Why do you not believe/discuss the Pearl Harbor Cts?

[Caustic Logic]

I heard the Halsey knew about it line alot.

It's new to me - generally the dichotomy, perhaps false, is Washington knew, local on-the-sea command did not. I've been thinking for a while this might be a false dichotomy that prevents understanding.

Let us look at Admiral Halsey. <snip> Halsey is a hero.

That is a nifty scenario, and all possible given the right clues and tools. There are many different ways the attackers might have been greeted, but the facts on the ground, the results of decisions, made almost any other type of outcome impossible. Halsey and his birds were too far away and learned too late. Lexington's even further out. Saratoga's further yet.

The Japanese Carrier Strike Force arrived close enough to Pearl that the American's stood a chance of intercepting them in a night action! And the Fleet would've been protected by carrier and land-based fighter aircraft. And the Japanese would be facing Land-based, carrier-based bombers.

Don't think planes flew too good in night actions at the time, otherwise a good hypothetical. "Stood a chance" of lots of things, but luck, fate, coincidence, grace/curse of god, the angry sea fairies. and whatever else conspired to keep anything other than surprise slaughter from happening.

It is interesting to note that the majority of American carriers were in the Atlantic where American shipping was being attacked.

Mostly to protect the convoys, I presume? I have heard how they flew spotting missions at least and reported positions of German subs or ships to the British.

Was the Japanese carrier strike force even ordered to sail by radio? I'd have thought it'd be sent by encoded telegraph or courier.

Okay, now THAT is a good question I hadn't clearly considered before. They were in-harbor, in Japanese waters, where they could plug into telegraph lines to tokyo itself - and that is a dangerous message to transmit, as someone pointed out in the other thread. Hmmm... I did have the impression it was transmitted, but that may not be as founded as I thought. And this is a big point of possible evidence for me, so I'll have to go back. And I was There has been my main source on that BTW.

Alright, happy Saturday.

[kookbreaker]

I was thinking of the scout plane launched by the Soryu after 0918 to determine the actual number of U.S. carriers in the area. That plane had found and identified all three American carriers, but was unable to report this due to a radio failure.

I don't think that would have made any difference, really. Wether they thought there was one carrier or three, the Japanese attitude was still 'when the Americans show up, we will beat them.'

[Corsair 115]

I don't think that would have made any difference, really.


Well, it would have given them the precise nature and location of the opposition they were up against. That's surely valuable information. Up to that point, confusion was the watchword for the Japanese as they had no idea exactly what opposition was out there, particularly since it was not in their expectations.

I also mentioned it to point out the exact event I was referring to when I mentioned radio failure.

[Dave Rogers]

Don't think planes flew too good in night actions at the time, otherwise a good hypothetical. "Stood a chance" of lots of things, but luck, fate, coincidence, grace/curse of god, the angry sea fairies. and whatever else conspired to keep anything other than surprise slaughter from happening.

The whole point of a night action, I would have thought, would be to negate the Japanese advantage in carrier-based aircraft, in which case the US advantage in number of hulls and guns would become significant. However, given the far better night action capability of the IJN at that time (Savo Island being the classic example), things might not have gone so well for Halsey as the simple numbers might suggest.

Dave

[dudalb]

No Kidding. The First few times the US met the Japanese in a night surface action, the Japanese won easily. American training and preparation for Night Actions ,before the end of 1942, were pathetic, negating superior US radar, where the Japanese always stressed night actions. And that nighttime actions only increased the far superior qualaties of the Japanese Long Lance torpedo would not have helped matter much for the US.

[fezzic]

One might recall that the PH task force was small with a well defined mission with limited contingencies. Once the basic plan of action was made known it would not have required extensive communications to update and then order the task force to sortie. Certainly the mission and objectives would have been known to the particular participants and reiterating them in a sortie message -- that everyone in the IJN fleet could concievable read -- would not be (to me) very smart considering what was at stake.

