Do Materialism and Evolution Theory Undermine Science?

[Nick227]

No I am not assuming that at all.

The only place where S needs to be clearly defined is 1) the laws of whatever fabric S is part of (in this case our universe) 2) in the minds of whatever intelligent systems (E.G. humans) are considering S as part of a proof. S doesn't need to know anything at all about itself to begin with.

Whether you consider that System S references System S, or you consider that System S is referenced by another System there is still assumption. The human "considering S as part of a proof" is merely another system assuming itself to be self-referencing considering S as the same.

This is the problem I have with your self-referencing system. The act of reference is merely a narrative created from a data stream. It cannot be said to absolutely convey or define Self, and so the belief that it does so makes more solid what is actually a rather arbitrary border.

Nick

[Nick227]

It doesn't sound, to me, like Nick is trying to sell any form of dualism. But, just to be sure, I'll ask him:
Nick, are you really trying to sell some form of dualism, in your arguments?

Not as far as I'm aware.

One can accept the idea that there is no real self to refer to, when speaking of "I"; and yet not be a dualist. In fact, the basic principals of that modern approach are very anti-dualism in nature. We are still talking about normally-understood matter, afterall.

I do find it valid, in some ways, the point that RD makes when he says that he is using "I" as a reference without a referent. However, I submit that the normal human understanding of the term is that it points to some apparently existing limited entity who has thoughts, who owns a body, who has possessions, and so on and so forth.

Relatedly, the behaviourist position which I have seen put out on this forum previously, that of "I" referring to the whole organism, I also consider valid but not really relating to the issue, which again is that of considering why "I" should seem to be the way it does.

Nick

[Nick227]

I however find that to be quite unsatisfying for a few simple reasons: 1) ‘thinking’ and ‘identification’ are such broad categories here that it’s hard to distinguish what’s excluded from them; 2) ‘identification’ seems to be simply thrown in there as an ad hoc bridge, i.e. we know there’s thinking and we know there’s the sense of “I”, thus there must be a case of ‘identification’ somewhere that “brings” these two notions together, hence ‘identification’ is thrown in as a saviour for solving the dilemma.

In short: There must be identification for the “I” to happen because, well, without identification it cannot happen. I find it a tad like begging the question. It doesn’t really reveal too much about what’s really happening, except, well, “identification” whatever that actually denotes to.

Well, in considering that thoughts can be either passively observed or acted upon, from the first person perspective it does seem rational to hypothesise the presence of an unconscious agency that is mediating this process. Of course, from a third-person, more objective viewpoint this apparent perception of "how it is" may be quite invalid. But I do find it interesting that identification does appear, sensorily, to resemble a neurochemical process.



While it’s commendable that ancient “sages” must have gone through extraordinary feats of introspection to confidently reaching such a conclusion, it is also quite a trivial conclusion after the invent of scientific reasoning and accumulation of systematic data.

Well, I think it is rather that these "sages" simply examined in depth the thoughts they were attracted towards until they made the identification sufficiently conscious so that the truth of self was laid bare.

Remember here also that Dennett or Blackmore's views of the self, which differ slightly, are remarkably close to that of Gautama the Buddha. I must say that I find your rhetoric a little patronising here and to me this could indicate that actually you do not yourself have either the ancient or modern perspectives particular clear. Of course I could be wrong, but in the event that I'm not I would recommend Blackmore: The Meme Machine, closing 2 chapters. She provides imo an excellent summary of various perspectives.

Thus we find some interesting suggestions: Like when Gazzangia proposes the existence of a “narrative self”, as one type of “self-system” in the left prefrontal cortex which seems to be responsible for what we call “self-talk”. The basis for his assumption has come through work with split brain patients and interhemispheric conflict (in Baars 1997). Furthermore, Baars alludes to the possibility of there also being a non-verbal self-system in the right hemisphere.

Baars also introduces some interesting dysfunctions: like anosognosia, where patients may reject their own limbs. So in this case they cannot identify with their own limbs even though their intellectual capacities are intact, thus there certainly are thoughts going on, and there certainly is thinking about identity and identification, yet there is inability to identify with certain parts of “oneself”.

So yes, in a very general way, there is ‘identification’ in the center of the problem again, but the simplicity of just referring to such a category is becoming increasingly unsatisfying.

Finally, Baars also suggest that the “observing self” could be a necessary framework for conscious experience, for which he says the following:



These are just some hints as to why at least I don’t think it’s quite sufficient to simply throw the baby out with the bathwater when considering self-referential systems or simply “self-systems”.

I am not suggesting throwing things out with bath-water. I'm just pointing out the fundamental issues with considering the notion of a "self-referring system" to be absolutely valid.

As to Barr's idea, I have pointed out repeatedly that without this self-narrative, or "benign user illusion" to use Dennett's term, there simply can be no experience. He seems to be reinforcing my point. Thinking creates duality.

Nick

[Nick227]

Wait... you are saying that there can be thought without a thinker? A physical process without a physical substrate? I don't think you are an idealist so you are clearly misunderstanding my meaning here.

To my mind you are confusing things when you use words like "thinker" because you are implying selfhood. There are thoughts. The presence of thinking does not mean there actually exists "a thinker." It is only other thoughts that construct it so. The thoughts frequently appear to relate the perspective of a "thinking self," who is the apparent "doer" of the thinking, as well as the holder of opinions, the owner of a body, the possessor of various objects and an assortment of other things. This does not mean that a thinking self exists. Indeed it is clear that it does not in the sense that it appears to.


I am simply asserting that the existence of an "I" reference implies the existence of some system which is the substrate of the reference, which can be said to be the system that is "experiencing" the "I." That seems to be just materialism 101 to me...

It implies the existence of it, yes.



I didn't say anything about being a dualist. I said that to think the only definition of "self" is the dualistic one is dualistic thinking.

The definition of "self" that I use, or my notion of self, is purely materialistic at this point, and it would be absurd to think it is any less "real" than the rest of the objective universe.

If my notion of self is something along the lines of "the entity that is writing this sentence" then how could it not be real? The sentence is clearly real, as real as anything else. So what wrote it? A ghost?

The issue is that the perspective is still dualistic.

Writing takes places because thinking takes place and identification with thought takes place. If one considers Dennett's "parallel processor" model, then one of the Multiple Drafts being near-constantly created are these thought narratives, these little stories that appear to be happening to some "self." When identification with these stories takes place so notional selfhood is constructed.

To my mind, one may validly consider that, at the level of an apparently independent organism existing embedded within its environment, there is a self having thoughts. But this perspective simply does not exist beneath this level and it is inevitably dualistic.

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

I must say that I find your rhetoric a little patronising here and to me this could indicate that actually you do not yourself have either the ancient or modern perspectives particular clear.

But, but… there is actually no one to be patronized or anyone doing the patronizing! ;)

I am not suggesting throwing things out with bath-water. I'm just pointing out the fundamental issues with considering the notion of a "self-referring system" to be absolutely valid.

One fundamental issue is of course to consider the actual existence of those physical processes that makes it appropriate to speak of them as self-referential systems.

As to Barr's idea, I have pointed out repeatedly that without this self-narrative, or "benign user illusion" to use Dennett's term, there simply can be no experience. He seems to be reinforcing my point. Thinking creates duality.

And it is exactly at that point where you might go astray, or simply muddle the waters again. It is not completely satisfying to say that without a self-narrative there can be no experience. You seem to equate ‘self-narrative’ with ‘benign user illusion’ which could be problematic. If you also read what I presented in reference to Gatzzangia, who proposed the existence of a narrative self, then you ought to notice that it does not necessarily mean the same thing as a self-narrative. The distinction could be considered minuscule, but potentially quite elementary for avoiding putting the cart before the horse.

Let’s backtrack to Baars again and quote him a little bit more (I’m pretty sure it is still within fair use, especially since it’s from the same paragraph), (underlining mine):
The ‘self’ involved in conscious access is sometimes referred to as the self as observer. William James called it the knower, the ‘I’. This is of course our common intuition, one that was not seriously doubted until this century, when philosophers like Gilbert Ryle found ways to question it. Empirically we now know that Ryle was wrong. The ‘narrative interpreter’ found in the left frontal cortex of split-brain patients, does indeed receive conscious sensory information (Gazzaniga, 1993). (Baars 1997: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, No 4, 1997).

Now, when you say that without a self-narrative there cannot be experience, some clarifications and qualifications must be presented.

First, there is probably a difference between self and narrative, especially when also considering the content of the narrative. If the content of the narrative revolves around a central figure called “I”, then I tend to agree with you in that such central figure only exists when such narrative is active – you might call it an illusion. But of course, there are also other definition for I.

Second, when you say that “you” can passively observe “your” thoughts, but not necessarily act upon them, I assume that what you mean by “you” is something other than the central figure in the previously mentioned narrative. Thus, I assume you mean by such “you” to be a sort of self-reference (or what Baars presented as the narrative interpreter)… but not the “I” who is presented in the narrative of “I” (i.e. what you coined as a self-narrative)?

To finish off with your beloved Daniel Dennett, this blast from the past might be appropriate:

That of which I am conscious is that to which I have access, or (to put the emphasis where it belongs), that to which I have access . . . (Dennett 1978: Brainstorms)

[rocketdodger]

Whether you consider that System S references System S, or you consider that System S is referenced by another System there is still assumption.

The only assumption at this point in the process is that solipsism is false. I am starting to think that (solipsism) is really what you are after...

The human "considering S as part of a proof" is merely another system assuming itself to be self-referencing considering S as the same.

No. The notion of reference is independent of the notion of self. I could have no notion of self and still understand and make use of the notion of reference.

I only say "S references itself" instead of "S references S" because humans have a strong notion of self. But I don't have to say it that way. It would be perfectly possible to express all our ideas with a huge string of the propositional calculus or something along those lines. It would just be fairly dry (and tedious), if you ask me.

This is the problem I have with your self-referencing system. The act of reference is merely a narrative created from a data stream.

Huh?

It cannot be said to absolutely convey or define Self, and so the belief that it does so makes more solid what is actually a rather arbitrary border.


Yes, it can, if that is how Self is defined. I don't understand why you are clinging to the dualistic notion of self and then dogging on the dualistic notion of self. Seriously its like you are arguing with yourself at this point.

[Nick227]

But, but… there is actually no one to be patronized or anyone doing the patronizing! ;)

I can foresee any future criticisms I might make of your understanding being dealt with in similar manner! Lucky that I am not "in it to win it."


And it is exactly at that point where you might go astray, or simply muddle the waters again. It is not completely satisfying to say that without a self-narrative there can be no experience. You seem to equate ‘self-narrative’ with ‘benign user illusion’ which could be problematic.

As I see it, it would be problematic if there was no identification. How would you consider it problematic?


If you also read what I presented in reference to Gatzzangia, who proposed the existence of a narrative self, then you ought to notice that it does not necessarily mean the same thing as a self-narrative. The distinction could be considered minuscule, but potentially quite elementary for avoiding putting the cart before the horse.

Watch the duality radar here. Spelling radar too!

Let’s backtrack to Baars again and quote him a little bit more (I’m pretty sure it is still within fair use, especially since it’s from the same paragraph), (underlining mine):
Originally Posted by Baars 1997: Global Workspace Theory
The ‘self’ involved in conscious access is sometimes referred to as the self as observer. William James called it the knower, the ‘I’. This is of course our common intuition, one that was not seriously doubted until this century, when philosophers like Gilbert Ryle found ways to question it. Empirically we now know that Ryle was wrong. The ‘narrative interpreter’ found in the left frontal cortex of split-brain patients, does indeed receive conscious sensory information (Gazzaniga, 1993). (Baars 1997: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, No 4, 1997).

I think if you examine this notion of a "narrative interpreter" you will agree that it cannot be regarded as a self.



Now, when you say that without a self-narrative there cannot be experience, some clarifications and qualifications must be presented.

First, there is probably a difference between self and narrative, especially when also considering the content of the narrative. If the content of the narrative revolves around a central figure called “I”, then I tend to agree with you in that such central figure only exists when such narrative is active – you might call it an illusion. But of course, there are also other definition for I.

One problem here... it is not only the presence of a narrative about "I" that creates a sense of self. Once the notion of limited selfhood is created in the brain any thinking narrative will maintain this notional selfhood, for it will constantly appear that there must be a self that is experiencing the thoughts. Furthermore, the thoughts themselves will soon relate almost entirely to this notional self.

Whilst thinking, and identification with thought, are taking place it will tend to reinforce selfhood, pretty much no matter what the thinking is about. An exception might be a narrative specifically intended to attack the idea of notional selfhood though.

As Blackmore (1999) relates, self may validly be considered purely memetic. Her term is "selfplex", hope I'm allowed to quote...

In most people the selfplex is constantly being reinforced. Everything that happens is referred to the self, sensations are referred to the observing self, shifts of attention are attributed to the self, decisions are described as being made by the self, and so on. All this reconfirms and sustains the selfplex, and the result is a quality of consciousness dominated by the sense of 'I' in the middle - me in charge, me responsible, me suffering.


Second, when you say that “you” can passively observe “your” thoughts, but not necessarily act upon them, I assume that what you mean by “you” is something other than the central figure in the previously mentioned narrative. Thus, I assume you mean by such “you” to be a sort of self-reference (or what Baars presented as the narrative interpreter)… but not the “I” who is presented in the narrative of “I” (i.e. what you coined as a self-narrative)?

Well, narratives are narratives. They create self. When I say one can passively observe thinking I am trying to relate that which appears to take place. Who knows?

Nick

[rocketdodger]

To my mind you are confusing things when you use words like "thinker" because you are implying selfhood. There are thoughts. The presence of thinking does not mean there actually exists "a thinker." It is only other thoughts that construct it so. The thoughts frequently appear to relate the perspective of a "thinking self," who is the apparent "doer" of the thinking, as well as the holder of opinions, the owner of a body, the possessor of various objects and an assortment of other things. This does not mean that a thinking self exists. Indeed it is clear that it does not in the sense that it appears to.

That is textbook idealism. You are an idealist. Is anyone else reading this nonsense?

The issue is that the perspective is still dualistic.

What typed that sentence on a keyboard, entering it in browser, such that it arrived on these forums?

Was it the entity on the JREF forums that other users reference as Nick227?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

[Nick227]

That is textbook idealism. You are an idealist. Is anyone else reading this nonsense?

An apt question indeed!! But, it is not idealism, RD. It is pretty much straight-down-the-line modern materialism. You may recall some months ago, on another thread, me pointing out that when you start to investigate selfhood, beneath the level of the functioning independent organism, it gets weird. It gets very weird indeed. Things seem to be deeply, deeply counter-intuitive. You refused to accept this, despite me urging you to read Blackmore, Dennett, and others. I figure you clearly are interested at some level or other, elsewise why would you continue the dialogue? I'm just wondering if you will ever realise that actually it is pretty strange.



What typed that sentence on a keyboard, entering it in browser, such that it arrived on these forums?

Was it the entity on the JREF forums that other users reference as Nick227?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

et al


If you read the rest of that post you will see that I point out that I'm fine to consider things solely at the level of the functioning organism and conclude that there really is a self doing things. But once one gets beneath that level, as inevitably one must if one is to meaningfully investigate selfhood and consciousness, things get very strange indeed.

This is the problem. It's is not that things are necessarily complicated. It is that they are deeply, deeply counter-intuitive. Scientists have spent decades trying to find "places in the brain where things become conscious" and similar. They have spent decades trying to create and sustain a model that matches what seems intuitively correct. They haven't got very far. This, as I think most now realise, is because the models that work are deeply counter-intuitive. They challenge directly the brain of the scientist working on them, for what is related in the model must also be going on inside that brain. All the defences that the notional self uses to protect itself are inevitably activated to deal with any threats the model creates in the brain of the investigator, and this is the real issue.

Nick

[Wowbagger]

My point in asking that was to demonstrate that the building blocks of the brain are themselves "easily delineable functional units," which are in turn composed smaller and simpler sub-units, etc, What if this wasn't true? What if there is a tremendous overlap in the tasks many parts of the brain are supposed to do? I think we are finding is that there are trends for thoughts to occur in certain places, but that exceptions and differences crop up, every now and then. The functional units are not as easily delineable as you might think.

[PixyMisa]

An apt question indeed!! But, it is not idealism, RD. It is pretty much straight-down-the-line modern materialism. You may recall some months ago, on another thread, me pointing out that when you start to investigate selfhood, beneath the level of the functioning independent organism, it gets weird. It gets very weird indeed. Things seem to be deeply, deeply counter-intuitive. You refused to accept this, despite me urging you to read Blackmore, Dennett, and others. I figure you clearly are interested at some level or other, elsewise why would you continue the dialogue? I'm just wondering if you will ever realise that actually it is pretty strange.
I've read Blackmore, Dennett, and others. Where's the weird?

This is the problem. It's is not that things are necessarily complicated. It is that they are deeply, deeply counter-intuitive. Scientists have spent decades trying to find "places in the brain where things become conscious" and similar. They have spent decades trying to create and sustain a model that matches what seems intuitively correct. They haven't got very far. This, as I think most now realise, is because the models that work are deeply counter-intuitive. They challenge directly the brain of the scientist working on them, for what is related in the model must also be going on inside that brain. All the defences that the notional self uses to protect itself are inevitably activated to deal with any threats the model creates in the brain of the investigator, and this is the real issue.
No.

[rocketdodger]

What if this wasn't true? What if there is a tremendous overlap in the tasks many parts of the brain are supposed to do? I think we are finding is that there are trends for thoughts to occur in certain places, but that exceptions and differences crop up, every now and then. The functional units are not as easily delineable as you might think.

I am talking about a neuron as the unit.

Unless I have missed out on some major discoveries, I don't believe there is just a trend that all thought occurs on a substrate of neurons, and that one neuron is easily distinguishable from its neighbors.

[rocketdodger]

If you read the rest of that post you will see that I point out that I'm fine to consider things solely at the level of the functioning organism and conclude that there really is a self doing things. But once one gets beneath that level, as inevitably one must if one is to meaningfully investigate selfhood and consciousness, things get very strange indeed.


But what you are doing on these threads is forcing people like Pixy and I, who really do stop our consideration at the level of the functioning organism, to argue about those deeper levels we care nothing for.

Basically we say "there is a self that does things, that is our 'self'," and you reply with "ok I agree but the real self is deeper, don't you see, and it isn't what you think it is." Well of course it isn't "what we think it is" because we don't care to delve deeper -- we are materialists.

In essence you argue with materialists about dualism, but that is retarded, because we aren't dualists. This is evident from your endless attempts to pigeonhole half of us into dualism when we are clearly not dualists.

[Nick227]

But what you are doing on these threads is forcing people like Pixy and I, who really do stop our consideration at the level of the functioning organism, to argue about those deeper levels we care nothing for.

That sounds honest. Thank you. But I am actually not forcing you to do anything.

Basically we say "there is a self that does things, that is our 'self'," and you reply with "ok I agree but the real self is deeper, don't you see, and it isn't what you think it is." Well of course it isn't "what we think it is" because we don't care to delve deeper -- we are materialists.

I don't think you can define materialists as those who don't care to delve deeper. Dan Dennett is a materialist. His "multiple drafts" theory, for example, delves into the realm of actual brain processing. Plenty of other researchers who claim to be materialists have done the same.

You could say, perhaps, that you are a materialist but that you are not interested in selfhood below the level of the functioning organism.

In essence you argue with materialists about dualism, but that is retarded, because we aren't dualists. This is evident from your endless attempts to pigeonhole half of us into dualism when we are clearly not dualists.

Considering self and world at the level of the whole organism is dualistic. It's overtly dualistic. You can wriggle your way out of bits of the dualism with some quasi-behaviourist modelling, but basically it's dualist.

As I see it, the situation is pretty much as Dennett called it back in the early 90s. No one wants to regard themselves as a Cartesian Dualist, it's the unhippest term on the block, but actually the vast majority are still mentally modelling selfhood on the basis of the Cartesian model.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

Considering self and world at the level of the whole organism is dualistic.
No.

It's overtly dualistic.
No.

