Why do you not believe/discuss the Pearl Harbor Cts? [Archive]

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 02:01 PM

This is the thread where I will argue about Pearl Harbor and the foreknowledge debate, in general terms - any class of evidence and/or questions of motive and means, the role of openness vs. 'National Security' in public discourse, etc. I've always tried to make my analysis independent of morality considerations and about the facts - I'm not about tearing down FDR, or covering for the Nazis, but rather pursuing the complex truth, in the hopes that folks are wise enough to handle it and make a balanced judgment. It could well be argued that if FDR and his cabinet/advisers did follow such a plan, that they are all the more worthy of hero status for making a tough choice of Greek Tragedy type and WWII scale to wake up the nation and save the world.

My position on the issue is, sorry to say, there exists strong points of evidence that the Pearl Harbor debacle was due to a long-term plan to provoke Japan, provide the perfect target, enable and allow the attack, withhold intelligence from the target to ensure surprise, and manipulate the consequences. While there is no proof of this notion, it makes sense from a logic standpoint, and the entirety of evidence I'm aware of is totally consistent with it. I've seen some decent arguments/opinions opposed to this, from on high and all over, but never yet any conclusive counter evidence or unequivocal debunks. There is yet no compelling alternate narrative that doesn't rely on appeal to patriotism/optimism or leave random coincidence the prime player.

Personally I feel this is a special case because of the considerations above, and worth more than the standard agree-disagree-argue formula. Off the bat I would like to draw attention to a few possible valid positions - please check your own views against these and then weigh in with more detail:

1) The evidence contradicts foreknowledge and I'm willing to explain how
2) I'm not sure what is true, but am willing to learn and consider any rational option in pursuit of the truth
3) I'm not sure what is true, and not willing to find out.
4) I have no comment on the foreknowledge debate, because these issues should not be discussed publicly. Best to let sleeping corpses lie.
5) These issues should not be discussed publicly, but I'll still flatly say FDR didn't know, etc., without explaining why.

Alright, so that's the intro. Anyone care to share their thoughts on why there was no such plan, etc.?

Biscuit

2nd March 2009, 02:37 PM

First off your chosen title for this thread is way off. There are at least three active threads on the events at Pearl Harbor.

I'm not about tearing down FDR, or covering for the Nazis, but rather pursuing the complex truth, in the hopes that folks are wise enough to handle it and make a balanced judgment.

What do the NAZI's have to do with the bombing of Pearl Harbor? Who is it that is disguising the truth about pearl harbor to this day? Is it academics from around the world? Is the actual evidence itself lying to us? Is it the illuminati?

It could well be argued that if FDR and his cabinet/advisers did follow such a plan, that they are all the more worthy of hero status for making a tough choice of Greek Tragedy type and WWII scale to wake up the nation and save the world.

This is an interesting twist for a CTer. Hero by way of villainous treason to his own government. I don't think you are being very sincere in this analysis.

My position on the issue is, sorry to say, there exists strong points of evidence that the Pearl Harbor debacle was due to a long-term plan to provoke Japan, provide the perfect target, enable and allow the attack, withhold intelligence from the target to ensure surprise, and manipulate the consequences. While there is no proof of this notion, it makes sense from a logic standpoint, and the entirety of evidence I'm aware of is totally consistent with it.

Full disclosure I nominated you for a stundie for this one. Opinion based on evidence that points to a logical conclusion that is devoid of proof? That should be discarded in favor of a more scientific method.

I've seen some decent arguments/opinions opposed to this, from on high and all over, but never yet any conclusive counter evidence or unequivocal debunks. There is yet no compelling alternate narrative that doesn't rely on appeal to patriotism/optimism or leave random coincidence the prime player.

What evidence are you talking about? Have you read any history books on the events that lead up to WWII? The narrative you have described appeals, as most ct's do, to a very unpatriotic and pessimistic view of America as the omnipotent villain behind everything.

I don't see how a tragic event like pearl harbor could be remembered without being colored with patriotic hues. Why is that a problem?

What random coincidence are you referring to? Do you suggest that Japan did not carefully and skillfully execute a sneak attack?

Personally I feel this is a special case because of the considerations above, and worth more than the standard agree-disagree-argue formula. Off the bat I would like to draw attention to a few possible valid positions - please check your own views against these and then weigh in with more detail:

1) The evidence contradicts foreknowledge and I'm willing to explain how
2) I'm not sure what is true, but am willing to learn and consider any rational option in pursuit of the truth
3) I'm not sure what is true, and not willing to find out.
4) I have no comment on the foreknowledge debate, because these issues should not be discussed publicly. Best to let sleeping corpses lie.
5) These issues should not be discussed publicly, but I'll still flatly say FDR didn't know, etc., without explaining why.

Alright, so that's the intro. Anyone care to share their thoughts on why there was no such plan, etc.?

Put me down for column A. Did we expect Japan was going to attack? Yes. Did we think it would be Pearl Harbor? No.

I strongly suggest you read the following before commenting again.
http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/pearl_harbor_review/index.shtml

I know you said you want to discuss it in general terms but do you plan on providing any evidence for your POV?

J. Wellington Wimpy

2nd March 2009, 02:42 PM

What do the NAZI's have to do with the bombing of Pearl Harbor?

Ask John Belushi (http://video.google.com/videosearch?hl=en&q=%22bombed+pearl+harbor%22+animal+house&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ei=gGCsSc_FOpmQsQOa_4TQBA&sa=X&oi=video_result_group&resnum=4&ct=title#). :D

Skeptic Guy

2nd March 2009, 02:45 PM

The NSA link that Bisquit provides is valuable. And before you claim that you can't trust the NSA, one of the authors uncovered the Gulf of Tonkin cover-up.

MG1962

2nd March 2009, 02:58 PM

While there is no proof of this notion, it makes sense from a logic standpoint, and the entirety of evidence I'm aware of is totally consistent with it. I've seen some decent arguments/opinions opposed to this, from on high and all over, but never yet any conclusive counter evidence or unequivocal debunks.

What I dont understand. Why do others 60 years on have to attempt to prove this debunking. You have no proof your assertion can be proved, but still expect others to do so.

If FDR and military administrators at the time did anything wrong, it was to misjudge the Japanese mind. Japanese history is littered with audacious and inovative attacks. Often against enemy strong points. Pearl Harbor (since the up grades of the 1930's) Had always caught eye of Japanese planners. FDRs choice to move the fleet there made too attractive to pass up.

In essence the US were preparing to sacrifice Manila, assuming they could not defend everything else. Pearl could become the staging point for any re-invasion. The Japanese saw an oppotunity to push the US all the way back to California. History shows it did not pan out that way

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 02:59 PM

First off your chosen title for this thread is way off. There are at least three active threads on the events at Pearl Harbor.

I know there are, but none started by me, recent and clean, that start with this big picture thing and include the option of not discussing it and why, which I think has been glossed over before. I already have two threads, yeah, but these are on more specific issues but keep meandering into generalist arguments, so this is the place I'd like to take those.

What do the NAZI's have to do with the bombing of Pearl Harbor?
Obviously, the latter led to US war with the former. And a lot of 12/7 Truther types are known to be anti-FDR, or pro-Nazi, right-wing, etc. Just saying that's not me, even if I wind up agreeing with them on Pearl Harbor, the facts anyway, if not the judgments.

Who is it that is disguising the truth about pearl harbor to this day? Is it academics from around the world? Is the actual evidence itself lying to us? Is it the illuminati?

See? That's a big question. Obviously the FDR White House, US Navy, Army, and it seems NSA have ensured that much material remains hidden from view. I feel the UK is also hiding info (that's the alliance again), and perhaps other forces around the world to some extent. But even more so the story is really not secret, just has its own little roadblocks in peoples' own minds. We are disguising the truth from ourselves. And maybe that's good, I dunno...

This is an interesting twist for a CTer. Hero by way of villainous treason to his own government. I don't think you are being very sincere in this analysis.

For war with Spain, or Iraq, or political points, no. But we're dealing with World War 2 here, late 1941. That's very late and it was getting very dark. I only feel I can even approach this openly, and others consider it half-fair, because of that distinction.

Full disclosure I nominated you for a stundie for this one. Opinion based on evidence that points to a logical conclusion that is devoid of proof? That should be discarded in favor of a more scientific method.

Cool, that's a first AFAIK. Please offer the PROOF of your own theory. I await eagerly. :)

Biscuit

2nd March 2009, 03:05 PM

I did offer you proof, read the NSA article I linked to before you post anything else in response. It will take some time but if you really want a genuine good faith talk about the generalities of Pearl Harbor than we need to be on the same page.

Please feel free to provide any evidence of your own in your response.

Horatius

2nd March 2009, 03:26 PM

Cool, that's a first AFAIK. Please offer the PROOF of your own theory. I await eagerly.

Well, there's the problem. You're asking us to prove a negative. How could we, even in theory, demonstrate that no one in authority in the US had definite intelligence of an attack on Pearl Harbor on that particular day? Should we post the entirety of everything ever known by the US government, and then say, "Nope! Nothing there!"?

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 03:40 PM

Sorry, goofed the previous response:
What random coincidence are you referring to? Do you suggest that Japan did not carefully and skillfully execute a sneak attack?

Well, like the coincidence that US decision to put the fleet at Hawaii indefinitely ooops allowed it to be attacked far easier than at San francisco. That the US 'peace proposal" of Nov 26 was, oops, taken as an ultimatum by the japanese. That Naval intel decisions not to pass certain warnings to Pearl because 'they already knew enough' was, oops, disastrous.

Etc...

Put me down for column A. Did we expect Japan was going to attack? Yes. Did we think it would be Pearl Harbor? No.

Good, then we can talk. Depends on what you mean by "we." And "expect." What do you make of the bomb plot messages (http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/bomb-plot-messages.html)?

I strongly suggest you read the following before commenting again.
http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/pearl_harbor_review/index.shtml

I've read two of the links at least, and scanned a couple others. Some good info, I agree. Let's keep that link here for reference.

[QUOTE]I know you said you want to discuss it in general terms but do you plan on providing any evidence for your POV?

Yes, I just mean in general I'm open to anything. I was hoping everyone else could take the lead on offering points, since I just don't know where to start.

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 03:48 PM

If FDR and military administrators at the time did anything wrong, it was to misjudge the Japanese mind. Japanese history is littered with audacious and inovative attacks. Often against enemy strong points. Pearl Harbor (since the up grades of the 1930's) Had always caught eye of Japanese planners. FDRs choice to move the fleet there made too attractive to pass up.

Oops! The closest we have to a plausible reason for the Fleet's location is it was "thought" it would have a "restraining effect" on Japanese moves into Indochina, etc. It had proximity but not the strength or readiness for this end, and so served more as a provocation that invited response (calling the bluff). I can illustrate the points with quotes and facts with a little digging.

Can you say for sure this was all miscalculation? Because it's real bad if so, quite deft if the goal was an "overt act of war."

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 03:51 PM

Well, there's the problem. You're asking us to prove a negative. How could we, even in theory, demonstrate that no one in authority in the US had definite intelligence of an attack on Pearl Harbor on that particular day? Should we post the entirety of everything ever known by the US government, and then say, "Nope! Nothing there!"?

Also to MG1962 above - I'm not actually looking for proof either way. IMO there is none, and I only asked after Biscuit Stundied me for having no proof. He has none either. We have evidence, of all kinds, on different levels. I'm willing to discuss that.

dudalb

2nd March 2009, 04:06 PM

Ask John Belushi (http://video.google.com/videosearch?hl=en&q=%22bombed+pearl+harbor%22+animal+house&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ei=gGCsSc_FOpmQsQOa_4TQBA&sa=X&oi=video_result_group&resnum=4&ct=title#). :D

Damn. Ya Beat me to it.

dudalb

2nd March 2009, 04:13 PM

Well, like the coincidence that US decision to put the fleet at Hawaii indefinitely ooops allowed it to be attacked far easier than at San francisco.

Uh, the US Fleet was NEVER based at San Francisco 1in the 1930's. It was based at San Diego.
You are shooting yourself in the foot with howlers like that one.
So you admit have no evidence that the fleet was based in Hawaii as a staked out lamb for the Japanese Fleet?

fezzic

2nd March 2009, 04:16 PM

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 04:33 PM

Uh, the US Fleet was NEVER based at San Francisco 1in the 1930's. It was based at San Diego.
You are shooting yourself in the foot with howlers like that one.

The fleet did something at SF, tho maybe the main mooring was at SD. Those are the two ports I'm recalling, but maybe mixed up - Howler, please. West Coast - Hawaii. Point confirmed.

So you admit have no evidence that the fleet was based in Hawaii as a staked out lamb for the Japanese Fleet?

Why would I claim that when I do? Again, no proof, for the sillies who think such things have proof. Let's see...

The Fleet was moved out for a training exercise sometime in early 1940 and was supposed to be sent back. FDR personally was insistent it stay there, first for two weeks, then for some time, then permanently until further notice, no more questions, Hawaii is home. What did the CINCPAC (or diff title at the time), Adm James O. Richardson think of this? Why was he relieved of duty in January 1941 and replaced with Kimmel?

This is an older post I did, but still good. http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2006/12/on-treadmill-admiral-richardson-out-of.html

What I can add now is that in his public testimony, he does not say things like what I quote there, or even that he felt the fleet was vulnerable - just questioned the 'deterrent' rationale. But he was forceful in his efforts to either put the fleet back at CA, or get on war footing with intel and surveillance, and other readiness. And his memoirs reveal he was very concerned about vulnerability to attack, and that it almost seemed desired.

"[FDR's] public statements, of course, did not state what I consider what were his real intentions or beliefs in the matter, which were that we would be at war with Japan in due time, and that he was willing for some ship of the Navy to be the victim of a Japanese “mistake.””

That's just the starting point, how they got there.

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 04:41 PM

I don't believe Pearl Harbor CTs because, from what I can see, a lot of them try to infer "intentions" on the part of FDR and USN, among others. Now one is trying to guess what FDR, et al, thought. On that basis, there can be all kinds of speculation any one of which could be plausibly valid even if unprovable.

Uh-huh.

If FDR and military administrators at the time did anything wrong, it was to misjudge the Japanese mind.
Etc...

Like hijackers flying civilian passenger airliners into buildings, the idea of a carrier task force sailing, undetected, to Hawaiian waters and delivering a surprise attack aimed at crippling the US Pacific Fleet was not on people's radars -- even if it was played out in war games.

;)

"they" didn't know... coincidence theorists and their mysterious ignorant "they." No one foresaw this possibility? Not enough people? Not clearly enough? Sources? They didn't know how to do radio direction finding on aircraft carriers? Didn't realize they carried aircraft? What?

Who are "they," Fezzic?

theprestige

2nd March 2009, 04:47 PM

Look at a map of the Pacific some time. I mean, really look at it. Take your time. Try to fully grok the distances involved.

One of the major problems with naval warfare--especially early 20th-century naval warfare--is the amount of time it takes to get from Point A to Point B. Another major problem was the amount of fouling a ship's hull would accumulate on a long voyage far from any major shipyard, slowing it down and forcing it to burn more fuel with every additional nautical mile it traveled.

Basing the fleet at Hawaii still meant it was too far away from Japan to make any immediate meaningful counterattack. West Coast bases would have added several more months of costly, unproductive voyaging, before the fleet even arrived in the theater. U.S. naval planners had been wrestling with this problem for over 40 years, by the time Japan attacked.

It was understood that even sortieing from Pearl on Day One, the fleet would still take months to get to the Philippines, and would be in dire need of major maintenance immediately upon arrival. That's why the gradual, island-hopping approach was favored. That's why the Naval Construction Battalions were formed: specifically to follow along behind the fleet as quickly as possible, building shipyards and installing drydocks in favorable harbors all along the route from Hawaii to the Far East.

And even then, some planners for years argued in favor of preempting mid-Pacific island chains, and installing bases there ahead of time, so that whatever hostilities might in future break out, the fleet would already be prepared.

dudalb

2nd March 2009, 04:49 PM

I don't believe Pearl Harbor CTs because, from what I can see, a lot of them try to infer "intentions" on the part of FDR and USN, among others. Now one is trying to guess what FDR, et al, thought. On that basis, there can be all kinds of speculation any one of which could be plausibly valid even if unprovable.

Like hijackers flying civilian passenger airliners into buildings, the idea of a carrier task force sailing, undetected, to Hawaiian waters and delivering a surprise attack aimed at crippling the US Pacific Fleet was not on people's radars -- even if it was played out in war games. Responsible people had to make decisions based on the realities of the day and second-guessing their decisions based on events leads to "if I knew then what I know now" situations of hindsight.

:)

The focus was on the Phillipines and Guam. No one was thinking about an aerial attack on Pearl Harbor. The most they thought would happen is sabotage (which General Short was obbsesive about) and Submarine action off the coast of Hawaii.
As one admiral said after the war: "None of thought the Bastards would have the nerve or take the risk of coming that far East".
And even among the Japanese High Command, it was a controversial decision.
Even Yamamoto expected to lose roughly one third of his fleet in the attack.

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 05:07 PM

Look at a map of the Pacific some time. I mean, really look at it. Take your time. Try to fully grok the distances involved.

As I'm sure the specialists at the time did, considering things like:

[/QUOTE] the amount of time it takes to get from Point A to Point B [...] the amount of fouling a ship's hull would accumulate [...] forcing it to burn more fuel [...][/QUOTE]

Basing the fleet at Hawaii still meant it was too far away from Japan to make any immediate meaningful counterattack.

Do you know this or make it up? Because obviously if that's what war planners calculated, they were wrong.

West Coast bases would have added several more months of costly, unproductive voyaging, before the fleet even arrived in the theater. U.S. naval planners had been wrestling with this problem for over 40 years, by the time Japan attacked.

No, from what I gather they just moved the fleet back in each of the however many years before 1940.

It was understood that even sortieing from Pearl on Day One, the fleet would still take months to get to the Philippines, and would be in dire need of major maintenance immediately upon arrival.

I'm no expert, but here is what a task force of 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 8 train vessels, and 6 aircraft carriers moved in 12 days:
http://i133.photobucket.com/albums/q62/chainsawmoth/127-911/Kido_Butai_attackroute.jpg

That's why the gradual, island-hopping approach was favored.
No, I think that was to also take terriitory to, for example:
follow along behind the fleet as quickly as possible, building shipyards and installing drydocks in favorable harbors all along the route from Hawaii to the Far East.

That's a slower process than zipping somewhere, attacking, and zipping away.

MG1962

2nd March 2009, 05:14 PM

Oops! The closest we have to a plausible reason for the Fleet's location is it was "thought" it would have a "restraining effect" on Japanese moves into Indochina, etc. It had proximity but not the strength or readiness for this end, and so served more as a provocation that invited response (calling the bluff). I can illustrate the points with quotes and facts with a little digging.

Can you say for sure this was all miscalculation? Because it's real bad if so, quite deft if the goal was an "overt act of war."

It had nothing to do with a restraining effect on Indo China. It was to discourage them from attacking Pearl Harbor by ceating a situation of unacceptable losses for the IJN.

The Japanese understood the value of Peal as a base, and always intended to attack it. The US in their Rainbow studies arrived at the same conclussion

fuelair

2nd March 2009, 05:18 PM

I know of no inarguable verified, not debunkable evidence of such. Any such evidence would remove it from a need to discuss. Without such, it is just mental masturbation. Either way, discussion is kind of pointless.

Caustic Logic

2nd March 2009, 05:23 PM

Caustic Logic

3rd March 2009, 01:07 AM

It had nothing to do with a restraining effect on Indo China. It was to discourage them from attacking Pearl Harbor by ceating a situation of unacceptable losses for the IJN.

The Japanese understood the value of Peal as a base, and always intended to attack it. The US in their Rainbow studies arrived at the same conclussion

1) my bad. The deterrence was re: Dutch East Indies in particular, not Indochina.

2) I'm not aware of any designs against Pearl Harbor aside from the fleet there. As the joint investigation of 45 said "the opinion has been expressed by several naval witnesses that it was their belief Japan would attack our Pacific Fleet *wherever it might be* at the very outset of hostilities." ??? They would sail to California? :jaw-dropp Well of course, but Hawaii, whod'a thunk it? That's only half the distance!

Did these studies specify an attack against the Fleet at the Harbor, or just the Harbor? (presumably infrastructure, the few ships there, etc.)

3) You may appreciate some of the Commissions other findings:
"the fact the fleet was based at Hawaii bore no conclusive relationship to nor conditioned the Japanese decision to attack our Pacific Fleet."

“It was his understanding that the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was with a view to its providing a restraining influence on Japan."

"The Secretary of State, as well as our Ambassador to Japan were satisfied that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor did in fact prove a deterrent to Japanese action as did the Chief of Naval Operations."

"It remains a debatable question as to whether the Pacific Fleet was
exposed to any greater danger by reason of the fact that it was based at
Hawaii. The 360 perimeter of the islands afforded unlimited avenues for
operations and the maximum channels for escape in the event of attack by
a hostile superior force. The west coast, on the other hand, afforded
only a 180 scope of operation with no avenues for escape from a
superior attacking force and left only the alternative of proceeding
into the teeth of such a force."
How can you argue with that logic? Hawaii was safer than California!

4) Deterrent mission: Okay, I got the country wrong, but here is Adm. Richardson citing CNO Stark in a letter of May 27 1940 he called “one of the most direct replies to any of my letters to him, although it was far from being as definitive as I would have liked:"

“Why are you in the Hawaiian area? Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presnence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action.”

See next post for some more details on the policy and why it may have - oops - backfired.

Caustic Logic

3rd March 2009, 01:40 AM

First, on pst #19 I misread "counterattack" somehow as Japanese attack on PH. apologies theprestige, but your post still makes it sound like battleships were crawling through broken glass rather than gliding through water, in an attempt to magnify the *mind-boggling* distances involved.
---
The closest we have to a plausible reason for the Fleet's permanent basing in Hawaii is it was "thought" it would have a "restraining effect" on Japanese moves into the Dutch East Indies and in general. It had the general proximity but not the strength or readiness for this end, and so served more as a provocation that invited response (calling the bluff). This is actually an inversion of that other Roosevelt’s famous maxin – speak softly and carry a big stick - and can be glimpsed in these quotes:

“In my discussions in Washington, both within the Navy department and within the White House, it was constantly asserted that the presence of the fleet in Hawaiian waters was exerting a restaining influence on the Japanese. […] the statement might have had a factual basis […] but, it has always seemed odd to me that such an affirmative statement had not been made in the intervening years by some Japanese military officer occupying an important position in the Japanese governmental structure during this period.” [Adm. Richardson, Treadmill to Pearl Harbor, p330]

"I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might
influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military
government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for
war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not
undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in
Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action." [Richardson, to Congressional investigation in 1945]

“The US Fleet […] received orders to remain at Pearl Harbor […] with the purpose of dissuading the Japanese Government from moving southward […] The War Department staff believed that a show of strength in the Pacific might be taken by the Japanese Government as an occasion open hostilities. On this ground the Army planners strongly objected to leaving the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. […] The retention of the fleet in the Pacific might cause Japanese leaders to review and revise their plans, but it would act as a deterrent “only as long as other manifestations of government policy do not let it appear that the location of the fleet is only a bluff.” [Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, pp 15-16 - cited in Richardson, 330]

[On Navy decision to publicly recall all possible aviators from Pearl to training in Florida, publicly leaving the fleet with even weaker aviation abilities]: “Since this information […] was bound to become known to Japaneseintelligence activities, it was a sure giveaway to the Japanese that the U.S. governmental positioning oof the fleet in Hawaii was one of bluff, and not of early combative action.”[Richardson, 313 - emph. mine]

“It seemed to me that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull evaluated the Japanese leaders in terms of themselves. Military moves, which were valueless from the hard realities of war and just window dressing, were assigned great weight. The President and Mr. Hull never seemed to take into consideration that Japan was being led by military men, who would evaluate military moves largely on a military basis.” [Richardson, 333]

“The seed of the disaster that was about to occur had been sown as Admiral Richardson had predicted the year before, when our foreign policy was allowed to dictate military strategy. This situation had resulted in a disastrous deterrent posture. Our bluff was called when the failure of Tokyo’s diplomatic efforts to restore its flow of oil made a preemptive strike an attractive option as a way to save Japan’s face.” [Layton et al. And I Was There, p 235]

Referring to the presence of our fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese Foreign Minister in June of 1940 stated to Ambassador Grew that "the continued stay of our fleet in those waters (Hawaiian) constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas * * *." [19] As Secretary Hull stated, [20] "The worst bandit * * * doesn't like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him at * *. They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not." [Joint Committee, final report 1946 - weird asterisks in original, as found here. (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_4.html#159a)]

That last is interesting. We just had an "unloaded gun" pointed halfway to their heads? Deterrent?

MG1962

3rd March 2009, 04:22 AM

That last is interesting. We just had an "unloaded gun" pointed halfway to their heads? Deterrent?

The problem the American planners had was not being aware of the Zengen Sakuson Doctrine that dated all the way back to 1923. Japanese naval planners became obsesed in creating circumstances for a "Grand battle" specifically with the US navy. In its orginal form, the American fleet would be lured into Japanese waters, after an initial attack by auxillery units. The Japanese Capital ships would send the American fleet to the bottom

Minozu Genda, who was the Billy Mitchell of the Japanese navy wrote extensively about the intitial planning in a series of memos in the late 1940's. He talks of a switch in the Zengen doctrine to being a carrier based offensive operation, and students at the Naval War College in Tokyo being asked to put together a wish list and tactical doctrine for a major encounter with US forces.

So it can be argued that the Japanese were expecting significant conflict with the US as early as 1936, and depending how serious you take the Zengen Sakuson doctrine an expectation of conflict going back 20 years before the actual war

dudalb

3rd March 2009, 12:31 PM

Of course talking about "Provoking" the Japanese raises suspiscions someone is either Whitewashing Japanese aggression in the Pacific, or playing the "Moral Equivilency" card.

MG1962

3rd March 2009, 02:00 PM

Of course talking about "Provoking" the Japanese raises suspiscions someone is either Whitewashing Japanese aggression in the Pacific, or playing the "Moral Equivilency" card.

Thats a very interesting point. I dont claim to be an authority, but I am completely unaware of any planning on the US part for pre-emptive offensive action. The US only ever decided on a reactive posture. This places your armed forces at a disadvantage, but given the state of US military spending between the wars. One has to consider it was the only option.

As a side light, one has to wonder why serious consideration to invasion of the Hawaiin Islands was not considered. It would have triggered the obvious reaction from the US and brough about the Zengen Sakuson they so wished for

Caustic Logic

3rd March 2009, 02:59 PM

So it can be argued that the Japanese were expecting significant conflict with the US as early as 1936, and depending how serious you take the Zengen Sakuson doctrine an expectation of conflict going back 20 years before the actual war

I'm not sure how this is supposed to fit in, but that's an interesting point. The US Navy had been hatching Orange war plans for conflict with Japan since, like 1910, spurred by the IJN victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Fleet Problem XIX was carriedout 1938, and included a simulated Jap attack on Oahu from the north, on a Sunday morning, and took the port by surprise. 3 1/2 years later, it seems any lessons were forgotten.

They may have used PH in those drills partly because they were there, rather than its likeliness to be hit. But still, I find it odd they consider it in peacetime, but all of a sudden as hostilities are imminent, Hawaii is upgraded in estimates to an 'impregnable' fortress, and the Japanese are clearly preparing for multiple major operations, Hawaii is basically the one place EVERYONE was surprised by?

---
So what I was wondering, after I found all those quotes, and typed some out, what's your take on the reason for basing the Fleet at Pearl? Is there some other explanation offered that you can share? Or is 'restraining Japan' the best we have?

Caustic Logic

3rd March 2009, 03:10 PM

Of course talking about "Provoking" the Japanese raises suspiscions someone is either Whitewashing Japanese aggression in the Pacific, or playing the "Moral Equivilency" card.

That's fine, suspicion is good. I encourage it :D I may well be biased towards 'leveling the field,' but only within the context of the facts. Japan was still responsible for the burning and bayoneting and mass rapes, disembowelments, beheadings, tortures, and other abuses in China, if that helps. The enslavement of 'comfort women' from China and Korea, the engineered crises used to conquer manchuria, etc...

The facts on the American side are what they are. I'm trying to discuss those.

I am completely unaware of any planning on the US part for pre-emptive offensive action. The US only ever decided on a reactive posture. This places your armed forces at a disadvantage, but given the state of US military spending between the wars. One has to consider it was the only option.

Actually... I did read in Layton's book about MacArthur's plan to bomb [ETA: be prepared to, or to threaten to, to make it possible] Japan itself from the Philippines. Rather 'bold,' it was considered, but ultimately unrealistic, given the limits of, as you say, peacetime production on bombers, and also the shortage of carriers in the Pacific. This was thought to be a stronger deterrent than the fleet at Hawaii - bombs on Toky was the goal - it was being built up throughout '41, up to 12/7, and was the reason for the 48 B-17s scheduled in from the States.

We were trying to put two guns to their head, one being loaded, the other harmless. Both were smacked from our hands.

Apologies for a top-o-my-head rendition of this episode - anyone else hear of this?

As a side light, one has to wonder why serious consideration to invasion of the Hawaiin Islands was not considered. It would have triggered the obvious reaction from the US and brough about the Zengen Sakuson they so wished for

Since I'm new to the Zengen Sakuson, could you explain how that would work? Sounds interesting.

MG1962

3rd March 2009, 03:38 PM

So what I was wondering, after I found all those quotes, and typed some out, what's your take on the reason for basing the Fleet at Pearl? Is there some other explanation offered that you can share? Or is 'restraining Japan' the best we have?

There is a very old military doctrine caled "Force in Keeping" I just tried to google it and got nothing relevant. My guess is modern military parlance has changed and it has another name

The basic idea is that you assemble a force, but have no intention of actually committing it to battle. The fact the force exists influences enemy battle plans, usually discouraging them to attack. Two examples of this doctrine in effect was the British Home Fleet and the German Grand fleet in WW1. Neither could be dispersed, nor really committed to battle for fear that losses would be so great the other side would get an advantage.

Yes the Germans did sorte in strength once, but had no real intention of engaging the British. In 5 years of war elements of both fleets saw each other once

In the same war, the Italian navy, an inferior force, kept the Austro Hungarian navy bottled up for the entire conflict. Simply by swinging at anchor in the right harbour.

MG1962

3rd March 2009, 03:44 PM

Since I'm new to the Zengen Sakuson, could you explain how that would work? Sounds interesting.

The basic concept was to lure the US fleet into Japanese waters. As they approach they are attacked and whittled down by submarine, destroyer and air attack. Even the concept of Kamakazi attacks was considered

At some point the Japanese fleet would sail in force and clean up the remainder of the Americans, hence delivering a great fleet victory. When looked at closely the similarities between this and the battle of Tsushima in 1905 in which a Japanese fleet ambushed and destroyed an inferior Russian fleet.

Many Japanese naval units were built and designed for this battle. The Japanese sacrificin armour for speed.

Caustic Logic

3rd March 2009, 10:02 PM

Cool, so we have a historical precedent for the bluff military force, and for whatever it means to the current case, the Japanese lure-and-ambush tactic.

Still no refutation of the stated purpose of the fleet move to Hawaii, still no grappling with the notion that 'deterrence' failed, and that both hawaii and the Philppines were taken as weak provocations tempting pre-emption. No arguments that being halfway to Japan increased the odds of a Japanese attack.

Where's the JREF's big guns?

Anyone wanting more info on the Philippines bombing plan, see Layton et al, chapter 15, Imperfect Threats - readable here until you hit your viewing limit like I did:
http://books.google.com/books?id=bZkmLX8i6UgC&printsec=frontcover

I'll be back with more later.

Caustic Logic

3rd March 2009, 10:55 PM

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 12:17 AM

Uh, the US Fleet was NEVER based at San Francisco 1in the 1930's. It was based at San Diego.
You are shooting yourself in the foot with howlers like that one.
So you admit have no evidence that the fleet was based in Hawaii as a staked out lamb for the Japanese Fleet?

Actually looks like it was more like LA.
On 7 May 1940, the U.S. fleet moved its headquarters from San Pedro, California, to Pearl Harbor. The move was undertaken with great reluctance by Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. Richardson and most Navy officials who opposed the move thought a fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor would be unnecessarily exposed to Japanese naval strength.
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/comint-4.html

San Pedro wiki - a neighborhood of Los Angeles, United States Navy Battle Fleet Home Port 1919-1940

Speaking of howlers, dude, whadya think of the commission saying Hawaii was safer than California, as if they have no clue of physical space?

eh...

Foolmewunz

4th March 2009, 01:50 AM

December 8, 1941: MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor. By William H. Bartsch. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003.
http://www.armyhistory.org/ahf2.aspx?pgID=877&id=256&exCompID=56
Acc. to this review, this book talks about "the shift in the American outlook that would elevate the Philippines from a strategic liability to an asset primarily based on using B-17s to deter Japanese ambitions."

This book discusses it on page 7
http://books.google.com/books?id=ajQgDfPxKYYC

The idea was long-range bombers from Luzon, bomb Japan, land in Vlaidivostok, if Stalin would say cool (he never did).

Military history buffs - what's the significance of a possible offensive force being established just south of Japan in the lead-up to Pearl Harbor?

Layton et al. say military planners wanted Hull to maintain negotiations longer, until this threat was ready. But Hull was upset to find Japanese bad faith, feigning diplomacy to cover for war prep. This caused him to "kick the whole thing over" on Nov. 27, issue the Hulltimatum, and the automatic recoil hit before the threat was ready, and while Pearl was still neglected as a "way station" for that effort.

It was a military disaster, but a political triumph.

CL,
You're just all over the map of the Pacific, aren't you? Settle into a coherent theme, please, because you just seem to be clutching at any old straw the wind blows your way.

Just to cover these few:

Clark AFB "just south of Japan in the lead up to Pearl...."
1. "Just south of"? The range of the B17 wouldn't have gotten it to Tokyo and then to Vladivastok, so this is nonsense. By the end of the war, they might've made it, but not in '41, and certainly not with the earlier B17s. So "just south of" is a bit misleading. That's sort of like asking if Greece is threatened because there's a submarine off Yemen! Japan had no possessions other than Formosa (Taiwan) within bombing range at the time, so the bombers were meant as deterrent to expansion into Southeast Asia.
2. "lead-up to Pearl Harbor"? Slightly tainting things with your choice of words, are you? There was a Japanese lead-up/build-up to Pearl. The American forces were being positioned to try to deter Japan's intentions.

As to the review that you linked to, they seem to more clearly state that they actually scrambled the B17s and fighters, but they couldn't keep them airborne forever. When they landed again and Big Mac proceeded to have one of his Big Mac attacks (of indecisiveness when it comes to the use of air as an attack technique), the Japanese hit the Philippines. (This is also rather well-known history of the area.)