The Midway operation, OTOH, involved many more ships. Four task forces. Different time schedules. A diversionary attack to pull the USN off-balance. And it was essential to be able to convey to the various task force commanders and ship commanders just what was going on. So a long operations order with many addressees was transmitted and that was what the USN picked up and could then plan its operations based on what the IJN was going to do.

[Caustic Logic]

One might recall that the PH task force was small with a well defined mission with limited contingencies. Once the basic plan of action was made known it would not have required extensive communications to update and then order the task force to sortie. Certainly the mission and objectives would have been known to the particular participants and reiterating them in a sortie message -- that everyone in the IJN fleet could concievable read -- would not be (to me) very smart considering what was at stake.

That's a fair estimate. There were apparently a long string of orders, abouth 3 weeks worth, sent to the task force up til they left harbor Nov 26 (Tokyo time). These can be read here (reconstructed from memory):
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/jm-097.html
ETA: So there was a lot of cimmunication, and details shared in some way to inform a fairly large group about a single but complex and sensitive operation. But this was all done in home waters, likely in secure and quiet channels, and no updates would be needed once they set off. Supposedly they did get some more instructions, but they required no response and no breaking of radio silence.

The Midway operation, OTOH, involved many more ships. Four task forces. Different time schedules. A diversionary attack to pull the USN off-balance. And it was essential to be able to convey to the various task force commanders and ship commanders just what was going on. So a long operations order with many addressees was transmitted and that was what the USN picked up and could then plan its operations based on what the IJN was going to do.

Very different "luck" than at the Battle of Pearl Harbor. I started out more gung-ho that FDR at least got wind of the attack orders, but all-in-all I'm far less certain now... foreign sources if any, and these only pan out if the orders were broadcast, or they had the telegraph/cable lines tapped.

Hmmmm...

[Caustic Logic]

Just a FYI - I was momentarily intrigued by Stinnett's "vacant sea order" construct, whereby FDR and USNavy ordered the area north of Hawaii clear of traffic, on Nov 25 1941. I figured it was probably wrong but wasn't sure. It's quite wrong, and I have my research up.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/04/vacant-sea-on-fdrs-order.html

[stilicho]

Just a FYI - I was momentarily intrigued by Stinnett's "vacant sea order" construct, whereby FDR and USNavy ordered the area north of Hawaii clear of traffic, on Nov 25 1941. I figured it was probably wrong but wasn't sure. It's quite wrong, and I have my research up.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/04/vacant-sea-on-fdrs-order.html

Which things of Stinnett's (clearly featured as the source of much of your site) have not yet been properly cleared up? I was unable to follow up on my promise of looking into sources about the US military observation of preparations by the Dutch for their possessions. I will need to go the university to use their library.

[Caustic Logic]

Which things of Stinnett's (clearly featured as the source of much of your site) have not yet been properly cleared up? I was unable to follow up on my promise of looking into sources about the US military observation of preparations by the Dutch for their possessions. I will need to go the university to use their library.

Thanks for the bump. The only Stinnett claim I care about is the McCollum Memo. AFAIK, no one else has verified it exists, hence my FOIA plans, that I still haven't followed up on. I'm afraid I'll get a negative hit, either because he mis-cited its location, or it's been removed, or it never existed and we'll never know for sure. But we'll see.

I'm assembling an article about Stinnett's "errors" and possible "disinfo" status. I think he's one of the main answers to my OP question...
ETA: And I've been removing old posts where I'd unquestioningly praised his works...

If you still think the NEI aspect you're speaking of is worth looking into, then it probably is and I look forward to hearing about it.

[stilicho]

Thanks for the bump. The only Stinnett claim I care about is the McCollum Memo. AFAIK, no one else has verified it exists, hence my FOIA plans, that I still haven't followed up on. I'm afraid I'll get a negative hit, either because he mis-cited its location, or it's been removed, or it never existed and we'll never know for sure. But we'll see.