You can wriggle your way out of bits of the dualism with some quasi-behaviourist modelling, but basically it's dualist.
No.

As I see it, the situation is pretty much as Dennett called it back in the early 90s. No one wants to regard themselves as a Cartesian Dualist, it's the unhippest term on the block, but actually the vast majority are still mentally modelling selfhood on the basis of the Cartesian model.
No.

[lupus_in_fabula]

I can foresee any future criticisms I might make of your understanding being dealt with in similar manner! Lucky that I am not "in it to win it."

You could also have interpreted it as an illustration of what happens when we simply choose to change description levels when it serves to keep our perspective intact – a kind of defensive mechanism? Perhaps (from one point of view)! I realize it was still uncalled for and thus I should apologize. Sorry for that! My rhetoric can also be seen as implying you are being silly or naïve by introducing such terms when criticizing a point you have made. For that too I should apologize. Again, sorry for that!

Now, back to the discussion…

However, from another point of view it could serve to illustrate where the first-person perspective can go no further without resulting in negation of a previously discussed phenomenon… but where a third-person perspective actually might be able to continue, although in a modified manner. I submit that even though such continuation is ‘modified’ it could still be quite ‘valuable’ for understanding the self, at least the underpinnings of such phenomenon.

As I see it, it would be problematic if there was no identification. How would you consider it problematic?

It ‘could’ be problematic if ‘self-narrative’ and ‘benign user illusion’ is taken to be the same thing without being aware of the ‘potential’ difference. As I see it, a self-narrative could simply imply a narrative of a central figure in the narrative, whereas ‘user illusion’ seems to include both the narrative and the interpretation of the narrative as a narrative (regardless of content). But you seem to have cleared that up later in your reply.

Watch the duality radar here. Spelling radar too!

That is the limitation I have (speaking English as a third language). I still think you can understand what I write.

About the duality radar… well, I don’t think it is too much of a concern here. It would only come up if one would confuse a way of referencing to something within a given context with the ontological position of dualism. If I watch hockey on TV and the commentator talks about someone passing the puck to someone else, it is fairly ineffectual to talk about ‘no one’ actually passing the puck. When talking about processes in the brain, from a third-person perspective, the same contextual situation should be understood. That is actually the strength of trying to be objective: it can illuminate and thus make it possible to communicate some detailed processes that aren’t directly accessible through introspection. We can assign properties to distinguishable “entities” without actually proposing dualism – it is simply a way to denote.

I think if you examine this notion of a "narrative interpreter" you will agree that it cannot be regarded as a self.

Some philosophers and scientists certainly seem to call it that. Why else would James call it the “I” or Baars conclude the following: “Consciousness enables access to "self" -- executive interpreters, located in part in the frontal cortex.”

It is certainly not the same as the self in any given narrative about self; it can perhaps be seen as one of the systems that make it possible for there to be a self-narrative, including narrative content, in the first place.

It is also perhaps an example of why we even talk about self-referencing systems to begin with: we can observe such “closed” mechanisms (by which we then understand some of them to be best described as self-referential). We talk about them being self-referential because they seem to at least to some degree have semi-autonomous characteristics. Our observations would also lead us to think that such “self-systems” would receive their own flow of sensory input, which empirically seems to be the case.

One problem here... it is not only the presence of a narrative about "I" that creates a sense of self. Once the notion of limited selfhood is created in the brain any thinking narrative will maintain this notional selfhood, for it will constantly appear that there must be a self that is experiencing the thoughts. Furthermore, the thoughts themselves will soon relate almost entirely to this notional self.

Which is also to say that ‘re-inventing the wheel’ every time is ineffective (conversely also called learning)!

I do not necessarily disagree with you here (regarding the notional self). I’m however skeptical about that being all that there is to this issue, i.e. that you simply talk about a tiny portion of what other people perhaps mean by self.

Whilst thinking, and identification with thought, are taking place it will tend to reinforce selfhood, pretty much no matter what the thinking is about. An exception might be a narrative specifically intended to attack the idea of notional selfhood though.

Many thoughts do not relate to the notional self either (for instance when concentrating deeply on a task, the task might engulf “oneself”, so to speak), it is only afterward when thoughts like “I did well (or bad) in that task” when notional self is brought back. On the one hand, there seems to be a connection between intensity of thinking, concentration, experience & doing, and how much of a notional self is perceived at those instances. On the other hand, with extreme relaxation or meditation a similar relationship is also found.

Since the notional self can be attacked by the idea that the notional self is, well, just a notion – I know, it sound trivial on paper but it is much harder to put into practice, well, at least harder to get to the result. One could maybe say that one meme is attacking another meme: the ‘benign user illusion’ is transformed into a ‘malign user illusion’ before it is eventually ignored (as Blackmore would have it).

Well, narratives are narratives. They create self. When I say one can passively observe thinking I am trying to relate that which appears to take place. Who knows?

Well, I submit that there wouldn’t be any kind of such relating unless there is some kind of self-reference that isn’t directly dependent on thinking alone. You could perhaps call that the self as observer?

[Brainache]

I should see a shrink. The voices in my head are saying stuff I don't understand...

[Nick227]

You could also have interpreted it as an illustration of what happens when we simply choose to change description levels when it serves to keep our perspective intact – a kind of defensive mechanism? Perhaps (from one point of view)! I realize it was still uncalled for and thus I should apologize. Sorry for that! My rhetoric can also be seen as implying you are being silly or naïve by introducing such terms when criticizing a point you have made. For that too I should apologize. Again, sorry for that!

OK, thanks.

Now, back to the discussion…

However, from another point of view it could serve to illustrate where the first-person perspective can go no further without resulting in negation of a previously discussed phenomenon… but where a third-person perspective actually might be able to continue, although in a modified manner. I submit that even though such continuation is ‘modified’ it could still be quite ‘valuable’ for understanding the self, at least the underpinnings of such phenomenon.

I mean, the 1st person perspective will inevitably be problematic here, given that in many ways it itself is being challenged. Just what exactly do we experience in the moment? What is there? This question is not easy to accurately answer, though it often seems to be so. If we consider Dennett's Multiple Drafts model, then the act of interrogating the multiple drafts with a probe of this nature - "What's happening" - will produce another draft - a thought narrative. Whether this narrative accurately reflects what's going on is questionable, and certainly when it comes to probing drafts on the specific subject of selfhood it must be very questionable indeed.

So, for me, whilst I appreciate my own 1st person insights I'm also pretty skeptical of them here.

That is the limitation I have (speaking English as a third language). I still think you can understand what I write.

Yes, for sure. I'm impressed that you're this good in your 3rd language. I was thinking of "Gatzzangia" (sic). You spelt his name wrong twice, interestingly in a manner that might make a social psychologist raise eyebrows! (anglo-saxon fear of n-word) Not trying to make something of it, just noticed.


Some philosophers and scientists certainly seem to call it that. Why else would James call it the “I” or Baars conclude the following: “Consciousness enables access to "self" -- executive interpreters, located in part in the frontal cortex.”

I find his terminology here pretty Cartesian. The tendency will inevitably be to seek a "self", whether it be a single neuron or an executive level. I've no doubt that heirachies exist, though my background knowledge is acutely limited here, but if one starts to consider them "selves" then I think a dangerous line is being crossed.

It is certainly not the same as the self in any given narrative about self; it can perhaps be seen as one of the systems that make it possible for there to be a self-narrative, including narrative content, in the first place.

For sure.

It is also perhaps an example of why we even talk about self-referencing systems to begin with: we can observe such “closed” mechanisms (by which we then understand some of them to be best described as self-referential). We talk about them being self-referential because they seem to at least to some degree have semi-autonomous characteristics. Our observations would also lead us to think that such “self-systems” would receive their own flow of sensory input, which empirically seems to be the case.

Yes. They also reinforce our own notion of self-referencing.



I do not necessarily disagree with you here (regarding the notional self). I’m however skeptical about that being all that there is to this issue, i.e. that you simply talk about a tiny portion of what other people perhaps mean by self.

Personally, I figure I'm pretty much on track with my usage of the word. I could be wrong but that's my sense of it. It's the sense that there exists someone who owns a body, has feelings, has opinions, owns a car, has a girlfriend, etc.



Many thoughts do not relate to the notional self either (for instance when concentrating deeply on a task, the task might engulf “oneself”, so to speak), it is only afterward when thoughts like “I did well (or bad) in that task” when notional self is brought back. On the one hand, there seems to be a connection between intensity of thinking, concentration, experience & doing, and how much of a notional self is perceived at those instances. On the other hand, with extreme relaxation or meditation a similar relationship is also found.

Yes, I agree. Either putting oneself totally into the moment or purely observing the actions of the body or mind both tend to reduce the activity of this notional self. It forms judgments later.

However, I don't really agree that this can be construed as "Many thoughts do not relate to the notional self either." I find it rather that the intensity of the focus, or the absence of the focus, block the activity of this self, or identification with this activity.

Since the notional self can be attacked by the idea that the notional self is, well, just a notion – I know, it sound trivial on paper but it is much harder to put into practice, well, at least harder to get to the result. One could maybe say that one meme is attacking another meme: the ‘benign user illusion’ is transformed into a ‘malign user illusion’ before it is eventually ignored (as Blackmore would have it).

Yes. Dennett has his "benign user illusion." Blackmore has it as malign. In considering the BUI and MUI as memes, it would be interesting to see which would most likely survive in the environment of the brain, ruled over by a selfplex inevitably hostile to any type of "user illusion" concept. I note that the memetics meme itself doesn't seem to have progressed so far yet.

It's also interesting to consider some of the Behaviourist models that Merc and others here create to deal with the situation. Memetically the model appears to seek to get inside the selfplex, rather Trojan Horse-like, and then influence it from the inside. It seems to be appealing particularly to those who like to consider themselves materialists yet who don't want to deal with the selfhood issues. I'm not criticising here, merely observing. Blackmore's MUI meme is far more confrontational to the selfplex. You can no doubt guess which this brain is more attracted to!



Well, I submit that there wouldn’t be any kind of such relating unless there is some kind of self-reference that isn’t directly dependent on thinking alone. You could perhaps call that the self as observer?

Can you explain more here?

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

I find his terminology here pretty Cartesian. The tendency will inevitably be to seek a "self", whether it be a single neuron or an executive level. I've no doubt that heirachies exist, though my background knowledge is acutely limited here, but if one starts to consider them "selves" then I think a dangerous line is being crossed.

It seems to be more about distinguishing between structure and function on many different levels, thus also recognizing that the brain is both plastic and modular at the same time. This is probably why it’s such a difficult task to really understand the workings of the brain (or the whole organism). At one level, these semi-autonomous modules which sort of do their “own” things seem to exist. At another level, what they do, seem to have profound consequences for the functioning of the system at a much higher level.

Like with any ecosystem, a kind of self-organization seems to be taking place. When accurately investigating parts of the system, in relation to higher level activities, a clearer picture of how the whole ecosystem functions can be created. In order to do that however, we pretty much have to define a crucial part in such a way that it signifies a relationship to the particular higher level function we only have access to by observation.

Can you explain more here?

The way I see it there’s two general options – although I might make the mistake of simplifying too much when equating ‘thinking’ with ‘inner dialogue’ here.

Option one: people aren’t completely without though when meditating and thus when they say they didn’t have any thoughts (or that there wasn’t thinking) they are simply confabulating in retrospect. That would also make my point moot.

Option two: there actually isn’t thinking going on (at least in terms of inner dialogue), but still there is awareness (you are not unconscious). In order for you then to relate such “experience” or “activity” or whatever you wish to call it, it seems plausible that some kind of registering was taking place. The very fact that you can relate to such an episode retrospectively seems to speak for itself in this case. I.e. the organism somehow has access to such recollection, whatever it may think about the actual experience.

[AWPrime]

Nick, it sounds like you are searching for some kind of 'object' instead of a process.

[rocketdodger]

I don't think you can define materialists as those who don't care to delve deeper. Dan Dennett is a materialist. His "multiple drafts" theory, for example, delves into the realm of actual brain processing. Plenty of other researchers who claim to be materialists have done the same.

I am an A.I. programmer. My primary interest is the realm of actual brain processing.

I am not interested in playing semantic games regarding the reality of "self." That is what I mean when I say "we don't care to delve deeper." I expect Dennet would agree.

You could say, perhaps, that you are a materialist but that you are not interested in selfhood below the level of the functioning organism.

Correct. What I am interested in is the material processes that cause behavior in an organism. That may or may not fit someones notion of "selfhood" -- and I don't care one way or the either. I expect Dennet would agree, except for the fact that such an attitude might impact sales of his books.

Considering self and world at the level of the whole organism is dualistic. It's overtly dualistic. You can wriggle your way out of bits of the dualism with some quasi-behaviourist modelling, but basically it's dualist.

As I see it, the situation is pretty much as Dennett called it back in the early 90s. No one wants to regard themselves as a Cartesian Dualist, it's the unhippest term on the block, but actually the vast majority are still mentally modelling selfhood on the basis of the Cartesian model.


See? You are doing exactly what I said you are doing.

I don't care to play this game anymore. I am an A.I. programmer who views himself as nothing but an advanced biological robot, which he could probably reprogram if he had the tools. If that is dualist, then I am a dualist, and I suspect so are a great many others, Dennet included.

[Wowbagger]

I am talking about a neuron as the unit.

Unless I have missed out on some major discoveries, I don't believe there is just a trend that all thought occurs on a substrate of neurons, and that one neuron is easily distinguishable from its neighbors.
Do you have any idea just how much interpolation goes into those brain activity maps, and into statements such as "this type of thinking generally occurs in this portion of the brain"? There is no exact area. There is a lot of overlap, between different people, and even within the same person, at different times.

ETA: The neuron does not do anything, on its own. Thinking is the emergent behavior of all of them. Just like a single virtual neuron does not do anything, in a neural net algorithm.

[rocketdodger]

Do you have any idea just how much interpolation goes into those brain activity maps, and into statements such as "this type of thinking generally occurs in this portion of the brain"? There is no exact area. There is a lot of overlap, between different people, and even within the same person, at different times.

ETA: The neuron does not do anything, on its own. Thinking is the emergent behavior of all of them. Just like a single virtual neuron does not do anything, in a neural net algorithm.

Ok let me spell it out for you in plain english

1) You said that in CS people break complex processes down into easily delineable functional subunits.

2) You claimed biological organisms may have no need to do so.

3) I pointed out that thought occurs on a substrate of neurons, which are easily delineable functional subunits, and which means yes, biological organisms do need to do so.

This implies both A) we should be able to model the brain using CS methods and B) whether you know it or not, your brain breaks problems down into some kind of subunit, because at the end of the day the whole thing is a bunch of neurons and the amount of processing a single neuron can do is very limited compared to an entire human thought.

[Nick227]

I am an A.I. programmer. My primary interest is the realm of actual brain processing.

I am not interested in playing semantic games regarding the reality of "self." That is what I mean when I say "we don't care to delve deeper." I expect Dennet would agree.

Correct. What I am interested in is the material processes that cause behavior in an organism. That may or may not fit someones notion of "selfhood" -- and I don't care one way or the either. I expect Dennet would agree, except for the fact that such an attitude might impact sales of his books.

I would like to suggest something, RD. If you don't wish to explore selfhood beneath the level of the independent functioning organism, then don't do so. Just don't do it. There's no need imo to try and enlist the perspectives of other forum members or well-known philosophers to try and bolster up your position.

You seem to me to be constantly trying to reinforce your own stance through reference to others and it just comes across to me that you are yourself very torn here. Why not just say that, if it's the case? In the above post you refer to Dan Dennett twice, once to claim that he would no doubt back up your position, something I rather doubt though you never know, a second time to claim that he only writes about these things to make money. I mean, is this really how you want to come across?

Nick

[Nick227]

It seems to be more about distinguishing between structure and function on many different levels, thus also recognizing that the brain is both plastic and modular at the same time. This is probably why it’s such a difficult task to really understand the workings of the brain (or the whole organism). At one level, these semi-autonomous modules which sort of do their “own” things seem to exist. At another level, what they do, seem to have profound consequences for the functioning of the system at a much higher level.

Like with any ecosystem, a kind of self-organization seems to be taking place. When accurately investigating parts of the system, in relation to higher level activities, a clearer picture of how the whole ecosystem functions can be created. In order to do that however, we pretty much have to define a crucial part in such a way that it signifies a relationship to the particular higher level function we only have access to by observation.

Yes, I find this so. It is thus important, as I mentioned, that one does not cross lines and start to regard certain areas of the brain as relating specifically to selfhood.



The way I see it there’s two general options – although I might make the mistake of simplifying too much when equating ‘thinking’ with ‘inner dialogue’ here.

Option one: people aren’t completely without though when meditating and thus when they say they didn’t have any thoughts (or that there wasn’t thinking) they are simply confabulating in retrospect. That would also make my point moot.

Option two: there actually isn’t thinking going on (at least in terms of inner dialogue), but still there is awareness (you are not unconscious).

Might it perhaps be easier to say that there is phenomenology?

In order for you then to relate such “experience” or “activity” or whatever you wish to call it, it seems plausible that some kind of registering was taking place. The very fact that you can relate to such an episode retrospectively seems to speak for itself in this case. I.e. the organism somehow has access to such recollection, whatever it may think about the actual experience.

Memories have been laid down, or narratives created during the act are recalled, perhaps.

I think that in actuality it is more that diminished number of thoughts or diminished identification with thought starts to take place, and thus the traditional perspective - that of being someone who experiences things - begins to become challenged in some narratives.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

You seem to me to be constantly trying to reinforce your own stance through reference to others and it just comes across to me that you are yourself very torn here. Why not just say that, if it's the case? In the above post you refer to Dan Dennett twice, once to claim that he would no doubt back up your position, something I rather doubt though you never know, a second time to claim that he only writes about these things to make money. I mean, is this really how you want to come across?
Nick: It's not RD. It's you.

[lupus_in_fabula]

Yes, I find this so. It is thus important, as I mentioned, that one does not cross lines and start to regard certain areas of the brain as relating specifically to selfhood.

That would be a case where evidence should ultimately lead the way. It is thus possible to observe some functions through elimination: Hypothetically, our first observation might suggest that without certain modular functions the subject does not show/experience common characteristics of, let's say, personal selfhood. Hence as a working assumption pending further research, we would be able to say that some specific areas in the brain seem to be more important for this particular function. We still wouldn't be able to say that the self is seated in that particular area, but we should be able to somehow estimate the relative importance of that area for selfhood.

What you see as danger here is something that could also be seen as limitation. Generally it is not a good idea to argue against empirical evidence from a philosophical point of view. If we start to make rules for what is allowed and what is not – we might miss something crucial. If we assume our conclusions – for instance that selfhood is 'only' generated by thinking – then we soon find ourself on a slippery slope towards dogmatism. We wouldn not be able to look elsewhere or challenge current assumptions even though we would know that those we currently have are merely provisional.

One potential danger I see here is that a personal belief system or doctrine about selfhood could be challenged. Science should however not care.

Might it perhaps be easier to say that there is phenomenology? Perhaps, but that is also quite a broad category. Ideally we would like to narrow it down rather than make it broader. It is, after all, "phenomenology" that we are trying to explain in a more detailed and systematic way.

Memories have been laid down, or narratives created during the act are recalled, perhaps.

I think that in actuality it is more that diminished number of thoughts or diminished identification with thought starts to take place, and thus the traditional perspective - that of being someone who experiences things - begins to become challenged in some narratives.Maybe so? But yet again, in that case it is the process of "diminished identification" that should be explained in a more detailed and systematic way.

I think it is plausible to think that some kind of meta-representation is involved (regarding thinking and identification), thus it seems logical to look for different kinds of neural patterns when the subject is "normal" vis-a-vis in "dissociative" mode. I think some research has been done with Tibetan monks where there seemed to be fluctuation in blood flow to certain brain regions between meditation and normal wakefulness.

