Idealists: What does 'physical' mean to you? [Archive]

Malerin

16th December 2008, 06:57 PM

Malerin offered an answer in another thread, which I trust I can move here in order to respond -

As I've asked for your own definition, I cannot state that you're wrong. I can point out that this definition isn't a useful one, however.

Well, it delineates materialism/physicalism from idealism. If reality is idealistic, then nothing can exist indepedent of being perceived or thought of. Under my definition, a universe consisting of non-intelligent stuff (for example, just hydrogen and helium) would only be possible in a materialistic reality. That kind of universe can't exist if idealism is true.

First of all, we're heading down an obvious path of constant definitions - the next one would be 'define matter' (which I assume you've anticipated). And, indeed, this is the path physicists have already walked this past century, and one we've paused at with regards to 'define information?'.

Which is why I made my definition fairly vague. I don't want to have pages of debate over definitions. I would just say matter is "stuff" which exists independent of thought and perception and when combined in certain ways makes "things" (which are also indepedent of thought and perception). I think the key is that a physical thing (e.g., chair made of atoms) can exist indepedent of mind while an immaterial or idealistic thing (e.g., "dream" chair or "bit of software code in Matrix" chair) can't.

In a materialistic reality, if no one's looking at or thinking about a book, it's still there. In an idealistic one, it disappears (or never existed at all). That's a huge difference.

Unfortunately, the 'independent of mind or perception' isn't something implicit in any definition I know of concerning 'physical'. This is not only a pointless distinction, it's a bit like the layman's effort to distinguish man from nature. It can't be done.

I think it's inherent in any definition of physicalism. I don't know of any materialists/physicalists who beleive physical matter exists and is mind-dependent. There are dualists who take that sort of position- that reality consists of physical matter made by God and dependent on God for it's continued existence and obeyance of the laws of nature (I had a metaphysics professor who argued that an electron does what it does because God is constantly intervening).

Perception is itself part of the physical system - if we state categorically within the definition that mind and physics are distinct, we've begged the question (so to speak) on idealism. In other words, within your definition of 'physical' is the premise that there is a distinction between mind and the rest of the universe.

Well, I would say a distinction between mind and what the mind is thinking (or dreaming or perceiving). I'm not sure what you're saying here. Rereading it, I think you're saying that idealism would be dualistic? I have no problem with that. That was the tack Berkeley took and I don't think he was being illogical in any way.

Malerin

16th December 2008, 07:03 PM

Most of the time when I hear "idealism", I think of Platonic idealism, which I think is not what you're referring to. If idealism differs from dualism in some way, I'd like to know how.

Try arguing that with A Course In Miracles believer (i.e., my wife).

"Ok, so there's the illusion and then there's God. Your belief system is dualistic."
"There's no illusion."
"Then what is all this?"
"Illusion."

And then I see what's on TV.

Beth

16th December 2008, 07:45 PM

Well yes, canines are quite intelligent. It could very well turn out that we're all just figments of the imagination of a dog, but have been spelling its name backwards the whole time.

Not only that, my dogs worship me instead of the other way round, so the spelling is not the only thing that's backwards :)

ImaginalDisc

16th December 2008, 08:05 PM

"Justice" exists in the behaviors of material beings. What immateriality is required?

Kevin_Lowe

16th December 2008, 08:16 PM

ETA: I assume by 'idealist' you mean the same thing as 'dualist' - is this correct? I must confess I'm not familiar with the 'idealist' label.

A dualist thinks that the universe contains matter/energy/real-stuff, which interacts by mysterious means with immaterial minds. Descartes was a dualist.

An idealist dispenses with the real stuff, and thinks that the universe consists solely of immaterial minds and mental events. Berkeley was an idealist. The obvious problem with idealism, that objects do not vanish when nobody is looking at them, was resolved in Berkeley's case by assuming the existence of an omniscient God to keep an eye on everything.

A physicalist dispenses with the immaterial minds and thinks that the universe is just made up of stuff, some of which forms minds.

(There's also "neutral monism", made up by idiotic Continental philosophers, which is just dualism plus the idea that the real-stuff and the immaterial mental-stuff are two different manifestations of one underlying reality. It's even dumber than dualism because it clings to the unsupportable idea of immaterial mental-stuff and then posits an extra layer of nonsense which there is no evidence for).

athon

16th December 2008, 09:24 PM

Well, it delineates materialism/physicalism from idealism. If reality is idealistic, then nothing can exist indepedent of being perceived or thought of. Under my definition, a universe consisting of non-intelligent stuff (for example, just hydrogen and helium) would only be possible in a materialistic reality. That kind of universe can't exist if idealism is true.

Fair point. However, as we've been discussing in other threads, how then is idealism any different in principle to monist materialism (as opposed to something like Descarte's dualistic materialism)? I guess I'm trying to nut out how you can define 'material' as distinct from mind at all, if they all operate under the same set of laws and principles.

Which is why I made my definition fairly vague. I don't want to have pages of debate over definitions.I have no problem with not wanting to get bogged down in semantics, however defining precisely what one means by a term can help clarify miscommunications. If by 'physical' you means something different to what I mean, we can't ever agree on definition alone.

If you've never given any thought to it, on the other hand, and left it vague intentionally, it means you yourself can create those same conflicts within your arguments. I'm curious to know if it's own definitions which conflict, or whether you simply don't have a clear understanding of it yourself.

I would just say matter is "stuff" which exists independent of thought and perception and when combined in certain ways makes "things" (which are also indepedent of thought and perception). I think the key is that a physical thing (e.g., chair made of atoms) can exist indepedent of mind while an immaterial or idealistic thing (e.g., "dream" chair or "bit of software code in Matrix" chair) can't.Again, no problem there. However, if one starts with that definition already begging the question in such a way, then there is no way to logically establish it. I could just as well create my own definition for anything and wash my hands of any discussion. If 'physical' only ever refers to that which is external to perception, then you've simply ruled perception out as a physical process by definition, not by logic.

In a materialistic reality, if no one's looking at or thinking about a book, it's still there. In an idealistic one, it disappears (or never existed at all). That's a huge difference.I disagree. I'd say in an idealistic reality, the laws which created your perception of that book cease to continue to do so when you are no longer perceiving it. To state boldly that the book disappears, you're making assumptions that are unsupported by your own observations. You cannot state the book no longer exists, as it conflicts with your very own definition of the book existing at all. See how definitions are now important?

In such a case, idealism is no different to materialism. In both cases, that statement is true. In your version, you've created a contradiction in meanings.

I think it's inherent in any definition of physicalism. I don't know of any materialists/physicalists who beleive physical matter exists and is mind-dependent. There are dualists who take that sort of position- that reality consists of physical matter made by God and dependent on God for it's continued existence and obeyance of the laws of nature (I had a metaphysics professor who argued that an electron does what it does because God is constantly intervening).True. I apologise for creating any confusion.

Well, I would say a distinction between mind and what the mind is thinking (or dreaming or perceiving). I'm not sure what you're saying here. Rereading it, I think you're saying that idealism would be dualistic? I have no problem with that. That was the tack Berkeley took and I don't think he was being illogical in any way.While dualism contains idealist principles, they don't have to be the same. I realise now what I was writing could be read that way, and I apologise for that confusion. I do, however, find it even more illogical than idealism itself.

To clarify, idealism on its own (IMO) seems identical in observation to materialism. Materialism relies on laws predicting how information will be perceived. That's the best that can be done. Beyond that, every speculation is the same as the last. As others have already said, if you want to believe in exactly the same laws that I do, with the added complication of it all being fabricated within a single mind, then go for it. It's not exactly going to be parsimonous, but meh...

Yet if 'physical' is distinguishable from 'mind', this presumes that the mind does not operate under physical laws. Observation clearly dictates otherwise, and logic says they need to interact by the very understanding that a physical 'external' reality is recognised by the mind.

Athon

Dancing David

17th December 2008, 05:30 AM

Roboramma

17th December 2008, 06:47 AM

Okay. As I said, I'm not sure if I qualify as an idealist, only that I've been accused of such. What is it you have in mind? I'm not sure what you are referring to here that isn't covered by solid, liquid or gas.

Plasma? Light?

How about a single hydrogen atom?
An electron?

None of those things fall under the definition you've supplied, but I think it likely that you would classify them as physical.

paximperium

17th December 2008, 07:02 AM

I don't think it is limited to the human brain. In the last week, I saw a story that indicated that dogs have a sense of fairness - i.e. justice.
Are you sure that this is really "justice" or just a man-made(mental process) label we impose into a physical concept?

Whether justice would exist absent all intelligent life in the cosmos is a good question. Do you have any opinion regarding the answer? I haven't made up my mind yet.
As labels go I'm a pragmatic materialist so my answer would be likely no. I believe that many such concepts are byproducts of physical processes. I don;t believe they can exist alone. But if anyone has a great argument against that, I'm open to hearing it.

I think it would be a question akin to whether or not a tree falling makes a sound when there is no intelligent life to hear it.
Well not really. Sound(ie. vibrations) from a falling tree will still occur but will the concept(or label) of "sound" still exist if no intelligence is there to label those vibration's "sound".

Beth

17th December 2008, 07:18 AM

Plasma? Light?

How about a single hydrogen atom?
An electron?

None of those things fall under the definition you've supplied, but I think it likely that you would classify them as physical. With the exception of a single hydrogen atom, actually no, I'm not sure that any of those things should be considered as examples of something physical. It's a very interesting question though and I'm not certain of the answer myself.

Why do you think photons and electrons should be classified as being physical?

As far as plasmas, I simply don't know enough about them to feel confident to classify them either way and, for all I know, they are as ethereal as light and electricity.

Beth

17th December 2008, 07:23 AM

Are you sure that this is really "justice" or just a man-made(mental process) label we impose into a physical concept? What do mean by 'physical concept'? What phrase seems an oxymoron to me.

As labels go I'm a pragmatic materialist so my answer would be likely no. I believe that many such concepts are byproducts of physical processes. I don;t believe they can exist alone. But if anyone has a great argument against that, I'm open to hearing it. I'm not sure if they can exist alone, yet they seem to be discovered rather than invented which implies an existance independent of the minds that are thinking of them. Which is, I think, why I am sometimes labeled an idealist.

Well not really. Sound(ie. vibrations) from a falling tree will still occur but will the concept(or label) of "sound" still exist if no intelligence is there to label those vibration's "sound". Yes, that is the question. I agree that the vibrations will exist. But does the concept of sound exist absent anyone to hear?

Soapy Sam

17th December 2008, 08:13 AM

In the absence of an infinite supply of turtles, there has to be a lowest level of which everything else is "made".
That level must be "made of" itself.

Assuming that strings exist, what are they made of?
I presume they must be made of spacetime. What else is there? On large scales it has emergent properties like duration and volume , while on the small scale it has properties like particles.

I'm biased against the notion of "information". The word is used to mean contradictory ideas- compare Shannon "information / entropy" with the conventional meaning of the word. Too confusing.
Also, information, in either sense is a subjective phenomenon. It requires a mind in order to make any sense as a concept.

I firmly believe in the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics, because I'm Scottish, so it feels right and proper. But I mean the old testament version. Anthropological "I'm OK, you're OK" theories tee me off something awful.
I'm an unreconstructed 19th century scientist, to be honest. Real physics stopped around 1900. Everything later is metaphysics. It has the whiff of the pit about it.
The reason relativity and QM are incompatible is they're both wrong.
Time is absolute. Space is invariant. Light goes as fast as it likes and all's right with the Universe.

Christ, Athon, I don't know. Find a physicist, get him drunk and demand an explanation.

Malerin

17th December 2008, 09:05 AM

Fair point. However, as we've been discussing in other threads, how then is idealism any different in principle to monist materialism (as opposed to something like Descarte's dualistic materialism)? I guess I'm trying to nut out how you can define 'material' as distinct from mind at all, if they all operate under the same set of laws and principles.

I'm not following. Are you asking how is a chair (for example) distinct from a mind if they bother follow the same laws of nature? I don't see the contradiction in defining "physical" as existing independent of mind, even if minds (if they arise from brains) are bound by the same laws of nature.

I have no problem with not wanting to get bogged down in semantics, however defining precisely what one means by a term can help clarify miscommunications. If by 'physical' you means something different to what I mean, we can't ever agree on definition alone.

I don't know how else I can define it. The way I defined it makes a clear distinction between a physical thing and an idealistic thing- the former can exist independent of mind, the latter can't.

If you've never given any thought to it, on the other hand, and left it vague intentionally, it means you yourself can create those same conflicts within your arguments. I'm curious to know if it's own definitions which conflict, or whether you simply don't have a clear understanding of it yourself.

Well, that's the definition I go by. It's pretty standard to classify physical things as things that are made of matter and are not mind-dependent.

Again, no problem there. However, if one starts with that definition already begging the question in such a way, then there is no way to logically establish it.

I don't see the question begging.

I could just as well create my own definition for anything and wash my hands of any discussion. If 'physical' only ever refers to that which is external to perception, then you've simply ruled perception out as a physical process by definition, not by logic.

No, perception (in a physical sense (sight for example)) is light bouncing off an object and striking a light-sensitive area (e.g., retina), producing electrical impulses, etc. Even without a brain to see the object, you would still have the object and the light bouncing off of it. There just wouldn't be anything to perceive it.

I disagree. I'd say in an idealistic reality, the laws which created your perception of that book cease to continue to do so when you are no longer perceiving it. To state boldly that the book disappears, you're making assumptions that are unsupported by your own observations. You cannot state the book no longer exists, as it conflicts with your very own definition of the book existing at all. See how definitions are now important?

I don't see the contradiction. In an idealistic reality, the book only exists because it is either being perceived or being thought of. That is a necessary condition for its existence. I think you might be confusing necessary condition with sufficient condition. Anyway, if you take away the necessary condition (i.e., the mind thinking of or perceiving the book), then the book cannot exist.

In a materialistic/physicalistic reality, this necessary condition doesn't exist (things exist on their own), and that is at the heart of the difference between idealism and materialism.

In such a case, idealism is no different to materialism. In both cases, that statement is true. In your version, you've created a contradiction in meanings.

I don't understand. In an idealist reality, the book disappears without a perceiver or thinker. In a materialist reality it doesn't disappear.

While dualism contains idealist principles, they don't have to be the same. I realise now what I was writing could be read that way, and I apologise for that confusion. I do, however, find it even more illogical than idealism itself.

Dualism can mean different things. Some take it to mean a mixture of materialism/immaterialism (rocks and angels). It can also mean that a theory has two components (e.g., idealism is dualistic because there is mind and what the mind is perceiving or thinking of).

To clarify, idealism on its own (IMO) seems identical in observation to materialism.

"In observation" is the key phrase. Fundamentally, they are very different models of reality.

Materialism relies on laws predicting how information will be perceived. That's the best that can be done. Beyond that, every speculation is the same as the last. As others have already said, if you want to believe in exactly the same laws that I do, with the added complication of it all being fabricated within a single mind, then go for it. It's not exactly going to be parsimonous, but meh...

Well, now you're getting into epistemology. We might not be able to tell what kind of reality we're in, but our inability to know isn't a reflection on reality itself.

Yet if 'physical' is distinguishable from 'mind', this presumes that the mind does not operate under physical laws.

How do you figure? If physicalism is true, then minds are just byproducts of brains, which are bound by physical laws.

LarianLeQuella

17th December 2008, 09:17 AM

I saw the title of this thread, and this popped into my mind....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQXECBdPgE (sorry, don't know how to do that little box thing unless these forums do it automatically...)

Silentknight

17th December 2008, 02:16 PM

Well not really. Sound(ie. vibrations) from a falling tree will still occur but will the concept(or label) of "sound" still exist if no intelligence is there to label those vibration's "sound".

That reminds me of my favorite thought experiment to determine whether existence is contingent on observation. You start with a room that's soundproof and has no windows, so there's no way to tell what's going on inside without opening the door. Take a priest and an altar boy and lock them inside. Wait several hours. Has the altar boy been molested or not? Until you open the door, you must assume that the altar boy is simultaneously molested and unmolested. :D

paximperium

17th December 2008, 02:24 PM

That reminds me of my favorite thought experiment to determine whether existence is contingent on observation. You start with a room that's soundproof and has no windows, so there's no way to tell what's going on inside without opening the door. Take a priest and an altar boy and lock them inside. Wait several hours. Has the altar boy been molested or not? Until you open the door, you must assume that the altar boy is simultaneously molested and unmolested. :D
Ahhhh...the infamous Ratzinger's Altar Boy experiment.

Dancing David

18th December 2008, 08:04 AM

Hmm,
A couple os thoughts:
If under idealism, things ‘only exist’ in a moment of existence created by perception or thought. It still becomes the equivalent of materialism.

If a photon comes into existence at the point of perception, then it comes into existence with an intact history and behaves as though it has travelled all the way from some distant object. It behaves as though there was a gravitational body that intercepted it if it is part of a ring event.

If on the other hand the photon is in existence for that whole time, because it is perceived by some meta-mind (the godthought proposal), then the rules of materialism still apply. It behaves as though it is made of energy/matter. It may exist only because of the meta-mind bur it still behaves the same.

So again, what difference is there between materialism and idealism?

Malerin
In an idealist reality, the book disappears without a perceiver or thinker. In a materialist reality it doesn't disappear.

Yet is behaves as though it has been there the whole time, yes or no?

Malerin
Well, now you're getting into epistemology. We might not be able to tell what kind of reality we're in, but our inability to know isn't a reflection on reality itself.

And what difference does it make? You can not tell one from the other. Quanta of energy, godthought, ideas, butterfly dreams, they all will act the same.

Dancing David

18th December 2008, 08:11 AM

Why do you think photons and electrons should be classified as being physical?

In common parlane, maybe yes, maybe no, depending upon idomatic reference.

However under the defintions of the usage by approximate models of particle physics and fields and forces, they are.

So under the defintion of 'materialsm' as the default position of scientific hypothesis and theory, light, leptons are physical, as is magnetism.

Beth

18th December 2008, 02:28 PM

In common parlane, maybe yes, maybe no, depending upon idomatic reference.

However under the defintions of the usage by approximate models of particle physics and fields and forces, they are.

So under the defintion of 'materialsm' as the default position of scientific hypothesis and theory, light, leptons are physical, as is magnetism.

Okay. I can see that physicists and materialists would classify such things as physical/material objects. Do idealists agree with this classification and when they speak of 'ideals' are they excluding such things?

athon

18th December 2008, 03:28 PM

I don't know how else I can define it. The way I defined it makes a clear distinction between a physical thing and an idealistic thing- the former can exist independent of mind, the latter can't.

Which, again, I have no problem with.

Rather than go point for point on the rest of your statements, I'll try a different tact (not to say this is you being obtuse, but rather it's an effort for me to understand your view, given what I feel are contradictions);

What, in your understanding 'causes' the chair to appear in your mind? If there is only 'mind' and nothing else, how does the chair come to become a construct in your consciousness? Likewise, what 'causes', say, a change in any observation in your mind? How might you explain, say, a ball dropping to the ground when it's pushed from a table?

Athon

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

18th December 2008, 04:30 PM

Well, it delineates materialism/physicalism from idealism. If reality is idealistic, then nothing can exist indepedent of being perceived or thought of.
That can't be right. The trees in your backyard exist independently of your thoughts about them. Idealism has to explain how this works.

~~ Paul

athon

18th December 2008, 04:48 PM

That can't be right. The trees in your backyard exist independently of your thoughts about them. Idealism has to explain how this works.

~~ Paul

Well, that's kind of my issue earlier - idealism simply relies on defining the universe as all existing as ideals in one's mind. The trees, by definition, don't exist externally. Once you're not looking, they're no longer 'exist' in any capacity (depending on which form of idealism you believe, I guess: some ideals must still exist in another 'Platonic ideal' sense... man, it all gets so confusing when everybody can just make up your own system...).

Even given this assumption, though, there has to be a set of 'rules' by which this operates. Some construct has to operate that says the trees appear when they do, and appear as they do, while giving the illusion of change while you're not looking.

Athon

RandFan

18th December 2008, 04:58 PM

Why do you think photons and electrons should be classified as being physical? Why do you think they shouldn't? Do they interact with the physical world? Can we measure and detect photons and electrons with physical instruments?

paximperium

18th December 2008, 05:15 PM

Well, that's kind of my issue earlier - idealism simply relies on defining the universe as all existing as ideals in one's mind. The trees, by definition, don't exist externally. Once you're not looking, they're no longer 'exist' in any capacity (depending on which form of idealism you believe, I guess: some ideals must still exist in another 'Platonic ideal' sense... man, it all gets so confusing when everybody can just make up your own system...).

Even given this assumption, though, there has to be a set of 'rules' by which this operates. Some construct has to operate that says the trees appear when they do, and appear as they do, while giving the illusion of change while you're not looking.

Athon
Essentially to an idealist/solipcist you and nothing else "really" exist except for being a construct of the mind.

You expand this to a human/person and it is essentially means people are "philosophical zombie/robots", a mind construct that acts sentient but is essentially acting out its role based on the mind's "rules". In essence, everyone and everything is an illusion, not "real", except in the mind.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

18th December 2008, 05:31 PM

Well, that's kind of my issue earlier - idealism simply relies on defining the universe as all existing as ideals in one's mind. The trees, by definition, don't exist externally. Once you're not looking, they're no longer 'exist' in any capacity ...
Yes, they do. When you come back home after two weeks on holiday, the trees in your backyard are still there in the same configuration as when you left. What maintained them in that configuration? It wasn't your conscious thoughts.

Essentially to an idealist/solipcist you and nothing else "really" exist except for being a construct of the mind.
Except that the solipsist has to explain why the trees in his backyard maintain their configured existence independently of his conscious thought.

Stuff is out there. Every metaphysic has some splainin' to do.

~~ Paul

athon

18th December 2008, 05:35 PM

Yes, they do. When you come back home after two weeks on holiday, the trees in your backyard are still there in the same configuration as when you left. What maintained them in that configuration? It wasn't your conscious thoughts.

Well, if they only exist as a conscious thought, then that's exactly what 'maintained' them.

Except that the solipsist has to explain why the trees in his backyard maintain their configured existence independently of his conscious thought.

Stuff is out there. Every metaphysic has some splainin' to do.

Yup. My point exactly. Even if it is just conscious thoughts, even they must subscribe to some set of rules that makes it all seem that way.

Athon

RandFan

18th December 2008, 05:39 PM

Except that the solipsist has to explain why the trees in his backyard maintain their configured existence independently of his conscious thought.

Stuff is out there. Every metaphysic has some splainin' to do. And you can eat while you sleep and eat imagined food and wake up hungry immediatly after.

For idealism you have to come up with additional explanations to resolve problmes that don't arise with materialism. Parsimony would dictate that what we percieve is real. So, in the end, there is no need for faith based reality.

RandFan

18th December 2008, 05:42 PM

Yup. My point exactly. Even if it is just conscious thoughts, even they must subscribe to some set of rules that makes it all seem that way. As I have been saying to Malerin for pages and pages. Persistent and consistent. Reality might just be perceived but at least it follows rules. Not like his faith based personal experiences that can't be examined.

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 05:51 PM

Why do you think they shouldn't? Do they interact with the physical world? Can we measure and detect photons and electrons with physical instruments?

I think in this context, "physical" means made of matter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter). A photon isn't categorized as matter -- its a massless wave/particle.

I have a question of my own, tho. What would you categorize as non-physical?

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 05:57 PM

Except that the solipsist has to explain why the trees in his backyard maintain their configured existence independently of his conscious thought.

Stuff is out there. Every metaphysic has some splainin' to do.

~~ Paul

Imo, solipsism sounds a lot like a form a megalomania. Have there been any serious philosophers who held it as an actual position beyond mere hypothetical debate?

Dancing David

18th December 2008, 06:02 PM

I think in this context, "physical" means made of matter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter). A photon isn't categorized as matter -- its a massless wave/particle.

I have a question of my own, tho. What would you categorize as non-physical?
Soory, AMM, photons are matter as much as bosons.

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 06:08 PM

Soory, AMM, photons are matter as much as bosons.

Okay, so what isn't matter? :)

RandFan

18th December 2008, 06:08 PM

I think in this context, "physical" means made of matter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter). What context? A question was asked how an electron or photon can be "physical"? Quite simple. I would suggest a remedial course of physics. If I ask you how you can think lions are cats and my "context" means felines then it's a silly if not poorly asked question. Further it interjects a presupposition that is not warranted. So what if there exist things that are physical that are not composed of matter?

A photon isn't categorized as matter -- its a massless wave/particle.Be that as it may it is still physical and that is why, to no surprise, photons are part of any physics course as are space-time and gravity. None of which are made of matter.

I have a question of my own, tho. What would you categorize as non-physical?The word you are looking for is metaphysical. My answer to you would be anything that is imagined that does not exist.

Beth

18th December 2008, 06:10 PM

Why do you think they shouldn't? Do they interact with the physical world? Because they don't have mass - or, at least, they didn't back when I was in school. Has that changed? It seems as if I heard at some point that the electron might have a very small mass. I can't say for sure now.

Can we measure and detect photons and electrons with physical instruments? Of course.

RandFan

18th December 2008, 06:14 PM

Because they don't have mass - or, at least, they didn't back when I was in school. Has that changed? It seems as if I heard at some point that the electron might have a very small mass. I can't say for sure now. (see post above)

Of course.Then they are physical. The only other option would be metaphysical, or do you have a third option that I don't know about?

Malerin

18th December 2008, 06:31 PM

Which, again, I have no problem with.

Rather than go point for point on the rest of your statements, I'll try a different tact (not to say this is you being obtuse, but rather it's an effort for me to understand your view, given what I feel are contradictions);

What, in your understanding 'causes' the chair to appear in your mind? If there is only 'mind' and nothing else, how does the chair come to become a construct in your consciousness? Likewise, what 'causes', say, a change in any observation in your mind? How might you explain, say, a ball dropping to the ground when it's pushed from a table?

Athon

Well, we're moving away from the question of "what is physical?" to "how does idealism work?". If reality is idealistic, there are a couple of possibilities as to how we perceive the chair:

1. The chair (and all things) exist as a projection of God's mind. In some way, our minds interact with God's mind so that we "see" the chair God wants us to see. Things don't disappear when we go away because God perceives all.
2. All our minds collaborate unconsciouslly to create the world we perceive. The chair is an unconscious manifestation of a group mind and we interact with it like we would a hallucination or vivid dream. Things don't disappear when we turn our backs on them because our minds are always unconsciously maintaining reality.
3. Same as (2), but there is only one mind (solipsism).

Malerin

18th December 2008, 06:36 PM

That can't be right. The trees in your backyard exist independently of your thoughts about them. Idealism has to explain how this works.

~~ Paul

This isn't really a problem for idealism. Berkeley invoked God as the ultimate perceiver, or you can just as easily say it is an unconscious process we're all engaged in (but not aware of) that maintains reality.

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 06:42 PM

What context? A question was asked how an electron or photon can be "physical"? Quite simple. I would suggest a remedial course of physics. If I ask you how you can think lions are cats and my "context" means felines then it's a silly if not poorly asked question. Further it interjects a presupposition that is not warranted. So what if there exist things that are physical that are not composed of matter?

[...]

Be that as it may it is still physical and that is why, to no surprise, photons are part of any physics course as are space-time and gravity. None of which are made of matter.

[...]

The word you are looking for is metaphysical. My answer to you would be anything that is imagined that does not exist.

Gotcha. Physical = everything that exists.

Judging from the discussion so far, it seems that there are two monist philosophies being debated and that the root of the argument is what to call the "stuff" that constitutes everything that exists. One is arguing that "EverythingThatsReal" is merely thus-n-thus and the other is asserting that ETR is, instead, such-n-such.

Essentially, from what I've gathered, the "Idealist" argues that the only thing that is ontologically real is subject and the "Materialist" argues that the only thing that's real is the object. Neither positions is positing contradictory predictions. They are basically picking different frames of reference of the same thing (in this case ETR) and arguing that the other frame of reference is somehow false or illusory.

Seems a lil' silly, IMO. :p

athon

18th December 2008, 06:57 PM

Well, we're moving away from the question of "what is physical?" to "how does idealism work?".

Well, considering the question was aimed at idealists, and it questions what 'physical' refers to, I think we're still on topic.

1. The chair (and all things) exist as a projection of God's mind. In some way, our minds interact with God's mind so that we "see" the chair God wants us to see. Things don't disappear when we go away because God perceives all.

Ok, fine. Then how is our mind not part of that process? If 'physical' refers to concepts in God's mind, and it's through this deity's perception of it that we have laws, doesn't the transfer of that information have to also subscribe to the system we've simply dubbed 'God's imagination'?

2. All our minds collaborate unconsciouslly to create the world we perceive. The chair is an unconscious manifestation of a group mind and we interact with it like we would a hallucination or vivid dream. Things don't disappear when we turn our backs on them because our minds are always unconsciously maintaining reality.

3. Same as (2), but there is only one mind (solipsism).

Again, I'll suspend disbelief for this as a concept, and address it on the assumption that this is the case. Now, wouldn't this assume again some system of laws to govern it? Whatever the minds are, they'd still require a level of interaction in order to create this 'reality'. No matter where we go, we keep requiring a set of laws for this to be embedded in.

These laws - no matter where or how they are embedded - give rise to observations. We can therefore refer to them as physical reality. Even if we are a single mind interpreting it, the mind interacts with it all. It must also subscribe to laws and rules. Otherwise it's simply special pleading.

Athon

athon

18th December 2008, 07:01 PM

Gotcha. Physical = everything that exists.

Judging from the discussion so far, it seems that there are two monist philosophies being debated and that the root of the argument is what to call the "stuff" that constitutes everything that exists. One is arguing that "EverythingThatsReal" is merely thus-n-thus and the other is asserting that ETR is, instead, such-n-such.

Essentially, from what I've gathered, the "Idealist" argues that the only thing that is ontologically real is subject and the "Materialist" argues that the only thing that's real is the object. Neither positions is positing contradictory predictions. They are basically picking different frames of reference of the same thing (in this case ETR) and arguing that the other frame of reference is somehow false or illusory.

Seems a lil' silly, IMO. :p

Well, yes and no. It is silly if one simply accepts that they are two different words for exactly the same system. Except they're not - Idealists seem to then assume a second layer to reality that continues to involve itself in some way (be it God, Plato's ideals, archetypes etc.) without being part of this 'set of laws'. Hence a contradiction - they must interact with the rules of nature without actually having anything to do with them.

Hence my confusion.

Athon

RandFan

18th December 2008, 07:04 PM

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 07:14 PM

Well, yes and no. It is silly if one simply accepts that they are two different words for exactly the same system. Except they're not - Idealists seem to then assume a second layer to reality that continues to involve itself in some way (be it God, Plato's ideals, archetypes etc.) without being part of this 'set of laws'. Hence a contradiction - they must interact with the rules of nature without actually having anything to do with them.

Hence my confusion.

Athon

[bolding added]

Well, if you think about it, there isn't a necessary contradiction. In a very significant way, the bolded statement is true. Gods, ideals, archetypes, etc. undeniably exists within the minds of people (in this case idealists) and within the realm of their minds they do appear to operate according to a different 'set of laws'. ;)

edit:The real question would be whether one considers abstractions like ideas, information, and thoughts to be ontologically real. To be clear on my position, I'm of the view that such such things are infact as ontologically real as 'physical' objects.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 07:16 PM

Well, considering the question was aimed at idealists, and it questions what 'physical' refers to, I think we're still on topic.

Ok

Ok, fine. Then how is our mind not part of that process? If 'physical' refers to concepts in God's mind, and it's through this deity's perception of it that we have laws, doesn't the transfer of that information have to also subscribe to the system we've simply dubbed 'God's imagination'?

Physical doesn't refer to concepts in God's mind. The Berkeley-type reality I described would not have anything "physical" in it. If God is the ultimate perceiver, then the transfer of information (from "Chair as projection of God's mind" to "Chair being perceived by us") would follow whatever rules God thinks are appropriate.

Again, I'll suspend disbelief for this as a concept, and address it on the assumption that this is the case. Now, wouldn't this assume again some system of laws to govern it? Whatever the minds are, they'd still require a level of interaction in order to create this 'reality'. No matter where we go, we keep requiring a set of laws for this to be embedded in.

Yes, there would be a system in place to keep the idealistic reality orderly and internally consistent. For example, we'd all have to agree what a "tree" looks like, and that it loses it's leaves in the Fall.

These laws - no matter where or how they are embedded - give rise to observations. We can therefore refer to them as physical reality.

Well, the laws don't give rise to observations. Minds do that. You can have a materialistic universe with no minds, with plenty of laws of nature, and you would never have any observations going on.

I also think you're making a big leap from observation to reality. Just because we observe something doesn't mean reality is physical or immaterial or theistic. The most we can say is that we are experiencing (or observing) such-and-such.

Silentknight

18th December 2008, 07:18 PM

I raised these points in the other recent topic.

Regardless of whether we live in a Matrix-like world, the conclusion that we cannot truly know anything meaningful about reality does not follow. Let's assume the world is an illusion and see where the possibilities lead.

First, suppose the world is an imperfect Matrix, just like in the movies. It begs the question, how does one identify the glitches in the system? The simple answer is that any violation of the laws of physics would be a glitch in the system. In the films, the people who realized that the world was an illusion were partly freed from its restrictions and were able to bend the normal laws. However this is all dependent on knowing what those physical laws are and understanding how they work in the first place. It is meaningless to say that Neo can defy gravity if we don't know what gravity is and how it's supposed to work. In this scenario, scientific knowledge would be extremely useful because it would allow us to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior in our world.

Now suppose the illusion or simulation were perfect. There are no glitches to speak of. What this implies is that the Matrix world and the real world would actually have no effect on each other in any way, shape, or form. Those trapped inside the illusion could never get out, and those outside, such as the pilots of Zion, could not hack into the Matrix to get inside. In other words, the two realities would in effect be mutually exclusive. What we learn and discover within this world would be meaningless in the outside world, and vice versa. In this scenario, scientific knowledge would be even more important, because it logically follows that this is the only world such knowledge could ever apply to, Matrix illusion or not. When objects are dropped, they fall to the ground, and if they fall from a great enough height, they get smashed into pieces. Neo would end up as a red smudge on the street for ignoring the laws of physics.

The third possibility is that the world is as real as we perceive it to be. In this scenario, science remains the most reliable means we possess of coming to as close an approximation of reality as possible, and conclusions based on speculation would not tell us anything useful about the world.