As to the "military planners" wanting Hull to stall....
1. Layton seems rather self-serving in his post-war comments. He wasn't in the thick of things in every theater as he makes it sound.
2. What good would Hull's negotations have done, in hindsight, as the multi-carrier fleet had left the Kuriles three days earlier.

The Japanese had the whole thing mapped out, including the move from the Kuriles, which was a stroke of genius, in retrospect. All activities in the Pacific after August of '39 pointed southwards, so everyone was anticipating that any attack would be in that area. (And it actually was - the attack on Pearl was a pre-emptive strike to try to take the US Navy out of play for long enough that the Japanese could secure hegemony amongst all the former European colonies, particularly Malaya and the East Indies and Philippines, and Central and Southern China and Indochina (rubber, oil, iron ore and coal).

Your comment as to wanting to generalize the discussions leads me to believe that you're not faring well in the specific discussions. I have a feeling you're not going to fare all that better in this area, either. You have yet to provide anything other than conjecture. Conjecture, I might add, that's been pretty well gone over extensively in the past few decades.

Foolmewunz

4th March 2009, 01:59 AM

<snip>

Speaking of howlers, dude, whadya think of the commission saying Hawaii was safer than California, as if they have no clue of physical space?

eh...

Context is everything, sometimes.

The discussion of "safer" was in lieu of being able to escape in all directions, thus requiring any opposing naval force to encircle the islands 360 degrees - a task that has never been accomplished, to my knowledge in modern naval warfare. Whereas a single port/bay can be quite easily bottled up, as is witnessed by the numerous times it's been done.

Where would ships escape moving eastwards in the event of an eventual attack on the US mainland? Alameda county? Could they take the freeway?

Equally, in the North Atlantic, many were concerned in having the fleet in Norfolk or Brooklyn. It'd be real easy for a German wolfpack to bottle them up.

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 03:10 AM

Thanks for a response. It was feeling lonely there. This one first, since it's easier.

Context is everything, sometimes.

The discussion of "safer" was in lieu of being able to escape in all directions, thus requiring any opposing naval force to encircle the islands 360 degrees - a task that has never been accomplished, to my knowledge in modern naval warfare. Whereas a single port/bay can be quite easily bottled up, as is witnessed by the numerous times it's been done.

Where would ships escape moving eastwards in the event of an eventual attack on the US mainland? Alameda county? Could they take the freeway?

Equally, in the North Atlantic, many were concerned in having the fleet in Norfolk or Brooklyn. It'd be real easy for a German wolfpack to bottle them up.

I get what they mean - coasts are like walls to ships, they work best in the open... yeah, me naval expert... but that's a non-sequitur. The main thing is the coast was also another 2000 mi plus further away from Japan. I know they aren't really that dumb, but it sounds so dumb to me to just compare them on some kind of par. Hey, maybe there's some inlet on a spit off Honshu with superb 360 view and defensibility, maybe that's a good spot?

I'm sure you get what I mean. I'm sure there's some context there I'm missing, I just caught that as illustrating my point w/irony.

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 03:47 AM

CL,
You're just all over the map of the Pacific, aren't you? Settle into a coherent theme, please, because you just seem to be clutching at any old straw the wind blows your way.

In general, I don't think so, but I am rushing ahead a bit on this point, and it shows. Thanks for taking the time to offer thoughts.

Clark AFB "just south of Japan in the lead up to Pearl...."
I was thinking relatively, in terms of Pacific distances - fleet at CA, fleet at HI, bomber force at Philippines. Way way east, way east, just south

1. "Just south of"? The range of the B17 wouldn't have gotten it to Tokyo and then to Vladivastok, so this is nonsense. By the end of the war, they might've made it, but not in '41, and certainly not with the earlier B17s. So "just south of" is a bit misleading. That's sort of like asking if Greece is threatened because there's a submarine off Yemen! Japan had no possessions other than Formosa (Taiwan) within bombing range at the time, so the bombers were meant as deterrent to expansion into Southeast Asia.

You're probably right where we disagree(d) here. I'm not a big WWII buff, and lack some of the reference points a lot of others have. Looking closer at my source, it seems the Tokyo-Russia attack line was more of a proposal, and only introduced in October '41. So the B-17 force was, I presume, for more local deterrence, and this offensive plan was not a factor "in the lead up."

Because I used this as evidence of a planned offensive capability above, I'd like to scratch that point.

2. "lead-up to Pearl Harbor"? Slightly tainting things with your choice of words, are you?

Juxtaposing, to make my point.

As to the "military planners" wanting Hull to stall....
1. Layton seems rather self-serving in his post-war comments. He wasn't in the thick of things in every theater as he makes it sound.

I'm sure that kind of bias plays some role in the book, and most of the contents are clearly from after-the-fact research. Sure. Grain of salt...

2. What good would Hull's negotations have done, in hindsight, as the multi-carrier fleet had left the Kuriles three days earlier.

The Japanese had the whole thing mapped out, including the move from the Kuriles, which was a stroke of genius, in retrospect. All activities in the Pacific after August of '39 pointed southwards, so everyone was anticipating that any attack would be in that area. (And it actually was - the attack on Pearl was a pre-emptive strike to try to take the US Navy out of play for long enough that the Japanese could secure hegemony amongst all the former European colonies, particularly Malaya and the East Indies and Philippines, and Central and Southern China and Indochina (rubber, oil, iron ore and coal).

Good summary, brief and potent. To answer the question in there, as you perhaps forgot, the PH striking force's order-to-sail included this proviso:

Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will
reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile
action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to
reassemble and return to their bases.

As for the Philippines, I doubt that would be spared. Would sparing Pearl avoid war with US? Would sparing the Philippines even? Opinion polls and White House meetings give very different indications.

Your comment as to wanting to generalize the discussions leads me to believe that you're not faring well in the specific discussions.

I think they went fairly well. Just ran their course, until someone adds something new. This one can keep going, since it's more general.

MRC_Hans

4th March 2009, 03:49 AM

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 04:17 AM

Son, you need more than a pea-shooter to lure out the big guns.

Haha! I need the right shout-out - the Big guns know when someone's talkin' to them!

What IS your case? So some of the decisions were, when seen in retrospect, not optimal? Some were even stupid?? Those things happen.

Good, thanks. So far we're on the reasoning behind putting the fleet in Hawaii and the effect this had on making it a more likely target of japanese hostilities. That's a small part of the whole case, and this part is fairly circumstantial, largely conjecture. In short, what we [you and I] seem to agree on is that "some decisions" were "not optimal" or "even stupid." All I'd like to add is that the relative stupidity or brilliance of a move is of necessity based on the intent of the move. What may seem stupid...

Pearl? It was a military disaster .... for Japan:

Well, from a military PoV, the battle- it was brilliantly done and unnaturally successful. In the long term, of course...

1) They did not manage to put the US navy out of action for nearly long enough.
Dit'n even scratch the carriers.

2) They grabbed the tiger by the tail, and bore the consequences.

3) Getting the US into the war was the worst thing that could happen to the Axis.
Yamamoto insisted, if they absolutely MUST do that, attacking the fleet at Pearl on the side was the best way to start it.

So wasn't it a boon to TDR? It sure was.

So didn't TDR MIHOP it?

I'm sure I should know what TDR is. I'm guessing FDR. :)

No, because if he did, why should he have let the Japanese fleet get away? Fine! lure the enemy into shooting first. That is smart politics. But, you don't let him run away afterwards! You lie waiting with everything you have and give him a good beating in return.

Good point, and a point for more conjecture. Admittedly, that's one way of doing things, and it has its merits, like whooping the enemy early on, defending your own ships better, less casualties... but there are other levels that would be considered - I did a blog post about the different ways a provocation could be managed.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/battle-of-pearl-harbor-alternate.html
It's pretty cynical read, but I challenge anyone to deny the basic logic of it.

The facts that Pearls was NOT alerted, that fighter-planes did NOT take off (except for a few brave entrepreneurs), that the carriers were NOT in a position to hit back, that the AAA guns were NOT manned and poised, those facts are the best proof that the attack was not part of a US plan.

Alright, those are certainly... words... you typed.

As for long-range bombing ideas:
Do you have any idea at all about the conditions for long-range air navigation at the time? Do you realize that they had hardly more navigation aids than a 19th century ship?

Again, I don't know as much about that as I thought, and it's a side-point. Apparently in '41 there was such a proposal being looked at, by Marshall and Stimson, et al. I don't know the details, but you can check the sources above and take it up with Gen. MacArthur. :)

Hans[/QUOTE]

MG1962

4th March 2009, 04:24 AM

No, because if he did, why should he have let the Japanese fleet get away? Fine! lure the enemy into shooting first. That is smart politics. But, you don't let him run away afterwards! You lie waiting with everything you have and give him a good beating in return.

The facts that Pearls was NOT alerted, that fighter-planes did NOT take off (except for a few brave entrepreneurs), that the carriers were NOT in a position to hit back, that the AAA guns were NOT manned and poised, those facts are the best proof that the attack was not part of a US plan.

You could almost see the planning meeting

President: Okay gentlemen here is the idea. We send our ships to Pearl Harbor, let the Japanese launch a brilliant tactical strike against us, then spend four years 5 trillion dollars and countless American and allies lives pushing them back across the Pacific

Admiral: If I may Mr President we have an alternate plan. Lay in wait for the Japanese. When they launch their planes, we launch ours and send their entire fleet to the bottom of the ocean, and the war is over by lunchtime

President: Seriously, whats the fun in that?

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 04:50 AM

You could almost see the planning meeting

[...]
President: Seriously, whats the fun in that?

If you want to seriously engage the issue, and I wouldn't blame you for not wnting to, you need to realize this would not be a military decision. As I said earlier, militarily, it was disaster, politically it was a triumph. An honest appraisal of the different options must not exclude political considerations - like the emotional potency of the event.

Was 1941 America easily riled up by dashing naval battles? Mmmaybe, a little.

We do know what the surge on the street after what happened was like. The character of it was very important - the clarity of it ... unprovoked ... total surprise ... defenseless ... aggression ... massacre ... thousands dead. These are all important factors in the real equation, and it all was based on the decisions, on both sides of the Pacific, that brought things to head there.

MG1962

4th March 2009, 05:16 AM

If you want to seriously engage the issue, and I wouldn't blame you for not wnting to, you need to realize this would not be a military decision. As I said earlier, militarily, it was disaster, politically it was a triumph. An honest appraisal of the different options must not exclude political considerations - like the emotional potency of the event.

Was 1941 America easily riled up by dashing naval battles? Mmmaybe, a little.

You are welcome to your opinion, and after all thats all it is. Americans have long been enchanted by the victories their navy has produced. All the way back to 1813 and the battle of Lake Erie. The population has been enthralled with the cavalier like behaviour of is navy

Naval warfare is as much about attitude as it is about equipment or training. The ultimate expression of this attitude can be found in studying the battle of Midway. There is no way in the world the avaliable US forces should have troubled the Japanese fleet, but through sheer guile they turned the direction of the war.

Foolmewunz

4th March 2009, 08:01 AM

CL,
I'm going to pretend I'm sober - not an easy task, I assure you, but I've been steeping myself in WWII and particularly the Pacific for quite a number of years, so I'm pretty sure of my footing, here.

This whole presumption is based on post-facto deliberations by people who should've known better and who ignored the facts of what was going on in Asia before the US involvement. For FDR or for anyone to have laid out this grand plan - as much as a decade in advance, presumes facts that are just not in play.

In August of '39, there was a little heralded but decisive battle on the borders of Mongolia. This event not only brought forward perhaps the greatest general of WWII (Zhukov) but also changed the entire war in Asia. What had been a land war, with designs on Russia, became a push southwards and eastwards. If you're not familiar with the battle or with the Japanese designs on Vladivastok and eastern Russia, you should read up on it. It's rather enlightening.

In short, Japan was planning to take vast expanses of the eastern part of the Soviet Union. Had they succeeded against Zhukov and secured Mongolia, they would have been in an ideal position when Hitler started Barbarosa to cut off all of Russian Asia. The spoils would have covered almost all of their raw material requirements, and they would've had no need to urgently head towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. They would've gotten all sorts of resources.

Japan had this "thing" for Russia. (And Russia wasn't all that fond of Japan, either.) Their navy was an afterthought (much as MacArthur didn't give much credence to either naval or air power). Their invincible army was going to march through all of China and Russia, and with Germany attacking from the west, as the plan went, Russia would crumble.
Well, except for Zhukov .....

I'll leave you with that. I see a couple of folks who actually know WWII are in the thread. I'm quite sure MRC Hans, who has much more detailed knowledge of the times, can give even better definition of what I think is the seminal event in the war in Asia.

(Germany got the pay-back from this scenario, Big Time! Check out the number of times they tried to get Japan - after Mongolia - to open an Eastern front. Japan wrote of their ally as treacherous and decided to go their own way, thereby freeing up Russia to throw everything at their Western front, and notably Zhukov led the way.)

Dave Rogers

4th March 2009, 08:05 AM

In August of '39, there was a little heralded but decisive battle on the borders of Mongolia. This event not only brought forward perhaps the greatest general of WWII (Zhukov) but also changed the entire war in Asia. What had been a land war, with designs on Russia, became a push southwards and eastwards. If you're not familiar with the battle or with the Japanese designs on Vladivastok and eastern Russia, you should read up on it.

It would help, of course, if somebody mentioned that it was the Battle of Khalkhin Gol you should read up on, but that might make it too easy...

Dave

Alt+F4

4th March 2009, 08:09 AM

...it makes sense from a logic standpoint...

Sorry, but it makes no sense from a logical standpoint. The history of the United States up to that time proved that no huge body count was needed for a declaration of war.

The U.S. entered World War I over something as dumb the Zimmerman Note. What would have made logical sense to fabricate a similiar telegram involving Japan. It makes no sense whatsoever to allow many of your warships to be intentional destroyed at the start of a war.

Foolmewunz

4th March 2009, 08:12 AM

It would help, of course, if somebody mentioned that it was the Battle of Khalkhin Gol you should read up on, but that might make it too easy...

Dave

Oh, another knowledgeable smartazz, I see.:spjimlad::spjimlad:

How am I supposed to remember that? I'm seriously not sober. But I reckoned "Google + Zhukov + Mongolia + 1939" would probably get to it. Probably the first real modern battle of the 20th century. A little bit of everything from tanks to artillery to air support to traditional infantry (and some horse and pony battalions for the nostalgia buffs).

But .... Yeah, one of my favorite "unknown" battles. Probably changed the course of WWII in more ways than could've been imagined at the time. (And the introduction of Zhukov as a major player is just a bonus. Reporting to Crazy Joe had a lot to do with it, of course, but here was a guy who defined the obscenity of war! Straight into the mouth of the beast!)

ETA: Sorry - forgot the spiders... didn't mean to be snarky.

dudalb

4th March 2009, 10:17 AM

Khalkin Gol is also known as Nomonhon. In fact ,the standard detailed English Language book on the topic by Alvin Coox is called that.
But nearly 600 pages it is not for the casual reader.
BTW, I and a couple of people are now playtesting some scenarios on the tactical level about Nomonhon/Khalkin Gol for the Matrix Games version of "Rising Sun", part of their revision of the John Tiller/Talonsoft Campaign system.

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 11:26 AM

Man, aplogies for that last post of mine. I was trying to make a big point and getting pretty tired already. Shoulda left it.

This whole presumption is based on post-facto deliberations by people who should've known better and who ignored the facts of what was going on in Asia before the US involvement. For FDR or for anyone to have laid out this grand plan - as much as a decade in advance, presumes facts that are just not in play.

Which presumption? The whole provoke Japan notion may well have been floating around for a while before the final crystalization, but it doesn't yield much evidence until the time it becam more conscious (if it did) - probably in late 1940, definitely my mid-1941, just getting more dedicated as time went by. It was a year span also marked by worsening situation vis a vis Axis power.

As for your Mongolian aspect, I am aware that there was a moment of tension there between USSR and Japan's army, tho I'm less familiar with the details. How does this relate?

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 11:52 AM

Sorry, but it makes no sense from a logical standpoint. The history of the United States up to that time proved that no huge body count was needed for a declaration of war.

True, major death was not always needed. Would it be for this scale of mobilization? Can you name the last time the US mobilized like it did for WWII? Odd then how the catastrophe triggering it just happened to be of a relevant scale. Are you aware the scale of outrage affects its potency?

The U.S. entered World War I over something as dumb the Zimmerman Note.

You forgot the Lusitania. That was far enough from home, just ambiguous enough, perhaps, that it was far from effective. But it did introduce the notion that German people were ready to kill us if we were close enough. The fact that they were also meddling with the Americas was the last straw, but it's hard to say if that alone would have done it. There was political maneuvering too by Wilson et al. I think there was a relative shortage of popular conviction, compared to WWII. We only had to be engaged briefly towards the end.

What would have made logical sense to fabricate a similiar telegram involving Japan. It makes no sense whatsoever to allow many of your warships to be intentional destroyed at the start of a war.

That they intended to attack Panama or something? An enemy violating the Monroe Doctrine always pushes buttons. That would be a good move. Good enough? I don't know. Lots of people would be working on exposing a hoax. That's risky. I can't sit here and quantify US opinion, and draw up a precise mathematical formula. Again, you're framing the loss of ships from simple +/- military perspective. + is good - is bad.

Politically tho, this way we know it was a real design of theirs, because it happened. We know they started it because we were at home port, at rest. Can't get any clearer. We lost a substantial loss. How do Americans cope with that? Demand payment in full usually, plus some, don't they?

"Remember the Alamo!"
"Remember the Maine!"
"Remember the Zimmerman Telegram?"
"Remember Pearl Harbor!"

What do all these but one have in common?

twinstead

4th March 2009, 12:01 PM

Hindsight Historians ROCK!

SpaceMonkeyZero

4th March 2009, 12:09 PM

As for foreknowledge of the PH attacks goes... What would have been better, *IF* there was foreknowledge of when and where the attack was going to be made, would be to warn PH at 7:25 a.m of an impending attack and greet the Japanese with 14" guns a blazing and fighters scrambled. Think of the propaganda victory: "Japanese attempt a sneak attack on a sleepy Sunday morning, and they're repelled! Now, onwards to Midway!" Meanwhile minimizing US casualties and maximizing Japanese casualties, possibly even making the fight easier in the Pacific, especially with the Battleships intact. Maybe even recall the carrier group that was lucky enough to not be there, to turn towards the attacking fleet and attack the lightly defended Japanese carriers.

That would be the best way *IF* the attack was known ahead of time to get the most out of the propaganda.

Of course, just like 9/11, it's possible for a great nation to be caught with it's collective pants down.

Skwinty

4th March 2009, 12:38 PM

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 12:41 PM

Hindsight Historians ROCK!

Sorry, my time machine is broken.

As for foreknowledge of the PH attacks goes... What would have been better, *IF* there was foreknowledge of when and where the attack was going to be made, would be to warn PH at 7:25 a.m of an impending attack and greet the Japanese with 14" guns a blazing and fighters scrambled.

Military thinking again. I do realize this is a valid approach - I would think it was likely considered and advocated among the few who had to be involved in any conspiracy. I think my link earlier got buried, but here is where I explain how a - can become a +.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/battle-of-pearl-harbor-alternate.html
An excerpt:
The first and foremost consideration is establishing the clarity of the aggressor/victim situation; the public would not tolerate our entry as an aggressor, but might be forced to concede to a ‘defensive’ war if the other side fired the first shot. Consider this line from the vague and misleading warning to Army commanders in the Pacific, sent Nov 27: “If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.” This is not quite the order to ‘let yourself get shot’ that some present it as, but it does illustrate, at the least, that Washington explicitly desired a well-defined they-started-it beginning (to the extent they wanted a beginning at all, of course).

As it wound up, hostilities could not be avoided, and the Japanese fired hundreds of first shots. Our side managed but a few in return, quite obviously in defense, and the administration got their desired clarity in spades.

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 01:03 PM

I remember reading a book some years ago, don't remember what it was called or who the author was. The book made reference to Ian Fleming who was with British Naval Intelligence.

The story goes somewhat like this.

The British had installed the communications systems in Burma and surrounding areas (I think, my memory of this is quite bad). The British were eavesdropping on the Japanese for some time and were the first to break the Japanese naval codes. America's involvement in the war was limited to lend lease and were reluctant to get more involved in the war.

The British, having broken the Japanese Naval Codes, knew that the Japanese fleet were on the way to attack Pearl Harbour.

They did not pass this information on to America as they knew that once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, America would enter the war boots and all.

They felt that 7000 lives was a small price to pay.

Just another CT, methinks.

7,000 lives? This might be interesting, if not bunk. I'll look into it, it may be a book I'm planning to buy next round. There is a thread where we talk about the British-naval code angle (still near the top - Pearl Harbor and JN-25B) if you want to check that out. I'm considering it as a possibility for the moment.

Wow, good thread so far, as good as I can hope for. I can see I'm not getting far convincing anyone of this case on its own merits. Roadblocks all over. How about we take a look at the coincidence theory then? See what's so attractive on the other side?

The bomb plot messagaes. What does everyone think about this intelligence not being passed to Pearl? It was received in Washington, was not seen in Hawaii. As to why, here are some views from Washington:
One Army officer testified that these were just another series of messages among thousands, but did confess it was the only such conversation among those so specific “in the sense of dividing any particular waters.”
Theodore Wilkinson, a brief interim director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, did recall what seems to be the bomb plot “information system.” Wilkinson told the Joint Congressional Committee he felt this material didn’t warrant being sent to Pearl Harbor as it showed nothing more that “the nicety of detail of intelligence” they were gathering – about how to attack Pearl Harbor, as it turns out.
Chief of Naval Operations Stark, and his self-appointed intel distributor Turner both professed to not recalling the messages at all, and dismissing the significance if they had seen or heard of them as showing the Japanese "attention to detail".

The coincidence theorist view is, what? that everyone just failed to realize that, in a period later said to be only marked by clues pointing elsewhere than Pearl Harbor, that Pearl Harbor being sectioned into a grid, with ships at rest locaions noted and regularly updated, sent back to Japan, was them just being randomly detailed and not a clue. No one in Washington had it occur to them what this might indicate, or mentioned by someone else in the two months-plus the info was being transmitted, entirly invisible to the on-site defenders.

Alright, you know, that is comforting. People are just so dumb sometimes, especially in mass, bureaucratic and such, just like 9/11. That's okay, we try, we learn, we fail again, but that's okay. People weren't sacrificed, that's all that matters, mother fate/ God/whatever was just helping us out, like always. What else can you expect? :D

MG1962

4th March 2009, 02:09 PM

They did not pass this information on to America as they knew that once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, America would enter the war boots and all.

They felt that 7000 lives was a small price to pay.

Just another CT, methinks.

Well mayb not. Churchill did have a habit of forgetting to tell allies important stuff occasionallly

dudalb

4th March 2009, 02:37 PM

Alright, you know, that is comforting. People are just so dumb sometimes, especially in mass, bureaucratic and such, just like 9/11. That's okay, we try, we learn, we fail again, but that's okay. People weren't sacrificed, that's all that matters, mother fate/ God/whatever was just helping us out, like always. What else can you expect?

You really do not want to get involved with 9/11 Truthers. You don't ,really.

Alt+F4

4th March 2009, 02:39 PM

Hindsight Historians ROCK!

Is there any other type of historian? :)

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 03:21 PM

You really do not want to get involved with 9/11 Truthers. You don't ,really.

No, not where I was going. Thx fr advc.

Is there any other type of historian? :)

Exactly. Hindsight is the only way to see the past - the question is the filters you have (and the filters the raw data goes through before getting to you). A good historian will try to correct for his biases to glimpse the truth he might have a hard time with. I'm not, in that sense, trying to be a good historian here, but playing hard to my own bias to pierce through the prevailing bias for a more balanced overall understanding.

twinstead

4th March 2009, 04:22 PM

Is there any other type of historian? :)

Well, sometimes pseudo-historians DO tend to second guess decisions made in the past based on knowing how things ultimately turned out. Just sayin' ;)

Caustic Logic

4th March 2009, 04:43 PM

Well, sometimes pseudo-historians DO tend to second guess decisions made in the past based on knowing how things ultimately turned out. Just sayin' ;)

Yeah, like everyone in this thread so far. Oh wait, no I'm second-guessing, everyone else just affirming the "first guess" publicly offered. Whatever, we're all guessing and interpolating our values and beliefs to filter historical data.

Alt+F4

4th March 2009, 05:01 PM

Well, sometimes pseudo-historians DO tend to second guess decisions made in the past based on knowing how things ultimately turned out. Just sayin' ;)

I agree....to a certain degree. I think it's difficult for any student of history to totally put out of their mind what they know happened after the events in question.

But overall, you are correct about "Monday morning quarterbacking" in regard to history. So, what did FDR know as absolute fact? He knew that the worst foreign war the United States had ever been involved in was World War I and that Wilson got Congress' declaration of war after something as flimsy as the Zimmerman Note.

American deaths on the Lusitania were about 130, on the U.S.S. Maine, about 350 (sorry if this is wrong, off the top of my head...sleepy). There was no reason for FDR to believe that a massive attack such as what happened at Pearl Harbor was necessary for a declaration of war against Japan.

Corsair 115

4th March 2009, 05:11 PM

In regards to the OP, "Why do you not believe/discuss the Pearl Harbor CTs?" I would simply answer, in the spirit of Occam's Razor, the simplest explanation for the event is that the United States got surprised.

It's hardly the first time in military history a nation got surprised by an attack, and not the last. So no other complicated explanation involving foreknowledge, supressing of such information, cover-ups, sacrificing military assests to start a war, is needed. Nothing of that sort is necessary to explain the events of that day.

The U.S. got surprised, plain and simple.

Biscuit

4th March 2009, 07:09 PM

What i get from this thread is that you don't like the current accepted view of history that pearl harbor was a sneak attack and instead with nothing but conjecture and your own bias want to convince everyone else of a different truth.

Your truth as I gather is such: FDR and the top military and political minds in the U.S. tried everything it could to provoke japan and when all else failed they choose to lose Twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The battleships USS Arizona (BB-39), USS California (BB-44), USS Maryland (BB-46), USS Nevada (BB-36), USS Oklahoma (BB-37), USS Pennsylvania (BB-38), USS Tennessee (BB-43) and USS West Virginia (BB-48); cruisers USS Helena (CL-50), USS Honolulu (CL-48) and USS Raleigh (CL-7); the destroyers USS Cassin (DD-372), USS Downes (DD-375), USS Helm (DD-388) and USS Shaw (DD-373); seaplane tender USS Curtiss (AV-4); target ship (ex-battleship) USS Utah (AG-16); repair ship USS Vestal (AR-4); minelayer USS Oglala (CM-4); tug USS Sotoyomo (YT-9); and Floating Drydock Number 2. Aircraft losses were 188 destroyed and 159 damaged, the majority were hit before they had a chance to take off. American dead numbered 2,403. That figure included 68 civilians, most of them killed by improperly fused anti-aircraft shells landing in Honolulu. There were 1,178 military and civilian wounded.

Further more no one suggested setting up pearl harbor as a trap to destroy the Japanese or if they did this was thrown out because otherwise it blows your conjecture out of the water.

Do you have anything other than your bias against the U.S. government to back this up? Please don't claim you aren't biased either as I saw one of your first links was an article connecting PH with 9/11.

Horatius

4th March 2009, 07:15 PM

Yeah, like everyone in this thread so far. Oh wait, no I'm second-guessing, everyone else just affirming the "first guess" publicly offered. Whatever, we're all guessing and interpolating our values and beliefs to filter historical data.

Yes, but it's the "first guess" that people actually had to act on, at that time. No one disputes that their first guess was horribly wrong. But that's what they had to work with, and they made decisions based on what they knew then, not on what we know now.

Brainster

4th March 2009, 09:13 PM

American deaths on the Lusitania were about 130, on the U.S.S. Maine, about 350 (sorry if this is wrong, off the top of my head...sleepy). There was no reason for FDR to believe that a massive attack such as what happened at Pearl Harbor was necessary for a declaration of war against Japan.

And I would add, zero US deaths on the USS Maddox led to Vietnam.

TjW

4th March 2009, 09:19 PM

I agree....to a certain degree. I think it's difficult for any student of history to totally put out of their mind what they know happened after the events in question.

But overall, you are correct about "Monday morning quarterbacking" in regard to history. So, what did FDR know as absolute fact? He knew that the worst foreign war the United States had ever been involved in was World War I and that Wilson got Congress' declaration of war after something as flimsy as the Zimmerman Note.

American deaths on the Lusitania were about 130, on the U.S.S. Maine, about 350 (sorry if this is wrong, off the top of my head...sleepy). There was no reason for FDR to believe that a massive attack such as what happened at Pearl Harbor was necessary for a declaration of war against Japan.

And of course, as I pointed out in his other thread, the Reuben James had been sunk in October of 1941, and Americans were angry about that.
The US had committed to lending the UK millions in war materiel in March, so US protection of convoys was going to continue.
The Germans could not afford to allow that shipping unimpeded, so more US naval and merchant marine losses were virtually a certainty.
I don't think the US public would have put up with that indefinitely.
Caustic Logic apparently believes they would.

If Caustic Logic wanted to speculate that FDR expected the US would soon be in a declared war, I'd probably agree with him.
When he speculates that a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy and a sharp political operator would sacrifice the amount of firepower that was based at Pearl Harbor, I have to disagree. It's not enough to get the nation into a popular war. You also have to win it.

MG1962

4th March 2009, 10:01 PM

Yeah, like everyone in this thread so far. Oh wait, no I'm second-guessing, everyone else just affirming the "first guess" publicly offered. Whatever, we're all guessing and interpolating our values and beliefs to filter historical data.

Could you point out what first second or third guesses I have made. I have demonstrated prevaling Japanese proceedural thinking of the time. I have done the same with the United States. I have offered no guess other than to suggest both sides followed tried and true military doctrines

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 12:15 AM

In regards to the OP, "Why do you not believe/discuss the Pearl Harbor CTs?" I would simply answer, in the spirit of Occam's Razor, the simplest explanation for the event is that the United States got surprised.

Thanks for a reminder of the OP - I'm forgetting my own admonition to not just disagree and argue, and I'm arguing with everyone who answers the original question!

Re: Occam's Razor - IIRC, this states the simplest rational explanation that can explain all the facts is the most likely to be true. It does NOT mean the simplest answer to say, the least depressing to consider, is the most likely to be true.

The razor applies here of course - the Q is this: is it more simple to propose a long string of errors, oversights, Japanese sneakiness, dereliction and negligence, tunnel vision, sabotage psychosis, bad luck, bad weather, and pure chance as responsible for the catalog of actions that finally brought about 12/7? Or to see a conscious plan leading to an end that, all can agree, worked very well to FDR's (and the world's) favor.

Yes, but it's the "first guess" that people actually had to act on, at that time. No one disputes that their first guess was horribly wrong. But that's what they had to work with, and they made decisions based on what they knew then, not on what we know now.

Actually the 'first guess' as I meant it here is still about the same. Kimmel and Short were finally exonerated (and that just leaves the question; if they didn't screw up then who did?) but that we were just caught by surprise still holds, of course, and is still "what we know now," for the most part. Which part was ever considered "horribly wrong?"

Thanks for the comment, Horatius. I respect you a lot. You other guys, too, mostly!

And I would add, zero US deaths on the USS Maddox led to Vietnam.

Too true! And look at how well that war went! Can you imagine if FDR had tried to base WWfrigginII on some fake out boat incident deep inside Japan's sphere of influence? You think hippies on campus caused a problem, right wingers have guns and such... I know it sounds a stretch to say the event shapes the war, but on some level it does, the question is how much. How much of a role did "Remember Pearl Harbor" play in morale for the war? It was significant, right?

And does anyone disagree that WWII would require a different level of inspiration than WWI? As FDR and the war cabinet had to know, the level of mobilization, and the duration, and geographic scope would all have to be longer and wider. Also, it was happening AFTER the jading experience of WWI. War is a Racket, America First, Merchants of Death, Neutrality Acts, anyone recall? This stuff melted away after Pearl Harbor, more or less, didn't it? Would that happen after some stupid telegram or a sunk boat everyone knows was loaded with DuPont explosives for England and chartered by the Rothschilds...

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 12:36 AM

I can't believe I'm keeping up with all this. I asked for it, my brain hasn't snapped (more than normal) yet. Keep it coming!

What i get from this thread is that you don't like the current accepted view of history that pearl harbor was a sneak attack and instead with nothing but conjecture and your own bias want to convince everyone else of a different truth.

What I get from that is you like things how they are and are too annoyed with any effort to challenge it. I have nothing but bias and conjecture, whereas you have the truth, somehow? And a list of ships and numbers on the casualties? Oops, I didn't realize how big this was, maybe I'm wrong then.

I know it's big, and people feel deeply, and I don't want to Trutherish and JAQ-off-ish. I'm actually kind of nervous about this. I also know I'm not convincing anyone per se. I's a conversation.

Now, if looking at this upsets you, you don't have to engage it. Seriously. You Stundie me for lacking "proof" bolding mine. I asked for the conclusive proof of your own theory of how 12/7 happened, and all you offered was a link to a page with some articles. Not doing it. Now I have been offering, having critiqued, some e-v-i-d-e-n-c-e. You seem to have missed it all if you feel I have "nothing but conjecture and your own bias." You're doing fine ignoring anyway, maybe you should just keep playing what you know.

Biscuit

5th March 2009, 01:10 AM

I can't believe I'm keeping up with all this. I asked for it, my brain hasn't snapped (more than normal) yet. Keep it coming!

What I get from that is you like things how they are and are too annoyed with any effort to challenge it. I have nothing but bias and conjecture, whereas you have the truth, somehow? And a list of ships and numbers on the casualties? Oops, I didn't realize how big this was, maybe I'm wrong then.

I know it's big, and people feel deeply, and I don't want to Trutherish and JAQ-off-ish. I'm actually kind of nervous about this. I also know I'm not convincing anyone per se. I's a conversation.

Now, if looking at this upsets you, you don't have to engage it. Seriously. You Stundie me for lacking "proof" bolding mine. I asked for the conclusive proof of your own theory of how 12/7 happened, and all you offered was a link to a page with some articles. Not doing it. Now I have been offering, having critiqued, some e-v-i-d-e-n-c-e. You seem to have missed it all if you feel I have "nothing but conjecture and your own bias." You're doing fine ignoring anyway, maybe you should just keep playing what you know.

First of all you bolded "proof" in your own post. I noted that in my nomination.