[Nick227]

That would be a case where evidence should ultimately lead the way. It is thus possible to observe some functions through elimination: Hypothetically, our first observation might suggest that without certain modular functions the subject does not show/experience common characteristics of, let's say, personal selfhood. Hence as a working assumption pending further research, we would be able to say that some specific areas in the brain seem to be more important for this particular function. We still wouldn't be able to say that the self is seated in that particular area, but we should be able to somehow estimate the relative importance of that area for selfhood.

What you see as danger here is something that could also be seen as limitation. Generally it is not a good idea to argue against empirical evidence from a philosophical point of view. If we start to make rules for what is allowed and what is not – we might miss something crucial. If we assume our conclusions – for instance that selfhood is 'only' generated by thinking – then we soon find ourself on a slippery slope towards dogmatism. We wouldn not be able to look elsewhere or challenge current assumptions even though we would know that those we currently have are merely provisional.

One potential danger I see here is that a personal belief system or doctrine about selfhood could be challenged. Science should however not care.

I should explain what I meant better. As already discussed, there are a variety of neurological processes known to be implicated in selfhood. But here we're discussing that relating from thinking - the "I" aspect. My knowledge of these things is not great but it seems to me that, even if thinking and the beliefs generated by thinking could be tracked to specific regions of the brain, this still wouldn't give us reason to really consider "selfhood" or the "I" to be located in this region, at least not without considerable proviso. My position is not so much dogmatic, but rather making sure that one doesn't return to Cartesian logic without awareness that one is doing so.

Perhaps, but that is also quite a broad category. Ideally we would like to narrow it down rather than make it broader. It is, after all, "phenomenology" that we are trying to explain in a more detailed and systematic way.

I have problems with terms like "awareness" being used in this context. It always seems to me safer to relate that which is materially present, less unwanted dualities creep in.

Maybe so? But yet again, in that case it is the process of "diminished identification" that should be explained in a more detailed and systematic way.

I would love to see researchers get into identification. Blackmore, who I personally consider a considerable luminary, writes of how thoughts create selfhood, but I've not seen her look at the notion that there can be an agency mediating action upon thought.

I don't know quite how well it sits with meme theory, but I think it's ok. I haven't seen anyone yet attempt to deal with the psychological aspects of meme theory. Are there emotion-related underpinnings to the organism's choice of which meme to house? Surely there must be.



I think it is plausible to think that some kind of meta-representation is involved (regarding thinking and identification), thus it seems logical to look for different kinds of neural patterns when the subject is "normal" vis-a-vis in "dissociative" mode. I think some research has been done with Tibetan monks where there seemed to be fluctuation in blood flow to certain brain regions between meditation and normal wakefulness.

Yes, I've read of these sorts of things. But personally, I figure we're looking for a dopamine-mediated process here. There's that dopamine kick when selfhood is constructed by the brain. It feels good to identify. There's that quasi-addictive urge to pursue just that thought, or line of reasoning, against more logical alternatives.

I suspect that problems come up here because thinking and emotions are two of the areas neurologists know least about.

Nick

[articulett]

I think materialism and evolution are the only framework regarding consciousness and life that have yielded and continue to yield an abundance of useful, deeper, and verifiable information and medical insight. I think all woo must spin their wheels obfuscating understanding of evolution and materialism or to try to prove them false so that they can continue to believe in their own assorted unevidenced contrary theories that they feel so special and wise for "believing in" without ever having to subject it to the scrutiny they give the scientific paradigm which yields actual results.

Nick's argument is the same as Undercover Elephant's was...

Legs give rise to running... Legs are responsible for the jog around the park I took. "Jogs" and "running" (gerund) are non material things (nouns) that rely on material (physical) things. So is music, movement, time, patterns, laps, and flames that are blown out. I am not a dualist because I believe in these non-material "things"... in the same way I am not a secret dualist to say that brains give rise to consciousness the way legs give rise to "running". Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains... there is no evidence that consciousness of any sort can exist absent a material brain. I presume that most materialists follow this line of thinking... including Dennett, Ramachandran, Blackmore, and most of those on the forefront of evolution and/or cognitive research. As much as some would like to think this is an incoherent philosophy, I presume their ignorance, obfuscation, and semantic confusion has more to do with keeping their own incoherent alternative beliefs "alive" in their "consciousness". It reminds me very much of the creationist need to not understand how natural selection gives rise to the appearance of designe. If we (materialists) are right, then their unfalsifiable alternative is in jeopardy and this scares them. They have an emotional "need" for their believe in their "belief".

[thesyntaxera]

Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains... there is no evidence that consciousness of any sort can exist absent a material brain. I presume that most materialists follow this line of thinking... including Dennett, Ramachandran, Blackmore, and most of those on the forefront of evolution and/or cognitive research.

Exactly. Consciousness arises from the brain, that much is obvious. My interpretation of what is being discussed is that the problem is the: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binding_problem

If the self is derived from consciousness, and consciousness is derived from the collected sensory information funneled together to create a continuous experience, then what is self ultimately? Especially if consciousness is the non-material result of the brain functioning...

It seems kind of a waste to only view self as being the mechanisms of the brain and body when there is no way to prove that an AI modeled consciousness is in anyway similar to how our brains actually function. Even if you can model every neuron it's not going to tell you what your modeled brain is thinking. It's only going to show you a modeled brain.

Unless one is in possession of the knowledge of how our brains collect and combine information to create conscious experience, arguing that it's all able to be modeled, and that the self is merely the collection of biomechanical components appears on the surface to be some what naive.

That is not to say that the potential for creating a thinking AI is impossible or that it won't give us insight into our own thinking nature. It's just that right now, AI isn't representative of a whole lot when it comes to the complexity of our own brains, so we don't know, and we can't argue very well what we don't know.

[thesyntaxera]

It reminds me very much of the creationist need to not understand how natural selection gives rise to the appearance of designe. If we (materialists) are right, then their unfalsifiable alternative is in jeopardy and this scares them. They have an emotional "need" for their believe in their "belief".

Is there any topic you can't some how contort into a discussion about creationists, religionists, and "believers" in general versus the almighty materialists? I think your post might indicate an emotional "need" for self validation more so than anything relevant to this discussion.

[Nick227]

Legs give rise to running... Legs are responsible for the jog around the park I took. "Jogs" and "running" (gerund) are non material things (nouns) that rely on material (physical) things. So is music, movement, time, patterns, laps, and flames that are blown out. I am not a dualist because I believe in these non-material "things"... in the same way I am not a secret dualist to say that brains give rise to consciousness the way legs give rise to "running". Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains... there is no evidence that consciousness of any sort can exist absent a material brain. I presume that most materialists follow this line of thinking... including Dennett, Ramachandran, Blackmore, and most of those on the forefront of evolution and/or cognitive research. As much as some would like to think this is an incoherent philosophy, I presume their ignorance, obfuscation, and semantic confusion has more to do with keeping their own incoherent alternative beliefs "alive" in their "consciousness". It reminds me very much of the creationist need to not understand how natural selection gives rise to the appearance of designe. If we (materialists) are right, then their unfalsifiable alternative is in jeopardy and this scares them. They have an emotional "need" for their believe in their "belief".

Well, Ramachandran describes himself as "neutral" in the materialist/idealist debate and I can't see Dennett or Blackmore agreeing with your statement "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains" as it is already assuming duality. No one actually owns the brain and no one interprets. Yet another Cartesian materialist! Hell, there's a lot of them on this forum. We need Samuel L Jackson down here!

ETA; Let's be honest, Articulett. You like to label yourself a "materialist" because you want to identify with a group that you perceive as being able to take a stand against parapsychology, homeopathy, alchemy, and most of all, Tom Cruise and Scientology. That's fair enough. I can relate to that. But the problem is that you don't actually understand materialism. Read Blackmore. She's into Anatta and Zen. She considers your apparent notion of self as just a parasitic memeplex. You can't escape Scientology just by identifying with a group. It doesn't work like that.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

I can't see Dennett or Blackmore agreeing with your statement "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains" as it is already assuming duality.

I can't see you agreeing with your own statement as it is already assuming duality.

You shouldn't communicate using personal pronouns unless you are a dualist, Nick. Duh.

[articulett]

Consciousness Explained (published 1991) is a book by the American philosopher Daniel Dennett which offers an account of how consciousness arises from interaction of physical and cognitive processes in the brain.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained

There are "things" like consciousness and music and wifi and a "jog in the park" that arise from material processes that are not, themselves "material"-- but this does not make them "dualistic" as much as woo want to pretend that it does. It's just a silly attempt to make it so that materialism doesn't make sense to them so that their unevidenced alternative belief seems more true.

[Dancing David]

Wow, I am glad i have stayed away, this has gotten worse, in terms of Nick227's insistence on thier POV.

The only self that makes sense in the one identified as a unique organic body. (Or inorganic when and if such things exist.)

But I still don't see where materialism and science are obviating science.

[AWPrime]

But the problem is that you don't actually understand materialism. No, that is your problem. You can't seem to grasp that a process that depends on material things (neurons, etc) doesn't suggest duality.
Heck, the fact that brain damage affects the mind/self clearly destroys dualism. In the end dualism is a, outdated, simplistic notion that can't hope to explain causal interaction.


A good example would be flowing water. In which one can compare the mind with flow (process) and the brain with water (material).

[Dancing David]

If the self is derived from consciousness, and consciousness is derived from the collected sensory information funneled together to create a continuous experience, then what is self ultimately? Especially if consciousness is the non-material result of the brain functioning...

The only coherent defintion of self in the unique physical body based upon the contingent history of that ephemeral body.


It seems kind of a waste to only view self as being the mechanisms of the brain and body when there is no way to prove that an AI modeled consciousness is in anyway similar to how our brains actually function. Even if you can model every neuron it's not going to tell you what your modeled brain is thinking. It's only going to show you a modeled brain.

Which just begs the question:

What point are you trying to make here.

The processes that the brain engages in are not deliniated but a base understanding is occuring.

Where are you headed here?

Unless one is in possession of the knowledge of how our brains collect and combine information to create conscious experience, arguing that it's all able to be modeled, and that the self is merely the collection of biomechanical components appears on the surface to be some what naive.

Oh really.

Do we have to justify models for science to have predicitive value.

Does what you say apply to fusion in stars?
Plate tectonics?
Ion channles in semi-permeable membrances of organic cells?

Or do you just reserve this for an undefined term, consciousness?


That is not to say that the potential for creating a thinking AI is impossible or that it won't give us insight into our own thinking nature. It's just that right now, AI isn't representative of a whole lot when it comes to the complexity of our own brains, so we don't know, and we can't argue very well what we don't know.

Um, what makes you think that we don't know, the mechanism of perception is getting to be deliniated, and that is the main process other than thinking and memory that people conflate with consciousness.

I will ask, what evidence is there that consciousness is not associated with an organic brain?

[Dancing David]

No, that is your problem. You can't seem to grasp that a process that depends on material things (neurons, etc) doesn't suggest duality.
Heck, the fact that brain damage affects the mind/self clearly destroys dualism. In the end dualism is a, outdated, simplistic notion that can't hope to explain causal interaction.


A good example would be flowing water. In which one can compare the mind with flow (process) and the brain with water (material).


Nick227 has a host of assumptions, they do not understand that the outcome of idealism and materialism is exactly the same. But then they believe that there is some ultimate perception beyond self and that this improves life functioning, not that they have any data or evidence to support it.

[Nick227]

There are "things" like consciousness and music and wifi and a "jog in the park" that arise from material processes that are not, themselves "material"-- but this does not make them "dualistic" as much as woo want to pretend that it does. It's just a silly attempt to make it so that materialism doesn't make sense to them so that their unevidenced alternative belief seems more true.

The duality is created by the notion that anyone is experiencing these things, Articulett.

When you wrote "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains" you are assuming that there is a "you" that is interpreting and an "our" who's brain it is. These are dualistic constructs, inconsistent imo with materialism.

Nick

[Nick227]

No, that is your problem. You can't seem to grasp that a process that depends on material things (neurons, etc) doesn't suggest duality.

That is not the point. That consciousness may be said to be brain activity or that thoughts emerge from neural substrate is not dualistic. I have not suggested otherwise. The dualism comes when you consider that there exists someone who is interpreting these things, or experiencing these things.

Articulett is doing what generations of researchers have done. She defeats dualism on one level only to reconstruct it on another. If you read Dennett (1991) you will see that throughout the book he labels this activity as Cartesian Materialism.

It's nearly two decades that Dennett has been banging on about these things. His "multiple drafts" model is widely regarded now, but still people who call themselves "materialists" fall into the Cartesian trap. They still look for a "place where it all comes together in the brain" or some lone neuron that is observing. Why is this? The answer is straightforward. It is because the intuitive model of self is so deeply embedded in the human brain that it is very difficult to overcome. It doesn't seem to matter if you have a Ph.D or have studied consciousness for years. The same mistake is made over and over even though Dennett and Blackmore have been calling it for nigh on 2 decades. It still goes on.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

ETA; Let's be honest, Articulett. You like to label yourself a "materialist" because you want to identify with a group that you perceive as being able to take a stand against parapsychology, homeopathy, alchemy, and most of all, Tom Cruise and Scientology.
What is it with this strange fetish for ascribing discreditable motives to people who disagree with you?

Have you ever considered, even for a moment, that the real reason people disagree with you is not that they want to fit in, stand out, or avoid the issue, but rather that you are talking a load of old cobblers?

[PixyMisa]

The duality is created by the notion that anyone is experiencing these things, Articulett.
Nope.

Experience is just information processing, a perfectly commonplace material process.

When you wrote "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains" you are assuming that there is a "you" that is interpreting and an "our" who's brain it is.
Obviously.

These are dualistic constructs
Nope.

inconsistent imo with materialism.
And you know what they say about opinions.

[PixyMisa]

That is not the point. That consciousness may be said to be brain activity or that thoughts emerge from neural substrate is not dualistic. I have not suggested otherwise. The dualism comes when you consider that there exists someone who is interpreting these things, or experiencing these things.
Nope.

The brain activity is the someone.

Articulett is doing what generations of researchers have done. She defeats dualism on one level only to reconstruct it on another.
Nope.

If you read Dennett (1991) you will see that throughout the book he labels this activity as Cartesian Materialism.
Nope.

It's nearly two decades that Dennett has been banging on about these things.
Two decades and you still haven't got it right.

His "multiple drafts" model is widely regarded now, but still people who call themselves "materialists" fall into the Cartesian trap.
Nope.

They still look for a "place where it all comes together in the brain" or some lone neuron that is observing.
Nope.

Why is this?
You tell me. It's your imagination.

The answer is straightforward.
Do tell.

It is because the intuitive model of self is so deeply embedded in the human brain that it is very difficult to overcome.
Nope.

It doesn't seem to matter if you have a Ph.D or have studied consciousness for years. The same mistake is made over and over even though Dennett and Blackmore have been calling it for nigh on 2 decades. It still goes on.
Nope.

What's more, Dennett's Cartesian Materialism is materialist, so even if people were clinging to it, they would still be materialists. Dennett's point is that it is a materialist explanation for consciousness that we know to be false by material evidence. Except for those aspects of Cartesian Materialism that have been shown to be true by material evidence.

Dualism enters into it only in the twisty little passages of your mind, Nick.

Nick
Well, you got that right.

[AWPrime]

That is not the point. That consciousness may be said to be brain activity or that thoughts emerge from neural substrate is not dualistic. I have not suggested otherwise. The dualism comes when you consider that there exists someone who is interpreting these things, or experiencing these things.Only if you give 'someone' a supernatural meaning/quality. You're basically shooting yourself in the foot.


It's nearly two decades that Dennett has been banging on about these things. His "multiple drafts" model is widely regarded now, but still people who call themselves "materialists" fall into the Cartesian trap. They still look for a "place where it all comes together in the brain" or some lone neuron that is observing. Why is this?It isn't, for that would be a strawman. If you take my water flow example its not some area or specific molecules that define the flow, its the whole working together in that process.

[lupus_in_fabula]

The duality is created by the notion that anyone is experiencing these things, Articulett.
Yes, a duality is created from a first-person perspective, there's no denying that and I don't think anyone here is in such denial. That is however not a statement of dualism in terms of ontology – you should really try to keep these two completely different issues separate here.

Nick, what I have constantly tried to point out is that at that exact point where people here say that "… is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains", it signifies a change to a third-person perspective rather than continuing towards an ontological position. Such a change is necessary because that exact point also signifies the end of the road for explaining this phenomenon through ones own first-person perspective.

Finally, this is exactly why the change of perspective is followed by a similar change in definition for the "self": It does no longer only signify the self as in 'sens' of self or what you call 'notional' self, but rather it signifies the particular system where those experiential processes are manifested.

When you wrote "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains" you are assuming that there is a "you" that is interpreting and an "our" who's brain it is. These are dualistic constructs, inconsistent imo with materialism. If you read what I just tried to explain, then that is not necessarily the case at all, not even close. One must simply notice when an elementary change in perspective has occurred, even though normal language use continues unhindered and unchanged.

[Nick227]

Nick, what I have constantly tried to point out is that at that exact point where people here say that "… is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains", it signifies a change to a third-person perspective rather than continuing towards an ontological position. Such a change is necessary because that exact point also signifies the end of the road for explaining this phenomenon through ones own first-person perspective.

Yes. But why then use terminology that suggests a perspective so dripping in duality....if this not what you mean? There is absolutely no need for it here.

Consider Articulett's statement "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains." I submit that this is just dualistic nonsense. No one is interpreting, and the brain does not belong to anyone. Furthermore, there's not even an underlying truism that could be being misconstrued through misuse or misinterpretation of the first person perspective. The statement is simply dualistic nonsense. Show me one redeeming feature. Retranslate it into the 3rd person perspective. Now look...it's still bollocks.

Or defend away, up to you. I just call it like it is.

Nick

[Nick227]

What is it with this strange fetish for ascribing discreditable motives to people who disagree with you?

Not descreditable. I just put out my judgments. If the people referred to feel maligned they should speak up. It's not healthy to internalise too many judgments. You end up believing in things like subjectivity. Better to check things out direct. Ask a behaviourist.

Nick

[Nick227]

Only if you give 'someone' a supernatural meaning/quality. You're basically shooting yourself in the foot.

No. Once you have "an observer" or "an experiencer", you have duality.


It isn't, for that would be a strawman. If you take my water flow example its not some area or specific molecules that define the flow, its the whole working together in that process.

Look, I don't need some pseudo-holistic blather to appease the reality that "I" is the result of autonomous narrative construction. Radical behaviourism neither. I can do holism. I can do behaviourism. I can also just look and call it like it is. I prefer the latter.

Nick

[AkuManiMani]

Meh...is it just me or do just about all philosophical debates come down to an issue of semantics?

It appears that our basic language structure is simply ill equipped to adequately deal w/ certain concepts -- particularly such a slippery one like agency/consciousness.

[lupus_in_fabula]

Yes. But why then use terminology that suggests a perspective so dripping in duality....if this not what you mean? There is absolutely no need for it here.
I don't think there's a need to be on the constant watch for dualism because it's nowhere near an ontological attribution. It's quite normal language use.

Consider Articulett's statement "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains." I submit that this is just dualistic nonsense. No one is interpreting, and the brain does not belong to anyone. Furthermore, there's not even an underlying truism that could be being misconstrued through misuse or misinterpretation of the first person perspective. The statement is simply dualistic nonsense. Show me one redeeming feature. Retranslate it into the 3rd person perspective. Now look...it's still bollocks. To me it simply means that there is a first-person interpretation going on and it is happening in quite homologous systems, thus 'our' interpretation and 'our' brains. Simple as that!

The brain simply belongs to the distinguishable system we denote to... or which shows such characteristics that it can be interpreted as showing brain like features as a structural part of the whole systemic function. The latter explanation just looks rather silly. :D

[AkuManiMani]

That is not the point. That consciousness may be said to be brain activity or that thoughts emerge from neural substrate is not dualistic. I have not suggested otherwise. The dualism comes when you consider that there exists someone who is interpreting these things, or experiencing these things.

Only if you give 'someone' a supernatural meaning/quality. You're basically shooting yourself in the foot.

