I" is lost in the transfer.
Can you define this "I" for me so I can understand what is being lost?

[Dancing David]

You appear to be wandering off the actual issue. The model of self you're using cannot deal with issues around parts of the body being changed or re-newed. These issues may be more theoretical rather than practical but they still demonstrate the problems that exist with conceptualising self in the way you do. IMO bundle theory is much stronger. It fits with what scientists are learning about the brain and does not create the kind of dramas that egoic theories and your model does.

Neurological research undermines ego or other persisting-self theories.

Nick

Nick227, perhaps it would be best to ask Mercutio what he thinks and does feel and what distinctions are being made.

for someone who claims to be using a 'grounded state of being' as in 'ground as the state of being', it might seems that you are projecting a whole lot of presuppositions and assumptions upon Merc.
Perhaps your assumption of the baggage you have with certain words does not tarnslate to merc's use of language?


You have asserted the Merc's models has some sort of egoic and drama, these are unwarranted assumptions that might be based upon your pre-existing biases and assumtions.

You have not demonstrated in any way that Merc holds the beliefs and thoughts you seem to be projecting upon Merc.

As an aside, the defintion that Merc is using of selfhood (whatever undefined mess that is) as a biological organism in it's whole, does not imply all the philosophical baggage that you seem to be adding to it.

As a second aside, you keep asserting that a being recreated at state56734289, is the same as the being at any state in time. IE you keep saying 'you have been recreated', this is not true, the only meaning of 'self' comes through the contingent history of the body. If you recreate a single state of the organism at state56734289, you have not recreated the organism.

Just as in the replacement of body parts, the body has the contingent history, you remove the hand and replace it, the convention of 'self' is that there are three states, state:with hand, state:absent hand, state:new hand. The deininition of say 'me' in this condition at all three states comes from the contingent history of the body.

Now future generations may define selfhood differently, as you have pointed out they may have different definitions of 'self'.

[Dancing David]

Well Nick227, I looked up ' dharmadhatu' and the basis for it as a buddhist teaching, and just as in your case of stating that CBT is 'cerebral', which is incorrect as it deals directly with emotion and the unity of thoughts and feelings:

It is as I said, ' dharmadhatu' is a Mahayana tradition begun about 600 years after the alleged death of the alleged historical buddha. And while the Mahayana contains great wisdom and may lead one to the path of enlightenment, it often digresses from the path taught by the alleged historical buddha. the teachings of the Pali canon are very careful to avoid certain issues, and 'dharmadhatu' seems to be one of those.

The state of nibbanna is one in which attachment to the notion of self has been extinguished and the follower of the path is free to act in an unconditioned matter. It is a description of a free process, and I do not see benefit to the notion of treating it as a 'realm'. Now you may, and should do so. I just see little benefit to making a noun out of a process. Especially an unconditioned process.


However if it is of benefit to you that is wonderful.

[Nick227]

What you're doing, Nick, is using language to make it appear as though something different is transpiring.

In truth, the original is destroyed, and an identical replica is created. That is different from what you wrote above.

The original is destroyed, but you are not destroyed.

If this still seems to be a non-sequituur then all I can really suggest is that you read more about consciousness, selfhood and the HPC. Have you read Dennett's Consciousness Explained or Blackmore, or Damasio? I'm reading these guys at the moment. Good it is.

Nick

[Belz...]

In a materialist universe this "ran" exists only as an idea.

Fascinating.

[Nick227]

Mercutio was pretty clear about this. "Selfhood" is behaviour. You destroy the original, and you destroy that set of behaviours because the organism is no more. That you have a copy of it changes nothing about that.

Neither selfhood nor behaviour are innate, if you ask me. I see no reason to suppose they should be. All the functions that give rise to behaviour or selfhood can be replicated. And I'm sure MercB would refuse to accept this just the same as MercA does!

Nick

[Belz...]

Yes, it it reconstructed. As I already said, in this version the original particles are transfered. You are disasembled and put together again.

You insist that "I" is lost in the transfer.
Can you define this "I" for me so I can understand what is being lost?

Thanks to Mercutio, I can now articulate my objection to this type of teleporter more clearly.