Remember that Neo wasn't just asked to believe in a ridiculous proposition without evidence. He had reasons to doubt based on what he and others saw happening around him, and was shown the real world for what it was.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 07:28 PM

Well, yes and no. It is silly if one simply accepts that they are two different words for exactly the same system. Except they're not - Idealists seem to then assume a second layer to reality that continues to involve itself in some way (be it God, Plato's ideals, archetypes etc.) without being part of this 'set of laws'. Hence a contradiction - they must interact with the rules of nature without actually having anything to do with them.

Hence my confusion.

Athon

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects. An idealist could argue that reality is simply thoughts and minds and the interaction between them. A materialist adds another (unecessary) layer of substance and interaction: thoughts, minds, and physical objects.

The idealist could also argue that we know for certain that thought and mind exist (in the Cartesian sense), so why muddy the waters by positing the existence of physical objects, which there is no evidence for?

MattusMaximus

18th December 2008, 07:37 PM

A dualist thinks that the universe contains matter/energy/real-stuff, which interacts by mysterious means with immaterial minds. Descartes was a dualist.

An idealist dispenses with the real stuff, and thinks that the universe consists solely of immaterial minds and mental events. Berkeley was an idealist. The obvious problem with idealism, that objects do not vanish when nobody is looking at them, was resolved in Berkeley's case by assuming the existence of an omniscient God to keep an eye on everything.

A physicalist dispenses with the immaterial minds and thinks that the universe is just made up of stuff, some of which forms minds.

(There's also "neutral monism", made up by idiotic Continental philosophers, which is just dualism plus the idea that the real-stuff and the immaterial mental-stuff are two different manifestations of one underlying reality. It's even dumber than dualism because it clings to the unsupportable idea of immaterial mental-stuff and then posits an extra layer of nonsense which there is no evidence for).

That helps a lot. Thanks for clarifying things for me, Kevin :D

Now I can keep up with the conversation...

RandFan

18th December 2008, 07:45 PM

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects. Actually no. We only need accept that what we percieve is as we percieve it. Physical objects behave as they do because of their pysical nature. The mass of an object explains why it behaves as it does when it is at rest and when it is in motion. With idealism you need another layer that isn't axiomatic and can't be explained. Why does something have mass and why do the rules dictate it operate by the laws of motion? We don't know. We have to insert the unknown into our theories.

Parsimony favors materialism.

MattusMaximus

18th December 2008, 07:47 PM

This isn't really a problem for idealism. Berkeley invoked God as the ultimate perceiver, or you can just as easily say it is an unconscious process we're all engaged in (but not aware of) that maintains reality.

But then this leads to an obvious question: from whence came God? Is God just something else that pops into existence simply because Berkeley perceives it to be so? Wouldn't this then make Berkeley, or whomever is perceiving the notion of God, the ultimate perceiver? But if that's the case, we're back to the whole tree question...

Sounds like circular logic to me.

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 07:53 PM

Now suppose the illusion or simulation were perfect. There are no glitches to speak of. What this implies is that the Matrix world and the real world would actually have no effect on each other in any way, shape, or form. Those trapped inside the illusion could never get out, and those outside, such as the pilots of Zion, could not hack into the Matrix to get inside. In other words, the two realities would in effect be mutually exclusive.

I pretty much agreed w/ almost all of your post, w/ the exception of the bolded statement. In the case of this Matrix-like scenario you have two 'universes' w/ the only exception being one is natural and the other is "intelligently" designed by some agency to emulate the other. It stands to reason that either:

(a) the Matrix universe was built within the natural/'real' universe. In this case, no matter how flawless the simulation architecture of the matrix is, a disruption to it in the 'real' universe it exists within will have a direct effect on it's performance. One would also have to specify whether or not a conscious human being needs to be pluged-in to it or can be "uploaded" into it w/o the necessity of their organic bodies.

or

(b) the architect is advanced enough to pinch off a separate space-time in which to construct this matrix -- in which case one would fall into the extremely speculative territory of multiverses (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse). Even assuming that The Architect could pinch off another bubble universe to constrict his matrix, it doesn't completely rule out the possibility that they could interact in some way.

In both scenarios there is still, in principle, some way for those in either universe to interact.

The third possibility is that the world is as real as we perceive it to be. In this scenario, science remains the most reliable means we possess of coming to as close an approximation of reality as possible, and conclusions based on speculation would not tell us anything useful about the world.

Remember that Neo wasn't just asked to believe in a ridiculous proposition without evidence. He had reasons to doubt based on what he and others saw happening around him, and was [I]shown the real world for what it was.

Well, regardless of what universe you're in, science would be the most reliable method of figuring out how things work in it. Given enough time it might even advance enough to have something meaningful to day about possible 'outside' universes :)

Silentknight

18th December 2008, 07:57 PM

Silentknight

18th December 2008, 08:03 PM

I pretty much agreed w/ almost all of your post, w/ the exception of the bolded statement. In the case of this Matrix-like scenario you have two 'universes' w/ the only exception being one is natural and the other is "intelligently" designed by some agency to emulate the other. It stands to reason that either:

(a) the Matrix universe was built [I]within the natural/'real' universe. In this case, no matter how flawless the simulation architecture of the matrix is, a disruption to it in the 'real' universe it exists within will have a direct effect on it's performance. One would also have to specify whether or not a conscious human being needs to be pluged-in to it or can be "uploaded" into it w/o the necessity of their organic bodies.

or

(b) the architect is advanced enough to pinch off a separate space-time in which to construct this matrix -- in which case one would fall into the extremely speculative territory of multiverses (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse). Even assuming that The Architect could pinch off another bubble universe to constrict his matrix, it doesn't completely rule out the possibility that they could interact in some way.

In both scenarios there is still, in principle, some way for those in either universe to interact.
Actually, when I said that the illusion was flawless, the assumption was that no interaction or disruption could or would take place at all. Were it to take place, the illusion would no longer be flawless, and we'd be back at scenario 1, which of course I'd already covered. My point had to do with a zero interaction reality, which would be necessary in order for the illusion to be flawless, since that's what the argument was addressing.

Well, regardless of what universe you're in, science would be the most reliable method of figuring out how things work in it. Given enough time it might even advance enough to have something meaningful to day about possible 'outside' universes :)
Yup.

MattusMaximus

18th December 2008, 08:05 PM

They just don't want to admit that God would go "POOF" without anyone to think about him. I'm just saying, given all the gods that people have invented throughout human history, you know, the contingency is more likely to run that way.

That's my point. The argument is not only circular, it is also self-contradictory.

If they say God does it, but then they go with idealism and they are the ones perceiving God into existence, then how can God be the thing that perceives stuff when they're not around? (The tree example, for instance)

Are they calling themselves God? That's the only way I see around the contradiction, unless I'm missing something, and I guess it would be consistent with what I understand of solipsism. I very well might have missed something, as I haven't followed the thread for a couple of days.

Kevin_Lowe

18th December 2008, 08:19 PM

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects. An idealist could argue that reality is simply thoughts and minds and the interaction between them. A materialist adds another (unecessary) layer of substance and interaction: thoughts, minds, and physical objects.

The idealist could also argue that we know for certain that thought and mind exist (in the Cartesian sense), so why muddy the waters by positing the existence of physical objects, which there is no evidence for?

Actually we don't know that for certain at all. In descending order of certainty:

1. I know I have a mind and thoughts.
2. I'm pretty sure there is an external universe doing its thing regardless of the content of my mind and thoughts.
3. I'm nearly as certain that some of the things in that external universe are humans with minds of their own.

However I'm less sure that you have a mind and thoughts, than I am that you exist as brute matter, because it's conceivable that you are some kind of automaton with no mind or thoughts.

You can't jump from 1 to 3 without acknowledging 2, unless you think you have some kind of telepathic means of verifying other minds' existence without recourse to the external, physical world.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 08:33 PM

Malerin

18th December 2008, 08:47 PM

But then this leads to an obvious question: from whence came God? Is God just something else that pops into existence simply because Berkeley perceives it to be so? Wouldn't this then make Berkeley, or whomever is perceiving the notion of God, the ultimate perceiver? But if that's the case, we're back to the whole tree question...

Sounds like circular logic to me.

From whence came the universe? The big bang? Why was there a big bang in the first place? Why something instead of nothing? Berkely would say that God is eternal and causeless. Some cosmoslogists say that "What caused the big bang?" is a meaningless question, like "What is North of the North Pole?" (though you can still ask "Why was there one in the first place?" Sort of like asking "Forget about North, why is there a North Pole at all?").

Any theory of reality is going to invite questions of the "Where did it all come from?" variety.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 08:52 PM

Actually we don't know that for certain at all. In descending order of certainty:

1. I know I have a mind and thoughts.
2. I'm pretty sure there is an external universe doing its thing regardless of the content of my mind and thoughts.
3. I'm nearly as certain that some of the things in that external universe are humans with minds of their own.

However I'm less sure that you have a mind and thoughts, than I am that you exist as brute matter, because it's conceivable that you are some kind of automaton with no mind or thoughts.

You can't jump from 1 to 3 without acknowledging 2, unless you think you have some kind of telepathic means of verifying other minds' existence without recourse to the external, physical world.

You're right. I should have said "I" instead of "we".

But where is the justification for (2)? I'm not sure about that at all. I have no evidence that there's anything external to me (in the physical sense).

Malerin

18th December 2008, 08:54 PM

That's my point. The argument is not only circular, it is also self-contradictory.

If they say God does it, but then they go with idealism and they are the ones perceiving God into existence, then how can God be the thing that perceives stuff when they're not around? (The tree example, for instance)

Who says this? I'm not aware of anyone claiming that God's existence is contingent on something perceving It.

MattusMaximus

18th December 2008, 08:55 PM

From whence came the universe? The big bang? Why was there a big bang in the first place? Why something instead of nothing? Berkely would say that God is eternal and causeless. Some cosmoslogists say that "What caused the big bang?" is a meaningless question, like "What is North of the North Pole?" (though you can still ask "Why was there one in the first place?" Sort of like asking "Forget about North, why is there a North Pole at all?").

Any theory of reality is going to invite questions of the "Where did it all come from?" variety.

Yes, but we can all acknowledge the reality of the universe, so why layer something extra and unnecessary atop it, such as God?

As for the "what caused the big bang?" question being meaningless, I beg to differ. Just today I had an old student come back for a visit - he is currently working on his PhD in theoretical physics with Leonard Susskind at Stanford. The subject of his PhD thesis is to be to work out the theoretical details of eternal inflation, which is a theory of "what caused the big bang". We had a nice chat about it, in fact - fascinating stuff.

Oh yeah, and nowhere in his thesis will he be mentioning God, just in case you were curious.

athon

18th December 2008, 08:55 PM

Physical doesn't refer to concepts in God's mind. The Berkeley-type reality I described would not have anything "physical" in it. If God is the ultimate perceiver, then the transfer of information (from "Chair as projection of God's mind" to "Chair being perceived by us") would follow whatever rules God thinks are appropriate.

Fine. But here's the thing I think you keep missing - that 'Chair as projecttion of God's mind' or whatever you want to call it appears to subscribe to a set of rules. THAT is physical. Call it whatever you will - matter is what we refer to when we observe rules interacting.

Yes, there would be a system in place to keep the idealistic reality orderly and internally consistent. For example, we'd all have to agree what a "tree" looks like, and that it loses it's leaves in the Fall.Then those rules describe matter, as such. That is physical reality - the rules which describe what we see. We're in no position to describe anything beyond that. If you want to call it 'God's dream', go for it. I won't go further than simply contemplate the nature of the rules which appear to govern it.

Well, the laws don't give rise to observations. Minds do that. You can have a materialistic universe with no minds, with plenty of laws of nature, and you would never have any observations going on.Ok, now this is plain silly. In either case, you wouldn't have observations. Even materialists admit that to observe, you need an observer. Yes, matter would exist without anybody observing it, however it is itself ultimately a moot point focusses on why things appear to change when we're not looking. Materialists rely on parsimony to say they change because the rules that govern it continue to operate on that system, regardless of observation. Idealists add a layer of compexity that says the rules are only in place in the mind's perception of it. In the end, one simply has infinitely more complex rules to say 'the ball fell from the table'.

I also think you're making a big leap from observation to reality. Just because we observe something doesn't mean reality is physical or immaterial or theistic. The most we can say is that we are experiencing (or observing) such-and-such.Oh, I fully agree. I think you'll find most people here also agree.

The bottom line is, we have no idea whether the growing tree in my yard grows according to a set of laws external to my perception, or is part of some great computer program. However, in the absence of any reason to believe it is more complicated, assuming that these laws are external to my perception of it is simpler. In other words, what benefit does the added complication of idealism provide?

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects. An idealist could argue that reality is simply thoughts and minds and the interaction between them. A materialist adds another (unecessary) layer of substance and interaction: thoughts, minds, and physical objects.

Except that's not quite true. Others have argued it well before me - we observe the laws that seem to govern our observations. That's it! That's materialism! We don't need to complicate it with gods or rules embedded in our own minds that create meaningless illusions of other people existing. It's fruitless navel-gazing at best. Science says we observe and we try to logically tie them together into relationships that we can attempt to make predictions with.

The idealist could also argue that we know for certain that thought and mind exist (in the Cartesian sense), so why muddy the waters by positing the existence of physical objects, which there is no evidence for?Because something must govern those thoughts and minds. There appear to be laws and rules that give rise to observations. And so far, we've managed to do quite well in finding relationships between them.

The thing is, the universe appears to operate beyond our perceptions of it. If that's an illusion, you'd need to point out why it appears that way.

Athon

MattusMaximus

18th December 2008, 08:56 PM

Who says this? I'm not aware of anyone claiming that God's existence is contingent on something perceving It.

But if you're an idealist, and you believe that you create it all in your own mind, then you must acknowledge that you are also creating the concept of God within your own mind. Otherwise, you aren't an idealist.

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 08:58 PM

From whence came the universe? The big bang? Why was there a big bang in the first place? Why something instead of nothing? Berkely would say that God is eternal and causeless. Some cosmoslogists say that "What caused the big bang?" is a meaningless question, like "What is North of the North Pole?" (though you can still ask "Why was there one in the first place?" Sort of like asking "Forget about North, why is there a North Pole at all?").

Any theory of reality is going to invite questions of the "Where did it all come from?" variety.

Well, what ever one wants to call the source of "where it call came from" one can assume one can assume that its eternal and/or ex nihilo.

If you wanna take the whole Idealist position of "well its all in the mind and the mind is the mind of God" then there is no distinction between god and the universe and you're just stating pantheism in another way. Either way, you're pretty much back to where you started.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 09:01 PM

But if you're an idealist, and you believe that you create it all in your own mind, then you must acknowledge that you are also creating the concept of God within your own mind. Otherwise, you aren't an idealist.

Ah, I see what you're asking. Some idealists do believe that we're all God, and we've forgotten what we were and created this illusion we call reality. But even those wouldn't say that God would disappear if it wasn't being perceived, because God (us) is the thing doing the perceiving. It's what the Course in Miracles people think and it doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

MattusMaximus

18th December 2008, 09:04 PM

Ah, I see what you're asking. Some idealists do believe that we're all God, and we've forgotten what we were and created this illusion we call reality. But even those wouldn't say that God would disappear if it wasn't being perceived, because God (us) is the thing doing the perceiving. It's what the Course in Miracles people think and it doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

Okay, so it is as I suspected in one of my earlier posts. Some idealists actually believe they are God. Wow.

Why don't you think this makes sense? What is to distinguish the validity of your view from this view? How do you come to the conclusion that your view of idealism is correct? At least the Course in Miracles view addresses the contradiction I spoke of earlier.

Kevin_Lowe

18th December 2008, 09:08 PM

You're right. I should have said "I" instead of "we".

But where is the justification for (2)? I'm not sure about that at all. I have no evidence that there's anything external to me (in the physical sense).

I think you have to create a very creative definition of evidence to say that you have no evidence there is anything external to you. Have you ever found an object which you had forgotten you had lost, like a coin under a seat cushion that you had never missed? Either that coin had an existence independent of your mind, or you have an unconscious mind that performs exactly the same function as an independently-existing physical world.

Have you ever done a science experiment, and then looked up what the result was supposed to be afterwards? Amazingly, if you do the experiment properly, the results you get will be exactly the ones science predicts, even though you had no idea at the time what that result was meant to be. That's how scientists at opposite ends of the world can productively work on the same problems at the same time and share their results.

Perhaps you meant to say that you have no irrefutable proof that there is anything external to you. That would be a correct but meaningless statement. Saying that you have no evidence that there is anything external to you is daft.

So where does this get us? Well, if you accept step one (that you have a mind) but not step two, all you've got is solipsism, not an idealist universe with multiple entities coexisting. If you accept step two you've got physicalism plus at least one mind (your own). If you accept step three you've got a physicalist universe with other thinking entities in it.

But how do you manage to embrace steps one and three, without embracing step two? Idealism requires accepting that you have a mind and so do other entities, but if you don't think there's any evidence of physical stuff external to you, how on Earth can you think there is evidence of minds external to you?

Malerin

18th December 2008, 09:09 PM

Well, what ever one wants to call the source of "where it call came from" one can assume one can assume that its eternal and/or ex nihilo.

Can you do what with a purely physical thing like the universe? What is it about the universe that makes it eternal and/or causeless? Scientists have no problem contemplating ways the universe will end (Heat Death, Big Crunch, Big Rip). With God, though, it gets a bit trickier, because you can say that to BE God is to be eternal and God IS the First Cause.

If you wanna take the whole Idealist position of "well its all in the mind and the mind is the mind of God" then there is no distinction between god and the universe and you're just stating pantheism in another way. Either way, you're pretty much back to where you started.

An idealist doesn't have to take that position. They can claim that there is God, our own minds, and the things that are projections of God's mind (which we perceive), and that these are all seperate things. Or you can be a solipsist and eliminate the whole pantheon altogether.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 09:15 PM

Okay, so it is as I suspected in one of my earlier posts. Some idealists actually believe they are God. Wow.

Why don't you think this makes sense? What is to distinguish the validity of your view from this view? How do you come to the conclusion that your view of idealism is correct? At least the Course in Miracles view addresses the contradiction I spoke of earlier.

Here's a sample conversation with my wife (who believes in Course in Miracles):

"OK, so if we're all God, why don't we pull the plug on this whole illusion so we can get back to our Godly state? This world sucks."

"There is no illusion. It never happened."

"Then what is all this?" ::sweeping arm gesture::

"An illusion."

"But you just said it didn't exist!"

"It doesn't. You can't talk about non-duality with dualistic language."

That's the gist of most of our metaphysical conversations.

Skeptic

18th December 2008, 09:17 PM

Russell said it best: those who think material is an illusion should get into a car and drive it into a brick wall, in a speed proportional to their degree of belief the wall isn't real.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 09:30 PM

I think you have to create a very creative definition of evidence to say that you have no evidence there is anything external to you. Have you ever found an object which you had forgotten you had lost, like a coin under a seat cushion that you had never missed? Either that coin had an existence independent of your mind, or you have an unconscious mind that performs exactly the same function as an independently-existing physical world.

The missing coin is consistent with idealism and materialism. It's not evidence for either of them.

Have you ever done a science experiment, and then looked up what the result was supposed to be afterwards? Amazingly, if you do the experiment properly, the results you get will be exactly the ones science predicts, even though you had no idea at the time what that result was meant to be. That's how scientists at opposite ends of the world can productively work on the same problems at the same time and share their results.

Again, that can happen under idealism as well as it can under materialism.

Perhaps you meant to say that you have no irrefutable proof that there is anything external to you. That would be a correct but meaningless statement. Saying that you have no evidence that there is anything external to you is daft.

It's not daft at all. If the evidence (and I assume you're referring to what we perceive with our senses) is consistent with both idealism and materialism, then how can it be evidence for one or the other? Suppose I tap on my desk. I hear sounds and feel a hard surface (sensory evidence (or sense-data)). But why should I suppose those sensations can only occur with a material object? I'm certain you've had dreams that seemed very real to you and you weren't aware you were dreaming. Your senses seemed to work in these dreams, right? It's equally possible that the sensations I'm getting when I tap on a desk are the result of a very vivid dream.

Kevin_Lowe

18th December 2008, 09:48 PM

The missing coin is consistent with idealism and materialism. It's not evidence for either of them.

How do you explain the coin's behaviour from an idealistic perspective? It's not a mind, so it wasn't perceiving itself. You weren't perceiving it or remembering it. If all that exists are minds and mental events then that coin didn't exist while it was lost, yet it's behaviour is exactly like that of a physical object with its own existence.

Again, that can happen under idealism as well as it can under materialism.

How do you explain the consistency of physical laws from an idealistic perspective? Physical laws aren't minds either, and there was a time when no mind comprehended those laws. So why are these laws consistent, even for minds which have never interacted with each other?

In both cases you've got a problem. You can solve it by pulling God out of a hat, or pulling an unconscious mind or telepathic network out of a hat that is effectively God-like in its perfect recall and perfect understanding of how the universe behaves, but you can't just handwave it away.

It's not daft at all. If the evidence (and I assume you're referring to what we perceive with our senses) is consistent with both idealism and materialism, then how can it be evidence for one or the other? Suppose I tap on my desk. I hear sounds and feel a hard surface (sensory evidence (or sense-data)). But why should I suppose those sensations can only occur with a material object? I'm certain you've had dreams that seemed very real to you and you weren't aware you were dreaming. Your senses seemed to work in these dreams, right? It's equally possible that the sensations I'm getting when I tap on a desk are the result of a very vivid dream.

I'd like to focus on the question which I think you avoided answering. Do you think that there are minds other than your own?

If you do, why do you think there are minds other than your own? What counts as evidence for this hypothesis, by the definition of evidence you personally use?

AkuManiMani

18th December 2008, 10:00 PM

Can you do what with a purely physical thing like the universe? What is it about the universe that makes it eternal and/or causeless? Scientists have no problem contemplating ways the universe will end (Heat Death, Big Crunch, Big Rip). With God, though, it gets a bit trickier, because you can say that to BE God is to be eternal and God IS the First Cause.

The central problem is that when you're trying to define an ultimate (in this case and ultimate cause) one runs into the problem of infinite regression of some sort. Either you come upon an undefinable or you never stop. What you decided to settle one and what you call it are incidental.

An idealist doesn't have to take that position. They can claim that there is God, our own minds, and the things that are projections of God's mind (which we perceive), and that these are all seperate things. Or you can be a solipsist and eliminate the whole pantheon altogether.

Well my point was that regardless of how one tries to dress up their cosmology or what cast of characters they bring to bear, you still run into the regression problem.

My position is we can only incrementally build our knowledge and that the process is indefinite. The Big Bang and god concepts are just provisional "just enough" solutions, with the major difference being that the Big bang conclusion has a vastly stronger empirical basis.

Malerin

18th December 2008, 10:04 PM

How do you explain the coin's behaviour from an idealistic perspective? It's not a mind, so it wasn't perceiving itself. You weren't perceiving it or remembering it. If all that exists are minds and mental events then that coin didn't exist while it was lost, yet it's behaviour is exactly like that of a physical object with its own existence.

How do you explain the consistency of physical laws from an idealistic perspective? Physical laws aren't minds either, and there was a time when no mind comprehended those laws. So why are these laws consistent, even for minds which have never interacted with each other?

In both cases you've got a problem. You can solve it by pulling God out of a hat, or pulling an unconscious mind or telepathic network out of a hat that is effectively God-like in its perfect recall and perfect understanding of how the universe behaves, but you can't just handwave it away.

But that's the idealist's answer! If they're a Berkeley-type they invoke God for the regularities we observe in reality (e.g., coins disappear and reappear in the same spot and the same condition). Or they posit a collective mind (or one mind) that is unconsciouslly regulating the whole thing.

I'd like to focus on the question which I think you avoided answering. Do you think that there are minds other than your own?

Yes

If you do, why do you think there are minds other than your own? What counts as evidence for this hypothesis, by the definition of evidence you personally use?

I don't have any evidence. I don't know if I'm inventing all this around me or not. I take it as a matter of faith that solipsism is false, because it would be really depressing if it were true. I'm also a theist, which I take on faith because I know my occasional feelings of spirituality could be explained as wishful thinking, or neurons XYZ firing in a certain way.

arthwollipot

18th December 2008, 10:45 PM

Great discussion guys. I'm really enjoying reading it, but I don't have the intellectual fortitude to join in.

Kevin_Lowe

18th December 2008, 11:10 PM

But that's the idealist's answer! If they're a Berkeley-type they invoke God for the regularities we observe in reality (e.g., coins disappear and reappear in the same spot and the same condition). Or they posit a collective mind (or one mind) that is unconsciouslly regulating the whole thing.

Same difference, if the collective mind is capable, as it seems to be, of keeping the whole universe straight from the time of the Big Bang.

I don't have any evidence. I don't know if I'm inventing all this around me or not. I take it as a matter of faith that solipsism is false, because it would be really depressing if it were true. I'm also a theist, which I take on faith because I know my occasional feelings of spirituality could be explained as wishful thinking, or neurons XYZ firing in a certain way.

The argument from consequences (also known as wishful thinking) is a canonical fallacy for a reason.

I had hoped you'd have something more philosophically interesting for us. The argument for solipsism is old hat, and you've got no philosophical argument past that point, merely a leap of faith.

Malerin

19th December 2008, 12:00 AM

Same difference, if the collective mind is capable, as it seems to be, of keeping the whole universe straight from the time of the Big Bang.

Right, but the question of what caused the Big Bang is answered under idealism- God (or a group of minds). Of course this raises the further questions of where God came from.

The argument from consequences (also known as wishful thinking) is a canonical fallacy for a reason.

Of course it's fallacious. Did I not admit to having no evidence to base my belief on, and that it was faith-based? Unless you have some new and interesting proof that other people exist, I bet almost everyone here is in the same boat. That has been my point in what seems like countless threads- we all have faith-based beliefs, atheist and theist alike. Maybe there are some die-hard agnostics lurking around here who really aren't sure other people exist. If so, they don't post much.

I had hoped you'd have something more philosophically interesting for us. The argument for solipsism is old hat, and you've got no philosophical argument past that point, merely a leap of faith.

There is no argument for solipsism because there is no evidence for solipsism. How do you prove other people don't exist? You can't. There is only the argument for the possibility of solipsism, which is, in effect, to say that we ultimately know very little about reality and should, therefore, be agnostic about it.

I had hoped you would see the distinction between possibility and actuality.

Malerin

19th December 2008, 12:15 AM

Yes, but we can all acknowledge the reality of the universe, so why layer something extra and unnecessary atop it, such as God?

As for the "what caused the big bang?" question being meaningless, I beg to differ. Just today I had an old student come back for a visit - he is currently working on his PhD in theoretical physics with Leonard Susskind at Stanford. The subject of his PhD thesis is to be to work out the theoretical details of eternal inflation, which is a theory of "what caused the big bang". We had a nice chat about it, in fact - fascinating stuff.

Oh yeah, and nowhere in his thesis will he be mentioning God, just in case you were curious.

I said some cosmologists. I know Hawking holds this view.

"What existed before the Big Bang?

...

"Elaborating on an analogy that Hawking briefly mentioned, Singh goes on: "What's north of London? Edinburgh. What's north of Edinburgh? The north pole. What's north of the north pole? You can't even ask the question, because the very concept of northness is born at the north pole."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,1591913,00.html

Dancing David

19th December 2008, 04:39 AM

Okay, so what isn't matter? :)

Ask someone who thinks there is something like that.

:)

Dancing David

19th December 2008, 04:45 AM

Well, what ever one wants to call the source of "where it call came from" one can assume one can assume that its eternal and/or ex nihilo.

If you wanna take the whole Idealist position of "well its all in the mind and the mind is the mind of God" then there is no distinction between god and the universe and you're just stating pantheism in another way. Either way, you're pretty much back to where you started.

Yes, ontology is closed and speculative at this point.

An ideal universe and a material universe behave exactly the same. There is no difference.

Objects in the idealist universe behave as though they are material.

Dancing David

19th December 2008, 04:47 AM

The missing coin is consistent with idealism and materialism. It's not evidence for either of them.

Again, that can happen under idealism as well as it can under materialism.

So they are equivalent?

It's not daft at all. If the evidence (and I assume you're referring to what we perceive with our senses) is consistent with both idealism and materialism, then how can it be evidence for one or the other? Suppose I tap on my desk. I hear sounds and feel a hard surface (sensory evidence (or sense-data)). But why should I suppose those sensations can only occur with a material object? I'm certain you've had dreams that seemed very real to you and you weren't aware you were dreaming. Your senses seemed to work in these dreams, right? It's equally possible that the sensations I'm getting when I tap on a desk are the result of a very vivid dream.

In which case it still doesn't matter, all equivalent.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th December 2008, 05:22 AM

Well, if they only exist as a conscious thought, then that's exactly what 'maintained' them.
But you didn't think about them while on holiday. They weren't in your thoughts. Neither was 99% of the rest of the familiar world, yet there it is upon your return, in all its familiar glory.

All these sollipsists and idealists have to explain what it is that maintains the external world when they aren't paying attention.

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th December 2008, 05:24 AM

This isn't really a problem for idealism. Berkeley invoked God as the ultimate perceiver, or you can just as easily say it is an unconscious process we're all engaged in (but not aware of) that maintains reality.
You could say that, but you have no evidence. Therefore it might not be your unconscious thoughts. It might be that the stuff exists independently of you. It might be that the stuff is "physical."

~~ Paul

paximperium

19th December 2008, 05:29 AM

You could say that, but you have no evidence. Therefore it might not be your unconscious thoughts. It might be that the stuff exists independently of you. It might be that the stuff is "physical."

~~ Paul
In other words, Malerin and everyone and everything is nothing more than a figment of "god's" imagination.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th December 2008, 05:32 AM

Right, but the question of what caused the Big Bang is answered under idealism- God (or a group of minds). Of course this raises the further questions of where God came from.
God? Can you show us a definition of idealism that mentions god?

I think idealism simply holds that the mental is a fundamental ontological existent that is not a product of the brain.

~~ Paul

Ichneumonwasp

19th December 2008, 06:09 AM

The missing coin is consistent with idealism and materialism. It's not evidence for either of them.

Again, that can happen under idealism as well as it can under materialism.

It's not daft at all. If the evidence (and I assume you're referring to what we perceive with our senses) is consistent with both idealism and materialism, then how can it be evidence for one or the other? Suppose I tap on my desk. I hear sounds and feel a hard surface (sensory evidence (or sense-data)). But why should I suppose those sensations can only occur with a material object? I'm certain you've had dreams that seemed very real to you and you weren't aware you were dreaming. Your senses seemed to work in these dreams, right? It's equally possible that the sensations I'm getting when I tap on a desk are the result of a very vivid dream.

Man I hate to get back into this, but..........

What I think you misunderstand about Kevin's statements above and what David and I and many others have been trying to say to you is this:

the evidence of our senses is not evidence of a particular ultimate reality. None of us, as far as I know, even speaks about ultimate reality having any set characteristics that we can define. The evidence of our senses is evidence of our senses, so when we say that we have evidence of the reality of a coin, that is all that we mean -- that coin follows certain rules.

When it comes to an ultimate reality, there is either monism, dualism, or pluralism. We approach this from a monist perspective. If monism is correct, then we can't say anything about the ultimate substance because words are defined in relation to one another. The only thing we can do is discover the rules by which what we see works.

If dualism is correct, then there is an interaction problem. How does the mind of God create the world? That's easy in a trivial sense, through thought. But the problem then becomes, what is God? If He is Other, then his mind does not work by the rules that we see around us (if it did then he would just be part of the same rule following thought-stuff), so how does he create the world? What is "mind"? We are left with only one answer -- magic, which means we can't understand it. That's perfectly fine with me as an explanation, though non-parsimonious and a little unsatisfactory. It is certainly possible, and most monists would say that we can't tell the difference anyway, so it doesn't matter. A consequence, though, is that "we" are just rule following bits of the mind of God doing its thing, so we are the same as a chair, in a sense -- everything is the mind of God. If everything is the mind of God, then our thoughts when they come to God are just God thinking itself, not "us" realizing God in some cosmic sense.

If you think that "we" have some separate form of free will, then "we" are something different from God and also different from chair, which would seem to imply neither monism nor dualism but pluralism. Why do we want to keep multiplying the "stuff" of the universe?

It would seem to me that even from the perspective of idealist dualism there is only one being with free will and that is the Ultimate Mind. Everything else is some form of his thought, so an illusion. I'm not sure how this helps anyone or differs in any way from a monist perspective. Hence David's frequent reply, "what difference does it make, since it's all the same anyway?"

Malerin

19th December 2008, 06:28 AM

MattusMaximus

19th December 2008, 02:58 PM

Russell said it best: those who think material is an illusion should get into a car and drive it into a brick wall, in a speed proportional to their degree of belief the wall isn't real.

Or, as I like to say, for some reason I get the sense that all these idealists/solipsists look both ways before crossing the road.

Wouldn't that make them hypocrites?

Silentknight

19th December 2008, 03:12 PM

I almost hate to reply now, but he can read my response when he gets back.
There's another way to look at the Matrix:

Neo never left the Matrix. He merely moved to a Matrix within a Matrix that the computers devised as an outlet for the rebellious humans who resisted the normal program. Morpheus and all the rest were plugged in the whole time.

It's a similar thought that someone had when they started a thread about a skeptic in heaven- if you get to heaven, can you still be skeptical about where you're really at (maybe you'[re dying in the OR and having a vivid NDE where time has really slowed down).

You say this as if somehow contradicts my argument. Knowing and understanding the physical laws of whichever reality one happens to be living in would be important regardless of whether it's a flawed illusion, a perfect illusion, a layered illusion, or ultimately real. Therefore your prior assertions that we can't conclude anything about reality, because the evidence could fit idealism just as easily, are false. Even assuming we're living in an illusion, the properties of said illusion would still apply to us as if it were real.

For example, in the hammer experiment that you're so reluctant to try, the properties of the hammer would be that it's a lever tool that amplifies kinetic force through a focused point of hard forged steel. Your head, meanwhile, is organic material that is soft and squishy by comparison, since bone tissue won't be able to put up much resistance to the force behind a hammer. Regardless of whether these are simply properties of illusions, it's still pretty obvious that subjecting your illusory cranium to illusory blunt force trauma would be bad for your illlusory health. The knowledge is neither useless nor meaningless.

I would also second what Ichneumonwasp pointed out regarding interaction. You're making the same oversight as creationists. To say that God thought up all of reality is no different from saying that God created the universe, in that it tells us nothing useful about the means he used to do so. We have never observed and do not have any examples of thinking minds that are able to create things or otherwise alter reality, not without any intermediary structures such as muscles, limbs, and motor neurons. You're essentially using a special definition of "mind" or "thought" in the same way that creationists use a special definition of "create."

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th December 2008, 04:14 PM

Or, as I like to say, for some reason I get the sense that all these idealists/solipsists look both ways before crossing the road.