There's no need to attribute a "supernatural" quality anything in order to invoke dualism. Its an inevitable consequence of the subject-object structure of language.

[thesyntaxera]

The only coherent defintion of self in the unique physical body based upon the contingent history of that ephemeral body.

If that is the only definition that works for you then that is fine with me. I would call that my body, and my personality more a representation of my "self".

Does a severely brain damaged person have a sense of self? Often not.


Which just begs the question:

What point are you trying to make here.

The processes that the brain engages in are not deliniated but a base understanding is occuring.

I know for a fact there is, as you do. I also know it's is not solely being modeled on AI and what can be achieved with that....that is my point. It's not a fully representative method of modeling. Assuming one could create a complete, thinking, virtual brain it would tell us little because we could not actually see how it thinks, hear it's thoughts, or know how it perceives it's self.

Oh really.

Do we have to justify models for science to have predicitive value.

If one is going to argue in favor of such things, then I would say yes, you should have some justification for doing so. Otherwise it's intellectual wankery, and a waste of time. Show me a useful scientific model that doesn't have some justification behind it.

Or do you just reserve this for an undefined term, consciousness?

No, but thanks for asking.


Um, what makes you think that we don't know, the mechanism of perception is getting to be deliniated, and that is the main process other than thinking and memory that people conflate with consciousness.

It is getting delineated...yet the riddle is still mostly unsolved. Big surprise. So what is your point? That we still don't know? Didn't I say that to begin with. There is no answer to the binding problem as yet, and perhaps AI research will reveal something. I have my doubts. Feel free to change my mind with some evidence.

I will ask, what evidence is there that consciousness is not associated with an organic brain?

You can ask. I'm not arguing that, but if you want an answer the best one I can think of is the hypothetical potential that we will fully model a human brain that is conscious. It will lack anything organic most likely.

What I am arguing is that studying consciousness is like looking at an audio waveform on a computer. You can see it, but you can't hear it. You know that it might contain the most beautiful of songs, but until you figure out a way to perceive it directly it will remain just a collection of bits on a spinning magnetic disk.

What you are telling me is that the consciousness or "song" is the bits on a spinning magnetic disk only.

What I am telling you is that it is the song you can't hear, and that it emerges from the bits on the disk, thus it is immaterial.

Or something to that effect.

[rocketdodger]

Retranslate it into the 3rd person perspective.

"Consciousness is the behavior of a system S that is caused by the pattern of neuronal firing in system S."

Now look...it's still bollocks.

According to who? You? There is no "you." That implies an observer. For something to be bollocks, there must be an observer, and that is dripping with dualism.

[thesyntaxera]

Meh...is it just me or do just about all philosophical debates come down to an issue of semantics?

It appears that our basic language structure is simply ill equipped to adequately deal w/ certain concepts -- particularly such a slippery one like agency/consciousness.

Dude, where have you been all this time? Some one needed to say that like 5 pages ago.

[rocketdodger]

Meh...is it just me or do just about all philosophical debates come down to an issue of semantics?

It appears that our basic language structure is simply ill equipped to adequately deal w/ certain concepts -- particularly such a slippery one like agency/consciousness.

Or that certain individuals are simply ill equipped to adequately use our basic language structure to deal with certain concepts.

Which seems a much more likely candidate for this thread, given that we have a single individual insisting that a great number of others, who have demonstrated their intelligence time and time again in other threads, just don't understand their own words

[Nick227]

"Consciousness is the behavior of a system S that is caused by the pattern of neuronal firing in system S."

To me that's a long way away from the original statement...


"Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains."

I think it's good to pull this stuff up. Maybe Articulett learns something at this juncture. What's wrong with that?

Nick

[Nick227]

Which seems a much more likely candidate for this thread, given that we have a single individual insisting that a great number of others, who have demonstrated their intelligence time and time again in other threads, just don't understand their own words

And making such a comment once again infers to me that actually you do not know. To me you're just following group behaviour, RD. "We've all demonstrated our intelligence to each other, we must know." Group behaviour, pragmatism, balance of probabilities - it's BS.

Nick

[thesyntaxera]

And making such a comment once again infers to me that actually you do not know. To me you're just following group behaviour, RD. "We've all demonstrated our intelligence to each other, we must know." Group behaviour, pragmatism, balance of probabilities - it's BS.

Nick

Well, as we all know Nick, consensus reality is the real one, right? Maybe if we get enough people here to validate your intelligence others might take into consideration what you are saying?

[AWPrime]

No. Once you have "an observer" or "an experiencer", you have duality.Actually you're haven't presented any good argument for that.


Look, I don't need some pseudo-holistic blather to appease the reality that "I" is the result of autonomous narrative construction. Radical behaviorism neither. I can do holism. I can do behaviorism. I can also just look and call it like it is. I prefer the latter.But you're not doing that. You merely keep insisting on duality.

[rocketdodger]

Group behaviour, pragmatism, balance of probabilities - it's BS.

Yes, it is "BS."

Except when it leads to things like computers and the internet, which you in turn can use to post foolish theories about how it is "BS."

Have you tried simply holding your breath until you pass out? It seems like that is the effect you are going for here.

[articulett]

The woo always hide their woo behind semantics and obfuscations, but the rest of the scientific community seems to understand each other just fine with the words we have.

I understand most everyone quite well-- including Dennett, Dawkins, Pinker, Ramachandran, and assorted neurologists and cognitive psychologists who write on this very topic. I can't make sense of Nick227, and it doesn't look like anyone really is. It seems to me that he's imagining flaws in materialism that aren't there-- flaws he's created by his semantic games. He uses so many words, but he doesn't communicate anything at all.

I do appreciate those who came to my defense, but I keep the woo on ignore... it just starts to feel like a commercial of nothingness to me after a while--not a dialogue. When I attempt conversation with a woo, I feel like they are just using me as a sounding board to spin their favorite delusion in their head and convince themselves that they are making sense to someone other than themselves.

I think they post on these forums because it makes them think that their ideas have withstood criticism of the skeptics... but most of the time the skeptics can't even pin down what the hell their point is, much less what evidence they have for their claims (other than the supposed "flaws" in the current scientific paradigm).

[articulett]

I don't think scientists are having the problem you seem to have or imagine people having with materialism... your problem seem more to be one of semantics, Nick227--

http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSN1130147020080911

Julie Steenhuysen

CHICAGO (Reuters) - Scientists who tricked monkeys by swapping images of sailboats for teacups have figured out how the brain learns to recognize objects, a finding that could lead to robots that "see."

"One of the central questions of how the brain recognizes objects and faces is that you never essentially see the same image twice," said James DiCarlo, an associate professor of neuroscience at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

He said humans have no trouble recognizing a dog, regardless of whether it is running, lying down, wagging its tail or begging for food.

"The pattern of light in your eyes is never the same when you view your wife or your dog, yet you can still recognize that as the person or creature that you love," said DiCarlo, whose research appears on Thursday in the journal Science.

Scientists think people do it by gathering a host of different snapshots of the same object over a short period of time.

"Even though we don't see the same images twice, nearby images in time tend to be images of the same object," DiCarlo said in a telephone interview.

To test this idea, DiCarlo set up an experiment on two monkeys in which the scientists tried to trick them into unlearning their assumptions about an object.

The researchers attached electrodes to the parts of the brain responsible for recognizing objects. They specifically were testing changes in neurons that recognize images of a sailboat.

The monkeys were given treats if they looked at a video screen that contained several different pictures of a sailboat. Occasionally, when they looked away, the researchers switched one of the sailboat pictures for an image of a teacup, but only in one spot.

Eventually, some of the neurons in the monkeys' brains responsible for sailboat images responded to a teacup instead.

DiCarlo said the study in monkeys follows a similar experiment in humans and suggests this is likely how people learn to categorize and recognize objects they see.

He said the finding opens a window into the visual learning system and will help researchers as they attempt to build computers with vision-like systems.

"There's a lot of tasks that are essentially mindless for humans, but that only humans can do," DiCarlo said, such as inspecting things on assembly lines, searching for explosive devices and looking at radiology images.

I think we can all understand this article just fine. We understand that the word "recognize" is a cognitive process arising from a material brain...

I don't see how whatever it is that you believe differently helps us understand what is going on any more than the current model, and I think we all understand this is study based on the material model. If you don't or see an inconsistency then it appears to only be in your head.

[Dancing David]

If that is the only definition that works for you then that is fine with me. I would call that my body, and my personality more a representation of my "self".

Does a severely brain damaged person have a sense of self? Often not.

Whichc is where the defintion of a 'self' solely as a process breaks down. People with dementia, alzheimers and brain trauma are still 'selfs', but they often lack a crucial step in the processes. Which is why the unique body (with attendant processes) is the only coherent defintion, so far.



I know for a fact there is, as you do. I also know it's is not solely being modeled on AI and what can be achieved with that....that is my point. It's not a fully representative method of modeling. Assuming one could create a complete, thinking, virtual brain it would tell us little because we could not actually see how it thinks, hear it's thoughts, or know how it perceives it's self.

Well to some extent yes but to other extents no, the processes that are commonly called consciousness are studied as we speak.
And that seems to be mainly a phenomenalogical arguement to me, we can't see the fusion at the core of stars either, but it seems to be likely.

We can appreaciate much of, predict the outcome of some, the processes labels as consciousness.




If one is going to argue in favor of such things, then I would say yes, you should have some justification for doing so. Otherwise it's intellectual wankery, and a waste of time. Show me a useful scientific model that doesn't have some justification behind it.

As I have stated before, science in the construct of approximate models, to think you have described the actual process would be a mistake.




No, but thanks for asking.



It is getting delineated...yet the riddle is still mostly unsolved.

I think not, if you would please explain the nature of this riddle, so far it usually resolves down to some semantics of language and not a reall riddle.

What do you think is happening in 'cosciousness' that is a riddle, I will try to find relevant research.

Big surprise. So what is your point? That we still don't know? Didn't I say that to begin with. There is no answer to the binding problem as yet, and perhaps AI research will reveal something. I have my doubts. Feel free to change my mind with some evidence.

I approach it from psychology and neurology, my point is that the 'riddle' often is not.

What specific are you thinking of?
Which parts of the myriad processes called consciousness are you thinking of?




You can ask. I'm not arguing that, but if you want an answer the best one I can think of is the hypothetical potential that we will fully model a human brain that is conscious. It will lack anything organic most likely.

What I am arguing is that studying consciousness is like looking at an audio waveform on a computer. You can see it, but you can't hear it. You know that it might contain the most beautiful of songs, but until you figure out a way to perceive it directly it will remain just a collection of bits on a spinning magnetic disk.

And again science is about the construct of approximate models, not truely understanding the process.


What you are telling me is that the consciousness or "song" is the bits on a spinning magnetic disk only.

Sort of, but more that the neurological basis is becoming understood.

So what mystery are you reffering to. Song is being fairly well studied in some interesting ways.


What I am telling you is that it is the song you can't hear, and that it emerges from the bits on the disk, thus it is immaterial.

Or something to that effect.


Oh, so it is a phenomenalogical argument, yes you an Ake Mani mani will get along.

I don't like dualism, even when it is dressed up as 'emergent properties'.

[Dancing David]

Well, as we all know Nick, consensus reality is the real one, right? Maybe if we get enough people here to validate your intelligence others might take into consideration what you are saying?


No, that would mean that racism is often the real reality, that stereotypes are real.

reality is the one that happens despite our dearly held notions of how it should behave.

If it was a consensus, then here in the Midwest jesus would be walking around a giving tax breaks to the wealthy would have made us all employed.

The deal is this, reality doean't care. it does what it wants, the basis is the same , be it material or idealism, there is no difference.

We can not tell the underlying mechanism, only approximate it's behavior.

[articulett]

thesyntaxera cannot distinguish an opinion or belief from a fact and such types are too annoying for me to converse with.

Objective reality is the thing that is the same for everyone no matter what they "believe". Airplanes fly whether you believe they do or not. If it requires an "according to whom"-- it's not objective.

woo talk vs. clear talk http://www.csicop.org/si/2004-05/new-age.html

If you are using obfuscation, semantics, sarcasm and other manipulations or logical fallacies to try and make your point (nick227, akumanimani, thesyntaxera), you probably are wrong and you are not as "clear" as you think you are in your head. (That is, the reality you think you are "creating" is not the one we are perceiving.)

[rocketdodger]

He uses so many words, but he doesn't communicate anything at all.

I always think you talk way too much articulett, but there are usually gems embedded in your huge posts. Case in point.

[Nick227]

Actually you're haven't presented any good argument for that.

Where is the point of observation? There isn't one, not that anyone has been able to find.

It appears that I am a human being observing things in the world around me, that the locus of awareness is located somewhere behind my eyes. Yet actually, according to for example Dennett, this brain is simply a parallel processor creating simultaneous drafts (from data streams) and there is no place where consciousness is happening. One of the drafts it creates pretty much ongoingly is a little story about what's happening. This little story features the principle character "I," and it seems that this "I" is located somewhere inside the head, that it is the holder of opinions, the haver of feelings, the owner of a car, this kind of thing.

This to me is the typical model for observation or experience, yet we know that it is false. It is also dualistic in that there are immediate infinite regress issues that emerge as soon as one considers the possibility of this self existing within the body, brain, or located in some hypothesized non-physical space.

One might claim that the subject of experience, the observer of things, is the whole organism, even though this is not how people invariably claim it appears to be. This I would consider valid in the sense of addressing the need for "I" to maintain psychological health but to me it is still dualistic in that one is inevitably left hypothesising non-physical entities to explain expressions like "my body."

Happy to discuss more. I find it an interesting subject.

Nick

[Nick227]

I think we can all understand this article just fine. We understand that the word "recognize" is a cognitive process arising from a material brain...

I don't see how whatever it is that you believe differently helps us understand what is going on any more than the current model, and I think we all understand this is study based on the material model. If you don't or see an inconsistency then it appears to only be in your head.

Well, if you don't believe me and feel the issue is only in my head, how about we go through some passages from Blackmore's work on this issue? She's well-established as a researcher and skeptic, so I'm imagining you approve of her.

I would be happy to look through Consciousness: An Introduction and The Meme Machine and check out some quotes. Another good possibility might be Dennett's Consciousness Explained.

What do you think? This seems to me an adult solution that could move us along a bit.

Nick

[AWPrime]

Where is the point of observation? There isn't one, not that anyone has been able to find.Here is another problem you have. You have assumptions based upon just your own opinion. Observation doesn't require a point in the way you want it to.


Also I would like to know why you assume that a process is non-physical?

[AkuManiMani]

If you are using obfuscation, semantics, sarcasm and other manipulations or logical fallacies to try and make your point (nick227, akumanimani, thesyntaxera), you probably are wrong and you are not as "clear" as you think you are in your head. (That is, the reality you think you are "creating" is not the one we are perceiving.)

Jeeze...what'd I say to get you all flustered this time? :confused:

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It is possible that the use of dualistic language to describe the brain might get in the way of the ongoing investigation of the workings of the brain, but it does not imply that the person using the language is a closet dualist.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Oops, duplicate post. Could a mod please delete?

[AkuManiMani]

Well, Ramachandran describes himself as "neutral" in the materialist/idealist debate and I can't see Dennett or Blackmore agreeing with your statement "Consciousness is our individual interpretation of the pattern of neuronal firing in our brains" as it is already assuming duality. No one actually owns the brain and no one interprets. Yet another Cartesian materialist! Hell, there's a lot of them on this forum.

Nick, I have to confess that I've only skimmed the discussion so far (so correct me if there something I've missed) but it seems as if you are ignoring the fact that a lot of the "dualism" you're decrying isn't so much an ideological stance but a product of the subject-object structure of language.

In the case of discussing the nature of consciousness and the brain the line between subject (observer) and object (the brain) becomes very problematic. Even so, I think your approach of saying that "no one interprets" sounds more than a little silly. If you haven't already, could you please clarify?

[AkuManiMani]

It is possible that the use of dualistic language to describe the brain might get in the way of the ongoing investigation of the workings of the brain, but it does not imply that the person using the language is a closet dualist.

~~ Paul

^^^^^
What this guy said.

Oh, so it is a phenomenalogical argument, yes you an Ake Mani mani will get along.

I don't like dualism, even when it is dressed up as 'emergent properties'.


/facepalm

Oy... emergence is not "dualism". Dualism is a binary division of two ontologically different elementary "stuffs"; phenomenology, on the other hand, deals with addressing processes. Think of it as viewing things in hierarchies of organization or layers of complexity.

The two perspectives aren't even addressing the same things so I'm at a loss as to how you manage to equate them O_o

[Nick227]

Here is another problem you have. You have assumptions based upon just your own opinion. Observation doesn't require a point in the way you want it to.

Also I would like to know why you assume that a process is non-physical?

I was not aware that I was doing this.

Nick

[Nick227]

It is possible that the use of dualistic language to describe the brain might get in the way of the ongoing investigation of the workings of the brain, but it does not imply that the person using the language is a closet dualist.

~~ Paul

I would say that would depend on the context in which it is used.

For sure, language frequently implies duality. So if we're trying to investigate self and communicate what we believe to be true, then I think it's constantly needed to make sure that the way we're using language minimises inappropriate interpretation. This isn't always easy.

However, simply because language invariably implies duality does not mean that all dualistic statements that a writer makes are arising because of language. In the specific case of Dennett's "cartesian materialists," the waters are muddied because the writer is frequently not aware that they are following a dualistic model.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

So you're happy to have observation without a clearly defined place where this takes place?

In the context of cognitive science, no.

But in the context of science in general -- of course.

Because your stance is basically "you can't say for sure that water breaks down into hydrogen and oxygen via electrolysis, because who was the observer? There is no such thing as an observer!" And that is fundamentally useless if one is interested in what happens to water when you run a current through it.

[rocketdodger]

In the specific case of Dennett's "cartesian materialists," the waters are muddied because the writer is frequently not aware that they are following a dualistic model.

Of course, because even if I explicitly state "I do not believe there is anything other than the material" I could still be a dualist.

[Nick227]

In the case of discussing the nature of consciousness and the brain the line between subject (observer) and object (the brain) becomes very problematic. Even so, I think your approach of saying that "no one interprets" sounds more than a little silly. If you haven't already, could you please clarify?

Hi Aku,

The basis for me making this point relates to Dennett's model of the brain as a parallel processor. One channel of simultaneous processing is thinking - the construction of narratives which create the notion of their existing some interior entity to which they refer - an "I." This "I" is considered as existing rather as coherent peripheral activity suggests a centre, hence why Dennett calls it a "centre of narrative gravity."

Thus it can be understood that, empirically there is no actual "I." It is simply that the presence of thinking both constantly implies a subject, and frequently refers to it.

Thus when I say that there is actually no one interpreting, I am referring to this phenomenon. Interpretation is taking place, but the sense that someone is doing the interpreting is created as a result of thinking itself.

Nick

[Nick227]

Of course, because even if I explicitly state "I do not believe there is anything other than the material" I could still be a dualist.

...if your thinking alludes to it, yes.

Nick

[Nick227]

In the context of cognitive science, no.

But in the context of science in general -- of course.

Because your stance is basically "you can't say for sure that water breaks down into hydrogen and oxygen via electrolysis, because who was the observer? There is no such thing as an observer!" And that is fundamentally useless if one is interested in what happens to water when you run a current through it.

Well, I struck that comment a little while after I made it as I did feel on reflection that it was rather weak. But I don't see that your analogy with electrolysis is really what it's about, if I'm understanding you right. I'm not disputing that the brain can make all sorts of observations about what is occuring in the world, merely that if we look beneath the level of the functioning whole organism, then no one is actually doing it.

eta; maybe Dennett writes it better than me...