I'm assembling an article about Stinnett's "errors" and possible "disinfo" status. I think he's one of the main answers to my OP question...
ETA: And I've been removing old posts where I'd unquestioningly praised his works...

If you still think the NEI aspect you're speaking of is worth looking into, then it probably is and I look forward to hearing about it.

You don't have to FOIA it. The actual document is available on wikipedia (see below). The whole thing is right there.

I don't think anyone doubted its existence, CL. What was doubtful was its influence on Pearl Harbor. Stinnett is pretty much the only person who thinks it was important and only because Richardson was removed from his position in what was an unrelated incident.

Sometimes you've tried to explain that certain acts of American policy and Japanese policy were irrelevant to the facts about Pearl Harbor, often because of their distance in time and geography. The McCollum memo is even moreso because it's nothing that was new or exciting in American policy and doesn't have anything specific in it such as names of ships, names of persons, or dates.

I am not the first one (q.v Egil and MG1962) who has pointed out that American naval effort in 1941 was concentrated in the Atlantic and not the Pacific. Iceland, the various conferences, the extension of the "neutral protected" zone, and so forth, were American acts of provocation in the Atlantic and clearly showed where the focus was until the Japanese attacked. Even after the attacks, the Washington Conference asserted the Germany First policy that had been in place from the outbreak of hostilities.

If the McCollum memo was important in any way it was in confirming an existing policy.

(Source: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/McCollum_memorandum )

[Egil]

I didn't know about the McCollum Memo until just now. It was written in October of 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor.

If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war. -- A. H. McCollum

It is unquestionably to our interest that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate and probably can't do better. We ought to make certain that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably need from us substantial further destroyers and air-reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that would hamper our ability to do this - so long as probability continues. If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic is also protection to her and us in the Orient. However, I concur in your courses of action. We must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both. -- Captain Knox

I do not see it as a Smoking Gun. What it is is a discourse on options about how best to proceed not necessarily a plot to get the Japanese to attack us so we can bust some Japanese, Italian and German heads.

Looking at Captain Knox's addition, it appears that quiet contrary to Stinnett's allegations, the belief was that we could contain a war by strengthening Britain and creating a stalemate in Europe which would free up British resources to strengthen their Pacific holdings which would also keep Japan contained.

[stilicho]

I didn't know about the McCollum Memo until just now. It was written in October of 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor.

The reason you haven't is, of course, because it isn't important to historians. The only place I've seen it featured prominently (and I've read 3 full FDR biographies among other pieces involving the villains) is in Stinnett's book and on conspiracy sites. If you leaf back through this thread, I've pointed out a number of real incidents in the fairly long span between the McCollum Memo and Pearl Harbor, and the fact that the attack on Pearl Harbor was one of many Japanese attacks that occurred simultaneously. Yet it's only the Pearl Harbor one that invites a conspiracy theory.

I do not see it as a Smoking Gun. What it is is a discourse on options about how best to proceed not necessarily a plot to get the Japanese to attack us so we can bust some Japanese, Italian and German heads.

Note that a lot of the options are simply continuations of policies that were in place anyhow.

Looking at Captain Knox's addition, it appears that quiet contrary to Stinnett's allegations, the belief was that we could contain a war by strengthening Britain and creating a stalemate in Europe which would free up British resources to strengthen their Pacific holdings which would also keep Japan contained.

While isolationists in the US dithered, including many of those in Congress, there was a calculable risk that Britain would be defeated. This was most certainly the mood of any intelligence officer in the US prior to the launching of Operation Barbarossa. Corsair and kookbreaker added something that I hadn't. Both the Germans and the Japanese believed fully in the power of their own ideals and their military machines to break all opposition and, in the light of events up to OCT 1940 when the McCollum Memo was written, there was no reason to doubt that they could accomplish those goals. By the time of Pearl Harbor, this confidence was probably ill-founded as Germany had turned towards Russia, the US had largely won control of the convoy routes in the Atlantic, and Japan was left with the possibility that both the US and Britain had the strength to thwart them in China and the Pacific.

