Are Atheists Evil?

[Stone Island]

Upon realizing that asking whether atheists are any more moral or immoral the theists isn't philosophically interesting, we have a penetrating question from Maverick Philosopher (http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/03/sam-harris-on-whether-atheists-are-evil.html):
Q2. Given some agreed-upon moral code, are atheists justified in adhering to the code?

The agreed-upon code is one that most or many atheists and theists would accept. Thus don't we all object to child molestation, wanton killing of human beings, rape, theft, lying, and the swindling of scum like Bernard Madoff? And in objecting to these actions, we mean our objections to be more than merely subjectively valid. When our property is stolen or a neighbor murdered, we consider that an objective wrong has been done. And when the murderer is apprehended, tried, and convicted we judge that something objectively right has been done. Let's not worry about the details or the special cases: killing in self-defense, abortion, etc. Just imagine some minimal objectively binding code that all or most of us, theists and atheists alike, accept.

What (Q2) asks about is the foundation or basis of the agreed-upon objectively binding moral code. This is not a sociological or any kind of empirical question. Nor is it a question in normative ethics. The question is not what we ought to do and leave undone, for we are assuming that we already have a rough answer to that. The question is meta-ethical: what does morality rest on, if on anything?

Before answering, look at the conditions the Maverick Philosopher sets out in the second paragraph.

Maverick Philosopher points to the transcript of a debate (http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html) between Richard Taylor and William Lane Craig on this topic.

[Dave Rogers]

I see absolutely no reason to distinguish between atheists and theists on this point. So, I'd like to turn the question around: Given some agreed-upon moral code, are theists justified in adhering to the code? I think that the only possible answer is "no". Given that this agreed-upon moral code is agreed between people, and an ineffable deity has no need to be bound by it, and hence can at any time hypothetically instruct people to act against it, it seems to me that any such code is even less binding on theists than on atheists. Therefore, the only moral code that theists could hypothetically agree upon is the exact moral code prescribed by the deity they believe in, and we are well aware that moral codes prescribed by deities are - in our experience - no less mutable than those agreed upon by people.

Dave

[arthwollipot]

Is Madoff an atheist?

[mikeyx]

I see absolutely no reason to distinguish between atheists and theists on this point. So, I'd like to turn the question around: Given some agreed-upon moral code, are theists justified in adhering to the code? I think that the only possible answer is "no". Given that this agreed-upon moral code is agreed between people, and an ineffable deity has no need to be bound by it, and hence can at any time hypothetically instruct people to act against it, it seems to me that any such code is even less binding on theists than on atheists. Therefore, the only moral code that theists could hypothetically agree upon is the exact moral code prescribed by the deity they believe in, and we are well aware that moral codes prescribed by deities are - in our experience - no less mutable than those agreed upon by people.

Dave

You suck, you beat me to it......

[Akhenaten]

what does morality rest on, if anything?


Ultimately, it rests on the need to survive. This doesn't apply to the fake morals espoused by the religious. It only applies to the practical, agreed-upon morals practiced by flourishing and productive societies.

[godless dave]

When our property is stolen or a neighbor murdered, we consider that an objective wrong has been done.

Speak for yourself.

[CriticalSock]

Are cyclists evil?

Why cyclists?

Why atheists??

[Jaxe]

Are cyclists evil?
Yes

[godless dave]

The question is not what we ought to do and leave undone, for we are assuming that we already have a rough answer to that.

Then what's the problem?

The question is meta-ethical: what does morality rest on, if on anything?


Who cares? I mean, I find it a very interesting psychological and biological question, but it's irrelevant to determining if someone else behaves in a way I call moral.

[TX50]

Yes

Definitely, but not as evil as windsurfers.

[JoeTheJuggler]

The question is meta-ethical: what does morality rest on, if on anything?

I've given my answer to this on several threads, but I'm happy to do it again.

Morality is an innate capacity in humans that was selected for its advantage to animals living in highly-complex social groups. It is very similar to language. There is the innate capacity and a learned, conventional part to both.

As for the conventional part: both moral norms and languages have fairly constant universals with some (relatively minor) variations among them. (See Pinker--even though languages seem very diverse, he points to just a handful of "switches" that could be thrown one way or the other to explain all the kinds of grammar.)

I think both make use of similar mental processes (capacity to infer intention or agency, pattern recognition, semiotics, etc.)

There are proto-versions of both in other higher mammals (especially primates) living in complex social groups.

Brain trauma or structural deficiencies can diminish both capacities.

The adaptive advantage of both is abundantly obvious, but I could delineate some of them if anyone needs it spelled out.

[Beerina]

Are Atheists Evil?

Yes, according to most religions around the world.


Which is why they're obviously false, since the concept that otherwise decent people are evil because they don't recognize God without proof is silly on the face of it.

[quarky]

Here's a thing I wrote when i was a kid:

Morality is the fulcrum of the lever on which we stand, to be elevated by the weight of those whom fail to adequately speculate on the nature of the unknowable.

I'm not sure what it means now, but I recall being smart as a kid.

[JoeTheJuggler]

Morality is the fulcrum of the lever on which we stand, to be elevated by the weight of those whom fail to adequately speculate on the nature of the unknowable.

Using "whom" as a subject IS evil.

[mikeyx]

Are Atheists Evil?

Yes, according to most religions around the world.


Which is why they're obviously false, since the concept that otherwise decent people are evil because they don't recognize God without proof is silly on the face of it.


atheists are not innately evil, but what they can be is ANNOYING, pushy and opinonated just like evangelicals, liberals, feminists, peta members, and flamboyant homos, all of which can be guilty of invading your personal space with their world view when it's isn't wanted.....

[rwguinn]

atheists are not innately evil, but what they can be is ANNOYING, pushy and opinonated just like evangelicals, liberals, feminists, peta members, and flamboyant homos, all of which can be guilty of invading your personal space with their world view when it's isn't wanted.....
I hope like hell that you are wearing the Flame Retardant Suit today!

[Third Eye Open]

SI, please read about evolution. It is a very interesting subject and explains lots of the behaviors humans have.

[Marquis de Carabas]

liberals, feminists, peta members, and flamboyant homos
i.e. atheists.

[Neverfly]

Blasphemy!
PETA IS evil. (http://www.peta.org/sea_kittens/)

[Third Eye Open]

Blasphemy!
PETA IS evil. (http://www.peta.org/sea_kittens/)

Good lord neverfly, I just noticed your post count. Has it even been a week?!:jaw-dropp

No offense but I wonder how you find the time!

[Neverfly]

Good lord neverfly, I just noticed your post count. Has it even been a week?!:jaw-dropp

No offense but I wonder how you find the time!

It varies greatly. I also had a heavy head start by pushing out over 60 posts in one day... In honesty, I have no idea how I did that and retained some semblence of sanity myself...

And I haven't even spread out to the other sections of the board yet.

[joobz]

Blasphemy!
PETA IS evil. (http://www.peta.org/sea_kittens/)
I Disagree.

Bert IS Evil. (http://www.bertisevil.tv/index2.htm)

[quarky]

Using "whom" as a subject IS evil.

yes.

As a kid, I used who, and changed it today, to whom, because of getting stupider.

Its always self-serving, morality. That was the gist of my poemy-thingy.

[Ron_Tomkins]

Are Atheists Evil?

First mistake: The question generalizes

Even if we were to give "Evil" a clear universal definition (which you should do before asking such question) such as "actions that harm other people and living creatures"; asking if ALL atheists are Evil is a very poor elaborated question, that prejudices from the very beginning and that seems to be already biased toward a particular type of answer

I have found that in this planet, there are people with bad intentions, and that there is no single pattern to identify them and put them all in a category: They could be atheists, theists, black, white, hispanic, italian, tall, short, fat, republican, democrat, etc.

Therefore, because of the very primitive concept of the question itself, I cannot take it seriously

[Nogbad]

Is Madoff an atheist?

Identifying someone as scum is a rather odd device to use in meta ethics.

I find myself asking if the maverick philosopher is a tabloid journalist or, even, do I care who he is?

