A Free Will Religion Question

[Graham]

An offshoot from another thread:

From the viewpoint of certain religious factions, including "mainstream" (I think) Christianity, the supposed god allows suffering because for him to intervene would be to violate the free will of the person or persons involved.

If their god had created a world where men were incapable of violence / malevolance of any kind, would that be an infringement of free will?

If so, how so?

I cannot fly when I flap my arms, no matter how hard I try. I may want to but I cannot. Has god infringed on my free will by not allowing me to do so?

Is there a difference between the two situations?

Graham

[El Greco]

Originally posted by Graham
From the viewpoint of certain religious factions, including "mainstream" (I think) Christianity, the supposed god allows suffering because for him to intervene would be to violate the free will of the person or persons involved.

And where exactly does suffering from severe congenital syndromes fit in this theory ?

[Graham]

Originally posted by El Greco


And where exactly does suffering from severe congenital syndromes fit in this theory ?

Happily, it's not my theory.

That said, a person suffering from a severe congenital syndrome that, for example, prevents him from walking or talking is only more disabled than the average person whose weak and puny arms prevent him from flying.

It's a quantative difference only, if I'm using that word correctly.

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

Christianity, the supposed god allows suffering because for him to intervene would be to violate the free will of the person or persons involved As has been noted above, this argument only works for some sorts of sufferingI cannot fly when I flap my arms, no matter how hard I try. I may want to but I cannot. Has god infringed on my free will by not allowing me to do so? If you were a bird the chances are that you could fly. Evolution, though, appears to have selected flightless primates for survival

I will get back to you on the other q soon as I am in the middle of making my supper

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham
I cannot fly when I flap my arms, no matter how hard I try. I may want to but I cannot. Has god infringed on my free will by not allowing me to do so?No, but by removing the possibility of your actually flying, arguably a hypothetical god has stripped the act of not flying of whatever moral significance it might otherwise have had. This doesn't seem too problematic in the case of acts that appear to lack inherent moral weight anyway, but it might be different in other instances. Consider the case of obeying certain moral dictates: "Thou shalt not kill"; "Thou shalt not steal". If god brings it about that it is always impossible to follow an immoral course of action, then the moral value of deliberately refraining from an immoral course of action is greatly diminished.

I don't mean to suggest that we are free moral actors in every situation even under the best of circumstances, but wouldn't making the commission of any harmful act impossible severely limit the moral dimension and stature of human conduct? And don't we often consider "free will" to mean the (hypothetical) human faculty of choosing among possible (or at least theoretically possible) courses of action?

[T'ai Chi]

Originally posted by Graham

If their god had created a world where men were incapable of violence / malevolance of any kind, would that be an infringement of free will?


If there is peace, there is violence, and vice-versa. You can never separate the two.


I cannot fly when I flap my arms, no matter how hard I try. I may want to but I cannot. Has god infringed on my free will by not allowing me to do so?


Yes.

Or no. Maybe the blind chance godless forces that occur over billions of years have infringed on your free will?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Graham
I cannot fly when I flap my arms, no matter how hard I try. I may want to but I cannot. Has god infringed on my free will by not allowing me to do so?

Thats a common misconception.

"Free Will" has nothing to do with physical restrictions in trying to perform actions (otherwise "Free Will" would be synonomous with "omnipotence"). "Free Will" is a concept used to describe the ability of a person or thing to consciously make decisions at his own accord (or you can just say "'Free Will' means 'desire'").

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Thats a common misconception.

"Free Will" has nothing to do with physical restrictions in trying to perform actions (otherwise "Free Will" would be synonomous with "omnipotence"). "Free Will" is a concept used to describe the ability of a person or thing to consciously make decisions at his own accord (or you can just say "'Free Will' means 'desire'"). Unless I misunderstood Graham, you've just restated his point. He is suggesting that in his example, God has not interfered with free will for the reason you have supplied.