It has nothing to do with my level of patience with you, it has everything to do with your disregard for historical fact and your dislike of the government of the U.S. You propose that the U.S. acted in the most reckless and stupid fashion in order to lose thousands of lives and millions in ships and planes in one attack and spend four years engaged in brutal war on two fronts in order entertain your own bias.

You obviously never read the full NSA account of pearl harbor that I linked to.

If they were capable of luring the japanese to attack pearl harbor why would they not then attack their fleet when its so close to our own shores? For crying out loud our carriers were at sea at the time! Add a few subs and destroyers and Japan would have been decimated, the people would have been up in arms, death to the axis powers. You get to declare war and only have one major front to fight, Europe.

But no instead they deliberately lost millions of dollars worth of ships, risk crippling their fleet, not to mention the lives lost, all on a gamble that they would win in an all out war in the pacific. Right... your understanding of occams razor needs some review.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 01:52 AM

It's not enough to get the nation into a popular war. You also have to win it.

Okay, here's an exercise: Find where you can see stats on US Naval ship production, charted on a timeline. Compare the number of active ships before Dec 1941 to after. Somehow the major stupid blow FDR would never risk didn't have much relevant effect after all, did it? In fact, that dip might have added more than its weight to the rise in production, due to a 'catching up' mentality. You have to win it? We won it! If there was such a risk taken, it paid off, your own assessment aside. Who could have predicted that, though? Military planners, running projections!

Could you point out what first second or third guesses I have made. I have demonstrated prevaling Japanese proceedural thinking of the time. I have done the same with the United States. I have offered no guess other than to suggest both sides followed tried and true military doctrines

Apologies for that 'guess' thing. What you've offered is helpful towards understanding. I'm just saying, there's been a lot of speculation all around here. They would do this, they were thinking that, surely they would, etc. Military concepts are more solid, written about, reference-able, and that's cool. I guess what I'd like to challenge you on is whether there's ever a time to NOT follow those rules, like to meet the demands of another, higher strategic level. I think there is a space for that, and if there isn't there should be and history is full of dummies.

Dave Rogers

5th March 2009, 01:53 AM

As for your Mongolian aspect, I am aware that there was a moment of tension there between USSR and Japan's army, tho I'm less familiar with the details. How does this relate?

I would suggest you follow Foolmewunz's advice; look it up yourself, become familiar with the details, and figure out for yourself how it relates. Until you've understood it for yourself, those who do aren't likely to take your opinions as seriously.

Dave

stilicho

5th March 2009, 02:05 AM

I can't believe I'm keeping up with all this. I asked for it, my brain hasn't snapped (more than normal) yet. Keep it coming!

I am a little surprised that nobody mentioned yet that the seizure of Wake Island and Guam were a part of the overall operation. Grab your atlas and perhaps a compass and you might understand why those actions were as important as the air raid on Pearl.

Was the loss of those bases also attributable to this fantastic plan to provoke the Japanese?

---

On the other hand, I find your approach to the issue of provocation to be hiding a deep suspicion of something more sinister. Why not just say what you think that was? I have not read a single paragraph of history where any US military officer in 1941 would not have prepared Pearl Harbor differently knowing now what they knew then.

There is also the faint suggestion that only an air raid on Pearl Harbor could have 'accomplished' US entry into WWII on the side of the Allies. Even though American policymakers are on record as wanting the Japanese to shoot first, that was accomplished with the seizure of Guam and Wake, not to mention the actions of the IJN for the remainder of December 1941. The loss of American lives and materiel at Pearl Harbor was not the only instance of Japan shooting first.

Pearl Harbor could strongly be argued thusly to be irrelevant to American entry into the war.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 02:10 AM

First of all you bolded "proof" in your own post. I noted that in my nomination.
Yeah, I see you caught that. Too bad you totally missed the reason. I'm saying this isn't a 'proof' game - whaddya expect, a letter from FDR explaining the whole plot? Even then people would cry coincidence... But rather than even addressing the evidence, first thing you say is "Haha! No proof! Haha!" It's rather annoying.

It has nothing to do with my level of patience with you, it has everything to do with your disregard for historical fact and your dislike of the government of the U.S.

Fact, baaad! USA baaad!

You propose that the U.S. acted in the most reckless and stupid fashion in order to lose thousands of lives and millions in ships and planes in one attack and spend four years engaged in brutal war on two fronts in order entertain your own bias.

Whoah, I never claimed they did all that just to "entertain my own bias"!

You obviously never read the full NSA account of pearl harbor that I linked to.

No, I didn't. That's what, 14 different articles? Is there any particular spot where this proof resides therein, or is it just magically imbued in every word? I had already read two of those in full before you came along, and found useful info in them, none of which cannot fit in with my own theory. I absorb all, so far. Be the first, find a stumper!

I'm tired of re-addressing the same 'lose ships baaad not shoot enemy baaaad' line. My answers to that are above, FWIW, if they're showing up on other peoples' screens. I'm no more of a military strategist than the rest of you all, and apparently much less. Biscuit, if only you'd been advising FDR, we coulda won the war in a month!

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 02:30 AM

I would suggest you follow Foolmewunz's advice; look it up yourself, become familiar with the details, and figure out for yourself how it relates. Until you've understood it for yourself, those who do aren't likely to take your opinions as seriously.

Dave
Alright, learning is good anyway. Will I know the connection when I see it, or will it take a month of going back over it? Because I want to be taken seriously.

I am a little surprised that nobody mentioned yet that the seizure of Wake Island and Guam were a part of the overall operation. Grab your atlas and perhaps a compass and you might understand why those actions were as important as the air raid on Pearl.

Was the loss of those bases also attributable to this fantastic plan to provoke the Japanese?

No one told them what to attack, that was Japanese strategy. The compass told me nothing. Remeber Midway was not as catchy somehow. Pearl Harbor was the big thing policially, at home, right? Then my point unaffected.

On the other hand, I find your approach to the issue of provocation to be hiding a deep suspicion of something more sinister. Why not just say what you think that was?
??? More sinister? What do you think I might think it is?

I have not read a single paragraph of history where any US military officer in 1941 would not have prepared Pearl Harbor differently knowing now what they knew then.

Knowing what they knew later of the purpose behind the Bomb Plot messages, for instance, Navy officers would still withhold it from Pearl?

There is also the faint suggestion that only an air raid on Pearl Harbor could have 'accomplished' US entry into WWII on the side of the Allies. Even though American policymakers are on record as wanting the Japanese to shoot first, that was accomplished with the seizure of Guam and Wake, not to mention the actions of the IJN for the remainder of December 1941. The loss of American lives and materiel at Pearl Harbor was not the only instance of Japan shooting first.

No, but it's the one that just rises to the top, doesn't it?

Pearl Harbor could strongly be argued thusly to be irrelevant to American entry into the war.

Now THAT may be Stundie material.

Foolmewunz

5th March 2009, 02:40 AM

CL,
You do realize that the bombing of Clark AFB would've been a sufficient act of war to involve the USA, don't you. Losing 20 to 30 (I can't remember the number) of their B17s is fairly costly and would've sufficiently incensed the public of and by itself. But, setting yourself up to allow half the damned fleet to be sunk? It's just an absurd proposition. The idea wouldn't, as someone mentioned, be to start a war and possibly lose it. Once lured into the area around Pearl, the American carriers could've wiped them out if they'd known they were coming, and they would've surely done so.

And that's what's meant by Occam's in this instance. Your version sems to be that you want the simplest solution as in "one answer" and there isn't one single answer.

All sorts of mis-steps, freaks of nature, coincidences, tactical errors, misinterpretations, etc... happen every day. We are honing in on a single event, but you're trying to encompass everything from several years earlier into a simplistic solution and rather than digest it as history, coming to the conclusion that it was a conspiracy.

Look at Midway for a counter-example. Did the Japanese high command set their own navy up to be decimated? Sure looks like it to me. I mean how could a less-experienced and out-gunned Admiral have caught the Japanese carriers refueling and rearming their planes. I'm sure Yamamoto set it up. He was quoted as saying that his own victory at Pearl Harbor probably meant the end of Japan, after all. He lost five times the ships, a hundred more planes, three of his four carriers, and ten-fold the personnel as the USN did. If you're Japanese, surely you have to see this as some sort of dastardly plot.

And what about the US Navy being able to Cross the T, not just once but twice in the Pacific, at Cape Esperance and again at Leyte Gulf? (Mind you, at Leyte Gulf the Japanese commander pretty much knew he was heading for trouble...)

Oh, and as to the battle on the Mongolian border - the point I was making is that since Japan had no expansion designs on Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands until the end of '39, any American subterfuge could've only been brought into play when Japan started pointing outwards instead of inwards towards the land mass of Asia. Yet most supporters of the PH conspiracy believe this was in the planning several years earlier. Why would they have set up a sacrificial lamb at PH when the Japanese were engaging their forces on the Asian mainland. The Navy wasn't going to conquer the Pacific by itself - land forces were required. The Japanese attacked PH to give their forces free reign in the Asian theatre, not to try to conquer Hawaii. They set out to remove American naval power from the equation and nearly succeeded.

Coincidences abound. What of the British battleships steaming towards Malaya and turning about one hour before they would've encountered (and likely crippled or destroyed) the Japanese invasion forces? (On Dec 7 or 8, I believe.)

Foolmewunz

5th March 2009, 03:06 AM

<snip>

Now THAT may be Stundie material.

Only if you want to totally embarass yourself. You're a lone voice arguing that "it had to be Pearl Harbor". Wake, Guam, the Philippines - they attacked US forces in all three and within 24 hours. Ergo, Pearl was just busiest and the noisiest, and as a result is the best known.

If AQ had only attacked the Pentagon on 911, do you think the American public would've been wishy-washy in their support of the "War on Terror"? The twin towers get most of the attention (well, other than those wacky and wonderful kids over at CIT and PFT), but I think that the Pentagon and Shanksville would've done quite adequately in terms of "the new Pearl Harbor" as conspiradroids so like to refer to it.

Dave Rogers

5th March 2009, 03:08 AM

Alright, learning is good anyway. Will I know the connection when I see it, or will it take a month of going back over it? Because I want to be taken seriously.

The Wikipedia article is a good enough starting point, and the second paragraph of the "Aftermath" section outlines the relevant issues.

Dave

Foolmewunz

5th March 2009, 03:25 AM

All - I knew I had a great write-up of the Russia-Japan battle, somewhere, and I'm kind of pleased to say that I found it this afternoon. It's in a work by a poster whom I admired, but who is no longer around (he was getting real busy in his RW job), KiwiWriter... An American, by the way, who served in the Navy and spent time in NZ.

He started a WWII history blog/site a few years ago, and it's some interesting reading - I hope he finds time to complete it, as I like the way he writes, particularly when he goes into long narratives. Reminds me a bit of Michener's approach to history.

If you want some interesting reading, I highly recommend it.... The sections that exist are pretty good. The best is probably the opening chapter, where you'll find the events of 1939.

http://usswashington.com/worldwar2plus55/index.htm

The title is misleading, because he started it a few years back.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 03:41 AM

CL,
You do realize that the bombing of Clark AFB would've been a sufficient act of war to involve the USA, don't you.
Possibly. Yeah, probably. But Pearl did it better. Would you disagree? I'm not sure why, if it was just Hawaii being closer and more American, if it was the bad taste of the Pihilippines wars and sense it was ill-gotten anyway, or if it was the US Fleet, and the large number of dead, and ships damaged. Something made it the headline and FDR's rallying point.

sigh

Okay, now I'm starting to wish I had at least some back-up.

Losing 20 to 30 (I can't remember the number) of their B17s is fairly costly and would've sufficiently incensed the public of and by itself. But, setting yourself up to allow half the damned fleet to be sunk? It's just an absurd proposition.

Yes, it would seem so, under normal circumstances. Perhaps it wound up being more than they needed, but it's what was there. Perhaps they were trying to avoid a loss 'just big enough,' in case people were suspicious of this?

The idea wouldn't, as someone mentioned, be to start a war and possibly lose it. Once lured into the area around Pearl, the American carriers could've wiped them out if they'd known they were coming, and they would've surely done so.

And as I responded above - so they wouldn't risk the whole fleet, cause then you maybe can't win the war? They would have looked at this, and predicted something like what happened - we could mobilize wartime production and make up the losses many fold. If the risk was taken, it paid off. So other than the risk it wouldn't go like projected (no hindsight to show it would), there's no reason to expect the plotters to abandon ship over this concern.

And that's what's meant by Occam's in this instance. Your version sems to be that you want the simplest solution as in "one answer" and there isn't one single answer.

Of course, there are a million forces acting in all directions. It's not a matter of getting it down to one answer, but reducing the number. All the necessary elements have to be explained, and are, with their own reason.
The decision to move the Fleet to Pearl
The decision to maintain a veneer of deterrent with that fleet while revealing your bluff
using that base as a staging ground for a buildup in a closer yet area (Philippines), including plans for long-range bombing of Japan proper
The decisions leading to inadequate air patrol capabilities
The decisions to deny crucial intelligence to Hawaii
[This is the big one, comprising multiple failures over a span of time - the whole chain of bomb plot messages, all but tiny bits of the Purple material, by fate and random slowness the 1:00 deadline warning, several other clues, and this is all presuming the Naval codes were unreadable]
The decision to have carriers (air cover) sent away just as Japan's 6 moved in (again, by fate so far as we can know)
The decision to have Hawaii and everyone spend their precious attention on spotting the winds execute message, which never was transmitted, and a five-minute look will show, had no intelligence value.
There's others, but you get the idea.

Each of these must be explained. Mass retardation in clever jargon is the usual answer. Many can and do have plausible explanations in consensual reality. Others require ... I don't know, isn't that a lot of coincidence?

Look at Midway for a counter-example. Did the Japanese high command set their own navy up to be decimated? Sure looks like it to me. I mean how could a less-experienced and out-gunned Admiral have caught the Japanese carriers refueling and rearming their planes. I'm sure Yamamoto set it up. He was quoted as saying that his own victory at Pearl Harbor probably meant the end of Japan, after all. He lost five times the ships, a hundred more planes, three of his four carriers, and ten-fold the personnel as the USN did. If you're Japanese, surely you have to see this as some sort of dastardly plot.

He was all American-ish. Hitch-hiked all over... it makes a certain sense. Fact is, we had their codes and they didn't have ours. Wasn't that the main thing?

Oh, and as to the battle on the Mongolian border - the point I was making is that since Japan had no expansion designs on Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands until the end of '39, any American subterfuge could've only been brought into play when Japan started pointing outwards instead of inwards towards the land mass of Asia.

Word, I probably wasn't going to look that up. I'd agree they prob had enough of Asia's landmass seized, and looked for that islandy stuff. Britain or USSR both had weak east flanks, Stalin prob made a deal... I will read up. So intentions in the Pacific, where US has intentions, obviously is where sparks fly, and the thinking in Washington does seem to have changed towards a Pacific step-up in 39 and def 40. Okay...

Yet most supporters of the PH conspiracy believe this was in the planning several years earlier.

I dunno, the idea might have been bounced around in oscure memos and chit-chat for 20 years, but the fleet was moved in May 1940, that's as early as I have a reason to pin it, or a point it was likely being considered.

The Japanese attacked PH to give their forces free reign in the Asian theatre, not to try to conquer Hawaii. They set out to remove American naval power from the equation and nearly succeeded.

Exactly, everyone knows they attack enemy Navies at the outset of hostilities. Hostilities were imminent, and even the Hawaiian commanders were warned to look out for attacks in Kra, Philippines, and poss. Borneo. Why didn't they? If only we all had known where our fleet was going to be when the Japs climbed Mount Niitaka at sunrise on December 7. But alas, there were also clues pointing elsewhere, so Ocam's razor...

Sorry.

I need to go do something else now.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 03:55 AM

Only if you want to totally embarass yourself. You're a lone voice arguing that "it had to be Pearl Harbor". Wake, Guam, the Philippines - they attacked US forces in all three and within 24 hours. Ergo, Pearl was just busiest and the noisiest, and as a result is the best known.

Yesterday, Dec 7, a date which... the Japanese struck several targets of US interest, including Hawaii, where much business and noisiness was bothered.

Sorry, I just can't do anything serious today, after now.

If AQ had only attacked the Pentagon on 911, do you think the American public would've been wishy-washy in their support of the "War on Terror"?
Interesting. I think the psych. impact would be shallower. Yeah, by a bit. Homeland, many dead, horrifying method, retaliation, sure... But those who get suspicious would still wonder, as they did, and all the stuff we've been over would be brought up ... I think minus the huge impact of the NY horror Bush's BS would've worn though earlier, and it might have lessened his ability to get the Iraq war off. A tiny bit?

The twin towers get most of the attention (well, other than those wacky and wonderful kids over at CIT and PFT), but I think that the Pentagon and Shanksville would've done quite adequately in terms of "the new Pearl Harbor" as conspiradroids so like to refer to it.

And to some extent they should! IMO! But if they realize everything they suspected is contra-indicated by reality itself, they should, like, stop and reflect.

Serious, but different. Perfect timing, peace out for now.

ETA: And voila, I'm also a "muse" at this time. Is their a hazing?

MRC_Hans

5th March 2009, 04:21 AM

Haha! I need the right shout-out - the Big guns know when someone's talkin' to them!

The problem being: Are you someone?

Good, thanks. So far we're on the reasoning behind putting the fleet in Hawaii and the effect this had on making it a more likely target of japanese hostilities. That's a small part of the whole case, and this part is fairly circumstantial, largely conjecture.

Ehr, what is the purpose of a fleet if it is not likely to be a target of enemy action? Kidding aside, the purpose of the US Pacific fleet is and was to protect US interests in the Pacific. Now, I notice that there turns out ot be a lot of things within this topic of which you admit to know little, but surely you are aware that the Pacific Ocean is a rather large place? From where do you best protect your interests in such a place? From the edge (as on the US West Coast)? Or closer to the centre (as on Hawai)?

In short, what we [you and I] seem to agree on is that "some decisions" were "not optimal" or "even stupid." All I'd like to add is that the relative stupidity or brilliance of a move is of necessity based on the intent of the move. What may seem stupid...

And?

Well, from a military PoV, the battle- it was brilliantly done and unnaturally successful. In the long term, of course...

Unnaturally? Surprise attacks with adequate forces are usually very successful. What is unnatural about that?

Yes, it was brilliantly done, although called off too early. Probably by a commander who knew that there was a long-term perspective.

Dit'n even scratch the carriers.

Which were out on excercise, out of harm's way. Sign of conspiracy? Then why sacrifice the battle-ships?

Yamamoto insisted, if they absolutely MUST do that, attacking the fleet at Pearl on the side was the best way to start it.

Well, he was not really in favor of it, but orders are orders, especially if you're Japanese.

I'm sure I should know what TDR is. I'm guessing FDR. :)

T for Teddy. OK, I goofed ... sue me.

Good point, and a point for more conjecture. Admittedly, that's one way of doing things, and it has its merits, like whooping the enemy early on, defending your own ships better, less casualties... but there are other levels that would be considered - I did a blog post about the different ways a provocation could be managed.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/battle-of-pearl-harbor-alternate.html
It's pretty cynical read, but I challenge anyone to deny the basic logic of it.
Certainly: The basic logic is non-existing.

FDR wanted to join the war against Germany. He may also have wanted to be at war with Japan, either as a tool to the former, or for its own reasons (there were plenty of those). But all he needed was to be at war with Japan.

FDR, obviously, wanted to WIN the war, against both Germany and Japan (unless you have some totally absurd CT).

So what would have been the inevitable result of a naval battle with the Japanese fleet within US territorial waters? A war declaration from Japan (more on this, below).

At that point, with both fleets blodied and a war declaration in the mailbox, he would have no need for a strong public motivation.

Again, I don't know as much about that as I thought, and it's a side-point. Apparently in '41 there was such a proposal being looked at, by Marshall and Stimson, et al. I don't know the details, but you can check the sources above and take it up with Gen. MacArthur.

All sorts of proposals come up during war, or preparations for war. Even desperate ones. The good MacArthur was not exactly know for being overly cautious.

About the war declaration. Are you aware that the Japanese war declaration was prepared and waiting for for the 'mission accomplished' signal from Nagumo?

So you claim that the US administration was aware of Nagumo's fleet's movements (operating on a wast ocean surface, under strict radio silence), but unaware that a war declaration was ready to be despatched? (Or unable to figure out that one would follow immidiately after the attack)

Hans

MRC_Hans

5th March 2009, 04:28 AM

You are welcome to your opinion, and after all thats all it is. Americans have long been enchanted by the victories their navy has produced. All the way back to 1813 and the battle of Lake Erie. The population has been enthralled with the cavalier like behaviour of is navy

I think you are right, however, the discussion about this fails to address the point that once the fleets had met, there would be no discussion: Japan and the US would have been at war, period.

Hans

Belz...

5th March 2009, 04:39 AM

Do you know this or make it up? Because obviously if that's what war planners calculated, they were wrong.

Yes, people are frequently wrong.

MRC_Hans

5th March 2009, 04:49 AM

What I get from that is you like things how they are and are too annoyed with any effort to challenge it.

No. We challenge it. And we find that it stands up to the challenge. Then we challenge you and find you don't.

I have nothing but bias and conjecture,

Ahh, don't belittle youself. You also have faulty logic.

And a list of ships and numbers on the casualties? Oops, I didn't realize how big this was, maybe I'm wrong then.

Yes, the size of it is actually part of the argument. Not even the most stupid commander, why, not even a politician, would willingly take such a beating at the begining of a war.

Now, if looking at this upsets you,

It doesn't.

you don't have to engage it.

Oh, I take pleasure in engaging nonsense. (Don't ask me why)

Hans

MG1962

5th March 2009, 05:35 AM

Apologies for that 'guess' thing. What you've offered is helpful towards understanding. I'm just saying, there's been a lot of speculation all around here. They would do this, they were thinking that, surely they would, etc. Military concepts are more solid, written about, reference-able, and that's cool. I guess what I'd like to challenge you on is whether there's ever a time to NOT follow those rules, like to meet the demands of another, higher strategic level. I think there is a space for that, and if there isn't there should be and history is full of dummies.

In this instance no there is no higher agenda. The US actions after the war prove this. They had no overall strategic demands for the Pacific than they did before the war. They did not increase their holdings or access to resources. About the only outward change would be the birth of a very strong alliance between the US and Australia.

Your question of ship construction is interesting but not valid. The Washington Treaty and subsequent London Treaty were designed to limit ship construction and cost by setting a very specific ratios between nations and the battleships they could produce. In a sense this hastened the developement of aircraft carriers, because a number of battleship hulls were converted to carrier designs.

What some nations did, particularly Japan was take older vessels and radically modify. and update them. A classic example was the Kongo

Before her rebuild

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Japanese_battleship_Kongo.jpg

After the rebuild

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kongo_after_reconstruction.jpg

MG1962

5th March 2009, 05:56 AM

Possibly. Yeah, probably. But Pearl did it better. Would you disagree? I'm not sure why, if it was just Hawaii being closer and more American, if it was the bad taste of the Pihilippines wars and sense it was ill-gotten anyway, or if it was the US Fleet, and the large number of dead, and ships damaged. Something made it the headline and FDR's rallying point.

The single biggest factor was the nature of the attack. Because of a mix up at the Japanese end, the war declaration was not transmitted till after the attack.

Whilel I believe Americans would still have been outraged, if the attack had come after such a declaration, I think much anger would have been turned towards FDR and the military for letting it happen

The sneak attack infuriated the American people. The fact the US demanded unconditional surrender terms is an expression of that furry. No quarter would be offered, no quarter asked for. The attack made the war very personal for many Americans. This was not two countries engaged in a power trip that got out of hand. Americans acted as if Tojo himself had walked up to their front door and punched them in the mouth.

To give you an insight into this. Alcatraz death row inmates volunteered for extra duty at the end of the prison day to help build rafts for the US Navy. So imagine if guys with no future can become this motivated, what the rest of the country would be like

BazBear

5th March 2009, 06:02 AM

It simply seems ludicrous to me that FDR would knowingly allow a surprise attack of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, with the goal being to get into a European war with the Nazis. Hitler declaring war on the USA shortly after the attack was not at all a certainty.

If not for the U.S. Navy's major victory at The Battle of Midway, which took the IJN's four best carriers and hundreds of it's best naval aviators out, I'm not sure FDR could or would have been able to divert the resources needed for the European theater, at least not for quite some time. He would have had no choice but to make a "Pacific first" policy the nations priority, both for strategic military and domestic political reasons.

stilicho

5th March 2009, 02:19 PM

No one told them what to attack, that was Japanese strategy. The compass told me nothing. Remeber Midway was not as catchy somehow. Pearl Harbor was the big thing policially, at home, right? Then my point unaffected.

Midway wasn't a part of the DEC 1941 Japanese military campaign. But Wake and Guam were. So was Tarawa in the British Gilberts.

My first question to you: Why is the overall campaign not as important to you as that one air raid? If the air raid had done no damage, in other words, would the loss of strategic dominance in the Pacific have meant nothing militarily or politically?

Support your answer with examples.

ETA: I should correct myself: Midway was shelled during the same campaign.

Corsair 115

5th March 2009, 02:57 PM

The razor applies here of course - the Q is this: is it more simple to propose a long string of errors, oversights, Japanese sneakiness, dereliction and negligence, tunnel vision, sabotage psychosis, bad luck, bad weather, and pure chance as responsible for the catalog of actions that finally brought about 12/7? Or to see a conscious plan leading to an end that, all can agree, worked very well to FDR's (and the world's) favor.

Seems to me achieving surprise answers things much more simply than some dastardly covert conspiracy plan.

It's worth recalling the Japanese themselves did not expect the attack to go in unopposed. They expected to have to fight their way in and fight their way out. Acheiving complete tactical surprise was not considered likely—but as it happened, fortune was on their side and they achieved it.

Luck can sometimes play a key role in a battle.

Your truth as I gather is such: FDR and the top military and political minds in the U.S. tried everything it could to provoke japan and when all else failed they choose to lose Twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The battleships USS Arizona (BB-39), USS California (BB-44), USS Maryland (BB-46), USS Nevada (BB-36), USS Oklahoma (BB-37), USS Pennsylvania (BB-38), USS Tennessee (BB-43) and USS West Virginia (BB-48); cruisers USS Helena (CL-50), USS Honolulu (CL-48) and USS Raleigh (CL-7); the destroyers USS Cassin (DD-372), USS Downes (DD-375), USS Helm (DD-388) and USS Shaw (DD-373); seaplane tender USS Curtiss (AV-4); target ship (ex-battleship) USS Utah (AG-16); repair ship USS Vestal (AR-4); minelayer USS Oglala (CM-4); tug USS Sotoyomo (YT-9); and Floating Drydock Number 2.

It should be noted that, of the battleships, only the Arizona and Oklahoma proved to be complete losses. The Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Maryland only received minor damage during the raid, though the latter two were trapped by their sunken comrades. The sunken West Virginia and California, and beached Nevada, were all eventually returned to service. Indeed, the West Virginia, California, and Tennesse were extensively rebuilt, so much so their profiles bore little resemblance to that of their appearance at the time of the raid. These three ships became fully modern battleships in all respects except speed.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 03:30 PM

Yes, the size of it is actually part of the argument. Not even the most stupid commander, why, not even a politician, would willingly take such a beating at the begining of a war.

Right, good thing we didn't get majorly beaten at first, that would have been disastrous. No wait, it wasn't. But if it had been on purpose, whether people knew that or not, obviously that makes all the difference.

In this instance no there is no higher agenda.
Nothing changed after pearl Harbor? Just another naval battle to be won, like the ones before and after?

The US actions after the war prove this. They had no overall strategic demands for the Pacific than they did before the war. They did not increase their holdings or access to resources.
Okay, not that it was the plan at the outset, but when did our bases in Korea and japan come into effect?

Midway wasn't a part of the DEC 1941 Japanese military campaign. But Wake and Guam were. So was Tarawa in the British Gilberts.
Last night the Japanese attacked Midway Island.
Mentioned along with Guam and Wake and the rest as by-lines below the declaration of general attack (including all targets) and Oahu given prime mention in paragraph 2. "the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned..." It has that going for it.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/EastWind/Infamy.html

My first question to you: Why is the overall campaign not as important to you as that one air raid? If the air raid had done no damage, in other words, would the loss of strategic dominance in the Pacific have meant nothing militarily or politically?

Support your answer with examples.

It meant something politically. I'll let MG provide one example:
The sneak attack infuriated the American people. [...] Americans acted as if Tojo himself had walked up to their front door and punched them in the mouth.[...] Alcatraz death row inmates volunteered for extra duty at the end of the prison day to help build rafts for the US Navy. So imagine if guys with no future can become this motivated, what the rest of the country would be like
Here are others.
http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&q=remember+pearl+Harbor&btnG=Search+Images&gbv=2
I'm not the one to ask why PH stands above the others, it just does. This disingenuous 'oh it was just another battle with no sognificance' crap gets old. People will was poetic about the loss at PH, watch the movie and cry, etc, but as soon as a conspiracy theory is being discussed, meh, it's just an event...

ETA: That's all I have time for until tonight.

Foolmewunz

5th March 2009, 03:44 PM

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 03:55 PM

CL,
Yet, what this amounts to, after just these few pages (and you ain't seen the big guns until you go onto a military history buff forum and trot something like this out), is another of those "Well, it just doesn't seem to me..." conspiracies.
Like Russell Pickering's honest take on 911, you've been polite and even reasoned, but in the end with Russell it came down to the fact that regardless of the evidence, he just didn't trust the big ol' government, and actually said, in so many words, that regardlesss of the evidence we provided, which he was not disagreeing with, in his gut he just knew the government was behind 911 and nothing we did would shake him from that belief.
Is that your ultimate stance? It's pretty futile to argue with faith-based conclusions, and that's what I'm seeing here.

Good question. I don't mind being compared to Russ, but on 9/11 we disagree (I have the odd feeling, but almost no mental stuff, clues etc). Here I really can see the whole thing in outline form, and while it's essentially a gut suspicion thing, until I see more than wishful thinking filling in the gaps and trying to replace my skepticism, I'll have to keep going, unless I just decide to stop for some other reason.

I also haven't presented more than a few points of evidence yet. I'll toss out another without explanation, as people who know why 12/7 CTs are bunk should know why the McCollum memo isn't a clue.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo

I'm curious what those reasons are, will check back tonight.

Foolmewunz

5th March 2009, 08:19 PM

Good question. I don't mind being compared to Russ, but on 9/11 we disagree (I have the odd feeling, but almost no mental stuff, clues etc). Here I really can see the whole thing in outline form, and while it's essentially a gut suspicion thing, until I see more than wishful thinking filling in the gaps and trying to replace my skepticism, I'll have to keep going, unless I just decide to stop for some other reason.

I also haven't presented more than a few points of evidence yet. I'll toss out another without explanation, as people who know why 12/7 CTs are bunk should know why the McCollum memo isn't a clue.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo

I'm curious what those reasons are, will check back tonight.

Hmmm? Now I'm curious. Are you just trawling (not trolling - trawling)? You don't agree that PNAC's statement - purely speculative as it was - was a blueprint. Yet, here's a nearly identical statement and you want to accept that as a possible blueprint?

Ya got me! Why is one patently a statement of possibility/probability and the other an indication of palace intrigues?

stilicho

5th March 2009, 09:36 PM

It meant something politically. I'll let MG provide one example:

Here are others.
http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&q=remember+pearl+Harbor&btnG=Search+Images&gbv=2
I'm not the one to ask why PH stands above the others, it just does. This disingenuous 'oh it was just another battle with no sognificance' crap gets old. People will was poetic about the loss at PH, watch the movie and cry, etc, but as soon as a conspiracy theory is being discussed, meh, it's just an event...

ETA: That's all I have time for until tonight.

In terms of emotional impact, yes. That one air raid was important. In terms of whether the US would respond militarily, it was not (in and of itself) any more important than any of the other events of DEC 1941.

This is where the problem of hindsight comes in. If the battleships hadn't been moved to Pearl then the Japanese would not have commenced their campaign? That's absurd when you look at the scope of their operations. Was the movement of the US battleship fleet any more "provocative" than the British reinforcement of Malaya in November or the American reinforcement of the Philippines as early as May 1941?

Which ones involve conspiracy? They all likely emanated from the same level of strategic thinking.

--- ---

Try going back and looking at on-line versions of the newspaper reports from the weeks following DEC 07 1941. If you clip out all the Pearl references you are still left with a mass of aggressive Japanese actions all over the Pacific. Which of them have been analysed to death over misplaced intelligence as much as that one single air raid?

Moreover, you should ask yourself why historians have not grasped the significance of this conspiracy? Historians have done detailed work on all aspects of the US entry into WWII and haven't come to the same conclusions that you apparently have.

--- ---

You brought up before that Kimmel and Short were unfairly blamed. I agree that they represent sympathetic figures in the event. However, many of those who would have "someone" blamed, indicted, impeached, or even arbitrarily condemned to death over "allowing" 9/11 to happen are the same ones to rush to the defence of Kimmel and Short almost because they were blamed.

I hope you can appreciate the similarities.

--- ---

I did edit my previous post because I had forgotten about Midway. Easy to overlook with the sheer magnitude of Japanese military operations on DEC 7 1941 and the weeks to follow.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 10:54 PM

Now, I notice that there turns out ot be a lot of things within this topic of which you admit to know little, but surely you are aware that the Pacific Ocean is a rather large place? From where do you best protect your interests in such a place? From the edge (as on the US West Coast)? Or closer to the centre (as on Hawai)?

Sure, just from a tactical PoV it works to potect Pacific interests. It should have been understood, tho, that with Japan protecting and expanding its own interests, this would lead to friction that might actually include that centralized command locale.

And?

And unless you know the true motive, you can't say whether a move is smart or stupid. The way the fleet was poised turned out to be a mistake from the PoV of the stated goal. Did they make a bad miscalculation, or is the stated goal not correct?

Unnaturally? Surprise attacks with adequate forces are usually very successful. What is unnatural about that?

The surprise was unnatural, is what I meant... or was it? I know sometimes two or more things can break at once, but... The deterrent plan failed, and the Fleet was placed close enough to strike with ease IF surprise could be achieved. Air patrols were made weak through neglect (??), and failed to detect, intel failed to serve its purpose, largely through not being disseminated properly, Radar failed through newness and/or confusion, and surprise was achieved. If almost any one of these was working, the surprise would be lost and plan aborted.

Yes, it was brilliantly done, although called off too early. Probably by a commander who knew that there was a long-term perspective.

From what I hear, the idea was they did a lot, and the 2nd wave lost more planes, due to surprise being gone by then and a fight emerging, and the third would fare worse. Diminishing returns. Call it good.

Which were out on excercise, out of harm's way. Sign of conspiracy? Then why sacrifice the battle-ships?