"These strings or streams of narrative issue forth as if from a single source - not just in the obvious physical sense of flowing from just one mouth, or one pencil or pen, but in a more subtle sense: their effect on any audience is to encourage them to (try to) posit a unified agent whose words they are, about whom they are: in short, to posit a center of narrative gravity. Physicists appreciate the enormous simplification you get when you posit a center of gravity for an object, a single point relative to which all gravitational forces may be calculated. We heterophenomenologists appreciate the enormous simplification you get when you posit a center of narrative gravity for a narrative-spinning human body. Like the biological self, this psychological or narrative self is yet another abstraction, not a thing in the brain, but still a remarkably robust and almost tangible attractor of properties, the "owner of record" of whatever items and features are lying about unclaimed. Who owns your car? You do. Who owns your clothes? You do. Then who owns your body? You do! When you say

This is my body

you certainly aren't taken as saying

This body owns itself.

But what can you be saying, then? If what you say is neither a bizarre and pointless tautology (this body is its owner, or something like that) nor the claim that you are an immaterial soul or ghost puppeteer who owns and operates this body the way you own and operate your car, what else could you mean?" - Consciousness Explained p418 [spacing and italics author's own]

Nick

[thesyntaxera]

Whichc is where the defintion of a 'self' solely as a process breaks down. People with dementia, alzheimers and brain trauma are still 'selfs', but they often lack a crucial step in the processes. Which is why the unique body (with attendant processes) is the only coherent defintion, so far.

See, and I would say they are people who in some cases have lost their sense of self. Another coherent definition used in the psychological sense is that it IS your personality and the way you represent yourself and all of the idea's that one might contain.

A person wanting there to be only one coherent definition can desire that all they want, it still doesn't change the fact that there is more than one way to look at it.

Well to some extent yes but to other extents no, the processes that are commonly called consciousness are studied as we speak.
And that seems to be mainly a phenomenalogical arguement to me, we can't see the fusion at the core of stars either, but it seems to be likely.

Perhaps it is a phenomenological argument. So what? Perhaps comparing brains and stars is kind of silly.


As I have stated before, science in the construct of approximate models, to think you have described the actual process would be a mistake.

When did I say I was describing the actual process?

I think not, if you would please explain the nature of this riddle, so far it usually resolves down to some semantics of language and not a reall riddle.

The binding problem. I mentioned it in the very paragraph you are commenting on. How do all of our senses bind together into a continuous conscious experience, one that includes memory and thinking?

I approach it from psychology and neurology, my point is that the 'riddle' often is not.

My understanding is that it is one of the main "riddles" regarding this topic.

What specific are you thinking of?
Which parts of the myriad processes called consciousness are you thinking of?

How the CNS interacts with the brain to produce continuous experience that includes memory and thinking.

And again science is about the construct of approximate models, not truely understanding the process.

In some sense yes. You can't deny that science hasn't helped us truly understand certain things though.

Sort of, but more that the neurological basis is becoming understood.

That is certainly true. Right now though, you are just talking about the 'bits', yes?

So what mystery are you reffering to. Song is being fairly well studied in some interesting ways.

The mystery of the binding problem, yet again.

I don't like dualism, even when it is dressed up as 'emergent properties'.

I'm not arguing dualism though. Just that the sum collection of information that makes up the brain, namely the 5 senses, thought, and memory all combine to create conscious experience and that conscious experience emerges out of such things. It isn't separate, just the result of having a CNS and brain working together.

[thesyntaxera]

No, that would mean that racism is often the real reality, that stereotypes are real.

reality is the one that happens despite our dearly held notions of how it should behave.

If it was a consensus, then here in the Midwest jesus would be walking around a giving tax breaks to the wealthy would have made us all employed.

The deal is this, reality doean't care. it does what it wants, the basis is the same , be it material or idealism, there is no difference.

We can not tell the underlying mechanism, only approximate it's behavior.

I was being cranky and glib. Not serious.

[Dancing David]

^^^^^
What this guy said.




/facepalm

Oy... emergence is not "dualism". Dualism is a binary division of two ontologically different elementary "stuffs"; phenomenology, on the other hand, deals with addressing processes. Think of it as viewing things in hierarchies of organization or layers of complexity.

The two perspectives aren't even addressing the same things so I'm at a loss as to how you manage to equate them O_o


I know, perhaps you have altered your stance from before, or I have misread your more recent posts.

I would swear you just reffered to something as being immaterial.

[lupus_in_fabula]

I'm not disputing that the brain can make all sorts of observations about what is occuring in the world, merely that if we look beneath the level of the functioning whole organism, then no one is actually doing it.
Here could be the point where you might be obviating 'anyone doing it' too quickly in my opinion:

1) If we go "beneath the level of the functioning whole organism" we are also getting rid of the whole problem altogether in one single sweep, which makes the whole saying that "no one is actually..." into a mere tautology. I'm not sure why you think this is a satisfying explanation?

2) When we say that the organism does (anything), it sets the description level for where agency and action is perceived to happen, thus it is the 'functioning whole' which is denoted to, and what we certainly don't want to get rid of, obviously.

There could also be some further problems when, on the one hand, getting rid of the agent altogether, and on the other hand, simply referring to a process like 'thinking' as the sole contributor to 'doer'. Mainly, it misses the intermediate stage altogether. Or, it simply replaces a potential explanation with a broad abstraction.

Here is what Dennet has to say about homunculi as explanatory agents: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive that they can be replaced by machines (Dennett, 2000: Are we explaining consciousness yet?; originally in Dennett, 1978: Brainstorms).

Empirically there seems to be quite a bit of evidence for these semi-intelligent (or stupid) semi-autonomous modules in the brain which could directly be involved in creating the first-person 'sense of a doer' (which are empirically detailed rather than abstracted away). Or to use Baars' own words: "Contrary to some, this sense of self is conceptually coherent and well-supported by hard evidence." (Baars 1996).

Hence, in stead of defining 'away' the doer, it is also possible to simply 'redefine' what the doer stands for empirically. Thus we could propose "many selves" or as Damasio would put it, "proto-selves". We could also propose other selves for which there seems to be some empirical evidence for, like left-brain interpreter, sensorimotor self, emotional and motivational self, social self-systems and appetitive self (in Baars 1996: Journal of Consciousness Studies, No. 3).

Grounding the process in empirical denotations could be a more satisfying approach for describing what is happening, rather than simply sweeping the whole problem under the rug and label it "thinking". It still doesn't mean that there is a central all-encompassing doer (except the whole organism of course); it also doesn't mean each self-center is somehow conscious of itself; and it certainly doesn't infer dualism. It could simply be a better explanation in terms of empirical and functional detail?

[rocketdodger]

Well, I struck that comment a little while after I made it as I did feel on reflection that it was rather weak. But I don't see that your analogy with electrolysis is really what it's about, if I'm understanding you right. I'm not disputing that the brain can make all sorts of observations about what is occuring in the world, merely that if we look beneath the level of the functioning whole organism, then no one is actually doing it.

Outside of cognitive science, who the hell cares?

Can you give me a single reason why, for instance, a chemist should care? Or a biologist? Or a physicist? Or an engineer?

eta; maybe Dennett writes it better than me...

I don't see any statement in that quote to the effect of why the lack of a definitive "self" negates the usefulness of objectivity. Do you?

[AkuManiMani]

I know, perhaps you have altered your stance from before, or I have misread your more recent posts.

I would swear you just reffered to something as being immaterial.

Hmm...Its beena while but if I remember that particular discussion correctly I was arguing to the effect that mind is a process that can be considered an entity generated by the brain but not necessarily the brain itself. I was basically proposing a strong emergence argument. I believe I did use the term "immaterial" but spent several pages trying to qualify what I meant by that. I'll have to see if I can dig up that old discussion and review exactly what was said....

I've gotta habit of stating things in an odd manner -- my bad >_<

[Nick227]

Here could be the point where you might be obviating 'anyone doing it' too quickly in my opinion:

1) If we go "beneath the level of the functioning whole organism" we are also getting rid of the whole problem altogether in one single sweep, which makes the whole saying that "no one is actually..." into a mere tautology. I'm not sure why you think this is a satisfying explanation?

I am just trying to shine light on the nature of the issue. To me, the issue continues when the organism lives in denial of it.

2) When we say that the organism does (anything), it sets the description level for where agency and action is perceived to happen, thus it is the 'functioning whole' which is denoted to, and what we certainly don't want to get rid of, obviously.

There could also be some further problems when, on the one hand, getting rid of the agent altogether, and on the other hand, simply referring to a process like 'thinking' as the sole contributor to 'doer'. Mainly, it misses the intermediate stage altogether. Or, it simply replaces a potential explanation with a broad abstraction.

To me the core issue with this "psychological or narrative self," to use Dennett's terminology, is that the model of self that the brain typically constructs through processing thought is not very good.

On a scientific and philosophical level it is clearly a non-starter, in that homunculi do not exist, and that Cartesian Materialism is finally unlikely to provide us with a useful model of brain function. Useful research has been undertaken by people following the model, but finally it's a hindrance.

On a social level it's necessary to have some form of psychological self, and this version does function to a degree, and so no doubt largely achieves its evolutionarily-derived function. We can talk and share and form social bonds.

On a global level it's potentially disastrous. The way we model self through thinking could be said to create wars, economic catastophes, exploitation, religion, and many other woes. It creates immense fear of death. It creates fear generally.

I'm not saying I know the answer but to me this is the root of the problem. The model of self evolution has given us to fulfil social and biological needs is potentially disastrous on many other levels.

Personally, I think a potentially good start is to be made by reassigning the narrative self to the whole organism, though of course this still leaves us with certain paradoxical propositions like "my body." I'm open to other possibilities, but I don't think they can really take much shape or form until the issue itself is actually recognised.

Nick

[Nick227]

I don't see any statement in that quote to the effect of why the lack of a definitive "self" negates the usefulness of objectivity. Do you?

As I said in the OP it could be said to reduce objectivity to mere behaviour.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

As I said in the OP it could be said to reduce objectivity to mere behaviour.

Nick

But you did not give an argument as to why reducing objectivity to mere behavior undermines science. And frankly, I don't think you can.

Like I said earlier, this "mere behavior" led to the computer you are using to argue that objectivity is "mere behavior."

[PixyMisa]

Where is the point of observation?
That depends on what the question is supposed to mean.

It appears that I am a human being observing things in the world around me, that the locus of awareness is located somewhere behind my eyes. Yet actually, according to for example Dennett, this brain is simply a parallel processor creating simultaneous drafts (from data streams) and there is no place where consciousness is happening.
Here's a hint, Nick: Starts with B. Ends with RAIN.

One of the drafts it creates pretty much ongoingly is a little story about what's happening. This little story features the principle character "I," and it seems that this "I" is located somewhere inside the head, that it is the holder of opinions, the haver of feelings, the owner of a car, this kind of thing.
Yes.

This to me is the typical model for observation or experience, yet we know that it is false.
Wrong.

It is also dualistic
Wrong.

in that there are immediate infinite regress issues
Wrong.

that emerge as soon as one considers the possibility of this self existing within the body
Wrong.

brain
Wrong.

or located in some hypothesized non-physical space.
Meaningless.

One might claim that the subject of experience, the observer of things, is the whole organism, even though this is not how people invariably claim it appears to be.
What? What do you think people mean when they say "I"?

This I would consider valid in the sense of addressing the need for "I" to maintain psychological health but to me it is still dualistic in that one is inevitably left hypothesising non-physical entities to explain expressions like "my body."
No. One is not. You might be, but that is because you have no grasp of the subject at hand.

[Dancing David]

I was being cranky and glib. Not serious.

OOOOOps, nevermind.

[Dancing David]

Hmm...Its beena while but if I remember that particular discussion correctly I was arguing to the effect that mind is a process that can be considered an entity generated by the brain but not necessarily the brain itself. I was basically proposing a strong emergence argument. I believe I did use the term "immaterial" but spent several pages trying to qualify what I meant by that. I'll have to see if I can dig up that old discussion and review exactly what was said....

I've gotta habit of stating things in an odd manner -- my bad >_<


Thats cool, I would probably end up apologizing in the end.

I understand your position, i just don't agree with it, sorry for being snarky.

[Nick227]

This I would consider valid in the sense of addressing the need for "I" to maintain psychological health but to me it is still dualistic in that one is inevitably left hypothesising non-physical entities to explain expressions like "my body."
No. One is not. You might be, but that is because you have no grasp of the subject at hand.

Well, both Dennett and Blackmore pull this expression up. So kindly explain. To what does the "my" in the expression "my body" actually refer? What is the sense of it?

Nick

[Nick227]

But you did not give an argument as to why reducing objectivity to mere behavior undermines science. And frankly, I don't think you can.

That depends on what you consider science to be. If you regard it as a tool to make potentially useful changes to our environment, then I don't see how science is undermined by being considered just behaviour. When you start to think it's some kind of truth-generating paeon which will save the world from woo, well, to a degree I'd say that's correct, at least behaviourally, but there start to be problems that need addressing. Problems regarding the nature of objectivity. To be honest, I started this thread to discuss this area more. I don't know the whole answer, but would be happy to hear more views from people who can grasp the point. Things got a little side-tracked!

Like I said earlier, this "mere behavior" led to the computer you are using to argue that objectivity is "mere behavior."

For sure. It's great. I am not against science and I am not against objectivity. It is simply that I am for truth. You can't fight woo with more woo.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

Well, both Dennett and Blackmore pull this expression up. So kindly explain. To what does the "my" in the expression "my body" actually refer? What is the sense of it?

Nick

"my body" == "the body which supports the entity fabricating this statement."

[rocketdodger]

When you start to think it's some kind of truth-generating paeon which will save the world from woo, well, to a degree I'd say that's correct, at least behaviourally, but there start to be problems that need addressing.
For sure. It's great. I am not against science and I am not against objectivity. It is simply that I am for truth. You can't fight woo with more woo.

Except that when we say "X is true" or "X is woo" we really mean "There is an extremely high probability of X agreeing with past and future observations within and between individuals" or "There is an extremely small probability..."

The only thing that matters is internal consistency within and between individuals. You really could say that we create our own reality, because we do. It just so happens that the reality most of us create is very consistent, both with the reality created by others and the past and future of our own reality, so it works out.

So you could say that the "truth" science leads to is nothing but a very consistent notion of reality while the "woo" irrational thinking leads to is nothing but a very inconsistent notion of reality. It isn't perfect, but it can't be perfect -- materialism and the computational model of consciousness tells us that.

[PixyMisa]

"my body" == "the body which supports the entity fabricating this statement."
Precisely.

All of which is, of course, entirely material.

[plumjam]

here is an article which argues some of what Nick has been saying

http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2008/004/11.37.html

[articulett]

here is an article which argues some of what Nick has been saying

http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2008/004/11.37.html

Excellent... I can't wait to see all the evidence where they falsify materialism by, at last, showing consciousness existing absent a brain!

Here's someone arguing regarding what Nick hasn't been saying:

wtDr8Y6n7e8

[plumjam]

Excellent... I can't wait to see all the evidence where they falsify materialism by, at last, showing consciousness existing absent a brain!


I'm trying to resist the temptation.

[articulett]

:fg:

[thesyntaxera]

here is an article which argues some of what Nick has been saying

http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2008/004/11.37.html

It was an interesting, mostly biased read. Apparently they have never heard of Spinoza, or the idea that what is natural may be god...

[rocketdodger]

here is an article which argues some of what Nick has been saying

http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2008/004/11.37.html

lol -- Alvin Plantinga. This man wouldn't know a sound logical argument if it hit him on the head.

Let me ask you, plumjam, since I know you are always eager to answer: What is the definition of a "true" belief versus a "false" belief?

Because, if you didn't know already, Alvin Plantinga is particularly fond of slinging around terms like "true" and "false" without providing an associated meaning.

Of course, if he did provide a meaning, his arguments would instantly fall apart. So you can't really blame him -- he is behaving like any other theist would in his shoes.

[PixyMisa]

here is an article which argues some of what Nick has been saying

http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2008/004/11.37.html
That's perhaps more coherent than Nick, but contains at least as many logical fallacies.

[Nick227]

"my body" == "the body which supports the entity fabricating this statement."

Entity? What is this entity if it is not the body?

Just take a look for yourself, when you say "my body" to what does the word "my" seem to refer?

Nick

[Darat]

It's a gerund.

[Nick227]

The only thing that matters is internal consistency within and between individuals. You really could say that we create our own reality, because we do. It just so happens that the reality most of us create is very consistent, both with the reality created by others and the past and future of our own reality, so it works out.

Personally, I do not believe you are creating your own reality. It is being created for you perhaps but I do not believe you are creating it.

Issues with determinism regardless, I find meme theory more likely here. As soon as the human brain developed the capacity to imitate so inevitably another replicator, aside of the gene, was born. We now have these big cumbersome brains highly adept at storing and transmitting memes and driven to do so by what Blackmore terms "the selfplex" - a pernicious memeplex. It's a variety of memes co-existing in a frequently uneasy relationship and maintaining their control over the organism's activity through the organism accepting that they represent "itself."

It would be good to untangle which aspects of the narrative self are created genetically and which memetically.

Nick

[Nick227]

It's a gerund.

I thought the gerund was the action aspect of a verb being used as a noun. How is "my" a gerund?

Nick

[Nick227]

Well, both Dennett and Blackmore pull this expression up. So kindly explain. To what does the "my" in the expression "my body" actually refer? What is the sense of it?

"my body" == "the body which supports the entity fabricating this statement."

Precisely.

All of which is, of course, entirely material.

What is this "entity" if not the body? Are you claiming that the body has non-physical aspects?

The answer to the question is actually quite straightforward, as you would know if you actually understood the books you claimed earlier to have read...

The brain creates a sense of self from identifying with narratives that is inconsistent with reality. The programme may be considered either disfunctional, created for other functions than understanding self, or influenced by non-genetic replicators - depending on your orientation or who you read. But one thing is clear - the model of self the brain constructs through narratives is inconsistent with reality.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

What is this "entity" if not the body?
A process. As Darat says, a gerund.

Are you claiming that the body has non-physical aspects?
NO.

How many times do we need to explain this to you?

The answer to the question is actually quite straightforward, as you would know if you actually understood the books you claimed earlier to have read...
We understand these books just fine.

The brain creates a sense of self from identifying with narratives that is inconsistent with reality.
No.

The programme may be considered either disfunctional, created for other functions than understanding self, or influenced by non-genetic replicators - depending on your orientation or who you read.
No.

But one thing is clear - the model of self the brain constructs through narratives is inconsistent with reality.
Are you dead? No? Then no.

Nick
How do you know?

[rocketdodger]

Personally, I do not believe you are creating your own reality. It is being created for you perhaps but I do not believe you are creating it.

Issues with determinism regardless, I find meme theory more likely here. As soon as the human brain developed the capacity to imitate so inevitably another replicator, aside of the gene, was born. We now have these big cumbersome brains highly adept at storing and transmitting memes and driven to do so by what Blackmore terms "the selfplex" - a pernicious memeplex. It's a variety of memes co-existing in a frequently uneasy relationship and maintaining their control over the organism's activity through the organism accepting that they represent "itself."

It would be good to untangle which aspects of the narrative self are created genetically and which memetically.

Nick

Nick -- you are obviously a chatbot. I have decided.

Because the format of all your posts is exactly the same.

1) Briefly reference an idea X in the previous post, such as "Personally I don't believe X..."

2) Immediately vomit an entire paragraph of undechiperable gibberish that references Susan Blackmore or Daniel Dennet and terms they "coined," which is in no conceivable way linked to the idea X, and invariably begins with the sentiment "Instead I think..." or "I find it more likely..." or "Rather..."

3) End with an attempt to change the topic of conversation to something you can post more gibberish on, such as "It would be good to..." or "I really think we need to..." or "We should really...."

[Nick227]

A process. As Darat says, a gerund.

"Floundering is one way to try and stop drowning." In this sentence the word "floundering" is a gerund - a noun created from the present participle of a verb.

How is the word "my" in the phrase "my body" a gerund? Kindly explain.


We understand these books just fine.

I genuinely see no evidence of that. How about we go through actual passages from both writers on the concept of "narrative selfhood" and take a good thorough look?

Nick

[Nick227]

Nick -- you are obviously a chatbot. I have decided.

Because the format of all your posts is exactly the same.

1) Briefly reference an idea X in the previous post, such as "Personally I don't believe X..."