Wouldn't that make them hypocrites?
It's like the old joke about the solipsist philosopher: Say Prof. Smith, I agree with you 100%!

~~ Paul

Ichneumonwasp

19th December 2008, 04:19 PM

It's like the old joke about the solipsist philosopher: Say Prof. Smith, I agree with you 100%!

~~ Paul

Or the other that I have heard - supposedly one of Bertrand Russell's protege's wrote him that she had discovered solipsism and couldn't understand why more people didn't sign up for it.

Kevin_Lowe

19th December 2008, 06:42 PM

Of course it's fallacious. Did I not admit to having no evidence to base my belief on, and that it was faith-based? Unless you have some new and interesting proof that other people exist, I bet almost everyone here is in the same boat. That has been my point in what seems like countless threads- we all have faith-based beliefs, atheist and theist alike. Maybe there are some die-hard agnostics lurking around here who really aren't sure other people exist. If so, they don't post much.

I think that's a misunderstanding of the position most people around here take. I have personal proof that I have a conscious mind, and that's where proof ends. I have evidence (not proof) that I, my mind and everything else in this universe is made up of stuff that has its own independent existence, and evidence (not proof) that other people have minds like mine.

I had hoped you would see the distinction between possibility and actuality.

Mere possibility is cheap. Anything's possible. It's possible I'm a crab dreaming it's a wallaby dreaming it's a brain in a vat being fooled by a Cartesian demon who is in turn being fooled by God.

Evidence, on the other hand, is worth something.

RandFan

19th December 2008, 06:49 PM

Mere possibility is cheap. Anything's possible. It's possible I'm a crab dreaming it's a wallaby dreaming it's a brain in a vat being fooled by a Cartesian demon who is in turn being fooled by God.

Evidence, on the other hand, is worth something. :)

Malerin

22nd December 2008, 10:08 PM

Remember that Neo wasn't just asked to believe in a ridiculous proposition without evidence. He had reasons to doubt based on what he and others saw happening around him, and was shown the real world for what it was.

SK, this was what I was responding to. How do you know he was shown the "real world"? What would have prevented the computers from coming up with a matrix within a matrix for the unruly humans, so they could live out their fantasy of rebellion? Nothing.

Malerin

22nd December 2008, 10:42 PM

Man I hate to get back into this, but..........

What I think you misunderstand about Kevin's statements above and what David and I and many others have been trying to say to you is this:

the evidence of our senses is not evidence of a particular ultimate reality.

Right, which is the point I always make. Now, how do I reconcile this with another thread where you made an appeal to sense data as evidence for the existence of external objects and people?

None of us, as far as I know, even speaks about ultimate reality having any set characteristics that we can define. The evidence of our senses is evidence of our senses, so when we say that we have evidence of the reality of a coin, that is all that we mean -- that coin follows certain rules.

I would add "it seems" to follow certain rules, but I take your point.

When it comes to an ultimate reality, there is either monism, dualism, or pluralism. We approach this from a monist perspective. If monism is correct, then we can't say anything about the ultimate substance because words are defined in relation to one another. The only thing we can do is discover the rules by which what we see works.

How are you using "monism"? Do you think there's only one real thing and everything is a type of that thing? Monism has so many different meanings, but it usually implies oneness, so I'm not clear on what a "monist perspective" is.

I would argue that there are three broad categories of reality: materialism (physical objects existing independent of mind/perception; idealism (immaterial things dependent on mind/perception; and dualism (combination of material and immaterial (rocks and angels both existing)). All other "isms" are subsets of these three categories: existence monism , for example, would be a type of materialism where only one concrete thing exists and everything is a type of that thing.

If dualism is correct, then there is an interaction problem.

Well, what kind of problem? I don't see an ontological problem (it's logically possible). I think it's an epistemic problem because we have no clue how the interaction works, but that doesn't mean the interaction can't work.

How does the mind of God create the world? That's easy in a trivial sense, through thought. But the problem then becomes, what is God? If He is Other, then his mind does not work by the rules that we see around us (if it did then he would just be part of the same rule following thought-stuff), so how does he create the world? What is "mind"? We are left with only one answer -- magic, which means we can't understand it. That's perfectly fine with me as an explanation, though non-parsimonious and a little unsatisfactory.

I don't know why it should be unsatisfactory. If God does exist, then the last thing I would expect is to be able to comprehend God's mind, motives, and methods. It would be like trying to explain calculus to a two-year old.

It is certainly possible, and most monists would say that we can't tell the difference anyway, so it doesn't matter.

Again, need to know what type of monism you mean.

A consequence, though, is that "we" are just rule following bits of the mind of God doing its thing, so we are the same as a chair, in a sense -- everything is the mind of God. If everything is the mind of God, then our thoughts when they come to God are just God thinking itself, not "us" realizing God in some cosmic sense.

How do you figure? Idealism could consist of three seperate things: minds, God, and the things minds perceive. This is basically Berkeley's idealism. I think Berkely would say "everything that appears external to us" is a "projection" of the mind of God. That would not include our own minds, though. What you're describing is more like what the Cource in Miracles people think.

If you think that "we" have some separate form of free will, then "we" are something different from God and also different from chair, which would seem to imply neither monism nor dualism but pluralism. Why do we want to keep multiplying the "stuff" of the universe?

Because we want to consider all possibilities. The amount of "stuff" in a theory of reality isn't grounds for rejecting that reality, because you would have to have some sort of standard of evidence to apply (e.g., realities with multiple layers are less probable). But this standard of evidence is going to rest on circular reasoning (How do we know realities with lots of stuff are less probable? Because realities with less amounts of stuff are more probable. How do we know realities with less amouns of stuff are more probable? Because realities with lots of stuff are less probable. And so on.)

In other words, you need to know what kind of reality you're in in order to lay odds on competing models of reality.

It would seem to me that even from the perspective of idealist dualism there is only one being with free will and that is the Ultimate Mind. Everything else is some form of his thought, so an illusion.

I don't see why this follows at all. Again, you can posit a reality consiting of God, minds, and the things minds perceive. I don't see anything logically impossible in that.

I'm not sure how this helps anyone or differs in any way from a monist perspective. Hence David's frequent reply, "what difference does it make, since it's all the same anyway?"

I think AkuManiMani gave a good response. It all boils down to what your foundation is. If you're locked in to a certain view of reality, concepts and ideas that might occur to you might be closed off because of this narrow way of thinking.

AkuManiMani

22nd December 2008, 11:08 PM

If dualism is correct, then there is an interaction problem.

Well, what kind of problem? I don't see an ontological problem (it's logically possible). I think it's an epistemic problem because we have no clue how the interaction works, but that doesn't mean the interaction can't work.

I think what Ichneumonwasp meant is that interaction strongly implies some commonality the between interacting components.

I suppose it's conceivable that 2 or more fundamentally different somethings can interact but, as you said, it raises the epistemological problem of discerning how such an interaction would work. Since such a realm of empirical inquiry is far beyond what we can investigate right now it seems the safer default position would be monism. One thing that makes monism more favorable as a philosophical position, imo, is that is avoids some of the special pleading that seems inherent to pluralistic ontologies.

The main thing that I take issue with in pluralism is that assuming that there are fundamentally different "stuffs" makes what appears an unsupportable assertion as to what the "ultimate reality" is.

I'm not aware of whether or not you hold to a monist or plural position but are you aware of any justifications/reasoning behind considering pluralism more coherent than monism?

Malerin

22nd December 2008, 11:27 PM

I think what Ichneumonwasp meant is that interaction strongly implies some commonality the between interacting components.

I suppose it's conceivable that 2 or more fundamentally different somethings can interact but, as you said, it raises the epistemological problem of discerning how such an interaction would work. Since such a realm of empirical inquiry is far beyond what we can investigate right now it seems the safer default position would be monism. One thing that makes monism more favorable as a philosophical position, imo, is that is avoids some of the special pleading that seems inherent to pluralistic ontologies.

The main thing that I take issue with in pluralism is that assuming that there are fundamentally different "stuffs" makes what appears an unsupportable assertion as to what the "ultimate reality" is.

I'm not aware of whether or not you hold to a monist or plural position but are you aware of any justifications/reasoning behind considering pluralism more coherent than monism?

Yeah, my wife asked me the exact same question the other day (becasue she sees no distinction between thought and mind). Take monistic idealism (everything is made of mind or thought). This leads to the claim that either mind is a type of thought, or thought is a type of mind. Neither of those make any sense to me. It seems clear to me that thought is a byproduct of mind, not a type of mind. Monistic idealism is like claiming smoke is a type of fire.

All that being said, it might be possible that there is only God, and everything is a type of God. But that raises the question: why, if we are God (or a type of God), are we hiding from our true nature? Maybe God is schizophrenic, who knows?

That's my reasoning and it's not really based on any evidence. Just a feeling I have. I'm also absolutely convinced there is no literal Hell (lake of fire, eternal torment). I have no evidence for or against Hell, but I am as convinced of its nonexistence to the same degree most atheists here are convinced of materialism.

arthwollipot

22nd December 2008, 11:37 PM

I actually understood that.

Ichneumonwasp

23rd December 2008, 06:01 AM

Right, which is the point I always make. Now, how do I reconcile this with another thread where you made an appeal to sense data as evidence for the existence of external objects and people?

You can't because I never made that appeal. I don't even think in that way, so I have no idea where you got the idea from. We have discussed this before and you know I don't hold that opinion. What I argued was that sense data provides evidence of something -- namely that we experience some interacting stuff that follows rules. It is simply wrong to say that there is no evidence of a chair just as there is no evidence of God -- that both propositions are equal. There is plenty of evidence of chairs -- just open your eyes. That evidence does not prove that a chair is material, mental, neutral monistic, whatever, but it is evidence. The same is not the case for God, unless you simply define the evidence into God (existence = God).

How are you using "monism"? Do you think there's only one real thing and everything is a type of that thing? Monism has so many different meanings, but it usually implies oneness, so I'm not clear on what a "monist perspective" is.

One ultimate substance. We can't know what the substance is, but it interacts together because it is all the "same stuff" at a fundamental level. You can call it vibrating energy comprising superstrings, you can call it the mind of God. Who knows? There is no way to know what it is. But monism holds that everything that is is comprised of the fundamental "stuff:, the ur-substance.

Well, what kind of problem? I don't see an ontological problem (it's logically possible). I think it's an epistemic problem because we have no clue how the interaction works, but that doesn't mean the interaction can't work.

But there is a fundamental intellectual problem. If an interaction is possible it occurs through some mechanism. Mechanism implies the working of the stuff we commonly call "material", so the problem revolves back to a monism that follows a simple set of rules. The only other solution is "magic" -- we don't know how it works and we can't know how it works. I can't imagine a more intellectually unsatisfying and unfalsifiable proposition.

I don't know why it should be unsatisfactory. If God does exist, then the last thing I would expect is to be able to comprehend God's mind, motives, and methods. It would be like trying to explain calculus to a two-year old.

See above. It means that it is all magic to us, so we can never be sure that it is correct. It may be the way things are, but it certainly won't help us. Essentially, this means that ontology is a waste of time.

Again, need to know what type of monism you mean.

By definition, there can only be one type of monism. Everything else is projection. Since we cannot know the ultimate substance any attempt to define it as "mental" or "physical" is just whistling in the wind, a waste of time, and a complete distraction.

How do you figure? Idealism could consist of three seperate things: minds, God, and the things minds perceive. This is basically Berkeley's idealism. I think Berkely would say "everything that appears external to us" is a "projection" of the mind of God. That would not include our own minds, though. What you're describing is more like what the Cource in Miracles people think.

So, there are three substances? If there is one mind that creates everything, then everything flows from that mind. Everything, therefore, follows the rules of that mind -- that it created from the beginning. If you want to stick to monism, then that mind is ultimately all that is, so "you" are merely an extension of that mind.

If you want to believe that there are three substances, then how do they interact? It seems that you must answer, "magic". So, you've created a situation in which you multiply the number of substances and can only have them interact through an unexplainable "mechanism". Do you see why I and many others find this an unsatisfactory way of approaching the world?

Because we want to consider all possibilities. The amount of "stuff" in a theory of reality isn't grounds for rejecting that reality, because you would have to have some sort of standard of evidence to apply (e.g., realities with multiple layers are less probable). But this standard of evidence is going to rest on circular reasoning (How do we know realities with lots of stuff are less probable? Because realities with less amounts of stuff are more probable. How do we know realities with less amouns of stuff are more probable? Because realities with lots of stuff are less probable. And so on.)

In other words, you need to know what kind of reality you're in in order to lay odds on competing models of reality.

Who says the other theories are impossible? I don't know anyone here who says they are impossible. What we say is that they are not parsimonious and they are generally intellectually unsatisfying.

I don't see why this follows at all. Again, you can posit a reality consiting of God, minds, and the things minds perceive. I don't see anything logically impossible in that.

If there is a single substance and that substance is God's mind, then your mind is composed of that substance, so "you" thinking about God is just God thinking about Himself ultimately. If you want to posit other substances -- God, other minds, etc. then fine; but that isn't monism.

I think AkuManiMani gave a good response. It all boils down to what your foundation is. If you're locked in to a certain view of reality, concepts and ideas that might occur to you might be closed off because of this narrow way of thinking.

Sure, if you're locked into that way of thinking. Have you considered that you haven't yet worked out the consequences of monism?

Ichneumonwasp

23rd December 2008, 06:06 AM

Monistic idealism is like claiming smoke is a type of fire.

I would say that monistic idealism makes no sense. Idealisms look to me like dualisms.

All that being said, it might be possible that there is only God, and everything is a type of God. But that raises the question: why, if we are God (or a type of God), are we hiding from our true nature? Maybe God is schizophrenic, who knows?

But that's just it. We can't hide from our true natures; it really doesn't even make sense to say such a thing. If monism is correct, everything we do is just God acting. There is no "us" properly speaking. To speak of "us" is to speak dualistically.

Malerin

23rd December 2008, 11:11 AM

Just so we're clear on the conversation:

Right, which is the point I always make. Now, how do I reconcile this with another thread where you made an appeal to sense data as evidence for the existence of external objects and people?

You can't because I never made that appeal. I don't even think in that way, so I have no idea where you got the idea from.

Maybe here?

Good God, what has gone wrong with you? Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people. It does not tell us absolutely that they exist (as I have mentioned repeatedly), but how could it be anything but evidence for their existence?

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=129944&highlight=kicking+rock&page=4

So you can see why I'm a little confused. :confused:

One ultimate substance. We can't know what the substance is, but it interacts together because it is all the "same stuff" at a fundamental level. You can call it vibrating energy comprising superstrings, you can call it the mind of God. Who knows? There is no way to know what it is. But monism holds that everything that is is comprised of the fundamental "stuff:, the ur-substance.

But there is a fundamental intellectual problem. If an interaction is possible it occurs through some mechanism. Mechanism implies the working of the stuff we commonly call "material", so the problem revolves back to a monism that follows a simple set of rules. The only other solution is "magic" -- we don't know how it works and we can't know how it works. I can't imagine a more intellectually unsatisfying and unfalsifiable proposition.

I wouldn't say we "can't know how it works". Maybe after we die or there will be some revelation in the future. At the present time, the causal mechanism is unknown, but that's true in all branches of science too- there are always questions being asked that we don't have answers for.

But just because idealism wouldn't be intellectually satisfying to you in no way makes it implausible. You're just saying you would prefer reality to be a different way. Reality is what it is, no matter how much we wish otherwise.

IMO, the workings of the casual mechanism between materialism/immaterialism or God's mind and our mind isn't that interesting. But the idea that reality is within us (or God) is very interesting to me and I think about it a lot.

Silentknight

23rd December 2008, 11:58 AM

SK, this was what I was responding to. How do you know he was shown the "real world"? What would have prevented the computers from coming up with a matrix within a matrix for the unruly humans, so they could live out their fantasy of rebellion? Nothing.
I'm going to avoid mentioning the First and Second Renaissance short films, because you're just going to ignore them anyway if I do.

As has already been said, possibility is cheap, but evidence is worth something. If the machines had created a second layer of illusion for this purpose, which was indistinguishable from reality, then it would still be moot (and the machines would have invested a hell of a lot of simulated effort into killing off the humans in the simulated war). In the distinction between simulation and reality that the movie actually focused on, Morpheus made it a point to show Neo rather than just telling him about it and asking him to accept speculative possibilities. My point, which you missed, is that this is very different from asserting that it's a matter of pure faith to apply our evidence to the materialistic world because you believe it could equally apply to other possibilities.

If it has already been demonstrated that there are glitches / inconsistencies in the world, and one has already been shown another layer of reality, then yes, it might follow that there are other layers of reality out there. If not, then the possibility is meaningless.

From your last post:
I wouldn't say we "can't know how it works". Maybe after we die or there will be some revelation in the future. At the present time, the causal mechanism is unknown, but that's true in all branches of science too- there are always questions being asked that we don't have answers for.
You're committing the argument from ignorance fallacy, so it's not at all analogous to the missing pieces in scientific knowledge. "After we die"? "Revelation in the future"? The fact that you've failed to qualify them in any meaningful way means they're not really answers at all. Science concerns itself with answers obtained through observation and testing.

But just because idealism wouldn't be intellectually satisfying to you in no way makes it implausible. You're just saying you would prefer reality to be a different way. Reality is what it is, no matter how much we wish otherwise.
You made the claim, therefore it's up to you to substantiate it. So far this looks like nothing more than special pleading that the mere possibility of idealism be elevated to proof or plausibility.

IMO, the workings of the casual mechanism between materialism/immaterialism or God's mind and our mind isn't that interesting. But the idea that reality is within us (or God) is very interesting to me and I think about it a lot.
I think the question of interaction is important if you're going to jump to conclusions about reality based on the possibility of something like a prime thinking entity.

Ichneumonwasp

23rd December 2008, 12:21 PM

Just so we're clear on the conversation:

Maybe here?

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=129944&highlight=kicking+rock&page=4

So you can see why I'm a little confused. :confused:

No, I cannot see why you're confused because we have had previous conversations in which I have been quite clear about my epistemic/metaphysical stance -- that I can't know what is really out there. Sense data is evidence of other people and other things. It doesn't tell us the ultimate make-up of those other people or other things (or even if they really exist), but it is certainly evidence of and for them. We cannot say the same for God. We have no reliable evidence supporting the existence of God in the same way that we have reliable evidence supporting the existence of the computer screen in front of you (since other people can see it repeatedly, act on it, etc. -- and that is how we define reliable evidence).

Evidence is not proof. Evidence is information used to support or deny some fact. That evidence may be wrong, or it may lead one to a wrong conclusion, but that does not stop it from being evidence. We speak of evidence primarily in pragmatic terms, especially in science. It does not refer to tiny peeks at ultimate reality. There is no peek at ultimate reality from a monistic stance. There are only the rules of the game and how it is played, and we spend our time trying to figure that out.

I wouldn't say we "can't know how it works". Maybe after we die or there will be some revelation in the future. At the present time, the causal mechanism is unknown, but that's true in all branches of science too- there are always questions being asked that we don't have answers for.

But just because idealism wouldn't be intellectually satisfying to you in no way makes it implausible. You're just saying you would prefer reality to be a different way. Reality is what it is, no matter how much we wish otherwise.

IMO, the workings of the casual mechanism between materialism/immaterialism or God's mind and our mind isn't that interesting. But the idea that reality is within us (or God) is very interesting to me and I think about it a lot.

Once again, who said idealism or dualism or pluralism are implausible or impossible? Certainly not me. They are not the most elegant solutions to the problem, however. Monism is a much more elegant solution.

As to revelation upon death -- works the same as magic. If that is what you want to believe, that is fine, but you have no basis now to decide what is and is not true except your own whims and desires (or someone else's if you wish to follow some previously decided upon dogma). You may want that all will be revealed at death, but wishing doesn't make it so. And it doesn't solve the problem -- whatever interaction, if possible, will still have to be "magic". If there is a mechanism, then it is "physical" -- meaning that it follows the rules of the game we see around us. If there is an explanation that doesn't amount to "magic", then there is a mechanism.

This is in a different class from scientific knowledge that we have not yet gained. This is a philosophical gulf that we cannot bridge.

For the record, I don't have any problem with whatever you want to believe for yourself. But if you commit errors when discussing it here, I or someone else is going to call you on it.

However, there is another issue that everyone must consider when discussing these matters. Whether we really exist as we think we do or not, it is clear that our psychology has a particular structure. We want to believe that we will live beyond death. That thought is comforting. We want to believe that justice will prevail. We want to believe that we are protected by our parents. We want to believe that the good prevail and the evil perish. Our minds are structured to project agency on others so that we can "see" that they have minds too. We see agency everywhere.

This should give us pause when discussing issues over ultimate ontology being "mind".

Malerin

23rd December 2008, 01:16 PM

No, I cannot see why you're confused because we have had previous conversations in which I have been quite clear about my epistemic/metaphysical stance -- that I can't know what is really out there.

This is, literally, the exchange that occurred:

Me: (from an earlier thread) Sense data is not evidence for the existence of external things or people.
You: (quoting verbatim here) Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people
Me: Remember when you said sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people?
You: I never said that.

My confusion partly comes from our previous conversations. I would never have expected you to play the sense-data card, yet you did, which is obvious to anyone who can read, then you denied you would ever do such a thing.

So I'm even more confused now.

Sense data is evidence of other people and other things.

I notice you say it again, but you leave out the crucial word "external" (which you included earlier). It's trivial to say sense-data is evidence for other people and things because without the word "external" you can claim that those other things might or might not exist outside the mind. It's basically claiming that sense-data is evidence of something, which no one would deny. I don't deny that other people and objects exist, but whether they exist in my mind as ideas or they exist external to me is a hugely important question.

Likewise, it is NOT a trivial claim to say that sense-data is evidence for the existence of external people and things. THAT would be saying there are external things and people (as opposed to them existing internally in our minds), and our perceptions of them are evidence that they exist external to us. That is a much stronger claim. I suspect you realize this, which is why you left the word "external" out in the above quote. Maybe in the earlier quote you didn't realize you had included it?

It doesn't tell us the ultimate make-up of those other people or other things (or even if they really exist), but it is certainly evidence of and for them. We cannot say the same for God. We have no reliable evidence supporting the existence of God in the same way that we have reliable evidence supporting the existence of the computer screen in front of you (since other people can see it repeatedly, act on it, etc. -- and that is how we define reliable evidence).

OK, now you seem to be back to making the sense-data argument: I see the computer screen, other people see it, ergo my (and other's perception) of the computer is evidence for it's external existence (again, you shy away from this word, but it's certainly implied). But just a few posts ago you claim to "never think that way" so I don't know what you mean.

Ichneumonwasp

23rd December 2008, 01:45 PM

This is, literally, the exchange that occurred:

Me: (from an earlier thread) Sense data is not evidence for the existence of external things or people.
You: (quoting verbatim here) Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people
Me: Remember when you said sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people?
You: I never said that.

My confusion partly comes from our previous conversations. I would never have expected you to play the sense-data card, yet you did, which is obvious to anyone who can read, then you denied you would ever do such a thing.

So I'm even more confused now.

I don't want to have to go over this ten times again.:(

You seem to be interpreting everything I write from your dualistic pre-suppositions. Please approach this from another angle. You are also confusing epistemology with ontology.

Sense data is evidence for things and people. External or not, it is evidence for them. You cannot take this to mean that I have said that those people or things definitely exist externally (that they are proved) because I never said that. But sense data is evidence that they do exist externally (not definite, only that it is evidence for their external existence). Whether or not that sense data is an accurate reflection of ulitmate reality is an entirely different thing.

I notice you say it again, but you leave out the crucial word "external" (which you included earlier). It's trivial to say sense-data is evidence for other people and things because without the word "external" you can claim that those other things might or might not exist outside the mind. It's basically claiming that sense-data is evidence of something, which no one would deny. I don't deny that other people and objects exist, but whether they exist in my mind as ideas or they exist external to me is a hugely important question.

Likewise, it is NOT a trivial claim to say that sense-data is evidence for the existence of external people and things. THAT would be saying there are external things and people (as opposed to them existing internally in our minds), and our perceptions of them are evidence that they exist external to us. That is a much stronger claim. I suspect you realize this, which is why you left the word "external" out in the above quote. Maybe in the earlier quote you didn't realize you had included it?

How many different ways must I communicate "I am not making an ontological claim" here? Evidence is pragmatic. It does not prove any ontological existent. I have already claimed that I cannot know the nature of ultimate reality, so your repeated attempts to mischaracterize what I am saying is getting extremely annoying. Can you please take a step back and read what I have actually written and not what you think I mean based on some strawman characterization -- one that appears to arise from what look like dualistic assumptions on your part. This conversation is going to go exactly where the last one did if you continue to do the same thing. I didn't leave anything out of what I said on purpose or otherwise. I have been saying the same thing all along, but you have not read what I have written.

Let me repeat -- we cannot get to ultimate reality. Even if you believe in an idealistic monism, a dualism, whatever, we cannot get to ultimate reality. There is a reason why I do not subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth -- because it is a projection. All that we can do with our limited minds is project onto reality, guess at it.

When we speak of evidence we speak of using information that helps to affirm or deny some fact. Facts, in a pragmatic sense, cannot mean "that which is an accurate reflection of ultimate reality" because we don't know what ultimate reality is (you can guess at it; you can have faith in it, but you cannot know it). We know what works, what fits within the rules of the game that we see "out there". Evidence is information that fits within the rules of the game. Reliable evidence is that which can be affirmed by others in a reliable way -- like a scientific experiment that can be repeated to arrive at the same results. Unreliable evidence is that which cannot be affirmed by others.

So, we have reliable evidence of other people externally. Joe over there can see Sue just as I can and just as you can. That is not an ontololgical claim; it is an epistemic one. Evidence of God based on a feeling is not reliable evidence because one person's internal feeling cannot be experienced by others, so it cannot be affirmed. The types of evidence are not equal, so we cannot treat them as if they are equal.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

23rd December 2008, 03:54 PM

Part of the problem here is with the word external. Sometimes people use the word to refer to things that exist separately from the observer. But sometimes people are referring to things whose coherency is maintained separately from the consciousness of the observer, without regard to what those things actually are. That's how I use the word, and I think Ichneumonwasp does, too.

It would be helpful if people would clarify what they mean by external.

I notice you say it again, but you leave out the crucial word "external" (which you included earlier). It's trivial to say sense-data is evidence for other people and things because without the word "external" you can claim that those other things might or might not exist outside the mind. It's basically claiming that sense-data is evidence of something, which no one would deny. I don't deny that other people and objects exist, but whether they exist in my mind as ideas or they exist external to me is a hugely important question.
Those other things clearly exist outside your conscious mind. That is sufficient reason to call them external.

~~ Paul

Malerin

23rd December 2008, 05:47 PM

I don't want to have to go over this ten times again.:(

You seem to be interpreting everything I write from your dualistic pre-suppositions. Please approach this from another angle. You are also confusing epistemology with ontology.

This isn't some matter of interpretation.

You said X
I reminded you of when you said X
You denied saying X
I quoted you as saying X

Whatever my perspective, I have your own quotes. You clearly made a claim you later denied making. You're either changing definitions midstream, or twisting yourself into knots to avoid a pretty trivial point. Maybe you had a different meaning of "external" a few weeks ago. I don't know. Moving right along...

Sense data is evidence for things and people. External or not, it is evidence for them.

Well, let's examine that a little. Is your claim that when I look at a computer, the visual sense data is evidence that there is an actual computer, existing independent of me? Not some "dream" computer. A computer that is made of "stuff", and doesn't go away when no one's looking at it or thinking of it.

You cannot take this to mean that I have said that those people or things definitely exist externally (that they are proved) because I never said that. But sense data is evidence that they do exist externally (not definite, only that it is evidence for their external existence). Whether or not that sense data is an accurate reflection of ulitmate reality is an entirely different thing.

I never claimed you said it was proof. Again, this hinges on what "external" means. I take it to mean "not in the mind" or "existing independent of thought or perception". If that's what external means, then you're saying sense-data is evidence that reality is a certain way (i.e., things exist that are outside the mind and are not mind-dependent). Is this what you mean?

How many different ways must I communicate "I am not making an ontological claim" here?

It seems like you're making two claims: ontologically, you're saying "reality is a certain way" (external thigns exist). This IS an ontological claim because reality could consist of no external things (e.g., idealism). Espistemically, you're saying "sense-data" is evidence for reality consisting of external things.

Evidence is pragmatic. It does not prove any ontological existent. I have already claimed that I cannot know the nature of ultimate reality, so your repeated attempts to mischaracterize what I am saying is getting extremely annoying.

Because you keep making ontological claims about external reality and then appealing to sense-data as evidence. OK, I looked up external and I think I know where you're coming from:

"1 a: capable of being perceived outwardly <external signs of a disease> b (1): having merely the outward appearance of something : superficial (2): not intrinsic or essential <external circumstances>
2 a: of, relating to, or connected with the outside or an outer part <the building's external features> b: applied or applicable to the outside <a lotion for external use>
3 a (1): situated outside, apart, or beyond ; specifically : situated near or toward the surface of the body (2): arising or acting from outside <an external force> b: of or relating to dealings or relationships with foreign countries c: having existence independent of the mind <external reality>"

Are you using the first definition of external? I'm using the 3rd. But if you're using the 1st definition, you're making a pretty trivial claim: sense-data is evidence that reality can be perceived? That is tautologically true, so of course I would agree with that. Necessarily, if there is sense-data and perception going on, there is a part of reality being perceived.

If you're using 3(c), then you're making an ontological claim.

athon

23rd December 2008, 07:04 PM

Malerin

23rd December 2008, 09:58 PM

I'll have a stab at clarifying by reiterating what I said in my last post;

Our perceptions make it appear as if there is a reality external to our perception of it. There is no evidence to suggest this is an illusion. Why go to the trouble of supposing it is an illusion - that it does not have an existence independent of my perception of it - if there is no observation which supports that concept?

We can't definitely say one way or another. We don't need to. The observations consistently appear that way, and our behaviour supports it. To add weight to the thought that it is any other way would demand some reason to believe so, such as at least a flaw that disrupts the illusion.

Athon

You can picture an Egyptian priest making a similar argument: the sun seems to go around the Earth, and we have no evidence to suggest otherwise, so let's just say Ra does it and be done with it.

I will grant you that reality appears materialstic (objects appear to exist in three dimensional space, and they stay put where you leave them), but that is also consistent with a lot of non-materialistic models of reality. It does add another layer to suggest that this is all an illusion, but unless we had some sort of evidence that reality is non-illusionary, the illusionary aspect of certain models of reality can't be counted against them.

And one last point on simplicity (which I think you're arguing for). Materialism is far from a simple theory. No one on Earth understands it completely, because humans don't have the memory or time to achieve advanced degrees in the dozens of materialistic fields you'd have to master to get a handle on it.

athon

24th December 2008, 03:20 AM

You can picture an Egyptian priest making a similar argument: the sun seems to go around the Earth, and we have no evidence to suggest otherwise, so let's just say Ra does it and be done with it.

And in that situation, I'd have no problem with their conclusion. However, at some stage in history there were observations which came about which meant that conclusion was no longer adequate.

The thing is, there is no problem speculating 'what if?'. Yet to seriously suggest an alternative, you need an observation which demonstrates a short-fall in the current explanation.

I will grant you that reality appears materialstic (objects appear to exist in three dimensional space, and they stay put where you leave them), but that is also consistent with a lot of non-materialistic models of reality.

That's not the point. It's also consistent with fairies working behind the scenes, with butterfly dreams, computer simulations, and everything being built by tiny invisible elves. It's consistent with an infinite array of possible scenarios. Yet the reason why parsimony is assumed is that deferring only to what is consistent with a theory is virtually useless.

Surely in making other decisions in life you don't give all possibilities that are consistent with an idea equal weighting? Why would you in this case?

It does add another layer to suggest that this is all an illusion, but unless we had some sort of evidence that reality is non-illusionary, the illusionary aspect of certain models of reality can't be counted against them.

This seems like an odd way to form a philosophy, and one I suspect you don't apply to all decisions you make. If you were driving down the road, and the petrol gauge 'appeared' to say 'empty', I'd doubt you'd consider it equally likely that the gauge was broken. Hell, the observation is consistent with 'broken gauge', yet an empty tank is parsimonous, hence you'd pull into a station and fuel up.

And one last point on simplicity (which I think you're arguing for). Materialism is far from a simple theory. No one on Earth understands it completely, because humans don't have the memory or time to achieve advanced degrees in the dozens of materialistic fields you'd have to master to get a handle on it.

Ok, most of the stuff you've said so far has been (more or less) reasonable, even if ultimately it does come down to a conflict with parsimony. It's kept me interested in the hope you'd bring some thoughtful comments to the table (which you have). But this is just plain silly.

What we're discussing here is not a matter of 'simplicity of concept' but of parsimony. Given two possible ideas, the one that uses all of the observations with the fewest assumptions (all else being equal) is to be selected for testing or application. To do the reverse makes no sense.

Athon

Ichneumonwasp

24th December 2008, 04:53 AM

This isn't some matter of interpretation.

You said X
I reminded you of when you said X
You denied saying X
I quoted you as saying X

Whatever my perspective, I have your own quotes. You clearly made a claim you later denied making. You're either changing definitions midstream, or twisting yourself into knots to avoid a pretty trivial point. Maybe you had a different meaning of "external" a few weeks ago. I don't know. Moving right along...

Well, let's examine that a little. Is your claim that when I look at a computer, the visual sense data is evidence that there is an actual computer, existing independent of me? Not some "dream" computer. A computer that is made of "stuff", and doesn't go away when no one's looking at it or thinking of it.

Grrrr........

As I have repeatedly said, I have absolutely no idea what exists "out there" -- what form it takes, if it actually exists, however you want to frame it. Evidence for something external is to me means "I can see something external to me and you can see something external to me too" (it is a pragmatic definition). This does not mean that there actually is something external to me. For the fourth time, I am not making an ontological claim. I am claiming that there is sense data and nothing else (by nothing else I do not mean that nothing else exists necessarily, but that sense data is all we have to go on). How can you not understand that?

The problem is not in what I said; it is in your interpretation.

ETA:
Malerin, what you have done is take words I wrote and stripped them of their context so as to arrive at a conclusion alien to me. If you want to know what I meant, then you must consider the context. I have not changed my stance on any of this. If you doubt my sincerity, then please ask anyone else with whom I have had similar discussions. I can't recall everyone, but you can certainly ask Paul, Mercutio, Nick, Robin, Dancing David, Rocketdodger, BDZ and several others. I did not make an ontological claim because I do not believe that I can make an ontological claim. We have discussed this previously. You can fault me for assuming that you would take that into consideration, but please stop playing this trolling game.