They were actually running errands, ferrying fighters to Midway and Wake. Why save the carriers is interesting - I don't think it's the real Q. Saving was not the order of the day, new ships can be built. One other factor to consider is that planes can fight planes better than boats. At least I think so. Battleships do not have planes on top of them. When the carriers left, at least one source (Layton et al.) estimates about a 50% reduction in air defense. This chance move left PH extra vulnerable from Dec 5-7.

So what would have been the inevitable result of a naval battle with the Japanese fleet within US territorial waters? A war declaration from Japan (more on this, below).

Actually I think that was secured, along with the first few battles, by the oil and metal embargoes, frozen assetts, support to the Chinese, buildup in the Philippines, and the "Hulltimatum" as the final kick. And the US declaration would follow, the remaining questions would be the character of that entry. There had to be some thought given to it.

At that point, with both fleets blodied and a war declaration in the mailbox, he would have no need for a strong public motivation.

Perhaps not a need, per se, and I need to concede this - Pearl Harbor as we got it was not the only way to do that cynical maneuvering stuff, if that happened. But as it came out, it did prove a very good way. This isn't just paperwork where action A triggers clause B. You need a few million dedicated soldiers quick, full factory production, full Congressional support... emotion matters.

So you claim that the US administration was aware of Nagumo's fleet's movements (operating on a wast ocean surface, under strict radio silence), but unaware that a war declaration was ready to be despatched? (Or unable to figure out that one would follow immidiately after the attack)

The other way around is more likely, but they may well have known of the actual Kido Butai's movements. I have no direct evidence, but it's entirely possible. The sea lanes on their approach had been ordered clear by the US, that couldn't have helped. I'm sure there was a good reason otherwise they gave, I'll have to look that up again...

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 11:08 PM

Seems to me achieving surprise answers things much more simply than some dastardly covert conspiracy plan.

It's worth recalling the Japanese themselves did not expect the attack to go in unopposed. They expected to have to fight their way in and fight their way out. Acheiving complete tactical surprise was not considered likely—but as it happened, fortune was on their side and they achieved it.

Really? It seems like they were expecting stiffer resistance there, but needed surprise, hence the regular updates via the "bomb plot" system. I know they double checked on arrival, sending a scout and the subs out to make sure people weren't running around in war mode. Maybe it was just a bonus.

Luck can sometimes play a key role in a battle.

Thanks for clarifying the actual losses in the attack. That's important to realize 18 ships were not just obliterated by any measure. The shallow harbor didn't stop the torpedos any better than at Taranto, but it did prevent serious sinkage. And also as you note the loss was not a complete loss, as some of these earned upgrades for their trouble and became super-cyborg battleships. Though you can't put a value on human resources, manpower is valuable, and the human casualties were likewise more than replaced in short order.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 11:35 PM

This is where the problem of hindsight comes in. If the battleships hadn't been moved to Pearl then the Japanese would not have commenced their campaign?

The part with attacking the Fleet at Hawaii would be scratched. I guess it's possible they'd hit the fleet at San Pedro. Not likely.

That's absurd when you look at the scope of their operations. Was the movement of the US battleship fleet any more "provocative" than the British reinforcement of Malaya in November or the American reinforcement of the Philippines as early as May 1941?

Which ones involve conspiracy? They all likely emanated from the same level of strategic thinking.

I think all of that was provocative, but not necessarily by design. It tempts pre-emption. You shouldn't be surprised when someone blows up the cannon you were building in your yard to target them. No particular conspiracy I see in these things. The US oil embargoes and other such actions were more specifically provocative, and almost forced a push to he south, where they could secure their own oil.

Try going back and looking at on-line versions of the newspaper reports from the weeks following DEC 07 1941. If you clip out all the Pearl references you are still left with a mass of aggressive Japanese actions all over the Pacific. Which of them have been analysed to death over misplaced intelligence as much as that one single air raid?

How many of them have so much "misplaced intelligence" surrounding them?

Moreover, you should ask yourself why historians have not grasped the significance of this conspiracy? Historians have done detailed work on all aspects of the US entry into WWII and haven't come to the same conclusions that you apparently have.

That is an interesting point. I think 1) you may be dismissing the historians who do address it as not being historians 2) the historical record is more ambiguous than you realize, even among mainstream stuff 3) most publishers don't want depressing and "controversial" stuff when the feel-good Stephen Ambrose stuff sells so much better 4) Perhaps certain publishers have been made aware that 'the public interest' requires a certain 'tone', or something 5) or maybe they all just really decided it's wrong because why would you decide to lose ships? That's crazy! Historians are human.

Corsair 115

5th March 2009, 11:42 PM

Really? It seems like they were expecting stiffer resistance there, but needed surprise, hence the regular updates via the "bomb plot" system. I know they double checked on arrival, sending a scout and the subs out to make sure people weren't running around in war mode.

Well, if they had known with absolute certainty that complete surprise had been achieved, there wouldn't be much need to send fighters along to escort the dive and torpedo bombers.

And also as you note the loss was not a complete loss, as some of these earned upgrades for their trouble and became super-cyborg battleships.

All of the U.S. battleship fleet were scheduled for various refits/modernizations, but naturally the onset of war changed the plans.

With U.S. entry into the war, the Nevada and Pennsylvania, as the oldest of the ships, had full reconstructions ruled out, and only a partial reconstructions were undertaken. Three of the four other surviving battleships, as previously mentioned, underwent full reconstructions which made them fully modern vessels, other than their slow speed. These ships could be sent for the long periods of yard work required since the newer North Carolina and South Dakota class battleships were coming into service, and had sufficient speed (about 28 knots) to escort the carriers (the older battleships topped out at about 21 knots).

A great resource for detailed information on U.S. capital ships, as well as those of other nations, is the Haze Gray and Underway Naval History Information Center (http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/) web site.

Caustic Logic

5th March 2009, 11:49 PM

The Wikipedia article is a good enough starting point, and the second paragraph of the "Aftermath" section outlines the relevant issues.

Dave

Wow, this one got buried before I got to it. I did look into it and dang, that's a long "battle." Alright, so the battle meant for 1 USSR and Japan were not at war. I didn't reealize there was a Japan-german plan to move through Russia. From Japan's end that seems dumb when they are Island people, not Mongols, and already had Manchuria, Korea, and parts of China to deal with. The army had grown land-crazy? So it was the southward Island chomping Naval plan that I always took for Japan's natural mode, maybe cause that where we fought them most. Soviets saw it different.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkhin_Gol
So for whatthis adds... it's how we got to the 1940-41 era when the US Fleet was moved further out, and the attack on Pearl Harbor. And what else?

Hmmm? Now I'm curious. Are you just trawling (not trolling - trawling)? You don't agree that PNAC's statement - purely speculative as it was - was a blueprint. Yet, here's a nearly identical statement and you want to accept that as a possible blueprint?

Ya got me! Why is one patently a statement of possibility/probability and the other an indication of palace intrigues?

I guess trawling is a good word, but not "just." I realy haven't seen much intelligent discussion of this "smoking gun" as some call it. I have a few reasons to not call it a blueprint or anything, but it is definitely interesting as evidence, and most people don't know about it. I'll come back to this.

Miss_Kitt

6th March 2009, 12:03 AM

Still no refutation of the stated purpose of the fleet move to Hawaii, still no grappling with the notion that 'deterrence' failed, and that both hawaii and the Philppines were taken as weak provocations tempting pre-emption. No arguments that being halfway to Japan increased the odds of a Japanese attack.
...

I have to raise a few questions with your paragraph, above:

I don't think anyone has problems with the idea that "deterrence" failed against the Japanese! That's demonstrably true. We put a defensive / reactive force in Hawaii, and it failed to deter a Japanese attack. Is this somehow a Big New Insight??

It is equally clear, with the clarity of hindsight, that the Japanese took the US military's actions as something that would be more effectively dealt with by "pre-emption" than by declaring war without making an unannounced attack. Again, I don't think there's too much argument that that's what happened. But to regard the pre-positioning of men, materiel, and ships as "provocation" is, frankly, ridiculous. There was nothing in the fleet's placement at PH that could be reasonably construed as a lead-up to invasion of, or attack on, the Japanese homeland. Your implicit position is that the US was "asking for it" by taking defensive steps. By such logic one can argue that the mall owner is "asking for it" by having security guards!

The central point that you assiduously avoid is that Japan made an unannounced, unprovoked attack on the United States. To argue that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable--which was demonstrated--and that somehow constitutes "provocation" or justification for an attack is completely excusing a murderous, immoral action. You seem to have a real problem with the difference between defensive force and offensive force.

Positioning your military to intercept another country's attacks against you or your allies: Defensive. Attacking a country that has not attacked you / is not in alliance with a country that has attacked you: Offensive.

If you are arguing that the US intentionally sacrificed the victims of the Pearl Harbor bombing, you need to demonstrate that. So far, what you have done is say, "I think you're all buying into a giant fraud! Prove me wrong!!"

There have been several people over the decades who have believed that, but they simply don't have the evidence. I think you have nothing to offer that hasn't already been looked at; but feel free to prove me wrong.

One more thing: Demonstrating that there was disagreement between the military (or, more correctly, one specific member of the military hierarchy) and the State Department on what to do, how, and why, is nothing remarkable. It isn't the job of the Armed Services to agree with State (or, for that matter, to disagree) in their discussions with the Administration. Each branch gives its input in to the President and his Cabinet, and ultimately it falls to the man in the Oval Office to make the call.

The challenge with trying to impute intention or thought processes that led to a disaster, after a disaster has occurred, is that everyone is in a complex dance of Cover Thy Butt. Admirals have a vested interest in--and a tendency to think in terms of--showing it was not Navy's fault; State will see it as a good plan that was executed poorly (ie, Navy's failure); the White House will blame bad Intel, etc. But ultimately, that only counts on the question of, "why didn't we detect / intercept the attackers incoming", not Why Did They Attack?

The Japanese attacked because they were trying to take the US out of the war in one stroke, because they wanted to have no opposition in setting up their Empire over much of Asia and the Pacific. The attack was not 'provoked' because the Japanese were able to make an attack; a provoked attack would have included, say, the US Navy blockading Japanese shipping with the Fleet.

I just read an interesting article on the other issue that CT-ers tend to argue: That the US knew the attack was coming from signals intelligence, but deliberately or incompetently did not respond. It turns out most of that rumor was started by *one* person's recollections and testimony to Congress, which was at odds with what everyone else said. There is a copious absense of any signal intercept that qualifies, as well.

Given the choice between one man being mistaken or malicious, and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of people participating in a cover-up of the deliberate sacrifice of American servicemen for decades, what is more likely? I've never understood the CT view of human behavior, which believing that most people will help hide evidence of wrong-doing, when we daily see counter-examples. Whistle-blowers come forward, especially when the events involved result in human death or suffering. The longer the time since the event has occurred, the more people have to have been involved in covering up, and then covering up the cover-up, and then...you see the progression?

I don't buy it on UFOs, I don't buy it on Pearl Harbor. If you want to argue that that is the case, PROVE IT! Don't challenge us to disprove your arbitrary assertion. I am a devotee of the Invisible Pink Unicorn, and you can't disprove her to me. (Go ahead, try!) Her first lesson to us is that She, and any other unsupported assertion, cannot be disproved. That's why Reason requires that the onus of proof is on he who asserts the positive.

Get your evidence--and especially, evidence that quotes more than one party--in order. I'll take a look. But I'll be amazed if you've somehow found something that nobody else looked at and decided wasn't going to win them a Pulitzer or a couple of million in book sales.

Caustic Logic

6th March 2009, 12:35 AM

I keep getting distracted... Thanks for the long comment I'll respnd better to later. Quickly tho:
But to regard the pre-positioning of men, materiel, and ships as "provocation" is, frankly, ridiculous.
No, and I'm not playing the we asked for it card. But the fact it, it was coming, US actions and placement helped decide when and where, and they somehow failed to predict and prepare. The details are all rather complex...

I think you've misunderstood the degree to which I'm confusing offense and defense. By 'provocation'I mean we were bluffing with HI and Philippines, where there were at least plans Tokyo may have known, to bomb Japan itself, being discussed before Pearl Harbor. A weak force on your flank threatening to be a strong force beggars pre-emption, and this is natural. Problem is at HI there seems to be a disconnect where everyone forgot what pre-emption means, or something.

On Richardson's disagreements, yeah, it could just be a curmudgeonly paranoiac relieved of duty for being all defensive. He was relieved after putting the Fleet on wartime security footing in Nov 1940 without approval for the Navy, BTW. Jumpy!

a provoked attack would have included, say, the US Navy blockading Japanese shipping with the Fleet.
A blockade is not warfare! It's only warlike, on a par with embargoes, which the US DID do.

I just read an interesting article on the other issue that CT-ers tend to argue: That the US knew the attack was coming from signals intelligence, but deliberately or incompetently did not respond. It turns out most of that rumor was started by *one* person's recollections and testimony to Congress, which was at odds with what everyone else said. There is a copious absense of any signal intercept that qualifies, as well.

This story is interesting, but does not explain a lack of "signal intercept." This is about one clue, the winds code, which only served as a distraction. The Japanese never sent it, and it meant nothing much if they did but US was obsessed with hearing it. I don't know why Safford and others insist they saw it. Seems highly unlikely.

Given the choice between one man being mistaken or malicious, and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of people participating in a cover-up of the deliberate sacrifice of American servicemen for decades, what is more likely?

You may be confusing 9/11 and 12/7 here. No, Safford is wrong, the rest of the world right, and no cover-up there - but there were many other clues that aren't fictitious, and perhaps no more than a couple dozen people - facing down the nazis mind you - who blocked its dissemination.

Alright, that's full enough actually, the rest is mostly worn repeats to me by now. So, the McCollum memo: Next post.

ETA: Sorry, more reflects the amount of disagreement I've encountered than anything on your part. "Whim of Iron" is hilarious!

Caustic Logic

6th March 2009, 02:08 AM

Scans of the document can be seen here (http://www.rationalrevolution.net/war/mccollum.htm) for reference:

Wikipedia page (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo)

I'm among the people who've called this a "smoking gun," in an older article I may need to replace. I didn't read it close the first time around, and I'm reviewing it now.

So it's October 1940 - Japan is looking outward, east and south to the Pacific - they've just signed the Tripartite pact with Germany and Italy - France is overrun and about all of Europe - The US fleet is at Pearl Harbor. The head of far east desk, Office of Naval Intel, Lt Com Arthur H McCollum, writes a "memorandum for the Director. I think this means DNI Radm Walter Anderson.

In the first few pages, the less famous major portion, McCollum outlines the world situation, with the totalitarian powers in charge of all Europe except Great Britain, aided as much as possible by the US, and actually predicts the USSR will side with the Axis sooner or later. He mentions Axis attempts to subvert, propagandize, and "confuse" the US into a purely defensive posture with Latin American meddling and Pacific moves by Japan, to end her aid to Great Britain. McCollum calls for "prompt, warlike action" in either theater. He feels the Pact leaves "no ground on which to doubt" the three totalitarian powers will go to war with the US if entering as a full ally of the UK or "should she attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the orient." And he predicts that if England falls, the Axis would quite likely attack America next. So war may be when, not if. Says to keep Britain's lines open, Japan should be "diverted or neutralized." He then outlines the strategic situation of US vs. Japan in the Pacific, called for arrangements with Britain and Nethrlands and a "prompt and early declaration of war."

Finally he wraps it up with point 9, which is what the CTists cite.

"It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.
D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the US Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.

If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war."

Alright, that's it. A list of actions proposed because Japan wasn't changing and more "ado" would be needed before FDR was "capable" of declaring war. Hawaii is mentioned. An overt act of war is mentioned. It would be hindsight historicism to just draw a straight line between them, but there they are side-by-side: The fleet at Pearl is in fact in the list of "means" by which Japan might be led to "do some fool thing," as FDR once put it.

"So much the better" implies two things to me:
1) It's not the main purpose. To be "better" is to be other than the thing you've been referring to. The main purpose seems to be to prepare for war in the Pacific since it should and perhaps might materialize soon.
2) Better implies it is to the same ends as the main purpose. The whole thing is about war, and how to get into it. Having them fire the first shot would be "better" than us doing it.

Alright, so at the moment, it doesn't look like any direct clue to a specific policy re: Pearl Harbor at all. It is however instructive of the type and level of thought going on in Washington at the time.

stilicho

6th March 2009, 02:45 AM

Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4490683#post4490683)

Try going back and looking at on-line versions of the newspaper reports from the weeks following DEC 07 1941. If you clip out all the Pearl references you are still left with a mass of aggressive Japanese actions all over the Pacific. Which of them have been analysed to death over misplaced intelligence as much as that one single air raid?

How many of them have so much "misplaced intelligence" surrounding them?

It's very obvious from this reply that you aren't from the British Commonwealth. Our military history is packed full of both folly and muttered oaths against the "bullheaded brass". One relevant example is the mismanagement of the defense of Hong Kong. It's relevant to me, because I am Canadian, and it's relevant to the time period we are discussing, as a part of that original multi-pronged Japanese offensive.

Why not argue that the presence of the Canadians in Hong Kong was an equal provocation to the Japanese? All I can wonder is why we suffered over 1,000 casualties (more than half those committed) for a lost cause and a militarily impossible role.

Oddly, though, the question of treachery and provocation only appears to apply when Americans are involved.

Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4490683#post4490683)

Moreover, you should ask yourself why historians have not grasped the significance of this conspiracy? Historians have done detailed work on all aspects of the US entry into WWII and haven't come to the same conclusions that you apparently have.

That is an interesting point. I think 1) you may be dismissing the historians who do address it as not being historians 2) the historical record is more ambiguous than you realize, even among mainstream stuff 3) most publishers don't want depressing and "controversial" stuff when the feel-good Stephen Ambrose stuff sells so much better 4) Perhaps certain publishers have been made aware that 'the public interest' requires a certain 'tone', or something 5) or maybe they all just really decided it's wrong because why would you decide to lose ships? That's crazy! Historians are human.

1. Some of the people passing themselves off as historians are not historians. That's true. Some historians who have addressed the possibility of treachery (or whatever you want to call it) have merely mentioned it in passing. An example of this is John Keegan, a real historian, who asks exactly the question you do in a collection of his lectures. I've read three biographies of FDR and none of them have established anything sinister in his actions.

2. The historical facts of a theatre-wide offensive Japanese operation, commencing with preparations prior to November 1941, aren't ambiguous. The ambiguity is created over the Pearl Harbor equivalent of the AUG 06 PDB and similar minutiae.

3. University presses aren't so constrained. If a grad student wanted to earn his doctorate by sweeping away the ambiguity and presenting the solid case of American provocation and/or FDR's treachery, they'd fire up the machines and pump out the books.

4 & 5. These are essentially extensions of your third point. I know you wanted to nominate me for a Stundie for explaining that the loss of those ships was not militarily significant to the expansion of war in the Pacific. I agreed with you that the manpower loss was an emotional trigger (and continues to be) but did not preponderantly influence America's decision to enter WWII.

Caustic Logic

6th March 2009, 04:10 AM

It's very obvious from this reply that you aren't from the British Commonwealth. Our military history is packed full of both folly and muttered oaths against the "bullheaded brass". One relevant example is the mismanagement of the defense of Hong Kong. It's relevant to me, because I am Canadian, and it's relevant to the time period we are discussing, as a part of that original multi-pronged Japanese offensive.

Why not argue that the presence of the Canadians in Hong Kong was an equal provocation to the Japanese? All I can wonder is why we suffered over 1,000 casualties (more than half those committed) for a lost cause and a militarily impossible role.

Admittedly, I am from the states, and I know next to nothing of these episodes. I guess in context of this thread and the paranoid revisionism, mmmmaybe there is a conspiracy! If you can see a motive, some possible clues.... ???

Oddly, though, the question of treachery and provocation only appears to apply when Americans are involved.
Americans are a peculiarly paranoid people, sometimes.

1. Some of the people passing themselves off as historians are not historians. That's true. Some historians who have addressed the possibility of treachery (or whatever you want to call it) have merely mentioned it in passing. An example of this is John Keegan, a real historian, who asks exactly the question you do in a collection of his lectures. I've read three biographies of FDR and none of them have established anything sinister in his actions.

3 glowing portraits of our wartime hero, and none called him a mass murderer? That's pretty good. How about Charles Beard? He's not a historian?

3. University presses aren't so constrained. If a grad student wanted to earn his doctorate by sweeping away the ambiguity and presenting the solid case of American provocation and/or FDR's treachery, they'd fire up the machines and pump out the books.

Yeah? I'm not so sure that hasn't happened. I'll look into it - if so they maybe they aren't considered historians anymore. Just crackpots... Oh hey, like Beard. Oh, he was an isolationist...

I know you wanted to nominate me for a Stundie for explaining that the loss of those ships was not militarily significant to the expansion of war in the Pacific. I agreed with you that the manpower loss was an emotional trigger (and continues to be) but did not preponderantly influence America's decision to enter WWII.

Sorry about ribbin ya there, it just struck me as funny and debate-clubbish. I'll agree that at the head level, the decision was as made as it needed to be well aside from the HI attack. I think it had something to do with the heart coming into it that the "go" light was given to the head. And all those guys lined up outside the recruiting offices weren't thinking mainly about Guam.

Foolmewunz

6th March 2009, 06:20 AM

Beard? Quaker? Isolationist dating back to WWI? Wrote critically of FDR's interventionist policies throughout the 30s and 40s? That Charles Beard?

Yeah, I believe he's a pretty good example of a respected and fairly decent historian trashing his own reputation because the mainstream historians were pretty much New Dealers and in his last book he did go a little overboard. But, like I said, he was an isolationist for about a half-century, so I don't think he was someone who was moved to a brave act by FDR's treachery and subterfuge. Pretty ironic, actually, that he was fairly well flattened by those "horrible New Dealer liberals" because he was farther left than they were.

I'm not that familiar with that infamous last book on FDR, though. I always thought he was just a critic of any foreign interventionism at all.

stilicho

6th March 2009, 12:22 PM

Yeah? I'm not so sure that hasn't happened. I'll look into it - if so they maybe they aren't considered historians anymore. Just crackpots... Oh hey, like Beard. Oh, he was an isolationist...

Beard was an historian but he did not prove his case. It's been a long time since I read his book, and it was partly to cull quotes for a college paper I wrote, but I recall his reliance on secondary or questionable sources. Recent biographers have had access to material that Beard didn't.

And all those guys lined up outside the recruiting offices weren't thinking mainly about Guam.

Just as I am sure that American Marines landing on the Solomons weren't thinking about Australia's shipping lanes either.

I'm on board with those historians who maintain that America was actually at war from the time of the Lend-Lease Act. The fact that isolationism (alternatively, non-interventionism) was such a political force at least until the official declarations of war is testimony to its deep roots in the US. Even if the US had never fired a shot, it would have continued to increase military and economic help to (primarily) the British Commonwealth, China, and the Soviet Union in their efforts to stop the Axis. They didn't need a shooting war for that to happen.

Pearl Harbor may have helped to change it superficially and temporarily but that isolationist mindset is even now a political force in the US. I, on the other hand, maintain that American isolationism remains the greatest single threat to world peace and security.

MG1962

6th March 2009, 01:34 PM

Just as I am sure that American Marines landing on the Solomons weren't thinking about Australia's shipping lanes either.

I'm on board with those historians who maintain that America was actually at war from the time of the Lend-Lease Act. The fact that isolationism (alternatively, non-interventionism) was such a political force at least until the official declarations of war is testimony to its deep roots in the US. Even if the US had never fired a shot, it would have continued to increase military and economic help to (primarily) the British Commonwealth, China, and the Soviet Union in their efforts to stop the Axis. They didn't need a shooting war for that to happen.

Pearl Harbor may have helped to change it superficially and temporarily but that isolationist mindset is even now a political force in the US. I, on the other hand, maintain that American isolationism remains the greatest single threat to world peace and security.

I think one of the hardest things to deal with when discussin the cause and effect of WW2, no matter side of the Pearl harbor fence you sit on is the incredible complexity of the politics of the time.

The incredible interplay of idelologies, all with enough power to really make themselves heard is mind boggling. For instance the Soviets were part of the good guys leading into the war, however in ways their polices were worse than anything generated by the Nazis. Their only saving grace (The Soviets) was that the Nazis and facist movments around the world hated them more than the west did.

It can be very easy to look back through the coolness of time and look at what happened play by play. The reality was, FDR, Churchill Stalin etc etc, had to play with the cards in their hands and hope they won the pot

Metullus

6th March 2009, 02:05 PM

For instance the Soviets were part of the good guys leading into the war, however in ways their polices were worse than anything generated by the Nazis. Their only saving grace (The Soviets) was that the Nazis and facist movments around the world hated them more than the west did.Well, the Soviets were really one of the "bad guys" leading into the war, given that they were arguably Hitler's most important allies right up to Barbarossa.

The Soviets became one of the "good guys" only when the Germans finally attacked them; this was after Poland, after France, and after the Battle of Britain.

The alliance with the Soviets was very much a "enemy of my enemy is my friend" kind of thing.

stilicho

6th March 2009, 03:07 PM

The incredible interplay of idelologies, all with enough power to really make themselves heard is mind boggling.

It's a little off-topic but I wrote three different papers in university on international relations in the interwar years, centring largely on the issues of Eastern Europe. To this day, I have a hard time justifying the Franco-British guarantee to Poland. Of all three intermediary powers directly affected by German expansionist doctrine (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland) the last presents the least sympathetic case for intervention.

As you said, the competing ideologies, a mere seven or eight decades ago, were indeed mind-boggling. What we call democracy (like it or not) was new to a lot of people (less than a generation since women's suffrage, elimination of several European crowns, legal trade unions, even Pitchfork Ben Tillman in the US) and far more fragile than most people imagine nowadays. It still makes me wonder how people can decide not to be active in politics even at the local or neighbourhood level.

By the summer of 1941, though, the competing ideologies faded against the older (ancient?) concept of nations at war. Regardless of the rhetoric, that was Japan, Germany and Italy (and sometimes Roumania) who were being fought and less so "Imperialism", "Nazism", or "Fascism". It wasn't some mystic Shinto spirit that attacked at Pearl. Those were flesh-and-blood Japanese flying Vals.

Hope we haven't derailed CL's thread too much!

stilicho

6th March 2009, 05:10 PM

Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4491016#post4491016)
It's very obvious from this reply that you aren't from the British Commonwealth. Our military history is packed full of both folly and muttered oaths against the "bullheaded brass". One relevant example is the mismanagement of the defense of Hong Kong. It's relevant to me, because I am Canadian, and it's relevant to the time period we are discussing, as a part of that original multi-pronged Japanese offensive.

Why not argue that the presence of the Canadians in Hong Kong was an equal provocation to the Japanese? All I can wonder is why we suffered over 1,000 casualties (more than half those committed) for a lost cause and a militarily impossible role.

Admittedly, I am from the states, and I know next to nothing of these episodes. I guess in context of this thread and the paranoid revisionism, mmmmaybe there is a conspiracy! If you can see a motive, some possible clues.... ???

There are several examples in Canadian military history that lead some towards conspiracy theories. Passchendaele (Third Ypres) comes to mind immediately. But the one that still has conspiracy theorists in Canada scratching their heads is the Dieppe Raid. Even though there is nothing in any of the Churchill biographies I've read (including Martin Gilbert's), the CT is that he knew the plan was fatally flawed and allowed it to go ahead as an instructional tool for the Americans who were eager to invade Festung Europa as early as possible. As with the defence of Hong Kong, there was little chance of the operation's success against overwhelming obstacles.

There is no definitive proof that this is the case yet it lingers in the same way that Australians and New Zealanders recall Gallipoli. Churchill is not nearly as widely admired in "the colonies" as he is in the US. Personally, I think this is unwarranted.

Caustic Logic

6th March 2009, 11:02 PM

Beard? Quaker? Isolationist dating back to WWI? Wrote critically of FDR's interventionist policies throughout the 30s and 40s? That Charles Beard?

Yeah, not really the best example. Or actually I guess he might be, which is the problem. The lack of historical acceptance of foreknowledge is a problem - indicating either it's not true, or there are problems with history as practiced, or some combo.

I'm not that familiar with that infamous last book on FDR, though. I always thought he was just a critic of any foreign interventionism at all.

Me neither really, only learned of it recently for some reason - little re-printed, no cheap used copies around. Will have to resort to... the library, if evn that. Knee-jerk isolationism is a stance, and a bias, and that's what the book points to, I hear - but I'm curious how he thought and explained out his concerns, and what exactly they were. Lefty isolationist - just intriguing enough in itself.

Pearl Harbor may have helped to change it superficially and temporarily but that isolationist mindset is even now a political force in the US. I, on the other hand, maintain that American isolationism remains the greatest single threat to world peace and security.

That first is a good point - the mood of Dec 8 was like the sparkplug, or whatever, that got the machine running. It had to have more fuel, and the machinery set up. The last is a complex statement I certainly can't agree with or totally disagree. My thoughts on that are in flux and too deep to go off on now. But at the time, it was perhaps the single biggest obstacle barring the US from world war, and that was just getting less and less peaceful, but more important starting to let through glimpses of what the peace after would look like.

It can be very easy to look back through the coolness of time and look at what happened play by play. The reality was, FDR, Churchill Stalin etc etc, had to play with the cards in their hands and hope they won the pot

That's a good point to consider from any/all angles. No 20/20 hindsight, just obscured foresight with major upheavals and threats of more changing the horizon and points of reference ahead of you. From the CT perspective, it helps explain why FDR would take such a big gamble with Pearl Harbor and the fleet. In that memo, McCollum mentioned the possibility of the USSR siding with the Axis. That's new to me, and it might've spooked FDR, if he hadn't already thought of it. So, not knowing what the future holds, with contingency planning in mind, how big a war machine must the US become and for how long? How much of a shock, how much temporary political capital will you need? If you miscalculate, or have to settle for a different amount than what your adding machine gives - do you want to risk going over your needs or under?

Caustic Logic

7th March 2009, 12:51 AM

Hope we haven't derailed CL's thread too much!

No, great post! The thoughtful background thoughts are important for setting the tone of a good thread, and these are valid points you bring up. I didn't know about Tillman, now I do a little thanks to you and Wikipedia. Yikes!

There are several examples in Canadian military history that lead some towards conspiracy theories.

I'm just unusually hard wired to see them, and laying all this Pearl Harbor suspicion out here, taking it out of my own head and getting new perspectives, has cooled my jets a little.iBut the reverse process might be useful to some. I get a hunch sometimes conspiracy really does abound, and give too much credence to flights of fancy. But certainly it must happen somewhere, at some time?

I like to study these things, but like one at a time, in detail, so I can't even begin to dwell on any of these even a minute. I do appreciate the lead tho, as maybe this Dieppe raid would be interesting down the road.

There is no definitive proof that this is the case yet it lingers in the same way that Australians and New Zealanders recall Gallipoli. Churchill is not nearly as widely admired in "the colonies" as he is in the US. Personally, I think this is unwarranted.

Oh there wouldn't be proof. ;) I should know more about Churchill, but from my own limited, tinted view, the guy kind of gives me the creeps.

stilicho

7th March 2009, 02:44 AM

I should know more about Churchill, but from my own limited, tinted view, the guy kind of gives me the creeps.

Why does Churchill give you the creeps?

Caustic Logic

7th March 2009, 03:08 AM

Why does Churchill give you the creeps?

I don't know exactly. His career seems all about warfare and empire and jingoism, that plus openly manipulative and calculating, and boastful and self-righteous, and stuff like that. I found some of his quotes from the World Crisis, as presented by Colin Simpson put in his Lusitania book, a little chilling. Out-of-context I suppose.

MG1962

7th March 2009, 05:05 AM

There is no definitive proof that this is the case yet it lingers in the same way that Australians and New Zealanders recall Gallipoli. Churchill is not nearly as widely admired in "the colonies" as he is in the US. Personally, I think this is unwarranted.

Well it turned out after the war that the Gallipoli campaign could never achieve it's objective n matter how well or bravely the soliders of the combined nations fought

On inspection it was found that taking the heights would not have afforded the Allies the strategic advantage they'd expected.

In terms of Churchill there are a couple of reasons for the dislike in the colonies lol - We like to think we Dominions by that stage.

The fall of Singapore was seen as a disgrace and shambles. Some troops arrived and were captured without firing a shot. Many of those troops should never have been sent. Churchill knew from his own orders that the cause was lost and all he expected from his troops was to delay Japanese success as long as possible.

The other source of dislike for Churchill stems from the movement of the Australian 6th Division. After serving with distinction in North Africa. The Australian government recalled them after the fall of Singapore for fear of invasion of Australia

Without consultation, Churchill ordered the returning convoy diverted to Ceylon to become part of the forces in Burma, leaving Australia effectivly undefended. John Curttin the Australian Prime Minister stood up to Churchill and finally after three months the troops were on their way.

Australian defense planning between the wars had been strongly influenced by the needs and assurances given by Britian. Unfortunately when it came to the crunch Australia saw herself badly let down. Yes Britian more than had her hads full trying to survive a war, but I am writing this from an Australian perspective.

Fortunately the US stepped in and filled the gap in men and material, hence an alliance and friendship was born that continues to this day unabated

Caustic Logic

8th March 2009, 12:45 AM

Foolmewunz

8th March 2009, 09:41 AM

I have never questioned the pedigree of the McCollum memo, much as I'd not really question the authenticity of Northwoods. I have no doubt that in a bureaucracy, where everyone's just dying to put their brilliant words onto paper, that there would be one or another person who would propose things from an aggressive/hawkish perspective.

What needs to be shown is whether such documents were writing up policy or were merely tossing out ideas for the boss to consider.

Only a couple of items in McCollum's recommendations were followed through on. They never had time to make deals in Singapore and the Dutch territories, and never joined the full embargo.

So, you're not pushing it as a blueprint they followed, obviously. Ergo, you're questioning whether it represents the mindset of the government and particularly FDR. I'd say you have a long way to go before actuall proving that. It speaks of one or two persons' views, and those persons happened to be war hawks. Unless you've got an initialed copy with FDR saying "Good idea, Mac - get right on it..." there's nothing there other than another memo with someone's views.

stilicho

8th March 2009, 05:22 PM

I don't know exactly. His career seems all about warfare and empire and jingoism, that plus openly manipulative and calculating, and boastful and self-righteous, and stuff like that. I found some of his quotes from the World Crisis, as presented by Colin Simpson put in his Lusitania book, a little chilling. Out-of-context I suppose.

Try Martin Gilbert's biography of Churchill. It's probably the best biography of him that I've read.

Churchill essentially presided over the descent of the UK from the world power to a middle power with considerable political clout. That is not normally a gentle and easy descent but the UK remains a considerable force in international affairs. Before him, imperial powers would simply collapse into nothingness.