2) Immediately vomit an entire paragraph of undechiperable gibberish that references Susan Blackmore or Daniel Dennet and terms they "coined," which is in no conceivable way linked to the idea X, and invariably begins with the sentiment "Instead I think..." or "I find it more likely..." or "Rather..."

3) End with an attempt to change the topic of conversation to something you can post more gibberish on, such as "It would be good to..." or "I really think we need to..." or "We should really...."

Well, in writing that post it did strike me that the second paragraph, whilst tied to the first, would require quite a bit of additional background in the reader's mind for the connection to be self-evident. So, fair comment. I don't use the same format so often though. There are the occasional tangents, but my developer has the tangent function pretty well set to normal human standards now, I think.

Nickbot

eta: if you ask me Pixy is a far better candidate for a chatbot than me. Interject with "no" or "nope" every five words or so and then announce "it's a process" repeatedly if you meet resistance. I can write out his response to this post...

.........................

if you ask me Pixy is a far better candidate for a chatbot than me
No
Interject with "no" or "nope" every five words or so
No
and then announce "it's a process"
It is a process
repeatedly if you meet resistance.
It is a process.

.............................

Memetics, huh?

[rocketdodger]

How about we go through actual passages from both writers on the concept of "narrative selfhood" and take a good thorough look?

We already tried that.

You posted a passage, I asked you to specifically show why anything from the passage was relevant to the issue you claimed it addressed, and you still haven't answered.

Go ahead and try again.

Find a passage from either Dennet or Blackmore that shows why the definition "my body" == "the body which supports the entity fabricating this statement" is invalid.

[Nick227]

We already tried that.

You posted a passage, I asked you to specifically show why anything from the passage was relevant to the issue you claimed it addressed, and you still haven't answered.

Go ahead and try again.

Find a passage from either Dennet or Blackmore that shows why the definition "my body" == "the body which supports the entity fabricating this statement" is invalid.

We can just use a chunk of the same one...

Like the biological self, this psychological or narrative self is yet another abstraction, not a thing in the brain, but still a remarkably robust and almost tangible attractor of properties, the "owner of record" of whatever items and features are lying about unclaimed. Who owns your car? You do. Who owns your clothes? You do. Then who owns your body? You do! When you say

This is my body

you certainly aren't taken as saying

This body owns itself.

But what can you be saying, then? If what you say is neither a bizarre and pointless tautology (this body is its owner, or something like that) nor the claim that you are an immaterial soul or ghost puppeteer who owns and operates this body the way you own and operate your car, what else could you mean?" - Consciousness Explained p418

You seem to be advocating that the answer to Dennett's question is the "bizarre and pointless tautology" he mentions.

Either that or "the entity fabricating this statement", as you put it, is conceived of as being something other than the body.

Nick

[Nick227]

RD,

Here's how Susan Blackmore starts her chapters on selfhood in her main work on consciousness...

"Questions about the nature of consciousness are intimately bound up with those about the nature of self because it seems as though there must be someone having the experience, that there cannot be experiences without an experiencer. Our experiencing self seems to be at the centre of everything we are aware of at a given time, and to be continuous from one moment to the next. In other words, it seems to have both unity and continuity. The problems start when you ask what kind of thing that experiencer might be.

In everyday language we talk unproblematically about our 'self.' 'I' got up this morning, 'I' like muesli for breakfast, 'I' can hear the robin singing, 'I' am an easy-going sort of person, 'I' remember meeting you last week, 'I' want to be an engine driver when I grow up. It seems that we not only think of this self as a single thing but we accord it all sorts of attibutes and capabilities. In ordinary usage, the self is the subject of our experiences, an inner agent who carries out actions and makes decisions, a unique personality, and the source of desires, opinions, hopes and fears. This self is 'me'; it is the reason why anything matters in my life.

That this apparently natural way of thinking about ourselves is problematic has been recognised for millenia. In the sixth century BC the Buddha challenged contemporary thinking with his doctrine of annatta or no-self. He claimed that the self is just a name or a label given to something that does not really exist; a suggestion that seems as hard to understand and accept today as it was then." - Consciousness, An Introduction Ch 7, p 94-95, italics author's own

I'd recommend the whole chapter, plus the subsequent two, to you. We can continue into the various models of selfhood that have arisen and their issues if you like. It's fascinating stuff.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

You seem to be advocating that the answer to Dennett's question is the "bizarre and pointless tautology" he mentions.

If you happen to think the brain and body are the same entity, then yes. And in that case, it does become a pointless tautology.

But there is no rule that states one must consider brain and body to be the same entity. Which is why Dennet does not show that definition to be invalid -- or even "bizarre and pointless."

[Nick227]

If you happen to think the brain and body are the same entity, then yes. And in that case, it does become a pointless tautology.

But there is no rule that states one must consider brain and body to be the same entity. Which is why Dennet does not show that definition to be invalid -- or even "bizarre and pointless."

So you have never said "my brain?"

Nick

[rocketdodger]

RD,

Here's how Susan Blackmore starts her chapters on selfhood in her main work on consciousness...



I'd recommend the whole chapter, plus the subsequent two, to you. We can continue into the various models of selfhood that have arisen and their issues if you like. It's fascinating stuff.

Nick

Once again, Nick -- how does any of that invalidate the 3rd person definition of "my body" that I gave?

[Nick227]

Once again, Nick -- how does any of that invalidate the 3rd person definition of "my body" that I gave?

I quoted Blackmore in the hope that it might help to persuade you to consider that the issue of understanding self is well accepted as not being simple.

You have yet to deal with the problem of phrases like "my body." Thus far we have "gerund" and "it refers to the brain." I believe it's fair to say that anyone with any background in this area is unlikely to be impressed by these attempts but, of course, feel free to dispute this.

I can only restate my case - It is well acknowledged that the model of self created by thinking is acutely problematic. This place may actually be one of the few philosophical forums where this is not well accepted. Certainly, over on Richard Dawkins Forum, it would not take so long to get to first base.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

"Floundering is one way to try and stop drowning." In this sentence the word "floundering" is a gerund - a noun created from the present participle of a verb.

How is the word "my" in the phrase "my body" a gerund? Kindly explain.
Self is merely a name for being, that is, the gerund of the infinitive to be.

Your problem is that you have a fundamental misconception of what materialism is. You think it only allows for nows. In reality, it only allows for verbs.

"I" is not a noun. "I" is a gerund.

To put it another way, it is what it does. If it does not, it is not.

[rocketdodger]

So you have never said "my brain?"

Nick

I have. What of it? That is clearly a tautology if you are a materialist. What is wrong with tautologies?

[PixyMisa]

I have. What of it? That is clearly a tautology if you are a materialist.
I'd disagree.

A program can refer to the hardware it is running on as its hardware; the hardware is not the program.

Same with my brain.

[Nick227]

Self is merely a name for being, that is, the gerund of the infinitive to be.

Your problem is that you have a fundamental misconception of what materialism is. You think it only allows for nows. In reality, it only allows for verbs.

"I" is not a noun. "I" is a gerund.

To put it another way, it is what it does. If it does not, it is not.

How does this deal with the issue of "my body?" To what does the reference refer? As usual you are hurling goalposts about with gay abandon.

As to 'I' being a gerund (!)...how would you rephrase, for example, the statements Blackmore quotes making use of this gerund?

'I' got up this morning, 'I' like muesli for breakfast, 'I' can hear the robin singing, 'I' am an easy-going sort of person, 'I' remember meeting you last week, 'I' want to be an engine driver when I grow up.

Can you rewrite them with this gerund?

Nick

[PixyMisa]

How does this deal with the issue of "my body?" To what does the reference refer?
To restate the bleedin' obvious, yet again:

"My" here refers to the relationship of a process to its physical substrate.

As usual you are hurling goalposts about with gay abandon.
You're confused. I haven't changed my position at all.

[Nick227]

To restate the bleedin' obvious, yet again:

"My" here refers to the relationship of a process to its physical substrate

As I see it, in order to do that the process would have to recognise itself as a process. You are constructing the process as referring to itself, as a process, when actually a process cannot refer to itself. It is merely happening, in response to other activities.

In addition, the majority of the uses of the terms "I" or "my" clearly presuppose the existence of fixed material referents. Feel free to re-phrase the statements Blackmore includes to prove me wrong.

When I originally asked the question, I added "What is the sense of it?" because the issue is not "what may selfhood be constructed to mean," but "How does it seem? How does it appear?"

Nick

[PixyMisa]

As I see it, in order to do that the process would have to recognise itself as a process.
Sure. Which I do, clearly, because I just said so.

I submit that this is not the case, as is demonstrated by the majority of uses of the terms "I" or "my."
You can't get there from here, Nick.

Feel free to re-phrase the statements Blackmore includes to prove me wrong.
It's not merely a question of being wrong, though of course you are indeed wrong. It's a question of abject pointlessness. You're trying to prove something about the nature of reality by arguing about the terminology used to describe it.

That trick never works.

When I originally asked the question, I added "What is the sense of it?" because the issue is not "what may selfhood be constructed to mean," but "How does it seem? How does it appear?"
Who the hell cares?

Susan Blackmore's apt description of consciousness as an illusion does not mean that consciousness is not real, or that it is not material. Her point is that consciousness is not what it may trivially appear to be.

What it is, is a process. Not a thing. A does, not an is.

A gerund.

[Dancing David]

My is the common referent to the unique physiacl body that is part of an individual process called consciousness.

the issue of posseion in semantics is part of the confision, but Nick will make mountains out of the arcahic meanings in words.

The body exists, they comes in seperate bodies. No one owns them but by social convention they are assumed to own themselves.

Doesn't mean that they do, doesn't mean that they don't.

By living in the moment and with some consideration of the future state of the ephemeral body one can live an uncomplicated life. (If the one chooses to do so or is capable of such a choice.)

[Nick227]

It's not merely a question of being wrong, though of course you are indeed wrong. It's a question of abject pointlessness. You're trying to prove something about the nature of reality by arguing about the terminology used to describe it.

That trick never works.


Who the hell cares?

Susan Blackmore's apt description of consciousness as an illusion does not mean that consciousness is not real, or that it is not material. Her point is that consciousness is not what it may trivially appear to be.

What it is, is a process. Not a thing. A does, not an is.

A gerund.

I perceive a fairly major problem with this apparent viewpoint of yours.

Thinking does not refer to itself, rather it refers to the neural substrate from which it arises. It is an expression of the state of the neural substrate at that time.

Thus, the thought "my body" does not refer to that actual thought, but rather it reflects the state of the neural substrate from which it emerges. To believe it reflects the thought itself would not be consistent with materialism. In fact it would be idealism.

Thus the perspective you are advancing is clearly idealistic. Considering the phrase "my body" to be a gerund is to assume that the thought itself is self-aware, that it is describing its own relationship to the substrate. That's not materialism.

Nice try, though.

Nick

[Nick227]

My is the common referent to the unique physiacl body that is part of an individual process called consciousness.

the issue of posseion in semantics is part of the confision, but Nick will make mountains out of the arcahic meanings in words.

I am articulating the issue, but it is actually endemic. It's all around us in human culture. It arises because of the nature of thinking, not of language or semantics. Because thinking narratives both construct and reinforce our idea of selfhood, not actual biological selfhood, so the organism starts to seek to fulfil not its needs, but the needs of this constructed narrative self.

Like you say, life can be easy, fun, and fulfilling when lived in the moment with openness. But with a narrative self on board, constructed progressively over decades of human interractions, you can pretty much bet its going to start to drag.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

I'd disagree.

A program can refer to the hardware it is running on as its hardware; the hardware is not the program.

Same with my brain.

Yes of course. It depends on how one is looking at it.

I was looking at it as the program being a state of the hardware. That is a less useful viewpoint in many applications, but in this one -- namely, arguing with Nick -- I think it is more appropriate because it stops him cold in his attempts to corner us into admitting dualism.

[rocketdodger]

Can you rewrite them with this gerund?


The substrate of this process got up this morning and this process awoke.

This process prefers the stimuli generated by the substrate of this process when it consumes muesli for breakfast.

This process interprets auditory stimuli from the substrate of this process as a robin singing.

This process calculates that there is a high probability it is considered by humans as "an easy-going sort of person."

This process has a valid reference of the event of meeting you last week.

This process desires to be an engine driver when the substrate of this process "grows up" and this process matures.

[rocketdodger]

I perceive a fairly major problem with this apparent viewpoint of yours.

Thinking does not refer to itself, rather it refers to the neural substrate from which it arises. It is an expression of the state of the neural substrate at that time.

Thus, the thought "my body" does not refer to that actual thought, but rather it reflects the state of the neural substrate from which it emerges. To believe it reflects the thought itself would not be consistent with materialism. In fact it would be idealism.

Thus the perspective you are advancing is clearly idealistic. Considering the phrase "my body" to be a gerund is to assume that the thought itself is self-aware, that it is describing its own relationship to the substrate. That's not materialism.

Nice try, though.

Nick

Spot on, except for the facts that

1) Incompleteness -- no duh. Are you really lecturing materialists on incompleteness?

2) A thought can partially reference itself if one views thoughts as latent I.E. a sequence of states rather than a single state. And it is easy to do for a fully self-aware being -- it simply thinks about itself thinking about itself at that moment.

3) Viewing thoughts as non-latent is absurd, because you would need to assert that every different state of the brain at every single infinitessimal time slice is a different thought.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

However, simply because language invariably implies duality does not mean that all dualistic statements that a writer makes are arising because of language. In the specific case of Dennett's "cartesian materialists," the waters are muddied because the writer is frequently not aware that they are following a dualistic model.
I agree that not all statements that sound dualistic do so merely because of language. Sometimes the speaker is a dualist. However, as I did say, not all dualistic-sounding statements imply that the speaker is a dualist. As soon as I use the word mind, it sounds dualistic. Yet I am not a dualist.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Thus the perspective you are advancing is clearly idealistic. Considering the phrase "my body" to be a gerund is to assume that the thought itself is self-aware, that it is describing its own relationship to the substrate. That's not materialism.
The phrase "my body" is not a gerund, it is an adjective followed by a noun. I believe people are saying that the internal behavior we call "mental" is a continuous physical process, not a thing. This sounds like a rejection of idealism, in which the mental is taken as a fundamental ontological existent.

May I suggest that if you try to define materialism and idealism in sufficient detail to explain the world as we see it, you will find that the definitions differ only in terminology. There is no way to distinguish what actually is.

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

Spot on, except for the facts that

1) Incompleteness -- no duh. Are you really lecturing materialists on incompleteness?

2) A thought can partially reference itself if one views thoughts as latent I.E. a sequence of states rather than a single state. And it is easy to do for a fully self-aware being -- it simply thinks about itself thinking about itself at that moment.

"It" simply thinks?

There are thoughts. To me those thoughts are an expression of the neural substrate and represent its state at that time. A thought is not self-aware.

Pixy's position is nonsensical to me. It is idealistic in that it is ascribing self-awareness to a thought.

3) Viewing thoughts as non-latent is absurd, because you would need to assert that every different state of the brain at every single infinitessimal time slice is a different thought.

Can you explain this bit more? It sounds interesting but I do not understand it.

Nick

[Nick227]

The phrase "my body" is not a gerund, it is an adjective followed by a noun. I believe people are saying that the internal behavior we call "mental" is a continuous physical process, not a thing. This sounds like a rejection of idealism, in which the mental is taken as a fundamental ontological existent.

As I see it personally, Pixy is ascribing selfhood to the thought itself. If thinking is the process emerging from the neural substrate then he is saying that the thought "my body" reflects the relationship between that thought and the substrate. From a third person perspective this is true but to claim that the thought is expressing its relationship to the substrate is pure idealism and frankly a pretty extreme position for even the most wild-eyed of idealists to take.

I don't think it has anything to do with considering selfhood a continuous mental process. Selfhood may be considered a continuous mental process precisely because thoughts are not self aware. In thinking so the assumption arises that there must be a thinker, which is then reinforced by the forming neural architecture that develops around this artificial "I" position.

A year or so in discussions he came out with his position on selfhood that "the thoughts become aware of themselves." It seems things are getting crazier still.

Nick

[AWPrime]

a process cannot refer to itself. Prove it.

Give us something more then bad assumptions and semantics jokes. Also you might want to invest in a dictionary, you seem to forget the meaning of words such as idealism. With you it seems to be a catchphrase.

[rocketdodger]

A thought is not self-aware.

Can you give a mathematical argument as to why a process cannot reference itself?

Yes, we all know nothing can completely reference itself. But why not even partially?

Can you explain this bit more? It sounds interesting but I do not understand it.

It means if you want to insist that two different states of a process' substrate necessarily imply two different processes then you must be prepared to admit an infinite number of processes, even over an arbitrarily small period of time, since reality admits an infinite number of states over an arbitrarily small period of time.

The only alternative is to accept that a process might remain functionally the same even if the state of its substrate has changed. Which is the view I take.

[PixyMisa]

I perceive a fairly major problem with this apparent viewpoint of yours.

Thinking does not refer to itself, rather it refers to the neural substrate from which it arises. It is an expression of the state of the neural substrate at that time.
No it's not. It's the process.

Consider just for a moment: I snap freeze you in an instant of time. Is the frozen you expressing any thoughts? No, it isn't.

Thus, the thought "my body" does not refer to that actual thought, but rather it reflects the state of the neural substrate from which it emerges.
Nope.

To believe it reflects the thought itself would not be consistent with materialism. In fact it would be idealism.
I don't see how you can possibly continue to make this absurd claim.

It's a material process. Doing material stuff to other material stuff.

See the word "material" there? It means what it says.

Thus the perspective you are advancing is clearly idealistic.
Only to you, Nick.

Considering the phrase "my body" to be a gerund is to assume that the thought itself is self-aware
No. The process is, however, self-referential.

that it is describing its own relationship to the substrate.
Yes.

That's not materialism.
Of course it is. Every part of what I described is purely material. You are projecting idealism onto it, because you are incapable of thinking any other way.

Nice try, though.
:rolleyes:

[PixyMisa]

As I see it, in order to do that the process would have to recognise itself as a process. You are constructing the process as referring to itself, as a process, when actually a process cannot refer to itself.
If you actually believe this, then it might explain your mental roadblock.

Of course a process can refer to itself. I'm a computer programmer. I design processes that do this every single day. I couldn't do my job without it.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As I see it personally, Pixy is ascribing selfhood to the thought itself. If thinking is the process emerging from the neural substrate then he is saying that the thought "my body" reflects the relationship between that thought and the substrate. From a third person perspective this is true but to claim that the thought is expressing its relationship to the substrate is pure idealism and frankly a pretty extreme position for even the most wild-eyed of idealists to take.
I agree that a thought per se does not contain any physical reference to itself. I don't think Pixy is saying that it does. What we are saying is that a sequence of thoughts can include self-referential thoughts just as it can include references to an apple or a chair. The references encapsulated in the thoughts can include references to the thinking process just as they can include any other references. It is no different from saying that a person can punch himself in the face just as he can punch someone else.

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

I agree that a thought per se does not contain any physical reference to itself. I don't think Pixy is saying that it does. What we are saying is that a sequence of thoughts can include self-referential thoughts just as it can include references to an apple or a chair. The references encapsulated in the thoughts can include references to the thinking process just as they can include any other references. It is no different from saying that a person can punch himself in the face just as he can punch someone else.

~~ Paul

For sure thoughts can include references to the thinking process. But that is a quite different proposition from saying that in the expression "my body" the actual thought "my body" is referring to its (the thought's) relationship to the neural substrate. For this to be so the thought itself would have to be referencing itself in the moment. The thought would need to be aware that it was a thought. This would place the thought a priori and is thus idealism.

A complex system, once it is identified as a system, may of course self-reference. This does not mean that each aspect of its interior processing self-references, merely that the system overall has a means of communicating about itself.

Nick

[Nick227]

No it's not. It's the process.

Consider just for a moment: I snap freeze you in an instant of time. Is the frozen you expressing any thoughts? No, it isn't.

And...?


It's a material process. Doing material stuff to other material stuff.