[Caustic Logic]

You don't have to FOIA it. The actual document is available on wikipedia (see below). The whole thing is right there.

Do you happen to know the source Wikipdia used? Independent receipt, or simply scanned from Stinnett's book? Page 4 has that odd red underlining I've seen in Rationalrevolution's posting... Maybe you know something I don't.

I don't think anyone doubted its existence, CL. What was doubtful was its influence on Pearl Harbor. Stinnett is pretty much the only person who thinks it was important and only because Richardson was removed from his position in what was an unrelated incident.

I doubt its existence, but agree with Stinnett and many others on its relevance if real. That's 0 for 2. :) As for Richardson and the memo, yeah possible coincidence, but please be sure to check my analysis, last section at this link
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/03/mccollum-memo-analysis.html

Sometimes you've tried to explain that certain acts of American policy and Japanese policy were irrelevant to the facts about Pearl Harbor, often because of their distance in time and geography. The McCollum memo is even moreso because it's nothing that was new or exciting in American policy and doesn't have anything specific in it such as names of ships, names of persons, or dates.

"prompt warlike action [...] an overt act of war, so much the better" is unexceptional? Do you have any other such statements or documents showing this is run-of-the-mill?

It mentions many ships, indirectly, as "the main strength of the US Fleet, now in the Pacific," to be retained in Hawaiian waters as a preparation for possible war with Japan and perhaps a cause (depending how you read "if by these actions...").

I am not the first one (q.v Egil and MG1962) who has pointed out that American naval effort in 1941 was concentrated in the Atlantic and not the Pacific. Iceland, the various conferences, the extension of the "neutral protected" zone, and so forth, were American acts of provocation in the Atlantic and clearly showed where the focus was until the Japanese attacked. Even after the attacks, the Washington Conference asserted the Germany First policy that had been in place from the outbreak of hostilities.

And do note, the Pacific is where we (the US) ultimately entered the war, as some (notably Ickes) felt made the most sense strategically. And of course, the McCollum memo had its focus on Japan and the Pacific as the avenue to involvement. You're certain everyone's thoughts weren't really on the Pacific as they depleted the fleet there and ignored the threat to Pearl? You got a mind-reading time machine? Let me use it!

If the McCollum memo was important in any way it was in confirming an existing policy.

(Source: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/McCollum_memorandum )

Quite possibly - as I noted "it's quite possible that FDR was already in that groove and just asked McCollum to write up something to help clarify the issues and options."

[Caustic Logic]

I didn't know about the McCollum Memo until just now. It was written in October of 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor.

Omigsh, I didn't notice that before, well scrap all my points. :p
Well I'm glad you're catching up. Please also check my analysis linked to above. I'm guessing you'll dismiss it as irrelevant, as coincidence theorists usually do.

I do not see it as a Smoking Gun.

I agree - the reason you feel a need to say that, I'm sure, is the number of sites trumpeting it as one. IMO it is however a valuable clue to the thinking in Washington in the eventful 14 months leading to the attack.

What it is is a discourse on options about how best to proceed not necessarily a plot to get the Japanese to attack us so we can bust some Japanese, Italian and German heads.

You can't see that it promotes proceding with "prompt warlike action" in either theater, that the Tripartite Pact means we'd be at war with the whole axis if with Japan, and that it would be "better" for us if Japan committed the first "overt act?" Because this is exactly what happened, and it was predicted and prescribed a year in advance and that's irrelevant somehow?

Looking at Captain Knox's addition, it appears that quiet contrary to Stinnett's allegations, the belief was that we could contain a war by strengthening Britain and creating a stalemate in Europe which would free up British resources to strengthen their Pacific holdings which would also keep Japan contained.