In the end I found the answer to the latter question was no.

[LarianLeQuella]

In an effort to copy StoneIsland's style, I am just going to post a link:

http://www.edwardtbabinski.us/fundamentals/bible_moral_guide.html

I would say that the bible is actually DANGEROUS for establishing a moral code...


Edited for civility

Folks, remember to keep on topic and be civil. Thank you.

[Stone Island]

First mistake: The question generalizes


Poor Sam Harris, Ron Tomkins thinks you're stupid,

In Letter to a Christian Nation (Knopf, 2006), in the section "Are Atheists Evil?", Sam Harris writes:
If you are right to believe that religious faith offers the only real basis for morality, then atheists should be less moral than believers. In fact, they should be utterly immoral.

Maverick Philosopher agrees that atheists aren't less moral than believers, and they certainly aren't utterly immoral. The question, which you would have seen had you bothered to read the OP, was why?

As it says,
What (Q2) asks about is the foundation or basis of the agreed-upon objectively binding moral code. This is not a sociological or any kind of empirical question. Nor is it a question in normative ethics. The question is not what we ought to do and leave undone, for we are assuming that we already have a rough answer to that. The question is meta-ethical: what does morality rest on, if on anything?

[Achán hiNidráne]

Posted in error.

[Monketey Ghost]

If evil exists, which it doesn't, I am, which is to say an atheist who's evil.

[Wowbagger]

Do the people who wrote and signed this sound evil?

http://www.americanhumanist.org/who_we_are/about_humanism/Humanist_Manifesto_III

They seem to think human nature is a good enough foundation, on its own, to rest moral values onto.

[Ron_Tomkins]

Poor Sam Harris, Ron Tomkins thinks you're stupid,

Did I say that?

[Stone Island]

Philosophy is not the strong suit of some (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=137997).

Maverick Philosopher is asking, I think, a serious question. No one has attempted to answer that question, either going off topic or answering what they think the question is, but really replying simply to Sam Harris's simple statement of the problem and not Maverick Philosophers more complex restatement.

Sam Harris's answer, that empirically speaking atheists in particular are no more or less evil than anyone else, is a standard atheist move. Maverick Philosopher shows that that move isn't that strong, that it still leaves questions to be answered when he writes,

But the point of this post is not to take sides on the question of the basis of morality, but simply to point out that Sam Harris has confused two quite obviously distinct questions. For if he had kept them distinct, he would have seen that the question whether morality requires a basis in religion is logically independent of the question whether theists are more moral than atheists. He would have seen that invoking the platitude that atheists can be as morally decent as theists has no tendency to show that morality does not require a supernatural foundation.

[ThatSoundAgain]

maverick philosopher agrees that atheists aren't less moral than believers, and they certainly aren't utterly immoral. The question, which you would have seen had you bothered to read the op, was why?

As it says,
what (q2) asks about is the foundation or basis of the agreed-upon objectively binding moral code. This is not a sociological or any kind of empirical question. Nor is it a question in normative ethics. The question is not what we ought to do and leave undone, for we are assuming that we already have a rough answer to that. The question is meta-ethical: What does morality rest on, if on anything?

I don't know if you realise it, but you're bringing in a rather sneaky argument by Maverick Philosopher.

You want us to consider what objective foundation morality rests on without having shown that there is such a foundation at all.

All the handwaving about abortion and self-defense killing is really just misdirection; a paragraph that you can stomp your feet and point to whenever anyone tries to broaden the discussion to include facts that wouldn't fit with the answer you're fishing for. That's the sneaky bit, much like a Microsoft EULA.

The elephant in the room, however, is that this question relies on a false premise. Ain't no such thing as an "objectively binding" moral code.

[Stone Island]

The elephant in the room, however, is that this question relies on a false premise. Ain't no such thing as an "objectively binding" moral code.

So, when MP writes, Just imagine some minimal objectively binding code that all or most of us, theists and atheists alike, accept. your answer is that the "minimal" is really zero.

[Nogbad]

So, when MP writes, your answer is that the "minimal" is really zero.

What does objectively mean? How many ages and cultures must it transcend to be objectively binding?

Is it merely that which is functional to specific cultures and times?

[Foster Zygote]

Philosophy is not the strong suit of some (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=137997).

Wait, I'm confused. Am I really on Stone Island's ignore list or not? I thought I was in some pretty exclusive company. I'll be crushed if he isn't really ignoring me.

And does he really think that what he linked to was anything more than a means of poking fun at him?

[ThatSoundAgain]

So, when MP writes, Just imagine some minimal objectively binding code that all or most of us, theists and atheists alike, accept. your answer is that the "minimal" is really zero.

No, there's the confusion right there: I'm not claiming that there's not some generally* agreed upon moral common ground between societies and individuals, or in your terms that "the minimal" is entirely nonexistent.

I'm just saying that any moral code, even the "minimal" is not and cannot be objective.

It's always cultural.

* With a large grain of salt, numerous exceptions, and a multitude of unknowns. And only if you whittle "the minimal" way down and accept that quite a lot of people will deviate.

[Wowbagger]

Stone Island, my previous post in this thread directly answered your question, I believe. Did you read the link? It's not that long.



ETA: Here it is, again: http://www.americanhumanist.org/who_we_are/about_humanism/Humanist_Manifesto_III

[joobz]

Maverick Philosopher is asking, I think, a serious question. No one has attempted to answer that question, either going off topic or answering what they think the question is, but really replying simply to Sam Harris's simple statement of the problem and not Maverick Philosophers more complex restatement.

It should be easy to empirically prove that atheists are less moral than theists. Show the data.

[I Ratant]

The tossup ignores the middle ground... amoral.
As persons neither committed to theism OR athesism must have slot in this mess of pseudo intellectual posturing.
These souls would be innocent of the concept of a big sky daddy.
If only we were so blessed!

[Dragoonster]

So, when MP writes, your answer is that the "minimal" is really zero.

Depends on what kind of objective is meant. IMO there is no universal objective moral code, and MP seems to agree in the statement, by including the bolded portion: "Just imagine some minimal objectively binding code that all or most of us, theists and atheists alike, accept." It's impossible for a truly universal objective thing to only apply to most, rather than all. If murder is objectively wrong, there would be absolutely no one who thought it was right. But there are.

So, does "objective" mean "majority view"? aka "what decent, normal people think"? In which case there's a bit of a No True Morality fallacy against murderers, masochists, thieves, etc.

Assuming that the "objective" morals in paragraph one really only mean "general social mores", the answer to the basis of morality would be society, I guess. The real answer, as morality isn't objective, is that the basis of morality varies per person and is entirely subjective, even if 99.9% of the persons arrive at the same morality. Going further, the basis might be "promotion of self-interest" or "empathy-based actions", but there's no single objective answer there either.

[Stone Island]

Depends on what kind of objective is meant. IMO there is no universal objective moral code, and MP seems to agree in the statement, by including the bolded portion: "Just imagine some minimal objectively binding code that all or most of us, theists and atheists alike, accept." It's impossible for a truly universal objective thing to only apply to most, rather than all. If murder is objectively wrong, there would be absolutely no one who thought it was right. But there are.

So, does "objective" mean "majority view"? aka "what decent, normal people think"? In which case there's a bit of a No True Morality fallacy against murderers, masochists, thieves, etc.

You gloss over the difference between what most of us accept and what applies to all of us.

The argument from disagreement is a fallacy too.

There is no one who thinks that murder is "right", since the definition of murder contains within the concept of its being unjustified homicide. I will grant that there are a wide variety of opinions with regards to what constitutes justifiable homicide (which wouldn't, by definition, be murder).

[Stone Island]

No, there's the confusion right there: I'm not claiming that there's not some generally* agreed upon moral common ground between societies and individuals, or in your terms that "the minimal" is entirely nonexistent.

I'm just saying that any moral code, even the "minimal" is not and cannot be objective.

It's always cultural.

* With a large grain of salt, numerous exceptions, and a multitude of unknowns. And only if you whittle "the minimal" way down and accept that quite a lot of people will deviate.