Thinking is considered a material process in that thinking derives from the neuronal architecture. Thinking is an expression of that neuronal state. When the neuronal state expresses "I" or "my" it says it with thoughts, but the thoughts do not say "I" or "my" about themselves.




No. The process is, however, self-referential.

A system which includes thought may be considered self-referential but this does not mean that thoughts themselves may be considered self-referential.

To consider that thoughts can be self-referential you need to be an idealist.

Nick

[Nick227]

Can you give a mathematical argument as to why a process cannot reference itself?

Yes, we all know nothing can completely reference itself. But why not even partially?

It depends what you call a system and what you call a process. The process we're discussing is thinking. Whilst it may have complex origins, I submit that thinking itself is but the passage of thoughts, discrete units of information. The thought cannot reference itself. A thought can be recognised by the system as a thought and other thoughts might arise referring to it, but the thought does not recognise itself and cannot refer to itself. Thus, to the materialist, the neural substrate is always the source of thought. An idealist might consider that the thought "I" is self-referential but to a materialist I submit that this is not so.


It means if you want to insist that two different states of a process' substrate necessarily imply two different processes then you must be prepared to admit an infinite number of processes, even over an arbitrarily small period of time, since reality admits an infinite number of states over an arbitrarily small period of time.

The only alternative is to accept that a process might remain functionally the same even if the state of its substrate has changed. Which is the view I take.

Yes. I mean you also could drag it all back to process and consider that neuronal architecture itself is merely process of which thinking is simply a sub-process. But I take the same view as yourself.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

And...?
And what's important is the process. When we discuss thoughts, we're not talking about instantaneous states, we're talking about processes.

Thinking is considered a material process in that thinking derives from the neuronal architecture.
Yes.

Thinking is an expression of that neuronal state.
NO!

It's the process.

When the neuronal state expresses "I" or "my" it says it with thoughts, but the thoughts do not say "I" or "my" about themselves.
Yes they do.

To think of a thought as an is rather than a does is to import idealism into a material process. That's entirely your doing.

A system which includes thought may be considered self-referential but this does not mean that thoughts themselves may be considered self-referential.
Wrong in every respect.

To consider that thoughts can be self-referential you need to be an idealist.
Not in the slightest.

If your persist in clinging to idealist notions of what thoughts are, you will remain unable to understand what thoughts actually are. I cannot help you with that.

You're falling into the same trap as Berkeley and Plantinga and every other idealist who thought they had found a problem with materialism: You have blindly imported your idealist notions into a materialist discussion. Of course that's going to result in inconsistencies - but those inconsistencies are of your creation and have nothing to do with materialism.

[rocketdodger]

Whilst it may have complex origins, I submit that thinking itself is but the passage of thoughts, discrete units of information.

Your submission is in disagreement with all available material evidence in the fields of cognitive and computer science. Neurons are discrete. Bits are discrete. The substrate is discrete. The processes that arise on the substrates are not discrete.

The thought cannot reference itself. A thought can be recognised by the system as a thought and other thoughts might arise referring to it, but the thought does not recognise itself and cannot refer to itself.

Do you have anything resembling a proof of this? Even an informal logical argument?

I don't think you are making much headway here, given that most of us are programmers who work with self-referential processes every day, by simply asserting that we are wrong.

[lupus_in_fabula]

Perhaps neural substrate is not necessarily best described in singular (as in referring to a single category)? It is convenient, but empirically it seems to be ad hoc nonetheless.

[Dancing David]

Neural processes are absolutely ad hoc, they are not programs run on a hard machine. They are programs that are the machine, the substrate reacts to itself and that is how the 'program' arises. The neural pathways are determined by enzyme gradients during development, providing the rough architechture but the 'software' comes about through the reaction of the neurons themselves to the whole process.

Now in other animals that display a higher level of steotypic behavior there is mor ehard wiring of certain behavioral events. And certainly some pathways will develop more in response to visual stimuli than others. yet the 'software' is inherently created in the reaction of the substrate to the stimulus and the rest of the system.

[Dancing David]

Nick seems to be using the Kantian arguement that a thing can't represent itself without the creation of metaspace.

Nick also is ignoring all the work on body mapping in the perceptions of the brain.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

For sure thoughts can include references to the thinking process. But that is a quite different proposition from saying that in the expression "my body" the actual thought "my body" is referring to its (the thought's) relationship to the neural substrate. For this to be so the thought itself would have to be referencing itself in the moment. The thought would need to be aware that it was a thought. This would place the thought a priori and is thus idealism.
I do not think anyone is saying that a thought is aware of itself. People have multiple times stated that they are talking about a process, not a thing. The process can produce a sequence of thoughts dealing with the subject of the brain and its internal behavior. The overall process is self-aware, not the individual thoughts.


A complex system, once it is identified as a system, may of course self-reference. This does not mean that each aspect of its interior processing self-references, merely that the system overall has a means of communicating about itself.
Agreed.

~~ Paul

[Nick227]

And what's important is the process. When we discuss thoughts, we're not talking about instantaneous states, we're talking about processes.

Well, processes that manifest as referring to states. The discussion, at this juncture, is about the expression "my body" and what the "my" refers to. I don't see that this has so much to do with actual processes understood through third party examination. "My" is not a gerund here. That is simply not, I submit, how the word is understood. You can try and reframe things to construct it as so, but that's up to you.

What you appear to be saying, if I understand you right, is that your personal understanding of what thinking is is causing you to re-evaluate your own thinking processes, or rather causing the human system to re-orientate itself. If so, why not just say that?

To think of a thought as an is rather than a does is to import idealism into a material process.

Not so. It could be used to import idealism into a material process, it does not have to do so. It does so only if one considers that thought precedes materiality.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

Well, processes that manifest as referring to states. The discussion, at this juncture, is about the expression "my body" and what the "my" refers to. I don't see that this has so much to do with actual processes understood through third party examination. "My" is not a gerund here. That is simply not, I submit, how the word is understood. You can try and reframe things to construct it as so, but that's up to you.
Again, your argument rests on your personal understanding of the common usage of specific words. This has less than nothing to do with what actually happens.

What you appear to be saying, if I understand you right, is that your personal understanding of what thinking is is causing you to re-evaluate your own thinking processes, or rather causing the human system to re-orientate itself. If so, why not just say that?
Because it's irrelevant.

Not so. It could be used to import idealism into a material process, it does not have to do so. It does so only if one considers that thought precedes materiality.
If you want to claim this this, then all you need to do is provide a coherent definition of thought as a material object.

[Nick227]

Your submission is in disagreement with all available material evidence in the fields of cognitive and computer science. Neurons are discrete. Bits are discrete. The substrate is discrete. The processes that arise on the substrates are not discrete.

Fair enough. But they do manifest as so.

Do you have anything resembling a proof of this? Even an informal logical argument?

Have you ever witnessed a thought refer to itself? As I see it, there is thinking. It cannot be about itself because the only aspect that it has is referential to other phenomena. What aspect does thinking have that could be referred to?

I don't think you are making much headway here, given that most of us are programmers who work with self-referential processes every day, by simply asserting that we are wrong.

Well, I've been pointing out a couple of things. Firstly, earlier on, that the very concept of a "self-referential system" is inevitably weak as it relies on there being present a process which attributes selfhood. Thus "the system" is entirely dependent on this function to be considered a self in the first place. (Or, in the case of "third party" attribution of self, it requires that this party has itself a process attributing self present that it may be projected onto the system being examined). Secondly, that in considering that the process of thinking constructs a model of self as an inner, causative agent, one might alter this by considering that this agent is actually the whole organism. However, in doing so, certain paradoxial propositions, such as "my body" appear. Perhaps this could be overcome by considering that nouns and prepositions are actually dative constructs, something I'm not much convinced about as yet!

Nick

[Nick227]

Again, your argument rests on your personal understanding of the common usage of specific words. This has less than nothing to do with what actually happens.

What actually happens at a neural level may be significant but the internal models and understandings that arise are inevitably the guts of it as the topic being discussed is the effect of creating a narrative self and how it happens.

Because it's irrelevant.

You may not consider it relevant but I think that if you are going to start rearranging the internal conceptual structure of language prior to engaging in a discussion then it seems to me to be at least reasonable to let people know. The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed. I'm not attempting to devalue it, merely putting in some context.


If you want to claim this this, then all you need to do is provide a coherent definition of thought as a material object.[/QUOTE]

Well, thinking can still be a material process that infers the existence of fixed states.

Nick

[rocketdodger]

Fair enough. But they do manifest as so.

Do you have evidence to support this statement? For example, can you describe what a "discrete thought" is like, and name a few instances of them?

Have you ever witnessed a thought refer to itself?

Absolutely. The thought "I am thinking about this thought."

As I see it, there is thinking. It cannot be about itself because the only aspect that it has is referential to other phenomena. What aspect does thinking have that could be referred to?

If thinking could not be referred to, then how would we be able to have a discussion about it?

However, in doing so, certain paradoxial propositions, such as "my body" appear.

It is only paradoxial to you. It is tautological to materialists.

[rocketdodger]

What actually happens at a neural level may be significant but the internal models and understandings that arise are inevitably the guts of it as the topic being discussed is the effect of creating a narrative self and how it happens.

No. This is why you just don't get it -- you really are an idealist to begin with.

What actually happens at a neural level is of paramount importance.

You may not consider it relevant but I think that if you are going to start rearranging the internal conceptual structure of language prior to engaging in a discussion then it seems to me to be at least reasonable to let people know. The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed. I'm not attempting to devalue it, merely putting in some context.

Wait -- I thought we were talking about materialists. Now we are talking about "the vast majority of humans?"

Your argument was that materialists who use personal pronouns are subconsciously dualists. We have shown that to be false because yes, we really know what we are talking about.

Now you want to move the goalposts and argue "the vast majority of humans are subconsciously dualists, even if materialists are not." Well... ok, but what does that have to do with the OP? The vast majority of humans are also clueless when it comes to science and objectivity in general. So where are you going with this now?

[Nick227]

Do you have evidence to support this statement? For example, can you describe what a "discrete thought" is like, and name a few instances of them?

This entire thread is composed of informational packets.

Absolutely. The thought "I am thinking about this thought."

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.

If thinking could not be referred to, then how would we be able to have a discussion about it?

The point is that a thought cannot refer to itself. That thinking is recognised as a phenomena is not in dispute.

It is only paradoxial to you. It is tautological to materialists.

Well, Dennett considers it a reflection of the benign user illusion, Blackmore that of a pernicious memeplex. I'm no expert but from what I've read I'd say you're pretty much on your own with considering it just tautological.

I don't think many who've been involved in this area actually doubt that thinking tends to cause the organism to conceptualise self as an inner, causative agent - the seeming possessor of various attributes and capabilities - and that this is not how things actually are. This disparity between notional self and actual self (however it might be constructed) is, I submit, well accepted. The cognitive neuroscientist, Steven Pinker, for example, writes specifically about how even grammar reflects this notion, citing various non-reflexive verbal constructions that proclude the speaker from reassigning subject and object in situations where this reflexion would disinfer self as an inner agent of causation. Blackmore considers the narrative self as purely memetic. Dennett asks if the statement we've been looking at can really be considered just a "bizarre and pointless tautology." I don't think there's so much dispute out there.

Nick

[Nick227]

No. This is why you just don't get it -- you really are an idealist to begin with.

What actually happens at a neural level is of paramount importance.

But the effect is to create an illusory self. In considering how this comes about so one can examine not just neurons. One can consider language. One can consider culture. One can consider evolution.

That thinking arises from neuronal activity is not in dispute. But thinking tends to create this illusory narrative self, and it is not so likely that the reason for this will be found neuronally.



Your argument was that materialists who use personal pronouns are subconsciously dualists. We have shown that to be false because yes, we really know what we are talking about.

That was not my argument, though I appreciate that such a position would be a great deal easier to dispute and that it could thus be attractive to you.

Now you want to move the goalposts and argue "the vast majority of humans are subconsciously dualists, even if materialists are not."

Not my position either. You're making a rather suspect use of quote marks here, RD. I haven't written that and it would be nice if you could maintain basic standards of honesty in communication.

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

I'm no expert but from what I've read I'd say you're pretty much on your own with considering it just tautological.

I think "Dennett's straw man" was probably the thing that people criticized him the most for. It even got a wiki-mention: The now standard response to Dennett’s project is that he has picked a fight with a straw man. Cartesian materialism, it is alleged, is an impossibly naive account of phenomenal consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Consequently, whatever the effectiveness of Dennett’s demolition job, it is fundamentally misdirected (see, e.g., Block, 1993, 1995; Shoemaker, 1993; and Tye, 1993).

Moreover, Dennet seems to have moved on from his "multiple drafts" metaphor toward that of "fame in the brain". He also seems to be interested in the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness (promoted by Baars). Blackmore acknowledges that there is indeed a sort of consensus among many scientists that GW in some form or another might be a fruitful approach. It seems that Blackmore, who criticizes it, seems to be in the minority here.

[Nick227]

Absolutely. The thought "I am thinking about this thought."

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.

To add...personally, if I was trying to prove my own point wrong, I would probably cite something more along the lines of "This thought is not very long," because bringing selfhood into it just complicates things, if you ask me. However, I would more consider this merely an attempt to create a thought that appears to self-reference, through fulfilling certain criteria, rather than actual self-reference. The point is arguable.

Nick

[Nick227]

I think "Dennett's straw man" was probably the thing that people criticized him the most for. It even got a wiki-mention:

Moreover, Dennet seems to have moved on from his "multiple drafts" metaphor toward that of "fame in the brain". He also seems to be interested in the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness (promoted by Baars). Blackmore acknowledges that there is indeed a sort of consensus among many scientists that GW in some form or another might be a fruitful approach. It seems that Blackmore, who criticizes it, seems to be in the minority here.

If I recall, Blackmore's criticism was that Barrs doesn't really address the issue of subjective states. I think she quotes Barrs' own crits of his model, but I don't have her book to hand. I would like to read more of Barrs' work and of higher-order process models in general, but at this point it doesn't seem to me that they really deal with selfhood properly. I could be wrong.

However, it's not clear for me that any of this really relates to the specific point here. Does Barrs' model really assert that a narrative self, as typically concieved of though thinking, actually does exist?

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

A minor nitpick, the name is actually Baars (2x a).
Does Barrs' model really assert that a narrative self, as typically concieved of though thinking, actually does exist?
I don't think so, but I guess it would always depend on what you mean by "actually". I mean, the narrative self is by definition already a kind of closed deal (it assumes its very abstract conclusion), and thus not a very satisfying approach. It doesn't really tell us anything empirically, thus we must venture into neuronal space. The view on selfhood could look very different from there, hence why he proposes particular brain regions as potentially important for different aspects of selfhood.

[rocketdodger]

This entire thread is composed of informational packets.

The fact that humans communicate in what may be considered discrete messages does not imply that the thoughts leading to those communications are also discrete.

As I said, give me an example of a discrete thought. Hint: For a thought to be discrete, it would have to lead to no other thoughts.

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.

The thought is the entire statement. And the statement references itself. You are just wrong, Nick.

The point is that a thought cannot refer to itself.

Why not? Are you ever going to give a logically sound argument for this claim of yours?

[rocketdodger]

That thinking arises from neuronal activity is not in dispute. But thinking tends to create this illusory narrative self, and it is not so likely that the reason for this will be found neuronally.

The "why" probably won't be found neuronally. The "how" must be.

You seem to be interested in the "why." Fine. But that has nothing to do with whether materialists know what they are talking about when it comes to "self." That has everything to do with the "how."

And that is precisely what you have been ignoring or discounting the entire time you have been a member of this forum. The "how."

That was not my argument, though I appreciate that such a position would be a great deal easier to dispute and that it could thus be attractive to you.

Then why do you always respond to our explanations by asking us to formulate statements in the third person objective?

Not my position either. You're making a rather suspect use of quote marks here, RD. I haven't written that and it would be nice if you could maintain basic standards of honesty in communication.

Then why have you started using excuses like this when presented with logically sound refutations of your claims:

The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed.

You're making a rather suspect use of quote marks here, RD. I haven't written that and it would be nice if you could maintain basic standards of honesty in communication.

Because we have the quote function on this forum, the use of standard quotation marks is extended to include more than simply a direct quote.

If you don't agree with my speculations, then you are free to refute them -- tell us what your actual argument is!

What usually happens around here is people don't know what they are arguing and they get defensive when they see someone try to figure it out for them. Is that the case with you, Nick?

[PixyMisa]

What actually happens at a neural level may be significant but the internal models and understandings that arise are inevitably the guts of it as the topic being discussed is the effect of creating a narrative self and how it happens.
Even if I grant that, your argument is still entirely beside the point.

You may not consider it relevant but I think that if you are going to start rearranging the internal conceptual structure of language prior to engaging in a discussion then it seems to me to be at least reasonable to let people know.
I'm not "rearranging the internal conceptual structure".

I'm defining my terms.

An exercise that would do you a world of good.

The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed.
I don't agree at all. And it's still irrelevant.

I'm not attempting to devalue it, merely putting in some context.
In a way that is simultaneously irrelevant, unsupported, and incorrect.

Well, thinking can still be a material process that infers the existence of fixed states.
How? (And you mean implies. Well, I assume you mean implies. Infers is also grammatically correct in this instance, but that would make your statement rather circular.)

[PixyMisa]

This entire thread is composed of informational packets.
True.

But are they thoughts? In a colloquial or metaphorical sense, perhaps, but once again that is just irrelevant.

Are they thoughts as thoughts are thought? No. They are expressions of thoughts.

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.
None of which is apposite.

The point is that a thought cannot refer to itself.
Wrong! Since it is trivially provable that an expression of a thought can refer to itself, it is necessary also that a thought can refer to itself.

That thinking is recognised as a phenomena is not in dispute.
Small mercies...

I don't think many who've been involved in this area actually doubt that thinking tends to cause the organism to conceptualise self as an inner, causative agent - the seeming possessor of various attributes and capabilities - and that this is not how things actually are. This disparity between notional self and actual self (however it might be constructed) is, I submit, well accepted. The cognitive neuroscientist, Steven Pinker, for example, writes specifically about how even grammar reflects this notion, citing various non-reflexive verbal constructions that proclude the speaker from reassigning subject and object in situations where this reflexion would disinfer self as an inner agent of causation. Blackmore considers the narrative self as purely memetic. Dennett asks if the statement we've been looking at can really be considered just a "bizarre and pointless tautology." I don't think there's so much dispute out there.
Yeah, well, what you are talking about here is, once again, language.

And the appropriate response to any argument about the nature of reality based on the nature of language is a punch in the snoot. If language disagrees with reality, language is wrong. So what? Language is often wrong.

This is why scientists define their terms.

And this also is why your argument is entirely specious.

[Nick227]

The fact that humans communicate in what may be considered discrete messages does not imply that the thoughts leading to those communications are also discrete.

Does it not? I would have thought that it would have implied it. Might not be true, but I think it would at least imply it.

As I said, give me an example of a discrete thought. Hint: For a thought to be discrete, it would have to lead to no other thoughts.

Perhaps there is a state change brought about by the thought that creates more thoughts.

I mean, I'm happy to admit that I don't know much about the neurobiology of thinking. Do you? I'm interested.

The thought is the entire statement. And the statement references itself. You are just wrong, Nick.

Well, obviously we have to define just what we term a thought. As I'm arguing from a more experiential, "how it seems" aspect and you from more biological perspective it seems clear we're not going to meet here.

How much is now known about the nature of thinking? Maybe this would help.

Nick

[Nick227]

Because we have the quote function on this forum, the use of standard quotation marks is extended to include more than simply a direct quote.

If you don't agree with my speculations, then you are free to refute them -- tell us what your actual argument is!

What usually happens around here is people don't know what they are arguing and they get defensive when they see someone try to figure it out for them. Is that the case with you, Nick?

Well, this is what you wrote...

Now you want to move the goalposts and argue "the vast majority of humans are subconsciously dualists, even if materialists are not."

You put quote marks around a statement which to my mind clearly attributed it to me. Yet I did not write this nor anything particularly like it, as far as I'm aware.