Knox also urged nothing precipitated in the Orient." It's a bit of a dissenting opinion. He had a limited view that us being at war with Japan would somehow interfere with helping England, which proved quite the opposite.

[stilicho]

"prompt warlike action [...] an overt act of war, so much the better" is unexceptional?

The term "overt" as in "overt act" or "overt aggression" is probably used 100 times in the Hewitt Inquiry alone, often in direct quotes from memos much closer to DEC 07 1941 than that.

I hadn't considered that this memo wasn't authentic before. I think you'd better clear that up first. My position has been that it's irrelevant since its contents are not extraordinary in any case and cannot be proved to be connected to anything that happened in the intervening 14 months.

And do note, the Pacific is where we (the US) ultimately entered the war, as some (notably Ickes) felt made the most sense strategically. And of course, the McCollum memo had its focus on Japan and the Pacific as the avenue to involvement. You're certain everyone's thoughts weren't really on the Pacific as they depleted the fleet there and ignored the threat to Pearl? You got a mind-reading time machine? Let me use it!

I wish we wouldn't have to go over old things again. The US may have declared war in DEC 1941, but they were already in the conflict after Lend-Lease, the assumption of responsibility for the defence of Iceland, the extension of the patrolled zone in the Atlantic, the sinking of the Reuben James, and the revision of the Neutrality Acts. The British had reopened the Burma Road to supply China. And that's just the high-level thumbnail.

I don't know what your comment about depleting the fleet means.

[fezzic]

I would observe that people occasionally write memorandums and papers analyzing the situation or providing their (the author's) best appreciation of the situation and possible courses of actions. It might be an utterly hopeless assignment but the author, in good faith, plows through the strategies or legalities to advance, if possible, the premise behind the assignment. It does not mean that the action or strategy is going to be implemented, but it does show what is possible.

Operation Northwind would be such an example -- how to justify an invasion of Cuba? What would be the pretext? How would it appear to be made to happen? Is there only one way to obtain the 'provocation'?

[stilicho]

Operation Northwind would be such an example -- how to justify an invasion of Cuba? What would be the pretext? How would it appear to be made to happen? Is there only one way to obtain the 'provocation'?

That's a perfect comparison, fezzic. I don't have exact figures but I would guess that dozens if not hundreds of such documents are prepared each year and not just at the US State Department, the Pentagon, or other American agencies but likewise in the offices of governments all over the world.

You can look at it the other way too. We know the Nazis had an operational plan for invading the UK in WWII. But the event didn't happen even though all the plans and documents are there. There are even schedules of British political luminaries to be dealt with after a successful invasion.

None of these documents caused the events they detailed to happen. Not all documents are plans. Not all plans come to fruition. This is why documents have to be placed into the context of events of the time and the level of responsibility of their authors.

[Caustic Logic]

That's a perfect comparison, fezzic. I don't have exact figures but I would guess that dozens if not hundreds of such documents are prepared each year and not just at the US State Department, the Pentagon, or other American agencies but likewise in the offices of governments all over the world.

Oh my god, you guys are - okay... You think plans for false flag ops are written up all the time (which may be true) and that makes everything okay? Or what?

Northwoods is different from the McCollum memo in these ways:
One proposed we blow stuff up and kill people ourselves and blame it on Cuba. Extrememly cynical but never carried out. TThe other proposed a more general posture that might lead to a genuine enemy attack. The steps were primarily followed (whether due to the memo or not) and the enemy attack did happen.

Sometimes I wonder what would happen if Northwoods was acted on - we probably would not have had that one surviving copy of the plan then - serious erasure would follow - and we'd be arguing circumstantial evidence that the Cuba war of 1963 was based on false flag stuff and you'd all be saying that's nuts.

You can look at it the other way too. We know the Nazis had an operational plan for invading the UK in WWII. But the event didn't happen even though all the plans and documents are there. There are even schedules of British political luminaries to be dealt with after a successful invasion.