The funny thing is, we always look at a particular culture's practices and judge them. What are we doing when we do that? What are we doing when we judge ourselves judging other cultures? Is it arbitrary all the way down?

[Wowbagger]

The funny thing is, we always look at a particular culture's practices and judge them. What are we doing when we do that? What are we doing when we judge ourselves judging other cultures? Is it arbitrary all the way down? It's not arbitrary. "Ethical values are derived from human need and interest as tested by experience...."

Look, your OP asked "Are atheists evil?", and as you could tell, the answer is "not necessarily".

You then brought up issues of ethical foundations. How could someone be good without God? In response, I linked you to the Humanist Manifesto. It presents a human-based foundation for promoting good, yet progressive, moral values.

What more do you need to know?

[Cavemonster]

The funny thing is, we always look at a particular culture's practices and judge them. What are we doing when we do that? What are we doing when we judge ourselves judging other cultures? Is it arbitrary all the way down?

Not arbitrary, culturally determined. The standards by which we judge our own judgment, and the practice of evaluating our own judgment in the first place are aspects of culture and will vary from group to group.

There may be some genetic roots which are shared by almost all humans, but most even some of the most basic stuff varies wildly around the globe.

What is murder?

Is killing a woman who has been raped because her impurity mars the honor of your family wrong?

Is killing a doctor who performs abortions wrong?

Is killing yourself and leaving your family with no economic support wrong?

These are all considered morally right by some Muslims, some Christians, and some Buddhists.

[Dragoonster]

You gloss over the difference between what most of us accept and what applies to all of us.

How?

The argument from disagreement is a fallacy too.

Not when the subject itself requires 100% agreement to be true. Is "grapes taste better than pears" true if someone thinks pears taste better than grapes, and if "taste" is understood to be an opinion and not objectively quantifiable?

There is no one who thinks that murder is "right", since the definition of murder contains within the concept of its being unjustified homicide. I will grant that there are a wide variety of opinions with regards to what constitutes justifiable homicide (which wouldn't, by definition, be murder).

The "justified"/"unjustified" part is subjective. Person A can feel killing person B is justifed but person B may feel it's unjustified, and vice-versa. Both may call it murder if they're killed, but not if they kill the other. So no objective morality concerning killing either of them exists. Calling one or the other "Murder" is merely demonstrating your own subjective view, it isn't demonstrating some universally objective moral fact.

[D'rok]

Philosophy is not the strong suit of some (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=137997).

Maverick Philosopher is asking, I think, a serious question. No one has attempted to answer that question, either going off topic or answering what they think the question is, but really replying simply to Sam Harris's simple statement of the problem and not Maverick Philosophers more complex restatement.

Sam Harris's answer, that empirically speaking atheists in particular are no more or less evil than anyone else, is a standard atheist move. Maverick Philosopher shows that that move isn't that strong, that it still leaves questions to be answered when he writes,

And Maverick Philosopher's (MP) move doesn't pass the "so what?" test. His restatement is a straw man.

The point of Harris' argument is simply that religion is not required for morality. The argument says nothing about a supernatural meta-ethical base for morality. Harris didn't confuse the two questions - he asked the first one, not the second one. Harris' argument is valid and sound whether or not there is a supernatural meta-source for morality. The second question is as dis-interesting to an atheist as the first one is to MP.

MP's fundamental complaint is that Harris' argument "is not philosophically interesting". So what? It is still correct.

MP is making the typical theist countermove - "prove that there is no God" - recast as "prove there is no supernatural meta-source for morality". Neither are possible, so they are rarely, if ever, attempted. Proving that morality does not require religion is quite easy, so it is attempted. The attempt is successful. Religion is not the source for morality.

It is also possible to identify what actually is the source (as opposed to the meta-source) of morality. This typically requires employing neurobiology, evolutionary biology, sociology, etc. None of those results negate the possibility that the meta-source is still supernatural. So what?

MP has painted himself into a corner. By granting that religion is not the source of morality, he strongly implies the conclusion that religion is disconnected from the supernatural meta-source of morality, should such a thing, in fact, exist.

[TraneWreck]

Upon realizing that asking whether atheists are any more moral or immoral the theists isn't philosophically interesting, we have a penetrating question from Maverick Philosopher (http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/03/sam-harris-on-whether-atheists-are-evil.html):


Before answering, look at the conditions the Maverick Philosopher sets out in the second paragraph.

Maverick Philosopher points to the transcript of a debate (http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html) between Richard Taylor and William Lane Craig on this topic.

A couple of things:

First, though it wasn't explicitly done in the OP I get the idea that this is headed towards an argument for the existence of god by objective morality. As has been said a thousand times, this is nonsense because religious people cherry-pick the laws "dictated by god," following those that they choose. No Christian in the United States, for example, shows any concern for Jesus' statements about wordly wealth and one's cheritable duties. So those people are making a practical decision to ignore the dictates of god. The morality of the religious comes from the same Earthly judgments that we atheists make.

Second, the quote in the OP is very indirect. He seems to be implying that there's something suspicious in the general human attitude towards crimes like rape and murder (though every culture has its own unique way of justifying particular subsets of those crimes). What's the conclusion? Other than the common argument I discussed above, I don't really understand what you think he's getting at.

And as for a common basis for morality, why not genetics? We all share 99% or more of our DNA, so it seems highly likely that we would have similar attitudes towards social relationships.

That may not arrive at the cosmic objectivity the religious crave, but it certainly explains the issue mentioned in the OP.

[jj]

Is dishonest, completely invalid stereotyping of minorities evil?

[Travis]

Why is it that those who are identified as Maverick Philosophers usually aren't?

Just something I've noticed.

[Robin]

Why is it that those who are identified as Maverick Philosophers usually aren't?

Just something I've noticed.
You beat me to it. I was about to say that this Maverick Philosopher is clearly neither.

[Robin]

I notice a particularly silly blunder this guy makes.

He is confusing the question of whether religious faith is a necessary foundation for morality - as raised by Sam Harris in his quote - with the entirely different question of whether morality needs a supernatural foundation - a question not even raised in the Sam Harris quote.

Sam Harris is quote right in saying that if religious faith was a necessary foundation for morality then atheists should be less moral than theists.

[Safe-Keeper]

What is a Maverick Philosopher anyhow? An anthropologist in an F-14?

[paximperium]

I notice a particularly silly blunder this guy makes.

He is confusing the question of whether religious faith is a necessary foundation for morality - as raised by Sam Harris in his quote - with the entirely different question of whether morality needs a supernatural foundation - a question not even raised in the Sam Harris quote.

Sam Harris is quote right in saying that if religious faith was a necessary foundation for morality then atheists should be less moral than theists.
I disagree. It is NOT a blunder but was done on purpose.

[Travis]

I disagree. It is NOT a blunder but was done on purpose.

Apparently hoping no one would notice.....or care.

[joobz]

Someone quote me, because I'm on ignore:

The premise of the OP is a fully testable hypothesis.
Show, by looking at crime statistics, that atheists are less moral than thiests.
Show, by looking at fedelity statistics, that atheists are less moral than theists.
Show, by looking at atruistic statistics, that atheists are less moral than theists.

None of the linguistic gymnastics matter. If you can't prove it with evidence, the argument is false.

[Safe-Keeper]

Someone quote me, because I'm on ignore:

The premise of the OP is a fully testable hypothesis.
Show, by looking at crime statistics, that atheists are less moral than thiests.
Show, by looking at fedelity statistics, that atheists are less moral than theists.
Show, by looking at atruistic statistics, that atheists are less moral than theists.

None of the linguistic gymnastics matter. If you can't prove it with evidence, the argument is false.Thereyago

[D'rok]

I disagree. It is NOT a blunder but was done on purpose.

Seconded.

[TraneWreck]

What is a Maverick Philosopher anyhow? An anthropologist in an F-14?

No, just a guy who takes off his shirt, oils himself down, and plays chess...