Malerin

24th December 2008, 10:43 AM

Grrrr........

As I have repeatedly said, I have absolutely no idea what exists "out there" -- what form it takes, if it actually exists, however you want to frame it. Evidence for something external is to me means "I can see something external to me and you can see something external to me too" (it is a pragmatic definition). This does not mean that there actually is something external to me. For the fourth time, I am not making an ontological claim. I am claiming that there is sense data and nothing else (by nothing else I do not mean that nothing else exists necessarily, but that sense data is all we have to go on). How can you not understand that?

The problem is not in what I said; it is in your interpretation.

ETA:
Malerin, what you have done is take words I wrote and stripped them of their context so as to arrive at a conclusion alien to me. If you want to know what I meant, then you must consider the context. I have not changed my stance on any of this. If you doubt my sincerity, then please ask anyone else with whom I have had similar discussions. I can't recall everyone, but you can certainly ask Paul, Mercutio, Nick, Robin, Dancing David, Rocketdodger, BDZ and several others. I did not make an ontological claim because I do not believe that I can make an ontological claim. We have discussed this previously. You can fault me for assuming that you would take that into consideration, but please stop playing this trolling game.

Do you really think I'm trolling? Come now. Arthwollipot seems to be enjoying all this and he actually understood something I wrote! I think I know why we're not understanding each other. What do you mean by "external"? This claim that you've made:

Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people.

Is either a trivial point or an epistemic point with an ontological assumption (i.e., reality consists of external things and sense-data is evidence of them). It all hinges of what you think "external" means. So can you tell me how you're using it?

Malerin

24th December 2008, 11:19 AM

And in that situation, I'd have no problem with their conclusion. However, at some stage in history there were observations which came about which meant that conclusion was no longer adequate.

The thing is, there is no problem speculating 'what if?'. Yet to seriously suggest an alternative, you need an observation which demonstrates a short-fall in the current explanation.

Not really. To achieve agnosticism all I need to show is the evidence we have is consistent with multiple mutually exclusive models of reality. Think of it as playing the role of defense lawyer. I don't have to prove my theory. I just have to show that all your evidence is consistent with mulitiple suspects. If I do that, then agnositicsm is the only defensible position.

That's not the point. It's also consistent with fairies working behind the scenes, with butterfly dreams, computer simulations, and everything being built by tiny invisible elves. It's consistent with an infinite array of possible scenarios.

Right, that's my point. Evidence that is consistent with multiple theories cannot be evidence for any particular theory.

Yet the reason why parsimony is assumed is that deferring only to what is consistent with a theory is virtually useless.

I don't quite understand you. If sense-data isn't evidence for a type of reality (because it is consistent with other types of reality), what else do you have to defer to?

Surely in making other decisions in life you don't give all possibilities that are consistent with an idea equal weighting? Why would you in this case?

I think about whether this is all a projection of mind or not. The apparent orderliness of the universe doesn't mean it's materialistic or atheistic.

This seems like an odd way to form a philosophy, and one I suspect you don't apply to all decisions you make. If you were driving down the road, and the petrol gauge 'appeared' to say 'empty', I'd doubt you'd consider it equally likely that the gauge was broken. Hell, the observation is consistent with 'broken gauge', yet an empty tank is parsimonous, hence you'd pull into a station and fuel up.

That's just an appeal to pragmatism. You can be pragamtical in an idealistic reality, a theistic one, a materialistic one, etc.

Ok, most of the stuff you've said so far has been (more or less) reasonable, even if ultimately it does come down to a conflict with parsimony. It's kept me interested in the hope you'd bring some thoughtful comments to the table (which you have). But this is just plain silly.

What we're discussing here is not a matter of 'simplicity of concept' but of parsimony. Given two possible ideas, the one that uses all of the observations with the fewest assumptions (all else being equal) is to be selected for testing or application. To do the reverse makes no sense.

1. How do you know this rule of parsimony is valid? You can't derive it from logic or math. It's a matter of induction, which is based on empirical evidence. But that empirical evidence is also consistent with other models of reality.
2. How do you "test" for what reality you're in? Even if parsimony is true, it doesn't follow that we should assume reality does not have an illusionary layer to it. Without any evidence to the contrary, we can't know one way or another. Parismony is as valid in a coherent idealistic reality as it is in a materialistic reality.

3. Parismony is a form of Occam's razor (principle of parsimony). So let's look at two competing claims:

A)Lightning is Zeus throwing thunderbolts from the clouds.

B)Lightning is a static discharge of electricity, the causes of which are still being debated (http://www.pbs.org/wnet/savageplanet/03deadlyskies/01lforms/indexmid.html). The eletrical discharge is comprised of electrons, and the reason we see ligthning is because it emits massless particles called photons.

Is (B) really the simpler theory? (A) is cartoonish, but also very simple to understand. Zeus gets mad and throws thunderbolts. That's lightning. On the other hand, parts of (B) are still being debated, and (B) leads to other very esoteric questions about the nature of matter and energy which very few of us even understand (and some of the questions aren't even answered yet). This was my earlier point: that far from being the simpler theory, materialism is so complex, no one fully understands it.

rocketdodger

24th December 2008, 11:51 AM

I will contribute with the usual "three equivalent properties of 'physical' originally proposed by Robin some years ago" post.

If something is physical (or material) it features these three equivalent properties:

1) It can be mathematically described.

2) It follows the same underlying order as all other physical (material) stuff.

3) It can be scientifically observed.

Ichneumonwasp

24th December 2008, 02:41 PM

Do you really think I'm trolling? Come now. Arthwollipot seems to be enjoying all this and he actually understood something I wrote! I think I know why we're not understanding each other. What do you mean by "external"? This claim that you've made:

Is either a trivial point or an epistemic point with an ontological assumption (i.e., reality consists of external things and sense-data is evidence of them). It all hinges of what you think "external" means. So can you tell me how you're using it?

It is a trivial point. An entirely trivial point. Of course it is trivial. I meant it as an utterly trivial example of how you can open your eyes and see people sitting over there drinking their Starbucks and discussing bits of silly philosophy between tokes on a clove cigarette.

How could the statement -- open your eyes and you can see people over there too -- be anything but trivial?

I have already explained more than once what "external" means -- it means I can see someone over there and so can you. It does not mean that person necessarily exists, but that I receive sense impressions of such a person and these same sense impressions help me to negotiate this world that I perceive and avoid the charging tiger, recently escaped from the zoo and angry at clove cigarette smokers, that the first year philosophy student still thinks is a figment of his solipsistic imagination even as he is torn to shreads before my eyes.

It contrasted with the statement you made that we have equal evidence for God as we do for people sitting over there. We don't. We have plenty of reliable evidence for people sitting over there. We open our eyes and see them. We do not have reliable evidence for God. The only evidence for God that we have is definitional or personal.

We have an equal lack of absolute evidence for everything ontological -- God, people, whatever. That is an entirely different issue, however, since that state of affairs is no help to anyone. There is essentially no way out of radical doubt (your earlier attempt didn't emerge from that dark cave any more than Descartes' appeal to his ontological proof). So we live our lives by opening our eyes and accepting what we see. Whether or not that has anything to do with ultimate reality, who knows? Or as Dancing David is fond of saying, "Who cares and what difference does it make?"

I am not the one making ontological claims. You are. My stance is that we can't make any such claims. We may begin with assumptions. The assumption I accept is that everything is ultimately one substance. Most philosophical issues disappear with that assumption, but it does have consequences. Increase the number of substances and you multiply the problems.

Now, at this point, you can continue this fruitless line -- which does amount to trolling at this point since I have had to repeat myself five times now while you ask the same questions and I give you the same answers -- or we can move on and you can deal with the other issues at hand. It's your choice.

AkuManiMani

24th December 2008, 02:48 PM

Ichneumonwasp

24th December 2008, 02:48 PM

1. How do you know this rule of parsimony is valid? You can't derive it from logic or math. It's a matter of induction, which is based on empirical evidence. But that empirical evidence is also consistent with other models of reality.
2. How do you "test" for what reality you're in? Even if parsimony is true, it doesn't follow that we should assume reality does not have an illusionary layer to it. Without any evidence to the contrary, we can't know one way or another. Parismony is as valid in a coherent idealistic reality as it is in a materialistic reality.

3. Parismony is a form of Occam's razor (principle of parsimony). So let's look at two competing claims:

A)Lightning is Zeus throwing thunderbolts from the clouds.

B)Lightning is a static discharge of electricity, the causes of which are still being debated (http://www.pbs.org/wnet/savageplanet/03deadlyskies/01lforms/indexmid.html). The eletrical discharge is comprised of electrons, and the reason we see ligthning is because it emits massless particles called photons.

Is (B) really the simpler theory? (A) is cartoonish, but also very simple to understand. Zeus gets mad and throws thunderbolts. That's lightning. On the other hand, parts of (B) are still being debated, and (B) leads to other very esoteric questions about the nature of matter and energy which very few of us even understand (and some of the questions aren't even answered yet). This was my earlier point: that far from being the simpler theory, materialism is so complex, no one fully understands it.

Yes, B is the simpler theory because it is based on a simpler ontology. If there is a Zeus, then he is a highly complex being that, if we believe the stories, is divine. If he is divine and the world is material, as the stories hold, then we are dealing with dualism. If dualism is the case, then how does the divine interact with the material?

A purely mechanical explanation does not unnecessarily multiply ontological categories or types of substances. Monism is as simple as it gets. That one story is told in fewer words is not an expression of the simplicity of how it all works.

The material explanation for lightening is an explanation. The Zeus explanation ultimate devolves into "it's magic". That is not an explanation; it is a mere description since it does not provide an actual mechanism.

Silentknight

24th December 2008, 03:39 PM

Not really. To achieve agnosticism all I need to show is the evidence we have is consistent with multiple mutually exclusive models of reality. Think of it as playing the role of defense lawyer. I don't have to prove my theory. I just have to show that all your evidence is consistent with mulitiple suspects. If I do that, then agnositicsm is the only defensible position.
The only problems are that you haven't shown that it's consistent with other models of reality, and you have failed to prove that they're mutually exclusive either. In fact, it's been pointed out to you numerous times that your other models of reality are indistinguishable from the currently accepted theory. Furthermore, the point I have raised, which you continue to ignore, is that regardless of how many alternate models you come up with, the evidence we gather from this reality is most reasonably applied to this reality. It's not a matter of faith to apply observations such as "gravity makes things fall towards a center of mass" to the world we live in, regardless of how many models of reality there are.

The problem with postulating unsubstantiated models of reality is that for every reality you claim is possible, there's an equal and opposite model of reality that cancels it out. You say that God could be the prime thinker, I say we could have imagined God into existence. You say there could be a Matrix world machines have created, I say there could be humans pulling the strings of the machines. That's why possibility is cheap.

Your analogy of the sun is beside the point. If all the currently available evidence pointed towards a sun that was really a glowing chariot wheel, or was a small body that revolves around the earth, or was a giant lump of burning coal, it would be perfectly reasonable to accept the current model. The way people found out more about the sun was through further observations, not by asserting that we can't ever know the truth because the evidence could fit other unfounded explanations.

Malerin

24th December 2008, 03:51 PM

It is a trivial point. An entirely trivial point. Of course it is trivial. I meant it as an utterly trivial example of how you can open your eyes and see people sitting over there drinking their Starbucks and discussing bits of silly philosophy between tokes on a clove cigarette.

How could the statement -- open your eyes and you can see people over there too -- be anything but trivial?

Because "external" can be defined different ways, as I showed. Only now am I clear what meaning of the word you're using. When you said Good God, what has gone wrong with you? Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people. it was in the context of a couple of other people arguing that sense-data is evidence that material external (strong sense) things exist. I'm guessing they thought you were agreeing with them.

Even in the trivial sense, though, there are problems with your claim.

It contrasted with the statement you made that we have equal evidence for God as we do for people sitting over there. We don't.

As long as you don't make any claims about the actual existence of real people, this is true (for the moment). Your claim seems to be:

1. Sense data is evidence that there are other people.
2. Sense data is not evidence that other people actually exist, independent of our minds.
3. The evidence for God is not as strong as evidence for other people.

This is a very weak argument though, because you're basically claiming there's no evidence for the real external (in the strong sense) existence of other people and there's no evidence for God.

Here's where I think it falls apart. When you claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for the existence of external (weak sense) things, you're assuming that the sense-data is not coming from God in some idealistic way. If it is coming from God, then every piece of sense-data is evidence for God's existence.

So even the trivial claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for other things begs the question that the sense-data is not coming from God. But you can't know that, so it fails as even a trivial claim.

There is essentially no way out of radical doubt (your earlier attempt didn't emerge from that dark cave any more than Descartes' appeal to his ontological proof).

It's a work in progress. I still think there's something to the claim "If there are multiple coherent theories, and we know one of the necessary conditions of one of the theories is true, then that theory is more likely to be true."

I am not the one making ontological claims. You are. My stance is that we can't make any such claims.

I've almost entirely been pushing agnosticism. The few times I've admitted to a theistic bias, I've explained that I have no evidence for it.

Malerin

24th December 2008, 03:59 PM

Furthermore, the point I have raised, which you continue to ignore, is that regardless of how many alternate models you come up with, the evidence we gather from this reality is most reasonably applied to this reality.

I'm ignoring it because this doesn't mean anything. You're basically saying "the evidence from this reality is evidence for this reality". OK.

Silentknight

24th December 2008, 04:15 PM

I'm ignoring it because this doesn't mean anything. You're basically saying "the evidence from this reality is evidence for this reality". OK.

Keep burning all that straw, because it seems to be the only thing you're good at. I was saying that there's no reason to treat the evidence we have as if it applied to any of your other models of reality. You've repeatedly claimed that evidence, including sense-data, could just as easily support alternate theories of reality. However you haven't offered up any connection whatsoever between said evidence and any given alternate model; all you've said is that because it's possible, we have to give all of your ridiculous assertions about reality an equal share. This is just as disingenuous as creationists claiming that fossil evidence was put there to trick us.

athon

24th December 2008, 04:42 PM

Right, that's my point. Evidence that is consistent with multiple theories cannot be evidence for any particular theory.

Not at all. This fails to take into account assumptions.

You refer to a court case - imagine two postulated scenarios which both use all of the evidence. One has to introduce some assumptions in order for the evidence to still fit, while the other does not. Otherwise they are perfectly equal, in that all observations are accounted for. In a court, there would be a requirement for the second model to provide additional evidence for those assumptions. This same requirement exists in science.

If this didn't happen, no court would ever convict, science would never progress, and we'd be paralysed for choice. Yes, it is pragmatic, but what is the point of any of this if not for having some use?

I don't quite understand you. If sense-data isn't evidence for a type of reality (because it is consistent with other types of reality), what else do you have to defer to?

I said 'only'. We have to defer to sense data, of course. But we also need to limit the assumptions. Otherwise in every case I require some sort of explanation, I'd be able to concoct the wildest, most complicated stories which (so long as it could account for the observations) would all, according to you, be equally valid.

I think about whether this is all a projection of mind or not. The apparent orderliness of the universe doesn't mean it's materialistic or atheistic.

As others have said again and again, the observations can only be used to form relationships which lead to laws. These laws are what are referred to as 'material'. There is no comment on where these laws are embedded. That is a statement of idealism. Materialism simply says the appear to be independent of our thinking of it. It is parsimonous. Idealism says they are not. That is not parsimonous, as it makes an assumption that contradicts what appears to be the case.

Yes, parsimony is an assumption based on induction. I agree. And it is most certainly born of pragmatism (ironically, William of Occham's philosophy was born out of theology...it was later modifications that used it for pragmatic purposes. I'm sure the poor old monk is now turning in his grave. :D)

That's just an appeal to pragmatism. You can be pragamtical in an idealistic reality, a theistic one, a materialistic one, etc.

Yes it is, and no you can't.

The reason is straight forward - when one relies on using a model for something, parsimony provides the most useful means of selecting one as it will lead to progress where others will not.

Historically, there were two schools of thought on how life transpired. One thought life arose mechanistically, the other from a strange life essence called 'vitalism' (I'm giving the five second version of this story - in reality, it's much more detailed).

Now, both schools used all the observations, but both required some assumptions. Yet out of the two, the mechanistic school believed life could be explained by rules of chemistry and physics, which required only the assumption that they operated in ways yet to be understood. Vitalism believed there was a yet to be discovered force which created life. The assumptions were greater, and there were no observations indicating that a new property of the universe was required.

Vitalism never moved forward, and contributed nothing. The reason being was it was not parsimonous - the assumptions provided no indication of how to interpret new observations. It could not even say anything about this mysterious force (Vitalism was simply a 'god of gaps' argument in disguise).

Idealism is also a god of gaps argument. Yet in this case, there isn't even a gap. It is purely an assumption without a purpose. It's even more useless than vitalism in that respect.

1. How do you know this rule of parsimony is valid? You can't derive it from logic or math. It's a matter of induction, which is based on empirical evidence. But that empirical evidence is also consistent with other models of reality.

It's an induced conclusion. And it has proven useful.

2. How do you "test" for what reality you're in? Even if parsimony is true, it doesn't follow that we should assume reality does not have an illusionary layer to it. Without any evidence to the contrary, we can't know one way or another. Parismony is as valid in a coherent idealistic reality as it is in a materialistic reality.

*sigh* Now this is getting tiring, sorry. We've all pointed out how idealism is not parsimonous. You constantly ignore it.

I can't argue too much if you wish to make a special case for your ontology and choose against parsimony. Go for it. I can't state you're wrong, only that it seems pointless to me. But if it's 'use' is helping you to sleep at night, who am I to argue?

But when you say it is equally parsimonous, when you've been shown where it isn't...you're simply being obtuse. If that's the case, the respect I've had for this discussion has vanished. Which is a shame, as it's otherwise been interesting.

Is (B) really the simpler theory? (A) is cartoonish, but also very simple to understand. Zeus gets mad and throws thunderbolts. That's lightning. On the other hand, parts of (B) are still being debated, and (B) leads to other very esoteric questions about the nature of matter and energy which very few of us even understand (and some of the questions aren't even answered yet). This was my earlier point: that far from being the simpler theory, materialism is so complex, no one fully understands it.

What is it with you ignoring what has been said? Please, by all means disagree if you can show where something is wrong, but ignoring it in order to maintain your argument is dishonest.

Parsimony IS NOT the same as simplicity. Yes, I know some explanations use the term 'simpler explanation', but I hate them. They are wrong.

Parsimony is based on a ratio of observations and assumptions. Assumptions that require more details which cannot be accounted for by observations are to be avoided in favour of assumptions that can be. That is parsimony.

I'll continue when you've demonstrated that you understand that much, as I don't think there's much point if you wish to ignore that difference.

Athon

Ichneumonwasp

24th December 2008, 04:46 PM

Because "external" can be defined different ways, as I showed. Only now am I clear what meaning of the word you're using. When you said it was in the context of a couple of other people arguing that sense-data is evidence that material external (strong sense) things exist. I'm guessing they thought you were agreeing with them.

Even in the trivial sense, though, there are problems with your claim.

I have no idea what others thought, nor do I think it very likely that anyone else read what I wrote. I often don't have time to read everything that people write here, though there are many who I do take the time to read in full.

I'm gald to see that you understand and are being reasonable about it. That's more the Malerin I know and respect.

As long as you don't make any claims about the actual existence of real people, this is true (for the moment). Your claim seems to be:

1. Sense data is evidence that there are other people.
2. Sense data is not evidence that other people actually exist, independent of our minds.
3. The evidence for God is not as strong as evidence for other people.

This is a very weak argument though, because you're basically claiming there's no evidence for the real external (in the strong sense) existence of other people and there's no evidence for God.

OK, but I didn't make a positive argument. I argued negatively against your claim that there is as much evidence for God as there is for the external existence of other people. We don't generally use the word "evidence" to refer to knowledge of true ontology. While it is the case that we are equally in the dark about ultimate reality, it is not the case that we have equal evidence for God and the external reality of other people.

I don't need to repeat the same arguments, but, yes, it is a weak argument. I didn't mean it to be a knock-down argument. It is simply trivially true that we have sense data and that we use sense data that can be corroborated by others and that constitutes the primary way that we use the word "evidence" or "reliable evidence". We simply lack the corroboration from others (except in a mediated way) for the existence of God.

There are ways to prove God's existence, but they are also trivial and a waste of time.

Here's where I think it falls apart. When you claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for the existence of external (weak sense) things, you're assuming that the sense-data is not coming from God in some idealistic way. If it is coming from God, then every piece of sense-data is evidence for God's existence.

So even the trivial claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for other things begs the question that the sense-data is not coming from God. But you can't know that, so it fails as even a trivial claim.

No, that has no bearing on the argument. The sense data argument refers to the way that we treat sense data as evidence. It does not concern ultimate reality.

It is certainly possible that every bit of sense data that we experience results from the action of God. But that is beside the point. Let's assume that there are only two possibilities -- God and no God. In one scenario everything that exists is the result of God's action, so all evidence is "from God". In the opposing scenario everything that exists is the result of information banging into itself, so all evidence is from information banging into itself with no God. So, it's a wash, since we can't now which of the two possibilities is "real".

When we speak of evidence as sense data, we speak of evidence as sense data. We can't know what is behind it. God, no God, there is simply no way to reach any final conclusion, so this is not a weak point.

The weak point is that it doesn't tell us anything about ultimate reality. It cannot. We can't start with any ontologic stance because we cannot know what ontologic reality *is*.

All we can do is examine the "rules of the game" and comment on them.

When we engage in metaphysics we leave the realm of what is knowable and enter the realm of assumption.

It's a work in progress. I still think there's something to the claim "If there are multiple coherent theories, and we know one of the necessary conditions of one of the theories is true, then that theory is more likely to be true."

And I obviously disagree. When one of the components for how we can know in the first place is used as a necessary condition, then I don't think we can move forward. As the cogito doesn't prove that "I" exist, but only that "thought exists", I think your formulation proves that thought is necessary for any sort of knowledge; I don't think you can then claim that it is necessarily more likely as the basic ontology.

I've almost entirely been pushing agnosticism. The few times I've admitted to a theistic bias, I've explained that I have no evidence for it.

OK, then, that's fine. I realized several years ago that we can decide on God as the explanation of ultimate reality but can't prove it. Simply stated -- God or no God -- it's a choice. Trying to prove it is a waste of time. I don't particulary think that it matters if the final answer is monism, dualism, pluralism or whatever -- it is still a choice. Or, another way of putting it, it's an approach toward life.

Silentknight

24th December 2008, 05:12 PM

paximperium

24th December 2008, 05:19 PM

Thanks all for a great discussion. A specific nod to Athon, SilentKnight, Akumanimani and Ichneumonwasp for a very interesting discussion into the topic at hand.

Even Malerin's weaseling is interesting in noting all the different dodges and apologetic he attempts without much success.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

24th December 2008, 05:32 PM

Materialism simply says the appear to be independent of our thinking of it. It is parsimonous. Idealism says they are not. That is not parsimonous, as it makes an assumption that contradicts what appears to be the case.
I think there are forms of idealism that are equally parsimonious. It becomes simply a question of whether the fundamental existent is "physical" or "mental." Neutral monism was even invented to reduce the struggle between those two possibilities.

If all the monism guys got together and really laid out the details of their various metaphysics, they would all be equivalent modulo terminology.

~~ Paul

Frank Newgent

24th December 2008, 06:18 PM

Imo, solipsism sounds a lot like a form a megalomania. Have there been any serious philosophers who held it as an actual position beyond mere hypothetical debate?
Not always serious
The following is a Preamble to the party platform of the League of Nihilistic Solipsism.

1 - As representatives of the League of Nihilistic Solipsism, "we" hang tough in a world of epistemological failure and cosmic purposelessness; a world in which nihilical solipsists, along with other proto-phenomena and apparent p-zombies, are, every now and again, sovereign over existential horror and emotional anguish, and no one is forced to sacrifice his or her repudiation of all imposed values for the benefit of others' nonlinguistic illusions.

2 - "We" observe that the bodies of other human beings behave as my body does in similar circumstances and, so, infer that the mental life and series of mental events which characteristically accompany my bodily behaviour - today, quite possibly, suicide - are also present in the case of others. It is further observed that the banality inherent in any recognition that such behavior is not necessarily meaningful oft subverts critical tools and seems to make inescapable an environment where pointless ideas can be imposed forcibly with little resistance.

3 - Consequently, "we" defend each person's right to engage in any series of astounding improbabilities most likely destined to fail after a lifetime of meaningless suffering. And although within the world "we" picture one does not absolve his or her self of arbiting ultimate moral responsibility, there may very well be times when wandering the streets wearing a sign "I am not drunk. I am crazy. Give me some goddamn money!" will just have to do. It helps to be good looking and well spoken when alienated by a crippling spiritual emptiness.

4 - In the party platform "we" will set forth our basic principles and enumerate various policy stands derived from those principles. These specific policies are not the goal, however. Decades of scientific inquiry and careful research have ended within a perspective of utter futility for life and universal existence and the unavoidable conclusion that there is no point.

http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=662123&postcount=10

Malerin

24th December 2008, 07:56 PM

Not at all. This fails to take into account assumptions.

You refer to a court case - imagine two postulated scenarios which both use all of the evidence. One has to introduce some assumptions in order for the evidence to still fit, while the other does not. Otherwise they are perfectly equal, in that all observations are accounted for. In a court, there would be a requirement for the second model to provide additional evidence for those assumptions. This same requirement exists in science.

This is just a reiteration of your claim that we should prefer materialism because it is the simpler theory (or more parsimonious one). In court and science, I would agree this is a good tool. In metaphysics? Not so sure. I've already agreed that materialism has this going for it: things seem to exist independent of us in space, but this is also consistent with certain models of theism, dualism, and idealism. In the absence of any evidence about what reality really is, why should we assume things are the way they seem? That seems intellectually lazy because it's been our experience that often times, things aren't what they seem to be. In the absence of any real knowledge about reality, it is just as possible that things aren't the way they seem, that reality has an illusionary aspect to it.

There is also this to be said about materialism: we have no proof that physical matter exists. The information and sense-data we get from the world is equally consistent with non-materialistic models of reality. So why posit a materialistic reality we have no proof for? Idealism, on the other hand, asserts that everything is thought and mind. We do have proof that thought and mind exist (to doubt it is to assert it, in the case of thought. If you doubt you have a mind, I don't know how to repsond). Why not go with the theory of reality we at least have some evidence for?

If this didn't happen, no court would ever convict, science would never progress, and we'd be paralysed for choice. Yes, it is pragmatic, but what is the point of any of this if not for having some use?

It's an epistemic point. If we're agnostic about reality, then that agnosticism will bleed into other areas. I'm not saying we should be radical skeptics, but a blind adherence to materialism is close mindedness.

I said 'only'. We have to defer to sense data, of course. But we also need to limit the assumptions. Otherwise in every case I require some sort of explanation, I'd be able to concoct the wildest, most complicated stories which (so long as it could account for the observations) would all, according to you, be equally valid.

And I would again say materialism is an increidbly complicated story that no one in the world completely understands. Can you imagine how many years it would take just to earn advanced degrees in all the medical fields? And that's just one subset of materialism.

And if we're limiting assumptions, why should we assume that reality is what it appears to be? Why should we assume that the inferences we've made about the existence of physical matter are correct?

Yes it is, and no you can't.

Why can't you be pragmatic in a dualistic reality or idealistic one? If reality is idealistic in the Berkelian sense, there's nothing wrong with claiming God created a coherent world goverened by regular laws. There's no contradiction with behaving pragmatically in a Berkelian idealistic reality. The gas gauge reads empty so I buy gas. The difference is that the things I think are real (gas, gauges, cars) are actually ideas, but my behavior regarding them is still pragmatical.

The reason is straight forward - when one relies on using a model for something, parsimony provides the most useful means of selecting one as it will lead to progress where others will not.

Again, an appeal to simplicity based on inferences. I would respond as I have been: why assume reality is materialistic when there's no evidence for matter, and why assume reality doesn't contain an illusionary aspect to it? There's no proof that reality does or doesn't have an illusionary aspect to it, so you're violating your own rule of parsimony by making a baseless assumption (multiplying entities, in other words)

Idealism is also a god of gaps argument. Yet in this case, there isn't even a gap. It is purely an assumption without a purpose. It's even more useless than vitalism in that respect.

Of course there's a gap: Sense data -----> reality. How do we bridge the gap from sense-data to the ultimate nature of reality, to objects in-and-of themselves? There's a huge gap in our fundamental knowledge of reality. Maybe reality is not theistic, but maybe it's not atheistic either. All we have to go on is sense-data, which is consistent with innumerable models of reality.

*sigh* Now this is getting tiring, sorry. We've all pointed out how idealism is not parsimonous. You constantly ignore it.

I don't ignore it. You just don't like my answer. I think materialism also violates parsimony by positing the existence of physical matter that we have no evidence for. And assuming reality is non-illusionary without any evidence to base that assumption on is also fallacious. If you don't find that appealing, should I say you're ignoring me?

I can't argue too much if you wish to make a special case for your ontology and choose against parsimony. Go for it. I can't state you're wrong, only that it seems pointless to me. But if it's 'use' is helping you to sleep at night, who am I to argue?

Just because it seems pointless to you doesn't mean it's not how things are. Materialism seems incredibly pointless to me- we're here for X amount of time until the heat-death of the universe. Whoopee. That doesn't mean reality isn't materialistic.

But when you say it is equally parsimonous, when you've been shown where it isn't...you're simply being obtuse. If that's the case, the respect I've had for this discussion has vanished. Which is a shame, as it's otherwise been interesting.

Sorry to disappoint. I don't agree with your principle that people who don't agree with you are being "obtuse" and disrespectful. I've done my best to present my case. I've heard your arguments and don't find them convincing. That doesn't mean I think you're obtuse or I have less repsect for you- you just don't agree with me.

What is it with you ignoring what has been said? Please, by all means disagree if you can show where something is wrong, but ignoring it in order to maintain your argument is dishonest.

Maybe it would be more helpful if you tell me what do you think I'm ignoring, instead of assuming I'm trying to dodge something. When people argue metaphsyics, so much turns on defintion and nuance that it can appear that someone is ignoring you when they think they've made a valid response. That is what happened with my discussion with Ichenuwasp before I realized everything turned on how "external" was being used in a claim he made.

Parsimony IS NOT the same as simplicity. Yes, I know some explanations use the term 'simpler explanation', but I hate them. They are wrong.

You may hate them, but that's part of the definition:

"Main Entry: law of parsimony
Date: 1837
: occam's razor"

":a scientific and philosophic rule that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily which is interpreted as requiring that the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more complex or that explanations of unknown phenomena be sought first in terms of known quantities"

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/law+of+parsimony

Parsimony is based on a ratio of observations and assumptions. Assumptions that require more details which cannot be accounted for by observations are to be avoided in favour of assumptions that can be. That is parsimony.

"Ockham’s razor
philosophy
also spelled Occam’s razor, also called law of economy, or law of parsimony, Main
principle stated by William of Ockham (1285–1347/49), a scholastic, that Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; “Plurality should not be posited without necessity.” The principle gives precedence to simplicity; of two competing theories, the simplest explanation of an entity is to be preferred. The principle is also expressed “Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.”

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor

Webster and Britannica both reference "simplest explanation". You really think they got the definition wrong?

I'll continue when you've demonstrated that you understand that much,

Yes, sire. I humbly beg your forgiveness and will try to understand more in the future.

as I don't think there's much point if you wish to ignore that difference.

Yes, how dare I go by Webster and Britannica. Clearly, Athon is the accpeted standard :rolleyes:

Silentknight

25th December 2008, 12:39 PM

Something just occurred to me.

It really really shouldn't be all that hard to come up with evidence that specifically supports idealism. I'm not talking about the claim that the evidence we have could apply equally to other models of reality; that's not evidence in and of itself, that's special pleading. I'm talking about evidence that actually demonstrates idealism as a plausible model of reality.

Some examples off the top of my head: The first would be a demonstration that the mind can directly affect and alter reality, not just our perception of it, but an actual example of thought changing something in the physical world without any intermediaries. Yes, that could fall under psychic phenomena, but even in that case the burden of evidence still falls on those claiming it to be true. The second would be an answer to the question of interaction, in other words, a proposed mechanism by which a mind, whether ours or God's or whatever, can intervene with or manipulate the world. This is almost the same exact question creationists must answer, yet are incapable of addressing. A third form of evidence could simply be sense-data of another layer of reality, for example, how Neo was shown what the Matrix was instead of just being told.

Religious beliefs such as the afterlife or direct revelation are not evidence but appeals to magic. Challenging or finding a minute flaw in the established theory is not evidence for the contrary either. That's no different from how creationists claim that the gaps in evolutionary theory are evidence for intelligent design. In keeping with the analogy, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that evolution is 100% false, so what? Creationism has still got nothing of its own to stand on.

This does not count as evidence:

Malerin: How are you materialists!
All your evidence are belong to us!
You are on the way to revelation!

JREF: What you say?

Malerin: You have no proof of physical matter, make your time!
Ha ha ha ha!

Idealism, on the other hand, asserts that everything is thought and mind. We do have proof that thought and mind exist (to doubt it is to assert it, in the case of thought. If you doubt you have a mind, I don't know how to repsond). Why not go with the theory of reality we at least have some evidence for?
No it's not, you're confusing begging the question for a tautology. You're assuming that thoughts got there in and of themselves and exist acausally, which is no different from how creationists assume in the kalam and telological arguments that God existed uncaused. However it's not so much a question of whether thoughts and mind exist as a question of their specific nature. In the meantime, there is plenty of evidence that the chemical and bioelectrical processes of the brain are the cause of thought. I gave you numerous examples of how physical causes can affect the mind, destroy certainty of thought, and alter one's personality and sense of self, and you handwaved it with special pleading.

By your logic, the fact that the programs on my computer are necessary to respond to the programs on your computer is proof that the programs are responsible for the existence of the computer itself.

athon

25th December 2008, 03:31 PM

I've only got a few minutes before I have to head out, so I'll hold off on responding to the rest of your post until later, Malerin. Then again, I think we might have come to the end of the discussion - if you still think parsimony equals simplicity, I think we've come to a halt.

I do want to quickly respond to your dictionary definitions, however. Yes, those definitions themselves are too simplistic. Sorry to break it to you, but dictionaries have their limitations. I'd rather go with my understanding of science history and philosophy, where entire chapters have been written on parsimony, than a couple of sentences in a dictionary.

