Peronsal Idendity

[Malerin]

Here are some questions to play around with. Then, I'll start an indepth discussion on personal identity across time.

1. Does total amnesia result in a new person?

2. Suppose a teleporter existed that copied all the information of your body (positions of atoms, neurons firing, etc.). When you step into the teleporter, you are disintegrated, your information is sent to a different "station", and you are rebuilt with new matter. Would the person who comes out the teleporter be you, or a copy of you?

3. Suppose the teleporter worked a bit differently. Instead of sending information from one station to the next, your actually physical matter is sent. When you step through, the matter that makes you up is dissasembled, sent through space, and reassembled. Would this make any difference if you could pick which teleporter to go through?

4. Suppose you could go back in time 5 seconds and stand next to yourself. Which person would be you? Would there be two "you's", each with a valid personal identity claim? If yes, would it make any difference if you went back 5 years?

5. Every decade or so, all the atoms that make us up have been replaced by new atoms. Suppose you were in a coma for 10 years. Further suppose that for the 10 years you're in that coma, every time an atom migrates from your body, a scientist collects and stores it (he's very dedicated). After 10 years, you wake up. But at the same time, the scientist scans all the information in your body completely (like the teleporter case), and has just finished assembling all the atoms he collected and stored for 10 years into something that is identical to you. Which is you?

6. If, at the moment of death, a computer could scan your brain completely and upload all of your memories, would you consider that life-after-death?

[drkitten]

Here are some questions to play around with. Then, I'll start an indepth discussion on personal identity across time.

1. Does total amnesia result in a new person?

2. Suppose a teleporter existed that copied all the information of your body (positions of atoms, neurons firing, etc.). When you step into the teleporter, you are disintegrated, your information is sent to a different "station", and you are rebuilt with new matter. Would the person who comes out the teleporter be you, or a copy of you?

3. Suppose the teleporter worked a bit differently. Instead of sending information from one station to the next, your actually physical matter is sent. When you step through, the matter that makes you up is dissasembled, sent through space, and reassembled. Would this make any difference if you could pick which teleporter to go through?

4. Suppose you could go back in time 5 seconds and stand next to yourself. Which person would be you? Would there be two "you's", each with a valid personal identity claim? If yes, would it make any difference if you went back 5 years?

5. Every decade or so, all the atoms that make us up have been replaced by new atoms. Suppose you were in a coma for 10 years. Further suppose that for the 10 years you're in that coma, every time an atom migrates from your body, a scientist collects and stores it (he's very dedicated). After 10 years, you wake up. But at the same time, the scientist scans all the information in your body completely (like the teleporter case), and has just finished assembling all the atoms he collected and stored for 10 years into something that is identical to you. Which is you?

6. If, at the moment of death, a computer could scan your brain completely and upload all of your memories, would you consider that life-after-death?

Yawn. I think I did this to death my freshman year of college. And the drugs were better, too...

[Silentknight]

"Peronsal Idendity"? ;)
Here are some questions to play around with. Then, I'll start an indepth discussion on personal identity across time.

1. Does total amnesia result in a new person?
Does the extent of the memory loss include education, language skills, and potty training? I suppose the answer then would be yes, though now the problem is finding someone willing to change adult diapers.
2. Suppose a teleporter existed that copied all the information of your body (positions of atoms, neurons firing, etc.). When you step into the teleporter, you are disintegrated, your information is sent to a different "station", and you are rebuilt with new matter. Would the person who comes out the teleporter be you, or a copy of you?

3. Suppose the teleporter worked a bit differently. Instead of sending information from one station to the next, your actually physical matter is sent. When you step through, the matter that makes you up is dissasembled, sent through space, and reassembled. Would this make any difference if you could pick which teleporter to go through?
It would probably be easier to just walk to the next room. You never know when your head might get put on backwards.
4. Suppose you could go back in time 5 seconds and stand next to yourself. Which person would be you? Would there be two "you's", each with a valid personal identity claim? If yes, would it make any difference if you went back 5 years?
Wouldn't your past self become your current self in a matter of 5 seconds when he travels back in time to meet himself? I dunno, that just doesn't seem like enough time to really get to know my past self. Also, wouldn't anything you do to your past self eventually happen to your current self? (Not that that's necessarily a bad thing.)
5. Every decade or so, all the atoms that make us up have been replaced by new atoms. Suppose you were in a coma for 10 years. Further suppose that for the 10 years you're in that coma, every time an atom migrates from your body, a scientist collects and stores it (he's very dedicated). After 10 years, you wake up. But at the same time, the scientist scans all the information in your body completely (like the teleporter case), and has just finished assembling all the atoms he collected and stored for 10 years into something that is identical to you. Which is you?
Considering the way some atoms leave your body-- that's disgusting.
6. If, at the moment of death, a computer could scan your brain completely and upload all of your memories, would you consider that life-after-death?
It depends on the quality of the downloads the computer's owner has stored in his private folder.

[Brian-M]

My thoughts on the questions...

1. Only if it results in a new personality.
2. Still me.
3. You'd still have to send information about which atom goes where, so it's the same as #2 with the added complication of transporting and recycling the same matter.
4. I'd be me, and he'd be a different me. I'm not sure I understand the question.
5. You are a process, not the individual parts that sustain the process. If you were duplicated exactly, down to the atomic level there would be two of you, both just as real, not one real and one fake.
6. Not unless the information gathered from my brain was used to run an exact simulation of my mind. Just archiving it would still be death.

[leonAzul]

Here are some questions to play around with. Then, I'll start an in depth discussion on personal identity across time.