[Darth Rotor]

Are Atheists Evil?
Some are, some aren't.

Next question?

@ joobz.

None of the linguistic gymnastics matter. If you can't prove it with evidence, the argument is false.
Being a nitpicky so and so this morning. Suggest "support" versus "prove" in that sentence.

I've read a number of threads here and there about what "proof" requires. Given the area we are dealing in here (morality) "supported by evidence" fits your excellently founded admonition very well. :)

Now, I am off to have IRL lunch with Tricky. Huzzah!

DR

[D'rok]

/thread

[cj.23]

I have actually recently met something I never believed in -- the fundamentalist atheist, who is blinded to any fact by their hatred of religion, and hence is completely unable to accept history, philosophy, or even science when it goes against their virulent loathing of religion. I debated some on the conflict hypothesis - the idea that religion and science were and are inevitably in conflict - and they just rabidly ranted nonsense without any real attempt at countering any facts. It was one of the most depressing experiences I have ever had... The enemy is never religion or atheism - it is irrational dogmatism, for all of us. :( In a few years on atheist forums these are really the first I have met who could not be reasoned with at all - truly loony morons :(

If anyone is interested -http://www.richarddawkins.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=23&t=72341

cj x

[D'rok]

I have actually recently met something I never believed in -- the fundamentalist atheist, who is blinded to any fact by their hatred of religion, and hence is completely unable to accept history, philosophy, or even science when it goes against their virulent loathing of religion. I debated some on the conflict hypothesis - the idea that religion and science were and are inevitably in conflict - and they just rabidly ranted nonsense without any real attempt at countering any facts. It was one of the most depressing experiences I have ever had... The enemy is never religion or atheism - it is irrational dogmatism, for all of us. :( In a few years on atheist forums these are really the first I have met who could not be reasoned with at all - truly loony morons :(

If anyone is interested -http://www.richarddawkins.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=23&t=72341

cj x

Not evil though. Just yer garden variety insufferable pricks.

[MG1962]

I think the biggest problem is most athiests we are probably going to meet come from societies that have inherited Christian thesist values as a norm.

It would be interesting to see an athiest transplanted to a Buddhist or Hindu society and see what the variations in moral standings are

[joobz]

I think the biggest problem is most athiests we are probably going to meet come from societies that have inherited Christian thesist values as a norm.

It would be interesting to see an athiest transplanted to a Buddhist or Hindu society and see what the variations in moral standings are
I don't think Islamic states take kinidly to atheists Either.

[Foster Zygote]

Now, I am off to have IRL lunch with Tricky. Huzzah!

DR

Skip the sausages.

[Foster Zygote]

I think the biggest problem is most athiests we are probably going to meet come from societies that have inherited Christian thesist values as a norm.

It would be interesting to see an athiest transplanted to a Buddhist or Hindu society and see what the variations in moral standings are

I'm not sure what you're suggesting.

First: Are you implying that Christians are more inherently moral than Buddhists or Hindus?

Second: Are you saying that atheists only appear to be as moral as Christians because they grew up exposed to Christan morality, and that without that exposure their behavior would be measurably different?

[Stone Island]

Thereyago

That's not the premise of the OP at all. Can't you read?

[TraneWreck]

That's not the premise of the OP at all. Can't you read?

But the premise is that there's something unusual and surprising about a fact perfectly consistent with humanity's shared genetics.

I don't really see how it's all that worthwhile to stick to the original point.

[MG1962]

I'm not sure what you're suggesting.

First: Are you implying that Christians are more inherently moral than Buddhists or Hindus?



No simply there is potential for differing moral codes. For a good part of western civilisation, there was virtually no seperation of church and state. This means law and moral standings of a society were based on the religious beliefs encompassed by that society.

An example of this is homosexuality. At times in ancient Greece it was not only accepted but encouraged. In our civilisation it has been abhored and really only recently has society become accepting of such practices.

Personally I have no attraction to other males, yet if I grow up in a society where such attractions are the norm, chances are culturally I would develope acceptence and enjoyment of such activities.


Second: Are you saying that atheists only appear to be as moral as Christians because they grew up exposed to Christan morality, and that without that exposure their behavior would be measurably different?

Not really. I am saying an athiest moral settings are decided by the culture they grow up in. For a very long time the only access poor children had to education was through various Christian charity systems. Over time it was seen that such a concept as universal education was a great positve for society. Today an athiest will pay their taxs knowning a persentage of that tax will go to education, and be more than happy to do so. They may even get involved in fund raising for a school

Desire for universal education does not need a theist or athiest standpoint, but simply a desire to get the best for children and society

[arthwollipot]

Not evil though. Just yer garden variety insufferable pricks.Religion certainly does not have a monopoly on dickishness.

[joobz]

Has SI presented any evidence supporting* the claim that Atheists are less moral than theists?

didn't think so...


*Thanks Darth Rotor for catching my previous lingquistic error.

[Dave Rogers]

Maverick Philosopher is asking, I think, a serious question. No one has attempted to answer that question, either going off topic or answering what they think the question is, but really replying simply to Sam Harris's simple statement of the problem and not Maverick Philosophers more complex restatement.

What I find significant about Maverick Philosopher's actual question is that it can equally well be put to those who choose to derive their moral code from the received precepts of a religion established by others than themselves, and who may be presumed to some level only to adhere to that moral code out of desire for reward and fear of punishment, administered directly by a deity. In the extreme case, there is in effect no moral judgement made by such people, as it is entirely abrogated in favour of a supreme entity whose will they find it advantageous to follow.

Sam Harris's answer, that empirically speaking atheists in particular are no more or less evil than anyone else, is a standard atheist move. Maverick Philosopher shows that that move isn't that strong, that it still leaves questions to be answered when he writes,

A lot of the answers you're receiving, I suspect, are simpler than you claim to have required due solely to your choice of thread title, which is extremely misleading. You've started a thread called "Are Atheists evil?", then posed a different question in the OP; now you're criticising those who answer the question in the thread title. Perhaps if you were a little more straightforward, you might get people to address the question you claim to have set out to ask them to address.

Dave

[godless dave]

Philosophy is not the strong suit of some (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=137997).

Maverick Philosopher is asking, I think, a serious question.

Serious, yes. Relevant to human experience, no. Interesting, somewhat, from a psychological and biological perspective as I said above.


No one has attempted to answer that question, either going off topic or answering what they think the question is, but really replying simply to Sam Harris's simple statement of the problem and not Maverick Philosophers more complex restatement.

Actually the question was answered early in this thread. Atheist morality, just like all human morality, is based on psychological motivations rooted in our evolutionary heritage.


Sam Harris's answer, that empirically speaking atheists in particular are no more or less evil than anyone else, is a standard atheist move. Maverick Philosopher shows that that move isn't that strong, that it still leaves questions to be answered when he writes,
But the point of this post is not to take sides on the question of the basis of morality, but simply to point out that Sam Harris has confused two quite obviously distinct questions. For if he had kept them distinct, he would have seen that the question whether morality requires a basis in religion is logically independent of the question whether theists are more moral than atheists.


The Maverick Philosopher is wrong. If we observe that empirically speaking atheists in particular are no more or less evil than anyone else, then we can conclude that religion is not a necessary basis for morality, which was the entirety of Harris's claim.

[Stone Island]

If the argument from disagreement works against the "Skydaddy," why doesn't it work against shared genetic heritage or evolutionary advantage?

In addition, insofar as Socrates' argument in the Euthyphro was correct, doesn't it also work against shared genetic heritage?

[TraneWreck]

If the argument from disagreement works against the "Skydaddy," why doesn't it work against shared genetic heritage or evolutionary advantage?

In addition, insofar as Socrates' argument in the Euthyphro was correct, doesn't it also work against shared genetic heritage?

It depends on your perspective. I suppose you could point to abberrant cultures like the Aztecs or Nazis and conclude that humanity has vastly divergent understandings of morality.

I would say that the reason we remember these culture's as unique was due to the fact that there is far more agreement than disagreement when it comes to cross-cultural morality.