Let's look at your Zeus explanation of lightning. It's certainly simpler, as you simply say some individual is responsible for the lightshow we get in a storm. We then have the static electricity model, where charges are separated within a cloud by the movement of water molecules. Far more complicated than 'a big man does it', but follows parsimony far better, as there are fewer assumptions and they account for more observations related to the phenomenon. In this situation, parsimony has nothing to do with simplicity.

So, yes, the dictionaries are incorrect. Not the first time I've disagreed with a dictionary definition, and won't be the last. Dictionaries aren't the comprehensive authorities we'd like them to be, in spite of being useful.

In the very least for the purposes of my point, understand that in my experience (and I've done quite a bit of study in science history and philosophy) parsimony involves comparing related observations with an evaluation of the nature of assumptions required. If this explanation is more complicated than something like 'god did it', so be it. It's still following parsimony.

Athon

Nick227

25th December 2008, 04:52 PM

Some examples off the top of my head: The first would be a demonstration that the mind can directly affect and alter reality, not just our perception of it, but an actual example of thought changing something in the physical world without any intermediaries.

Thoughts are creating this discussion. So I'd say that thinking is demonstrably affecting reality here. Thinking creates the sense of there being a self that is having the thoughts but this self is immaterial. One might say that thinking emerges from a neural substrate and so has a material source, but without a mental sense of self being generated by the thoughts there would be no motivation to act upon them imo.

Yes, that could fall under psychic phenomena, but even in that case the burden of evidence still falls on those claiming it to be true. The second would be an answer to the question of interaction, in other words, a proposed mechanism by which a mind, whether ours or God's or whatever, can intervene with or manipulate the world.

There is no compulsion to act upon all thinking. It seems to me only those thoughts which appear to be the most "my thoughts," those which most create a sense of self, get acted upon. Thus it's reasonable to surmise that there must be a process which is developing thinking into acting upon thought. I've heard this process referred to as "identification."

This is almost the same exact question creationists must answer, yet are incapable of addressing. A third form of evidence could simply be sense-data of another layer of reality, for example, how Neo was shown what the Matrix was instead of just being told.

I don't quite understand this bit.

Nick

Nick227

25th December 2008, 05:05 PM

I have already explained more than once what "external" means -- it means I can see someone over there and so can you. It does not mean that person necessarily exists, but that I receive sense impressions of such a person and these same sense impressions help me to negotiate this world that I perceive and avoid the charging tiger, recently escaped from the zoo and angry at clove cigarette smokers, that the first year philosophy student still thinks is a figment of his solipsistic imagination even as he is torn to shreads before my eyes.

Materialists and skeptics often ime make these kinds of points but I find them of limited philosophical or scientific value. Natural selection means that a coalition of processes that has formed into an organism over billenia is inherently driven to resist death. This makes no meaningful statement that I can see about the nature of reality.

That sensory phenomenology appears to be "outside" and thoughts and feelings "inside" could well be another function of natural selection. It does not necessarily mean anything in particular.

Nick

Malerin

25th December 2008, 08:00 PM

I've only got a few minutes before I have to head out, so I'll hold off on responding to the rest of your post until later, Malerin. Then again, I think we might have come to the end of the discussion - if you still think parsimony equals simplicity, I think we've come to a halt.

http://www.google.com/search?q=%22law+of+parsimony%22+simplest+explanati on&rls=com.microsoft:*:IE-SearchBox&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=ie7&rlz=1I7DKUS

"Notice how the principle has strengthened in these forms which should be more correctly called the law of parsimony, or the rule of simplicity."
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html

"The generalization states that, if there are a number of explanations for observed phenomena, the simplest explanation is preferred. Called also scientific parsimony."
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/law+of+parsimony

"This principle says that, of competing explanations, choose the simplest explanation, because the simplest explanation is most likely to be the correct one. In particular, if the same thing (whatever it is) can be equally well explained either by (a) appealing to one thing (or one type of thing), or (b) appealing to two things (or two types of things), then always choose (a)."

http://home.wlu.edu/~mahonj/Ancient_Philosophers/Lecture1.htm

"Noun: law of parsimony
The principle that entities should not be multiplied needlessly; the simplest of two competing theories is to be preferred"

http://www.wordwebonline.com/en/LAWOFPARSIMONY

"There is a widespread philosophical presumption that simplicity is a theoretical virtue. This presumption that simpler theories are preferable appears in many guises. Often it remains implicit; sometimes it is invoked as a primitive, self-evident proposition; other times it is elevated to the status of a ‘Principle’ and labeled as such (for example, the ‘Principle of Parsimony’)."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/

I think it's beholden on you to explain why we should abandon the standard definition of the law of parsimony (as defined by standard dictionary, encyclopedia, medical dictionary, philosophically, and even mathematically) in favor of your definition which you have not supported with any outside sources.

Ichneumonwasp

26th December 2008, 05:35 AM

It's an epistemic point. If we're agnostic about reality, then that agnosticism will bleed into other areas. I'm not saying we should be radical skeptics, but a blind adherence to materialism is close mindedness.

I don't want to get in the middle of your discussion, but this point must be addressed. The value of philosophy is in its rigor. Radical doubt takes doubt to its logical conclusion. We value Einstein because he did not stop half-way, but carried his ideas to their conclusions, even though his thinking produced very strange ideas.

What you are proposing is a way to open up fuzzy thinking. First of all, who is "blindly adherent to materialism" here? I have had similar discussions over the past several years, and invariably someone starts talking about "true believers" or "blind adherence" or "closed mindedness" or some such moniker, and it always struck me as silly. I see people who argue vigorously for a position, but I also see these same people with very open minds, willing to look from a variety of viewpoints.

It isn't "blind adherence" to anything that you are witnessing, but rigor in the approach. Too many folks come by trying to open a space for their latest idea (or, often, it is a very old idea) and claim that their interlocutors are "closed minded" when they meet resistance.

It is a childish ploy. I had hoped better from you.

And I would again say materialism is an increidbly complicated story that no one in the world completely understands. Can you imagine how many years it would take just to earn advanced degrees in all the medical fields? And that's just one subset of materialism.

And if we're limiting assumptions, why should we assume that reality is what it appears to be? Why should we assume that the inferences we've made about the existence of physical matter are correct?

What difference does it make how complicated or uncomplicated "materialism" is? It simply is what it is.

Why should we assume that reality is as it appears? Well, when it comes to ultimate reality we don't. When it comes to approaching the "rules of the game" we have no other option. The way the world works is the way the world works. All we can do is examine it. Whether or not it is ultimately all in the mind of God, vibrating strings of energy, information, your own solipsistic imaginings, that doesn't matter when it comes to explanations in the here an now.

The world appears to work by a set of rules. What we call materialism concerns our attempts to examine what those rules are and how they work, plain and simple. To suggest that ultimate reality being the product of the mind of God should, therefore, bleed into what we see so that anything is possible destroys the entire project of science. Why bother with anything then? Let's all just navel gaze every moment. Science is an attempt to model what we see and hope that it reflects the underlying reality. It actually doesn't matter if it gets it right or not in an ultimate sense, only that it works. If the model we construct works, then that's what we go with. Trying to introduce a fudge factor into the model itself -- psi is likely, ghosts are likely, whatever -- removes rigor from the model. The only wiggle room is between the model and reality, not within the model itself. The model is used to predict future and explain past outcomes, not fit ultimate reality. The deciding factor for what goes into the model is experience -- reality with a little 'r' -- not what we want.

When it comes to parsimonious explanations, Zeus hurling thunderbolts is not an explanation, it is a gloss and description of an event. "Oooh, lightening, Zeus threw another thunderbolt".

Parsimony concerns explanations, not descriptions. The ontology that houses Zeus is (a) much more complicated than monism, or (b) permits "magic". In general such descriptions always introduce magic into the mix; so they are not less complicated explanations. Such descriptions do not provide a mechanism, they bypass the problem with hand waving (they are god of the gaps arguments).

I honestly cannot believe that you would introduce this very old type of discussion which has been dealt with in the philosophy of science ad nauseum as a real issue. I thought you said that you had a degree in philosophy? Or is this a silly game?

When it comes to a dualistic viewpoint, where is the evidence? If you want to introduce dualism into the picture, then that means magic is real -- there is no explanation for how certain things occur, no mechanism -- so provide the evidence. I hope you see that you are introducing god of the gaps into the picture. You are arguing against a rigorous approach and for sloppy thinking -- unless you have something amazing to tell us, some well described event or series of events that have no possible physical explanation.

If you want to get to the real issue, then please explain to me how dualism works. I have asked this question repeatedly for years but heard no answers. Perhaps you can supply one? Or is it just magical thinking?

Ichneumonwasp

26th December 2008, 06:06 AM

Materialists and skeptics often ime make these kinds of points but I find them of limited philosophical or scientific value. Natural selection means that a coalition of processes that has formed into an organism over billenia is inherently driven to resist death. This makes no meaningful statement that I can see about the nature of reality.

That sensory phenomenology appears to be "outside" and thoughts and feelings "inside" could well be another function of natural selection. It does not necessarily mean anything in particular.

Nick

I didn't set the terms of the debate. Malerin did. It is far easier to discuss the matter using our dualistic language, as long as the point gets across for that debate, than to move into the whole arena of monism's conclusions. That often just confuses all concerned.

But your point is well taken -- the internal/external division is an artificial hold-over from earlier dualistic ways of thinking, still enshrined in our common language.

Ichneumonwasp

26th December 2008, 06:10 AM

http://www.google.com/search?q=%22law+of+parsimony%22+simplest+explanati on&rls=com.microsoft:*:IE-SearchBox&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=ie7&rlz=1I7DKUS

"Notice how the principle has strengthened in these forms which should be more correctly called the law of parsimony, or the rule of simplicity."
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html

"The generalization states that, if there are a number of explanations for observed phenomena, the simplest explanation is preferred. Called also scientific parsimony."
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/law+of+parsimony

"This principle says that, of competing explanations, choose the simplest explanation, because the simplest explanation is most likely to be the correct one. In particular, if the same thing (whatever it is) can be equally well explained either by (a) appealing to one thing (or one type of thing), or (b) appealing to two things (or two types of things), then always choose (a)."

http://home.wlu.edu/~mahonj/Ancient_Philosophers/Lecture1.htm

"Noun: law of parsimony
The principle that entities should not be multiplied needlessly; the simplest of two competing theories is to be preferred"

http://www.wordwebonline.com/en/LAWOFPARSIMONY

"There is a widespread philosophical presumption that simplicity is a theoretical virtue. This presumption that simpler theories are preferable appears in many guises. Often it remains implicit; sometimes it is invoked as a primitive, self-evident proposition; other times it is elevated to the status of a ‘Principle’ and labeled as such (for example, the ‘Principle of Parsimony’)."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/

I think it's beholden on you to explain why we should abandon the standard definition of the law of parsimony (as defined by standard dictionary, encyclopedia, medical dictionary, philosophically, and even mathematically) in favor of your definition which you have not supported with any outside sources.

His definition is the same as those offered above. You would see that if you took a step back and asked yourself this question, "What do they mean by explanation?" I think what Athon has offered is a much better and pithier way of looking at the issue. It really is a comparison between assumptions and observations. Thanks, Athon. By the way, I'm sorry to step into this since you were the one addressed and you are much better at explaining this stuff than I am.

Malerin

26th December 2008, 10:19 AM

I don't want to get in the middle of your discussion, but this point must be addressed. The value of philosophy is in its rigor. Radical doubt takes doubt to its logical conclusion. We value Einstein because he did not stop half-way, but carried his ideas to their conclusions, even though his thinking produced very strange ideas.

Which is what I've been arguing for- questioning basic assumptions.

What you are proposing is a way to open up fuzzy thinking. First of all, who is "blindly adherent to materialism" here?

Huh? Did I single anyone out? I was talking about a general principle: we shouldn't blindly adhere to any philosophy. If I said, "we shouldn't use racial epitheths" would you assume I'm talking about certain people here? Maybe a little less "rightoues" indignation next time?

I have had similar discussions over the past several years, and invariably someone starts talking about "true believers" or "blind adherence" or "closed mindedness" or some such moniker, and it always struck me as silly. I see people who argue vigorously for a position, but I also see these same people with very open minds, willing to look from a variety of viewpoints.

And I see people who tell me to stand in the street or hit myself if I don't believe in materialism. Theists tell me I'm going to Hell for questioning the Bible. There's "blind adherence" on both sides, and there are open-minded people on both sides. This whole point that you felt compelled to bring up is...pointless.

It isn't "blind adherence" to anything that you are witnessing, but rigor in the approach. Too many folks come by trying to open a space for their latest idea (or, often, it is a very old idea) and claim that their interlocutors are "closed minded" when they meet resistance.

Step off the soapbox and realize I was making a general point.

It is a childish ploy. I had hoped better from you.

I don't really care what hopes you'd had for me and whether they're dashed or not.

What difference does it make how complicated or uncomplicated "materialism" is? It simply is what it is.

That could be said about any theory of reality. Athon seems to be making a point that materialism is the simpler theory (or doesn't multiply entities or whatever he means by his private definition of "parsimony"), and should be preferred right out of the starting gate.

Why should we assume that reality is as it appears? Well, when it comes to ultimate reality we don't.

Athon is arguing we should, or at least, that's what I think he's arguing.

When it comes to approaching the "rules of the game" we have no other option. The way the world works is the way the world works. All we can do is examine it. Whether or not it is ultimately all in the mind of God, vibrating strings of energy, information, your own solipsistic imaginings, that doesn't matter when it comes to explanations in the here an now.

I agree- the fact that we behave pramatically doesn't have any bearing on ultimate reality other than it seems to be coherent and follow certain rules.

The world appears to work by a set of rules. What we call materialism concerns our attempts to examine what those rules are and how they work, plain and simple.

Materialism goes much further than that:

"The philosophy of materialism holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to exist is matter, and is considered a form of physicalism."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

"Physicalism is sometimes known as materialism. Historically, materialists held that everything was matter -- where matter was conceived as "an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist""
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

To suggest that ultimate reality being the product of the mind of God should, therefore, bleed into what we see so that anything is possible destroys the entire project of science. Why bother with anything then?

I'm not arguing for radical skepticism- just agnosticism about fundamental reality. Just because reality may be idealistic or theistic doesn't mean we should abandon science. Why would you think that?

When it comes to parsimonious explanations, Zeus hurling thunderbolts is not an explanation, it is a gloss and description of an event. "Oooh, lightening, Zeus threw another thunderbolt".

That is an explanation. It's not a good one, but it's coherent and explains the event: Lightning is caused by an irate God throwing glowing objects from the clouds.

Parsimony concerns explanations, not descriptions.

Of course it does. Did I not reference many sources defining it as preference to the simpler theory?

The ontology that houses Zeus is (a) much more complicated than monism, or (b) permits "magic". In general such descriptions always introduce magic into the mix; so they are not less complicated explanations. Such descriptions do not provide a mechanism, they bypass the problem with hand waving (they are god of the gaps arguments).

I don't know what your hang-up is with "magic" (which you seem to define as unanswered questions, which science is full of). Why should we assume everything about reality is explainable? If God exists, I fully expect there to be many things I'll never comprehend about God.

I honestly cannot believe that you would introduce this very old type of discussion which has been dealt with in the philosophy of science ad nauseum as a real issue. I thought you said that you had a degree in philosophy? Or is this a silly game?

This is metaphsyics. You'll notice no one's throwing around Bayes Theorem here. This isn't a philo of science discussion- it's a discussion about what our epistemic position should be relative to competing theories of reality. The claim that some models of reality have components that may never be explained or understood is not evidence that those models are any less possible. You may not want reality to be a certain way, and you seem to be confusing unpalatable with unlikely. I really don't like materialism and it's implications, but I've always said it's a live possibility.

When it comes to a dualistic viewpoint, where is the evidence? If you want to introduce dualism into the picture, then that means magic is real -- there is no explanation for how certain things occur, no mechanism -- so provide the evidence.

I have repeatedly argued that an agnostic does not have to supply evidence if he can show the available evidence fits multiple theories. All the evidence we have is compatibale with innumerable models of reality, including models that may never be fully explained or comprehended by beings like us. Again, you're confusing unknowable with unlikely. You're also ignoring that science is full of unanswered questions. Maybe these questions will be answered in the future, and maybe the material/immaterial interaction will be explained in the future.

I hope you see that you are introducing god of the gaps into the picture. You are arguing against a rigorous approach and for sloppy thinking -- unless you have something amazing to tell us, some well described event or series of events that have no possible physical explanation.

All the events we see have possible physical, idealstic, and theistic explanations. You're asking for evidence for God and I'm NOT arguing for theism. I am saying it is possible, and based on the evidence we have, as possible as atheism.

If you want to get to the real issue, then please explain to me how dualism works.

What caused the Big Bang? What's inside a black hole? How and why does consciousness arise from a mass of neurons? Explain what dark matter and dark energy are. Explain why the universe is expanding at an accelerating rate.

I have asked this question repeatedly for years but heard no answers. Perhaps you can supply one? Or is it just magical thinking?

And I've been wanting to know for years what caused the Big Bang. See, we have something in common after all.

Malerin

26th December 2008, 10:45 AM

His definition is the same as those offered above.

Really? Including this?: Yes, I know some explanations use the term 'simpler explanation', but I hate them. They are wrong.

I think I've referenced half a dozen reputable sources that specifically define it as an appeal to the "simpler explanation". It may be fun to have private definitions for words, but it makes for some very confusing discussions.

You would see that if you took a step back and asked yourself this question, "What do they mean by explanation?" I think what Athon has offered is a much better and pithier way of looking at the issue.

Let's throw another one on the pile:

"parsimony - the principle that the simplest explanation, the one that requires the fewest hypotheses, is the one most likely to be correct; same as Occam's Razor: the simplest of two competing theories is to be preferred"
http://www8.nos.noaa.gov/coris_glossary/index.aspx?letter=p

The people at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration? Morons, all of them! :rolleyes:

If you and Athon think there's a better defintion, by all means, submit it to all these, these... heretics! Webster, Brittanica, Stanford, NOAA, etc. In the meantime, why don't we go with the commonly understood meaning of things instead of making **** up?

Ichneumonwasp

26th December 2008, 01:40 PM

That could be said about any theory of reality. Athon seems to be making a point that materialism is the simpler theory (or doesn't multiply entities or whatever he means by his private definition of "parsimony"), and should be preferred right out of the starting gate.

Athon is arguing we should, or at least, that's what I think he's arguing.

Take a step back, then. He is arguing the same as I am, and it is not the definition that you give below for materialism. He is arguing a monistic position where it is impossible for us to know for sure what ultimate reality is. And monism is the simpler theory. It has fewer assumptions.

I agree- the fact that we behave pramatically doesn't have any bearing on ultimate reality other than it seems to be coherent and follow certain rules.

Good, at least we can get that far.

Materialism goes much further than that:

"The philosophy of materialism holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to exist is matter, and is considered a form of physicalism."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

"Physicalism is sometimes known as materialism. Historically, materialists held that everything was matter -- where matter was conceived as "an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist""
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

Those are old defintions of materialism. Most folks here don't adhere to those definitions but substitute the word "materialism" for monism. We can't know what the ur-substance really *is*, but matter is as good a random label as anything else.

I'm not arguing for radical skepticism- just agnosticism about fundamental reality. Just because reality may be idealistic or theistic doesn't mean we should abandon science. Why would you think that?

Because you said that our agnosticism about ultimate reality should bleed into other beliefs.

That is an explanation. It's not a good one, but it's coherent and explains the event: Lightning is caused by an irate God throwing glowing objects from the clouds.

An explanation provides a basic mechanism. There is no mechanism for Zeus' existence nor how he works in the description. If parsimony means that the description with the fewest components is the best explanation do you honestly think that anyone would cotton to the idea? Really? 'God did it' is the most parsimonius answer for everything, right? So Ockham was really arguing 'God did it' all along? What's the point of the razor? Just say God did it and be done?

I don't know what your hang-up is with "magic" (which you seem to define as unanswered questions, which science is full of). Why should we assume everything about reality is explainable? If God exists, I fully expect there to be many things I'll never comprehend about God.

Then you don't get it. It isn't "unanswered questions" but fundamentally unanwerable questions. Asking what the mechanism for dualistic interactions is is not at all similar to asking what happened at the Big Bang except when we get to the issue of ultimate beginnings where we may not have any answers. But that is not the same as a dualistic viewpoint where anything is potentially possible. What are the limits to what can happen if dualism is true? Why can't you separate your mind from you body at will? Shouldn't you be able to do so if they are fundamentally different?

This is metaphsyics. You'll notice no one's throwing around Bayes Theorem here. This isn't a philo of science discussion- it's a discussion about what our epistemic position should be relative to competing theories of reality. The claim that some models of reality have components that may never be explained or understood is not evidence that those models are any less possible. You may not want reality to be a certain way, and you seem to be confusing unpalatable with unlikely. I really don't like materialism and it's implications, but I've always said it's a live possibility.

But, again, the issue is not that they have never been explained, it is that they fundamentally cannot be explained. That is why I use the word "magic".

I have repeatedly argued that an agnostic does not have to supply evidence if he can show the available evidence fits multiple theories. All the evidence we have is compatibale with innumerable models of reality, including models that may never be fully explained or comprehended by beings like us. Again, you're confusing unknowable with unlikely. You're also ignoring that science is full of unanswered questions. Maybe these questions will be answered in the future, and maybe the material/immaterial interaction will be explained in the future.

As I have told you before, I am not ignoring the unanswered in science. I am pointing out the unanswerable in dualism. It's a big problem.

All the events we see have possible physical, idealstic, and theistic explanations. You're asking for evidence for God and I'm NOT arguing for theism. I am saying it is possible, and based on the evidence we have, as possible as atheism.[/QUTE]

Sure they do. And those other explanations needlessly multiply the components of the explanation. And, no, I'm not asking for evidence of God. I'm again pointing out that there is no explanation when it comes to dualism. Doesn't that bother you?

[QUOTE]What caused the Big Bang? What's inside a black hole? How and why does consciousness arise from a mass of neurons? Explain what dark matter and dark energy are. Explain why the universe is expanding at an accelerating rate.

And I've been wanting to know for years what caused the Big Bang. See, we have something in common after all.

Already dealt with above.

Ichneumonwasp

26th December 2008, 01:42 PM

Really? Including this?:

I think I've referenced half a dozen reputable sources that specifically define it as an appeal to the "simpler explanation". It may be fun to have private definitions for words, but it makes for some very confusing discussions.

Let's throw another one on the pile:

"parsimony - the principle that the simplest explanation, the one that requires the fewest hypotheses, is the one most likely to be correct; same as Occam's Razor: the simplest of two competing theories is to be preferred"
http://www8.nos.noaa.gov/coris_glossary/index.aspx?letter=p

The people at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration? Morons, all of them! :rolleyes:

If you and Athon think there's a better defintion, by all means, submit it to all these, these... heretics! Webster, Brittanica, Stanford, NOAA, etc. In the meantime, why don't we go with the commonly understood meaning of things instead of making **** up?

I'm not entirely sure that he has a problem with the definitions themselves as approximations, only that the definitions can be sorely misinterpreted, as you seem to be doing.

I mean, honestly, do you think parsimony, as used in philosophy and science means 'God did it'?

Silentknight

26th December 2008, 02:09 PM

Thoughts are creating this discussion. So I'd say that thinking is demonstrably affecting reality here. Thinking creates the sense of there being a self that is having the thoughts but this self is immaterial. One might say that thinking emerges from a neural substrate and so has a material source, but without a mental sense of self being generated by the thoughts there would be no motivation to act upon them imo.
Reread my request. I was asking for a demonstration that thoughts can directly affect reality without any intermediaries. It's not analogous to what idealism claims, because in order for this discussion to be possible, my thoughts required nerves, muscles, and limbs to translate into words on a screen, a computer that works, is plugged in, and hooked up to broadband, and other people possessing the same things. You never would have been able to know my thoughts if I had just thought them.

This ties in to the question of interaction I posed. The exact means by which a mind can interact with reality is an important missing piece of the equation. I've asked creationists the same question, of how a designing mind can influence things in nature, and have never gotten an answer.

I don't quite understand this bit.

Nick
I should have been clearer. If idealism claims that all evidence is equally consistent with alternate models of reality, then there truly ought to be a way of finding direct sense-data of these alternate models. In the Matrix analogy that Malerin is so fond of, Neo was given sense-data that other layers of reality exist. He wasn't just told that because it's possible it must be equally plausible. My point of contention is with the question begging claim that what we perceive could be due to reality operating differently.

I'm asking to be shown. It's the same question of demonstration.

I have repeatedly argued that an agnostic does not have to supply evidence if he can show the available evidence fits multiple theories. All the evidence we have is compatibale with innumerable models of reality, including models that may never be fully explained or comprehended by beings like us. Again, you're confusing unknowable with unlikely. You're also ignoring that science is full of unanswered questions. Maybe these questions will be answered in the future, and maybe the material/immaterial interaction will be explained in the future.
Really? How have you shown that the available evidence fits multiple theories? All you've done is essentially claim that infinite imaginary worlds deserve their fair share of the evidence. This is rather like creationists claiming that intelligent design fits what we observe and deserves a place in academia just because it's an alternate model, even though they can't supply any evidence that would allow ID to stand on its own.

Your entire statement is an argument from ignorance. The fact that something ridiculous that you dream up can't be "disproven" is no reason to accept its possibility (let alone worship it as creationists do). You're basing your arguments on something that you've deliberately defined as non-falsible. I said before that I'd be open to alternate models if you could supply some evidence, yet you shifted the burden of proof. It's not a matter of ruling models of reality out, it's a matter of ruling them in.

Nick227

26th December 2008, 02:28 PM

Reread my request. I was asking for a demonstration that thoughts can directly affect reality without any intermediaries. It's not analogous to what idealism claims, because in order for this discussion to be possible, my thoughts required nerves, muscles, and limbs to translate into words on a screen, a computer that works, is plugged in, and hooked up to broadband, and other people possessing the same things. You never would have been able to know my thoughts if I had just thought them.

This ties in to the question of interaction I posed. The exact means by which a mind can interact with reality is an important missing piece of the equation. I've asked creationists the same question, of how a designing mind can influence things in nature, and have never gotten an answer.

But if you accept that the thoughts are immaterial and that they are creating reality, then materialism is still in trouble. Just how does a thought cause a nerve to move? This bit I find interesting. Can you explain more? Or are you saying thoughts are an epiphenomenon?

Nick

Malerin

26th December 2008, 02:51 PM

I'm not entirely sure that he has a problem with the definitions themselves as approximations, only that the definitions can be sorely misinterpreted, as you seem to be doing.

Parsimony, as I've said repeatedly, means, all things being equal, we should prefer the simpler theory. How am I misinterpreting that? I have already referenced multiple reputable sources in support of my interpretation, which isn't even an interpretation- it's the literal definition. YOU are the one arguing against the standard usage of the term. YOU have referenced nothing to support Athon's own personal definition that contradicts a widely understood term. I've shown my proof. The burden is on YOU to show why everyone else is wrong.

I mean, honestly, do you think parsimony, as used in philosophy and science means 'God did it could have done it'?

There, is that clearer? I'm beginnig to wonder if you've read half of what I've posted. I've argued the appeal to parsimony as evidence for a particular reality is fallacious in and of itself. Occam's Razor never should have been brought into the discussion at all.

This isn't going anywhere and I probably should have stopped when it became clear you wouldn't acknowledge the fact that you'd made a claim weeks ago, and then denied making it, despite a quote that clearly shows you saying it. I thought, generously, that you were equivocating on "external". Now, I'm not so sure.

Anyway, good luck with your campaign to convince everyone of the true meaning of "parsimony".

Silentknight

26th December 2008, 03:09 PM

But if you accept that the thoughts are immaterial and that they are creating reality, then materialism is still in trouble. Just how does a thought cause a nerve to move? This bit I find interesting. Can you explain more? Or are you saying thoughts are an epiphenomenon?

Nick

Well, I don't accept that premise because it begs the question again. We do have some evidence that physical causes can affect or disrupt thought processes. For example, diseases like Alzheimer's can destroy an individual's personality, memories, and sense of self. Conditions like depression or schizophrenia can undermine the certainty one has towards one's own thoughts. Nutrition, drugs, alcohol, and physical trauma can disrupt or otherwise affect thinking. Unfortunately we don't have any evidence that it works the same in reverse. Sick people cannot will themselves into better health. Thoughts cannot affect or change reality without a means by which to act upon reality.

So to answer your question, I do hold that thoughts are an epiphenomenon (if we're using the same definition) at least for the time being. What I'm saying is, I would willingly accept an alternative explanation of reality if shown some evidence of it. Mind you, I'm as biased as everyone else, so even if someone were to pass the MDC and demonstrate psychic phenomena, for example, I'd still search for a quantifiable or measurable cause.

Nick227

26th December 2008, 03:32 PM

Well, I don't accept that premise because it begs the question again. We do have some evidence that physical causes can affect or disrupt thought processes. For example, diseases like Alzheimer's can destroy an individual's personality, memories, and sense of self. Conditions like depression or schizophrenia can undermine the certainty one has towards one's own thoughts.

I would not for a second dispute that thinking has a neural basis and that physical disruptions here will affect thinking. However, you are not addressing the issue of interactionism. By what mechanism does thinking taking place presumably in my head, become articulated and expressed as sentences?

I don't know the answer by the way, in case you're wondering. I'm just interested in this area so I thought I'd see if you do.

Nutrition, drugs, alcohol, and physical trauma can disrupt or otherwise affect thinking. Unfortunately we don't have any evidence that it works the same in reverse. Sick people cannot will themselves into better health.

If you're not aware of a state change that comes about when you feel good about yourself then I feel sorry for you. It's of course harder to quantify the power of positive thinking when compared with, say, drug actions on the body, but I've no personal doubt it's present. The body feels different when you feel good about yourself or bad about yourself. Feeling loved feels good. Feeling alone usually bad.

Thoughts cannot affect or change reality without a means by which to act upon reality.

Yet they do act upon reality. We've already agreed this, haven't we? We don't know how but it happens.

If you're saying that thinking is an epiphenomenon then doesn't this mean that it can't have any actual processing function? This doesn't sound all that likely to me.

Nick

Silentknight

26th December 2008, 04:16 PM

I would not for a second dispute that thinking has a neural basis and that physical disruptions here will affect thinking. However, you are not addressing the issue of interactionism. By what mechanism does thinking taking place presumably in my head, become articulated and expressed as sentences?

I don't know the answer by the way, in case you're wondering. I'm just interested in this area so I thought I'd see if you do.
Neurobiology is admittedly not my area of expertise, but I know enough to say that the simple answer would be through chemical and bioelectrical processes, which science has begun to measure and understand. The technology for extracting images directly from the mind (meaning brain) has been around for several years now. There was an interesting thread (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=130755) in the Science section about this and several recent news stories, including this one (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28286263/) and a much older story here (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4715327.stm).

If you're not aware of a state change that comes about when you feel good about yourself then I feel sorry for you. It's of course harder to quantify the power of positive thinking when compared with, say, drug actions on the body, but I've no personal doubt it's present. The body feels different when you feel good about yourself or bad about yourself. Feeling loved feels good. Feeling alone usually bad.
No, I'm not denying that positive thinking can have long term health benefits, and I probably should have clarified to include that, since I did mention it previously. The brain does in fact release a flood of chemicals into the body when you experience strong emotions. If they're good emotions, it can have a positive measurable effect on your health, and if they're bad emotions, it can have a negative effect, again measurable. However that's the point right there. It's a quantifiable and repeatable observation that can be scientifically tested.

The brain is indeed the control center of the body, yet at the same time, it relies on the body's systems in order to survive. It's very much another organ in the body, and modern medicine has learned to treat it as such. However there's a huge leap from this and, say, psychic phenomena, or literally warping reality through thought alone.

Yet they do act upon reality. We've already agreed this, haven't we? We don't know how but it happens.

If you're saying that thinking is an epiphenomenon then doesn't this mean that it can't have any actual processing function? This doesn't sound all that likely to me.

Nick
See above. I didn't deny that thoughts could act upon reality, in a matter of speaking, through physical processes. What I take issue with is the hypothesis that thoughts can create or alter reality without any means to act upon it. To bring back the creationism analogy, in order for the "designing mind" to be consistent with what we define as "creating" something, then it would require a brain, nerves, muscles, limbs, and raw materials as well. This is not the same as thinking thoughts, then a miraculous POOF, then something happens. There's no evidence that anything really happens this way.

AkuManiMani

26th December 2008, 04:53 PM

Malerin: How are you materialists!
All your evidence are belong to us!
You are on the way to revelation!

JREF: What you say?

Malerin: You have no proof of physical matter, make your time!
Ha ha ha ha!

Change every 'SIG'! For great justice!

Silentknight

26th December 2008, 07:24 PM

I wanted to take back something I said earlier, though it's more a story nitpick than anything argument related.

It's been a while since I've seen The Matrix Reloaded so my memory's a bit fuzzy on it, but it turns out there were indeed some mind-screwy elements introduced and potential plot twists alluded to in that movie. These included the AIs, the real history and role of "The One," and yes, the possibility that Zion was the true Matrix. However, what this meant in the context of the plot was that the Zion rebellion, The One, and the prophecy around them were all anomalies / eventualities that the machines had planned ahead for, and to a degree depended upon. In other words, Zion was still real, just that the machines had worked it into their equation for upkeep of the Matrix. The original program, the perfect world, was rejected, so the current program was a flawed world that would eventually decay if The One didn't return to the source and reset it every now and then. Failure to fulfill the prophetic cycle and do so would cause the program to collapse, thus killing every human attached to it, while the war in the real world would kill all the humans in Zion. Altogether this would cause the human race to go extinct.

However, the real issue with living in a potential Matrix world is not the ontological quandary it sets up. If the world is an illusion, yet indistinguishable from reality, so what? The question still stands, so what? It makes absolutely no difference, doesn't change the way we ought to treat reality, tells us nothing useful about alternate models of reality, and as I've said before, applying all our evidence to the perceived reality remains the most rational thing to do. The real issue with living in the Matrix is that it is an illusion designed to enforce a form of slavery. The loss of free will is what's really at stake, not the moot implications about the nature of reality. If you find out you've been an unwitting slave all along, everything changes and everything matters.

I need not point out the obvious that this is true for slavery even among beings who exist in the same reality. Regardless of whether the real world is staring you right in the face, there are some who won't come to the realization that they're slaves, because it's the only life they've ever known. It's like Harriet Tubman said:

"I freed thousands of slaves. I could have freed thousands more, if they had known they were slaves."

This issue, I think, of questioning the beliefs and way of life you've taken for granted all along because of the limitations they impose on freedom, is more important than simply doubting away reality for the sake of being pedantic.