[Abdul Alhazred]

Originally posted by Graham
I cannot fly when I flap my arms, no matter how hard I try. I may want to but I cannot. Has god infringed on my free will by not allowing me to do so?

That's free will, not free action. You are free to want or not want to fly.

[DarkPrimus]

Free will is the ability to choose to do anything you wish to, within your ability to accomplish.

If there are natural contraints that prevent you from doing something, it is not a hinderence of your ability to choose for yourself.

I have free will, dispite my being unable to spontaniously turn oxygen into gold.

[Dorian Gray]

He is suggesting that in his example, God has not interfered with free will for the reason you have supplied. Actually, he didn't suggest anything so much as ask several questions.

But the same logic applies to both sets of questions. You may want to commit violence, but are incapable of it.

[Dorian Gray]

How about this: Regardless of the situations set up in the questions, free will doesn't exist if God is omniscient/prescient.

[Graham]

Originally posted by ceo_esq

I don't mean to suggest that we are free moral actors in every situation even under the best of circumstances, but wouldn't making the commission of any harmful act impossible severely limit the moral dimension and stature of human conduct? And don't we often consider "free will" to mean the (hypothetical) human faculty of choosing among possible (or at least theoretically possible) courses of action?

Precisely! In a world where it was not possible to commit violence, how would our free will be impeded?

Tai Chi

If there is peace, there is violence, and vice-versa. You can never separate the two.

And if there was neither violence nor peace, what would you have?

There is no answer to that question because peace is simply the lack of violence.

Your comment smacks of two-bit mysticism, IMO.

Yahweh

Thats a common misconception.

"Free Will" has nothing to do with physical restrictions in trying to perform actions (otherwise "Free Will" would be synonomous with "omnipotence"). "Free Will" is a concept used to describe the ability of a person or thing to consciously make decisions at his own accord (or you can just say "'Free Will' means 'desire'").

Ceo-Esq is correct, this is entirely the point.

You can consciously make a decision to flap your arms and fly but you cannot do it.

You can consciously make a decison to kill but if somehow you simply could not do it, would your free will be impaired?

Abdul Alhazred

That's free will, not free action. You are free to want or not want to fly.

Again, precisely the point. Where is the difference between this and a hypothetical situation where you are free to want or not to want to do violence but are physically incapable of it?

Dorian grey

How about this: Regardless of the situations set up in the questions, free will doesn't exist if God is omniscient/prescient.

I am inclined to agree with this but the question is based in the idea that God has somehow granted free wil to humanity.

And back to . . .

Ceo_Esq

No, but by removing the possibility of your actually flying, arguably a hypothetical god has stripped the act of not flying of whatever moral significance it might otherwise have had. This doesn't seem too problematic in the case of acts that appear to lack inherent moral weight anyway, but it might be different in other instances. Consider the case of obeying certain moral dictates: "Thou shalt not kill"; "Thou shalt not steal". If god brings it about that it is always impossible to follow an immoral course of action, then the moral value of deliberately refraining from an immoral course of action is greatly diminished.

This is an interesting point, IMO.

However, since the hypothesis involves and all-knowing god, what difference does it make to him whether you actually do the dirty deed or not?

Further, it's not moral behaviour we are discussing here as much as behaviour that negatively affects others.

What value does refraining from such behaviour have, other than the result thereof?

Possibly it has some value to god, who by some accounts appreciates righteousness but again, why would an all-knowing god need to smell the pong to know the egg was rotten?

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

Originally posted by Graham
An offshoot from another thread:

If their god had created a world where men were incapable of violence / malevolance of any kind, would that be an infringement of free will?

If so, how so?
Graham
Hmm.. "malevolence" meaning wishing evil to others.

I am struggling, Graham, at the mo to concieve of a world without violence, how it would operate. Violence is a physical act; physically there need be little difference in the roughness, say, of 2 friends having a wrestle and 2 people fighting; you can't have one without the other I think

[Graham]

Originally posted by Mr Clingford

Hmm.. "malevolence" meaning wishing evil to others.