As for distinguishing skydaddy from genetics, DNA doesn't provide immutable, unchangeable laws that we must all abide by, it merely explains the phenomon (thought amazing by the quoted thinker in the OP) that we share a great deal of moral intuition.

The more we learn about the very foundations of our humanity, however, the more we are able to make those cross-cultural moral judgments.

Our recent understand of battered-wife syndrome, for example, let's us reject the notion that abused women in muslim states are happy. Human psychology transcends culture, so we can identify the same process.

The more we learn, the more able we are to judge behavior with respect to the human organism, but all such laws will be contengent on humanity. A skydaddy makes a claim about the way the universe operates.

[godless dave]

In addition, insofar as Socrates' argument in the Euthyphro was correct, doesn't it also work against shared genetic heritage?

I thought Euthyphro was about piety.

[godless dave]

If the argument from disagreement works against the "Skydaddy," why doesn't it work against shared genetic heritage or evolutionary advantage?

No one is claiming that our genetic heritage will result in all humans having the same concepts of morality. I'm claiming that our genetic heritage is what motivates humans to develop certain concepts of morality.

If it were true that religion was necessary for morality, we would expect to see significant differences between the behaviors of religious people and non-religious people.

[Stone Island]

If it were true that religion was necessary for morality, we would expect to see significant differences between the behaviors of religious people and non-religious people.

MP isn't talking about what's necessary for morality, or sufficient, but justification.

[godless dave]

MP isn't talking about what's necessary for morality, or sufficient, but justification.

Right. But he was responding to Harris, who was only talking about what was necessary and sufficient. And I was responding to your question about the argument from disagreement. The argument from disagreement isn't much help to us here, because we do not have a population of intelligent, conscious agents who do not share a common genetic heritage with humans, so there is nothing to make comparisons to.

[Achán hiNidráne]

Why does my morality need justification to the likes of you?

[godless dave]

Why does my morality need justification to the likes of you?

Or justification at all?

[Darth Rotor]

Why does my morality need justification to the likes of you?

To take the question on its own merits, and I admit this is slightly out of context:

Why does it need justification?

In case you wanted to share it, or see others adopt it (or at least parts of it.) In case you wanted others to see things more your way.

DR

[arthwollipot]

I thought Euthyphro was about piety.In its original form, yes. But it is often restated in more modern terms to be about morality: "Are the acts that God commands moral because God commands them, or does God command only moral acts?"

The orignal Euthyphro was stated in polythestic terms too, but is more usually restated monotheistically.

I started a thread on the Euthyphro a while back, but it didn't engender much interest.

[Stone Island]

To take the question on its own merits, and I admit this is slightly out of context:

Why does it need justification?

In case you wanted to share it, or see others adopt it (or at least parts of it.) In case you wanted others to see things more your way.

DR

I've been told that atheists consider each moral problem afresh, unlike theists who rely on rules handed down from on high.

Now, unless the atheist's fresh considerations are merely arbitrary poses, or expressions of some preference, then it's likely that they're justified (theoretically if not practically) in some way.

It seems to me that to say that the good is pleasure, or happiness for the greatest number, or God's will, or the general will, or an result of certain evolutionary processes, or anything at all, requires a justification because there are plenty of honest, intelligent people who believe something different. They want to know what the good actually is, and to get them to change their mind requires justified reasons. Now, Ill admit that if the good is merely your particular, arbitrary preference, then no justification is needed. No justification is possible.

[ThatSoundAgain]

I've been told that atheists consider each moral problem afresh, unlike theists who rely on rules handed down from on high.

I don't agree with this description. Of course you can't consider each moral problem in isolation. At the very least you're bringing your own values and other baggage along with the surrounding society's. Atheist or not.


Now, unless the atheist's fresh considerations are merely arbitrary poses, or expressions of some preference, then it's likely that they're justified (theoretically if not practically) in some way.

It seems to me that to say that the good is pleasure, or happiness for the greatest number, or God's will, or the general will, or an result of certain evolutionary processes, or anything at all, requires a justification because there are plenty of honest, intelligent people who believe something different. They want to know what the good actually is, and to get them to change their mind requires justified reasons. Now, Ill admit that if the good is merely your particular, arbitrary preference, then no justification is needed. No justification is possible.

Of course justification and discussion of moral stances are possible. That's the important step where it goes from the individual to the social - important in constructing the ethics that make society possible.

But justification only goes so deep: Both these individual morals and the ethics derived from them rest on unprovable axioms. We call those values, and they're usually something like "happiness is preferable to unhappiness" or fuzzy concepts like "the greater good". If there's too wide a gap between two people's fundamental values, ethical discourse gets very difficult.

Here's my point: These fundamental values are essentially subjective. There is a point at which everyone, theist or otherwise, can justify no further than "just because". Why is behaviour supposedly pronounced moral by a deity better than behaviour that isn't? Just because.

In other words, morality is fundamentally an aesthetic. Like food, art, music, sexual attraction etc., it boils down to "I like X better because I find it appealing". Rephrased, "behaviour X is moral because I like it better" or "Behaviour (not X) is immoral because I find it distasteful".

It's very simple to show that a supposed absolute morality is so inaccessible to humans as to be irrelevant. Just find two believers in gods with incompatible moral systems. Then get them to shout equally loud that they have access to the universally correct morals, and watch how it's possible for orthagonal morals to appear equally absolute.

By all means, carry on the interesting discussion on ethics and the foundations of common ground in moral matters, but don't fool yourself that you can find bedrock by digging deep enough.

In stead, realise that your values are subjective but that that's no reason to fight less fervently for what you deem good.

[godless dave]

I've been told that atheists consider each moral problem afresh, unlike theists who rely on rules handed down from on high.


You've been told wrong on both counts.

[JetLeg]

Here's my point: These fundamental values are essentially subjective. There is a point at which everyone, theist or otherwise, can justify no further than "just because". Why is behaviour supposedly pronounced moral by a deity better than behaviour that isn't? Just because.

In other words, morality is fundamentally an aesthetic. Like food, art, music, sexual attraction etc., it boils down to "I like X better because I find it appealing". Rephrased, "behaviour X is moral because I like it better" or "Behaviour (not X) is immoral because I find it distasteful".

It's very simple to show that a supposed absolute morality is so inaccessible to humans as to be irrelevant. Just find two believers in gods with incompatible moral systems. Then get them to shout equally loud that they have access to the universally correct morals, and watch how it's possible for orthagonal morals to appear equally absolute.

In stead, realise that your values are subjective but that that's no reason to fight less fervently for what you deem good.

Hi, ThatSoundAgain.


I _really_ fail to understand your logic.

Don't you view the two bolded statements as contradictory?


1) Do we fight fervently for "What food is really tasty? ". Or "Which woman is more attractive? " Do we have arguments? Is it even possible to have arguments about these? Yet, we have moral debate, and it is very important to have it.

Feminism, Abolitionism were innovations in terms of moral debate. But if morality is subjective, then of what use is debate?


2) If I would think that morality is subjective, then my reaction to a person who says "Onions are tasty" (I don't like onions), and to a person that says "Rape is wrong" would be the same. I would shrug, and say "Well, weird position to hold. ".

-------------------------

I think that moral subjectivism is problematic for the reasons above.

[godless dave]

The taste of onions is a subjective opinion each person can have without affecting anyone else. Moral opinions, when they influence behavior, do affect others, so it makes sense to discuss them with each other. But they're still subjective.

[TraneWreck]

I've been told that atheists consider each moral problem afresh...


This reminded me of one of my favorite arguments that Kant makes:

Kant basically criticized the entire practice of trying to discern proper morality from neutral thought experiments or examples. He argued that the mere fact that we choose certain examples and not others proves we cannot help but approach the issue with our prior moral intuition (Kant wouldn't call it moral intution, I can't remember all of his terms off the top of my head).

When you read philosophers you constantly come up with situations like the Ring of Gyges (from Plato, a ring that makes you invisible). Would it be wrong to steal if no one would ever catch you? Or situations that force extreme moral judgments: a South American despot is about to execute 20 people from a village. If you take a gun and shoot one member, he will let the other 19 go, if you don't act he kills them all, what is the appropriate course of action?