1. Does total amnesia result in a new person?

I forget.

2. Suppose a teleporter existed that copied all the information of your body (positions of atoms, neurons firing, etc.). When you step into the teleporter, you are disintegrated, your information is sent to a different "station", and you are rebuilt with new matter. Would the person who comes out the teleporter be you, or a copy of you?

Iff possible, it were a transformation.

3. Suppose the teleporter worked a bit differently. Instead of sending information from one station to the next, your actually physical matter is sent. When you step through, the matter that makes you up is dissasembled, sent through space, and reassembled. Would this make any difference if you could pick which teleporter to go through?

Physical matter can only be conveyed in a physical container. Or did I miss something?
Either way, whether case 2 or case 3, I would want to see a whole lot of evidence before I would trust a teleporter. I am certainly not perfect, but parts of me are quite excellent :D

4. Suppose you could go back in time 5 seconds and stand next to yourself. Which person would be you?
I am I; and I am I…

Would there be two "you's", each with a valid personal identity claim?

This would make the most sense. At the moment of bifurcation, an independent, yet linked, entity would emerge.

If yes, would it make any difference if you went back 5 years?

Whether 5 years or 5 picoseconds, a separation of point of view (POV) would have occured.

5. Every decade or so, all the atoms that make us up have been replaced by new atoms.

It occurs on a smaller period than 10 years, yet go on.

Suppose you were in a coma for 10 years. Further suppose that for the 10 years you're in that coma, every time an atom migrates from your body, a scientist collects and stores it (he's very dedicated). After 10 years, you wake up. But at the same time, the scientist scans all the information in your body completely (like the teleporter case), and has just finished assembling all the atoms he collected and stored for 10 years into something that is identical to you. Which is you?

As I said above: I am I; and I am I.
The result could be a genetically accurate replica of me, including the memories that I had at the time of the replication, yet going forward, this second entity would not be able to share the identical POV, nor the subsequent qualia.

6. If, at the moment of death, a computer could scan your brain completely and upload all of your memories, would you consider that life-after-death?
Only iff I could enjoy the experience :bgrin:

[Hokulele]

6. If, at the moment of death, a computer could scan your brain completely and upload all of your memories, would you consider that life-after-death?


No, the same way I do not consider a diary an example of life after death.

[paximperium]

Hasn't all of these questions been handled by Star Trek: TNG sometime during their entire run?

[ruach1]

Yawn. I think I did this to death my freshman year of college. And the drugs were better, too...

Dr. Kitten maintaining the standards.

[Malerin]

My thoughts on the questions...

[quote] 5. You are a process, not the individual parts that sustain the process. If you were duplicated exactly, down to the atomic level there would be two of you, both just as real, not one real and one fake.

The problem with creating a duplicate is I now have two different people (even if they're identical, the matter used to create the duplicate is different than the matter that you are made of. Even if all the "processes" in both are identical (and I'm not sure what you mean exactly by "you are a process"), they are numerically distinct- there is a person over here and a person over there, each with a seperate consciousness and point of view)).

"You", by definition, is a label that is applied to only one person. So my question is, how does it make any sense to categorize two different people as one "you"? If the duplicate "you" (U2) stubbed his toe, wouldn't it be kind of odd to say "you" (U1) are also in pain? Or if U2 is looking at a red picture and U1 is looking at a blue picture, and I ask you (U1) "What color are you seeing?", any answer other than "blue" would be a lie, wouldn't it?

[Malerin]

Hasn't all of these questions been handled by Star Trek: TNG sometime during their entire run?

I remember in Star Trek the movie, there was a teleporter accident and two people got fused together, but as someone said, the drugs were better back then ;)

None of these are original. But they're good jumping off points for talking about personal identity.

[Malerin]

No, the same way I do not consider a diary an example of life after death.

Suppose it copied all of your memories and transferred them to an electronic "brain" that could carry out all the functions your organic brain can.

[Malerin]

I forget.

As I said above: I am I; and I am I.

What do you mean by this? Are you saying there are two people and each of them is you? Or there are two people and each has its own personal identity?

The result could be a genetically accurate replica of me, including the memories that I had at the time of the replication, yet going forward, this second entity would not be able to share the identical POV, nor the subsequent qualia.

Right, it would be a different person. So which one is you? If I were your boss, who would I mail the paycheck to?

[Hokulele]

Suppose it copied all of your memories and transferred them to an electronic "brain" that could carry out all the functions your organic brain can.


No, and for the same reason I do not consider a diary to be "me". Memories are extremely plastic, prone to being molded, and subject to constant biasing. A completely accurate memory would be as unlike "me" as a painting would be. Memories naturally fade, change, and warp to match what I wish to be true, rather than what is true. I have pictures of myself in places I no longer recall, and I can picture myself in places I have never been.

I am certainly not the sum of my memories, and it would take a very complex and somewhat erratic computer program to replicate this in any way. My flaws are what make me human.

[Mashuna]

There's a very long thread already dealing with most of these questions here (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=118451).

[westprog]

There's a very long thread already dealing with most of these questions here (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=118451).

If this thread reprises all the same arguments in the same way, is it the same thread?

[Mashuna]

If this thread reprises all the same arguments in the same way, is it the same thread?

:D

[Dancing David]

Here are some questions to play around with. Then, I'll start an indepth discussion on personal identity across time.

1. Does total amnesia result in a new person?

No the only continuity of self is in the body. The new person is a partial until all the atons and molecules turn over.

there is no self, there is a body.