Canada's war leader, Mackenzie King, is probably a lot freakier than Churchill was. Until Trudeau, he was our Prime Minister longer than anyone had been. He was involved in spirituality and thought his dead mother was speaking to him through his dog. He visited Hitler, while in office, in 1937 and heaped praise on him:

"He said to me that I would have loathed living in Berlin with the Jews, and the way in which they had increased their numbers in the city ... He said there was no pleasure in going to a theatre which was filled with them .... They were getting control of all the business, the finance .... It was necessary to get them out to have the German people really control their own City and affairs." (King's Diary, probably speaking of Neurath.)

In his less peculiar moments, he is probably the single greatest influence on India's Nehru guiding his newly independent nation into the Commonwealth.

Oh, and we have him on our $50 bill as homage to his ability to conduct successful seances, I suppose.

stilicho

8th March 2009, 05:52 PM

So I just wanted to sort of bump this and again try and pull things towards the McCollum memo (see post 104). So, like, a lot of people know it exists, and what it's alleged to say. But it is still a newer piece of evidence, and not as re-hashed as a lot of the other pieces of the puzzle.

....

Any comments on the content and its relevance?

I guess the first question about it is why it wasn't a part of any of the prominent biographies of FDR written since 1994.

The second thing is its timing. I could see something worth pursuing in a memo written shortly after the outbreak of hostilities or shortly before the deployment of US forces. But the McCollum Memo is almost exactly in the middle. Unless I'm mistaken, it's dated OCT 1940. Was there anything that the US Administration or the Pentagon suddenly did in NOV 1940 that might make you think it was connected? Why didn't the US do anything to reinforce its bases for almost a year? We've seen how quick the US can mobilise for war in the past few years.

More on the timing. It's before the US Presidential election of 1940. Even though most people probably figured FDR would win, if this was a conspiratorial document, its engineers would have to be involved in rigging that election too. This is in an era in which polling was primitive and predated the infamous image of a grinning Truman holding up a newspaper with a headline proclaiming his opponent victorious.

Third point: What probably urged the US military into reinforcing its bases was not any old memo from a minor officer, but rather the Atlantic Conference (Placentia Bay, NF) in August of 1941. That's the event that really forged American interests with those of the British and (eventually) the Soviet Union. It was widely reported (even condemned!!) by the contemporary press.

You don't have to blow the dust off some memo to discover where America's interests were in 1941. Just read some real history and it's pretty easy to see that the US was not going to back down from the Axis.

Travis

8th March 2009, 08:09 PM

Caustic Logic

9th March 2009, 12:27 AM

What needs to be shown is whether such documents were writing up policy or were merely tossing out ideas for the boss to consider.

If it's even vague enough to wonder, that's something. I'd have to presume it's more the latter, ideas McCollum thinks are good. But the relationship between this and any policy would be interesting to know. It could be that these ideas then formed an unwritten policy we don't know of, that they helped in some aspects to form a plan, while others were tossed. It may have offered more a mental framework or attitude than it did concrete steps. It's quite possible that FDR was already in that groove and just ordered McCollum to write up something to help clarify the issues and options, or that it never even reached FDR or any decision-makers... we don't know that for sure.

Only a couple of items in McCollum's recommendations were followed through on. They never had time to make deals in Singapore and the Dutch territories, and never joined the full embargo.

I've heard it said "all eight actions" were followed, and written that myself, but fact is I don't know enough of the details to know. I think the general spirit of it was followed anyway, but on specs I'll defer to your call and look into it some more later. I've also called point F (keep fleet at Hawaii) the most pivotal, though there's no real reason to say so except that it stands out after the fact. It is one step that was carried out, and I'll come back to this in a moment. (resp. to Stilicho)

So, you're not pushing it as a blueprint they followed, obviously. Ergo, you're questioning whether it represents the mindset of the government and particularly FDR. I'd say you have a long way to go before actuall proving that.

Oh hell yeah, if I could prove it, I wouldn't sittin here yapping on a chat forum.

It speaks of one or two persons' views, and those persons happened to be war hawks. Unless you've got an initialed copy with FDR saying "Good idea, Mac - get right on it..." there's nothing there other than another memo with someone's views.

Well, war hawks of a feather might just flock together, and FDR was the big bird. The question is did he see it? If so, it couldn't help but make an impression, along with everything else over the year or so leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Caustic Logic

9th March 2009, 01:07 AM

I guess the first question about it is why it wasn't a part of any of the prominent biographies of FDR written since 1994.
First, thanks for the fascinating tidbits on leaders of the English-Speaking world. On this Q:
1) There's no proof FDR saw or acted on the memo (tho he may have an it might be worth mentioning, depending on the type or tone of book)
2) It wasn't actually published til 1999, and that in a CT book, so that's a reason to question any first thoughts to including it

The second thing is its timing. I could see something worth pursuing in a memo written shortly after the outbreak of hostilities or shortly before the deployment of US forces. But the McCollum Memo is almost exactly in the middle.
Pretty much - it outlined far the war had progressed to that dark place they were in in late '40. I think the timing makes sense, given that there were big decisions to be made and for example, the election was coming up, which means he'd be able (if he won again) to pursue a bolder course after November.

Unless I'm mistaken, it's dated OCT 1940. Was there anything that the US Administration or the Pentagon suddenly did in NOV 1940 that might make you think it was connected?
I wish I had a handy list of October/Nov/Dec actions, but the day, and not just month is interesting here; the date is Oct 7, and the connection Stinnett drew was with FDR's meeting the next day with Adm. Richardson. They had met in July at Richardson's request to hash out some issues - mostly the stay at Pearl. The CINCUS made no progress and gave up, accepting his lot and working on defense. In Oct. the Adm was summoned back to meet FDR again. They just argued the same points, and FDR was even more adamant that the fleet was exerting a deterrent effect there. It was later said that the CINCUS "hurt the president's feelings" at this meeting, leading to his termination in late January.

Asserting the new mooring was a deterrent, when it had just been explicitly outlined as a "means" that could possibly "lead" Japan to an "overt act of war." Connection? If so, it's a telling one. But we don't know.

Why didn't the US do anything to reinforce its bases for almost a year? We've seen how quick the US can mobilise for war in the past few years.

Well, the Philippines were strengthened some, with those B-17s. Midway and Wake were given more fighters at the end anyway. But Pearl indeed seems to have been left out, due to some oversight?

More on the timing. It's before the US Presidential election of 1940. [...]

Didn't realize you were going to bring that up yourself. I'm not sure what you're getting at here tho.

Third point: [...] the Atlantic Conference (Placentia Bay, NF)

For sure, the big picture was unfolding on many levels over an extended period. If I'm not mistaken, that's the more-or-less secret meeting at which the US essentially sealed a pact with Britain, which they'd been discussing a while. I think this is the time when, by this understanding, the US would go to war with Japan over even an attack on solely British interests. FDR and his cabinet seem to have agreed to this, tho not publicly of course. It would have been ugly if carried out on those terms.

Luckily for them, the Philippines could hardly avoid being hit, and due to its forward placement and inadequate defenses, the US Fleet was also damaged, bringing the message home in such a shocking way only the most encrusted isolationists could oppose war.

You don't have to blow the dust off some memo to discover where America's interests were in 1941. Just read some real history and it's pretty easy to see that the US was not going to back down from the Axis.

Too true. So long as this document is real history (it does seem to be a primary source), it's part of the picture. It doesn't replace anything else, nor is it cancelled out by the rest. And I think it's a darn interesting piece.

Caustic Logic

9th March 2009, 01:31 AM

Sometimes what's lost in all this talk is that a big reason this war in the Pacific happened the way it did was that the Japanese and American cultures were remarkably ignorant of each other. Much pre-war planning took place on both sides that reflected their own biases more than objective military and political reality.

Travis, thanks for weighing in, you're okay. Not a good debunk, but a point to consider that actually hasn't come up yet that I recall. I think of it as "pleading to a lesser crime," sometimes from a belief the CTist just want to criticize someone. Toss 'em a bone - they didn't allow the attack, but they were racists!

Genuine supremacism and simple ignorance were all around and strong worldwide, and from what I've seen racist dismissal had occasional impact on policy and military decisions. But the people tasked with assessing risks and making deployment plans and so on, and studied their enemy, by and large knew better. This does little to explain the military side of things, IMO.

It DOES play more into the reaction to that failure. The shock of a successful attack by 'inferior' Asiatics was a challenge to a lot of basic assumptions -
The response was telling - the US incarcerated US citizens of Japanese ancestry in - concentration camps. The US later became the only nation to actually nuke another nation - and it was this one. Challenge OUR assumptions will you? Well we know how to put the colored people back in their place...

AND, if there were a provocation and allowance plan, we might find suddenly amplified racist dismissals of Japan's military capabilities (their boats have slanty eyes and can't sail fast...), 'cultural misunderstandings' turning a peace proposal into an ultimatum (oops!), and things of that sort. If there were a project to cover up that plan, the race divide offers plenty of fabric that could help in the job.

So yeah, thanks for bringing that into the discussion. :)

Foolmewunz

9th March 2009, 03:07 AM

CL,

When you cross into abject speculation, as in the above post, you lose the train of thought in any intelligent discourse.

Now I know and you know that all your discussion of slipping into racism refers to the ebil Amurricans. What you're missing is that the Japanese were suffering from the exact same myopia. In fact, it's arguable that Japan's downfall was because they totally misconstrued American desire for diplomatic solutions for weakness. They felt that Americans weren't any longer capable of being of the warrior class that honorable Japanese were.

Yamamoto himself is probably the one most often cited and very few others recognized that they were waking a sleeping giant. He's been quoted as saying, when he heard that the declaration of war was delayed until after the attack, that this would infuriate the Americans.

FDR and the American braintrust were civilians and diplomats. The entire Japanese leadership, including Tojo, were military. I think this was a far larger factor than you're crediting. Combined with both sides' poor understanding of the culture of the other, it was almost guaranteed that there would be massive confusion.

(And if you doubt inherent institutionalized Japanese racism we can end this conversation right now.)

Caustic Logic

9th March 2009, 03:24 AM

(And if you doubt inherent institutionalized Japanese racism we can end this conversation right now.)

They love American stuff and Michael Jackson, and don't even have an army!

LOL no need, I'm just a round-sunglasses blame-America-first beatnik at heart. The racism across the pond was real too, and genuine confusion and ignorance were as real as they were. I just wanted to mention some other possibilities, re: my general theory. That's a good counter-point to balance out my slant and keep things moving on a more even keel.

Shaboom, a thumb, spot-on post chap!

stilicho

9th March 2009, 04:05 AM

2) It wasn't actually published til 1999, and that in a CT book, so that's a reason to question any first thoughts to including it.

The 1994 date was a reference to the declassification of the "McCollum Memo".

I think the timing makes sense, given that there were big decisions to be made and for example, the election was coming up, which means he'd be able (if he won again) to pursue a bolder course after November.

Actually, no, it doesn't make any sense whatsoever. The Pacific Fleet was moved to Pearl before the "McCollum Memo". The embargo against Japan was ramped up in the summer of 1940, again before the "McCollum Memo". What bolder actions were enacted in the Pacific after the memo? The replacement of Richardson?

Meanwhile, the real threat to American neutrality was centred on the Atlantic, specifically the conference I mentioned and the Lend-Lease Act.

In retrospect it's only dumb luck that the Japanese didn't catch the carriers at Pearl too. I am only working from memory here, but if it serves me correctly, some carrier-borne aircraft actually did return to Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack and suffered casualties.

To convince you that the conspiracy is true, you should require something connecting the OCT 1940 memo to the actual attacks more than a year later. It's simply too vague otherwise.

--- ---

Don't overestimate the influence of the non-interventionists by late 1941, either. A lot of them had 'shot their wad' the previous year. By the time of the attack, Congress had already revised the Neutrality Acts to allow the arming of American merchant ships. So if FDR knew war was coming, Congress must have too.

MG1962

9th March 2009, 07:30 AM

In retrospect it's only dumb luck that the Japanese didn't catch the carriers at Pearl too. I am only working from memory here, but if it serves me correctly, some carrier-borne aircraft actually did return to Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack and suffered casualties.

On 7 December 1941, the three Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers were USS Enterprise (CV-6), USS Lexington (CV-2), and USS Saratoga (CV-3).

Enterprise: On 28 November 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel sent TF-8, consisting of Enterprise, the heavy cruisers Northampton (CA-26), Chester (CA-27), and Salt Lake City (CA-24) and nine destroyers under Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., to ferry 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 211 to Wake Island. Upon completion of the mission on 4 December, TF-8 set course to return to Pearl Harbor. Dawn on 7 December 1941 found TF-8 about 215 miles west of Oahu.

Lexington: On 5 December 1941, TF-12, formed around Lexington, under the command of Rear Admiral John H. Newton, sailed from Pearl to ferry 18 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 to Midway Island. Dawn on 7 December 1941 found Lexington, heavy cruisers Chicago (CA-29), Portland (CA-33), and Astoria (CA-34), and five destroyers about 500 miles southeast of Midway. The outbreak of hostilities resulted in cancellation of the mission and VMSB-231 was retained on board [they would ultimately fly to Midway from Hickam Field on 21 December].

Saratoga: Saratoga, having recently completed an overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington, reached NAS San Diego [North Island] late in the forenoon watch on 7 December. She was to embark her air group, as well as Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 221 and a cargo of miscellaneous airplanes to ferry to Pearl Harbor.

Yorktown (CV-5), Ranger (CV-4) and Wasp (CV-7), along with the aircraft escort vessel Long Island (AVG-1), were in the Atlantic Fleet; Hornet (CV-8), commissioned in late October 1941, had yet to carry out her shakedown. Yorktown would be the first Atlantic Fleet carrier to be transferred to the Pacific, sailing on 16 December 1941.

From the brilliant collection of resources here

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-1.htm

Caustic Logic

9th March 2009, 05:16 PM

The 1994 date was a reference to the declassification of the "McCollum Memo".

Maybe most FDR historians still didn't know to look for it 'til '99, and since then, most would find it irrelevant, except maybe very critical biographies. The Q of why it isn't in books on FDR is a good enough one and it's on the record here. What's the significance? Does this bear on the memo's authenticity or contents?

The Pacific Fleet was moved to Pearl before the "McCollum Memo". The embargo against Japan was ramped up in the summer of 1940, again before the "McCollum Memo". What bolder actions were enacted in the Pacific after the memo? The replacement of Richardson?
I've never argued this document is the one that set all this rolling. It urged KEEPING the fleet there, and expanding the embargo to a complete one. It's a road marker along the way. What followed was a general continuation down the same road.

Meanwhile, the real threat to American neutrality was centred on the Atlantic, specifically the conference I mentioned and the Lend-Lease Act.
Agreed that it was on the Atlantic that any pretense of neutrality died well before its obituary was announced after actions in the Pacific.

In retrospect it's only dumb luck that the Japanese didn't catch the carriers at Pearl too. I am only working from memory here, but if it serves me correctly, some carrier-borne aircraft actually did return to Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack and suffered casualties.
Yes, that's true. The Enterprise was about as close as the striking force at the same time, and was actually involved in the battle - after the initial and worst phase. This is a decent debunk - the Enterprise was supposed to be back the night before.

But To say it was luck that no carriers were there at first is a leap of faith. The reality-based factors were deployment orders, ship speed, storm conditions, etc. These all conspired to keep the Harbor carrier-free from mid-day Dec 5 to the morning of the 7th, and contributed to the poor defense available, and maybe to a weak aerial recon situation (I'm not sure what was assigned to whom).

I have a post up about the carriers that explains my thinking on the issue:
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/carriers-controversy.html
ETA: I repeat the bad reasoning of MacArthur's offensive force being built up in that piece. I'll have to fix that, please ignore - the bombers to the Philippines were for deterrent effect

To convince you that the conspiracy is true, you should require something connecting the OCT 1940 memo to the actual attacks more than a year later. It's simply too vague otherwise.

I don't even take a carrier's written ETA of Dec 6 as evidence it was ever supposed to be there then. I don't deal in direct links usually. Vague is okay, reality usually is. I don't think its TOO vague, to be considered as evidence. It directly relates to the issues at hand - Japan, Fleet, Hawaii, War. There's clearly a connection, the Q is what kind exactly and we can't know.

Don't overestimate the influence of the non-interventionists by late 1941, either. A lot of them had 'shot their wad' the previous year. By the time of the attack, Congress had already revised the Neutrality Acts to allow the arming of American merchant ships. So if FDR knew war was coming, Congress must have too.

That's probably true. Attrition - the Axis were making the case against the isolationists for quite a while. I think it was like old snow by then - the bulk of it had melted out from under, but a crusty shell was still left giving an appearance of mass opposition.

Alferd_Packer

9th March 2009, 05:17 PM

Travis

9th March 2009, 07:33 PM

Travis, thanks for weighing in, you're okay. Not a good debunk, but a point to consider that actually hasn't come up yet that I recall. I think of it as "pleading to a lesser crime," sometimes from a belief the CTist just want to criticize someone. Toss 'em a bone - they didn't allow the attack, but they were racists!

Genuine supremacism and simple ignorance were all around and strong worldwide, and from what I've seen racist dismissal had occasional impact on policy and military decisions. But the people tasked with assessing risks and making deployment plans and so on, and studied their enemy, by and large knew better. This does little to explain the military side of things, IMO.

It DOES play more into the reaction to that failure. The shock of a successful attack by 'inferior' Asiatics was a challenge to a lot of basic assumptions -

You're overlooking the fact that there was a great deal of racism on the Japanese side as well. That BOTH sides had misconceptions about the other is what I was speaking to. It was the existence of those misconceptions that, in my opinion, shaped the course of the war for most of the first two years after which the Americans faced up to the fact that their misconceptions of the Japanese were costing lives and made corrections to their planning. It is notable, for example, that pre-invasion planning of places like Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa was remarkably different from the pre-invasion planning for Tarawa and Guadalcanal. A large part of that was understanding how the Japanese actually did things and what they were actually capable of. The fact that there were no similar changes to Japanese attitudes towards Americans is a big factor that led to them losing the war.

stilicho

9th March 2009, 09:11 PM

Enterprise: On 28 November 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel sent TF-8, consisting of Enterprise, the heavy cruisers Northampton (CA-26), Chester (CA-27), and Salt Lake City (CA-24) and nine destroyers under Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., to ferry 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 211 to Wake Island. Upon completion of the mission on 4 December, TF-8 set course to return to Pearl Harbor. Dawn on 7 December 1941 found TF-8 about 215 miles west of Oahu.

(Source: http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv6-vs6-Pearl.html )

I knew I'd find something on-line about it but this is an account of carrier-borne aircraft from Enterprise that participated in the action at Pearl Harbor.

That's how close she was to being at Pearl on DEC 7 1941.

For the 'conspirators' (usually identified as any or all of FDR, Stimson, and Knox) to cut it that close in their 'plan' is either astonishingly foolish or astonishingly wrong.

stilicho

9th March 2009, 09:34 PM

I have a post up about the carriers that explains my thinking on the issue:
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/carriers-controversy.html

Your enigmatic style of inquiry leads the reader to conclude you don't fully believe in the conspiracy theory yourself. That's especially true of the part about Enterprise's expected and actual position on the morning of DEC 7 1941.

MG1962

9th March 2009, 09:41 PM

(Source: http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv6-vs6-Pearl.html )

I knew I'd find something on-line about it but this is an account of carrier-borne aircraft from Enterprise that participated in the action at Pearl Harbor.

That's how close she was to being at Pearl on DEC 7 1941.

For the 'conspirators' (usually identified as any or all of FDR, Stimson, and Knox) to cut it that close in their 'plan' is either astonishingly foolish or astonishingly wrong.

Thanks for that interesting read. I never realised Enterprises flight crews got into action.

It is interesting to think about how the Navy would handled the attack if they knew it was comming. Two carriers avaliable. Put them to sea, with planes ready to go. The island defenses beat off the intitial attack, and the US carriers launch and follow the torpedo bombers and such committed to making it back to the Japanese carriers.

Before the CT poo hoo the idea, it is almost identical to how Midway unfolded

Foolmewunz

9th March 2009, 11:25 PM

Thanks for that interesting read. I never realised Enterprises flight crews got into action.

It is interesting to think about how the Navy would handled the attack if they knew it was comming. Two carriers avaliable. Put them to sea, with planes ready to go. The island defenses beat off the intitial attack, and the US carriers launch and follow the torpedo bombers and such committed to making it back to the Japanese carriers.

Before the CT poo hoo the idea, it is almost identical to how Midway unfolded

Oh, I absolutely believe the scenario is correct (and it's Midway to a T, minus that old standby "good fortune"). That's one of the strongest logical (not proved) arguments against the PH CT. FDR could've had them attack, beaten them back and prevented serious losses, (and thus have his excuse for war), and then sink three or four of their carriers in an act of self-defence.

Pretty tasty scenario. You get your war and you cripple the enemy's best forward offensive weapon. Clausewitz would've lost sleep smiling over such a development.

Caustic Logic

10th March 2009, 01:05 AM

For the 'conspirators' (usually identified as any or all of FDR, Stimson, and Knox) to cut it that close in their 'plan' is either astonishingly foolish or astonishingly wrong.

Haha! The very fact you can use that closeness to make that argument shows they were astinshingly right. Think about it.

It looks... kind of accidental. But either way there was an abnormal shortage of air strength at Pearl Harbor at just the moment it would most be needed.

Your enigmatic style of inquiry leads the reader to conclude you don't fully believe in the conspiracy theory yourself. That's especially true of the part about Enterprise's expected and actual position on the morning of DEC 7 1941.

I suppose I should level that I'm not - normally - the most belief-oriented person. But in this case, I'm pretty confident - I try to play it even, maybe too hard on this article. Stilicho, Do you believe the real plan was to have the Enterprise back in time to greet the striking force?

tsig

10th March 2009, 08:24 AM

Haha! The very fact you can use that closeness to make that argument shows they were astinshingly right. Think about it.

It looks... kind of accidental. But either way there was an abnormal shortage of air strength at Pearl Harbor at just the moment it would most be needed.

I suppose I should level that I'm not - normally - the most belief-oriented person. But in this case, I'm pretty confident - I try to play it even, maybe too hard on this article. Stilicho, Do you believe the real plan was to have the Enterprise back in time to greet the striking force?

In the real world very few things go according to plan.

WWII has been over for some time now. Your horse is not just dead but disarticulated.

Foolmewunz

10th March 2009, 09:37 AM

In the real world very few things go according to plan.

WWII has been over for some time now. Your horse is not just dead but disarticulated.

Speaking of horses. Here's Old Paint, my Troof on the Hoof, getting ready to go diving at PH to get to the bottom of this.
(sorry for derail, but I haven't trotted out Old Paint in a while, and well, you've got to be ready for anything if you're going to go after this ludicrous CT)

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_110854666253fa7355.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=6207)

R.Mackey

10th March 2009, 10:15 AM

Thanks for that interesting read. I never realised Enterprises flight crews got into action.

It is interesting to think about how the Navy would handled the attack if they knew it was comming. Two carriers avaliable. Put them to sea, with planes ready to go. The island defenses beat off the intitial attack, and the US carriers launch and follow the torpedo bombers and such committed to making it back to the Japanese carriers.

Before the CT poo hoo the idea, it is almost identical to how Midway unfolded

That's also what nearly happened (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/index.html) at Pearl. Had the carriers gotten better intel about the Japanese fleet, they might well have gone after them. And it's a good thing they didn't, because they probably would have lost.

We've discussed Pearl Harbor a few times before (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=72551). I don't see that the conspiracy angle holds any water at all.

stilicho

10th March 2009, 10:29 AM

Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4501417#post4501417)
For the 'conspirators' (usually identified as any or all of FDR, Stimson, and Knox) to cut it that close in their 'plan' is either astonishingly foolish or astonishingly wrong.

Haha! The very fact you can use that closeness to make that argument shows they were astinshingly right. Think about it.

It looks... kind of accidental. But either way there was an abnormal shortage of air strength at Pearl Harbor at just the moment it would most be needed.

I don't know how you can gauge a normal or abnormal shortage (or surplus) of air strength at Pearl Harbor. Apparently, Kimmel thought there was a shortage of air strength at Wake Island or he wouldn't have sent more planes there. All of this hemming and hawing about what the commanders did right or wrong (to fit with a conspiracy) is truly juvenile.

While we're at it, why don't we just say that, tactically, the US should have stripped Wake, Guam and Midway of all their defenses and put it all in the Hawaiian Islands? We could dance around this mulberry bush almost forever.

The onus is on the CT to establish the incidents or actions which unequivocally demonstrate foreknowledge. So far, we are agreeing on the basic facts of the events before Pearl and even agree that they could only be ambiguously interpreted as foreknowledge. Ambiguity isn't good enough.

Originally Posted by stilicho http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4501417#post4501417)
Your enigmatic style of inquiry leads the reader to conclude you don't fully believe in the conspiracy theory yourself. That's especially true of the part about Enterprise's expected and actual position on the morning of DEC 7 1941.

I suppose I should level that I'm not - normally - the most belief-oriented person. But in this case, I'm pretty confident - I try to play it even, maybe too hard on this article. Stilicho, Do you believe the real plan was to have the Enterprise back in time to greet the striking force?

Of course not. I agree with your conclusion (on your own site) that it was only the chance occurrence of a storm that delayed Enterprise from being there. And not 'in time to greet the striking force' but instead on schedule according to the orders given.

The 'carriers ordered away from Pearl' to facilitate the attacks argument is exactly one of those aforementioned ambiguous interpretations. Many people have this idea that they were deliberately sent far far away because they were judged too valuable. Your own research proves this wasn't the case at all.

stilicho

10th March 2009, 10:32 AM

That's also what nearly happened (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/index.html) at Pearl. Had the carriers gotten better intel about the Japanese fleet, they might well have gone after them. And it's a good thing they didn't, because they probably would have lost.

Same argument holds for the decision not to relieve Wake Island in force before its fall to the Japanese later in the month. There is strong reason to both believe that the existing US carrier force could have driven off the second landing attempt but could equally have needlessly risked more lives (and possibly even the carriers) if it had succeeded.

Corsair 115

10th March 2009, 01:21 PM

Thanks for that interesting read. I never realised Enterprises flight crews got into action.

I remember reading in books years ago that Enterprise dive bombers arrived over Pearl during the attack, and several were shot down by flak. The specific details mentioned in the linked report were quite informative.

FDR could've had them attack, beaten them back and prevented serious losses, (and thus have his excuse for war), and then sink three or four of their carriers in an act of self-defence.

I'll quibble and say sinking three or four of the Japanese carriers is being optimistic. Recall that the reason for the four losses at Midway was due to the Japanese carriers being caught at the worst possible time, with fuelled and armed aircraft on deck (and with munitions from previous armament changes not being stowed properly). That greatly increased the damage caused by the bomb hits.

Sinking one or perhaps two, and damaging one or two others, seems a more reasonable estimate.

It looks... kind of accidental. But either way there was an abnormal shortage of air strength at Pearl Harbor at just the moment it would most be needed.

It was Sunday morning. Not exactly a hotbed of activity at that time of the day and week. This the Japanese knew and exploited.

Do you believe the real plan was to have the Enterprise back in time to greet the striking force?

This presupposes the USN already knew the aircraft carrier was really the prime weapon of naval warfare. It didn't. Heck, even the Japanese navy, including Yamamoto himself, often still thought of the battleship as the main naval weapon. The IJN had four of their Yamato class superbattleships either nearly completed or under construction at the time of Pearl Harbor. This would not indicate a navy that considered the aircraft carrier as the primary naval weapon—they could have built a lot of carriers with the materials and resources they poured into those superbattleships.

(Of the four vessels, the Yamato and Musashi were completed as planned; the Shinano, after reaching 50% completion, began conversion into an aircraft carrier, and the unnamed fourth, Number 111, was ultimately cancelled in 1942 when 30% complete.)

Caustic Logic

10th March 2009, 03:23 PM

On carrier movements:
This was ordered by Kimmel, but he was ordered to order from Stark in Washington, "as soon as possible" following the Nov 26 news of Japan's impending moves against anywhere but Pearl.

On air defenses ate Pearl Harbor, 1940/41 and I'm rushing a LITTLE ahead here: Richardson's book details the patrols in late 1940/early 41 as being “inadequate protective search” - 300 mile range across just over half the compass facing west, by 6-12 planes a day, usually PBY-4 model.

Sometimes land-based patrols weren't sent out at all, and patrols were done from the carrier decks. So there was a division of labor between land and sea craft for patrolling the area.

Capt Bellinger took over Fleet Patrol Wing 2 at Pearl in Nov 1940 - I believe this is at Hickam, and all land based:
[L]ooking over the situation, I was surprised to learn that here, in the Hawaiian islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked, the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

A study done at the time found that an adequate search covering the full-compass range of 800 miles depth would require 72 longer-range planes planes up at the same time. Bellinger only had sixty craft total to work with.

It reads as if keeping up even 6-12 each day was a strain with this number. The rest were I guess used for training, which was a big deal then, and/or in maintenance? I'm not as clear on the why, but the land system usually put up 6-12 planes/day in early 41.

Repeated requests from Bellinger, Richardson, Kimmel, and others to greatly boost the wing strength with more planes and more pilots and expand the patrols to more than 300 miles and/or make them continuous, were denied. Stark: “there will be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft, but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous.”

I haven't yet found a detailed source on Kimmel-era patrols policy but as the Army Pearl Harbor board decided:
Therefore, the situation on December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were out;
distant is the 800-mile stuff, the PBY's were likely on the same little occasional 300 mi sweep

I think the Kido Butai actually knew the existing range and skirted just outside it - from due north where the sweeps only went to about 330deg. I'll compare some graphics and be back...

So anyway, "4 or 5" patrol planes up on Dec 7, in the absence of the carriers, FWIW. Things just don't go according to plan, except aerial reconnaissance - the plans in Washington were followed, and this is where it ended

aviolet4u

10th March 2009, 04:31 PM

Look I'll save you guys all the trouble researching: Every single thing that happened in history and is happening is a conspiracy, everything!!

You guys can sleep well now...or don't sleep at all knowing this.

*bad attempt at sarcasm- I apologize in advance*

tsig

10th March 2009, 04:37 PM

Speaking of horses. Here's Old Paint, my Troof on the Hoof, getting ready to go diving at PH to get to the bottom of this.
(sorry for derail, but I haven't trotted out Old Paint in a while, and well, you've got to be ready for anything if you're going to go after this ludicrous CT)

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_110854666253fa7355.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=6207)

But can he read the minds of those long dead. That seems to be essential to this conspiracy.

Maybe we need a seance to get to the bottom of this.

Caustic Logic

10th March 2009, 05:03 PM

In the real world very few things go according to plan.

Then why do people even bother planning stuff? Regarding the battle of Pearl Harbor, everything went according to plan on the Japanese side, and almost NOTHING according to the stated US plan (ie to defend, etc). I'll just have to take the hit for being paranoid enough to not accept that mammoth divide. The plans were different than stated.

WWII has been over for some time now. Your horse is not just dead but disarticulated.

The horse is dead and dismembered, no argument there. I'm just showing how it was, once, a horse. It's a big animal to disappear, and it wasn't.

Again of the carriers: Here's a chart I made to show how the US and IJ Navies cooperated to ensure at least one carrier was near enough the harbor to have planes there at almost all times:
http://i133.photobucket.com/albums/q62/chainsawmoth/127-911/carriers_at_pearl_harbor.jpg
Yes the Enterprise was just barely beaten by the Kido Butai, and had its planes in port just after the japanese - but its planes were not there before to help patrol, or at the outset to provide more targets and hopefully leave more planes total alive to respond early on. This absence contributed to the success of the attack, and it was a result of decisions from Washington, where more clues were available pointing to Hawaii as a target.

stilicho

10th March 2009, 06:05 PM

A study done at the time found that an adequate search covering the full-compass range of 800 miles depth would require 72 longer-range planes planes up at the same time. Bellinger only had sixty craft total to work with.

<snip>

Repeated requests from Bellinger, Richardson, Kimmel, and others to greatly boost the wing strength with more planes and more pilots and expand the patrols to more than 300 miles and/or make them continuous, were denied. Stark: “there will be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft, but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous.”

I absolutely know that someone has pointed this out on one of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy threads, CL: Every commander worth his salt will ask for more rather than fewer resources. It's almost a mantra in Heinz Guderian's memoirs.

Go back and read the resources here and the ones you use on your own site. Not only were the commanders requesting more resources (and allocating them the best they could) but they were actually getting them.

You still ignore the bigger picture. Although American war production had begun to swing into gear, it was not close to what it became by, say, 1944. They were lending materiel to the UK, China, and the Soviet Union. The Atlantic theatre was seeing increased U-boat action against American vessels. Congress amended the Neutrality Acts and the US 'protected zone' in the Atlantic was extended halfway to Britain. Heck, you could even argue that the transfer of Iceland from British occupation to American occupation diverted precious resources from the Pacific.

(Source: http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_03.htm )

Are you going to argue that the Yorktown was deliberately assigned to the Atlantic to allow the Japanese superiority in the Pacific? Where does it end?

Please demonstrate the unambiguous action or event that proves LIHOP. Something along the lines of "do not defend Pearl Harbor" would be admissible.

stilicho

10th March 2009, 06:12 PM

This absence contributed to the success of the attack, and it was a result of decisions from Washington, where more clues were available pointing to Hawaii as a target.

Why do you retreat to a position you previously agreed was nonsensical?

You already have entered a dialogue with me and know that this one air raid was a part of a massive Japanese offensive that included targets in the British Gilberts, Malaya, Hong Kong, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines and Midway.

But now "clues were available pointing to Hawaii as a target". How entirely inconsequential to you were those other seven targets? Did you guess better than the Allies did?

(PS: I didn't even bring up the Dutch East Indies which, as you obviously know, were the ultimate objective.)

R.Mackey

10th March 2009, 09:38 PM

Then why do people even bother planning stuff? Regarding the battle of Pearl Harbor, everything went according to plan on the Japanese side, and almost NOTHING according to the stated US plan (ie to defend, etc).

Because if you don't plan, things go even worse.

The USN was planning. They knew the IJN might attack and were busy at work fortifying everything they could. Of course, they (and nobody else, either) did not anticipate the IJN attacking in eight sectors at the same time. A lot of people failed to give the Japanese credit for their seamanship and military prowess, and a lot of people paid the price. Morison describes this pre-war hubris in his official history.

The USN plan ultimately worked. The IJN was spread too thin. Pearl was a disaster, but a recoverable one. The Philippines resisted for a good long time, tying up troops that should have been landing elsewhere. Wake inflicted grossly disproportionate casualties. By preparing so many bases and strongpoints, the IJN was spread thin reducing them, and could neither replace air crews nor capital ships defeated piecemeal all over the Pacific. Nor were the Japanese able to build a balanced force, let alone one they could reliably supply. They jumped the gun.