Those issues are alternatively settled with deontic systems or utilitarian ideas or whatever you think will settle the issue.

But Kant pointed out that the fact that we choose those examples shows that we already have some idea of morality, and that it can't be researched purely empirically. Why is the choice in the South American despot example relevant to morality, but the color of socks I chose to wear on a Saturday not?

I always found that to be an interesting point.

[JetLeg]

This reminded me of one of my favorite arguments that Kant makes:

Kant basically criticized the entire practice of trying to discern proper morality from neutral thought experiments or examples. He argued that the mere fact that we choose certain examples and not others proves we cannot help but approach the issue with our prior moral intuition (Kant wouldn't call it moral intution, I can't remember all of his terms off the top of my head).

When you read philosophers you constantly come up with situations like the Ring of Gyges (from Plato, a ring that makes you invisible). Would it be wrong to steal if no one would ever catch you? Or situations that force extreme moral judgments: a South American despot is about to execute 20 people from a village. If you take a gun and shoot one member, he will let the other 19 go, if you don't act he kills them all, what is the appropriate course of action?

Those issues are alternatively settled with deontic systems or utilitarian ideas or whatever you think will settle the issue.

But Kant pointed out that the fact that we choose those examples shows that we already have some idea of morality, and that it can't be researched purely empirically. Why is the choice in the South American despot example relevant to morality, but the color of socks I chose to wear on a Saturday not?

I always found that to be an interesting point.

But thought experiments are not what we deduce our ideas of morality from. They are what we _test_ our ideas of morality with, how we _refine_ them.

[TraneWreck]

But thought experiments are not what we deduce our ideas of morality from. They are what we _test_ our ideas of morality with, how we _refine_ them.

In philosophy there's a famous debate between deontology and schools like consequentialism and teleology. Then you have subsets of those schools, so Kant would, I think, be classified as Deontology + anti-consequential. He would argue that there are certain appropriate and inappropriate acts regardless of their ramifications.

A consequentialist would look at a thought experiment and try to gauge the right action by the potential consequences. Kant's argument challenges the idea of even trying that tactic.

You've gone a bit farther down the line and actually decided on certain moral concepts. If you feel confident in that assessment, then you will know how to test it. You think murder is always wrong, for example, so only a thought experiment involving murder will be relevant.

Kant's argument deals with the process prior to all of that. How do we even know what our duties are (deontic) or how do we gauge consequences? In other words, how did you get to the point where you could conclude murder was wrong?

Kant famously thought you could arrive at such conclusions through reason, the categorical imperitive and such, but that reasoning was not, itself, based on empiricism.

But the point still remains, and is even supported by your comment, in order to find a situation relevant for testing our morality, you have to have some prior idea of morality. You can't simply derive it from observing a set of choices.

[D'rok]

I've been told that atheists consider each moral problem afresh, unlike theists who rely on rules handed down from on high.

I hope you told whoever told you that that he/she was wrong on both counts. Or do you agree with the proposition that theists rely on rules handed down from on high? Seems a little uncharitable to the moral compass of theists. Are theists simple moral automatons?

Now, unless the atheist's fresh considerations are merely arbitrary poses, or expressions of some preference, then it's likely that they're justified (theoretically if not practically) in some way.

It seems to me that to say that the good is pleasure, or happiness for the greatest number, or God's will, or the general will, or an result of certain evolutionary processes, or anything at all, requires a justification because there are plenty of honest, intelligent people who believe something different. They want to know what the good actually is, and to get them to change their mind requires justified reasons. Now, Ill admit that if the good is merely your particular, arbitrary preference, then no justification is needed. No justification is possible.You are conflating descriptive and normative claims about morality. Sourcing morality in evolutionary processes says nothing about "the Good". It is merely a descriptive claim. It also refutes competing descriptive claims such as the claim that morality is sourced in religion.

Of course, the claim that morality is sourced in religion includes both a descriptive claim and a normative claim - i.e., what is moral is so because it is God's will, and, because it is God's will, it should be obeyed. (Insert Euthyphro debate here).

"The Good" and morality are distinct but overlapping concepts. It is possible to speak about morality in strictly descriptive terms. However, doing so does still have a normative consequence. A successful descriptive claim sourcing morality in evolutionary processes implies the conclusion that the normative claims arising from false descriptions (e.g., sourcing morality in religious scripture), are not to be taken seriously.

If the source of morality is purely "natural", then we can trust our moral instincts and relax. No need for appeals to "the Good".

[MortFurd]

Snip
Or situations that force extreme moral judgments: a South American despot is about to execute 20 people from a village. If you take a gun and shoot one member, he will let the other 19 go, if you don't act he kills them all, what is the appropriate course of action?

Snip

Take the gun and shoot the despot for being such a SOB. Twenty (presumed) innocent lives spared and one less vicious bastard in the world.

I don't like playing morality thought experiments. They are usually so contrived as to not resemble reality, and if you bring in real, practical considerations that remove the moral consideration then all you get from the philosophers is "no fair, stick to the premise."

[TraneWreck]

Take the gun and shoot the despot for being such a SOB. Twenty (presumed) innocent lives spared and one less vicious bastard in the world.

I don't like playing morality thought experiments. They are usually so contrived as to not resemble reality, and if you bring in real, practical considerations that remove the moral consideration then all get from the philosophers is "no fair, stick to the premise."

Of course the despot would have henchmen or a small army, otherwise he wouldn't have captured the 20 in the first place.

But I see your point, and I agree with it. In fact, most of those slanted, extreme thought experiments leave you with no good answer, a Sophie's choice, of sorts.

The initial motivation for using the thought experiment, however, is central to philosophy. That's the Socratic innovation that created the western world: you want to figure something out? Observe it and use reasoning.

Kant, of course, thought you could skip the first part and engage in "pure" reasoning, but you don't have to agree with someone to find their arguments elegant.

[ThatSoundAgain]

Hi, ThatSoundAgain.


I _really_ fail to understand your logic.

Don't you view the two bolded statements as contradictory?

Hi there! No, I intended them to convey the same argument and can't really see how they can be read otherwise.

And yes, I'm dead serious with the last statement. There's two parts to it:

1) Morals is fundamentally an aesthetic.
2) You should none the less fight for what you believe is good.


1) Do we fight fervently for "What food is really tasty? ". Or "Which woman is more attractive? " Do we have arguments? Is it even possible to have arguments about these? Yet, we have moral debate, and it is very important to have it.

I think you'll find that people spend quite a lot of time debating food, wine, art, music, and who's hotter. All matters of taste. Rarely do people go to war over it, though. Some fights are simply not worth it, as godless dave pointed out above, especially when they're over things that don't affect you. In other words, I happen to be very fond of onions, but you probably wouldn't want to fight me to get me to stop eating them. That's because no matter what I do with onions, you can just choose to leave them be.

Feminism, Abolitionism were innovations in terms of moral debate. But if morality is subjective, then of what use is debate?

Simple; by debate you can hope to sway enough people to adopt your views that they'll become reality. That means you could help slaves and women have better lives if your values happen to dictate those as worthy causes.

The flip side is that your morals might dictate that you'd have been on what we now view as the wrong side of those arguments. A lot of otherwise good people through history were for oppression based on race or gender. Would I have opposed Hitler if I'd happened to be a German citizen in the 30s? I don't know for sure.

So the larger point is that what we say and do matters. IMO that's both uplifting and depressing.


2) If I would think that morality is subjective, then my reaction to a person who says "Onions are tasty" (I don't like onions), and to a person that says "Rape is wrong" would be the same. I would shrug, and say "Well, weird position to hold. ".

-------------------------

Yes, they're both opinions. The opinion on one of those things has significantly graver implications for other people, though.

I think that moral subjectivism is problematic for the reasons above.
Yes, it's problematic, but it's how the world works. That is, if you really think about it, absolute morals can be shown to be indiscernable and irrelevant. Everyone, necessarily, has to decide on a set of morals.