I am struggling, Graham, at the mo to concieve of a world without violence, how it would operate. Violence is a physical act; physically there need be little difference in the roughness, say, of 2 friends having a wrestle and 2 people fighting; you can't have one without the other I think

It is possible to concieve of such a world, I think.

If you've ever watched the TV series Buffy The Vampire Slayer there was a vampire who became one of the "good guys" after a computer chip was planted in his head that caused him tremendous pain every time he tried to attack someone.

To meet your requirements, the device could be made to register the intent of an action, rather than the action itself. That would llow friendly wrestling and such but prevent murderous strangling.

I'm sure that a being of godlike powers could come up with a far more elegent and imaginative solution, however ;)

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

I suppose the traditional reply is do you want to live in a world where you are controlled like that. Where do you draw the line, Graham as to what is unacceptable behaviour etc?

[Mr Clingford]

Because free will is, of course, not just to do with violent behaviours, but comes down to freedom of thought i think. i suppose I am saying that free will means us sentient beings have freedom of thought

[Graham]

Originally posted by Mr Clingford
I suppose the traditional reply is do you want to live in a world where you are controlled like that. Where do you draw the line, Graham as to what is unacceptable behaviour etc?

The point is that we are already controlled in many, many ways - I can't fly, I can't move objects with the power of my mind and so on and on and on.

Many people are even more "controlled" than I am - congenitally crippled people are prevented from walking, retarded people are prevented from doing all sorts of things.

There is already a line drawn, in fact, there are many lines - at least one for each person, it seems.

Does that answer your question?

Graham

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham
Precisely! In a world where it was not possible to commit violence, how would our free will be impeded?One thing to bear in mind is that the free will issue we're discussing arises in the larger context of the Problem of Evil - so we ought to consider whether such a hypothetical world would be an improvement over the actual one. Imagine what the world would be like under those circumstances. The assassin's bullet would be miraculously deflected; stolen money would be miraculously replenished. Treachery, greed and aggression might still exist in the will, but could not be concretely manifested - so perhaps they would cease to be "bad" in the sense we currently understand them to be. The idea of good actions as distinct from bad ones would evaporate. The physical universe, moreover, would be completely disorderly. The laws of physics would routinely break down. Science would be impossible. Our ability to plan our conduct rationally would be greatly reduced.

Such a world would not contain suffering directly caused by human beings, but it might be a highly chaotic and amoral place. Even assuming for the moment that human free will would not be impaired in that universe, there are arguably other reasons why a benevolent deity might avoid creating such a place.

[Graham]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
One thing to bear in mind is that the free will issue we're discussing arises in the larger context of the Problem of Evil - so we ought to consider whether such a hypothetical world would be an improvement over the actual one. Imagine what the world would be like under those circumstances. The assassin's bullet would be miraculously deflected; stolen money would be miraculously replenished. Treachery, greed and aggression might still exist in the will, but could not be concretely manifested - so perhaps they would cease to be "bad" in the sense we currently understand them to be. The idea of good actions as distinct from bad ones would evaporate. The physical universe, moreover, would be completely disorderly. The laws of physics would routinely break down. Science would be impossible. Our ability to plan our conduct rationally would be greatly reduced.

Such a world would not contain suffering directly caused by human beings, but it might be a highly chaotic and amoral place. Even assuming for the moment that human free will would not be impaired in that universe, there are arguably other reasons why a benevolent deity might avoid creating such a place.


I disagree that the laws of physics would have to breeak down. AS in the example I gave above, it is possibel to imagine that a human being could simply be prevented from acting upon an immoral impulse.

There would be no effect on science or our ability to plan ahead in that scenario.

As to whether it would be an amoral place, I would say not. The value of good intentions and actions is not dependent on a comparison with bad intentions/actions.

Think of "normal" behaviour as a baseline. Below that line is bad behaviour and above it, good behaviour.