2. Suppose a teleporter existed that copied all the information of your body (positions of atoms, neurons firing, etc.). When you step into the teleporter, you are disintegrated, your information is sent to a different "station", and you are rebuilt with new matter. Would the person who comes out the teleporter be you, or a copy of you?

Copy or divergent appearance of self. It is not teh same body, so it is not the same person.


3. Suppose the teleporter worked a bit differently. Instead of sending information from one station to the next, your actually physical matter is sent. When you step through, the matter that makes you up is dissasembled, sent through space, and reassembled. Would this make any difference if you could pick which teleporter to go through?

This is then the same body as in the same body that started reading this thread.



4. Suppose you could go back in time 5 seconds and stand next to yourself. Which person would be you? Would there be two "you's", each with a valid personal identity claim? If yes, would it make any difference if you went back 5 years?

two seperate identities, neither of which is 'me'. me is a fiction, there is no self, there are unique bodies and you made two.


5. Every decade or so, all the atoms that make us up have been replaced by new atoms. Suppose you were in a coma for 10 years. Further suppose that for the 10 years you're in that coma, every time an atom migrates from your body, a scientist collects and stores it (he's very dedicated). After 10 years, you wake up. But at the same time, the scientist scans all the information in your body completely (like the teleporter case), and has just finished assembling all the atoms he collected and stored for 10 years into something that is identical to you. Which is you?

neither, the self is a fiction, which body did the scientist recreate?

each moment of time has a unique identity. there is some continuity in the body. But the "I" who started this post is not the "I" who finsishes it.


6. If, at the moment of death, a computer could scan your brain completely and upload all of your memories, would you consider that life-after-death?


No that is a copy of a process.

[Dancing David]

[QUOTE=Brian-M;4079763]My thoughts on the questions...



The problem with creating a duplicate is I now have two different people (even if they're identical, the matter used to create the duplicate is different than the matter that you are made of. Even if all the "processes" in both are identical (and I'm not sure what you mean exactly by "you are a process"), they are numerically distinct- there is a person over here and a person over there, each with a seperate consciousness and point of view)).

"You", by definition, is a label that is applied to only one person. So my question is, how does it make any sense to categorize two different people as one "you"? If the duplicate "you" (U2) stubbed his toe, wouldn't it be kind of odd to say "you" (U1) are also in pain? Or if U2 is looking at a red picture and U1 is looking at a blue picture, and I ask you (U1) "What color are you seeing?", any answer other than "blue" would be a lie, wouldn't it?


"You”,” me", "I" are conventions of language, they have no referents other than to a physical body. The two bodies are not 'identical' as they are translocated in space and will immediately diverge in processes.

Neither is "You" because you is a fiction of language imposed upon reality.

[Dancing David]

Suppose it copied all of your memories and transferred them to an electronic "brain" that could carry out all the functions your organic brain can.

Different body, different identity.

[lionking]

BTW is there an award for two spelling mistakes in a two word title? Sorry, off topic.

[Malerin]

i haz speling skilz!

[Brian-M]

My thoughts on the questions...

The problem with creating a duplicate is I now have two different people (even if they're identical, the matter used to create the duplicate is different than the matter that you are made of. Even if all the "processes" in both are identical (and I'm not sure what you mean exactly by "you are a process"), they are numerically distinct- there is a person over here and a person over there, each with a seperate consciousness and point of view)).

"You", by definition, is a label that is applied to only one person. So my question is, how does it make any sense to categorize two different people as one "you"? If the duplicate "you" (U2) stubbed his toe, wouldn't it be kind of odd to say "you" (U1) are also in pain? Or if U2 is looking at a red picture and U1 is looking at a blue picture, and I ask you (U1) "What color are you seeing?", any answer other than "blue" would be a lie, wouldn't it?


To use an analogy, think of a computer program, like Windows. You can copy the same program onto another computer, and have two of the same program running at the same time. Different computers, same program. Of course, these programs will diverge over time as different users customize the settings, or the programs get infected with different viruses. After the copying, what happens to one version has no influence on the other (unless they're networked). Two versions of the same program.

Not a great analogy, but if you're duplicated you have two versions of yourself, as with programs. The word "you" may be an insufficient label to refer to both versions, but the problem is in our language, not in identity.

[Brian-M]

Different body, different identity.


That's where I differ with you. I regard personal identity as continuity of mind, not body. Unless of course we're talking about legal implications, not philosophical implications, in which case continuity of body would be the most sensible approach.

[Cavemonster]

Here's a great thought experiment via Doug Hofstadter.

Part one is similar to what is described above.

A man needs to go on a business trip to Mars. He is informed of the travel process and is a little nervous. A computer will scan his body, and all of his thoughts and memories and reassemble them on Mars. The original will be destroyed. The technician reassures him so he decides to try it. He enters the chamber, closes his eyes, and seemingly a moment later opens them to find himself on Mars. he touches his forehead and feels the very familiar scar from a childhood accident.

Part 2 has a little twist.

The man uses this method many times to travel back and forth and it has become second nature. One day, he closes his eyes in the chamber on earth and reopens them to find- he is still in the chamber on earth. The technician informs him that there has been a glitch in the system and the disintigration did not work as it usually did, but instead of destroying him, had done enough damage to his system that he would die in only a few hours.

Meanwhile his copy on Mars is told of this. The doomed man on earth has the strange experience of being consoled for his imanent death, by himself.

[bruto]

But since you're probably just a brain in a jar anyway it probably doesn't make any difference.

[Malerin]

To use an analogy, think of a computer program, like Windows. You can copy the same program onto another computer, and have two of the same program running at the same time. Different computers, same program. Of course, these programs will diverge over time as different users customize the settings, or the programs get infected with different viruses. After the copying, what happens to one version has no influence on the other (unless they're networked). Two versions of the same program.