The McCollum memo prescribed actions that DID happen, so why is this a good comparison?

None of these documents caused the events they detailed to happen. Not all documents are plans. Not all plans come to fruition. This is why documents have to be placed into the context of events of the time and the level of responsibility of their authors.

So doesn't that make this one special then? Or are you pretty sure it's just coincidence that actions D, F, and H at least, plus the overt act, paralleled the eventual reality?

[stilicho]

Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4596257#post4596257)
That's a perfect comparison, fezzic. I don't have exact figures but I would guess that dozens if not hundreds of such documents are prepared each year and not just at the US State Department, the Pentagon, or other American agencies but likewise in the offices of governments all over the world.

Oh my god, you guys are - okay... You think plans for false flag ops are written up all the time (which may be true) and that makes everything okay? Or what?

You should stop at the word "plans". Yes, plans or memos are drafted for all kinds of contingencies. The job of an historian is to match the ones that are meaningful from the ones that aren't.

The fact that Operation Northwoods was both rejected and is publicly available speaks volumes about two things. It was not anywhere near being implemented and the so-called secret cabal of evil false flag American reprobates can't even properly prevent it from becoming known.

I don't know what you mean by 'makes everything okay'. If you don't think that, for example, al-Qaeda is right now drafting similar memoranda in their hideouts in the lawless areas of Yemen, or that the US State Department is drafting memoranda about the conditions of lawlessness in Yemen providing sanctuary then you are kidding yourself. Which of these will be implemented? Which will be approved by those in positions of authority?

We don't know and it doesn't make everything okay at all. We do know that neither the McCollum Memorandum or Operation Northwoods were ever approved or directed by the administration in Washington. That's okay and I think you'd agree.


Northwoods is different from the McCollum memo in these ways:
One proposed we blow stuff up and kill people ourselves and blame it on Cuba. Extrememly cynical but never carried out. TThe other proposed a more general posture that might lead to a genuine enemy attack. The steps were primarily followed (whether due to the memo or not) and the enemy attack did happen.

Sometimes I wonder what would happen if Northwoods was acted on - we probably would not have had that one surviving copy of the plan then - serious erasure would follow - and we'd be arguing circumstantial evidence that the Cuba war of 1963 was based on false flag stuff and you'd all be saying that's nuts.

This is where our understanding of the way things work is very different. Somehow we know about the United Fruit Company in Guatemala, Iran-Contra, and the interests of ITT subsidiaries in Chile. The list goes on from there. In your world, none of those incidents would be known because the documentation would all be altered or destroyed and the MSM, public officials, and the military would all conspire to keep them secret regardless of the cost.

But respectable journalists and historians have written critical accounts of each of those incidents (and others) without anyone killing them or destroying the evidence.

And, back to Pearl Harbor, there is ample evidence to disregard the LIHOP theory because there are two sides to the story and the Japanese themselves have plenty of documentation.





Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4596257#post4596257)


You can look at it the other way too. We know the Nazis had an operational plan for invading the UK in WWII. But the event didn't happen even though all the plans and documents are there. There are even schedules of British political luminaries to be dealt with after a successful invasion.

The McCollum memo prescribed actions that DID happen, so why is this a good comparison?

It's called a contrast. You do both in history.



Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4596257#post4596257)
None of these documents caused the events they detailed to happen. Not all documents are plans. Not all plans come to fruition. This is why documents have to be placed into the context of events of the time and the level of responsibility of their authors.



So doesn't that make this one special then? Or are you pretty sure it's just coincidence that actions D, F, and H at least, plus the overt act, paralleled the eventual reality?


It depends on your meaning of the word 'special'. If you mean irrelevant then I agree. Have you read Morison's history at all?

I do agree with you that the Japanese were the aggressor and committed the first overt act of war. You know about Hull's fury over the unprovoked attack on the USS Panay.