It might sound scary, but it's actually the way things have always worked: Humans decide on a subjective morality and then act like they're the one with a mainline to objective morality.

[ThatSoundAgain]

Kant famously thought you could arrive at such conclusions through reason, the categorical imperitive and such, but that reasoning was not, itself, based on empiricism.


Speaking of this, I just thought the other day how the categorical imperative, at least according to my values, falls for itself: Would I elevate this principle (CI) to a general rule so that no one can ever act pragmatically, so that an end never justifies a means? No, I wouldn't.

Might be what you're speaking of when you say that reason alone isn't enough.

[Darth Rotor]

Kant, of course, thought you could skip the first part and engage in "pure" reasoning, but you don't have to agree with someone to find their arguments elegant.
In exploring that idea, didn't he come to the realization that "pure reason" had its limits?

I am not the world's best Kantian understander, so perhaps my takeaway of a hard read is off center.

DR

[arthwollipot]

I've been told that atheists consider each moral problem afresh, unlike theists who rely on rules handed down from on high.Load 'o' rubbish if you ask me. Atheists can have a consistent morality just like anyone else. It's just that they don't believe that it is external to society.

[JetLeg]

It's just that they don't believe that it is external to society.

Load 'o' rubbish. There is zero logical link between being a atheist and not believing that morality is external to society. An atheist can easily believe in objective morals, without believing that god is the source of them. There are plenty of moral philosophers that believe in objective morality that doesn't come from god.

[JetLeg]

I think you'll find that people spend quite a lot of time debating food, wine, art, music, and who's hotter. All matters of taste. Rarely do people go to war over it, though. Some fights are simply not worth it, as godless dave pointed out above, especially when they're over things that don't affect you. In other words, I happen to be very fond of onions, but you probably wouldn't want to fight me to get me to stop eating them. That's because no matter what I do with onions, you can just choose to leave them be.


Well, how do people debate food and who is hotter? What are the arguments for it?

For example, there was a thread with an unreligious argument against abortion. That was an argument, not just an opinion.

Can you produce something similar regarding food/who is hotter?

(You have a better case with art & music)

[Rodibidably]

Well, how do people debate food and who is hotter? What are the arguments for it?

For example, there was a thread with an unreligious argument against abortion. That was an argument, not just an opinion.

Can you produce something similar regarding food/who is hotter?

(You have a better case with art & music)
Ok, let's go with the who is hotter one:

Sarah Palin vs Tina Fey

Palin pros:
Sexy librarian thing going on

Palin cons:
bat-**** insane

Fey pros:
Sexy librarian thing going on
Funny
Not bat-**** insane

Fey cons:
The scar on her face

Winner by ANY objective standards: Tina Fey

[Foster Zygote]

I've been told that atheists consider each moral problem afresh, unlike theists who rely on rules handed down from on high.

I wonder by whom SI was told this?

[joobz]

I wonder by whom SI was told this?
I think it was Athey McStrawerson.

[TraneWreck]

In exploring that idea, didn't he come to the realization that "pure reason" had its limits?

I am not the world's best Kantian understander, so perhaps my takeaway of a hard read is off center.

DR

I am no Kant expert either, I just remember the theories I enjoyed and wrote about a decade ago.

In an attempt to avoid research (and reading Kant, which is a bit, er, onerous), I know that he argued for the limits of human knowledge and even stronger, our ability to ever really understand the world as it is, separate from our sensory experience of it.

But that ontology was, in a way, an argument in favor of using pure reason rather than empiricism.

As for the limits of that pure reason, I know he thought that approach was sufficient to justify his ethics, but his ontology and metaphysics were so complicated and ornate that I can only claim a cursory understanding.

[TraneWreck]

Speaking of this, I just thought the other day how the categorical imperative, at least according to my values, falls for itself: Would I elevate this principle (CI) to a general rule so that no one can ever act pragmatically, so that an end never justifies a means? No, I wouldn't.

Might be what you're speaking of when you say that reason alone isn't enough.

I've always had a soft spot for the categorical imperitive. It makes a lot of practical sense, if you don't make the final step Kant does and argue that it's an unbreakable rule.

Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end.

That's a pretty damn good general stance. One of Kant's weaknesses is not being able to deal with extreme situations, but I think you could get by on that rule for 99% of your life and be just fine.

For Kant I don't think the limit was reason, but what you reasoned from. Competing ethical systems like consequentialism and Aristotelian virtues (which, if pressed, I think I support more than any other option) relied on observing the world. Kant didn't think you could derive moral laws or norms from empirical observation.

But that's a pretty superficial breakdown and I'd be curious to hear from anyone with more insight.

[ThatSoundAgain]

Well, how do people debate food and who is hotter? What are the arguments for it?

For example, there was a thread with an unreligious argument against abortion. That was an argument, not just an opinion.

Can you produce something similar regarding food/who is hotter?

(You have a better case with art & music)

Just to make sure I understand what you're saying here:

Are you seriously questioning that people discuss food and sexual attractiveness?

[ThatSoundAgain]

I've always had a soft spot for the categorical imperitive. It makes a lot of practical sense, if you don't make the final step Kant does and argue that it's an unbreakable rule.

Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end.

That's a pretty damn good general stance. One of Kant's weaknesses is not being able to deal with extreme situations, but I think you could get by on that rule for 99% of your life and be just fine.

For Kant I don't think the limit was reason, but what you reasoned from. Competing ethical systems like consequentialism and Aristotelian virtues (which, if pressed, I think I support more than any other option) relied on observing the world. Kant didn't think you could derive moral laws or norms from empirical observation.

But that's a pretty superficial breakdown and I'd be curious to hear from anyone with more insight.

Me too on that last bit - it's been too long since I've seriously read about this stuff.

[godless dave]

With food or sexual attractiveness, any discussion of taste is rooted in biological responses to stimuli. So too with discussions of morality. Why do we have concepts of morality? Because some things make us feel bad and others make us feel good.

[arthwollipot]

Load 'o' rubbish. There is zero logical link between being a atheist and not believing that morality is external to society. An atheist can easily believe in objective morals, without believing that god is the source of them. There are plenty of moral philosophers that believe in objective morality that doesn't come from god.ETA: I just posted a reply that I realised was completely irrelvant. You're absolutely right. Carry on.

[Stone Island]

With food or sexual attractiveness, any discussion of taste is rooted in biological responses to stimuli. So too with discussions of morality. Why do we have concepts of morality? Because some things make us feel bad and others make us feel good.
Is it good that certain things make us feel good or make us feel bad? Why?

[joobz]

Is it good that certain things make us feel good or make us feel bad? Why?
Yes it is good that there are good things and things that make us feel good. It is also bad that there are good things and things that make us feel good. But, we cannot deny that it is also good that there are bad things and things that make us feel bad. Just like it is also bad that there are some bad things and things that make us feel bad. The reason for this is both good and bad.

[godless dave]

Is it good that certain things make us feel good or make us feel bad? Why?


"Is" it good? No. We generally perceive it as good. "Good" is an entirely subjective term.

[godless dave]

Maybe I can use an analogy of something else that's completely subjective that humans still hold as very important. "Is" the border between New York State, USA and Ontario, Canada along the Niagara River? Hundreds of millions of human beings act like it is. But the border isn't "real". It's a completely human construction, as are the nation-states of Canada and the USA. And those concepts have meaning to humans. Humans have fought and died because of these concepts.

Morality is like that. It's a human construction that exists only in human minds, and it's very important to humans. The rest of the universe takes no notice of the concept.

[Foster Zygote]

"Is" it good? No. We generally perceive it as good. "Good" is an entirely subjective term.

"Unless you're that guy from INXS and that's your thing, the pain would be excruciating."

Mr. White

[Red3]

Seeing as "evil" is a religious idea, and there is more than likely a passage in every book pertaining to the various religions saying "if you don't believe you're going to hell" etc; then yes, in that concept atheists are evil. But in a world free of religious dogma, of course not. The word evil is pretty much an empty vessel that can be filled with whatever the user of the word wishes to fill it with.