Not a great analogy, but if you're duplicated you have two versions of yourself, as with programs. The word "you" may be an insufficient label to refer to both versions, but the problem is in our language, not in identity.

This is a good point. I think there's an eqvicoation going on though. "Windows" is a name that applies to millions of software programs (just as "human being" refers to millions of people, and "Rex" refers to thousands of different dogs). "You", however, picks out a specific thing: you.

So instead of using "Windows", let's try your analogy with a different name: "Mona Lisa". Mona Lisa refers to a singular painting. If you copy the Mona Lisa exactly, then you have a much different analogy. You copy the Mona Lisa onto another canvas (just as you copied Windows onto another computer) down to the sub-atomic level. It is identical to the Mona Lisa, only made of different matter. This is where the analogy breaks down. Do you now have two Mona Lisas? That would seem to be absurd. One is hudreds of years old and painted by Da Vinci. The other is a duplicate created by whoever (or whatever). You have the original Mona Lisa and also a copy of it.

So I think you have a point if you're saying that a duplicate creates two people (or two human beings, or two Joes), because those labels can apply to more than one thing, like Windows, in your analogy. But to say there are two "yous", when "you" can ONLY refer to a single thing, is wrong, I think.

[Malerin]

[QUOTE=Malerin;4080108]


"You”,” me", "I" are conventions of language, they have no referents other than to a physical body. The two bodies are not 'identical' as they are translocated in space and will immediately diverge in processes.

Neither is "You" because you is a fiction of language imposed upon reality.

But when someone asks "can you help me with this?", you know they're referring to you, right? And when you think of yourself, I'm assuming you have a sense of identity. I guess I'm unclear: is you point that "you" is a useful convention, but breaks down as a concept when examined closely?

[Malerin]

That's where I differ with you. I regard personal identity as continuity of mind, not body. Unless of course we're talking about legal implications, not philosophical implications, in which case continuity of body would be the most sensible approach.

Do you believe that the mind is different from the brain? In other words, if I copied your brain and all its functions exactly, would I have you (mind1) and the copy (mind2)? I think this is a disintinction without a difference.

[slingblade]

BTW is there an award for two spelling mistakes in a two word title? Sorry, off topic.



I thought he was secretly conveying the "mission commence" message to his evil Evita clones....

[IMST]

2. E=MC2. In my case, M=85 Kg. I think the extent of destruction would be plenty to eliminate any likelihood that the transmitter would work.

[BoogieWoogieWookie]

Here's a great thought experiment via Doug Hofstadter.

Part one is similar to what is described above.

A man needs to go on a business trip to Mars. He is informed of the travel process and is a little nervous. A computer will scan his body, and all of his thoughts and memories and reassemble them on Mars. The original will be destroyed.


This was the plot to an Outer Limits episode entitled 'Think Like a Dinosaur.
The title refers to aliens in the show that looked like dinosaurs.

The transporter technology was owned by the aliens and they insisted that they watch over the humans for a while before they would give them the technology to see if they could cope emotionally with the process.

As in the case you described, an event happened during a transport in which the originating 'duplicate' was not automatically destroyed. This occurred because the alien operator received a message from the far end that the transport was not successful. However, a little while later it was discovered that the data was in error and the transport was successful after all.

The aliens had made it clear that the destruction of the original was absolutely necessary for technical reasons (I don't remember why). They called the process 'balancing the equation'. The human technician at the facility was given the job of balancing the equation by whatever method he chose. The fact that the transportee was a pretty young woman added a little more emotional stress to his conundrum.

I've always been fascinated by this type of thing. I just can't seem to get my mind around it. I can almost make it fit if there is only one 'me' that is in existence but it escapes me if there is another.

Thinking on the lines of a transporter as mentioned above, if everything works perfectly I get in the transporter, the button is pushed and I am assembled at the other end at the same time as my original body is destroyed. I then step out of the transporter and go my merry way. I can imagine this as easily as I can imagine getting on and off an elevator. But if I try to consider what the experience would be like if that one step, the destruction of the original, is somehow not taken, I just cannot come to wraps with that.

In the first case, I experience getting in the transporter then stepping out at a different location. In the second case, I experience getting in the transporter then stepping out at the same place, probably looking around for a second then saying 'Whoa! Why am I still here on earth/mars/titan/rigel 4/wherever?' Why does it feel differently this time? I just cannot mentally place myself at the other end although from that viewpoint it is exactly the same.

[Brian-M]

Mona Lisa refers to a singular painting. If you copy the Mona Lisa exactly, then you have a much different analogy. You copy the Mona Lisa onto another canvas (just as you copied Windows onto another computer) down to the sub-atomic level. It is identical to the Mona Lisa, only made of different matter. This is where the analogy breaks down. Do you now have two Mona Lisas? That would seem to be absurd. One is hudreds of years old and painted by Da Vinci. The other is a duplicate created by whoever (or whatever). You have the original Mona Lisa and also a copy of it.


And what if you get the two Mona Lisas mixed up, and no longer know which is which? If they're identical on the sub-atomic level, it would be impossible to tell which is which. The only thing which distinguishes one from the other is the knowledge that one is a copy, and that distinction lies in you, not the painting.

If they were identical down to the sub-atomic level, both of them would be equally genuine.


Do you believe that the mind is different from the brain? In other words, if I copied your brain and all its functions exactly, would I have you (mind1) and the copy (mind2)? I think this is a disintinction without a difference.