[Caustic Logic]

No, Stilicho, I did not mean irrelevant, so I guess we don't agree. A shame, that.

[Corsair 115]

So, after all these pages, we are still left with the simplest explanation for what happened at Pearl Harbor: the U.S. got surprised. No conspiracy theory needed to explain the events (nor is one supported by logic).

[Caustic Logic]

So, after all these pages, we are still left with the simplest explanation for what happened at Pearl Harbor: the U.S. got surprised. No conspiracy theory needed to explain the events (nor is one supported by logic).

I don't think that's the whole story, but the mechanical attack itself was indeed a surprise in both Washington and Hawaii. I mean, they didn't see the actual plans, or the approaching Kido Butai, or anything like that. My own concerns are more circumstantial - the fleet was placed in harm's way, and as the ultimatums flew and war became inevitable, no one in Washington or Hawaii had a functioning awareness that the Japanese like to attack enemy fleets just before announcing hostilities.

It's fishy, and I will examine it some more, but later. I'm putting pearl Harbor on hold, to focus on two events I've been meaning to cover - the USS Liberty, and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. I intend to put together an interim findings report on PH and will post a link here.

Stinnett's always railing against the "1950s version of events," but his "1990s version" is updated almost exclusively with bunk. So, I have no problem going back to a 1940s version - check Flynn's opinions (http://www.antiwar.com/rep/flynn1.html) - this is the meat and potatoes of what I think my case will be, with some newer bits worked in - esp. the memo and esp. if I can verify it - plus a willingness to consider an otherwise unbroached question: if FDR started the provocation to PH attack ball rolling and Stimson, Stark, Marshall, Turner, etc. could convince themselves to play along for the perceived national good, why would Kimmell and Short be immune from the bug?

[Corsair 115]

My own concerns are more circumstantial - the fleet was placed in harm's way...


It's only "in harm's way" if you expect the Japanese to sail over three thousand miles across the Pacific into enemy territory to strike at a major base of operations. It seems to me that, by any reasonable measure, that is a highly risky move and not one that would be reasonably anticipated due to the huge gamble it poses for the attacker. The chances of avoiding detection on a three thousand-plus mile journey would not seem favourable.

The Japanese, however, decided to roll the dice, and they got lucky (or the U.S. unlucky, depending on how you want to look at it).

[theprestige]

Hrm. This idea of keeping military forces out of "harm's way" could be pretty useful.

I mean, just think what would have happened at Gettysburg, if General Meade hadn't put the Union Army in harm's way!

Likewise, imagine how D-Day might have been, if the Allies had kept their soldiers out of harm's way!

Oh! And NORAD! Such a huge target! Surely the personnel stationed there are in harm's way! We should evacuate Cheyenne Mountain immediately!

[dudalb]

So, I have no problem going back to a 1940s version - check Flynn's opinions - this is the meat and potatoes of what I think my case will be, with some newer bits worked in - esp. the memo and esp. if I can verify it - plus a willingness to consider an otherwise unbroached question: if FDR started the provocation to PH attack ball rolling and Stimson, Stark, Marshall, Turner, etc. could convince themselves to play along for the perceived national good, why would Kimmell and Short be immune from the bug?

I wondered how long until the classic CT strategy of answering objections by making the Conspiracy bigger would come into play here.
This will not make you popular with other Pearl Harbor theorists, since the matrydom of Short and Kimmel is an almost religous viewpoint with the PH conspiracy kooks.
Why are you so intent on basically talking yourself into buying in the PH conspritacy theories? I presume a political ideology is responsible.

[dudalb]

My own concerns are more circumstantial - the fleet was placed in harm's way, and as the ultimatums flew and war became inevitable, no one in Washington or Hawaii had a functioning awareness that the Japanese like to attack enemy fleets just before announcing hostilities.