[godless dave]

I don't see evil as a purely religious concept.

[JetLeg]

ETA: I just posted a reply that I realised was completely irrelvant. You're absolutely right. Carry on.

Thanks :)

[JetLeg]

Just to make sure I understand what you're saying here:

Are you seriously questioning that people discuss food and sexual attractiveness?

I am seriously questioning that people have _arguments_ for those. I am not in doubt that someone can say "she's so sexy, cuz her tits are greaat", but thats not an argument...

[KingMerv00]

I know I'm on SI's ignore list but I just want to say how wrong he is. Thank you, carry on.

[ThatSoundAgain]

I am seriously questioning that people have _arguments_ for those. I am not in doubt that someone can say "she's so sexy, cuz her tits are greaat", but thats not an argument...

I disagree completely - It's as much an argument as "you shouldn't kill, cuz god says so." or "Stubbing my toe is bad, cuz it hurts."

Premise(s) > conclusion. Makes an argument.

Seriously, your example is very illustrative. It's closer to the metal, so to speak. By that I mean that people discussing art, food, sexyness etc. have typically spent much less time and energy constructing their arguments and supporting frameworks* than people discussing ethics. With good reason - less is at stake. You simply don't risk hurting other people, or being hurt or oppressed yourself, based on the outcome of a debate about cooking.

The simpler arguments for which food is tastiest have the same structure as the more involved ones about ethics. And the same lact of objective grounds. I'll reiterate, this realisation doesn't mean you should not care what you eat, or that ethics is suddenly irrelevant.

* That said, you can no doubt find ethical debates at the level you describe above, and debates about the finer points of art or attractiveness that in rigor far surpass this one we're having now.

[arthwollipot]

Yes it is good that there are good things and things that make us feel good. It is also bad that there are good things and things that make us feel good. But, we cannot deny that it is also good that there are bad things and things that make us feel bad. Just like it is also bad that there are some bad things and things that make us feel bad. The reason for this is both good and bad.That's very helpful. No, really. It is.

[L The Detective]

Maybe I can use an analogy of something else that's completely subjective that humans still hold as very important. "Is" the border between New York State, USA and Ontario, Canada along the Niagara River? Hundreds of millions of human beings act like it is. But the border isn't "real". It's a completely human construction, as are the nation-states of Canada and the USA. And those concepts have meaning to humans. Humans have fought and died because of these concepts.

Morality is like that. It's a human construction that exists only in human minds, and it's very important to humans. The rest of the universe takes no notice of the concept.

Just wanted to say that I have read this entire thread, and out of all the posts I particularly liked this one the most. In fact, I am probably going to steal this and use it in conversation sometime. Godless Dave, thank you for helping me look smarter.

[JetLeg]

* That said, you can no doubt find ethical debates at the level you describe above, and debates about the finer points of art or attractiveness that in rigor far surpass this one we're having now.

Yes, in art. But can you show a discussion of sexyness/food at a high level?

[ThatSoundAgain]

Yes, in art. But can you show a discussion of sexyness/food at a high level?

I might be able to - I have no doubt they exist, but no link for now.

Anyway, that's beside the point. Have a look at these paragraphs again:

Seriously, your example is very illustrative. It's closer to the metal, so to speak. By that I mean that people discussing art, food, sexyness etc. have typically spent much less time and energy constructing their arguments and supporting frameworks* than people discussing ethics. With good reason - less is at stake. You simply don't risk hurting other people, or being hurt or oppressed yourself, based on the outcome of a debate about cooking.

The simpler arguments for which food is tastiest have the same structure as the more involved ones about ethics. And the same lact of objective grounds. I'll reiterate, this realisation doesn't mean you should not care what you eat, or that ethics is suddenly irrelevant.

The complexity, or level of the argument, is irrelevant to my point which is that whether discussing art, food, or ethics, the foundation is the same: One of like / dislike.

[JetLeg]

I might be able to - I have no doubt they exist, but no link for now.


Well, it would be very interesting, so do try.


The complexity, or level of the argument, is irrelevant to my point which is that whether discussing art, food, or ethics, the foundation is the same: One of like / dislike.

Hm... In ethics, one tries to bring arguments that would establish that something is wrong objectively. Kant, for example. I think that in sexyness and food, they are pseudo-arguments. They look like arguments, but essentially, they aren't good points.

[The Man]

Well, it would be very interesting, so do try.



Hm... In ethics, one tries to bring arguments that would establish that something is wrong objectively. Kant, for example. I think that in sexyness and food, they are pseudo-arguments. They look like arguments, but essentially, they aren't good points.



Oh, certainly in ethics some will try to bring arguments that establish something as wrong objectively, particularly those looking to establish something as wrong objectively. While others refute those arguments by clarifying the subjective basis for such arguments that might not readily be apparent. Kant, for example is basically structuring his interpretation of ethics on the assumption that there can be an objective formula for establishing something as objectively wrong. The primary being the “if everyone did it” type of scenario, the problem is the resulting applicability is based on ones interpretation of first what might happen “if everyone did it” and then whether they would consider that condition to be good or bad. So the subjectivity has not been removed, but just moved to a consideration of the results of the “maximum” or everyone where it may not be as readily apparent. The second being that we should treat people as the ends and not the means, but that is contradictory since as the ends people also become the only means by which that can end be obtained. In short certainly augments can be made, but when it comes to actually removing the subjective nature of ethics, even Kant, well, can’t.

[JetLeg]

Oh, certainly in ethics some will try to bring arguments that establish something as wrong objectively, particularly those looking to establish something as wrong objectively. While others refute those arguments by clarifying the subjective basis for such arguments that might not readily be apparent. Kant, for example is basically structuring his interpretation of ethics on the assumption that there can be an objective formula for establishing something as objectively wrong. The primary being the “if everyone did it” type of scenario, the problem is the resulting applicability is based on ones interpretation of first what might happen “if everyone did it” and then whether they would consider that condition to be good or bad. So the subjectivity has not been removed, but just moved to a consideration of the results of the “maximum” or everyone where it may not be as readily apparent. The second being that we should treat people as the ends and not the means, but that is contradictory since as the ends people also become the only means by which that can end be obtained. In short certainly augments can be made, but when it comes to actually removing the subjective nature of ethics, even Kant, well, can’t.

Let's agree, for the sake of the argument. But does one come close to this in food/sexyness?

[The Man]

Let's agree, for the sake of the argument. But does one come close to this in food/sexyness?

They are exactly the same, subjective. Oh, certainly one might present arguments about characteristics that make foods generally taste bad (which also has a lot to do with the sense of smell) to most people. Even arguments about what might be considered sexy or beautiful to most people (like perhaps symmetry), but in the end they are all based on subjective standards which investigations and general discussions often demonstrate that peoples considerations will change given the appropriate circumstances. All food can seem good when you’re starving and what you find sexy in one person or situation you may find very different in another. Ethics is the same; the circumstances are the key and the basis of the subjective determination. Again some think ethical discussions and arguments are about trying to define a common standard of ethics when actually it should be about exploring the particular circumstances and conditions that might get one to deviate from what they might already consider to be a common standard of ethics. It is only through such considerations that we actually try to get a feeling for our own subjective ethical limits and can perhaps be more suited to deal with such limits should we encounter them in real life.

Yes I do understand that you have been taking more of a qualitative (if you will) type of approach. Speaking of the harm an ‘ethical transgression’ might cause as opposed to culinary or erotic transgression, but again it is just a matter of subjectivity. A bad review by a food critic can be just as devastating to a cook as the accusation of unethical behavior for some other business (even peanut butter can kill). I do not think we really need to get in to the potential and perhaps extreme difficulties of someone being considered sexy who does not appreciate that adulation (even if only form a particular person). Ethical considerations are really no better or worse then those other consideration not because they are qualitatively different or similar in the potential degrees of their impact but because the very ascriptions of better or worse are the subjective determinations that make all of those considerations, well, subjective.