By shifting their strategic focus from sea control with the battered battle line, to fast hit-and-run tactics with carriers and submarines, the USN consistently outmaneuvered the Japanese, bypassing some bases, isolating and starving others, and bombarding the remainder into oblivion. Strategically, it was a sound plan. Tactically, it hurt in the beginning, but such is the nature of a tactical surprise.

Yes the Enterprise was just barely beaten by the Kido Butai, and had its planes in port just after the japanese - but its planes were not there before to help patrol, or at the outset to provide more targets and hopefully leave more planes total alive to respond early on. This absence contributed to the success of the attack, and it was a result of decisions from Washington, where more clues were available pointing to Hawaii as a target.

This is 180 degrees out of phase with reality. Had Yorktown been in port, it would not have reduced the success of the attack. The attack would in all likelihood have been more successful, because the IJN would have torpedoed the snot out of her. That was, after all, part of their plan.

Had Yorktown been in port, it is unlikely they would have flown more recon. The defensive posture at Pearl would have been at the same relaxed status. Heck, if they'd suddenly decided to start flying more, despite being in no diplomatic crisis of any kind, you'd probably point to that instead as evidence of "foreknowledge." Classic foregone conclusion fallacy.

Caustic Logic

11th March 2009, 12:48 AM

Are you going to argue that the Yorktown was deliberately assigned to the Atlantic to allow the Japanese superiority in the Pacific? Where does it end?

It ends with the last bit of real-world considerations that any plotters as it were would be considering. The Atlantic buildup makes sense for its own reasons, but if I were working to provoke and allow an attack in the Pacific, I might over-do it and strip Hawaii as bare as could look natural. I might send the Yorktown to the Atlantic, and/or order the Saratoga in for optional work, and/or keep the Hornet (IIRC) delayed in its shakedown and introduction, and/or send the Lexington and Enterprise off on errands at the last minute. I'm not saying that's what was done, but I don't see why it wouldn't make sense.

Please demonstrate the unambiguous action or event that proves LIHOP. Something along the lines of "do not defend Pearl Harbor" would be admissible.

As I said at the outset, there is no proof thing. There is no "do not defend Pearl Harbor" memo. If this is what you'll require to admit defeat, we may as well just decalre you winner now.

Caustic Logic

11th March 2009, 01:07 AM

Originally Posted by Caustic Logic
It looks... kind of accidental. But either way there was an abnormal shortage of air strength at Pearl Harbor at just the moment it would most be needed.
This presupposes the USN already knew the aircraft carrier was really the prime weapon of naval warfare. It didn't.

Mmm, actually, I don't think the ol' 'what's better, battleship or carrier? Godzilla or the Hulk?' debates had to be resolved - simply put, aircraft were in short supply at Pearl. Attacks were planned, prob. not at Pearl but still - recon, poss. defense might want to be upped. I hope by then planners had concluded that aircraft carriers were undoubtedly the best vessels for having aircraft on top of them.

Let's put it this way - imagine if they'd shut down the air base at Hickam Field two days before the attack. But here, oh it's okay, they're designed to float away from time to time...

Otherwise, excellent post.

Caustic Logic

11th March 2009, 01:40 AM

Originally Posted by Caustic Logic
This absence contributed to the success of the attack, and it was a result of decisions from Washington, where more clues were available pointing to Hawaii as a target.
Why do you retreat to a position you previously agreed was nonsensical?
Please explain. Is this the explanation?
You already have entered a dialogue with me and know that this one air raid was a part of a massive Japanese offensive that included targets in the British Gilberts, Malaya, Hong Kong, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines and Midway.

But now "clues were available pointing to Hawaii as a target". How entirely inconsequential to you were those other seven targets? Did you guess better than the Allies did?

Is it an either-or situation? They had the clues they did of a southward offensive, and clues it may be multi-pronged, to involve possibly Dutch, british, and US intersts and set for most likely early December. This kind of vague but solid knowledge was known all over. But there were also, in the same world, yes it's no secret now, clues pointing at Hawaii as one of the targets. The other actions may have been noisier, and the PH strike was a quieter operation with less clues, radio silence, thru empty northern waters, etc...

But one clue, at least, was a 2-month long running analysis of what was there to hit at Pearl and exactly where - the Bomb Plot Messages (http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/bomb-plot-messages.html), as they're sometimes called. Ran from late September up to Dec 6. This system of updating tactical info was known of in Washington and seen by all the decision-makers there, but never at Pearl.

That's just one example, the best I've seen, of a case where Washington knew more than Hawaii. Stark said he never saw the messages, but if he did, it wouldn't mean anything, and he's the one who decided the carriers had to leave. In hindsight, that's obviously wrong. In foresight, well, it MUST be unforeseeable, because if he could see or predict how all his would come together, my word...

Caustic Logic

11th March 2009, 02:21 AM

Because if you don't plan, things go even worse.

RM, thanks for weighing in. You do know about planning, let's see what you know about Pearl Harbor

The USN was planning. They knew the IJN might attack and were busy at work fortifying everything they could.

Are you saying they COULDN'T strengthen Pearl Harbor, where the fleet was based with well-known inadequate air cover?

Of course, they (and nobody else, either) did not anticipate the IJN attacking in eight sectors at the same time.

They could narrow it own, by thinking back to Port Arthur, and guess that the sector the Pacific Fleet was in, might, y'know, be one of the sectors to anticipate. I don't know, I guess that is pretty crazy. :boggled:

A lot of people failed to give the Japanese credit for their seamanship and military prowess, and a lot of people paid the price. Morison describes this pre-war hubris in his official history.

That indeed sound soooo Morison, too all honrable and loyal.

Originally Posted by Caustic Logic
Yes the Enterprise was just barely beaten by the Kido Butai, and had its planes in port just after the japanese - but its planes were not there before to help patrol, or at the outset to provide more targets and hopefully leave more planes total alive to respond early on. This absence contributed to the success of the attack, and it was a result of decisions from Washington, where more clues were available pointing to Hawaii as a target.
This is 180 degrees out of phase with reality. Had Yorktown been in port, it would not have reduced the success of the attack. The attack would in all likelihood have been more successful, because the IJN would have torpedoed the snot out of her. That was, after all, part of their plan.

First, the one that was supposed to be there was Enterprise. But anyway, To be sure, the exact value of one or more carriers at the time is impossible to gauge, especially by non-experts. On the one hand, they could be afraid of losing them, on the other hand they could just be thinking about the planes. Planes were being tied up real bad all over in 1941, it seems.

Had Yorktown been in port, it is unlikely they would have flown more recon. The defensive posture at Pearl would have been at the same relaxed status. [QUOTE]
In itself, perhaps it wouldn't help the recon situation. If it was 'scheduled' back on 12/6, it is possible that its delay affected the patrol before the attack. Or maybe not, because the patrol pattern was apparently inadequate. I don't know, do you know the patrol patterns they were flying that morning? I'm not sure where to find that.

[QUOTE]Heck, if they'd suddenly decided to start flying more, despite being in no diplomatic crisis of any kind, you'd probably point to that instead as evidence of "foreknowledge." Classic foregone conclusion fallacy.

Ha! No, that's more the "eebil probocations" category. ;) Break in talks means guards up, talks going well means relax. These are apple + apple and orange + orange. so the scenario you present is like orange + apple, and what it seems actually happened is apple + orange. Hope that clears it up!

:D

Dave Rogers

11th March 2009, 03:37 AM

Stilicho, Do you believe the real plan was to have the Enterprise back in time to greet the striking force?

I thought it was the Nimitz that went back in time to stop the Pearl Harbor attacks.

;)

Dave

Foolmewunz

11th March 2009, 07:31 AM

CL,

You're off on one of those illogical leaps of faith again. Let's try to rein this one in.

You do realize the one question the Japanese high command and Yamamoto kept asking after Pearl, right. "But did you get the carriers?" "Where are the damned carriers?"

The USN, as Corsair pointed out, didn't think of the Carrier as the prime weapon. (Your Godzilla, I believe.) But the IJN did. Hell, not only were they using them in their boldest attack, but they were specifically after the US carriers.

Had any carriers been in Pearl, they would've been delighted. They wanted to get three or four of them! That's why they went after Pearl Harbor.

So this salient about whether/if they were taken out by FDR and his co-conspirators to make it an easier target is just absurd. They weren't looking for an easier target. They were lookng for carriers.

stilicho

11th March 2009, 08:48 AM

Is it an either-or situation? They had the clues they did of a southward offensive, and clues it may be multi-pronged, to involve possibly Dutch, british, and US intersts and set for most likely early December. This kind of vague but solid knowledge was known all over. But there were also, in the same world, yes it's no secret now, clues pointing at Hawaii as one of the targets. The other actions may have been noisier, and the PH strike was a quieter operation with less clues, radio silence, thru empty northern waters, etc...

Yes, strategically, all military actions are either/or. In fact, they are combinations of many either/or scenarios. That's why I've been mentioning the Neutrality Acts, Iceland, the expanded Atlantic protected zone, as well as the multiple other tactical objectives the Japanese had in the Pacific in DEC 1941.

Your own analysis bears this out when you mention how many recon aircraft were wanted at Pearl versus how many were actually there. You've probably had either/or moments yourself when managing your household budget. You prepare your budget and discover you may either buy a flat-screen or put a down payment on a new Hyundai. You find that you cannot do both. You have "foreknowledge" of your desire for both things but your budget tells you that you can't afford it.

Also, you're now arguing that Pearl was the 'quiet one'. Are you sure that's your final answer? Because if it is, you're again agreeing with everyone who's argued that it's not a LIHOP conspiracy. I wouldn't call it the 'quiet one' and I don't believe there was a conspiracy.

Go back to that ibiblio link that we put up for you a few pages ago. I went through about 50 of the documents and dispatches last night to be sure. None are specifying exact times or locations and it appears at least one of them has the reported location of one of the Japanese fleets wrong. It might help your analysis (since I don't have time to do it for you) to read and chart those documents instead of drawing a graph. Are any of them factually inaccurate? Are any of them misleading? That might be a better exercise than creating the chart that you did.

There are also intelligence reports from the Japanese on that site. I looked at most of those and figured that they knew almost the exact size and composition of the Canadian forces at Hong Kong before they attacked.

Corsair 115

11th March 2009, 10:55 AM

The USN, as Corsair pointed out, didn't think of the Carrier as the prime weapon. (Your Godzilla, I believe.) But the IJN did.

I wouldn't go that far. There were battleship proponents inside the IJN, and even Yamamoto himself, while aware of the aircraft carrier's value, still seem enamoured of battleships. For example, in the Midway plan, the "Main Force" was centered on a group led by the battleship Yamato.

Hell, not only were they using them in their boldest attack, but they were specifically after the US carriers.

The carriers were at the top of the list, but the battleships were to be hit as well. What's ironic is that, by knocking out the U.S. battleship fleet, it forced the USN to use the aircraft carrier as its primary naval weapon.

INRM

11th March 2009, 11:11 AM

What about the McCollum Memo?

Caustic Logic

11th March 2009, 03:25 PM

So this salient about whether/if they were taken out by FDR and his co-conspirators to make it an easier target is just absurd. They weren't looking for an easier target. They were lookng for carriers.

Thanks FMW for bringing it up this way. So, you're saying "they weren't looking for an easier target. They were lookng for carriers." They were disappointed, as they did find the former (bonus) and not the latter (downside). As they kept tabs, they'd know Enterprise was out, and probably Lexington (it left the 5th, and the ships-in-harbor reports were still going out),but probably had the Enterprise due back by then. So yeah, a surprise

So I'd have to agree IF there were a conspiratorial one-and-only reason, it would be save the carriers and deny the Japanese an intended target, flip-sides of the same coin, and showing an awareness of their value. The answer to it would be the same as to the loss of any other ship - build more, and more planes if lost. Saving the carriers would just be thrift, considering the level of production that would follow.

The reason I turned to impeding defense and recon (carriers seen as planes) is because I originally found the thrift explanation as too weak in itself. There are problems with this - questions of the patrol patterns any such planes would be plugged into, whether they'd be used at all, whether they'd be able to get anyone airborne before sinking in case of surprise... So admittedly it doesn't make 100% sense in itself.

But finally - Considering there's no reason anyone had to decide either-or, moving the carriers out serves both half-ass purposes, is doubly-indicated, and in real life did come to pass. It may have been a precaution considering the unknowns down each of the two lines of reasoning.

Caustic Logic

11th March 2009, 04:00 PM

Yes, strategically, all military actions are either/or.

I disagree on your metaphors. They did not chose to defend either/or the Philippines, Wake, Guam... this is more like you have so many resources and so many important points to defend. You can consider all, including Hawaii, and disperse as best you can among all, or for some reason go either Hawaii or everything else, which is almost what seems to be happening.

And to add to the above - the patrol planes situtation at Peearl was improved somewhat between Bellingers early '41 complaints and the attack. I'm looking into it more as far as what was wrong then. Layton's book has this:
As of 12/7 6 army B-17s were flyable (good for long-range, which wasn't being done) The Navy had 81 long-range PBY ambibians, usually taking a 16-hr 1700 mi forays of dawn til dusk. 54 of Bellinger's 81 planes were new arrivals - PBY-5 Catalinas – 8 deg wedge for over 700 mi – “fewer than thirty” available for continuous daily operations. Layton thought at least 250 PBYs were needed "to maintain a comprehensive daily surveillance.” That sounds high to me. He says only a 144-degree sector, with a centerline pointing WSW could be covered, leaving 60% of the clock unguarded.

As for why they were looking that way, below:

Also, you're now arguing that Pearl was the 'quiet one'. Are you sure that's your final answer? Because if it is, you're again agreeing with everyone who's argued that it's not a LIHOP conspiracy. I wouldn't call it the 'quiet one' and I don't believe there was a conspiracy.

It's how it looks at the moment. There are clues that MAY have been available giving perhaps every detail needed, but so far as we know, the striking force could have not been detected until it was close enough to be actually seen. Even the plans for this attack were written up separately from the main December strike plans in Tokyo, not mentioned in the larger plans, and given very small, tight circulation. Apparently the JN-25 code the combined fleet used to transmit the plans was not broken and then radio silence was observed.Then they set sail from the Kuriles thru a pretty empty channel of the North Pacific. The force was seen by the USS Boise, but this clue did not apparently make it anywhere after being reported on Dec 4.

Long-range patrols were never flown to the north. All suspicion at Pearl of Japanese designs on them (yes they were thinking about it) focused on the Marshalls IIRC, to the southwest, based on observed build-up there. In retrospect they should have suspected distraction. They should have recalled Fleet Problem XIX, where the Japanese attacked from the north, at dawn, on a Sunday and achieved surprise. Maybe they really just couldn't cover north AND south, chose one and crossed fingers... The radar was not used properly at all, and I'm still unsure how that happened (it was Short's job) The lack of long-range patrols has generally been put on Kimmel, but I'm unsure there too. I'm not sure it's the range so much as the direction. Imagination... resources...

This is evolution of thought going on here, BTW. I'm reading Henry Clausen's book too (w/Bruce Lee, but not the Kung-Fu one). It's all a complicated story with a hundred sub-stories, please bear with me during remodeling...

It might help your analysis (since I don't have time to do it for you) to read and chart those documents instead of drawing a graph. Are any of them factually inaccurate? Are any of them misleading? That might be a better exercise than creating the chart that you did.

I'll check that out later. I just love doing graphs, but I'd prefer to make it relevant, which means study. :)

Caustic Logic

11th March 2009, 04:08 PM

What about the McCollum Memo?

Hey, welcome!

See posts 104, 119, 121, 123, 124, 130
about the McCollum memo. Feel free to springboard off anything therein or offer anything new.

What are your thoughts on Pearl Harbor?

Foolmewunz

11th March 2009, 04:26 PM

I wouldn't go that far. There were battleship proponents inside the IJN, and even Yamamoto himself, while aware of the aircraft carrier's value, still seem enamoured of battleships. For example, in the Midway plan, the "Main Force" was centered on a group led by the battleship Yamato.

The carriers were at the top of the list, but the battleships were to be hit as well. What's ironic is that, by knocking out the U.S. battleship fleet, it forced the USN to use the aircraft carrier as its primary naval weapon.

Yeah, sorry... a little hyperbole on my part on both points. But just a little. They understood the value of the carrier far more than the USN, but yeah... they would've probably been saying, but where are the big battleships if they'd hit the carriers and the big boyz were out at sea.

R.Mackey

11th March 2009, 08:29 PM

I disagree on your metaphors. They did not chose to defend either/or the Philippines, Wake, Guam... this is more like you have so many resources and so many important points to defend. You can consider all, including Hawaii, and disperse as best you can among all, or for some reason go either Hawaii or everything else, which is almost what seems to be happening.

But this is silly. Do you really think Pearl was undefended, while everywhere else was rolling in an abundance of military resources?

If anything, Pearl was overstrength, considering that it was held to be a rear area and highly unlikely for attack. As I said before, nobody expected the Japanese to show up everywhere at once. That's just not the way it was done. According to doctrine, the USN should have had more assets in place in the Philippines, not Oahu.

Besides, more assets at Pearl wouldn't have saved it. It would have meant more ships on the bottom and more planes shot to bits on the tarmac. The base had the assets to defend itself reasonably well, were it prepared, alerted, freshly trained. Same thing happened to MacArthur, same day, same results, even though he knew it was coming and had seven hours warning.

An evil genius, even if forewarned, wouldn't have let the attack do so much damage, either. The fact that it was a sneak attack on American soil is plenty to do the dastardly job of getting us into WWII where we obviously didn't belong :rolleyes: regardless of the damage inflicted. The Evil Genius would have bushwhacked the IJN with submarines and B-17's, and if necessary lied about losses suffered, though I can't imagine it would have mattered.

I just don't see a coherent alternate hypothesis anywhere.

dudalb

11th March 2009, 09:44 PM

At to the battleship versus carrier debate, some naval historians actually consider that what happend a couple of days after Pearl Harbor..the Repulse and the Price of Wales being sunk by aircraft off the coast of Malaya...might have been just as important in settling the issue of air power versus battleshiips as the main arm of Naval power as Pearl.
The two British Ships had all the room in the world to maneuver,were not trapped in a narrow harbor, were fullly manned and ready, and still got sunk. That mush have been as huge blow to the Battleship Admirals, already reeling after Pearl Harbor.

stilicho

11th March 2009, 11:30 PM

But this is silly. Do you really think Pearl was undefended, while everywhere else was rolling in an abundance of military resources?

I was going to say that but you beat me to it.

Many accounts explain that the first Japanese assault on Wake Island failed partly due to the increased air defenses and, IIRC, a couple of 5-inch gun emplacements that they didn't know about. The intelligence was imperfect on both sides or they'd have succeeded on their first try at Wake.

I read a pretty good on-line of the Japanese actions against Johnston Atoll in DEC 1941 today but I can't find it now. Should it have been stripped of its defences to help out at the Hawaiian Islands?

Maybe CL's right. The US could have agreed with the Mahanians and simply not risked any of the Pacific Fleet at all, removed it all to San Diego (or transferred the whole thing to the Atlantic), and given up on any attempts to hold the Alaska-Hawaiian Islands-Panama line. We know from several Churchill biographies that he was not averse to letting the Japanese take Australia if it meant winning the war in the European theatre. He'd nearly convinced the Americans that was the right course to take.

The Reuben James was bound to be repeated. Woody Guthrie and Pete Seeger even wrote a ballad about it. That's the famous pacifists Guthrie and Seeger.

I must apologise for not addressing CL directly but the second-guessing and finger-pointing (obliquely, of course) is getting tiresome. There is no "do not defend Pearl Harbor" memo. There is nothing to suggest that the only Japanese action in DEC 1941 was a single air raid. Instead it's vague suggestion that perhaps Stark (or someone) knew more than Kimmel did.

I just don't know where it ends.

--- ---

To dudalb: Exactly right.

--- ---

Where's the conspiracy theory regarding the Franco-Siamese War? That was the one that allowed the Japanese to intervene and get those airbases in Vichy-controlled French Indochina from which the raids were launched to sink the Repulse and Prince of Wales. Did the Vichy commanders deliberately allow that to happen?

Corsair 115

12th March 2009, 05:33 PM

Layton thought at least 250 PBYs were needed "to maintain a comprehensive daily surveillance.” That sounds high to me.

Depends if he is factoring in serviceability rates or not. Not all 100% of the aircraft in a squadron were available for operation; some percentage was always unavailable due to repairs and/or maintenance.

Caustic Logic

13th March 2009, 02:10 AM

Depends if he is factoring in serviceability rates or not. Not all 100% of the aircraft in a squadron were available for operation; some percentage was always unavailable due to repairs and/or maintenance.

Thanks for the thought and that certainly seems to be true - different sources all say that, and it seems a small fraction - maybe 1/2 in a good case - can be flyable. Before wartime production, it was a hard limitation, esp. given all the training they were using a lot of existing planes for. Shoulda had em doing long-range recon practice north of Oahu.

So I took a bit of a break - man, what a thread! I just don't stop, do I? But I'm tired of arguing - for now anyway. I don't understand it all as well as I should to push further. I hope I helped stimulated some useful thought without being too ugly about it all. I know I've learned a few things and gotten some new perspectives to consider. I still don't feel de-bunked, but I could be wrong. My hunch still stands and my thinking on motive still all makes sense - but a number of other possible outcomes also make some kind of sense, so what?

It's in the evidence of what actually happened that a lot hinges - and that is vastly complex, some certainly controlled, obscured... others I just haven't read, but I'll keep looking at it and report back in about eight years with my findings. Lol. Or whenever it seems worthwhile.

For now, there's certainly no specific evidence pointing to any design in the surprise that happened - the main thing is the force en route - the only radio location clue they gave was disappearing at the Kuriles - their operational code was still unreadable, so we didn't read their orders to head to Hawaii. They weren't seen by long-range recon, and that's the no. 1 problem. Not Kimmel's lack of, that didn't matter, since it would be long-range in the wrong direction. This may well just be distraction/lack of imagination/etc. And that's really what did it more than anything, and it falls in the lap of Kimmel and his subordinates, not FDR. But a full patrol was impossible, perhaps leading to reliance on the magic of radar, which had its own problems, like no one understanding what to do about hundreds of blips heading south, one hour prior to striking. That would fall on Short and his subordinates.

Does that mean they're in on it? Maybe my "it" needs to change?

Foolmewunz

13th March 2009, 02:21 AM

You really really really do just want to believe in this, don't you?

I think, with very rare exception, we've been patient and professional. In fact, I think we're a little more pointed with old "friends" than we were with you. And I think the body of work here has done a very fine and well-tempered job of debunking what is essentially an Op-Ed opinion piece.

It's pretty hard to quote end quote debunk something when the person proposing it pretty much says that his evidence doesn't hold up that well and that there really isn't that much evidence, but he just wants to believe it, anyway.

So while I wouldn't rack it up to some of the brilliant tear-downs we've seen in some of the homeopathy or free energy or PSI threads, it's been a pretty good overall job. I'm a dilettante at history but I get a little full of myself, sometimes. I appreciate the stuff I've been able to pick up. (And I've learned to temper my hyperbole a bit, too.)

Caustic Logic

13th March 2009, 02:26 AM

But this is silly. Do you really think Pearl was undefended, while everywhere else was rolling in an abundance of military resources?

If anything, Pearl was overstrength, considering that it was held to be a rear area and highly unlikely for attack. As I said before, nobody expected the Japanese to show up everywhere at once. That's just not the way it was done. According to doctrine, the USN should have had more assets in place in the Philippines, not Oahu.

Sorry my last post came out kinda snappish. I've no doubt Hawaii was "held" by many to be a rear area thought unlikely to be attacked. It's just that it shouldn't've been, in retrospect or foresight. It was 1/3 from California to Japan, surrounded by open ocean on all sides, impossible to patrol, and home of the Pacific Fleet. I guess they just goofed up and didn't put 2+2+2 together, but as far as patrol planes, they were under-strength.

good patrol plans, aggressive intelligent use of radar data, and available intel pointing to Japanese intention on the Fleet, and miles of Pacific between them and the attacker, were also in short order. The blame for these is all over the place.

Besides, more assets at Pearl wouldn't have saved it. It would have meant more ships on the bottom and more planes shot to bits on the tarmac.

Can't disagree with that. Well put, in fact.

The base had the assets to defend itself reasonably well, were it prepared, alerted, freshly trained. Same thing happened to MacArthur, same day, same results, even though he knew it was coming and had seven hours warning.

People have always puzzled over that, haven't they? I heard a rumor that he was actually paid off to not respond. I haven't checked on that, but it seemed like it was maybe true, odd as it sounds. If you want to Google it, IIRC $600,000 was the amount.
ETA: Circumstantial case by Costello: http://www.fff.org/freedom/0695f.asp
Sounds like an interesting hypothesis.

An evil genius, even if forewarned, wouldn't have ...

Oh now you're just speculating. But thank you, all these different opinions go into making a good thread, and it's got a lot of that by now.

fezzic

13th March 2009, 03:09 AM

If you look at the runup to Pearl harbor from the viewpoint of someone staring into the fog of the future with no particular inkling that something bad was going to happen -- the country was at peace and conventionally, would expect a declaration of war then an attack force to approach -- to justify all the expense and effort then the decisions made might not see so poorly made. Looking at it from the viewpoint of "if I knew then what I know now" (a hindsight view), then yes the decision was shown to be wrong because of what happened but there was no way for the decision maker to know that at the time he made his decision. In situations like this, one can almost always do more, but when resources may be limited, choices have to be made and the poor decision maker has to make a decision.

I recall that someone, I don't recall who though not on these forums I think, put forward the idea that being attacked in Pearl Harbor was ultimately less destructive to the fleet than having the fleet sortie against the Japanese task force. A battleship sunk in Pearl Harbor could be salvaged/refloated and repaired while the same ship sunk in the open ocean is irrevocably lost and would have to be replaced.

Let's see. While I don't know the details of what happened in the Phillipines other than we took a beating there as well, one might point out that 1) there was probably no deployed early-warning system either observer or radar, 2) running a CAP would probably not be effective except in the immediate vicinity of the airbases due to lack of a running air defense and early-warning setup *, and 3) the operational aircraft were probably scrambled upon hearing of the PH attack and eventually had to land, refuel, and the crews rest, where #1 then allowed an incoming attack to catch them on the ground.

* Which would mean that the defending fighters could try and take a toll of the attackers but the attackers were going to hit their target anyway.

IMO, of course. :)

Caustic Logic

17th March 2009, 01:44 AM

fezzic: Good points on foresight vs. hindsight, but overplayed. Just because hindsight is 20/20 doesn't mean foresight is so myopic decision makers are normally just stumbling around in a haze with no idea of cause and effect. Pearl was indeed quite a good place to get your fleet sunk without actually losing more than necessary. I don't know much about the Philippines situation ither, but IIRC the cause for MacArthur's defenselessness really is baffling, beyond the mundane possibilities you cite. I'll be looking into it sometime, but not now.

You really really really do just want to believe in this, don't you? <snip> the body of work here has done a very fine and well-tempered job of debunking what is essentially an Op-Ed opinion piece.

Whereas I’ve been met with nothing but undeniable facts and unbiased minds open to any possibility? Does what I want to believe effect things? Sure, it leads to bias. Does that mean it’s necessarily wrong? No. What do you want to believe about Pearl Harbor? Does that instill any bias? Does that make you wrong?

As far as this goes to questioning my psychology or morals or whatever, I guess you've scored a hit. I'm that self-important anti-American paranoid type, at least to some degree, and I try to maintain balance while using my bias to possibly uncover truths or valuable PoVs that other might miss. I'm one of those aberrant neuron in the collective mind that tries to challenge the others. I should probably just be weeded out, but as things stand here I am, still buzzing away, giving you all another chance to fail to wonder "what if he's right?"

I think, with very rare exception, we've been patient and professional. In fact, I think we're a little more pointed with old "friends" than we were with you.

I was hoping for more than patience, which is “just wait ‘til this guy shuts up and it’s over… “

It's pretty hard to quote end quote debunk <snip> I wouldn't rack it up to some of the brilliant tear-downs we've seen

Glad you can admit, with the qualifications, that there has been no conclusive de-bunk. That’s natural; it’s a case that lends itself to neither proof nor disproof. We have seen some good thoughtful opinions on both sides, and it’s up to the readers to apply their own biased opinions to decide, by and large for sure, that the majority opinion cluster is indeed fact.

I'm a dilettante at history but I get a little full of myself, sometimes. I appreciate the stuff I've been able to pick up. (And I've learned to temper my hyperbole a bit, too.)

Good, I’m glad learning happened here, which is all in the learner’s attitude – and you for one have obviously got a good head on your shoulders. Your hyperbole was quite minor, what’re you talking about, tempering? You seem to know quite a bit already, and your presumptuousness is nothing compared to my own on display here.

Oh, wait... now I get what you’re talking about. Clevverrrr…. ;)

stilicho

17th March 2009, 01:06 PM

I don't know much about the Philippines situation ither, but IIRC the cause for MacArthur's defenselessness really is baffling, beyond the mundane possibilities you cite. I'll be looking into it sometime, but not now.

There are dozens of books written on the Pacific Theatre that explain MacArthur's inaction primarily due to his deferrence to the Filipino civilian leadership. Also, a teletype operator was on a lunch break when the radar report came in.

No big mystery.

Caustic Logic

17th March 2009, 02:09 PM

I've posted a new analysis of the McCollum Memo, based on what I did for this thread.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/03/mccollum-memo-analysis.html

FWIW, here are the new points:
Actions D recommends "Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore."
CNO Stark recalled the President favoring “pop-up Cruises,” saying something like “I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don’t mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six.” Three such missions, including to a prime IJN training ground near Honshu, were carried out from March-July 1941. All ended without any overt act of war. Can anyone bebunk that quote? Stinnett cites B Mitchell Simpson, III, Admiral Harold R. Stark (1989) pp 101, 102

Action H - "Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire."
In late July action H was more nearly approached – by a leap and not a step – with an embargo on the most vital petroleum exports to Japan. The oil embargo is universally accepted as one of the prime factors toppling their equilibrium irreversibly towards major war in SE Asia, at least sooner than otherwise would happen.

Additional evidence that people saw the memo:
Stinnett claims it was also addressed to Dudley Knox, an ONI strategist of great repute, who left his mark as having seen it. Knox endorsed McCollum's proposal in general but, in forwarding his thoughts to Anderson, added the caveat “we should not precipitate anything in the Orient.” [3] Beyond this, Stinnett could find no paper trail for the document, aside from a diary entry from Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long - dated Oct 7 1940 - that he felt “little by little we will face a situation which will bring us into conflict with Japan.” This had been triggered, Stinnett sums, when he that day “learned of a series of steps involving the US Navy and that one included concentrating the fleet at Honolulu.” [4]

And another Richardson quote, from his 1945 testimony, referring to his Oct. 8 1940 meeting with FDR:
Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.

Note Philippines would not do it, which leaves more American possessions as the location of any such mistake. He wouldn't specify. So as I summed up:

He's also leaving a roughly Hawaii shaped blank spot in the list of places a Japanese “mistake” might in fact mean war, as he insisted on keeping that hole filled with the fleet. We cannot at this point know if these two strands are directly connected. But if they are, that's about all you'd need to know. It's an awfully big question mark.

stilicho

17th March 2009, 03:41 PM

Action H - "Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire."

Quote:
In late July action H was more nearly approached – by a leap and not a step – with an embargo on the most vital petroleum exports to Japan. The oil embargo is universally accepted as one of the prime factors toppling their equilibrium irreversibly towards major war in SE Asia, at least sooner than otherwise would happen.

Why are you going backwards, CL?

We were making such progress and now it's back to the single source (Stinnett) of an old memo (OCT 1940) with no direct link to the Japanese maritime offensive of DEC 1941.

Just speaking to this point, you know it's both (a) unexceptional in anyone's thinking in late 1940 and (b) not quite on the mark when it claims 'by a leap and not a step'.

Why is it unexceptional? Because everyone knew that the Japanese cabinet had changed for the worse that summer. Konoye was featured on the cover of TIME magazine in July.

Neither you nor Stinnett have grasped that McCollum was responding to events commonly known at the time and not penning in anticipation of the future.

Why is it not on the mark? We've already talked about that, CL. The embargo was applied gradually and only in response to further Japanese provocations and aggression.

Caustic Logic

18th March 2009, 01:03 AM

Why are you going backwards, CL?

We were making such progress and now it's back to the single source (Stinnett) of an old memo (OCT 1940) with no direct link to the Japanese maritime offensive of DEC 1941.

This isn't backwards, there's no one direction. I reserve the right to go back and look again at any bit of evidence and keep considering it.

Stinnett did the research, and so long as it holds up, it's good. He's got the memo, the confirmations of it from Knox and Long, and pointed to the FDR-Richardson meeting the next day, which I can research myself. [ETA: I have not looked at the testimony of Adm Leahy, who was also at this meeting and is supposed to corroborate Richardson's recollection, but will]

As for "no connection," that's just plain silly. The question is how direct the connection was. I'm willing to discuss that.

Just speaking to this point, you know it's both (a) unexceptional in anyone's thinking in late 1940 and (b) not quite on the mark when it claims 'by a leap and not a step'.

Why is it unexceptional? Because everyone knew that the Japanese cabinet had changed for the worse that summer. Konoye was featured on the cover of TIME magazine in July.
<snip>Why is it not on the mark? We've already talked about that, CL. The embargo was applied gradually and only in response to further Japanese provocations and aggression.

First, thank you for engaging me here, I don't mean to run you off, but... a complete trade embargo on Japan is hardly "unexceptional" by any standard. The US was a huge trading partner, the origin of a dangerously large percentage of some commodities like oil, notably. I am talking out my ass a little, but c'mon. Embargoes are arguably acts of war, especially significant and crippling ones. Whatever the situation, to say war is unexceptional, or ordinary, just because the guys are jerks or problematic... It's a heavy decision.

Please also note the oil embargo, which was quite significant in its effects, was instituted at just about the same time it would become clear the "pop-up cruises" had failed to trigger any overt acts. (late July 41)

Neither you nor Stinnett have grasped that McCollum was responding to events commonly known at the time and not penning in anticipation of the future.

You know, I think I'm getting hung up on your wording sometimes. You are too smart to have meant McCollum was not anticipating the future. I presume you mean he didn't know the outcome, which is obvious. It's quite clear he was responding to events at the time, and his predictions where they would lead to, in the future, and what we should do about it.