I guess the Port Arthur was just a few hundred miles from Japan over seas pretty much controlled by Japan, and Hawaii was Three Thousand Miles through seas not controlled by Japan had anything to do with the US belief that Pearl Harbor was a fairly safe anchorage for the fleet.
They did not think they were putting the fleet in Harm's way.THeir reasoning was that stationing the fleet at Pearl would be a restraining factor on the Japanese but that it was still a safe secure port. They erred on both counts.

[Caustic Logic]

It's only "in harm's way" if you expect the Japanese to sail over three thousand miles across the Pacific into enemy territory to strike at a major base of operations. It seems to me that, by any reasonable measure, that is a highly risky move and not one that would be reasonably anticipated due to the huge gamble it poses for the attacker. The chances of avoiding detection on a three thousand-plus mile journey would not seem favourable.

The Japanese, however, decided to roll the dice, and they got lucky (or the U.S. unlucky, depending on how you want to look at it).

They didn't just roll the dice. They planned it out, learned air recon there sucked, that the N. Pacific was almost empty in Dec, ships are usually in harbor and undermanned on Sundays. They even knew exactly where each ship was. You don't jump into these things blind. Probably their biggest worry was the new radar, which luckily was mentally short-circuited.

[Caustic Logic]

I wondered how long until the classic CT strategy of answering objections by making the Conspiracy bigger would come into play here.
This will not make you popular with other Pearl Harbor theorists, since the matrydom of Short and Kimmel is an almost religous viewpoint with the PH conspiracy kooks.
Why are you so intent on basically talking yourself into buying in the PH conspritacy theories? I presume a political ideology is responsible.

I'm aware that this 'off-the-script,' which is exactly why I have to go there. I'm willing to follow up on this and risk being totally wrong, on the chance it helps explain what happened.


I guess the Port Arthur was just a few hundred miles from Japan over seas pretty much controlled by Japan, and Hawaii was Three Thousand Miles through seas not controlled by Japan had anything to do with the US belief that Pearl Harbor was a fairly safe anchorage for the fleet.

It shouldn't have led them to that erred conclusion, but it is plausible. Matter of degrees. Obviously they weren't as safe as they thought, and we're to presume this was an accidental miscalculation.

They did not think they were putting the fleet in Harm's way.
Please, Dudalb, neither of us knows what "they" were thinking.
THeir reasoning was that stationing the fleet at Pearl would be a restraining factor on the Japanese but that it was still a safe secure port. They erred on both counts.
That's what they said was the reason,and kept saying no matter how wrong it was shown to be. I highly doubt it's what FDR et al. were truly thinking.

[Corsair 115]

They didn't just roll the dice. They planned it out, learned air recon there sucked, that the N. Pacific was almost empty in Dec, ships are usually in harbor and undermanned on Sundays. They even knew exactly where each ship was.


Well of course if you're going to roll the dice you're going to give yourself every advantage. But, as the old military saying goes, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. The longer the journey the more likely some unforeseen event might transpires which will upset the delicate planning. The Japanese themselves didn't think achieving complete surprise was likely and expected their airstrikes to fight their way in and fight their way out. (After all, if they knew for a fact they were going to acheive complete surprise, why not swap out some fighters for additional dive and torpedo bombers? If you've got certain surprise, your bombers won't need the fighter escort.)

As it was, had things been just a little different, the Japanese would have had to fight their way in. If the war warning message had not been delayed, had the radar returns been properly understood, the U.S. might have mounted an aerial defence. I don't think it would have changed the overall outcome given the comparitive states of readiness between the two sides, but instead of losing only twenty-nine planes the Japanese may have lost two or three times that number.

Luck played out during the battle itself. The Arizona was destroyed by a lucky hit in its magazine; change that and the ship is probably not much more damaged than were the other inboard battleships. The Arizona gets repaired and likely goes on to useful service. Of course, it works the other way too. Had damage control on the West Virginia been slower to react, that ship probably capsizes the same way the Oklahoma did.