If the line becomes a barricade and one is prevented from going below it, there is still nothing to stop a person rising above the line as far as they may wish to.

Bear in mind also that even in a world without bad human behaviour there are still many trials and tribulations for humanity - problems to deal with, dangers to brave, etc. Plenty of oppoortunity for altruism and heroism and all those other "good" things.

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

Originally posted by Graham


The point is that we are already controlled in many, many ways - I can't fly, I can't move objects with the power of my mind and so on and on and on.

Many people are even more "controlled" than I am - congenitally crippled people are prevented from walking, retarded people are prevented from doing all sorts of things.

There is already a line drawn, in fact, there are many lines - at least one for each person, it seems.

Does that answer your question?

Graham Hmm, i don't think so because of the distinction between moral choices and freedom of action so my question still stands as regards where do you draw the line especially as regards freedom of thought

[Graham]

Originally posted by Mr Clingford
Hmm, i don't think so because of the distinction between moral choices and freedom of action so my question still stands as regards where do you draw the line especially as regards freedom of thought

Person A is born with no legs. He decides to walk but cannot do so.

Person B is born with a body that will not perform violent actions against another person. He decides to attack Person A but cannot do so.

Where is the difference?

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

Originally posted by Graham


Person A is born with no legs. He decides to walk but cannot do so.

Person B is born with a body that will not perform violent actions against another person. He decides to attack Person A but cannot do so.

Where is the difference?

Graham
PA may use prosthetics to walk.

Can you tell me more about this person B? So he desires to harm a person; what if he desires to harm himself by starvation? What happens then? I think the example is a little absurd. Surely PB can harm PA by non-violent means, though?

[Graham]

Originally posted by Mr Clingford

PA may use prosthetics to walk.

Can you tell me more about this person B? So he desires to harm a person; what if he desires to harm himself by starvation? What happens then? I think the example is a little absurd. Surely PB can harm PA by non-violent means, though?

PB's inhibition functions my measuring the intent of his actions. If his intent is "bad" he cannot proceed.

The example is a llittle absurd in "real world" terms but, IMO, so is god. we are talking hypotheticals here.

Self-harm is another issue, really. Personally, I would be happy to allow such a person the ability to harm themselves if they wanted to but others would no doubt disagree.

As regards PA, equally I could somehow craft prosthetic wings and fly to the moon. Perhaps if I am more specific in the example, it will demonstrate that that's irrelevant to the hypothetical:

Person A is born with no legs. He decides to walk on his own two feet but cannot do so.

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

Indeed, PA only has the freedom to choose of the options available.

I am not sure as to who can judge the absurdity of the existence of a God/something other? In my experience it has been less absurd to conclude that he exists, for instance.

I would like a good response, though, to the issue of freedom of thought because free will is not just to do with examples of crude phyiscal actions

i genuinely want to explore here, not just score points or (God forbid!, try and do some conversion of the "heathen damned"!!!!)

[Graham]

Originally posted by Mr Clingford
Indeed, PA only has the freedom to choose of the options available.

I am not sure as to who can judge the absurdity of the existence of a God/something other? In my experience it has been less absurd to conclude that he exists, for instance.

I would like a good response, though, to the issue of freedom of thought because free will is not just to do with examples of crude phyiscal actions

i genuinely want to explore here, not just score points or (God forbid!, try and do some conversion of the "heathen damned"!!!!)

Both Person A and Person B are entirely free of thought . . . er . . . no . . . free in their thoughts? Free to think what they like - that's it!

Both are free to have whatever intentions they like, however both are, in different ways, limited in their abilities to act upon those intentions.

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

Both are free to have whatever intentions they like, however both are, in different ways, limited in their abilities to act upon those intentions. That, I think, is what F W is about. God does not limit their available choices

You noted on the original thread the usual problems with FW - would you outline them for me if they have not been already made clear

[Graham]

Originally posted by Mr Clingford

That, I think, is what F W is about. God does not limit their available choices


Are we in agreement then?