His proposals were geared towards entering the War as full beligerents, not a brand-new idea to be sure, but still heavy. He also summarized "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." [emph mine] Well, they wound up committing one...

The president may have read it, the next day met with Richardson, and left the Admiral with the following feeling about that "mistake" comment:
This caused me to think that he meant sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the U.S., with the result that the citizens of the United States would be willing to enter the war [...] that we would be at war with Japan in due time, and that he was willing for some ship of the Navy to be the victim of a Japanese “mistake."

That's not interesting? Unexceptional? Please do explain.

ETA: What's your reasoning for emphasizing the time difference between OCT 1940 and DEC 1941 anyway? Does this mean something, like a debunk or something? Was FDR supposed to run off and provoke Japan immediately, and get them to comply, all within a month or two?

kookbreaker

18th March 2009, 05:38 AM

Caustic Logic

18th March 2009, 02:04 PM

CL, Stinnett presents a horde of things that resemble research but is not. Go to the Pearl Harbor forums (such as www.pearlharborattacked.com) and search for his name. He is not held in high regard. Not surprising, he is very 'fast and loose' with the facts. I have yet to hear from a student of cryptology or the Pacific theater who considers him reliable. From what I have read he doesn't seem to care much about accuracy, he actually declares that the Kudu Batai was broadcasting simply on the basis that some US stations intercepted some messages (that were not from Kudo Batai). He's also famous for shutting down his forum when the questions about his shoddy research got too 'hot' for him. I take anything from him with a massive grain of salt.

To be honest, I can't disagree. I've heard that before, and found a few points now at least where he seems to be willfully wrong, or stubbornly cockeyed... the radio silence issue as you mention, and he seems to claim the JN-25 code was broken, with a couple adjectives and no specifics, just "naval codes," and makes a number of leaps and good points made wrong. This requires the salt, and raises questions. I also noticed his Pearlharbor41 website is no more, interesting for someone with such revolutionary works to impart...

For the evidence at hand, however, it comes down to this:

1) Is the memo authentic? Seeing how well it fits w/Richardson' 10/8 meeting, it would be a prime forgery to fill that juicy spot of "the day before that" So far no one has made this claim or looked into it AFAIK

2) Knox's endorsement has the same questions - it's attached to the McCollum Memo scans available:
http://i133.photobucket.com/albums/q62/chainsawmoth/127-911/page6.gif

3) Long's diary - cited as War Diary of Breckenridge Long (University of Nebraska Press 1966) p 136. I don't have this. Neither does Amazon. Is he making it up? Or is it real but referring to something real and Stinnett used this plus JO's meeting to triangulate his forgery? Possible. Or is it verification that people were looking at the memo on Oct 7 and after?

4) Is his interpretation correct? Partly, I think, but I don't trust it. He paraphrases Long, as well as a direct quote. He makes some leaps in putting it all together. Luckily he other points are available in their own form w/no editorial spin from Stinnett.

So... I'm not appealing to Stinnett authority here, just to this one original thing he put out there. I'm open to this particular strand being a hoax if it is, but so far I have no real reason to believe so.

And if it's real, I feel it is revelatory.

Caustic Logic

18th March 2009, 03:40 PM

Stinnett was amazed that oil was allowed to flow to Japan "Between July 1940 and April 1941, during a period when American petroleum supplies were supposedly under embargo"

??? All other sources I've seen put the embargo at the end of July 1941. Anyone else?

So just a coincidence I caught that now just skimming for notes - I'm planning my own FOIA request for the McCollum memo, since I really don't trust Stinnett. National Archives is where he found it, Archive II, a special navy collection, so say the notes. Does anyone have any advice on how best to do this? Because otherwise I'll prob. do the standard online form.

stilicho

18th March 2009, 05:03 PM

As for "no connection," that's just plain silly. The question is how direct the connection was. I'm willing to discuss that.

It's not silly. The only thing the memo proves is that somebody, somewhere, at some time thought that American reactions to Japanese aggression in China, and its naval build-up, and its change of government towards a virtual military junta, may lead to war between the two powers. That's what it proves, period.

As I showed you, TIME magazine practically explained the path to war in a cover story on Konoye in JUL 1940. You might as well use that article as a part of the conspiracy.

You attach far too much weight to a memo that is not proved to have been seen by FDR, nor is it proved to have influenced Knox or anyone else.

First, thank you for engaging me here, I don't mean to run you off, but... a complete trade embargo on Japan is hardly "unexceptional" by any standard. The US was a huge trading partner, the origin of a dangerously large percentage of some commodities like oil, notably. I am talking out my ass a little, but c'mon. Embargoes are arguably acts of war, especially significant and crippling ones. Whatever the situation, to say war is unexceptional, or ordinary, just because the guys are jerks or problematic... It's a heavy decision.

It's the embargo that was unexceptional, CL.

Embargoes had been applied in numerous other cases in the 1930s, notably against Italy during their Abyssinian campaign, and against both sides in the Spanish Civil War. Not that they had the desired effects in either case but they are certainly unexceptional.

I noticed that you didn't reply to the second point about it being applied gradually. Again, you'll have to find something like a good economic history of the period to discover this. There are almanacs that show yearly international trade figures, often organised by resource or product. Any university library will have them.

Please also note the oil embargo, which was quite significant in its effects, was instituted at just about the same time it would become clear the "pop-up cruises" had failed to trigger any overt acts. (late July 41)

This is a good point. In fact, it shows that you have discovered that the basing of the Pacific Fleet's battleships was nowhere near the only or ultimate provocation or deterrent (depending on how you look at it). So were material and political support for China. So was the continued presence in the Philippines. And so on. All of these things, together, represent a provocative or deterrent stance or maybe a combination of both.

And what was Japan's response? To replace all its moderates with militarists, to cast enviously upon Hitler's unabated march through Europe, and to refuse to alter its strategy in China.

The president may have read it, the next day met with Richardson, and left the Admiral with the following feeling about that "mistake" comment:

Richardson Quote:
This caused me to think that he meant sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the U.S., with the result that the citizens of the United States would be willing to enter the war [...] that we would be at war with Japan in due time, and that he was willing for some ship of the Navy to be the victim of a Japanese “mistake."

That's not interesting? Unexceptional? Please do explain.

I confess I haven't read Richardson's memoirs so I don't know the context of that quote. From all accounts of the meeting with FDR, the admiral was relieved of his command due to his opinions about the basing of the Pacific Fleet. Since the multi-pronged Japanese offensive began ten months later, it's difficult to draw the straight line that Stinnett or even Richardson do. Even if there were, the Pearl Harbor attack crippled the entire US Pacific Fleet. It wasn't just 'some ship of the Navy'.

ETA: What's your reasoning for emphasizing the time difference between OCT 1940 and DEC 1941 anyway? Does this mean something, like a debunk or something? Was FDR supposed to run off and provoke Japan immediately, and get them to comply, all within a month or two?

It's to indicate to you the length of time between the events you are connecting directly. There are plenty of good chronologies (including that ibiblio site) that give you a broader view of what was happening. Sticking with one or two sources (Stinnett and Richardson) is bound to get you in trouble. Starting with a survey history of the period might help, followed by general histories of the two belligerents, followed by biographies of the prinicipals, and then a few accounts of the events in the Pacific before and after Pearl Harbor.

Grabbing Stinnett off the shelf and believing him wholesale is unsound.

Stinnett was amazed that oil was allowed to flow to Japan "Between July 1940 and April 1941, during a period when American petroleum supplies were supposedly under embargo"

If he said that then he's wrong.

We do know that the Japanese sent several economic demands for increased oil exports to the government of the Dutch East Indies in the period he is mentioning. In February and in April of 1941, US military personnel observed or participated in negotiations among the Dutch colonial administration, the British, and the Australians, during which the topic of Japanese surprise attacks to secure that oil supply were discussed.

Caustic Logic

19th March 2009, 02:29 AM

You attach far too much weight to a memo that is not proved to have been seen by FDR, nor is it proved to have influenced Knox or anyone else.

If anyone had seen it and been influenced, how do you suppose that could be proven?

It's the embargo that was unexceptional, CL.

Embargoes had been applied in numerous other cases in the 1930s, notably against Italy during their Abyssinian campaign, and against both sides in the Spanish Civil War. Not that they had the desired effects in either case but they are certainly unexceptional.

Okay, so there's a precedent is what you mean. I was meaning in the sense of most countries at any given time are NOT under embargo, so to be one of the few is, well, exceptional. That an embargo could be called unexceptional is itself because of the exceptional times. (eg - your two examples)

And, importantly, one has to consider the relative effects on a case-by-case basis. Japan was reliant on the US for about 80% of its oil needs, IIRC. I don't think this applied to Italy or Spain, and makes it, in this sense, exceptional. It did not cripple Japan - it only promised to unless they secured a more stable source of oil first. It hastened things, there's little doubt of that.

I noticed that you didn't reply to the second point about it being applied gradually.

I didn't see the point in replying, sorry. Yeah, it was done gradually, these are big processes at work. The Japanese did all they could to stall for time. Some restrictions had been applied in 1940, but the pace and scope increased greatly in 1941. That's not because "the memo" said so, but McCollum's advice likely contributed some. What else am I missing?

Please also note the oil embargo, which was quite significant in its effects, was instituted at just about the same time it would become clear the "pop-up cruises" had failed to trigger any overt acts. (late July 41)
This is a good point. In fact, it shows that you have discovered that the basing of the Pacific Fleet's battleships was nowhere near the only or ultimate provocation or deterrent (depending on how you look at it). So were material and political support for China. So was the continued presence in the Philippines. And so on. All of these things, together, represent a provocative or deterrent stance or maybe a combination of both.

Wow, that's an interesting turn. I point out that one level of provocation was replaced with another (possibly), and it's a good point? That's a good point of your own about the multi-level aspect of the deter/provoke/whatever-just-mobilize-and-get-ready campaign. Indeed, the fleet was too weak to be a threat, still somewhat distant, clearly a bluff. The embargoes had to be primary in their provocative effects, the buildup of air power in th Philippines, the China 'incident,' etc.

Almost makes one wonder what the real reason was, then, for including action F.

Since the multi-pronged Japanese offensive began ten months later, it's difficult to draw the straight line that Stinnett or even Richardson do. Even if there were, the Pearl Harbor attack crippled the entire US Pacific Fleet. It wasn't just 'some ship of the Navy'.

Yeah, at the time he was thinking a ship. Unless "some ship" is like "some fish." Maybe FDR was thinking smaller too. Maybe later he decided if one, why not a few? Only one was fully lost, after all. Maybe 5 or 6 out of commission for a long time... carriers untouched, lucky break.. see, not the worst start...

Grabbing Stinnett off the shelf and believing him wholesale is unsound.
:rolleyes:
Good idea, let me hop in my time machine and go back to earlier today and decide to file a FOIA request. Oops, not needed cause I already said that then. :D

If he said that then he's wrong.

Good. What the hell is up with this guy? I find it hard to believe he can be so widely wrong on accident.

We do know that the Japanese sent several economic demands for increased oil exports to the government of the Dutch East Indies in the period he is mentioning. In February and in April of 1941, US military personnel observed or participated in negotiations among the Dutch colonial administration, the British, and the Australians, during which the topic of Japanese surprise attacks to secure that oil supply were discussed.

Thanks, a new fact I didn't know of. These were the parties of the joint embargo that started in August. So as far back as February they were working on it, huh?

stilicho

19th March 2009, 12:58 PM

Quote:
Embargoes had been applied in numerous other cases in the 1930s, notably against Italy during their Abyssinian campaign, and against both sides in the Spanish Civil War. Not that they had the desired effects in either case but they are certainly unexceptional.

Okay, so there's a precedent is what you mean. I was meaning in the sense of most countries at any given time are NOT under embargo, so to be one of the few is, well, exceptional. That an embargo could be called unexceptional is itself because of the exceptional times. (eg - your two examples)

And, importantly, one has to consider the relative effects on a case-by-case basis. Japan was reliant on the US for about 80% of its oil needs, IIRC. I don't think this applied to Italy or Spain, and makes it, in this sense, exceptional. It did not cripple Japan - it only promised to unless they secured a more stable source of oil first. It hastened things, there's little doubt of that.

Not just "a" precedent, CL. Embargo in the form of a blockade was used by the British Navy against the USA in Napoleonic Wars. The Federal Navy blockaded the CSS in the War Between the States. Embargoes, blockades, trade restrictions, tariffs, and all sorts of economic pressures were typically applied to bolster diplomatic pressure in the time period we are discussing. They were not exceptional. They were a normal part of diplomacy.

However...

If there are two specific strategic decisions made by the US to commit itself to opposing Axis aggression they were (1) Lend-Lease and (2) the completion of the embargo against Japan.

Historians do not disagree on those basic influences.

I will try to reply to your other points later.

dudalb

19th March 2009, 03:30 PM

Caustic Logic

20th March 2009, 10:25 PM

Stilicho: Semantics. "A precedent" means it's been done before, no matter how many times. You are correct that embargoes were not invented just for Japan. Let us move on.

Stinnett is the latest of a number of ex Navy men who are reluctant to admit that the Naval Command screwed up so badly at Pearl on Dec.7, and thus seek to prove that Kimmel was a "victim" of some huge plot.
Frankly, he brings nothing new to the table that the other revisionists have not already worked to death.

I wouldn't say so much a "Navy man" as a guy who happened to be in the Navy when lots of people were. I don't know about his motives, but his research is troubled at best. BUT, revisionists had not worked to death the McCollum Memo before his book. They didn't even know about it.

I just read Phil Jacobson's pan of Day of Deceit. I'm sure he's primarily correct, but his take on the memo was weak. Here I'll respond as if he were a member.
http://www.usncva.org/books/book-10.html

One of the centerpieces of his argument is an October 1940 memorandum by then Lieutenant Commander McCollum of ONI in response to the September 1940 signing of the Tripartite Pact by Germany, Italy and Japan and not as any blueprint for initiating war with Germany and Japan.

Au contraire [sp]... The response was to exploit the treaty to enter the war. "Prompt warlike action," the eight actions, all against Japan, with "an overt act of war" as a bonus, but either way we'd be at war, prob. against all three Axis powers.

McCollum recognized the danger to the western powers if Japan was able to connect up with Germany and Italy through Asia and suggested eight actions designed to contain Japan generally and to keep her from making such connection with its other Axis partners.

Kinda - there's no talk of 'linking up,' but rather a joint closing of Britain's supply lines, Euro-Axis at Suez, Asia-Axis at Singapore/etc. area. 'Contain' is actually referred to as 'divert' and 'neutralize.'

Unfortunately, the book seizes on an off hand comment that is not one of the main points of the memo as the springboard for its conspiracy theory. That comment was if the eight proposed actions designed to contain Japan should by chance cause Japan to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.

Yeah, that's not the main goal, it's better than it. Better than what? Us entering as aggressors without being attacked first. These are clearly the two desired outcomes, one being better.

No proof of any official implementation of this mid-level memo is provided.

No proof that it was only "mid-level" is provided, nor that it was not acted on, or considered among other points in the President's mind.

Furthermore, Stinnett improperly ascribes McCollum's office as "an element of Station US (by which he means OP-20-G), a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters" in an effort to tie McCollum closer to OP-20-G than he actually was before WWII.

Probably correct, sounds like a Stinnett move.

A non-cryptologic fallacy of the book is the fact that Roosevelt had no assurance that Germany would declare war on the U.S. if the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor thus negating any reasonable conspiratorial design to get the U.S. into war with Germany by forcing Japan to attack the U.S.

How is that a fallacy? He had no guarantee, per se, but doesn't a good leader ever take a calculated risk? McCollum had in fact worked against this fallacy, in the memo in question, by pointing out the Pact leaves "no ground on which to doubt" the three totalitarian powers will go to war with the US if entering as a full ally of the UK or "should she attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the orient." And that's exactly how it went down.

stilicho

21st March 2009, 02:49 AM

Stilicho: Semantics. "A precedent" means it's been done before, no matter how many times. You are correct that embargoes were not invented just for Japan. Let us move on.

Move on to what?

You are aware, of course, that the US has habitually employed some version of the Export Control Act. It wasn't invented just for Japan. But it was a direct reaction to Japanese negotiation tactics. Why do you want to move on from that? Why do you want to ignore the influence of Lend-Lease? Or the sinking of the Reuben James? Or the modifications to the Neutrality Acts? Or the expansion of the Atlantic "protected zone"? Or the acceptance of American protection of Iceland?

What exactly are you willing to ignore to advance your conspiracy theory? And, moreover, why are you so willing to do that?

---- ----

Have you found sources regarding US observation of the fate of the Dutch East Indies yet?

Caustic Logic

21st March 2009, 02:16 PM

Move on to what? <snip> What exactly are you willing to ignore to advance your conspiracy theory? And, moreover, why are you so willing to do that?

There seems to be another misunderstanding here. I'm trying to focus on events surrounding and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, which leads to focusing on the Pacific. The rest of the world and its events also exist, and should be considered, but there's only so many I ideas I can type about.

You are aware, of course, that the US has habitually employed some version of the Export Control Act. It wasn't invented just for Japan. But it was a direct reaction to Japanese negotiation tactics. Why do you want to move on from that? Why do you want to ignore the influence of Lend-Lease? Or the sinking of the Reuben James? Or the modifications to the Neutrality Acts? Or the expansion of the Atlantic "protected zone"? Or the acceptance of American protection of Iceland?

All relevant tangential points I don't know as much about. Aside from full study, i can offer a quick + partial "what about" on these - Export control Act, cool - mostly on enemy-like states, right? Japanese diplomacy covering for their militarism and conquest helped determine the US actions like embargoes (whether it was to achieve acquiescence or hostility). Leand-Lease was a major step towards US belligerency, and made the Axis consider the US an effective enemy. The Reuben James sinking was an event that might have led to war. Didn't FDR try to peddle that as the sort of unprovoked attack that means the gloves are off, but the public wasn't convinced enough to make for strong unity? This is a point I need to study some more. That incident fits with the general idea of expanded Atlantic interest most of the way to Europe, incl. Iceland, with the US convoying British lend-lease ships, spotting hostile subs and reporting them to Brits to shoot at. This made Germany mad, but they did not want war with US and generally avoided making "mistakes."

Have you found sources regarding US observation of the fate of the Dutch East Indies yet?

I'm not even sure what you mean by "observation" or "fate" here. With more details I might be inclined to study it.

Peace.

stilicho

22nd March 2009, 09:53 PM

This made Germany mad, but they did not want war with US and generally avoided making "mistakes."

I will try and find a real book about the Dutch East Indies and the pre-Pearl Harbor negotiations (or ultimatums, depending on how you look at it). It's been some time since I worked on that and it's probably mainly in periodicals rather than full historical works.

As to your statement above, it's not warranted. Both Japan and Germany wanted war with the US. It's not only evident in their actions but also in their propaganda: http://www.solargeneral.com/mirrors/German%20Propaganda%20Archive/www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb28.htm

Pick out the parts you see as leading to warm relations.

Have you read the Hewitt investigation on your own by the way? Arthur McCollum is featured there too.

Caustic Logic

24th March 2009, 01:23 AM

I will try and find a real book about the Dutch East Indies and the pre-Pearl Harbor negotiations (or ultimatums, depending on how you look at it). It's been some time since I worked on that and it's probably mainly in periodicals rather than full historical works.

Alright, I look forward to learning the significance of this. I can imagine there would be some very complex issues involved, with the Netherlands in Nazi hands, the Dutch government working from London, and such a large outpost so far from home, but nearer British possessions, as Germany's ally prepared to pounce, and so on.

As to your statement above, it's not warranted.
It's certainly warranted if not the entire nuanced truth of the situation.
Both Japan and Germany wanted war with the US. It's not only evident in their actions but also in their propaganda: http://www.solargeneral.com/mirrors/German%20Propaganda%20Archive/www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb28.htm

Pick out the parts you see as leading to warm relations.

Lol. You're citing Nazi propaganda as evidence? Nazi Germany had different people thinking and saying different things to different audiences at different times. You could find "evidence" of a desire for "friendly relations" too, if you dug around. The overriding zeitgeist, as it seems to me from a semi-informed position, was war with the US was a big goal - eventually. If you look I bet you'll find multiple cases where they could and maybe should have attacked American ships but didn't. I do need to read more about the Reuben James and other Atlantic issues, maybe I'm wrong.

Have you read the Hewitt investigation on your own by the way? Arthur McCollum is featured there too.

No, I think I have one section of it bookmarked, but that's it. I'll look into it. It was weird first learning of the guy from Stinnett as the "mastermid <cue lightning> of the provocation plan," and then start reading about the stuff he actually did. He was a player in the problems leading up to PH (also dismissed the Bomb Plot messages as meaningless details), but Layton paints a favorable picture (Layton was in on it too, acc. to Stinnett). I liked his response to Stimson IIRC when he wanted to send a comprehensive, multi-clue warning to Honolulu about Dec. 5. He was shown the all-important Nov 27 "war warning" and told thay already had all they needed. McCollum basically said "whoopty-dooo, it says war warning. So can I send this, or what?" He was reportedly denied.

Alright, nothing else to add at the moment. I still haven't filed my FOIA request, for the record, but will when I'm less busy.

roundhead

24th March 2009, 03:08 PM

Stinnett is the latest of a number of ex Navy men who are reluctant to admit that the Naval Command screwed up so badly at Pearl on Dec.7, and thus seek to prove that Kimmel was a "victim" of some huge plot.
Frankly, he brings nothing new to the table that the other revisionists have not already worked to death.

He spent 17 years researching it before writing his book.

He looked at sources nobody else had at that point.

Anybody who thinks once we turned off the spigot of oil to Japan they werent going to attack somewhat soon is all wet. They didnt have enough oil on hand to last more than several months.

dudalb

24th March 2009, 03:32 PM

He spent 17 years researching it before writing his book.

He looked at sources nobody else had at that point.

Anybody who thinks once we turned off the spigot of oil to Japan they werent going to attack somewhat soon is all wet. They didnt have enough oil on hand to last more than several months.

Funny how you leave out what Japan was doing in China at the time of Pearl Harbor.
And you judge the final results of research, not how many years the guy spent doing it.

kageki

24th March 2009, 05:15 PM

Funny how you leave out what Japan was doing in China at the time of Pearl Harbor.
And you judge the final results of research, not how many years the guy spent doing it.

And you with what others were already doing like the British.

Let's just leave the moral issue aside. The point is that the US wasn't sitting idly by doing nothing at all, whether you perceive it to be good or bad, which is the crux of this whole concept of a "surprise".

kookbreaker

24th March 2009, 05:15 PM

He spent 17 years researching it before writing his book.

Time wasted.

He looked at sources nobody else had at that point.

Untrue. He twisted old info and misrepresented it to try and 'prove' things that were not true. He got his butt handed to him from even the most casual of historians and codebreakers.

Anybody who thinks once we turned off the spigot of oil to Japan they werent going to attack somewhat soon is all wet. They didnt have enough oil on hand to last more than several months.

So maybe the Japanese could have stopped the rampaging through Asia and gotten the 'oil spigot' turned back on? I guess that would have been a rational choice. Couldn't have that, eh?

kookbreaker

24th March 2009, 05:20 PM

And you with what others were already doing like the British.

Really? I can't say that even the worse British excess came close to the Rape of Nanking.*

Let's just leave the moral issue aside.

Convenient.

The point is that the US wasn't sitting idly by doing nothing at all, whether you perceive it to be good or bad, which is the crux of this whole concept of a "surprise".

Being politically aware of the possibility of war starting is a far cry from expecting an almost unprecedented sneak attack on what was considered a rear area.

I doubt anyone is claiming that the US was just sitting there minding its own business, what we are claiming is that the actions taken were not an automatic cause for war.

* At least in East Asia. But even Sepoy mutinies revenge and other similar events were nowhere near that level.

kageki

24th March 2009, 05:37 PM

Really? I can't say that even the worse British excess came close to the Rape of Nanking.*

Convenient.

Being politically aware of the possibility of war starting is a far cry from expecting an almost unprecedented sneak attack on what was considered a rear area.

I doubt anyone is claiming that the US was just sitting there minding its own business, what we are claiming is that the actions taken were not an automatic cause for war.

* At least in East Asia. But even Sepoy mutinies revenge and other similar events were nowhere near that level.

I hardly buy that.

Maybe not an "automatic cause for war", but still a cause.

Actually that is how it's taught or implied that the US was minding it's own business. They certainly don't mention the oil embargo in high school. Now you are making the distinction that the location was a "surprise" which is a completely different understanding or that it wasn't an "automatic cause for war". This is just lawyer nonsense.

dudalb

24th March 2009, 05:53 PM

Well, Kageki has a history of whitewashing Militarist Japan, so we should expect nothing better......

dudalb

24th March 2009, 05:55 PM

I hardly buy that.

Maybe not an "automatic cause for war", but still a cause.

Actually that is how it's taught or implied that the US was minding it's own business. They certainly don't mention the oil embargo in high school. Now you are making the distinction that the location was a "surprise" which is a completely different understanding or that it wasn't an "automatic cause for war". This is just lawyer nonsense.

For his next act, Kageki will explain how Germany was protecting itself agains aggression when it invaded Poland in 1939....

dudalb

24th March 2009, 05:57 PM

Japan was trying to conquer China.
The US saw Japan was using US Oil to do so, so said "until you stop attack Japan, we won't sell anymore oil to you".
And that justifies Japan's attacking the US????????
The thing the US should be criticised for is not doing this a long time before.

kageki

24th March 2009, 06:08 PM

Well, Kageki has a history of whitewashing Militarist Japan, so we should expect nothing better......

And don't you all whitewash US history? Korean war, Vietnam and now Iraq?

China was and is still communist.

Still this emotional plea does not address the issue of a "surprise" attack.

kookbreaker

24th March 2009, 06:16 PM

I hardly buy that.

No surprise.

Maybe not an "automatic cause for war", but still a cause.

Hardly. Trying to justify the embargo as a legitimate cause for war is weak at best.

Actually that is how it's taught or implied that the US was minding it's own business. They certainly don't mention the oil embargo in high school.

What the hell school did you go to? I learned about it by elementary school in Philadelphia? Cripes, our texts didn't go past the 50's and we still learned about it. I didn't even know you got gasoline from oil yet* and I learned about it.

* Seriously. I wondered why the Japanese in the 1930's needed so much lubricant.

kookbreaker

24th March 2009, 06:19 PM

And don't you all whitewash US history?

No. Where the hell did you get that idea?

Korean war,

What about it? How is that being 'Whitewashed'?

Vietnam

How is that being 'Whitewashed'? Last I checked the textbooks it still says the US lost.

and now Iraq?

Whitewashed? How? I see pundits arguing on both sides that its justified ora horror show. Hardly qualifies as a being a 'Whitewash'

China was and is still communist.

China has only been Communist since after WW2.

Still this emotional plea does not address the issue of a "surprise" attack.

What is you point, then?

kageki

24th March 2009, 06:40 PM

No surprise.

Hardly. Trying to justify the embargo as a legitimate cause for war is weak at best.

What the hell school did you go to? I learned about it by elementary school in Philadelphia? Cripes, our texts didn't go past the 50's and we still learned about it. I didn't even know you got gasoline from oil yet* and I learned about it.

* Seriously. I wondered why the Japanese in the 1930's needed so much lubricant.

It's not really about legitimate. It's a cause. I mean there wasn't a legitimate cause for Iraq, but the US started a war anyways.

Besides you concede that a war was a possibility. Your position is that the location was a "surprise", not that a war itself was a "surprise".

fezzic

24th March 2009, 07:19 PM

And you with what others were already doing like the British.

Let's just leave the moral issue aside. The point is that the US wasn't sitting idly by doing nothing at all, whether you perceive it to be good or bad, which is the crux of this whole concept of a "surprise".

The whole concept of surprise falls into two categories. Strategic and Tactical.

Certainly there was no [strategic] "surprise" that war was brewing or that war was verging on inevitable. The aims of Japan and the efforts of the US to thwart those aims meant that it was going to be war or knuckle under (by one side). Even though negotiation was probably viewed, practically, as not going anywhere, they had to try. Since the apparent intent of Japan was to seize resources in the Far East, the natural assumption is that they would attack there when the anticipated war broke out.

Pearl Harbor was a tactical surprise. The Japanese managed to approach and launch the attack without the defenders realizing they were there until it was too late to do anything except fight as best they could. Essence of surprise. Even in the midst of WWII, despite the code breaking, it would be remotely, well virtually impossible given the remaining resources, possible that the IJN could have repeated Pearl Harbor, obviously with significantly more risk and likely doing less damage, and as unlikely as it may seem get a somewhat similar result.

kookbreaker

24th March 2009, 08:32 PM

It's not really about legitimate. It's a cause. I mean there wasn't a legitimate cause for Iraq, but the US started a war anyways.

I notice you abandon your claims of a 'whitewash' with regards to US history in hopes of distracting me with a tangent on Iraq. Iraq is irrelevant to this discussion. Go to Politics if you want to talk about Iraq and its legitimacy.

Besides you concede that a war was a possibility. Your position is that the location was a "surprise", not that a war itself was a "surprise".

Fezzic has answered this better than I can. You are automatically assuming the knowledge of war = no possibility of a real surprise at PH. That is bull.

Egil

24th March 2009, 10:00 PM

Let it happen is wrong.

Admiral Halsey launched aircraft from the Enterprise and those aircraft 'bombed' Pearl Harbor. There were US Aircraft that got shot down during the raid by sailors who were not in on it.

The 'evidence' of a Japanese Attack is planted, mainly involving Japanese aircraft salvaged from China that were shot down by those mercenaries called The Flying Tigers.

The Midget Sub that is found outside Pearl Harbor was planted years later, but the one that washed up on shore was purchased from the Japanese for 'research purposes' and the Japanese 'Prisoner of War' was actually Tokyo Rose's brother.

And the Arizona's destruction was definately an inside job. There was no such thing as an Armor piercing bomb and it definitely didn't penetrate the Arizona's forward deck and explode in the magazine. It was planted there by Dorie Miller who was awarded the Navy Cross for planting the bomb, probably planted there by him during the Boxing match taking place a few days before.

/tinfoil

kageki

24th March 2009, 11:57 PM

I notice you abandon your claims of a 'whitewash' with regards to US history in hopes of distracting me with a tangent on Iraq. Iraq is irrelevant to this discussion. Go to Politics if you want to talk about Iraq and its legitimacy.

Fezzic has answered this better than I can. You are automatically assuming the knowledge of war = no possibility of a real surprise at PH. That is bull.

I abandoned it because I know it's not going to get anywhere and I had a whole thread on it before. Also it's not relevant to the topic.

I haven't made such assumption.

kageki

25th March 2009, 12:00 AM

Caustic Logic

25th March 2009, 12:42 AM

He spent 17 years researching it before writing his book.

He looked at sources nobody else had at that point.

Roundhead, welcome to the thread. There certainly are some new things in his long-researched book. Problem is, most of the new things seem to be bunk, and most of the time he spent on it had to be in making up wrong assumptions on the evidence.

So far, the only thing I'm sure I'm thankful for is the McCollum memo, providing it's not a fabrication, which is starting to seem entirely possible. If it's true, big clue, and I'll be checking it out.

And welcome, Kageki!
And you with what others were already doing like the British.

Let's just leave the moral issue aside. The point is that the US wasn't sitting idly by doing nothing at all, whether you perceive it to be good or bad, which is the crux of this whole concept of a "surprise".

Don't mind the others. They know this is not an issue of who was a bigger jerk, it's about power and calculations, and just throwing out things to disagree with you. Making the issue about Japanese aggression (which I will not play down, it was real bad) adds nothing tangible to the PH debate, except maybe for reasons FDR wanted to go to war bad enough to... So, what, Japan were aggressing in Asia, so FDR couldn't possibly have known of/provoked the surprise attack on the fleet? I mean really, what does this mean?

Caustic Logic

25th March 2009, 12:56 AM

Trying to justify the embargo as a legitimate cause for war is weak at best.

"Legitimate" doesn't matter. No US oil = 80% or so reduction in oil supplies = weeakened war effort = loss and reversion = unacceptable. Supplies were to be had just a ways south. Wikipedia:
While traditionally considered an act of war[2], in modern practise this is not necessarily so and an act of embargo is much more complex. The typical reaction is the development of an autarky.

That's self-reliance, not an option here. They knew expansionism at the time and were cocky. This would all have been predictable in Washington.

But I see Kageki already covered this.

It's not really about legitimate. It's a cause. I mean there wasn't a legitimate cause for Iraq, but the US started a war anyways.

IMO Japan had much more legitimate reason to strike the US then than the US had to strike Iraq. Odd that both were largely over control of oil fields.

Caustic Logic

25th March 2009, 01:09 AM

This is cool, the thread suddenly comes alive with richness of texture. Here we get our first MIHOP proponent, almost joining the forum for this, at only 8 posts now hours later. Funny stuff, maybe you are right :boggled:

Let it happen is wrong.

Admiral Halsey launched aircraft from the Enterprise and those aircraft 'bombed' Pearl Harbor. There were US Aircraft that got shot down during the raid by sailors who were not in on it.

Of course, it all makes sense... the US planes were real shoot-downs, and the Japnese planes were planted - but this is a little CIT - why wouldn't they just get some indoctrinated suicide pilots in Zero-style planes painted right? Ah, far be it from me to question your in-depth researched conclusion. But clearly no Japanese terrorists in a cave on Mt. Fuji and drunk on Sake could carry out such an operation with their origami boats, and did you see the video of the squibs from the Utah? A "disarmed target ship," sure, how convenient, clearly a plant. The rivets are blowing outward, and it keeled over at free fall speed!:jaw-dropp

Dave Rogers

25th March 2009, 02:48 AM

/tinfoil

Damn, that was close. Welcome to the forum. Have you ever heard of Poe's Law?

Dave

Egil

25th March 2009, 07:22 AM

Damn, that was close. Welcome to the forum. Have you ever heard of Poe's Law?

Dave

Poe's Law on composition?

As for the satirical CT, I find it funny to use the CTs' own pyschotic paranoia against them. They go ape when I take their position on th Holocaust. And no one pointed out the biggest lie in the above CT, Dorie Miller never set foot on the Arizona.

It is amazingly convenient Dorie Miller died of Tarawa not long after. :jaw-dropp

Foolmewunz

25th March 2009, 07:29 AM

Well played, Egil. And Welcome.
( I didn't catch the little "/tinfoil" signature, and having just endured what could be the beginning of another Kageki bashing-of-head-against-brick-walls-diversion, I read it as straight CT. Well played, in deed.)

Kageki,
Go away. The grown-ups were talking and you've interrupted. Now go back to your little corner.

Dave Rogers

25th March 2009, 07:55 AM

Poe's Law on composition?