Mind you, this and other plot threads were dropped in the third movie, where instead of taking advantage of them, they just filmed one big DragonballZ fight. Except with less constipated screaming.

rocketdodger

26th December 2008, 11:36 PM

I guess the short answer would be anything that is objectively real and knowable, right?

Yes.

It can be shown that this is equivalent to the three properties I mentioned, although I prefer not to use it because things like "objective," "real," and "knowable" require definitions and the moronic populace often get those definitions wrong.

And others, who are not morons but just troublemakers (such as nick227) will argue over any delineation between "objective" and "subjective."

So I stick with those three properties I spoke of because I haven't yet found a moron or troublemaker who could bring them down.

athon

27th December 2008, 03:45 AM

I'm not entirely sure that he has a problem with the definitions themselves as approximations, only that the definitions can be sorely misinterpreted, as you seem to be doing.

Whenever parsimony is explained in one or two sentences, it's typically referred to using the term 'simplicity' out of a need for brevity. I guess in some ways, one can argue that the observation-assumption ratio is something of a simplification - the problem, however, is that it depends on what one means by 'simple'. It's so easily interpreted in a manner that goes against the fundamental concept, as Malerin has done. I'm sure he hasn't done it intentionally, given it is such a common definition, however it's easily seen as insufficient - or plain incorrect - once you start looking into the underlying reasons why the rule of parsimony is used.

I've already explained why parsimony does not equal simplicity. Some people might well argue that what I said was, indeed, 'simpler'. I won't argue, so long as by 'simple' they do ultimately mean 'fewest assumptions with most relevance to the observations'. Yet as I highlighted, I feel this runs into problems. I'd accept it as an argument of semantics, or even have my reasoning attacked. Yet to simply provide a large number of dictionary definitions without demonstrating any understanding of the argument does nothing to persuade anybody, least of all me.

By using outdated or oversimplified definitions, it's easy to put forward a case for idealism; just say an idealist philosophy is 'simpler' than the historical definition of materialism, and it's difficult to argue against it. I'll even agree. Yet you've built a straw man - simpler explanations are not necessarily more scientific or more pragmatic, and I don't subscribe to pre-20th century notions of materialism, nor do I subscribe to notions of materialism that claim to describe a fundamental form of reality. Those strawman arguments can happily burn, in which case. I'll even poor on some additional fuel.

Athon

athon

27th December 2008, 04:08 AM

Parsimony, as I've said repeatedly, means, all things being equal, we should prefer the simpler theory. How am I misinterpreting that? I have already referenced multiple reputable sources in support of my interpretation, which isn't even an interpretation- it's the literal definition. YOU are the one arguing against the standard usage of the term. YOU have referenced nothing to support Athon's own personal definition that contradicts a widely understood term. I've shown my proof. The burden is on YOU to show why everyone else is wrong.

Yes, yes, we can all cut and paste dictionary definitions. I can't see that you understand the concept any better, although you've done a splendid job using Google. I wouldn't accept this line of reasoning from my students, nor do accept it from you. For full marks, you'll need to explain why these definitions 'contradict' mine.

I'll give this another stab using an example I've stolen from an old lecture I attended years ago, simply because I'm a masochist;

Once upon a time, it was thought that simple life forms could 'spontaneously generate' from non-living material. For instance, rotting meat could produce maggots ex nihilis, while moldy old straw could produce mice...and so on.

The competing theory was that unseen 'seeds' existed in a range of basic substances, which was alive but yet to germinate. Flies eggs, for example, constituted such 'seeds'. This was an assumption, as yet unsupported by observation (until Francesco Redi came along in the 17th century), and the observations which existed to this day were able to support both the vitalistic theories and the mechanistic theories. In all, to assume that life relied on little more than a universal force to manifest is far simpler than to tie together the mass of observations which existed a that time to support the notion that life could develop from invisible origins, espcially given that science had just entered the Newtonian age where ubiquitous laws were being sought for all manner of phenomena. Yet while simpler, the law itself was an assumption which was difficult to demonstrate.

It was therefore more appropriate to test the more 'parsimonous' theory (the most observations with the fewest assumptions) - in this case, it was also the one which was the more complicated, as it relied on a more complicated set of biological relationships.

Now, I've also had it argued to me that in this case, the manner of the assumptions was one of simplicity, and I might even agree that's true. The assumption of a ubiquitous elan vitale is harder to test than the far simpler assumption of invisible life (hence why Redi's experiment was such genius). And, Malerin, if you had have suggested that, I would have probably nodded and agreed that in this case, it is 'simpler' (which, in my experience, is usually what science historians are arguing by the word).

Anyway, good luck with your campaign to convince everyone of the true meaning of "parsimony".I think the only person not being convinced is yourself, Malerin. I also made the mistake a number of years ago of using the 'simpler' definition in a class, only to have my arse dragged across the coals (in a most friendly manner, of course :)). It made for one interesting lesson, and I haven't forgotten the reasoning.

Athon

Nick227

27th December 2008, 04:16 AM

I didn't deny that thoughts could act upon reality, in a matter of speaking, through physical processes. What I take issue with is the hypothesis that thoughts can create or alter reality without any means to act upon it.

What I'm asking is how are thoughts doing it right here, right now. How are thoughts creating the expression of this sentence? Because if we don't understand this then how can we make an assessment about psychic phenomena (which incidentally I don't believe in.)

Thanks for your other replies.

Nick

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 04:43 AM

What I'm asking is how are thoughts doing it right here, right now. How are thoughts creating the expression of this sentence?
At what level of detail do you wish the explanation?

For starters, thoughts are physical processes. They're the manipulation of information. An expression of a sentence is information.

Because if we don't understand this then how can we make an assessment about psychic phenomena (which incidentally I don't believe in.)
You don't? What about secret world governments of immortal alchemists?

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 05:27 AM

Parsimony, as I've said repeatedly, means, all things being equal, we should prefer the simpler theory. How am I misinterpreting that? I have already referenced multiple reputable sources in support of my interpretation, which isn't even an interpretation- it's the literal definition. YOU are the one arguing against the standard usage of the term. YOU have referenced nothing to support Athon's own personal definition that contradicts a widely understood term. I've shown my proof. The burden is on YOU to show why everyone else is wrong.

There, is that clearer? I'm beginnig to wonder if you've read half of what I've posted. I've argued the appeal to parsimony as evidence for a particular reality is fallacious in and of itself. Occam's Razor never should have been brought into the discussion at all.

This isn't going anywhere and I probably should have stopped when it became clear you wouldn't acknowledge the fact that you'd made a claim weeks ago, and then denied making it, despite a quote that clearly shows you saying it. I thought, generously, that you were equivocating on "external". Now, I'm not so sure.

Anyway, good luck with your campaign to convince everyone of the true meaning of "parsimony".

Dude, you argued that Zeus throwing lightening bolts was a simpler explanation than electrostatic charges amassing in clouds, etc. If you really believe that is the point of parsimony, then it follows that 'God did it' is the real output of Ockham's razor. What could be simpler than that? If Zeus throwing the lightening bolt entails the amassing of electrostatic charges in clouds, then the addition of Zeus is not parsimonious. If Zeus is the entire explanation, then it's 'God did it'. If you want to introduce the idea that "God could have done it", then there is no reason to debate the issue of parsimony. Instead, you need to define "God", so that one and all can discuss. There generally is an additional component added to explanations such as "God did it" or that "God could have done it", so if we are to examine the claim in detail you need to supply the detail. One of the big problems is that when you bring in particular conceptions of God, you've already introduced dualism to the picture, so parsimony goes out the window.

You could, and probably should, just argue that parsimony does not prove anything about ultimate reality. But trying to argue that Zeus throwing lightening bolts is just utter misuse of the term.

I haven't argued against the standard definition of "parsimony". I haven't even offered a definition. I do see, however, that those definitions do not contradict what Athon said. Why do not you as well?

What is wrong with parsimony being used to appeal to a particular ontology? It isn't used as proof, only as evidence that one outlook is more likely. There is no stench of truth about parsimony, only likelihood.

As to this "claim" that I made -- just wait a minute. I told you then that you misunderstood it, but you insisted that I must have been making an ontologic claim. I told you I wasn't and that I don't even believe that I can say anything about ultimate ontology. You insisted that I must be. I told you I wasn't. Rinse, repeat, rinse, repeat.

You kept up the charade for post afte post, and then you said, "Oh, I understand now" and now you go back to "you made a claim and then disowned it."

I didn't equivocate about anything. You completely misunderstood what I was saying, then told me that you did finally understand, now you are saying that you don't because I challenge you about the way you are trying to misuse "parsimony"?

What the hell is wrong with you?

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 05:40 AM

I got tired of waiting for a response from Malerin in this thread (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=4275610&postcount=211) to the question, so thought I'd open it up.

Well, I consider myself as being a phenomenologist rather than an "idealist" but my response to this would be that it's not really up to non-materialists/non-physicalists to define the terms that materialists/physicalists use.

However since I see you have provided your own answer in the following that point may be moot.

Historically speaking, materialists might well have only regarded existence in terms of particles and their interactions. As the nature of particle interactions, fields, energy, information etc. has become better understood, we've adjusted that understanding to define the universe less as an interaction of particles, and more as an expression of information according to deeper laws or rules. Thus 'physical' refers to the interaction of information that gives rise to properties which can be observed. Unfortunately the limit lies with the question of 'what is the fundamental property of information?', which is akin to asking 'what is reality made of?'.

Yes.... and very good!

But, of course, the devil is in the details. :)

The word 'physical' (or physicalism) is and outgrowth of 'material' (or materialism) - and these are, I strongly suspect, every bit as loaded concepts for many people as words such as "Soul" or "God".

(This is part of the reason why I just refer to things, in more neutral terms as "objective phenomena" or "subjective phenomena" - or, on occasion, phenomena and neumena.)

Historically, when the theory of matter was constructed in ancient Greece by such individuals as Leucippus and Democritus it was taken to mean some “substance” or other that is ultimately underlying all of objective reality.

This idea of some, ultimate, fundamental "substance" or other underlying all of objective reality was extremely important to the theory as it contrasted it sharply with the standard forms of vitalism and animism that held sway in the ancient world.

Several thousand years later and, to scientists at least, the idea of substance has been replaced with the word 'information' in the exact same sense that you apply it yourself.

The problem as I see it is that this neutral term "information" only serves to smother the blow by only describing the situation rather than explaining the situation - the profoundity of which is hard to fully appreciate:

We live in a universe in which only two things actually exist - consciousness and information. Yet - and here's the real kicker objects do indeed continue to exist even when we're not looking at them or thinking about them.

However, I am beginning to stray from your original question.

My issue with the words "physical" and "material" is that they come with a past. They come loaded with the concept of a neat mechanical, orderly Universe with some type of fundamental prima materia substance underlying it.

One doesn't have to look very hard online or offline to find a definition of “matter” that includes the word “substance” and I very much doubt the average man on the street would think it means anything other than this.

Consider, if I were to say that all I meant by "God" was: that which underlies objective reality and is ultimately responsible for our counsciousness (and, by extension, ultimately subjective reality also), the laws of the Universe, the information therein and all the properties said information gives rise to would you be happy to have this very fair, and frankly untheistic, use of the term replace all instances of matter and physical in any given science text book?

I very much doubt it. And is it not obvious that the reason for this would be the connotations that the word "God" brings with it?

I think we would all be better off replacing physical/material (laws, objects, etc.,) with phenomenal/neumenal (laws, objects, etc.,).

Idealists seem to allude to there being the possibility of something other than that which is 'physical' (as a philosophy distinct from physicalism). I'm wanting to know how they define the word 'physical' if it does not relate to an interaction of information according to a set of rules or laws.

Athon

I don't know what idealists do but that's not the case for me. My only question is what is the most parsimonious solution to the situation as we find it?

To that end I see two possible candidates with the ability to store information - some self-generating/sustaining substance or other (prima materia) or some kind of overmind (God).

We have no objective proof of either - yet, clearly, evidence for one would instantly falsify the other.

So just what is the most parsimonious solution to the situation as we find it?

Well, to my mind, even though both (prima materia versus God) are both valid and testable (in principle if not in practice) theories, the God theory clearly has the edge for the very simple reason that we already know that consciousness and/or mind exists while we have no evidence for any substance of any kind.

That certainly doesn't prove God exists but it definitely does make it more parsiminous. Theists are only theorising the existence of another (bigger) consciousness (one step) while adherents to the alternative theory have to imagine that there is some secret hidden substance underlying reality based on.... absolutely nothing (two steps).

In short, there is no multiplications of unknowns in theism since consciousness/mind is known to exist.

All the best,
Hypnopsi

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 06:09 AM

Unfortunately, this again is an overly simple concept. I can understand the notion of 'concrete' versus 'abstract', yet 'physical' has to take into account far more than just whether something is solid, liquid or gas.

For the most part solid, liquid or gas just refers to the three states of "matter".

I find a lot of idealists (not pointing anybody out in particular, mind) who use old concepts of materialism as straw men, and then proceed to demolish them in an effort to support vague notions of idealism.

I dare say you'll accuse me of this in my reply to you. But I really don't think that many physicalists really appreciate the folloy of using terms that historically (and currently to many) allude to some substance or other and then correcting their definitions afterwords...

Since there is no substance underlying reality I think you need to be much more careful with the words you use lest you fall into a cognitive illusion of sorts.

For example, there is no 'distance' between myself and my computer monitor in reality any more than there is any substance underlying my physiological body or the computer monitor. There is only 'information' about 'distance', etc.,.

In my view, language is very important as talk of things (sic phenomena/neumena) "existing" objectively and/or outside of us is a cognitive remnant of belief in substance theory as it is inherent in traditional materialism.

Cheers,
HypnoPsi.

plumjam

27th December 2008, 06:11 AM

Great post Hypnopsi, nominated. (163)

AkuManiMani

27th December 2008, 06:32 AM

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 06:43 AM

Berkeley was an idealist. The obvious problem with idealism, that objects do not vanish when nobody is looking at them, was resolved in Berkeley's case by assuming the existence of an omniscient God to keep an eye on everything.

What people need to remember about Berkely is that he lived from 1685 to 1753; long before the quantum mechanics revolution.

Indeed, if you look at the list of famous idealists on the relevant wikipedia page:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism#George_Berkeley

you will see that the vast majority were writing before quantum mechanics came along and, even at the later stages, only when it was just being born.

At the very least, they certainly didn't know as much about it as science does today.

So, what exactly would Berkelely make of a Universe that everyone seems to agree is "made" of nothing but "information"?

Obviously, we'll never know for sure - but I do however strongly feel that he would have felt vindicated in some sense.

~
HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 07:39 AM

Great post Hypnopsi, nominated. (163)

I thank you! You are too kind.

(HypnoPsi takes a bow)

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 08:13 AM

HypnoPsi has just won this thread...and life.

I now present him with The Golden Cookie Award! (#)

Thank you very muchly!

Yummy cookie!! :)

I must say that the assumption of an "over-mind" is a bit loaded itself. Do you mean to imply a literal mind or are you speaking metaphorically?

It's very hard to say - which, of course, is a big part of the problem. It was more of an off-the-cuff description really.

I suppose it cuts to the heart of my personal view that 'mind' is the experience of information (and information processing) in consciousness. Other's may (and do) differ.

It seem that whichever of the two explanations you go with [self-generating "stuff", or "overmind"] you still run into the regression problem namely: what underlies/causes/originate such-n-such. One can keep inquiring further ad infinitum. This is true of any ontology or world view.

Yes, that's correct.

How would (could) we ever know that some big consciousness/mind didn't have a bigger consciousness/mind beyond it (and so on)? And the exact same thing holds true for any fundamental substance we find. How do we ever "know" it's really fundamental?

I cannot imagine any satisfactory answer to this but, as I see it, it partly depends upon what evidence someone accepts. I believe the evidence that a moderate degree of psi ability exists (Ganzfeld, staring experiements, etc.,) in human beings - though I regularly reject outlandish claims of willed ability or high levels of accuracy.

"God", to me, can only really be known for sure (as in, without blind faith) through a type of cognitive communion of sorts; of which, I suspect, the faculty we loosly call 'intuition' is the medium.

Where others see differences and discrepancies in mysticism and near-death-experiences I see similarities and confirmation of something much more than a mundane and meaningless Universe of information with points of consciousness "in" it.

Cheers,
HypnoPsi

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 08:43 AM

Several thousand years later and, to scientists at least, the idea of substance has been replaced with the word 'information' in the exact same sense that you apply it yourself.
Not exactly. "Information" has real physical meaning (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_information). But I think what you're saying is that it's a small step from saying that an electron (for example) is defined by its behaviours to saying that an electron is its behaviours. (It is what it does, as someone said...)

That gives one of the isomorphic idealisms, what I call informational idealism.

The problem as I see it is that this neutral term "information" only serves to smother the blow by only describing the situation rather than explaining the situation - the profoundity of which is hard to fully appreciate:

We live in a universe in which only two things actually exist - consciousness and information.
That's only one thing.

Yet - and here's the real kicker objects do indeed continue to exist even when we're not looking at them or thinking about them.
Why should this be at all surprising?

We are still physical organisms with physical brains and our minds are still physical processes. Rocks and trees and grass are still material things, and care not in the least for our conscious awareness of them.

Nothing has changed; pure materialism still rules. Except that we've abandoned the search for essence and accepted that all we can perceive is behaviours.

My issue with the words "physical" and "material" is that they come with a past. They come loaded with the concept of a neat mechanical, orderly Universe with some type of fundamental prima materia substance underlying it.
My issue with your issue is so what?

One doesn't have to look very hard online or offline to find a definition of “matter” that includes the word “substance” and I very much doubt the average man on the street would think it means anything other than this.
Nor does it. It's the same stuff as it always was. It is what it does, and what it does has not changed.

Consider, if I were to say that all I meant by "God" was: that which underlies objective reality and is ultimately responsible for our counsciousness (and, by extension, ultimately subjective reality also), the laws of the Universe, the information therein and all the properties said information gives rise to would you be happy to have this very fair, and frankly untheistic, use of the term replace all instances of matter and physical in any given science text book?
No, because it's a mishmash of confused ideas.

I very much doubt it. And is it not obvious that the reason for this would be the connotations that the word "God" brings with it?
The "God" part is irrelevant; it's the definition that I have the problem with.

I think we would all be better off replacing physical/material (laws, objects, etc.,) with phenomenal/neumenal (laws, objects, etc.,).
To what end?

Either these new laws are identical to the old laws - F still = MA - or they are wrong.

To that end I see two possible candidates with the ability to store information - some self-generating/sustaining substance or other (prima materia) or some kind of overmind (God).
Why do you need either?

Matter is information. There is no evidence for any deeper reality, nor any need of such.

We have no objective proof of either - yet, clearly, evidence for one would instantly falsify the other.
How and why would they falsify each other?

So just what is the most parsimonious solution to the situation as we find it?
Materialism. Or informational idealism, which is exactly the same thing.

Well, to my mind, even though both (prima materia versus God) are both valid and testable (in principle if not in practice) theories, the God theory clearly has the edge for the very simple reason that we already know that consciousness and/or mind exists while we have no evidence for any substance of any kind.
That is wrong in every possible way.

The God (it's not a theory, let's call it...) argument has no connection at all to consciousness. Consciousness is a physical process. There's no question of that. If the universe exists in the mind of God - or is a computer program, same thing - then consciousness is still a physical process. It makes absolutely no difference.

That certainly doesn't prove God exists but it definitely does make it more parsiminous.
No. As I've noted before, any argument that includes God is less parsimonious than any other finite argument.

Theists are only theorising the existence of another (bigger) consciousness (one step)
No.

That's a consciousness (that we cannot observe) that generates reality that generates consciousness as we actually observe it. Two steps.

while adherents to the alternative theory have to imagine that there is some secret hidden substance underlying reality based on.... absolutely nothing (two steps).
No. That's reality that generates consciousness. One step.

In short, there is no multiplications of unknowns in theism since consciousness/mind is known to exist.
Wrong.

Nick227

27th December 2008, 08:44 AM

Yes.

It can be shown that this is equivalent to the three properties I mentioned, although I prefer not to use it because things like "objective," "real," and "knowable" require definitions and the moronic populace often get those definitions wrong.

And others, who are not morons but just troublemakers (such as nick227) will argue over any delineation between "objective" and "subjective."

So I stick with those three properties I spoke of because I haven't yet found a moron or troublemaker who could bring them down.

You might consider me a troublemaker because I challenge your points. Up to you. But I point out the nasty realities underneath what is to me a lot of pseudo-materialist flapdoodle.

If you want to jump on the materialist bandwagon, fair enough. But you need to be prepared for a rough ride if you're going to start to posit a realistic model for how the brain produces consciousness. The model will of necessity be deeply counter-intuitive. I've pointed this out to you on numerous occasions. At times you seem to come close to accepting it. The rest of the time it seems to me that you prefer not to look and just deal with the world of ideas as though materialism is some kind of salvific mantra which will save you from new-age madness. I'm afraid that it isn't.

As Dan Dennett says, on the subject of consciousness research, if your theory isn't counter-intuitive then it's just wrong. One day you're going to believe me.

Nick

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 08:44 AM

HypnoPsi has just won this thread...and life.
That HypnoPsi's argument appeals to you does not mitigate the fact that it is complete nonsense.

Nick227

27th December 2008, 08:47 AM

At what level of detail do you wish the explanation?

For starters, thoughts are physical processes. They're the manipulation of information. An expression of a sentence is information.

So you're saying that thoughts are simply material at every level?

You don't? What about secret world governments of immortal alchemists?

True. Forgotten about those guys!

Nick

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 08:48 AM

As Dan Dennett says, on the subject of consciousness research, if your theory isn't counter-intuitive then it's just wrong. One day you're going to believe me.
That depends entirely on what your intuition is telling you.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 08:50 AM

So you're saying that thoughts are simply material at every level?
Absolutely.

Remembering that "material" includes processes and not just objects. (Or alternatively, that objects are processes.)

plumjam

27th December 2008, 09:00 AM

I was going to address Aku´s point about the overmind being, itself, a loaded assumption, but thought I should let Hypno respond first.

In all seriousness, your response was very well thought out and well worded. However.. I must say that the assumption of an "over-mind" is a bit loaded itself.
Following on from Hypno´s well-made points about no materialist ever having experienced substance/matter (apart perhaps from a mischievous Dr. Johnson), it´s worth pointing out that in this respect the Overmind has a lot more going for it than does substance/matter, due to the fact that for millenia many human beings have at least seriously claimed to have experienced Overmind consciousness. Of course this has been described using various nouns or verbs according to what is available in that person´s particular culture, but there are strong commonalities of description.

Likewise there are strong commonalities of modes of life/behaviour leading up to such experiences. They commonly involve behaviours which weaken the hold of ego-domination upon consciousness, and include things like silence, solitude, fasting, celibacy, repentance, selfless service to humanity, worship, prayer, willed poverty, obedience, prostration, meditation etc..
So, in short, the assumption of an Overmind is not quite that. Rather it is an aspect of human experience and endeavour which has been repeatedly proven in the lives, and reflected in their teachings, of many reputable and indeed inspiring human individuals, throughout known human history.

Nick227

27th December 2008, 09:02 AM

As Dan Dennett says, on the subject of consciousness research, if your theory isn't counter-intuitive then it's just wrong.

That depends entirely on what your intuition is telling you.

Your intuition tells you what evolution has programmed it to tell you. Severe mental illness aside, you will believe that you are an individual experiencing a world of objects, thoughts and feelings. A materialist theory of consciousness must challenge this notion.

Nick

Nick227

27th December 2008, 09:04 AM

Absolutely.

Remembering that "material" includes processes and not just objects. (Or alternatively, that objects are processes.)

Can you cite me some research here? Thoughts don't appear to me to be material though I would be happy to be convinced they were!

Nick

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 10:21 AM

HypnoPsi has just won this thread...and life.

I now present him with The Golden Cookie Award! (#)

In all seriousness, your response was very well thought out and well worded. However.. I must say that the assumption of an "over-mind" is a bit loaded itself. Do you mean to imply a literal mind or are you speaking metaphorically? It seem that whichever of the two explanations you go with [self-generating "stuff", or "overmind"] you still run into the regression problem namely: what underlies/causes/originate such-n-such. One can keep inquiring further ad infinitum. This is true of any ontology or world view.

Yes, an overmind is a very loaded assumption. As is the assumption that "mind" is the more likely existent if monism is correct.

You guys jumping on this response tells me that you haven't been paying attention to what most of the rest of us have been saying.

The mistake that Pixy points out is that tending toward "mind" is wrong. We can't know what the ultimate existent is, so all the rest of the wrangling is silly. Call it information, whatever; it's all the same.

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 10:33 AM

My issue with the words "physical" and "material" is that they come with a past. They come loaded with the concept of a neat mechanical, orderly Universe with some type of fundamental prima materia substance underlying it.

One doesn't have to look very hard online or offline to find a definition of “matter” that includes the word “substance” and I very much doubt the average man on the street would think it means anything other than this.

Consider, if I were to say that all I meant by "God" was: that which underlies objective reality and is ultimately responsible for our counsciousness (and, by extension, ultimately subjective reality also), the laws of the Universe, the information therein and all the properties said information gives rise to would you be happy to have this very fair, and frankly untheistic, use of the term replace all instances of matter and physical in any given science text book?

Yep. The problem with all these words is that they come with so much baggage -- much of the problem is that the baggage is loaded with dualistic assumptions.

I sometimes interchange the word "God" in discussions about the same issue when they take on religious overtones, and this seems to piss off some people, but I certianly agree with the point.

So just what is the most parsimonious solution to the situation as we find it?

Well, to my mind, even though both (prima materia versus God) are both valid and testable (in principle if not in practice) theories, the God theory clearly has the edge for the very simple reason that we already know that consciousness and/or mind exists while we have no evidence for any substance of any kind.

That certainly doesn't prove God exists but it definitely does make it more parsiminous. Theists are only theorising the existence of another (bigger) consciousness (one step) while adherents to the alternative theory have to imagine that there is some secret hidden substance underlying reality based on.... absolutely nothing (two steps).

In short, there is no multiplications of unknowns in theism since consciousness/mind is known to exist.

All the best,
Hypnopsi

This is where you lose me. That we know thought exists is a function of how we can know anything in the first place, so I don't think it can tell us anything about a fundamental existent. It tells us what we already know -- thought exists. Our nature could be entirely distinct from what we experience as thought, however.

I still maintain that the real issue is not if the fundamental existent is matter or information or thought or whatever, but is there one, two, or many. If there is one, then we can't know what it is, really. Information is just as good a word as any other to label it but we don't know what that really means. Matter is another. Thought or mind another. God another. We shouldn't pretend that we know what any of these words mean, however, when it comes to describing the fundamental existent, only that they can serve as labels.

If we all agree that there is only one thing that *is* reality, then we have nothing to argue about.

The problem, as I see it, is where people tend to take it from there, often introducing other "substances" often without even knowing, especially if they refer to what amounts to two different substances that they label with one word.

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 10:59 AM

Can you cite me some research here? Thoughts don't appear to me to be material though I would be happy to be convinced they were!

Nick

They don't appear to be material because they aren't things, but processes. In the common world that we experience, stop the functioning of neurons and thought disappears. Thought is not identical with neuron but with neuron function.

The same is true of running. What is running? Where is running? We can see a particular thing running, but we cannot see "running" because it is a word that describes a process which involves a particular changing relation of parts that create translational motion.

Thoughts are the same, but we confuse ourselves everytime we use the word "thought", since it is a noun, though we are describing a verb.

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 11:30 AM

Your intuition tells you what evolution has programmed it to tell you. Severe mental illness aside, you will believe that you are an individual experiencing a world of objects, thoughts and feelings. A materialist theory of consciousness must challenge this notion.

Nick

And this is why I call you a troublemaker.

I have told you more than a dozen times that yes I understand that, and people who share my views such as pixy also understand that, yet you constantly assert that no, we do not, even though we explicitly say we do.

And your justification is always "but you are using words that suggest you don't really understand what you say you understand."

And our response, which has been given at least a dozen times as well, is that we are using those words differently than you think we are using them -- we even provide you with consistent definitions.

And your response to that is simply "I don't think you really are using those words the way you think you are using those words," which is an absurd accusation given that we provided you with a freaking definition. When someone says "I define X as Y" why would you respond with "no, I don't think you really do?"

By now any reader would be tired of this game, because it is pointless. And since you are the primary player of this dumb game, dragging forum members like pixymisa and myself into it unwillingly, I claim you are a troublemaker.

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 11:44 AM

So, in short, the assumption of an Overmind is not quite that. Rather it is an aspect of human experience and endeavour which has been repeatedly proven in the lives, and reflected in their teachings, of many reputable and indeed inspiring human individuals, throughout known human history.

So is the assumption that one consciously makes decisions.

Which we recently discovered to be completely wrong.

The above argument is no longer valid, plumjam. It doesn't even work as an appeal to authority, because the authority has been utterly discredited. We can't trust our own conscious experience anymore.

Don't you get it?

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 11:48 AM

"Information" has real physical meaning (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_information).

As an amaterialist this statement doesn't mean very much to me. Unless you can define it.... properly

But let's follow your link and see where it takes us shall we? The first sentence on your link at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_information

reads:

In physics, physical information refers generally to the information that is contained in a physical system."

Okay... so let's move on to physical systems at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_system

It reads:

"In physics the word system has a technical meaning, namely, it is the portion of the physical universe chosen for analysis."

In short... nothing but information.

Your choosing to underline the statement "real physical meaning" does nothing to either describe or explain your beliefs here.

It does however lead me to belive that you are very strongly holding onto the idea of ultimately there really being some substance or other out there underlying it all.

What's wrong with just accepting it as it is - pure, raw, information?

You need to explain what you mean by "physical" here.

But I think what you're saying is that it's a small step from saying that an electron (for example) is defined by its behaviours to saying that an electron is its behaviours. (It is what it does, as someone said...)

That gives one of the isomorphic idealisms, what I call informational idealism.

Personally, I describe myself as a phenomenologist and amaterialist. I don't see any need to think of the manifest Universe as ideas or material.

An electron, to me, would simply be a set of laws.

We live in a universe in which only two things actually exist - consciousness and information.That's only one thing.

Why?

Yet - and here's the real kicker objects do indeed continue to exist even when we're not looking at them or thinking about them.Why should this be at all surprising?

I didn't say it was surprising. The 'kicker' I'm refering to is the question mark over why there is something rather than nothingness?

We are still physical organisms with physical brains and our minds are still physical processes. Rocks and trees and grass are still material things, and care not in the least for our conscious awareness of them.

What exactly is this physical/material stuff of which you speak? Please be specific in your answer.

If you believe there is some substance(s) or other underlying reality just say so.

Nothing has changed; pure materialism still rules. Except that we've abandoned the search for essence and accepted that all we can perceive is behaviours.

But why believe in a material essence in the first place?

Look, thousands of years ago when the likes of Leucippus and Democritus thought up the theory of some fundamental substance (materialism) or other underlying phenomenal/neumenal objects it did indeed seem like a pretty good idea - to them. (Certainly much better than vitalism and animism, as they saw it.)

But that was thousands of years ago. Why hold onto this theory (sic fantasy)?

There is no substance - physical or otherwise - at all. There is only information.

My issue with the words "physical" and "material" is that they come with a past. They come loaded with the concept of a neat mechanical, orderly Universe with some type of fundamental prima materia substance underlying it.My issue with your issue is so what?

The "so what" is that people are being encouraged to live a fantasy. If science textbooks and teachers were to strongly stress the fact that words like "physical" and "material" were only placeholder terms for information that would be a step in the right direction.

However, my sense here is one of skeptics/atheists/materialists gaining by keeping people in ignorance. Happily throwing up their hands at the end of the day saying "Oh, well... look... if students take the words "physical" and "material" to mean some substance or other... it's not really our fault".

Why not just be honest and call phenomenal reality and phenomenal objects for what they are - phenomenal reality and phenomenal objects?

One doesn't have to look very hard online or offline to find a definition of “matter” that includes the word “substance” and I very much doubt the average man on the street would think it means anything other than this.Nor does it. It's the same stuff as it always was. It is what it does, and what it does has not changed.

What stuff??

Consider, if I were to say that all I meant by "God" was: [i]that which underlies objective reality and is ultimately responsible for our counsciousness (and, by extension, ultimately subjective reality also), the laws of the Universe, the information therein and all the properties said information gives rise to[i] would you be happy to have this very fair, and frankly untheistic, use of the term replace all instances of matter and physical in any given science text book?No, because it's a mishmash of confused ideas.

How so?

I very much doubt it. And is it not obvious that the reason for this would be the connotations that the word "God" brings with it?The "God" part is irrelevant; it's the definition that I have the problem with.

Why is that?

I think we would all be better off replacing physical/material (laws, objects, etc.,) with phenomenal/neumenal (laws, objects, etc.,).To what end?

It's more accurate. Science has gone through this before with other ideas like the aether.

Either these new laws are identical to the old laws - F still = MA - or they are wrong.

Not wrong - just different from how we have previously looked at them. F does still equal MA in terms of the same event occuring. The only difference is that we should not look at M (mass) as being a substance. (For example, in QLM its all just basically braiding.)

To that end I see two possible candidates with the ability to store information - some self-generating/sustaining substance or other (prima materia) or some kind of overmind (God).Why do you need either?

Matter is information. There is no evidence for any deeper reality, nor any need of such.

No. Information is information. "Matter" is a subjective sense about said information. At best, it is a placeholder term. At worse it is very misleading in terms of it's historical connotations.

And you're forgetting that science is about construction theories rather than standing still. There is no reason why the rest of us should stop asking what underlies reality (and/or what is the most parsimonious theory). Materialism has plateaued out - and evaporated. Playing let's pretend it doesn't matter and just keep on using the terms "physical" and "material" isn't good enough for me. You go ahead and feel free if it suits you.

How and why would they falsify each other?

I would say that's rather simple. A truly self-generating and self-sustaining (i.e. truly uncreated) substance would instantly and forevermore end all ideas of "God" permanently since no candidate for God could be God if something God had not actually created existed (since, surely, God, if it's posited to be anything is posited to be the creator of all.

And the same is true in reverse. Something that could show itself as the only genuine Creative force would end notions of anything being self-generating and self-sustaining.

Materialism. Or informational idealism, which is exactly the same thing.

Please explain this "informational idealism" of yours.

If you're saying that matter is an "ideal substance" then I agree. (Though, obviously, I still see it as fantasy.

The God (it's not a theory, let's call it...) argument has no connection at all to consciousness. Consciousness is a physical process. There's no question of that.

Well, I have one. How exactly can pure information bring about consciousness? Please be specific in your answer since this is surely not something you expect anyone to believe without evidence, is it?