The "I" is simply a behavior. Something that isn't "stored" and is destroyed, then recreated, by the machine. Since the original is destroyed, as it cannot be carried along, then that "I" no longer exist.

[Belz...]

The original is destroyed, but you are not destroyed.

I AM the original, Nick. The copy is not "me", it is a "he".

[Nick227]

Thanks to Mercutio, I can now articulate my objection to this type of teleporter more clearly.

The "I" is simply a behavior. Something that isn't "stored" and is destroyed, then recreated, by the machine. Since the original is destroyed, as it cannot be carried along, then that "I" no longer exist.

How is behaviour an innate property of living matter that cannot be replicated? If you replicate an organism you replicate its behaviour, allowing for environmental change.

How would BelzB's behaviour be different from BelzA's?

Nick

[tsig]

Dear god, you're just taking a trip across the world. It's not War and Peace or bloody Therese Raquin. You die, you live. In the future people will use these things to go down the shops. This guilt arises only from your archaic vision of selfhood.

Nick

"these things" are not possible so they will never exist.

[Mashuna]

How is behaviour an innate property of living matter that cannot be replicated? If you replicate an organism you replicate its behaviour, allowing for environmental change.

How would BelzB's behaviour be different from BelzA's?

Nick

Past behaviour would not be any different. Future behaviour would be very different, as BelzB is now on another planet and BelzA is dead :).

[Nick227]

Past behaviour would not be any different. Future behaviour would be very different, as BelzB is now on another planet and BelzA is dead :).

How would the neurological and physiological correlates of behaviour be different?

BelzB would act, react and respond the same way as BelzA would in the new environment. Behaviourally there is no difference.

Nick

[Darat]

How would the neurological and physiological correlates of behaviour be different?

BelzB would act, react and respond the same way as BelzA would in the new environment. Behaviourally there is no difference.

Nick

So BelzA is still behaving just as he did before he stepped into the teleporter?

[Mashuna]

How would the neurological and physiological correlates of behaviour be different?

BelzB would act, react and respond the same way as BelzA would have done had he not been disintegrated in the new environment. Behaviourally there is no difference.

Nick

I've added a few words in italics to try to answer your question.

[Nick227]

So BelzA is still behaving just as he did before he stepped into the teleporter?

No, BelzA has ceased to be. But he has been replaced by BelzB, an identical copy in terms of behaviour.

BelzA is a processing machine. BelzB will behave the same as BelzA if placed in the same environment, post-teletransporter learning aside.

Nick

[Nick227]

I've added a few words in italics to try to answer your question.

It doesn't answer my question. How are the neurological and physiological correlates functionally different? BelzA is a machine. BelzB is an identical machine.

Nick

[Mashuna]

It doesn't answer my question. How are the neurological and physiological correlates functionally different? BelzA is a machine. BelzB is an identical machine.

Nick

I'm happy that BelzB is an indistinguishable copy of BelzA. I guess I'm back to a moral issue around killing off BelzA.

[Nick227]

I'm happy that BelzB is an indistinguishable copy of BelzA. I guess I'm back to a moral issue around killing off BelzA.

Well, that depends partly on how you figure selfhood. It's a new situation. People don't usually die and come straight back again. Viewed through one moral filter it's murder or suicide, through another no worse than going to sleep and waking up again.

Anyway, BelzA is not too keen on the idea.

Nick

[Belz...]

How is behaviour an innate property of living matter that cannot be replicated? If you replicate an organism you replicate its behaviour, allowing for environmental change.

How would BelzB's behaviour be different from BelzA's?

For the same reason that, if you teleport DaratA while he's running, you don't keep the original "ran".

[Belz...]

No, BelzA has ceased to be. But he has been replaced by BelzB, an identical copy in terms of behaviour.

Thank you. It took quite a while for you to admit this.

Well, that depends partly on how you figure selfhood.

No, it doesn't. Morals aren't necessarily based on the idea of selfhood as you define it.

Anyway, BelzA is not too keen on the idea.

Indeed.

[Nick227]

For the same reason that, if you teleport DaratA while he's running, you don't keep the original "ran".

There is no 'original "ran."' You are trying to make the past participle of a verb into a tangible entity.

Nick