I regard the mind as a process performed by the brain. (Sort of how a program is a process carried out by a computer.) If you duplicate the brain exactly, then you also duplicate the mind. It may be possible to duplicate the mind without the brain. For example, working out how different clusters of neurons behave (black-box programming style) to recreate the mind from a set of programming modules that behave in an identical way, without simulating the brain itself.

ETA: I'm not saying whether or not this could be done, I'm just putting it out as a hypothetical example.

[Malerin]

And what if you get the two Mona Lisas mixed up, and no longer know which is which? If they're identical on the sub-atomic level, it would be impossible to tell which is which. The only thing which distinguishes one from the other is the knowledge that one is a copy, and that distinction lies in you, not the painting.

If they were identical down to the sub-atomic level, both of them would be equally genuine.

Ok, let's say we copied the Mona Lisa perfectly and then dropped both paintings and couldn't tell which was which. Because we can't tell which is which doesn't mean there are now TWO Mona Lisa's. It means there is the original Mona Lisa and the forgery and we can't tell which is which.

Our inability to tell which is which doesn't negate the existence of the forgery or the original. Example: suppose there are identical twins Sherri and Terri. For the life of me, I can't tell them apart. My (or anybody else's) inability to tell them apart doesn't create two Sherri's or two Terri's.




I regard the mind as a process performed by the brain. (Sort of how a program is a process carried out by a computer.) If you duplicate the brain exactly, then you also duplicate the mind. It may be possible to duplicate the mind without the brain. For example, working out how different clusters of neurons behave (black-box programming style) to recreate the mind from a set of programming modules that behave in an identical way, without simulating the brain itself.

But you believe the mind arises from SOME type of physical process, right (neurons, microchips, etc.)?

[Cavemonster]

okay, imagine I peeled of a 1cm square of the mona lisa and replaced it with new paint to make it indistinguishable?

What if I peeled off two squares?

At what point would it officially NOT be the Mona Lisa?

[leonAzul]

What do you mean by this? Are you saying there are two people and each of them is you? Or there are two people and each has its own personal identity?



Right, it would be a different person. So which one is you? If I were your boss, who would I mail the paycheck to?

I am I; and I am I ;)

ETA
simple and uncomplicated

[Scazon]

Ok, let's say we copied the Mona Lisa perfectly and then dropped both paintings and couldn't tell which was which. Because we can't tell which is which doesn't mean there are now TWO Mona Lisa's. It means there is the original Mona Lisa and the forgery and we can't tell which is which.

But the personality isn't a Mona Lisa- which is a (largely) static physical object. It is a dynamic process, a complex feedback system which interprets the external world using sensory input data and retrieved memories (most of which you don't notice), in a dynamically changing hardware system. If duplication were possible, at the moment of duplication all states would be identical. They would necessarily bifurcate from that point on, as the two bodies could not be in the same spot and so could not experience exactly the same inputs, and because the hardware would change differently as, among other things' they can't eat the same food.

Which would feel like "me" is utterly impossible to say, as you don't know what "feel" means when applied to anything but "me".

[Robin]

I'm afraid teleporter philosophy debates just aren't the same without Interesting Ian.

[Dancing David]

That's where I differ with you. I regard personal identity as continuity of mind, not body. Unless of course we're talking about legal implications, not philosophical implications, in which case continuity of body would be the most sensible approach.

Except the mind doesn't exist. Just the brain. :)

[Dancing David]

But when someone asks "can you help me with this?", you know they're referring to you, right? And when you think of yourself, I'm assuming you have a sense of identity. I guess I'm unclear: is you point that "you" is a useful convention, but breaks down as a concept when examined closely?


The conventoins have meaning through group consensus, the lack of a you beyond the body is my point. Thanks to the Alleged Historical Buddha.


When i think of 'myself' it is rather complex: there is the body (thoughts, emotions, perceptions and habits), then there are memories, emotions and thoughts about those things. But the body is very transient, the 'me' who starts this sentence is only partly the 'me' who finishes it. There are the five heaps, but there is no 'me' in them.

[Dancing David]

Do you believe that the mind is different from the brain? In other words, if I copied your brain and all its functions exactly, would I have you (mind1) and the copy (mind2)? I think this is a disintinction without a difference.

There is no mind, only brain. The two will imeadeatly diverge and no longer be the same.

[arthwollipot]

Except the mind doesn't exist. Just the brain. :)Is not "mind" simply the result of the operation of the brain?

[Dancing David]

I'm afraid teleporter philosophy debates just aren't the same without Interesting Ian.

Sigh... he never did answer the questions about the identical Spirographs either.

[Dancing David]

Is not "mind" simply the result of the operation of the brain?


I would say it is a collective singular noun given to brain processes, but it implies a ghost in the machine.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

2. Suppose a teleporter existed that copied all the information of your body (positions of atoms, neurons firing, etc.). When you step into the teleporter, you are disintegrated, your information is sent to a different "station", and you are rebuilt with new matter. Would the person who comes out the teleporter be you, or a copy of you?
This depends entirely on our accepted definition of "you."

~~ Paul

[arthwollipot]

I would say it is a collective singular noun given to brain processes, but it implies a ghost in the machine.I don't think it does. I think that the brain does stuff, and part of what it does produces perceptions, and we describe this as "mind". Now, if we had been talking about "spirit" or "soul", then I would have agreed with you wholeheartedly. But I think that "mind" is simply the result of the completely matierial workings of the brain.

In the teleporter example, the other guy is not me. I am the result of the processes going on in my physical brain. The other guy has a different physical brain (even if it started out identical to mine), and therefore a different "mind". Ergo, not me.