I just googled that one - I'd never heard of it before. No, I meant Poe's Law as referenced by http://rationalwiki.com/wiki/Poe's_Law, which states that:

Without a winking smiley or other blatant display of humor, it is utterly impossible to parody a Creationist in such a way that someone won't mistake for the genuine article.

http://christianforums.com/showthread.php?p=17606580#post17606580

The same is true of conspiracy theorists, and is believed by many skeptics to be the real reason why (for example) so many 9/11 truthers are perceived by other 9/11 truthers as government agents deliberately discrediting their movement by proposing absurd theories.

Dave

Egil

25th March 2009, 08:22 AM

Ah, that Poe. I know the law but not by its name.

dudalb

25th March 2009, 10:40 AM

"Legitimate" doesn't matter. No US oil = 80% or so reduction in oil supplies = weeakened war effort = loss and reversion = unacceptable. Supplies were to be had just a ways south. Wikipedia:

That's self-reliance, not an option here. They knew expansionism at the time and were cocky. This would all have been predictable in Washington.

But I see Kageki already covered this.

IMO Japan had much more legitimate reason to strike the US then than the US had to strike Iraq. Odd that both were largely over control of oil fields.

If you can't find better then Kageki to support your CT, you are in real trouble.

Caustic Logic

25th March 2009, 02:32 PM

If you can't find better then Kageki to support your CT, you are in real trouble.

Maybe you haven't noticed I got Roundhead in my corner too. Tho I think I chased him off. Hey, maybe that request for more details was parody too, yet even more dry... Right Kageki? :covereyes

It is amazingly convenient Dorie Miller died of Tarawa not long after.

I did not realize he died shortly after. So Tarawa is, what, a disease as well as an island?

kageki

25th March 2009, 03:26 PM

Maybe you haven't noticed I got Roundhead in my corner too. Tho I think I chased him off. Hey, maybe that request for more details was parody too, yet even more dry... Right Kageki? :covereyes

I did not realize he died shortly after. So Tarawa is, what, a disease as well as an island?

The tinfoil comment made it obvious he was up to something. I was just curious regarding the midget sub incident:

http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/midget.html

A number of questions still remain over this submarine, which was the first casualty in the war between the U.S. and Japan. Why did the Naval command at Pearl Harbor apparently ignore a confirmed enemy sinking right off its harbor mouth?

Caustic Logic

25th March 2009, 03:34 PM

The tinfoil comment made it obvious he was up to something. I was just curious regarding the midget sub incident:

Well it was part of a parody MIHOp argument, for which I hope you don't think there's any evidence.

A number of questions still remain over this submarine, which was the first casualty in the war between the U.S. and Japan. Why did the Naval command at Pearl Harbor apparently ignore a confirmed enemy sinking right off its harbor mouth?

Now that is a good question. It doesn't apply to FDR, but to hawaiian command, but it is curious - almost two hours before the attack and a japanese sub is sunk (meaning Japan did not fire the first shot, BTW, tho it was soon eclipsed). Why the hell is a Japanese submarine here in our waters? Ona Sunday morning... oh dear God, get the air recon extra vigilant and radar too! Didn't happen...

I have a hunch there was more than distant scheming in DC going on, and someone was sabotaging things from the ground in Hawaii. I know that sounds crazy, but oh well.

kageki

25th March 2009, 04:28 PM

Well it was part of a parody MIHOp argument, for which I hope you don't think there's any evidence.

Now that is a good question. It doesn't apply to FDR, but to hawaiian command, but it is curious - almost two hours before the attack and a japanese sub is sunk (meaning Japan did not fire the first shot, BTW, tho it was soon eclipsed). Why the hell is a Japanese submarine here in our waters? Ona Sunday morning... oh dear God, get the air recon extra vigilant and radar too! Didn't happen...

I have a hunch there was more than distant scheming in DC going on, and someone was sabotaging things from the ground in Hawaii. I know that sounds crazy, but oh well.

Apparently it was only about an hour before the attack. Here are some news articles about the find with a crude map of the approximate location of where it was found:

http://archives.starbulletin.com/2002/08/29/news/story1.html

Here is a detailed account:

http://www.nps.gov/archive/usar/scrs/scrs2y.htm

One of the fears of the attack planners was that the presence of the submarines would give away the Japanese intent. The fear was justified; however, U.S. forces did not understand the significance of sighting a submarine within the Pearl Harbor defensive zone until too late. The first midget submarine sighting was by the minesweeper USS CONDOR. At 3:42, 1-3/4 miles south of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys, CONDOR spotted a periscope. The minesweeper notified the destroyer USS WARD, whose commander, Capt. William Outerbridge, searched without success until 4:45. The next sighting came an hour later. At 5:45, the USS ANTARES' crew, towing a target into the harbor, spotted a submarine following them in. The submarine's conning tower was exposed. A seaplane spotter dropped smoke pots off the submarine at 6:33, giving the WARD a fix. At 6:37 the WARD spotted the midget behind the ANTARES at 12 knots, obviously making a run for the harbor. Captain Outerbridge made a decision in just three minutes to attack. Sounding general quarters at 6:40, the WARD's engines surged full ahead as the gun crews loaded the deck guns. No. 1 gun opened fire at 6:45 and missed; immediately No. 3 gun fired, hitting the submarine at the conning tower's junction with the hull. The submarine heeled to starboard, slowed and sank. The WARD depth-charged the sinking vessel as it plunged 1200 feet down, and at 6:46 ceased fire. The United States Navy, which had traded shots with German U-Boats in the Atlantic and probably had sunk one, had just made its first confirmed kill in World War II, and the opening shots of the war preceded the air attack at Pearl Harbor by an hour. Outerbridge sent a message to CINCPAC at 6:51; "We have dropped depth charges upon sub operating in defensive sea area." An amended message was sent at 6:53: "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area." Advance warning of an attack was not heeded, and at 7:50 the first wave of Japanese planes hit Pearl Harbor and other military bases on the island of Oahu (Prange, Goldstein and Dillon 1981).

Caustic Logic

25th March 2009, 04:53 PM

Apparently it was only about an hour before the attack. Here are some news articles about the find with a crude map of the approximate location of where it was found:

http://archives.starbulletin.com/2002/08/29/news/story1.html

Here is a detailed account:

Which gives a 5:45 first spotting of the one sub, just over 2 hrs before the bombs started falling. Thanks for the link, some good reading there. I was dimly aware of an earlier run-in, and this 2nd source gives the details. It was another two hours earlier! (I'm reading At Dawn We Slept from the beginning and haven't got there yet). Four hours of enemy sub activity off the mouth of the harbor prior and everyone's taken by surprise. I know not everyone was awake and alert for such clues, but obviously they should have been.

If it was this one screw-up I might dismiss it, but this is one of several.

MG1962

25th March 2009, 05:19 PM

kageki

25th March 2009, 06:15 PM

Not really. Such attacks had occured in the past, the Italians in WW1 carried out a number of very successful attacks. However they were not normally part of a co-ordinated attack. So in this respect the sub activity would not signal potential for air attack

Of interest, Bob Ballard (Titanic Fame) Did a search for the sub presumed destroyed prior to the attack. No wreckage was found, though looking through some of the photos taken by Japanese pilots, he identified a torpedo wake that he believes was fired from the sub. Rather than be sunk it would appear it did penetrate the harbour.

http://www.cdnn.info/industry/i010907/i010907.html

"Adm. Husband Kimmel, who predicted that hostilities between Japan and the United States would begin with submarine attacks, had drilled his crew relentlessly on the skills of anti-submarine warfare."

Apparently HURL did find the sub after Ballard's search.

dudalb

25th March 2009, 08:37 PM

I am now convicnced that Caustic Logic is trying to convince himself that the Pearl Harbor CT Theories are true. I just don't understand why he needs us for validatation.

kageki

25th March 2009, 08:55 PM

Which gives a 5:45 first spotting of the one sub, just over 2 hrs before the bombs started falling. Thanks for the link, some good reading there. I was dimly aware of an earlier run-in, and this 2nd source gives the details. It was another two hours earlier! (I'm reading At Dawn We Slept from the beginning and haven't got there yet). Four hours of enemy sub activity off the mouth of the harbor prior and everyone's taken by surprise. I know not everyone was awake and alert for such clues, but obviously they should have been.

If it was this one screw-up I might dismiss it, but this is one of several.

Pearl Harbor Attack: 7 December 1941, Online Action Reports: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Serial 0479 of 15 February 1942
http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/pearl/CinCPac.htm

PART III
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS DURING
JAPANESE RAID, 7 DECEMBER, 1941

The first enemy contact of 7 December, 1941, is believed to have been made at 0350, when the U.S.C.G. Condor sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine. At that time the Condor was conducting sweeping operations approximately one and three-fourths miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

The Condor, accordingly, at 0357, informed, by visual signal, the U.S.S. Ward, then patrolling off the Pearl Harbor entrance, of this contact. The Ward thereupon immediately instituted a search and at about 0637 sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine apparently trailing the U.S.S. Antares, then enroute into Pearl Harbor. At 0640, the Ward commenced its attack, which is believed to have been successful. At 0645, a despatch, by voice transmission, was sent to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who reports its receipt at about 0712, local time. no prior report of either contact had been made to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. During the previous year there had been several reports of submarine contacts, all of which turned out to be false. Upon receipt of the Ward's report by the Commandant, action was taken to: instruct the ready duty destroyer, the U.S.S. Monaghan, to proceed to sea; close the net gate; attempt to verify the contact report, with details thereon; and to notify, by telephone, at about 0720, the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Duty Officer.

Another telephone call to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, about 0740, from the Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO, relayed a report received at 0732 that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District that the Ward was towing a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0755, the Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows: "ENEMY AIR RAID - NOT DRILL". Almost simultaneously, Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battleships.

Corsair 115

25th March 2009, 09:03 PM

Which gives a 5:45 first spotting of the one sub, just over 2 hrs before the bombs started falling. And how, exactly, would the surface ships identify it as a Japanese submarine? It could just as easily be any other potential adversary's sub.

Four hours of enemy sub activity off the mouth of the harbor prior and everyone's taken by surprise. It was Sunday morning. Why does this fact seem to get so little emphasis? There's a reason the Japanese chose that time to attack.

Egil

25th March 2009, 09:43 PM

There was reason to suspect the midget submarine was Japanese in origin as it is the main belligerent in the region. However, that is not proof.

Should they have gone to a higher alert level? Yes. But alert for what?

The American thinking and planning was that the Japanese were going to lure us into a naval battle at sea where they could sink ships in unrecoverable depths. And that colored interpretation of intelligence that came in (which compared to modern days is scant).

We planned accordingly.

We thought wrong.

Could the White House know? Possible. Did Kimmel know most assuredly not as official messages relayed between the Islands and the mainland prove. He was warned of an imminent attack, but from what source was never stated. It was always a military fear of infiltration of Hawaii by sabateurs and geurilla forces, not a full fledged air assault from the sea.

They should've expected a Japanese surprise attack but that is hindsight. They had no reason to expect it as it was a huge gamble the Japanese would be undertaking and naval tradition breeds against it (Battle of Jutland where both sides were hindered by that breeding).

The Russians tried something like this before the Great War. They were defeated in total at Tsushima by Togo. Trafalgar is another example of taking a huge gamble. Infact, this goes all the way back to the Battle of Artemisium.
European battlefields are littered with the corpses of huge gambles.

Caustic Logic

26th March 2009, 12:56 AM

And how, exactly, would the surface ships identify it as a Japanese submarine? It could just as easily be any other potential adversary's sub.

Uh, ja... I'll spare you a detailed taunting as Egil already covered it.

Four hours of enemy sub activity off the mouth of the harbor prior and everyone's taken by surprise.It was Sunday morning. Why does this fact seem to get so little emphasis? There's a reason the Japanese chose that time to attack.

Whatcu talkin bout, Willis? I emphasized it myself right up there and let me emphasize it again - it was Sunday Morning. This was the usual just hang out and be vulnerable day, as the Japanese knew, as US planning people knew the Japanese knew. If they were concerned about an attack, the should have had a strong staff of clue-watchers on duty Sundays.

Also carriers can't launch planes at night, and aerial surveillance can't catch them either til after daylight. Therefore, as US planners knew, the dawn attack was the best for enemy air attack. Carriers sneak up in the dark and launch at first light before being spotted. So radar should be beefed up and made vigilant, and tapped into other clue-spotters' clues.

Please don't make me locate the quotes to support these, but these things were known.

Caustic Logic

26th March 2009, 01:27 AM

Egil, weclome to the thread. You seem to know what you're talking about.

There was reason to suspect the midget submarine was Japanese in origin as it is the main belligerent in the region. However, that is not proof.

Should they have gone to a higher alert level? Yes. But alert for what?

The American thinking and planning was that the Japanese were going to lure us into a naval battle at sea where they could sink ships in unrecoverable depths. And that colored interpretation of intelligence that came in (which compared to modern days is scant).

We planned accordingly.

We thought wrong.

To some extent, that was the or a main fear. But during 1941 the plans people in DC and at Pearl - notably Martin and Bellinger, of whatever exactly, had strongly IDd carrier task force air attack as by far the worst combo of likely and dangerous. (ie, not the most likely but too possible and dangerous to ignore. There were plans to use US carriers to sortie out and meet them, perhaps set in motion too late, and certainly ruled out once the carriers were sent away anyway.

Could the White House know? Possible. Did Kimmel know most assuredly not as official messages relayed between the Islands and the mainland prove. He was warned of an imminent attack, but from what source was never stated. It was always a military fear of infiltration of Hawaii by sabateurs and geurilla forces, not a full fledged air assault from the sea.

The warnings they were given (Kimmel and Short) on Nov 27 did not mention Hawaii. The Army's alert didn't specify any locations, the Navy's specified Philippines, Kra isthmus, or possibly Borneo. Any thought of designs on Hawaii was implied by precautions urged against sabotage etc. with no assessment these were likely at all. Any sense of attack there was on-the-ground instinct, and it was there if vague and centered on the Marshall islands to the WSW.

The warning should have triggered the kind of vigilance that would catch clues like these. But, as you say...

They should've expected a Japanese surprise attack but that is hindsight.

Hey, I was just looking at Layton's book again and found this among the events of Dec 5: "destroyers picked up two suspicious underwater contacts barely five miles south of Diamond Head [...] The previous night an unidentified submarine had been reported off Hawaii."

Caustic Logic

26th March 2009, 02:28 AM

Egil

26th March 2009, 07:16 AM

Also, from Layton et al (And I was There, 1985 - p 263) a passage that sheds light on two often-debated points - the absence of the carriers and the expected losses to the Fleet:

"At this point, the disposition of of Kimmel's forces was as follows: All the carriers were at sea with specific missions. All the heavy cruisers and more than half of the fleet's destroyers were at sea protecting the carriers. Only the battle force - the old, slow battleships with their escorts of light cruisers and destroyers - was still at Pearl Harbor."

I thought that was interesting. I'm not a big Navy buff, and don't know what this means exactly, for force availability and loss availability. Anyone else?

Naval doctrine doubted the usefulness of carriers against an enemy's battleline. They were thought to be better fit as scouting assets. Battleships cost a lot to build, maintain and operate out at sea. So I do not see the problem with the carriers and escorts being out to see while our Battleline was in port. A single carrier can sea a lot more area than a bunch of battleships even with onboard scouting aircraft.

What it further meant is that immediate future naval operations would not be hampered with dragging slower battlewagons around. And later, the battlewagons would be operating with a carrier force that is the supreme force in the Pacific. They could provide heavy gun support in landing operations.

If the battleships were sunk between the Marianas and the Phillippines, they'd be total losses, ditto for sinking in the Bismark Sea or near Midway.

And they played a key role in a very important naval battle called Leyte Gulf at the Battle of Surigao Strait. The Battleships sunk at Pearl defeated two Japanese task forces. Had the Battleships not been there, Halsey would be the only big stick and had he messed up the same way he messed up American losses would have perhaps be catastrophic causing a couple of years delay in ending the Pacific War.

Corsair 115

26th March 2009, 12:11 PM

The American thinking and planning was that the Japanese were going to lure us into a naval battle at sea where they could sink ships in unrecoverable depths.

It should be noted that was the original Japanese war plan as well. It was only changed to a first strike at Pearl Harbor at Yamamoto's insistence.

Uh, ja... I'll spare you a detailed taunting as Egil already covered it.

As Egil himself noted, suspecting it was a Japanese sub is not proof of it being a Japanese sub. Bit of a difference there, wouldn't you say?

dudalb

26th March 2009, 01:24 PM

And they played a key role in a very important naval battle called Leyte Gulf at the Battle of Surigao Strait. The Battleships sunk at Pearl defeated two Japanese task forces. Had the Battleships not been there, Halsey would be the only big stick and had he messed up the same way he messed up American losses would have perhaps be catastrophic causing a couple of years delay in ending the Pacific War.

Ah yes, The "Battle of Bull's Run".

Battleships also played a big role in the surface fighting in the Solomons. The USS Washington Sunk the Kirishima in the 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, one of the few incidents in WW2 where a battleship actually sunk another Battleship by gunfire.

Egil

26th March 2009, 01:47 PM

Ah yes, The "Battle of Bull's Run".

Battleships also played a big role in the surface fighting in the Solomons. The USS Washington Sunk the Kirishima in the 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, one of the few incidents in WW2 where a battleship actually sunk another Battleship by gunfire.

The Sea Battles around in Solomon Islands was some heavy fightings. The only match I know is the Battle of Surigao Strait and the Battle off Samar.

Caustic Logic

26th March 2009, 03:25 PM

To add to my post above about Layton's assessment of what was at Pearl: he cited all Heavy cruisers and half the destroyers gone. I did a little research looking at this site on what was present
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-2.htm
and this one on what was away with the carriers
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-9.htm

In Port:
Battleships – 8
Heavy Cruisers – 2
Light Crusiers – 6
Destroyers –30
Total = 46 war ships
Additional auxiliary ships, minesweepers, submarines, tenders, etc… 55 total

With the carrier task forces:
Two carriers, obviously
6 Heavy Cruisers
14 destroyers (split 9/5)
total = 22 war ships

So Layton's 100% HC reduction is actually 3/4, and 1/2 of destroyers is actually 1/3. A 22 ship-reduction leaving 46 behind is about 1/3 detachment in sheer numbers. About the quality and value of the classes of ships relative to each other I don't know - would this be the most valuable third?

Also I just found a good source I hadn't seen before on Kimmel's approval of the task forces - It was less an order than a suggestion, which raises some questions. I'm pondering it.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/Missing_Carriers.html
Also note, the above reduction was finalized with the second departure of the Lexington and its escort on Dec 5, with the Enterprise still out but due back. Leap of faith on Kimmel's part, and the estimate was wrong of course - all 22 ships were still away at dawn on the 7th and spared.

Where others see blind luck, I see a hole in the wall patched over with this superstition.

Egil

26th March 2009, 05:19 PM

Where others see blind luck, I see a hole in the wall patched over with this superstition.

She was not due back on the 5th, she was due back on Saturday evening and was delayed by a storm the very same storm that shelted the Japanese carrier force. Her next ETA was at 7 AM the day of the attack, 55 minutes before the attack began.

Admiral Halsey's Own words on this matter from the Congressional hearing:

A great deal depends, sir. We might have had a very much worse catastrophe here if these vessels has been in the process of sortieing when this happened. For instance, my ship, my task force had planned to be off Pearl about seven o'clock in the morning, and by the grace of God we had bad weather out there that held us up and I could not have gotten in until about four o'clock in the afternoon.

She was slowed by the same weather system that sheltered the Japanese carrier force! And at the time of the attack was 150 miles to the West of Pearl Harbor. She was probably within attack range of Japanese aircraft.
She put into port the following day as she was low on fuel! If they wanted to protect her, they'd have filled her to the brim and sent her south east! So much for the Myth that the Carriers were sent away to be protected!

She infact tried to find and attack the Japanese, one carrier against 6 Japanese Fleet Carriers. Halsey was known as Bull Halsey for a reason. As aggressive and as dumb as one.

Caustic Logic

26th March 2009, 05:28 PM

She was not due back on the 5th, she was due back on Saturday evening
I tried to go back and clarify that but screwedup and got sidetracked...

and was delayed by a storm the very same storm that shelted the Japanese carrier force. Her next ETA was at 7 AM the day of the attack, 55 minutes before the attack began.

Yes, another wrong calculation. Push-off time from Wake and predictable reality (weather) kept the task force from arriving before the Japanese, and bad calculations (not factoring in the delay) set the push-off. Should have been set earlier, but then the greater half of 22 more ships would have been in danger, so again, lucky break.

I've got to get to work now, will respond to your other points later.

Egil

26th March 2009, 05:31 PM

Caustic Logic

27th March 2009, 02:25 AM

Admiral Halsey's Own words on this matter from the Congressional hearing:
A great deal depends, sir. We might have had a very much worse catastrophe here if these vessels has been in the process of sortieing when this happened. For instance, my ship, my task force had planned to be off Pearl about seven o'clock in the morning, and by the grace of God we had bad weather out there that held us up and I could not have gotten in until about four o'clock in the afternoon.

Thank you for the quote. Please note "grace of God," and my above statement (post 234, last line) about superstition.

She was slowed by the same weather system that sheltered the Japanese carrier force!
That's some storm that people can't predict and set an accurate ETA so Kimmel wouldn't have sent the Lexington out as well.

And at the time of the attack was 150 miles to the West of Pearl Harbor. She was probably within attack range of Japanese aircraft.
Certainly within range of their target, and had some of its planes in combat during the second wave. I'm sure the Japanese wanted to hit the Enterprise, and may have considered trying if they knew where it was. Either they didn't, or had enough going on, and that carrier, most of its planes, 3 heavy cruisers, and 9 destroyers was spared.

She put into port the following day as she was low on fuel!
Well golly, I didn't know that before. So that had a, what, slowing effect perhaps?

If they wanted to protect her, they'd have filled her to the brim and sent her south east!
With what cover story? That would look fishy, this one - sorta - makes sense.

So much for the Myth that the Carriers were sent away to be protected!

Yeah. I guess that did it. ??

She infact tried to find and attack the Japanese, one carrier against 6 Japanese Fleet Carriers. Halsey was known as Bull Halsey for a reason. As aggressive and as dumb as one.
Yeah, the radar data still wasn't understood, the north escape was unknown, tho it had been seen just like the south approach. So a south escape was deuced, and Halsey wound up going the wrong direction, raging out of harm's way. Lucky for him and the guys with him, I suppose.

The Luck in having the Carriers out to sea on December 7th is no different than the Luck involved that happened six months later at Midway...
I'm no expert here, but didn't our reading their naval code JN-25 have something to do with it? Cause if so, our "luck" at Pearl Harbor had better be different, seeing's how JN-25 carried stuff like this (http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/message-we-missed.html).

Our boys
followed by irrelevant jingoistic war-babble.

Sorry, it does add texture. Thanks for engaging.

Egil

27th March 2009, 07:20 AM

Well golly, I didn't know that before. So that had a, what, slowing effect perhaps?

I'm no expert here, but didn't our reading their naval code JN-25 have something to do with it? Cause if so, our "luck" at Pearl Harbor had better be different, seeing's how JN-25 carried stuff like this (http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/message-we-missed.html).

followed by irrelevant jingoistic war-babble.

Sorry, it does add texture. Thanks for engaging.

The Enterprise departed Pearl Harbor to deliver Marine Corps Fighter Squadron 211 to Wake Island on the 28th of November, two days after the Japanese departed for Pearl Harbor. Admiral Halsey set his due date on the evening of the 6th (And the TF Commander would be the one to do this). She had to put into port on the 8th to take on fuel. This is cutting it exceptionally close. If the Japanese Naval Task Force was delayed any further, the Enterprise would've been caught in the Harbor.

As for JN-25. Code Breaking Material (http://archive.salon.com/books/feature/2001/06/14/fdr/index3.html)

Code-Breaking (http://www.vectorsite.net/ttcode_07.html#m2)

* US Navy codebreakers did not make real progress on JN-25 until January 1942. They were too late to defeat the attack on Pearl Harbor, but they would provide significant help to allow America put a stop to Japan's six-month rampage across the Pacific.

The Pearl Harbor CTs are wrong. We did not crack JS-25. Rocherfort and his codebreakers were only able to decipher about 1/3 of Code Traffic and that was in April, of 1942. We were not reading the Japanese Navy's Mail.

By April 1942, the Rochefort group could read about a third of JN-25's codewords. This might not have seemed like enough, but it was the most useful third, since it included those codewords that were most heavily used, making them the most easily targeted and most important.

Here is a dirty little secret of the Pearl Harbor Truthers. A lot of the pre-Pearl Harbor JN-25 messages they point to to prove the Americans knew of the incoming attacks weren't decyphered until after the attack if not until after the war!

kookbreaker

27th March 2009, 09:42 AM

The Luck in having the Carriers out to sea on December 7th is no different than the Luck involved that happened six months later at Midway...

Our boys hit the Japanese carriers when they were in the midst of rearming and refueling their planes. The movie Midway is pretty accurate how the Japanese switched aircraft munitions not once, but twice.

Their battle-plan called for two raids on Midway Island to knock it out of comission and then waiting for the American carriers to come to the rescue where they could be sunk. Of course, an Intelligence Officer named Rochefort deduced that the Japanese objective was Midway. Object AF is running out of fresh-water.

Have you read Shattered Sword, Egil? It actually busts a lot of those myths about the munitions and the 'luck'. It turns out a lot of the 'luck' the Americans had was actually a combination of Japanese Navy Doctrine issues, and Japanese Navy arrogance.

If you look at the overall battle, it turns out the Japanese were lucky some of their carriers weren't sunk earlier in the battle had a few small events gone the American's way.

The movie Midway is OK, but based on an obsolete account of the battle, one that was debunked in Japan well before Shattered Sword was written. It misses a lot of things, like the attacks made on the Japanese before any carrier-based planes showed up or the trouble a US submarine was causing in the carrier area.

kookbreaker

27th March 2009, 09:44 AM

Here is a dirty little secret of the Pearl Harbor Truthers. A lot of the pre-Pearl Harbor JN-25 messages they point to to prove the Americans knew of the incoming attacks weren't decyphered until after the attack if not until after the war!

Yup. But Stinnet presents them as if they were instantly decoded and translated, often listing their intercept date as the point of decoding. He was nailed for that. Deservedly.

Egil

27th March 2009, 09:49 AM

Have you read Shattered Sword, Egil? It actually busts a lot of those myths about the munitions and the 'luck'. It turns out a lot of the 'luck' the Americans had was actually a combination of Japanese Navy Doctrine issues, and Japanese Navy arrogance.

If you look at the overall battle, it turns out the Japanese were lucky some of their carriers weren't sunk earlier in the battle had a few small events gone the American's way.

The movie Midway is OK, but based on an obsolete account of the battle, one that was debunked in Japan well before Shattered Sword was written. It misses a lot of things, like the attacks made on the Japanese before any carrier-based planes showed up or the trouble a US submarine was causing in the carrier area.

It was Luck, also called a wierd confluence events or coincidence. Nagumo switched armaments on his reserve wave and then switched back when carriers were discovered, that coupled with the Doctrine of sending an attack together hurt them. The Americans sent their attack in piecemeal. They took heavy looses (the torpedo bombers) but that drew Japanese fighter cover down which opened the skies to the dive bombers. And I think the Japanese guns had a hard time elevating high enough.

dudalb

27th March 2009, 09:54 AM

Have you read Shattered Sword, Egil? It actually busts a lot of those myths about the munitions and the 'luck'. It turns out a lot of the 'luck' the Americans had was actually a combination of Japanese Navy Doctrine issues, and Japanese Navy arrogance.

If you look at the overall battle, it turns out the Japanese were lucky some of their carriers weren't sunk earlier in the battle had a few small events gone the American's way.

The movie Midway is OK, but based on an obsolete account of the battle, one that was debunked in Japan well before Shattered Sword was written. It misses a lot of things, like the attacks made on the Japanese before any carrier-based planes showed up or the trouble a US submarine was causing in the carrier area.

Shattered Sword is a brilliant book, but it's not a book for the casual reader.
Although a little outdated, I would still recommend Prange's "Miricle At Midway" as a good first book about Midway.

dudalb

27th March 2009, 09:56 AM

followed by irrelevant jingoistic war-babble.

Sorry, it does add texture. Thanks for engaging.

I guess pointing out that Japan was the agressor in the Pacific War is irrelevant jingoistic war-babble in your book.

Corsair 115

27th March 2009, 10:25 AM

kookbreaker

27th March 2009, 12:52 PM

In regards to the latter, one will recall the story of when, in a wargame conducted of the Midway operation, a U.S. strike sank a pair of Japanese carriers, the umpire stepped in and overturned the results. "Victory disease" indeed.

That said, a Japanese scout plane which found the USN carrier having its radio fail most certainly is a stroke of luck (good for the U.S. and bad for Japan).

Wasn't much of a failure. Tone's #4 sent a report at 0728. Trouble is, it didn't mention carriers. As it was, they really didn't make change in their present planning. The Japanese had a serious attitude of 'once the US Navy shows up, we will defeat it'.

Caustic Logic

28th March 2009, 12:47 AM

The Enterprise departed Pearl Harbor to deliver Marine Corps Fighter Squadron 211 to Wake Island on the 28th of November, two days after the Japanese departed for Pearl Harbor. Admiral Halsey set his due date on the evening of the 6th (And the TF Commander would be the one to do this).

Thanks for that bit, I hadn't looked into just who was setting the time. That it would be TF commander makes sense. I also just figured out what TF stands for, duh. Now since I've already identified the erred ETA as suspicious, it looks like I'm contemplating Halsey's being involved - not necc wittingly - in setting up what was there and what wasn't on the morning of the 7th.

IF you're not pulling my leg here, wouldn't put it past ya. It's an issue for another day tho. And of course t could just be luck, but totally worth a look IMO.

She had to put into port on the 8th to take on fuel. This is cutting it exceptionally close. If the Japanese Naval Task Force was delayed any further, the Enterprise would've been caught in the Harbor.

Close but not too close. Either luck, or some fairly precise intel grossly misused.

As for JN-25. Code Breaking Material (http://archive.salon.com/books/feature/2001/06/14/fdr/index3.html)

Code-Breaking (http://www.vectorsite.net/ttcode_07.html#m2)

Both new sites, bookmarked.

The Pearl Harbor CTs are wrong. We did not crack JS-25.
I'm inclined to agree the ones that claim it was cracked are in error. I am intrigued with british and Dutch progress as of, say, Nov. 26.

Rocherfort and his codebreakers were only able to decipher about 1/3 of Code Traffic and that was in April, of 1942. We were not reading the Japanese Navy's Mail.

I hear it was on the order of 10-15% in November 41. That's significant, as a lot of debunker sites mention how it was totally unreadable as of Dec. 7. True, but this was AFTER a 12/3 (IIRC) code alteration. When that order to sail message in the link above was sent, the last change had been on August 1, meaning nearly 4 mos. uninterrupted progress under their belts. Unfortunately, it was slowed up by "inexplicable" bad priorities in US cryptography.
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=135606
Previous thread on this issue

Here is a dirty little secret of the Pearl Harbor Truthers. A lot of the pre-Pearl Harbor JN-25 messages they point to to prove the Americans knew of the incoming attacks weren't decyphered until after the attack if not until after the war!

Here's an exercise - try to find our intercept of the order to sail for the PH strike force. Decoded at ANY time. You won't find it. It's as if every US station missed it, or it's being held back. I don't know if that means anything, but I find it odd. All the versions you'll find are from Japanese memories.

Caustic Logic

28th March 2009, 12:59 AM

I guess pointing out that Japan was the agressor in the Pacific War is irrelevant jingoistic war-babble in your book.

As I've pointed out (post 207), for the purpose of considering foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor, yeah, Japan's overall aggression status is irrelevant. In this context it serves only as a distraction, or poisoning the well, which work against rational consideration.

Would you care to contest this position?

Egil

28th March 2009, 08:32 AM

Thanks for that bit, I hadn't looked into just who was setting the time. That it would be TF commander makes sense. I also just figured out what TF stands for, duh. Now since I've already identified the erred ETA as suspicious, it looks like I'm contemplating Halsey's being involved - not necc wittingly - in setting up what was there and what wasn't on the morning of the 7th.

I heard the Halsey knew about it line alot.

Let us look at Admiral Halsey. He was hot-tempered and aggressive to a fault. He was not the best admiral but he knew his trade and he knew how devastating a well-executed attack on Pearl would be. It'd hamper US Naval Operations for a long while, if the 3rd Attack had been launched, serious fleet operations would be hampered for more than a year.

Depending on how much Halsey knew is important. He may have not been the smartest Admiral but he knew his trade. If he knew the Japanese attack plan and more importantly, their positions, he had a chance. The Carrier's would have a minumum Combat Air Patrol. It is just something the Bull might try.

But there is something more important. If Halsey knew the direction the Japanese carrier strike force approaching from, he could've really buggered the Japanese.

The Japanese force consisted of 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers and 414 aircraft. An additional 23 submarines rounded out the Japanese force's deployed to Pearl.

The American's outnumbered the Japanese in surface warships: 8 battleships,
8 cruisers, 30 destroyers, 4 submarines. And had near Aircraft parity. If we had Halsey's Task Force 8 it'd had a carrier, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, plus another 50 or so combat aircraft.

The Japanese Carrier Strike Force arrived close enough to Pearl that the American's stood a chance of intercepting them in a night action! And the Fleet would've been protected by carrier and land-based fighter aircraft. And the Japanese would be facing Land-based, carrier-based bombers.

Halsey could've launched scout aircraft and stumble across the carrier force, concievably without the Japanese knowing they'd been found out.

Halsey is a hero. The Japanese could not claim they sortied all the way to Pearl Harbor with 6 Carriers and 400 combat aircraft just to wave! No one could deny that Japan was intending to attack the United States, America goes to war and liberates Europe while booting Japan in the butt.

I hear it was on the order of 10-15% in November 41. That's significant, as a lot of debunker sites mention how it was totally unreadable as of Dec. 7. True, but this was AFTER a 12/3 (IIRC) code alteration. When that order to sail message in the link above was sent, the last change had been on August 1, meaning nearly 4 mos. uninterrupted progress under their belts. Unfortunately, it was slowed up by "inexplicable" bad priorities in US cryptography.

It is interesting to note that the majority of American carriers were in the Atlantic where American shipping was being attacked.

Here's an exercise - try to find our intercept of the order to sail for the PH strike force. Decoded at ANY time. You won't find it. It's as if every US station missed it, or it's being held back. I don't know if that means anything, but I find it odd. All the versions you'll find are from Japanese memories.

Was the Japanese carrier strike force even ordered to sail by radio? I'd have thought it'd be sent by encoded telegraph or courier.