If the universe exists in the mind of God - or is a computer program, same thing - then consciousness is still a physical process. It makes absolutely no difference.

Why do you think consiousness is a process?

No. As I've noted before, any argument that includes God is less parsimonious than any other finite argument.

Parsimony is like a jig-saw puzzle. Theists have a piece of the puzzle for the Universe, for everything in it and for their consciousness. Since the whole point of being parsimonious is to find the missing piece from the parts that are currently there (and solely from the parts that are currently there) theists are quite justified in suggesting it is a "bigger" consciousness that is the missing piece of the puzzle.

Materialism in the traditional sense of the word does not fare so well at all. They have two missing pieces having to infer that some substance exists and that it is self-generating and self-perpetuating without purpose, will or creative impulse Materialists have to multiply unknowns

That's a consciousness (that we cannot observe) that generates reality that generates consciousness as we actually observe it. Two steps.

What an absolute mess your last statement is. Being parsimonious with this question is about taking reality as it is now (Universe and us consious beings in it). It's not about asking what happens next/first after God is there.

That's reality that generates consciousness. One step.

In otherwords your answer is to just avoid the question. Just call "what is" reality and just say it causes consciousness. How does this answer the question about how reality got there exactly?

~
HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 11:53 AM

pseudo-materialist flapdoodle.

Absolutely fab. May I please use this along with my standard "magic powder" and "pixie dust" jibes. I promise to share too! :)

If you want to jump on the materialist bandwagon, fair enough. But you need to be prepared for a rough ride if you're going to start to posit a realistic model for how the brain produces consciousness.

Affirmative!

~
HypnoPsi

plumjam

27th December 2008, 11:59 AM

And this is why I call you a troublemaker.

I claim you are a troublemaker.

Hilarious. Maybe call the cops so Nick won´t keep hanging around your street corner.

plumjam

27th December 2008, 12:10 PM

So is the assumption that one consciously makes decisions.

Which we recently discovered to be completely wrong.

The above argument is no longer valid, plumjam. It doesn't even work as an appeal to authority, because the authority has been utterly discredited. We can't trust our own conscious experience anymore.

Don't you get it?
How did you or they arrive at this decision?
And if we can´t trust our own conscious experience anymore how/why would anyone feel confident in believing in such a finding?
Dodger, most of the time you´re just arguing against yourself, and getting increasingly angry in the process.
Can´t you see that if you argue a position that we can´t trust our own conscious experience anymore then you´re shooting any position you hold, in the foot? Unless of course you arrive at your decisions/findings via non-conscious processes.

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 12:27 PM

How did you or they arrive at this decision?
And if we can´t trust our own conscious experience anymore how/why would anyone feel confident in believing in such a finding?
Dodger, most of the time you´re just arguing against yourself, and getting increasingly angry in the process.
Can´t you see that if you argue a position that we can´t trust our own conscious experience anymore then you´re shooting any position you hold, in the foot? Unless of course you arrive at your decisions/findings via non-conscious processes.

Bold mine.

That is the conclusion that this finding leads to.

We make decisions in a traditionally non-conscious way and our "consciousness" merely becomes "aware" of the result. And when I say "non-conscious" and "consciousness" I am only using those terms for your convenience, because it isn't that simple (as troublemaker nick227 will attest).

This conclusion is devastating to those like yourself who insist that something must be true due to it just "seeming" so true to billions of people. Because the concept of consciously making a decision is arguably one of the most "seemingly true" aspects of human experience -- yet it is provably an illusion.

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 12:32 PM

plumjam

27th December 2008, 12:48 PM

Bold mine.

That is the conclusion that this finding leads to.

We make decisions in a traditionally non-conscious way and our "consciousness" merely becomes "aware" of the result. And when I say "non-conscious" and "consciousness" I am only using those terms for your convenience, because it isn't that simple (as troublemaker nick227 will attest).

This conclusion is devastating to those like yourself who insist that something must be true due to it just "seeming" so true to billions of people. Because the concept of consciously making a decision is arguably one of the most "seemingly true" aspects of human experience -- yet it is provably an illusion.
The point I was making was that those particular researchers would need to have faith in elements of their consciousness enough to be able to support findings which undermine that very same consciousness. Which is, of course, self-defeating.
They would be simultaneously undermining the value of conscious decisions while basing this undermining entirely on an aspect of their own consciousness i.e. the conscious decisions they made regarding some study or other.

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 12:55 PM

The mistake that Pixy points out is that tending toward "mind" is wrong.

No, it's not wrong. For thousands of years the debate has been between "mind or matter" (defined as immaterial thought and fundamental substance).

Nobody has ever came up with a third option.

Even using the word "Monism" (in the sense of a third option) doesn't actually offer a third option - at least, certainly not by way of description.

Heck... even suggesting there is a third option is just a vain attempt to explain the unknown with another unknown!

What's wrong with accepting that the reason "Mind" or "Matter" are the only two options available is because they actually are the only two options?

Could it not just simply be that because there really is no "matter" stuff you just don't like the only option that is left?

We can't know what the ultimate existent is, so all the rest of the wrangling is silly. Call it information, whatever; it's all the same.

Again, that depends upon what evidence you accept. Though I am certianly not going to say that all NDE's or all mystical experiences (or all described thereof) are "real" I am fully satisfied that there is "truth" somewhere in them there accounts.

And don't just dismiss them as anecdotes. Anecdote just means "unwritten" which is not the case with NDE's, etc.,. They are data because they have been collected, collated, and reduced to statistics (data) in terms of the elements each one contains.

NDE's etc., provide data - plain and simple.

~
HypnoPsi

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 01:10 PM

No, it's not wrong. For thousands of years the debate has been between "mind or matter" (defined as immaterial thought and fundamental substance).

Nobody has ever came up with a third option.

Even using the word "Monism" (in the sense of a third option) doesn't actually offer a third option - at least, certainly not by way of description.

Heck... even suggesting there is a third option is just a vain attempt to explain the unknown with another unknown!

What's wrong with accepting that the reason "Mind" or "Matter" are the only two options available is because they actually are the only two options?

Could it not just simply be that because there really is no "matter" stuff you just don't like the only option that is left?

Nope, none of the options can be the final "substance" (even though that is a poor word) because whatever it is, we cannot know its ultimate reality. We can attach labels to it, sure, but that gets us nowhere. Mind, matter, information, whatever, if you've committed to one or the other you've already lost this game if you think all is one "thing" and those words carry their normal everyday connotations.

Monism means only that we begin with an assumption -- that there is one thing that is ultimate reality. It tells us nothing else about it. We can examine it with science, but, by its very nature, we cannot arrive at what it *is*. We can label it, but that's no help.

In discussing this, we need to reach back before Democritus. This answer was reached by the second Milesian. Everything else since has been whistling in the wind as far as metaphysics is concerned.

And I am thoroughly confused by your contention that I might be upset by mind being the ultimate reality. Why would that even be an issue?

Again, that depends upon what evidence you accept. Though I am certianly not going to say that all NDE's or all mystical experiences (or all described thereof) are "real" I am fully satisfied that there is "truth" somewhere in them there accounts.

And don't just dismiss them as anecdotes. Anecdote just means "unwritten" which is not the case with NDE's, etc.,. They are data because they have been collected, collated, and reduced to statistics (data) in terms of the elements each one contains.

NDE's etc., provide data - plain and simple.

~
HypnoPsi

Of course NDEs are data. What they represent is an entirely other point. You can believe that they represent some interaction with a realm beyond, but then you are not a monist but a dualist.

plumjam

27th December 2008, 01:14 PM

Yes, very much so. But I would personally describe mystical experiences of this sort (Enlightnment, certain NDE's) as being communion with the Overmind in a very profound way.

In our day to day experience we have a sense of both Self and Other (than self) that is all too often overlooked.

What is the Other?

Who are we talking to when we talk to our selves, meditate or, in particular, pray if not the Other that we sense as both within and all around us at some level.
I think that the strongest, most effective, movement from self to other is what we ordinarily call love. Love is our attempt to dissolve the barrier of self and other.
As you say, consciousness is. Our knowledge of it comes from association with bodily forms. At the human level the association of consciousness with this form results in 100% self-consciousness, but is marred or blocked by the evolutionary necessity of an ego centre which is used to organise experience and enable intelligent planning etc..
The next step is to move beyond the domination of consciousness by the ego, and this is the aim of spiritual practice. I´m an adherent of the teachings of Meher Baba, and the above is part of what he says.
What would absolutely selflessness be like, I wonder?
Sri Ramakrishna used to go into spiritual ecstasy, witnessed by his disciples, as he was ascending in his experiences he would describe what was happening, until he reached the level of Nirvikalpa Samadhi (absorption in Divinity without qualities) at this point he would stop speaking because his individuality had become dissolved into the absolute. Description and language are predicated on the self/other separation, so no description was possible at that point.
I´m sure you already know that kind of thing, but I thought I´d just elucidate for the great unwashed :D
Anyway, I´m enjoying your posts.

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 01:25 PM

This is where you lose me. That we know thought exists is a function of how we can know anything in the first place, so I don't think it can tell us anything about a fundamental existent. It tells us what we already know -- thought exists.

Yes, I think I have lost you. First, I'm talking about consciousness and saying that we should apply parsimony to answer why/how:

"There is a Universe with us conscious beings in it".

In otherwords what sustains and/or causes existence?

My argument is that "God" is a more parsimonious answer than "Matter" (in the original and most commonly understood definition of the term).

Parsimony is a bit like trying to work out the last piece (and only the last piece) in a jig-saw puzzle.

Consciousness already exists as a valid holder of information - so theorising that there is another bigger holder of information (that is the Universe) is only a one step theory (i.e. it is parsimonious).

Materialists (again, in the original and commonly understood definition of the term) don't have a substance to begin with. They have to theorise it's existence before they can even begin to theorise it as the holder of all the information that is - and exists within - the Universe (gravity, consciousness, planetoids, Hillary Clinton and bigfoot :))

Materialism has to multiply unknowns. It is not parsimonious.

That's all I'm saying. I'm certainly not saying it in anyway proves the existence of "God/s".

Our nature could be entirely distinct from what we experience as thought, however.

I still maintain that the real issue is not if the fundamental existent is matter or information or thought or whatever, but is there one, two, or many. If there is one, then we can't know what it is, really. Information is just as good a word as any other to label it but we don't know what that really means. Matter is another. Thought or mind another. God another. We shouldn't pretend that we know what any of these words mean, however, when it comes to describing the fundamental existent, only that they can serve as labels.

I don't want to say many of these these points are invalid but they are (to my mind) purely academic (meaning, as yet, purely speculative without practical purpose or use).

As I said in an earlier post, multitudes of pholosophical man-hours down the millenia have only ever came up with two options for what underlies reality: "Mind" and "Matter". There must be some reason for this; why we, cognitively, we have a pretty good handle on these two options and only on these two options.

I'd say the reason we can't think of a third option is because there isn't a third option. So why speculate?

Calling the information that is the Universe (and all therein) information is just a neutral description of things - it's not an explanation. Now, "Mind" and "Matter" might not be very good explanations (or even satisfactory) but knowing if one is right would, at least, remove the other from the problem.

What has been called "matter" has been reduced to the point of being totally absent of any substance whatsoever. Since the very idea of "matter" actually means "mother substance" we don't have "matter" anymore.

That only leaves mind - or "Overmind"; a term I seem to have unwittingly coined.

Cheers,
HypnoPsi

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 01:41 PM

Yes, I think I have lost you. First, I'm talking about consciousness and saying that we should apply parsimony to answer why/how:

"There is a Universe with us conscious beings in it".

In otherwords what sustains and/or causes existence?

My argument is that "God" is a more parsimonious answer than "Matter" (in the original and most commonly understood definition of the term).

Parsimony is a bit like trying to work out the last piece (and only the last piece) in a jig-saw puzzle.

Consciousness already exists as a valid holder of information - so theorising that there is another bigger holder of information (that is the Universe) is only a one step theory (i.e. it is parsimonious).

Materialists (again, in the original and commonly understood definition of the term) don't have a substance to begin with. They have to theorise it's existence before they can even begin to theorise it as the holder of all the information that is - and exists within - the Universe (gravity, consciousness, planetoids, Hillary Clinton and bigfoot :))

Materialism has to multiply unknowns. It is not parsimonious.

That's all I'm saying. I'm certainly not saying it in anyway proves the existence of "God/s".

But that doesn't address my point. You seem to have begun with consciousness based on the cogito. Every idealist I have ever encountered arrives at that place sooner or later.

But, here's the problem -- the very means by which we know anything is through thought. We can't move from the way that we know things to what the fundamental nature of reality is because that mixes the means by which knowledge is possible with ontology. It might be the case, but our means of knowledge might have nothing whatever to do with fundamental existence.

I understand that you are beginning with consciousness. I've seen the argument many times before. The problem is that the argument is not as simple as it appears when it is examined in depth. I guess the question is, how far do you want to take it?

I don't want to say many of these these points are invalid but they are (to my mind) purely academic (meaning, as yet, purely speculative without practical purpose or use).

As I said in an earlier post, multitudes of pholosophical man-hours down the millenia have only ever came up with two options for what underlies reality: "Mind" and "Matter". There must be some reason for this; why we, cognitively, we have a pretty good handle on these two options and only on these two options.

I'd say the reason we can't think of a third option is because there isn't a third option. So why speculate?

Calling the information that is the Universe (and all therein) information is just a neutral description of things - it's not an explanation. Now, "Mind" and "Matter" might not be very good explanations (or even satisfactory) but knowing if one is right would, at least, remove the other from the problem.

What has been called "matter" has been reduced to the point of being totally absent of any substance whatsoever. Since the very idea of "matter" actually means "mother substance" we don't have "matter" anymore.

That only leaves mind - or "Overmind"; a term I seem to have unwittingly coined.

Cheers,
HypnoPsi

Yet, Anaximander said, following Thales, that the fundamental existent could not possible be any of the things we see around us, and in the 5th century B.C. In other words, it could not be water. It could not be matter. It could not be mind. Any of those "things" would be "swallowed by it". It is something "other". That is why Kant used the word Noumena in the first place. He was really getting at the same idea.

The problem as I see it isn't really with "matter" or "mind" or "information" -- the problem is when we think we know something about the fundamental existent, the ur-substance, when we use such words. For all I know Heraclitus got it right and all is fire, meaning change or motion. I don't think it helps to label it with one of the words that we use to speak of our ordinary daily experience.

I'm sure you know the J.B.S. Haldane quote, so I needn't repeat it. But I agree with him, whatever reality it is, it is probably stranger than we can know.

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 02:01 PM

Let me repeat this argument, and perhaps it will help.

Keep in mind that I begin with a basic assumption -- that everything is One.

Words are defined in relation to other words, and we know what particular things are by their definitions -- in terms of other things.

So, for instance, if I tell you that I drive a particular type of car that you are not familiar with, I would describe in terms that you are familiar with until you understand what I am talking about.

If we are to talk or even think about the fundamental existent, then we must do so in relation to something else. But there is nothing else to which it may be compared except itself. So, any definition of it will necessarily be self-referential.

All we can do is examine the rules by which it works.

Call it God. That's fine with me. I often do too. Call it mind. That's fine with me. I do the same sometimes. Call it matter. OK. I don't particularly like that one because of the reasons you have already outlined, but it's as good a word as any other.

If we accept that all is One, then there really is nothing left to discuss. We spend most of the time in these conversations playing semantic games. It helps pass the time, but it doesn't do anything.

If, however, there is more than one "thing", then that's a whole other kettle of fish.

HypnoPsi

27th December 2008, 02:15 PM

We make decisions in a traditionally non-conscious way and our "consciousness" merely becomes "aware" of the result.

Actually, you need to be extremely careful with interpreting the results of these experiments.

You'll need to read this link to know what I'm talking about here...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#Neuroscience

The point is that in Libet's experiments the subjects were told what to do (flex their wrists) long before they did it. In short, the experiment was really studying pre-meditated (and monotonous) decisions and not spontaneous (and creative) decisions.

It also raises questions about consciousness and brain activity actually being the same thing in the first place, as materialists allege, since the same single event (the decision to move) happens at two different times in the brain and consciousness.

If brain activity and consciousness are supposed to be the exact same thing then why the (up-to) half a second delay in brain activity and the, percieved, sense of willed movement in consciousness?

As they say... every solution brings a new problem...

And that's not even getting into the fact that the experiment was relying on the subjects own subjective judgements about timing to assert there is a delay in what is actually a twin-task experiement (since the subject was required to both watch the hands of a clock (actually it was an oscillating beam of light Libet used) and also to make a decision to move).

Also of note is that nowadays the delay between brain activity and conscious decision has been pushed back to about 1/4 or 1/5 (250ms or 200ms) of a second.

I don't think I am being overly skeptical here by saying that there are just too many problems here that materialists need to iron out if they want this to be convincing.

Furthermore, even in the Ammon and Gandevia experiment outlined in that section of the above linked wikipedia page, the researchers didn't actually cause the subjects hand to move - they only caused the subjects to choose to move a certain hand (in a statistically significant way most often - but not always).

An important difference.

If someone is doing something to your brain and asks you to choose to move one of your hands, the choice to actually move the hand is still yours even if they can statistically make you choose one hand over the other more often and make you think the choice of hand was yours.

Personally, I'm happy to accept that this does actually do say that there are limits to free will. (Or at least, eventually, people may be justified in drawing this conclusion when further, more precise and better controlled research is conducted.)

I don't see a problem with it. I'm told the mystic Gurdjieff basically claimed that man is just a machine and would say myself that several mystics I've read have said the same thing in their own way.

This conclusion is devastating to those like yourself who insist that something must be true due to it just "seeming" so true to billions of people. Because the concept of consciously making a decision is arguably one of the most "seemingly true" aspects of human experience -- yet it is provably an illusion.

Since the reasearchers themselves do not draw this conclusion (or anything like it) from work they were intimately involved in why should be take your word on this?

Think about something like table tennis or a computer game or even driving. There are lots of instances in life where we have to make split second decisions (that we've never made before and have therefore not become habitual, rehearsed or hard-wired) in much less time than half a second.

Without information on what occurs in the brain at these times (where subjects may very well consciously judge that their decision occured at a time earlier than which an EEG analysis determines the readiness potential occured) how can you claim to have a "proven" conclusion?

You have very slim data (all of it reliant upon testimonials from subjects in one way or another) from a very slim and restricted set of circumstances.

~
HypnoPsi

Silentknight

27th December 2008, 02:53 PM

Following on from Hypno´s well-made points about no materialist ever having experienced substance/matter (apart perhaps from a mischievous Dr. Johnson), it´s worth pointing out that in this respect the Overmind has a lot more going for it than does substance/matter, due to the fact that for millenia many human beings have at least seriously claimed to have experienced Overmind consciousness. Of course this has been described using various nouns or verbs according to what is available in that person´s particular culture, but there are strong commonalities of description.
Which is no more proof of an "Overmind consciousness" than sense data is proof for physical matter, to take a page out of the immaterialist playbook, since everything we perceive is processed internally and filtered through personal bias regardless. The brain can play tricks on you, false memories can be formed, and people can easily misinterpret what they experience through confirmation bias. The fact that there are even variations in what people describe, and that many people will never experience it at all, indicates that this is not on the level of a repeatable observation. Besides, it's possible for large numbers of people to be wrong; it's happened many times in history.

Likewise there are strong commonalities of modes of life/behaviour leading up to such experiences. They commonly involve behaviours which weaken the hold of ego-domination upon consciousness, and include things like silence, solitude, fasting, celibacy, repentance, selfless service to humanity, worship, prayer, willed poverty, obedience, prostration, meditation etc..
Which is not a validation of those behaviors any more than it's a validation of substance use, sleep deprivation, asceticism, self harm, or worshiping a specific deity. By the same logic, deliberately giving oneself an NDE in order to see angels would be an aspect of a healthy lifestyle.

For the record, I have had my share of what others might call "visions" or "out-of-body experiences." My dreams tend to be very vivid, and I've seen some very strange things when I was hospitalized. I just choose not to jump to any conclusions until I have enough information, and I don't let people tell me what to believe.

So, in short, the assumption of an Overmind is not quite that. Rather it is an aspect of human experience and endeavour which has been repeatedly proven in the lives, and reflected in their teachings, of many reputable and indeed inspiring human individuals, throughout known human history.
Yes, as a metaphor for the unexplained, which is something humans frequently conceive as part of their basic nature.

I think that the strongest, most effective, movement from self to other is what we ordinarily call love. Love is our attempt to dissolve the barrier of self and other.
Most emotions are. Given that they're an evolutionary adaptation that facilitates communication among social animals by allowing individuals to discern the mental states of others of their kind, this is not surprising.

As you say, consciousness is. Our knowledge of it comes from association with bodily forms. At the human level the association of consciousness with this form results in 100% self-consciousness, but is marred or blocked by the evolutionary necessity of an ego centre which is used to organise experience and enable intelligent planning etc..
Ironically, the same line of questioning that creationists use on the universe works here. Where did consciousness come from? Why is there something rather than nothing? If one is going to posit an Overmind consciousness, then from whence did the Overmind arise?

Nick227

27th December 2008, 02:53 PM

And this is why I call you a troublemaker.

I have told you more than a dozen times that yes I understand that, and people who share my views such as pixy also understand that, yet you constantly assert that no, we do not, even though we explicitly say we do.

And your justification is always "but you are using words that suggest you don't really understand what you say you understand."

Read back the threads, RD, and link me where you agree that it's counter-intuitive. Do it and I will believe you. Both you and Pixy have flat out denied it in recent past posts. In a recent thread you even stuck quote marks around something I never wrote and proceeded to rail against it, even when I protested you stuck with it. For me, neither of you demonstrate much intellectual honesty. You don't say it when you're wrong. You don't say it when you don't understand. You just quietly reform your opinions in the background.

And our response, which has been given at least a dozen times as well, is that we are using those words differently than you think we are using them -- we even provide you with consistent definitions.

And your response to that is simply "I don't think you really are using those words the way you think you are using those words," which is an absurd accusation given that we provided you with a freaking definition. When someone says "I define X as Y" why would you respond with "no, I don't think you really do?"

By now any reader would be tired of this game, because it is pointless. And since you are the primary player of this dumb game, dragging forum members like pixymisa and myself into it unwillingly, I claim you are a troublemaker.

Read back the threads, RD. This is tiring. You constantly accuse me of misinterpreting your language. It's your usual back door out.

Nick

Nick227

27th December 2008, 03:00 PM

The same is true of running. What is running? Where is running? We can see a particular thing running, but we cannot see "running" because it is a word that describes a process which involves a particular changing relation of parts that create translational motion.

Thoughts are the same, but we confuse ourselves everytime we use the word "thought", since it is a noun, though we are describing a verb.

Well, as I see it, running is a process that is inextricably tied up with something that runs. Thinking is also a process, but it is more complex. Thinking requires a subject being thought about and apparently language, a medium for expression. It does not require "a thinker" in the same way that running requires "a runner." Thus I wouldn't consider the analogy with running especially good, though perhaps it has some usefulness.

I agree with the model you describe for thinking. I just haven't seen much actual physical evidence that it's true. This is what I was asking for. Also, what I was originally asking for is a mechanistic explanation of how thinking translates into articulation, into physicality.

Nick

Nick227

27th December 2008, 03:10 PM

Absolutely fab. May I please use this along with my standard "magic powder" and "pixie dust" jibes. I promise to share too! :)

For sure, though personally I am basically materialist, largely because I like a challenge and because materialism seems to tie the mind down more. With idealism people fly off all over the place. You start discussing with a bunch of idealists and you can pretty much guarantee that within 15 mins everyone is at different ends of the universe. With materialists you can hold better to the subject matter.

Nick

Nick227

27th December 2008, 03:22 PM

And this is why I call you a troublemaker.

I claim you are a troublemaker.

Hilarious. Maybe call the cops so Nick won´t keep hanging around your street corner.

The difference between me and RD, as I see it, is that I am actually genuinely interested in the truth, whereas RD is only interested in being a good materialist, rather in the same way a Western religious type may be only interested in being a good Christian.

Thus RD seems to regard anyone who challenges materialism as a troublemaker, not a source of potential new insights. He's looking for faith. I'm looking for truth.

There's this cartoon of a bunch of mathematics scrawled on a blackboard with two sides of an equation linked by a box with the writing inside "...and then a miracle occurs..." I'm the annoying soul who isn't really satisfied with the equation. I want to make the box smaller.

Nick

AkuManiMani

27th December 2008, 03:53 PM

That HypnoPsi's argument appeals to you does not mitigate the fact that it is complete nonsense.

Pixy I'm sure you recognize hyperbole when you see it. I thought the "golden cookie award" might have given it away. ;)

I think he did a good job of injecting some new points into the discussion but, If you read the rest of my response you'd see that I don't agree with him 100%

articulett

27th December 2008, 04:18 PM

Consciousness comes from living brains similar to the way music comes from instruments. Music isn't matter, but it relies on matter and is not "magic". The fact that people go out of their way not to understand this analogy doesn't make consciousness mystical--nor does it make it parsimonious to posit some supernatural entity or source for it.

If hypno's jabber about parsimony sounds "deep" to you, it's probably because you desperately wish to believe in souls and are searching for some means of keeping yourself from understanding the above paragraph. Brains make consciousness like instruments make music. Alter the instrument and you alter what is produced by the instrument. Destroy the instrument, and all production stops.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

27th December 2008, 04:35 PM

We live in a universe in which only two things actually exist - consciousness and information. Yet - and here's the real kicker objects do indeed continue to exist even when we're not looking at them or thinking about them.
...
Well, to my mind, even though both (prima materia versus God) are both valid and testable (in principle if not in practice) theories, the God theory clearly has the edge for the very simple reason that we already know that consciousness and/or mind exists while we have no evidence for any substance of any kind.
You just contradicted yourself.

~~ Paul

plumjam

27th December 2008, 04:51 PM

You just contradicted yourself.

~~ Paul

No he didn´t. Objects do not equal substance.

articulett

27th December 2008, 05:10 PM

Is music "substance"? Why do you think consciousness demands a more "metaphysical" explanation than music?

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 05:54 PM

Read back the threads, RD, and link me where you agree that it's counter-intuitive. Do it and I will believe you. Both you and Pixy have flat out denied it in recent past posts.

We said it wasn't counter-intuitive for us. I dunno about pixy, but I am an A.I. programmer. I come up with algorithms to perform human cognitive tasks for a living. So of course a computational model of consciousness isn't that farfetched for me.

For me, neither of you demonstrate much intellectual honesty. You don't say it when you're wrong. You don't say it when you don't understand. You just quietly reform your opinions in the background.

Even if you are right about that ... so what? Isn't a reformed opinion an implicit admission of prior error?

Read back the threads, RD. This is tiring. You constantly accuse me of misinterpreting your language. It's your usual back door out.

OK Nick, lets play this game again.

You ask for consistent definition of "I" or "self."

I respond with "the entity typing this sentence."

Refresh my memory -- what was your response to that definition? I remember it being some nonsense along the lines of me not fully understanding what "entity" and "typing" and "sentence" were, because "they are all just processes." Am I incorrect? I mean, is 'the entity typing this sentence' incorrect?

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 06:18 PM

I'm the annoying soul who isn't really satisfied with the equation. I want to make the box smaller.

You are the annoying soul who is trying to blur everything into uselessness.

You have made utterly useless arguments, such as an assertion that it is impossible to distinguish between material processes.

You have, among other things, asserted that there is no "self" despite the fact (which we have pointed out to you) that the entire field of computer science relies upon the notion of "self."

It seems to me your true goal is the complete obfuscation of computer and cognitive science via the denial of agreed upon definitions.

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 06:25 PM

Without information on what occurs in the brain at these times (where subjects may very well consciously judge that their decision occured at a time earlier than which an EEG analysis determines the readiness potential occured) how can you claim to have a "proven" conclusion?

You have very slim data (all of it reliant upon testimonials from subjects in one way or another) from a very slim and restricted set of circumstances.

~
HypnoPsi

There was a more recent study completed in 2008. It appeared in "Nature Neuroscience." I will post a link to the abstract when I get back to the machine with the bookmark.

You are right that one should not reach the conclusion that the traditional ideas of a "conscious decision" are obsolete now. That wasn't my point.

My point was that there are known examples of decisions that an individual would insist were conscious yet are provably not. And this fact leads to the conclusion one cannot fully trust whatever faculty leads a human to claim a decision was consciously made -- because we have instances where that faculty is wrong.

And that, unfortunately for people like plumjam, means personal experience is not a completely reliable authority.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 06:33 PM

Your intuition tells you what evolution has programmed it to tell you.
Intuition is learned as much as it is genetic.

Unless you are telling me that my intuition about, say, algorithm optimisations is encoded in the 17th chromosome?

Severe mental illness aside, you will believe that you are an individual experiencing a world of objects, thoughts and feelings.
No.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 06:35 PM

Can you cite me some research here? Thoughts don't appear to me to be material though I would be happy to be convinced they were!
You haven't bothered to read a single post by anyone, ever, have you?

Because if you had, you would know that the entirety of human history is evidence for this.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 06:53 PM

No, it's not wrong. For thousands of years the debate has been between "mind or matter" (defined as immaterial thought and fundamental substance).

Nobody has ever came up with a third option.
Wrong. Information is one. Computation is another.

What is not an option, and never has been, is mind. If the fundamental nature of reality is "mind" in some sense, then that mind gives rise to matter, and the observable nature of reality remains material.

You cannot explain minds as we experience them by using "mind" as the fundamental existent, because minds are, plain and simple, physical processes. Every bit of evidence ever collected tells us this.

Again, that depends upon what evidence you accept. Though I am certianly not going to say that all NDE's or all mystical experiences (or all described thereof) are "real" I am fully satisfied that there is "truth" somewhere in them there accounts.
Thanks. Now I know where you're coming from.

NDEs and mystical experiences are fully explained by physical processes in the brain. There is exactly zero evidence that anything else is going on.

And don't just dismiss them as anecdotes. Anecdote just means "unwritten" which is not the case with NDE's, etc.,. They are data because they have been collected, collated, and reduced to statistics (data) in terms of the elements each one contains.
Anecdotes reduced to statistics are still worthless.

NDE's etc., provide data - plain and simple.
Data, yes. Evidence supporting your position, no.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

27th December 2008, 06:57 PM

No he didn´t. Objects do not equal substance.
Okay, but there is still a problem. What is it that allows objects to continue to exist when we are not thinking about them? It isn't consciousness. There must be another mechanism that preserves the continuity of the world. Let's call it "substance" or "external reality." Now suddenly the God theory loses its edge.

You can try to save it by saying that God thinks about the entire universe while I'm not, and that's what preserves the continuity. But then you need a mechanism for God to refresh my memory of a scene when I come back to it. What does that have to do with consciousness?

~~ Paul

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 06:57 PM

Pixy I'm sure you recognize hyperbole when you see it. I thought the "golden cookie award" might have given it away. ;)
I blame Microsoft.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 07:01 PM

We said it wasn't counter-intuitive for us. I dunno about pixy, but I am an A.I. programmer. I come up with algorithms to perform human cognitive tasks for a living. So of course a computational model of consciousness isn't that farfetched for me.
I'm not an A.I. programmer as such, but I build complex systems that need to be self-monitoring, which takes me into A.I. territory. So, likewise, a computational model of consciousness has become intuitive for me over the last 20 years or so.

AkuManiMani

27th December 2008, 07:49 PM

That only leaves mind - or "Overmind"; a term I seem to have unwittingly coined.

Cheers,
HypnoPsi

Actually, I think the term "Overmind" got into usage after being used as the name of an alien antagonist in a Blizzard RTS game ;)

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 07:51 PM

Hope you don't mind; I'm going to snip some of the questions that were effectively asked multiple times and just give the answer once.

[quote]What's wrong with just accepting it as it is - pure, raw, information?
Nothing at all. That's informational idealism.

As I said earlier, it is what it does. It's a small step from saying an electron is defined by its properties to saying that an electron is its properties. That it's all just information.

This does not change anything at all.

It doesn't make NDEs anything but the confused product of a dying brain.
It doesn't make mystical experiences anything but the confused product of an otherwise addled brain.
It doesn't make God real.
It doesn't make consciousness anything but a physical process.

All we've done is ignored the question of substance and accepted that all we can know is behaviours.

Personally, I describe myself as a phenomenologist and amaterialist. I don't see any need to think of the manifest Universe as ideas or material.
The Universe is material. After all, I can take a chunk of it and hit you over the head. Whether there is any deeper reality underlying what we observe is the question.

Materialism says "it is what it does".

Informational idealism says "there is no is, only does".

An electron, to me, would simply be a set of laws.
And that's what I call informational idealism. The critical point here is that the laws do not change in any way. The laws are deduced from observation, and tested by further observation.

Why?
Because otherwise it's dualism, and dualism either (a) is inherently inconsistent or (b) postulates an inherently inconsistent universe.

I didn't say it was surprising. The 'kicker' I'm refering to is the question mark over why there is something rather than nothingness?
Grilled cheese sandwiches.

What exactly is this physical/material stuff of which you speak? Please be specific in your answer.
As I've indicated, there are two answers I'm happy to accept.

One is, it is what it does.
The other is, there is no is, only does.

In the one case, matter is what gives rise to the behaviours we observe.
In the other, matter is a description for the behaviours themselves.

But why believe in a material essence in the first place
Because it is parsimonious.

Reality is indisputably material. To assume that it is essentially material as well is the most parsimonious option.

Look, thousands of years ago when the likes of Leucippus and Democritus thought up the theory of some fundamental substance (materialism) or other underlying phenomenal/neumenal objects it did indeed seem like a pretty good idea - to them. (Certainly much better than vitalism and animism, as they saw it.)
Indeed.

But that was thousands of years ago. Why hold onto this theory (sic fantasy)?
Because it works.

There is no substance - physical or otherwise - at all. There is only information.
That's fine too.

The point is, it's exactly the same.

The "so what" is that people are being encouraged to live a fantasy. If science textbooks and teachers were to strongly stress the fact that words like "physical" and "material" were only placeholder terms for information that would be a step in the right direction.
It makes no difference. None.

However, my sense here is one of skeptics/atheists/materialists gaining by keeping people in ignorance. Happily throwing up their hands at the end of the day saying "Oh, well... look... if students take the words "physical" and "material" to mean some substance or other... it's not really our fault".
It makes no difference.

Why not just be honest and call phenomenal reality and phenomenal objects for what they are - phenomenal reality and phenomenal objects?
Because that's complete nonsense.

Objects are real. Reality is real. Your conscious awareness of reality is just a physical process.

What stuff??
All stuff.

It's more accurate.
No. It's exactly the same.