[Cavemonster]

Why are "you" so tied to the particular matter of you?
We replace most of our cells many times over our lifetime.

If we replaced a tiny part of your brain, one neuron, with a transplant, would you stop being you instantly? How many neurons would it take if we switched them out one by one?

Please explain why I need to inhabit this particular group of cells.

[arthwollipot]

Why are "you" so tied to the particular matter of you?
We replace most of our cells many times over our lifetime.But there is a continutity of the whole. Replacing a small (read: miniscule) part of the whole does not affect the continuity of the whole. If all of the cells were replaced all at once, then yes, the continuity would be broken. But one at a time, no. There is no break in the continuity, therefore no break in the identity.

If we replaced a tiny part of your brain, one neuron, with a transplant, would you stop being you instantly? How many neurons would it take if we switched them out one by one?See above. Switching them out one by one would not affect the whole, so long as the new transplants operated in the same way as the old ones.

Please explain why I need to inhabit this particular group of cells.You are an epiphenomenon - the emergent result of the physical processes operating in your brain.

If I were to painstakingly construct a brain in a jar, assembling it neuron by neuron, so long as it operated in the same general way as a natural biological brain, it would have its own "mind" and identity, just like any other brain.

[Brian-M]

Ok, let's say we copied the Mona Lisa perfectly and then dropped both paintings and couldn't tell which was which. Because we can't tell which is which doesn't mean there are now TWO Mona Lisa's. It means there is the original Mona Lisa and the forgery and we can't tell which is which.

Our inability to tell which is which doesn't negate the existence of the forgery or the original. Example: suppose there are identical twins Sherri and Terri. For the life of me, I can't tell them apart. My (or anybody else's) inability to tell them apart doesn't create two Sherri's or two Terri's.


The point is not that you cannot distinguish between them, but that there is nothing distinguishing them. If the second Mona Lisa is created down to identical sub-atomic states, then in that moment of creation, it is the same painting.

Even if nobody can distinguish Sherri from Terri, the distinction still exists, and has always existed, making them two separate people.


But you believe the mind arises from SOME type of physical process, right (neurons, microchips, etc.)?

Yes, I just meant that that I can't be sure that it might be possible to simulate or re-create the mind without simulating the physical brain as well.


Is not "mind" simply the result of the operation of the brain?
There, I fixed it for you! :) (Nothing simple about the mind.)

[arthwollipot]

There, I fixed it for you! :) (Nothing simple about the mind.)Touché.

[Cavemonster]

But there is a continutity of the whole. Replacing a small (read: miniscule) part of the whole does not affect the continuity of the whole. If all of the cells were replaced all at once, then yes, the continuity would be broken. But one at a time, no. There is no break in the continuity, therefore no break in the identity.

See above. Switching them out one by one would not affect the whole, so long as the new transplants operated in the same way as the old ones.

You are an epiphenomenon - the emergent result of the physical processes operating in your brain.

If I were to painstakingly construct a brain in a jar, assembling it neuron by neuron, so long as it operated in the same general way as a natural biological brain, it would have its own "mind" and identity, just like any other brain.

What if we up the rate to two neurons at a time? Three? 1000? Where is continuity officially interrupted?

[arthwollipot]

What if we up the rate to two neurons at a time? Three? 1000? Where is continuity officially interrupted?I don't know. What makes you think I know?

[Brian-M]

What if we up the rate to two neurons at a time? Three? 1000? Where is continuity officially interrupted?

What if we just destroy one brain cell, or two, or three, or 1000? At what point can we consider cognition impaired?

I suspect in both cases, it's a gradient rather then a sharp distinction.

[Cavemonster]

But we can measure impaired cognition.
How do measure the level of selfness?

[arthwollipot]

But we can measure impaired cognition.
How do measure the level of selfness?How do define the "level of selfness"?

Translation: before measuring something, one has to be convinced that it actually exists. We can't tell how to measure the "level of selfness" unless we can understand clearly what "selfness" actually is. As evidenced by this thread, there still appears to be some dispute.

So first define "level of selfness" which of course will require a definition of "selfness", and then we can talk about methods of measuring it.

[Cavemonster]

I don't think there's any such thing as self-ness.
It is the quality that causes people to say that one human, whose cells were replaced one by one is fundementally different from another human all of who's cells were replaced at once.

I don't think there is a difference. This self-ness is the quality that so many here claim the second human lacks. I would like them to define it.

[arthwollipot]

I don't think there's any such thing as self-ness.
It is the quality that causes people to say that one human, whose cells were replaced one by one is fundementally different from another human all of who's cells were replaced at once.

I don't think there is a difference. This self-ness is the quality that so many here claim the second human lacks. I would like them to define it.I think I understand. This "self-ness" is the quality of being me. I have "self-ness" because I use the first person singular when descriibing myself. However, I do not use the first person singular when describing that guy who comes out of the teleporter, because he isn't me.

So it would be a binary choice, not a measurable scale. Either an entity is me, or it is not. There is no in-between.

Yes?

[Cavemonster]

Okay, so say I rip your body in half, right and left brain each following one half, and instantly rebuild the missing half on both.

They both have all your thoughts, feelings memories etc.
One is thinking "Whoa, I just got thrown to the left and I have a huge headache."
The other "Whoa, I just got thrown to the right and I have a huge headache."

Which one is you? Both? neither?

[Hokulele]

Which one is you? Both? neither?


To quote a Robert Heinlein character, "Sometimes she goes away, but I'm always right here."

[arthwollipot]

Okay, so say I rip your body in half, right and left brain each following one half, and instantly rebuild the missing half on both.