I mean, we're none of us perfect in communication, certainly not me, and emotions get a bit high in these kinds of discussions. But for me this is definitely crossing a line. It's intellectual dishonesty. I'm not trying to make a massive deal out of it, but I do find your behaviour here crossing a line.

Nick

[Nick227]

Even if I grant that, your argument is still entirely beside the point.

Right. So, in trying to determine the inner workings of a machine it is beside the point to examine the finished product it creates? Do me a favour, Pixy. I submit, the typical model of selfhood the human has is that of there existing an inner, causative agent that is responsible for what they do. We know this model is incorrect. Yet it is the model that the machine usually creates.

I'm not "rearranging the internal conceptual structure".

I'm defining my terms.

You are defining terms, yes, in a manner, a manner which rearranges how language is conceived of referring internally. Nothing wrong with that. But, for me, it would be greatly more constructive an approach to point out that the phrase "my body" appears to be tautological because of how we typical interpret the words "my body," rather than simply to charge off into claiming that the thoughts are referring to their relationship with their substrate.

Nick

[Dancing David]

The fact that humans communicate in what may be considered discrete messages does not imply that the thoughts leading to those communications are also discrete.

As I said, give me an example of a discrete thought. Hint: For a thought to be discrete, it would have to lead to no other thoughts.





Which by defintion would be a real problem as 'thoughts' are very fuzzy they are not limited in area or association, they are very plastic in terms of how the brain functions. It is more like a vote in a democratic body than anything else.

[Nick227]

Yeah, well, what you are talking about here is, once again, language.

And the appropriate response to any argument about the nature of reality based on the nature of language is a punch in the snoot. If language disagrees with reality, language is wrong. So what? Language is often wrong.

Am I to take it then that you would refute that language could be in any way responsible for aspects of neural function?

Consider that we have an organism, traditionally understood to have developed solely from genetic natural selection, that has developed this massive brain for little visible purpose, that creates a deeply flawed notion of self. I mean, why would this happen unless there are other forces driving the process?

Nick

[Nick227]

A minor nitpick, the name is actually Baars (2x a).

Thanks. To nitpick back, Dennett has 2 x t!

I don't think so, but I guess it would always depend on what you mean by "actually". I mean, the narrative self is by definition already a kind of closed deal (it assumes its very abstract conclusion), and thus not a very satisfying approach. It doesn't really tell us anything empirically, thus we must venture into neuronal space. The view on selfhood could look very different from there, hence why he proposes particular brain regions as potentially important for different aspects of selfhood.

It doesn't tell us much about the nature of the brain, for sure. However, I do find it interesting that this machine, so adept at so many things, would create what is in many ways an acutely disfunctional model of self. It will be very exciting, I think, when the whole thing is unravelled and just how it does it is laid bare.

Nick

[PixyMisa]

Am I to take it then that you would refute that language could be in any way responsible for aspects of neural function?
How is that even relevant?

Consider that we have an organism, traditionally understood to have developed solely from genetic natural selection, that has developed this massive brain for little visible purpose, that creates a deeply flawed notion of self.
Why should I consider that? It's just evolution buried under a pile of unsupported assumptions.

I mean, why would this happen unless there are other forces driving the process?
Why shouldn't it?

[PixyMisa]

Right. So, in trying to determine the inner workings of a machine it is beside the point to examine the finished product it creates?
Depends on the machine.

If the machine is a computer, then yes, it is entirely beside the point.

Failure modes, on the other hand, illuminate function marvellously.

Do me a favour, Pixy. I submit, the typical model of selfhood the human has is that of there existing an inner, causative agent that is responsible for what they do. We know this model is incorrect. Yet it is the model that the machine usually creates.
Even if I grant that, it is irrelevant.

You are defining terms, yes, in a manner, a manner which rearranges how language is conceived of referring internally.
You mean, my definitions are different to yours.

Nothing wrong with that.
Particularly since I am right and you are wrong.

But, for me, it would be greatly more constructive an approach to point out that the phrase "my body" appears to be tautological because of how we typical interpret the words "my body," rather than simply to charge off into claiming that the thoughts are referring to their relationship with their substrate.
For you, perhaps. In the real world, no.

[lupus_in_fabula]

It doesn't tell us much about the nature of the brain, for sure. However, I do find it interesting that this machine, so adept at so many things, would create what is in many ways an acutely disfunctional model of self. It will be very exciting, I think, when the whole thing is unravelled and just how it does it is laid bare.

Well, I don't know what exactly it is you mean by dysfunctional. What would be the opposite to dysfunctional in this case, and how would we measure the level of functionality?

[Nick227]

Well, I don't know what exactly it is you mean by dysfunctional. What would be the opposite to dysfunctional in this case, and how would we measure the level of functionality?

I consider the narrative self disfunctional in that it has no physical existence yet appears to do so. The organism creating it typically believes that there is some inner self there - some inner agent that is causing it to act, that is having beliefs, possessing things etc. Yet there is not. I mean, this dichotomy cannot be healthy. It cannot be healthy to intellectually model self in a manner that is quite different from how it is. There are all sorts of issues that could arise, because the organism has its biological needs, and then it also has all the needs of this non-existing narrative self. There will inevitably be conflicts.

I mean, it's a long and interesting discussion (well, would be for me anyway!)

Nick

[Nick227]

Why should I consider that? It's just evolution buried under a pile of unsupported assumptions.

Why shouldn't it?

As far as I know, no one has come up with a well-accepted gene-based explanation for the considerable expansion in human brain size over the last couple of million years. Thus it seems reasonable to me to consider that there may be other replicators operating on us - memes.

If units of cultural information are now driving the brain's evolution then to me this creates further concern about the narrative self. It may be that it is barely functioning according to genetic need at all. It could simply be a parasitic entity infesting the organism and directing its energy towards fulfilling the meme's drive for continued existence. This is Blackmore's hypothesis.

Anyway, we're drifting OT well and truly now, but these things do concern me.

Nick

[Nick227]

Moreover, Dennet seems to have moved on from his "multiple drafts" metaphor toward that of "fame in the brain". He also seems to be interested in the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness (promoted by Baars). Blackmore acknowledges that there is indeed a sort of consensus among many scientists that GW in some form or another might be a fruitful approach. It seems that Blackmore, who criticizes it, seems to be in the minority here.

I read some more background here and it seems to me that Dennett's "fame in the brain" idea is essentially a condensation of GW with MD. Both anyway consider the brain to be a parallel processor. MD is more a philosophical model, as I see it, and GW at least moving towards neurobiology. Issues still occur with selfhood, though it seems not so much because of the GW model itself, but rather in how human scientists attempt to understand it.

Some seem to consider that Dennett has done a considerable volte-face by looking at GW, because of it's overtly theatrical imagery. I would say, however, that this just demonstrates a rather superficial understanding on their part. I'm pretty sure Baars himself states that no one is watching the theatre. The GW "broadcast" is consciousness, is fame in the brain. It is not observed. The big, weird issue with MD, that of not being able to make an authoritative statement of just what exactly is present in consciousness at any point in time, still remains. It's not clear for me how this sits with GW.

Anyway, personally, I figure Dennett and MD are still going strong, and Cartesian Materialism alive and well and still thriving in the minds of many a consciousness researcher today!

Nick

[lupus_in_fabula]

I read some more background here and it seems to me that Dennett's "fame in the brain" idea is essentially a condensation of GW with MD. Both anyway consider the brain to be a parallel processor. MD is more a philosophical model, as I see it, and GW at least moving towards neurobiology. Issues still occur with selfhood, though it seems not so much because of the GW model itself, but rather in how human scientists attempt to understand it.

Some seem to consider that Dennett has done a considerable volte-face by looking at GW, because of it's overtly theatrical imagery. I would say, however, that this just demonstrates a rather superficial understanding on their part. I'm pretty sure Baars himself states that no one is watching the theatre. The GW "broadcast" is consciousness, is fame in the brain. It is not observed. The big, weird issue with MD, that of not being able to make an authoritative statement of just what exactly is present in consciousness at any point in time, still remains. It's not clear for me how this sits with GW.

Anyway, personally, I figure Dennett and MD are still going strong, and Cartesian Materialism alive and well and still thriving in the minds of many a consciousness researcher today!

I think the whole objection against Cartesian Materialism is somewhat of an amusing straw man here. The danger with creating such a straw man is of course that people who strongly crusade against it from a philosophical point of view, might ultimately get it wrong on the empirical plane, which is indeed what seems to have happened to Dennett. He rejected the notion that 'no one is filling in' apparent holes in visual information due to blind spots (which is correct), thus he also proposed that the visual system doesn't do such 'filling in' at all because there's no need for it (which apparently is incorrect). The visual cortex seems to indeed be involved in such a process.

I don't think him being wrong at that point refutes his general model though (although some do). I think however that his model was, and still is, ultimately just a metaphor, which should be kept in mind. His new metaphor – "fame in the brain" – is a way of consolidating new empirical finding with his philosophical framework. Empirical findings should change the philosophical framework, not the other way around. Philosophical straw men are never reliable platforms for predicting what's actually happening. Dennett's movement towards GW should be seen in the light of new empirical evidence surfacing – i.e. in relation to information that wasn't available when he wrote his book almost two decades ago.

I'm pretty sure new findings will give rise to yet another metaphor by him eventually.

[Nick227]

I think the whole objection against Cartesian Materialism is somewhat of an amusing straw man here. The danger with creating such a straw man is of course that people who strongly crusade against it from a philosophical point of view, might ultimately get it wrong on the empirical plane, which is indeed what seems to have happened to Dennett. He rejected the notion that 'no one is filling in' apparent holes in visual information due to blind spots (which is correct), thus he also proposed that the visual system doesn't do such 'filling in' at all because there's no need for it (which apparently is incorrect). The visual cortex seems to indeed be involved in such a process.

What I recall, and I stress that my memory and understanding isn't perfect here, was that Dennett claimed that "filling in" couldn't take place, presumably because there was no one for whom it was needed. Ramachandran discovered that filling in did take place. It would seem to me that the GW model might explain this inconsistency... if we say that consciousness is but GW on "broadcast" then perhaps the filling in is undertaken for the benefit of the other modules being broadcast to.

I don't think him being wrong at that point refutes his general model though (although some do).

Plenty of researchers seem only too willing to dismiss Dennett at any given opportunity. He took a real stand, I think, and created the basis for a workable model that still dominates the field, if you ask me, today.

The issue, as I've said several times in this thread, is that it does not really matter if you have a PhD and 20 years experience working with AI or cognitive neuroscience. You are still going to struggle on a personal level with Dennett's MD model unless you've really been able to examine your mind's own personal investment in selfhood. Dennett's model is so counter-intuitive there will inevitably be resistance, particularly amongst a group of people so used to using their heads. So I think he's right to have a pop at those he calls "Cartesian Materialists." It brings the real issue back to the surface repeatedly.

I think however that his model was, and still is, ultimately just a metaphor, which should be kept in mind. His new metaphor – "fame in the brain" – is a way of consolidating new empirical finding with his philosophical framework. Empirical findings should change the philosophical framework, not the other way around. Philosophical straw men are never reliable platforms for predicting what's actually happening. Dennett's movement towards GW should be seen in the light of new empirical evidence surfacing – i.e. in relation to information that wasn't available when he wrote his book almost two decades ago.

Yes. I'm going to have a go at reading one of Baars' books. I like his model, what I've seen of it. He's bringing Freud back in, as I see it. Its Freud + Dennett, basically - a winning combination!

Nick

[AWPrime]

Plenty of researchers seem only too willing to dismiss Dennett at any given opportunity. He took a real stand, I think, and created the basis for a workable model that still dominates the field, if you ask me, today.You contradict yourself. He dominates but the flied dismisses him? That sounds like its only dominates the minds of those that believe in it.

The issue, as I've said several times in this thread, is that it does not really matter if you have a PhD and 20 years experience working with AI or cognitive neuroscience. You are still going to struggle on a personal level with Dennett's MD model unless you've really been able to examine your mind's own personal investment in selfhood. Dennett's model is so counter-intuitive there will inevitably be resistance, particularly amongst a group of people so used to using their heads. Or its just simply that flawed, that its only used by people who overlook the 'counter-intuitive' nature of it because of their personal investment.

[Nick227]

You contradict yourself. He dominates but the flied dismisses him? That sounds like its only dominates the minds of those that believe in it.

Well, Dennett's model is still dominant, if you ask me, and does deal with the issue of selfhood which, as most commentators admit, is finally the core issue. It seems to me consistent with Baars' GWT, and in addition does deal with the issue of selfhood, which Baars' model, as I understand it, did not set out to do.

The remaining issue, imo, is not so much to do with the model itself but rather that many researchers still cannot themselves mentally model MD (or GWT without a self) because it is so counter-intuitive.

Or its just simply that flawed, that its only used by people who overlook the 'counter-intuitive' nature of it because of their personal investment.

I think we all know what the intuitive model of self looks like, and that actually it isn't like this in the brain. There's no "cpu." There's no homunculus. No one is watching. It's tough to reconcile what we know with "how it feels it should be inside," but Dennett's model provides a means to do so.

Nick

[AWPrime]

You're just repeating your statement.
"if you ask me" -> Personal opinion, not fact.

The remaining issue, imo, is not so much to do with the model itself but rather that many researchers still cannot themselves mentally model MD (or GWT without a self) because it is so counter-intuitive.Again you confirm that it isn't dominant and frankly unworkable (a good indication of a failed model).

Even your strawman of the intuitive model doesn't help, because most us the material process version, which has nothing to do with that strawman.

[Nick227]

You're just repeating your statement.
"if you ask me" -> Personal opinion, not fact.

Again you confirm that it isn't dominant and frankly unworkable (a good indication of a failed model).

Even your strawman of the intuitive model doesn't help, because most us the material process version, which has nothing to do with that strawman.

What are your actual issues with Multiple Drafts? Please state them and then we can look. Go on, show me you actually have the first understanding of the subject matter.

Lupus mentioned "filling-in." Fair enough. Now you have a go. What are the real issues for you?

Nick

[AWPrime]

What are your actual issues with Multiple Drafts?

One of the foundations of the theory was the conflict between Orwellian (post-experiential) or Stalinesque (pre-experiential) false perception hypotheses. When/where this occurs in the brain is what Dennett calls the 'Cartesian theater'. He then refuted the 'Cartesian theater' by saying that there is no privileged place in the brain where consciousness starts, in other words no theater.

However the 'Cartesian theater' is nothing more then a strawman, Dennet was the one that introduced it and stated that this is the limit of materialism. That view is false; he constructed his strawman by simplifying and limiting both the perception problem and materialism.

On review he should have known that his theory would be outdated.

Its clear that the mind is a continuous process and that different areas of the brain are optimized for different tasks. The former nukes the notion of drafts and the latter does tell us there are distinguishable sections.
This leads to the conclusion that the mind has sub-processes and that the consciousness, as part of the mind, covers a set of these sub-processes. It requires no 'theater' and is still materialistic.

[Nick227]

One of the foundations of the theory was the conflict between Orwellian (post-experiential) or Stalinesque (pre-experiential) false perception hypotheses. When/where this occurs in the brain is what Dennett calls the 'Cartesian theater'. He then refuted the 'Cartesian theater' by saying that there is no privileged place in the brain where consciousness starts, in other words no theater.

What I recall is that Dennett observed different ways in which the brain integrates perceptual information, labelling the options Stalinesque or Orwellian revisions. I don't recall him claiming that this took place in Cartesian Theatre. As I understand it, Dennett's Cartesian Theatre referred to the notion that information is somehow "entering consciousness" at one place in the brain, possibly or possibly not with some observing entity or system present.

However the 'Cartesian theater' is nothing more then a strawman, Dennet was the one that introduced it and stated that this is the limit of materialism.

Could you cite me where Dennett states this?

That view is false; he constructed his strawman by simplifying and limiting both the perception problem and materialism.

On review he should have known that his theory would be outdated.

Its clear that the mind is a continuous process and that different areas of the brain are optimized for different tasks. The former nukes the notion of drafts and the latter does tell us there are distinguishable sections.
This leads to the conclusion that the mind has sub-processes and that the consciousness, as part of the mind, covers a set of these sub-processes. It requires no 'theater' and is still materialistic.

But Dennett is a materialist. He's a strong AI theorist.

What do you mean by "mind" here? If you mean "consciousness" then, yes, there is the sense of it being a continuous process, but what I understand Dennett to be saying is that it is not really possible to articulate at any point in time just what the so-called "contents of consciousness" are, what really is definitively happening. The brain is a parallel processor and the action of interrogating one of the drafts being continuously created has a result, but you have no way to assert that it is definitively accurate. As I understand it, this viewpoint is echoed in Blackmore's assertion that there is no such thing as a "stream of consciousness."

I don't see Cartesian Materialism as Dennett's straw man. I see it as a valid label for a still prevalent contradiction between behaviour and belief noticeable in certain researchers. Happy to be proven wrong!

Nick

[Nick227]

But Dennett is a materialist. He's a strong AI theorist.

What do you mean by "mind" here? If you mean "consciousness" then, yes, there is the sense of it being a continuous process, but what I understand Dennett to be saying is that it is not really possible to articulate at any point in time just what the so-called "contents of consciousness" are, what really is definitively happening. The brain is a parallel processor and the action of interrogating one of the drafts being continuously created has a result, but you have no way to assert that it is definitively accurate. As I understand it, this viewpoint is echoed in Blackmore's assertion that there is no such thing as a "stream of consciousness."

I don't see Cartesian Materialism as Dennett's straw man. I see it as a valid label for a still prevalent contradiction between behaviour and belief noticeable in certain researchers. Happy to be proven wrong!

Nick

Hi AW,

Did you run out of Wikipedia articles to rip off for criticisms of Multiple Drafts?

Nick

[AWPrime]

Actually I completely forgot about this thread.

What I recall is that Dennett observed different ways in which the brain integrates perceptual information, labelling the options Stalinesque or Orwellian revisions. I don't recall him claiming that this took place in Cartesian Theatre. As I understand it, Dennett's Cartesian Theatre referred to the notion that information is somehow "entering consciousness" at one place in the brain, possibly or possibly not with some observing entity or system present.Don'/can't you see the connection?

Could you cite me where Dennett states this?The term was coined by him.

It requires no 'theater' and is still materialistic. But Dennett is a materialist. He's a strong AI theorist.That little section was actually a FYI for our resident idealist/dualist (that being you).

What do you mean by "mind" here? If you can't understand terms such as "mind" and "consciousness", then why are you here?

I don't see Cartesian Materialism as Dennett's straw man. I see it as a valid label for a still prevalent contradiction between behaviour and belief noticeable in certain researchers. Happy to be proven wrong!You must mean 'Cartesian Theatre', other wise you fail English. Also you have yet to show any contradiction.

[Nick227]

Don'/can't you see the connection?

Yes, there's a connection. But I don't consider the crits that the Wiki entry puts up against MD to be really such big deals. The basic model is great. I understand why Cartesian Theatre could be termed a straw man but to me to do so is not to really understand Dennett's perspective.

The idea he repeatedly tries to introduce, as does Blackmore, is that it is quite one thing to claim to have rejected Cartesian Dualism, but quite another to demonstrate this in the models of consciousness that one creates.

The term was coined by him.

Then you shouldn't have any problem citing me where Dennett says that "Cartesian Theatre is the limit of materialism."


If you can't understand terms such as "mind" and "consciousness", then why are you here?

I was not aware that there was an agreed definition of these terms. Would you care to point me to where it is.

You must mean 'Cartesian Theatre', other wise you fail English. Also you have yet to show any contradiction.

Cartesian Theatre is the model, Cartesian Materialist is the person who adheres to the model - consciously or otherwise. Dennett coined the latter term to refer to those who claimed to be materialist yet who's modelling of the inner circuitry in the brain still demonstrated duality. Typical examples of this include "trying to find a place in the brain where it all comes together in consciousness" and "trying to find a lone neuron or similar that is observing the theatre."

Nick

[AWPrime]

You obviously have little understanding of the subject, go read some more and then come back (pm me when your ready).