Science has gone through this before with other ideas like the aether.
The luminiferous aether hypothesis makes specifically testable - and as it turns out, wrong - predictions.

Materialism vs. informational idealism makes no difference to science in any way.

Not wrong - just different from how we have previously looked at them. F does still equal MA in terms of the same event occuring. The only difference is that we should not look at M (mass) as being a substance. (For example, in QLM its all just basically braiding.)
QLM? Never mind, not important.

What is important is that F=MA. The law does not change. Physics does not change. Nothing changes.

No. Information is information. "Matter" is a subjective sense about said information.
It's not subjective at all.

At best, it is a placeholder term.
That I can grant you.

At worse it is very misleading in terms of it's historical connotations.
It's only confusing if you are utterly determined to be confused.

And you're forgetting that science is about construction theories rather than standing still. There is no reason why the rest of us should stop asking what underlies reality (and/or what is the most parsimonious theory). Materialism has plateaued out - and evaporated. Playing let's pretend it doesn't matter and just keep on using the terms "physical" and "material" isn't good enough for me. You go ahead and feel free if it suits you.
This displays a complete misapprehension of both science and philosophy.

Science is based on methodological naturalism. Science works. This tells us (though it does not prove) that metaphysical naturalism, and more specifically, scientific natuarlism, is correct.

Metaphysical naturalism says that the Universe behaves as though it is made out of matter.
Scientific naturalism adds that this behaviour is consistent throughout the Universe.

Materialism is a reasonable assumption (but only an assumption) for the underlying nature of reality given this evidence. Informational idealism is likewise reasonable.

God is not.

I would say that's rather simple. A truly self-generating and self-sustaining (i.e. truly uncreated) substance would instantly and forevermore end all ideas of "God" permanently since no candidate for God could be God if something God had not actually created existed (since, surely, God, if it's posited to be anything is posited to be the creator of all.
The ontological argument was worthless when it was first proposed, and is still worthless.

And the same is true in reverse. Something that could show itself as the only genuine Creative force would end notions of anything being self-generating and self-sustaining.
See above.

If you're saying that matter is an "ideal substance" then I agree. (Though, obviously, I still see it as fantasy.
Yahzi's Bat demolishes this claim.

Well, I have one. How exactly can pure information bring about consciousness? Please be specific in your answer since this is surely not something you expect anyone to believe without evidence, is it?
Well, it's clear enough how material processes can bring about consciousness, since this is done by programmers and engineers on a daily basis.

Informational idealism is simply materialism with the idea of "substance" removed. It changes nothing in the observed nature of reality (nor should it, for then it would be false).

So that's how information gives rise to consciousness.

Why do you think consiousness is a process?
Because it is?

Seriously, what do you think it is if not a process?

Parsimony is like a jig-saw puzzle. Theists have a piece of the puzzle for the Universe, for everything in it and for their consciousness.
No; they have an infinite collection of pieces from an imaginary puzzle.

Since the whole point of being parsimonious is to find the missing piece from the parts that are currently there (and solely from the parts that are currently there) theists are quite justified in suggesting it is a "bigger" consciousness that is the missing piece of the puzzle.
No. This is never justifiable in terms of parsimony.

God is a short word. It is not a parsimonious concept. Indeed, it is antiparsimonious.

Materialism in the traditional sense of the word does not fare so well at all. They have two missing pieces having to infer that some substance exists and that it is self-generating and self-perpetuating without purpose, will or creative impulse Materialists have to multiply unknowns
Again, you have it backwards.

There is no unknown here. We know the material Universe exists. Materialsm simply does not assume that there is something else that exists.

What an absolute mess your last statement is. Being parsimonious with this question is about taking reality as it is now (Universe and us consious beings in it). It's not about asking what happens next/first after God is there.
Sorry, wrong again. God is an infinite set of assumptions; it allows for anything, and therefore explains nothing.

In otherwords your answer is to just avoid the question. Just call "what is" reality
Well, duh.

That's the definition of the term.

and just say it causes consciousness.
No. We observe that consicousness is a material process, and we have gone a long way to explaining the details of that process.

How does this answer the question about how reality got there exactly?
What do you mean, "how reality got there"?

Reality is reality. It is what is. It's all that is. There is no understanding of how it got there, because if we could do so, we would merely be extending our definition of reality.

How did God get there? Oh, he's self-causing? So reality can't be self-causing, but God can be? And at the same time, God isn't part of reality? Surely that means he doesn't exist?

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

27th December 2008, 08:13 PM

Human consciousness is a very specific thing that we know about. Idealists love to extend that limited domain to include God, God's creative impulse, God's maintenance of reality, the partitioning of the Supermind into individual minds, communication between minds, etc., yet insist that all this baroque mechanism is just an obvious extension to the known individual consciousness. It may be true, but it is certainly a leap from individual consciousness, and it certainly isn't simpler than physicalism.

I'm willing to entertain the idea that consciousness is fundamental, but the rest of that stuff is baggage that doesn't come for free.

~~ Paul

AkuManiMani

27th December 2008, 08:28 PM

Is music "substance"? Why do you think consciousness demands a more "metaphysical" explanation than music?

We have a pretty good grasp of where our conscious experience takes place, namely the brain. The problem is we don't really know, ontologically, what it is. What is it that makes the mass of material in the brain seem to feel, experience, and be aware? What IS being aware and why does the matter of the brain seem to experience while other matter does not? What property, or physical principle allows or causes sensate experience?

The fact is

NO

ONE

KNOWS

Period.

That is the mystery and the cause of so much metaphysical speculation and contention. Okay, we've narrowed down the problem: the brain generates consciousness. Great, wonderful. We're still left with the same profound mystery.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 08:50 PM

We have a pretty good grasp of where our conscious experience takes place, namely the brain.
Yep.

The problem is we don't really know, ontologically, what it is.
What what is? Consciousness? Sure we do.

What is it that makes the mass of material in the brain seem to feel, experience, and be aware?
Information processing.

What IS being aware and why does the matter of the brain seem to experience while other matter does not?
Computers do this too.

What property, or physical principle allows or causes sensate experience?
It's the organisation into a self-referencing information processing system.

The fact is

NO

ONE

KNOWS
The fact is, it's pretty straightforward, but people like to elevate consciousness to some magical status.

Period.
Exclamation mark.

That is the mystery and the cause of so much metaphysical speculation and contention.
All of it worthless.

Okay, we've narrowed down the problem: the brain generates consciousness.
Period.

Great, wonderful. We're still left with the same profound mystery.
I see no mystery here.

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 09:07 PM

Well, as I see it, running is a process that is inextricably tied up with something that runs. Thinking is also a process, but it is more complex. Thinking requires a subject being thought about and apparently language, a medium for expression. It does not require "a thinker" in the same way that running requires "a runner." Thus I wouldn't consider the analogy with running especially good, though perhaps it has some usefulness.

You have evidence of thinking that does not require a thinker? I'd love to hear about it.

Of course thinking is more complex than running. The analogy is designed to demonstrate only that both are actions, better represented by verbs and not nouns.

I agree with the model you describe for thinking. I just haven't seen much actual physical evidence that it's true. This is what I was asking for. Also, what I was originally asking for is a mechanistic explanation of how thinking translates into articulation, into physicality.

Nick

I'm afraid I don't understand. You haven't seen much evidence that if you stimulate nervous tissue in a particular way, you see a particular type of mental activity? Nor the fact that when the brain is shut off that thinking stops?

As to how thinking translates into physicality, I think you'd better be a little more specific. What precisely do you mean? How thinking can result in physical action? How detailed an explanation do you want?

Or are you asking how the entire system works? The body as a whole? No one has that answer yet.

Ichneumonwasp

27th December 2008, 09:20 PM

No he didn´t. Objects do not equal substance.

Actually, yes he did, but not precisely where Paul pointed out. If we know that mind exists, then we do have evidence that a substance exists namely "mind". In common philosophical usage mind/thought is one of the substances often mentioned. It is the primary substance behind idealism. I thought you knew that.

Now the real problem here may simply be that we are forced to use language which carries all sorts of baggage, so that particular sentence may not have accurately conveyed Hypnopsi's precise thoughts.

AkuManiMani

27th December 2008, 09:33 PM

Yep.

What what is? Consciousness? Sure we do.

[Its] Information processing.

Computers do this too.

It's the organisation into a self-referencing information processing system.

The fact is, it's pretty straightforward, but people like to elevate consciousness to some magical status.

[...]

I see no mystery here.

[1]Perhaps you're confusing my use of the word 'consciousness' to be synonymous with 'intelligence':

When I say consciousness I don't strictly mean cognition. I mean awareness; the conscious experience. The fact that the human brain and nervous system continue to operate and process information even when the conscious state is not active (e.g. in a coma or in during non-REM sleep) clearly demonstrate that information processing is consciousness.

A human can perform many complex operations in their conscious minds such as planing, philosophizing, or performing maths. But in the background, regardless of whether a person is lucid or not, is a dizzying array of complex, 'self-referencing' computation going on. The computational activity of a single living neuron alone is mind boggling. The fact that all of this is going on even when and individual is NOT conscious is proof positive than information processing is not the same as being lucid and aware. I don't buy the "computation = consciousness" position; it requires quite a leap of faith, in and of itself, even if one doesn't take into account the evidence to the contrary.

[2]Also you seem to be confusing my use of the term 'mystery' to be synonymous with 'magical'.

When I say that the nature of consciousness is a mystery I'm not trying to imply that it is 'magical' or beyond scientific explanation. Quite frankly, I would be disappointed beyond words if that were the case. What I'm saying is science hasn't yet gotten to the point where it can answer the fundamental whats and the whys of lucid experience. Hence, the reason why there is still much speculation as to what it's nature is.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 10:27 PM

[1]Perhaps you're confusing my use of the word 'consciousness' to be synonymous with 'intelligence':
Nope.

When I say consciousness I don't strictly mean cognition. I mean awareness; the conscious experience.Yep. Awareness and self-awareness.

The fact that the human brain and nervous system continue to operate and process information even when the conscious state is not active (e.g. in a coma or in during non-REM sleep) clearly demonstrate that information processing is consciousness.Not all information processing is consciousness, but all consciousness in information processing.

A human can perform many complex operations in their conscious minds such as planing, philosophizing, or performing maths. But in the background, regardless of whether a person is lucid or not, is a dizzying array of complex, 'self-referencing' computation going on.Absolutely.

The computational activity of a single living neuron alone is mind boggling.Only if your mind is easily boggled. Well, I guess if you're not used to modern computers; my relatively inexpensive PC has a teraflop graphics card.

The fact that all of this is going on even when and individual is NOT conscious is proof positive than information processing is not the same as being lucid and aware.I didn't say it was the same. I said that consciousness is information processing.

I don't buy the "computation = consciousness" position; it requires quite a leap of faith, in and of itselfNo leap of faith.

Look at the nature of consciousness. Look at what it does. It's all information.

even if one doesn't take into account the evidence to the contrary.If you can present this evidence, you'll be the first.

[2]Also you seem to be confusing my use of the term 'mystery' to be synonymous with 'magical'.Not really; just pointing out that there is neither mystery nor magic involved.

When I say that the nature of consciousness is a mystery I'm not trying to imply that it is 'magical' or beyond scientific explanation. Quite frankly, I would be disappointed beyond words if that were the case. What I'm saying is science hasn't yet gotten to the point where it can answer the fundamental whats and the whys of lucid experience. Hence, the reason why there is still much speculation as to what it's nature is.Science has answered the fundamental whats and whys. It hasn't answered every detail of how, but that's a different matter.

Malerin

27th December 2008, 11:13 PM

That certainly doesn't prove God exists but it definitely does make it more parsiminous. Theists are only theorising the existence of another (bigger) consciousness (one step) while adherents to the alternative theory have to imagine that there is some secret hidden substance underlying reality based on.... absolutely nothing (two steps).

In short, there is no multiplications of unknowns in theism since consciousness/mind is known to exist.

All the best,
Hypnopsi

I'm certainly sympathetic to this view (having devoted considerable energy arguing for it here and months ago (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=120937&highlight=argument+support+idealism)), but I'm not entirely sure I agree with your formulation of it.

The way you put it, the idealist is in a better position epistemically (parismoniously) because God (Overmind, as you call it) is simply consciousness to the nth degree, and we know that consciousness exists (and I would argue thought and mind as well).

However, there's still an assumption going on there- just because we have proof of consciousness doesn't mean there's a higher consciousness (God/Overmind). There's quite a big leap to go from "concsiouness exists" to "a higher consciousness exists", and we have no evidence to support the existence of God/Overmind. You bring up NDEs, and I'm also sympathetic to your view, but NDE's, even if they're not materialistically explainable, are consistent with materialistic realities (brain-in-a-vat, experience machine, being in a Matrix, etc.)

On a fundamental level, though, I agree the materialist is in a worse position. They have no proof at all for the existence of a physical substance, so their model of reality rests on basically three unproven assumptions: 1) Physical matter exists; 2) consciousness arises from physical matter and interacts with it; and 3) physical matter is either eternal or had a first cause (cause in and of itself).

The idealist has basically the same three assumptions, but for (1), the idealist has some actual evidence (the existence of consciousness). This isn't proof for (1), but it is evidence that the building block of idealism actually exists.

On the 2nd point, the idealist is also in a slightly better position. The materialist has no explanation how or why consciousess should arise from a bunch of physical stuff (neurons), while the idealist has some evidence of the interaction of perception, thought, and mind. We all know what it is to perceive something, think about it, and experience those thoughts in our mind. For the idealist, the story gets a little fuzzy on where all the objects we experience come from (group mind, God's mind, one mind), but that is also an objection for the materalist: where did all this physical matter come from? Which leads to the 3rd point:

On the 3rd point, the idealist also has to tell a story of where the idealist stuff came from (Is it eternal? First cause?). I think it makes more sense to imagine that God has the quality "eternal" or "first cause" than a bunch of physical matter. There's nothing in physicalism/materialism to suggets that matter is either eternal or a cause in and of itself.

So it's not that there are "no multiplications of unknowns" with theism or idealism (God still remains the big unknown), but the assumptions contained in either one have a bit more evidence to support them, and on the question "Where did it all come from?" The idealist (and/or theist) has a more convincing story.

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 11:28 PM

What I'm saying is science hasn't yet gotten to the point where it can answer the fundamental whats and the whys of lucid experience.

Wrong.

Hence, the reason why there is still much speculation as to what it's nature is.

There isn't much speculation as to the "nature" of experience anymore -- at least among those who know what they are talking about.

The majority of "speculation" is now limited to the mechanics and implementation of that "nature" rather than the "nature" itself. Again, at least among those who know what they are talking about.

And no, I do not consider Roger Penrose to be someone who knows what they are talking about when it comes to cognitive science.

PixyMisa

27th December 2008, 11:29 PM

On a fundamental level, though, I agree the materialist is in a worse position. They have no proof at all for the existence of a physical substance
I can hit you over the head with some if you like.

so their model of reality rests on basically three unproven assumptions
Wrong.

1) Physical matter exists
Wrong.

The assumption of materialism (the sole assumption) is that matter is what exists. We observe that matter exists; materialism states that everything is matter or comes from matter.

2) consciousness arises from physical matter and interacts with it
This is not an assumption. We know that this is true.

There is more evidence supporting this than any other concept. There is no evidence to the contrary.

3) physical matter is either eternal or had a first cause (cause in and of itself).
This is the first assumption.

The idealist has basically the same three assumptions, but for (1), the idealist has some actual evidence (the existence of consciousness).
We know that consciousness is a material process, so the existence of consciousness is evidence for materialism and a terrible problem for many forms of idealism.

This isn't proof for (1), but it is evidence that the building block of idealism actually exists.
Not in the slightest.

On the 2nd point, the idealist is also in a slightly better position. The materialist has no explanation how or why consciousess should arise from a bunch of physical stuff (neurons)
Feedback loops. As I said earlier, programmers and engineers create conscious systems every day.

while the idealist has some evidence of the interaction of perception, thought, and mind.
What?

No.

The only useful understanding of perception that we have comes from the framework of materialism.

We all know what it is to perceive something, think about it, and experience those thoughts in our mind.
Yes, we do: It's all material processes.

For the idealist, the story gets a little fuzzy on where all the objects we experience come from
Indeed.

(group mind, God's mind, one mind)
The first two don't exist; the last is solipsism.

but that is also an objection for the materalist: where did all this physical matter come from?
Wrong again.

This physical matter is what exists. Where it came from is not a meaningful question; it is where things come from.

Which leads to the 3rd point:

On the 3rd point, the idealist also has to tell a story of where the idealist stuff came from (Is it eternal? First cause?). I think it makes more sense to imagine that God has the quality "eternal" or "first cause" than a bunch of physical matter.
Another abject failure.

No. No it doesn't.

Again, we know that consciousness is a material process. So you have to have God, who is self-caused, creating the material universe somehow, which gives rise to consciousness through purely physical processes.

Under materialism, we just leave out the God part.

There's nothing in physicalism/materialism to suggets that matter is either eternal or a cause in and of itself.
That is materialism. That's the entire point of materialism. Matter is what is. Since all the we observe is matter, this makes a lot of sense.

So it's not that there are "no multiplications of unknowns" with theism or idealism (God still remains the big unknown), but the assumptions contained in either one have a bit more evidence to support them, and on the question "Where did it all come from?" The idealist (and/or theist) has a more convincing story.
No. The idealist - of your sort, not the consistent idealist whose ontology is indistinguishable from materialism - is not only multiplying entities unnecessarily, but multiplying undefined entities unnecessarily.

The nature of the Universe is material. The nature of consciousness is material. It's a reasonable assumption that the nature of reality is material. And necessarily more parsimonious than any ontology containing gods.

Malerin

27th December 2008, 11:29 PM

As to this "claim" that I made -- just wait a minute. I told you then that you misunderstood it, but you insisted that I must have been making an ontologic claim. I told you I wasn't and that I don't even believe that I can say anything about ultimate ontology. You insisted that I must be. I told you I wasn't. Rinse, repeat, rinse, repeat.

You kept up the charade for post afte post, and then you said, "Oh, I understand now" and now you go back to "you made a claim and then disowned it."

You were caught in a blatant contradiction. I was being charitable by assuming you meant no dishonesty. Your tone and later remarks convinced me you were lying after all. That's a serious accusation, so I'll repost the quotes.

Originally Posted by Malerin
Right, which is the point I always make. Now, how do I reconcile this with another thread where you made an appeal to sense data as evidence for the existence of external objects and people?
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=130922&page=3

Originally Posted by Ichneumonwasp
You can't because I never made that appeal. I don't even think in that way, so I have no idea where you got the idea from.
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=130922&page=3

Originally Posted by Ichneumonwasp
Good God, what has gone wrong with you? Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people. It does not tell us absolutely that they exist (as I have mentioned repeatedly), but how could it be anything but evidence for their existence?

...

We are justified in believing that there is an external world because we have signficant evidence that there is an external world

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.p...ng+rock&page=4

Malerin

27th December 2008, 11:33 PM

I can hit you over the head with some if you like.

Wrong.

Wrong.

The assumption of materialism (the sole assumption) is that matter is what exists. We observe that matter exists; materialism states that everything is matter or comes from matter.

This is not an assumption. We know that this is true.

There is more evidence supporting this than any other concept. There is no evidence to the contrary.

This is the first assumption.

We know that consciousness is a material process, so the existence of consciousness is evidence for materialism and a terrible problem for many forms of idealism.

Not in the slightest.

Feedback loops. As I said earlier, programmers and engineers create conscious systems every day.

What?

No.

The only useful understanding of perception that we have comes from the framework of materialism.

Yes, we do: It's all material processes.

Indeed.

The first two don't exist; the last is solipsism.

Wrong again.

This physical matter is what exists. Where it came from is not a meaningful question; it is where things come from.

Another abject failure.

No. No it doesn't.

Again, we know that consciousness is a material process. So you have to have God, who is self-caused, creating the material universe somehow, which gives rise to consciousness through purely physical processes.

Under materialism, we just leave out the God part.

That is materialism. That's the entire point of materialism. Matter is what is. Since all the we observe is matter, this makes a lot of sense.

No. The idealist - of your sort, not the consistent idealist whose ontology is indistinguishable from materialism - is not only multiplying entities unnecessarily, but multiplying undefined entities unnecessarily.

The nature of the Universe is material. The nature of consciousness is material. It's a reasonable assumption that the nature of reality is material. And necessarily more parsimonious than any ontology containing gods.

Pixy, I think you hit yourself on the head too many times trying to prove materialism. Your entire post could be summed up: "Materialism is true, therefore you're wrong".

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 11:38 PM

The idealist (and/or theist) has a more convincing story.

Until someone asks them, for instance, why an air-conditioner won't work or how to stop their buddy from bleeding out after an injury or where to plant seeds to get the best crops next year. Or any other question that requires a useful answer.

Then the utter uselessness and pointlessness of idealism becomes strikingly apparent.

rocketdodger

27th December 2008, 11:57 PM

The point I was making was that those particular researchers would need to have faith in elements of their consciousness enough to be able to support findings which undermine that very same consciousness. Which is, of course, self-defeating.
They would be simultaneously undermining the value of conscious decisions while basing this undermining entirely on an aspect of their own consciousness i.e. the conscious decisions they made regarding some study or other.

No.

If major elements of decisions are subconscious, yet individuals perceive them to be conscious, it is the perception of the decision that is wrong, not the decision itself.

The findings do not undermine the value of conscious decisions. They undermine the value of subjective perception.

rocketdodger

28th December 2008, 12:06 AM

Pixy, I think you hit yourself on the head too many times trying to prove materialism. Your entire post could be summed up: "Materialism is true, therefore you're wrong".

To an individual as blatantly uneducated in the relevant subject matter as yourself yes, it could be summed up that way.

On the other hand, since Pixy did after all provide short coherent reponses to every one of your points, someone who actually knows a thing or two about this issue would come away with alot more.

PixyMisa

28th December 2008, 12:18 AM

Pixy, I think you hit yourself on the head too many times trying to prove materialism. Your entire post could be summed up: "Materialism is true, therefore you're wrong".
Only if you didn't understand it or are being deliberately dishonest.

Once again: The observed nature of the Universe is material. It is made of stuff. I can pick up some of this stuff and hit you over the head with it.

If I hit you hard enough, your consciousness goes away.

From this (and vast bodies of further evidence all pointing to the same conclusion) we find that consciousness comes from matter, and not vice-versa.

This does not prove that materialism is true. I do not claim to know that materialism is true. What it proves is that all our observations of the Universe are consistent with materialism. And what that means is that any ontology inconsistent with materialism is false.

Informational idealism (as I've described) is entirely consistent with materialism; indeed, it's isomorphic - indistinguishable.

HypnoPsi's God version of idealism, assuming it's truly idealism and not dualism, could be indistinguishable from materialism - in which case, it fails of parsimony - or it could be distinct, in which case it fails of reality.

We could be brains in a vat, or the dreams of butterflies. Materialism would still be correct. Just incomplete - but that is, from all we can tell, unknowable.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

28th December 2008, 06:09 AM

The idealist has basically the same three assumptions, but for (1), the idealist has some actual evidence (the existence of consciousness). This isn't proof for (1), but it is evidence that the building block of idealism actually exists.
But the fact that it only exists inside the heads of certain organisms and can be manipulated by poking their brains is a bit of a conundrum. If my brain is a physical illusion played upon my senses by god, why did god bother to make it so that poking that illusion can alter or shut down my mind? It sounds like the same sort of god who made it appear as if evolution is true when he really just controls everything as puppets.

Also, I have a question: Where is the Theory of Consciousness? This "actual evidence" of which you speak never seems to have been built into a theory. Is it possible that "consciousness" is just a name for a bunch of brain processes and has no actual independent existence? That would explain why there is no theory. Where is the mindon and senson? Where are the interaction laws?

On the 2nd point, the idealist is also in a slightly better position. The materialist has no explanation how or why consciousess should arise from a bunch of physical stuff (neurons), ...
So you're basing your philosophy on the current state of neurophysiology, and even then you're not paying very close attention.

~~ Paul

PixyMisa

28th December 2008, 06:18 AM

So you're basing your philosophy on the current state of neurophysiology
They had internet access in 1932?

and even then you're not paying very good attention.
Indeed.

Maybe we could make a sticky that says "Before posting your take on cognition/neuroscience/psychology, make sure you listen to the whole of the MIT Introduction to Psychology (http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Brain-and-Cognitive-Sciences/9-00Fall-2004/CourseHome/index.htm) lecture series, as presented by the estimable Prof. Jeremy Wolfe. Unless you are the estimable Prof. Jeremy Wolfe, in which case, love the Freudian take on Hansel and Gretel!"

Dancing David

28th December 2008, 06:40 AM

I guess the short answer would be anything that is objectively real and knowable, right?

Not really because perceptions are objectively real for the person who experiences them, optical illusions can cause one to perceive color that is not there.

The 'objective' part has to do with, "Will a person with a not altered state of consciousness be able to measure the events the same way?" Those that can not be measured off of some standard scale need to be examined for bias more often.

And again the system of ontology/epistomology is not crucial, there is no way to tell if you are in an idealist universe or a material one.

Dancing David

28th December 2008, 06:42 AM

No he didn´t. Objects do not equal substance.
And you still can't tell a material object from an ideal object.

AkuManiMani

28th December 2008, 06:46 AM

Not all information processing is consciousness, but all consciousness in information processing.

[...]

Only if your mind is easily boggled. Well, I guess if you're not used to modern computers; my relatively inexpensive PC has a teraflop graphics card.

[...]

Look at the nature of consciousness. Look at what it does. It's all information.

Okay, so your position: Consciousness is a class of information processing

Great. But you haven't exactly narrowed it down. In fact, the more I think about it, the more it seems your line of reasoning leads down the same path as the idealists'. Allow me to explain.

Every physical process, in some sense, is a form of information processing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_information). This is plainly illustrated by the fact that we can mathematically model physical phenomenon and predict their behavior to an extent. Now if physical processes are basically the processing of information and your central argument here is that consciousness is information processing, then you're essentially saying that everything is in some sense a conscious process.

So either, you can leave your argument as it is without distinguishing exactly makes consciousness different from all other forms of computation [be it, unconscious brain functions, cellular processing, general physical process, etc.] in which case you've simply taken up the idealist position. OR, you can quit tap dancing and admit that lucid awareness is somehow different from all other computational phenomenon and we don't know why yet.

Either way, I'd say you've argued yourself into a corner. ;)

plumjam

28th December 2008, 06:50 AM

Actually, yes he did, but not precisely where Paul pointed out. If we know that mind exists, then we do have evidence that a substance exists namely "mind". In common philosophical usage mind/thought is one of the substances often mentioned. It is the primary substance behind idealism. I thought you knew that.
Rather pedantic of you. It´s quite clear from Hypno´s posts that he was using the term ´substance´ to mean physical/material ´stuff´, and this was the point Paul was addressing, and, in turn, myself.

PixyMisa

28th December 2008, 06:59 AM

Okay, so your position: Consciousness is a class of information processing
Specifically, consciousness is self-referential information processing. As I said in... Okay, looks like I didn't say that in this thread. Oops.

Makes your entire post moot, but that's not your fault. I've gone over this in considerable detail in past threads, but I'm happy to cover it again.

Look at it this way. A thinking entity needs the following:

Input - sensory data of some sort
Memory - the ability to memorise past input and output, and hence to learn
Logic - the ability to make decisions based on a mixture of input and memory
Output - some way of interacting with the world

I call this simple creature (which can be simulated with about 50 transistors) aware, but not self-aware. Dennett describes a thermostat as conscious, but I describ it as merely aware.

To be conscious, one must also be aware of oneself. That is, you need feedback from the logic circuits to themselves. Now we're looking at maybe 100 transistors.

This creature (or circuit) can think and feel and act and learn, and it can reflect on the process by which it does this. Not very much, mind you; it only has about 8 bits of memory, total. But it can do it.

We have a whole bunch more RAM and logic circuits, but self-reference is what makes us different from, say, a clock.

Edit: I did mention feedback loops, but the reference isn't very clear unless you've read Godel, Escher, Bach. If you have read Godel, Escher, Bach, then you missed the point and need to read it again.

plumjam

28th December 2008, 07:00 AM

And you still can't tell a material object from an ideal object.

Which is what Malerin has been arguing all along. Why is it, then, that given we know that the currency of idealism exists (consciousness, mind, thought), and we can never know whether the currency of materialism exists (mind-independent ´stuff´) that you and most other orthodox JREFers hitch your wagon of faith to materialism and attack idealism whenever it appears?
It has been demonstrated that idealism is a priori in the stronger position, and that materialists must rely more on faith than idealists.
Why go with the weaker position?

PixyMisa

28th December 2008, 07:05 AM

plumjam

28th December 2008, 07:10 AM

The findings do not undermine the value of conscious decisions. They undermine the value of subjective perception.

And the findings, ultimately, are only known via subjective perception. Which is what makes the whole proposition self-undermining.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

28th December 2008, 07:13 AM

Which is what Malerin has been arguing all along. Why is it, then, that given we know that the currency of idealism exists (consciousness, mind, thought), and we can never know whether the currency of materialism exists (mind-independent ´stuff´) that you and most other orthodox JREFers hitch your wagon of faith to materialism and attack idealism whenever it appears?
It has been demonstrated that idealism is a priori in the stronger position, and that materialists must rely more on faith than idealists.
Why go with the weaker position?
Because it's not a weaker position.

First of all, the simple currency of consciousness is not sufficient to explain what we see. It does not explain why the trees in my backyard are in the same configuration when I return from vacation, without having been conscious of them while I was gone. Now we have to start talking about god or the Metamind or some such thing that is a huge leap from individual consciousness. And then we have to explain how the metamind divides into individual consciousness. And so on.

Second, just because our so-called consciousness is the closest thing to us does not mean that it is fundamental. It might be, but the real question is whether one complete metaphysical model is simpler than another. I don't think it's at all obvious that the overall idealism package is simpler than the overall physicalism package (as you know, I actually think they are equivalent).

Finally, without being able to point at the fundamental building blocks of consciousness (where is the mindon?), the idealist runs the risk of declaring something fundamental that is in fact merely a name for a group of other things (for example, brain processes). If only you could point at some free-floating consciousness.

~~ Paul

plumjam

28th December 2008, 07:13 AM

Because we know that consciousness, mind, and thought are material processes, and not evidence for any sort of idealism.

You can´t ever know this because you can´t ever demonstrate the existence of the material (mind-independent stuff).

Ichneumonwasp

28th December 2008, 07:18 AM

You were caught in a blatant contradiction. I was being charitable by assuming you meant no dishonesty. Your tone and later remarks convinced me you were lying after all. That's a serious accusation, so I'll repost the quotes.

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=130922&page=3

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=130922&page=3

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.p...ng+rock&page=4

So, you're trying to prove to me that you can take things out of context again and that you have the reading comprehension skills of a first grader? Well, thank you very much.

You do know what evidence means, don't you? You do know that I specifically defined it in the way that I was using it to refer to what we see with our eyes and that I did not make an ontolgoical statement? You said yourself that you understood this, and now you say you don't?

OK, now you have actually committed a complete retraction of your earlier statement. You have actually done what you accuse me of. And why? Because I and a few others have found previous instances of your mistakes and pointed them out to you.

Learn to deal with it. Please stop being a child. Or don't. It's becoming increasing amusing the more you do it.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

28th December 2008, 07:21 AM

And the findings, ultimately, are only known via subjective perception. Which is what makes the whole proposition self-undermining.
...
You can´t ever know this because you can´t ever demonstrate the existence of the material (mind-independent stuff).
Yes, I can. That tree in my backyard is independent of my mind. So if you're going to allow only personal subjective perception to be considered real, you have no obvious explanation for the tree.

But you agree that the tree is independent of you, so then let the baggage-building begin. You're only allowed to use personal subjective perception as the building block of your final model. No tossing in additional concepts, however vaguely mind-like they may be, without evidence.

~~ Paul

Ichneumonwasp

28th December 2008, 07:22 AM

Rather pedantic of you. It´s quite clear from Hypno´s posts that he was using the term ´substance´ to mean physical/material ´stuff´, and this was the point Paul was addressing, and, in turn, myself.

Did you read the rest of my post in which I said that he may have simply misused a term that is loaded with prior assumptions? Substance does not mean 'physical/material stuff' in philosophical usage, so technically it was a contradiction. But I am fully willing to give him the benefit of the doubt since the language we use is loaded with all sorts of garbage.

I was merely pointing out that there techincally was a contradiction, but that it was no big deal and probably illusory.

plumjam

28th December 2008, 07:43 AM

Because it's not a weaker position.

First of all, the simple currency of consciousness is not sufficient to explain what we see.
That´s just a massive assumption on your part. If you were to say ´the normal consciousness of the individual human being´ I might agree with you.

It does not explain why the trees in my backyard are in the same configuration when I return from vacation, without having been conscious of them while I was gone. Now we have to start talking about god or the Metamind or some such thing that is a huge leap from individual consciousness. And then we have to explain how the metamind divides into individual consciousness. And so on.
Your alternative is to go with matter, for which there will never be any evidence. I go with Overmind, Metamind, God, Universal Consciousness..whatever one wants to call it. For this there is indeed thousands of years of evidence in the form of the likes of expanded consciousness, God-consciousness, Theosis, Fana, Nirvana, Samadhi, the Beatific Vision etc etc..
Of course, most JREFers get to dismiss that evidence by hiding behind the usual ´it´s anecdotal´ or ´it´s subjective´ or ´perception can be wrong sometimes´. Well, given the subject matter, how could such evidence not be?

Second, just because our so-called consciousness is the closest thing to us does not mean that it is fundamental. It might be, but the real question is whether one complete metaphysical model is simpler than another. I don't think it's at all obvious that the overall idealism package is simpler than the overall physicalism package (as you know, I actually think they are equivalent).
So you think that a model for which we have ample evidence, and a model for which we´ll never, in principle, have any evidence, are equivalent? How does that work?

Finally, without being able to point at the fundamental building blocks of consciousness (where is the mindon?),
See, here you´re betraying your materialist upbringing. Why would you just assume that consciousness has to be made up of ´building blocks´? Maybe consciousness is Eternally One, but chooses to ´as it were´ (illusorily) divide itself. This is what Hinduism, for one, has been experiencing and arguing for millenia.

the idealist runs the risk of declaring something fundamental that is in fact merely a name for a group of other things (for example, brain processes). If only you could point at some free-floating consciousness.
I don´t see any sensible way in which something like a brain process could be considered fundamental in any sense. Pointing at a consciousness? How would that work? To know it was a consciousness you´d have to be it. Maybe you can point back at yourself.

~~ Paul[/QUOTE]