They both have all your thoughts, feelings memories etc.
One is thinking "Whoa, I just got thrown to the left and I have a huge headache."
The other "Whoa, I just got thrown to the right and I have a huge headache."

Which one is you? Both? neither?Honestly, I really cannot see the point in such questions. Such an event is practically impossible, and so the question really is moot. But for the purposes of argument (and because I'm a little drunk right now) I'll see what I can do. :D

The answer is that they would both be me. Each would consider himself to be "me" and the other as "not me". They would both be identical at the moment of separation, but they would immediately start to diverge, and become more and more dissimilar as time goes on.

As for the "me" that I am now, does that disappear? No, it doesn't. It is duplicated, and each of the duplicates gets on with his life. The "me" I am now is no longer there, of course. But the "me" I was when I wrote the previous sentence is no longer there either. My "me" is constantly changing.

Both "mes" would consider himself "me".

This is why I hate conversations like this. I need more beer.

[Brian-M]

I've been thinking about the Mona Lisa thing, and realized we went off on the wrong tack. The question should be, is there an image/painting duality analogous to the mind/body duality?

After all, a clever forgery, an exact duplicate or a print of the Mona Lisa all present the same image.

But if you were to treat the original Mona Lisa with solvent, and swirl paint around, then let it dry out, would it still be the Mona Lisa? It has all the physical properties of the original, and even the original paint, but it no longer presents the image of the Mona Lisa.

So, is the Mona Lisa really the physical paint-on-canvas it's made from, or is it the image that this paint-on-canvas presents?

Are you really the neurons-and-chemicals your brain is made from, or are you the processes these neurons-and-chemicals produce?

Still not a good analogy, but I hope you get the picture. (Pun intended :D )

[leonAzul]

If I were your boss, who would I mail the paycheck to?

If you were my boss you would know my SSN and transfer the funds directly to my savings account ;)

[Cavemonster]

Honestly, I really cannot see the point in such questions. Such an event is practically impossible, and so the question really is moot. But for the purposes of argument (and because I'm a little drunk right now) I'll see what I can do. :D

The answer is that they would both be me. Each would consider himself to be "me" and the other as "not me". They would both be identical at the moment of separation, but they would immediately start to diverge, and become more and more dissimilar as time goes on.

As for the "me" that I am now, does that disappear? No, it doesn't. It is duplicated, and each of the duplicates gets on with his life. The "me" I am now is no longer there, of course. But the "me" I was when I wrote the previous sentence is no longer there either. My "me" is constantly changing.

Both "mes" would consider himself "me".

This is why I hate conversations like this. I need more beer.

I think we use silly yet clear analogies like this one to test and sharpen our definitions.
We've now come to the agreement (the drunk agreement) that it is possible for two separate individuals, artificially constructed, can both be "YOU". How cool is that.

There are more practical questions down the line, but it is incredibly useful to establish those truths we tend to leave mushy before you get to any real world applications.

[arthwollipot]

Are you really the neurons-and-chemicals your brain is made from, or are you the processes these neurons-and-chemicals produce?Is there a difference?

[Foster Zygote]

Sigh... he never did answer the questions about the identical Spirographs either.

Did you know there's a direct correlation between the rise in crime rate and the decline of Spirograph?

[Brian-M]

Is there a difference?


From a purely practical viewpoint, probably not.

(At least, not until science advances enough to start scanning brains into computers, assuming it ever does.)

[westprog]

Did you know there's a direct correlation between the rise in crime rate and the decline of Spirograph?

Nobody cares anymore.

[Nick227]

Oh, another Teletransporter debate! Seems a bit of a pity no one has touched on the most valuable function, to my mind, this thought experiment performs. It weeds out the real materialists from those who just think they are materialist. Of course you have to be claiming to be a material monist to play, as dualists anyway travel.

Phoney materialists won't get in the machine. Usually there are a lot of emotive arguments of dubious relevance but the bottom line is they won't get in. Behaviourists won't get in usually, and to my mind the experiment nicely shows up the inconsistencies with claiming to be both a behaviourist and a materialist.

Nick

[Malerin]

Honestly, I really cannot see the point in such questions. Such an event is practically impossible, and so the question really is moot. But for the purposes of argument (and because I'm a little drunk right now) I'll see what I can do.

Check out the studies on split-brain patients. Some very interesting stuff there.

[paximperium]

Oh, another Teletransporter debate! Seems a bit of a pity no one has touched on the most valuable function, to my mind, this thought experiment performs. It weeds out the real materialists from those who just think they are materialist. Of course you have to be claiming to be a material monist to play, as dualists anyway travel.

Phoney materialists won't get in the machine. Usually there are a lot of emotive arguments of dubious relevance but the bottom line is they won't get in. Behaviourists won't get in usually, and to my mind the experiment nicely shows up the inconsistencies with claiming to be both a behaviourist and a materialist.

Nick

Well as a materialists, I'm terrified of being vaporized but thrilled to have every atom reconstructed...in an approximation of "me".

I do like the movie "The Prestige" take on that issue.

PS: I'm not too familiar with "behavioralist".

[arthwollipot]

Check out the studies on split-brain patients. Some very interesting stuff there.Oh, yes indeed. Alien Hand Syndrome is fascinating and freaky.

Anyone who doesn't believe that the mind is a direct product of the brain should do a little research into the effects of damage to the various parts of the brain. Fascinating. Utterly fascinating.

[Dancing David]

Is not "mind" simply the result of the operation of the brain?

Not in the way it gets slung around in philosophy, it takes on as much baggage as 'consciousness' and 'self-awareness'. It is mainly the baggage I take exception to. It is a redundant word with all sorts of dangerous conotations. Especially when it is capitalized!

[Dancing David]

I don't think it does. I think that the brain does stuff, and part of what it does produces perceptions, and we describe this as "mind". Now, if we had been talking about "spirit" or "soul", then I would have agreed with you wholeheartedly. But I think that "mind" is simply the result of the completely matierial workings of the brain.

In the teleporter example, the other guy is not me. I am the result of the processes going on in my physical brain. The other guy has a different physical brain (even if it started out identical to mine), and therefore a different "mind". Ergo, not me.


See that is because you are 'smart' and examine the 'contents' of your 'mind' for 'validity'! ;)

Many many people put just as much woo into mind as they do spirit.

[Dancing David]

Why are "you" so tied to the particular matter of you?
We replace most of our cells many times over our lifetime.

If we replaced a tiny part of your brain, one neuron, with a transplant, would you stop being you instantly? How many neurons would it take if we switched them out one by one?

Please explain why I need to inhabit this particular group of cells.

Please explain any evidence that 'you' is not tied directly to the aggregate body as it exists at any given time. It transitory and ephemeral, it does not exist like 'beauty' in the platonic foolishness. It is an illusion imposed upon transitory physical states, when those states are ended, so is the rest of it.

[Dancing David]

Did you know there's a direct correlation between the rise in crime rate and the decline of Spirograph?


Cool, we Must Raise Awareness of this Issue!

[Dancing David]

But we can measure impaired cognition.
How do measure the level of selfness?


Well here is the frist run:
-selfness does not exist except as the unique body as defined through contingent history

but it has many legal and social/cultural constructs as well.

1. Legal identity as defined by a state or aggregate group.
2. Social identity as defined by participation is social guilds, professions, clubs, socio-econimic status and various other social contructs.
3. Cultural identity as provided in group associations, cultural myths and memes.
4. Personal identity as defined by interaction with other social creatures;the 'exchange' identity as it were. "hey, I met you before", "I have heard about you"
5. Personal behaviors as defined by others through memory of interactions "You seem different, do you feel okay"
6. Persona as a presentation of self to others.
7. Persona as a presentation of self to one's self.
8. Self as defined by the persistance of memory.
9. Self as defined by the aggregat contingent history of choices.
10. Self as defined by the stereotypes of cliques, claques, guilds, groups, clubs, socio-economic status.
11. Self as defined in the idiomatic expression of social and cultural contexts "The clothes make the man."

[Dancing David]

Well as a materialists, I'm terrified of being vaporized but thrilled to have every atom reconstructed...in an approximation of "me".

I do like the movie "The Prestige" take on that issue.

PS: I'm not too familiar with "behavioralist".
Nick227 had his booty handed to him on a platter by Mercutio who pointed out the nonsense that Nick227 thinks is real.

Nick227 believes that there is no objective reality, that one can overcome subjective states to find 'true reality' and in a lot of neoFreudian twaddle that leads people into unethical behaviors in the name of 'therapy'.

[Cavemonster]

Please explain any evidence that 'you' is not tied directly to the aggregate body as it exists at any given time. It transitory and ephemeral, it does not exist like 'beauty' in the platonic foolishness. It is an illusion imposed upon transitory physical states, when those states are ended, so is the rest of it.

You may misunderstand me. I'm not suggesting that "i" will in any way continue to exist in the absence of a brain.

'I' is an emergent property of the physical brain and would exist equally within an exact physical copy of that brain. It isn't tied to this particular brain in the sense that it could theoretically be replicated.

As for the social conventions of "self-ness" I think we're even now entering a situation where many of them break down. A group of people could easily collectively manage a blog, email account and forum personality.

"He" could have friends, enemies, people could have strong opinions about "him" even sexual attraction to "him".

How far are we away from a computer program that can create a self in the same way? I can't find the link, but another program was recently revealed which claims to pass a Turing test.

[Dancing David]

You may misunderstand me. I'm not suggesting that "i" will in any way continue to exist in the absence of a brain.

'I' is an emergent property of the physical brain and would exist equally within an exact physical copy of that brain. It isn't tied to this particular brain in the sense that it could theoretically be replicated.

theoreticaly, yes but the physical tanslation and alternate matrix would be different and the processes would diverge right away.


As for the social conventions of "self-ness" I think we're even now entering a situation where many of them break down. A group of people could easily collectively manage a blog, email account and forum personality.

"He" could have friends, enemies, people could have strong opinions about "him" even sexual attraction to "him".

How far are we away from a computer program that can create a self in the same way? I can't find the link, but another program was recently revealed which claims to pass a Turing test.

[quarky]

I've transferred my consciousness to my stomach flora, and we are well, thankyou.

We're hoping that quarky drops out at some point, and frees us from this claustraphobia.

[Nick227]

Nick227 had his booty handed to him on a platter by Mercutio who pointed out the nonsense that Nick227 thinks is real.

It seems that the narratives stored in our memories differ here! As I recall of the last "teletransporter" discussion, it drew to a close with myself and Cyborg engaging with Merc and Belz over various issues, a significant one being that simply getting emotional about all the possibilities didn't really undermine the central point Susan Blackmore was making about the thought experiment - that it distinguishes the true materialists from the "Cartesian" ones, to use Dennett's terminology.

I went to Sardinia for a week near the end and it kind of dissipated while I was away. But mine was the last post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=3999766#post3999766) and I'm completely happy to pick it up again if anyone wishes. I still think it's a great thought experiment.

Nick