God has not limited the choices of either person, only their ability to act on those choices is limited.

Therefore, the Free Will hypotheses does not explain why God has allowed there to be man-made suffering in the world.


You noted on the original thread the usual problems with FW - would you outline them for me if they have not been already made clear


I think the reference was not so much that there are problems with free will in itself but that there are problems with the Free Will explanation for suffering.

It would appear that we have finally reached agreement on the greatest of these problems.

The other major problem, IMO, is the possibility of determinism - that one thing leads inevitaby to the next. If that is true, although a person may appear to have a choice in any given decision, in fact they don't as their decision is determined by their genetic makeup, their upbringing and what they had for breakfast, so to speak.

Graham

[Mr Clingford]

God has not limited the choices of either person, only their ability to act on those choices is limited We agree if you mean that their ability to act is not limited by God but by other people, gravity etc, the Free Will hypotheses does not explain why God has allowed there to be man-made suffering in the world How does this follow? Because i think it does!

[Graham]

Originally posted by Mr Clingford
We agree if you mean that their ability to act is not limited by God but by other people, gravity etc

Back to the drawing board then . . . :)

Person A - his ability to act is limited by lack of legs. For the sake of the example, we assumed that this was a cogenital defect and not, for example the result of a car accident.

Person B - his ability to act is limited by some unspecified biological mechanism that, again, we will assume he was born with.

Both persons were born with these limitations, they are not the result of any human activity (or gravity!).

In a material world, there is no one to blame for these limitations - they are simply a result of chance.

If we posit a god-being, he is responsible for them by default, directly or indirectly.

So either:

(a) God is now, as we speak limiting the free will of all people born cripples

or

(b) Removing the facility to do something without removing the desire is not an infringement of freewill



If (a), then it does not make sense to suggest that God allows suffering because to intervene would infringe on free will.

If (b), you cannot explain why god could not so order the world as to make it impossible for men to intentionally cause each other to suffer.


How does this follow? Because i think it does!

You'll have to do better than that, I'm afraid!

Graham

[metropolis_part_one]

We agree if you mean that their ability to act is not limited by God but by other people, gravity etc

Concerning flying to the moon, God has limited you since God made the rules for gravity as well as 'creating' man or allowing man to 'develop' in such a way as to make it impossible to fly to the moon. You can want to fly to the moon, but due to various restrictions placed on you by God, you cannot.

Similarly in the hypothetical, you may want to harm someone but due to a restriction placed on you by God you would not be able to.

In neither of the above scenarios is your 'freedom of thought' infringed upon in any way. Equally obviously, your free will is not infringed upon - just as not being able to fly to the moon does not limit your free will, neither would not being able to harm someone limit it.

And if you would respond that 'God has allowed us to be able to travel to the moon by other methods, yet we would never be able to harm anyone by any method, so our free will IS taken away', let us choose another example, such as 'turning into a vapour to pass through locked doors' or anything equally impossible. Is our free will limited by not being able to do this? Of course it isn't.

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham


Are we in agreement then?

God has not limited the choices of either person, only their ability to act on those choices is limited.

Therefore, the Free Will hypotheses does not explain why God has allowed there to be man-made suffering in the world.Do you agree that there are good things that would be lost by modifying the universe in the hypothetical manner you are suggesting?

[Graham]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
Do you agree that there are good things that would be lost by modifying the universe in the hypothetical manner you are suggesting?

I don't know. Have you any examples?

Graham

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham

I don't know. Have you any examples?

Graham Well, for example, Daniel Howard-Snyder (a philosophy prof at Western Washington University) speculates in an article called "God, Evil and Suffering":
If God systematically prevents us from harming others yet permits us to have a significant say about the sorts of persons we become, then it will have to look to us as though we can harm others even though we can't. For if I know nothing I do can harm others, then I won't have the same opportunity to develop my character as I would if it seemed that I could harm others. But deception is incompatible with God's goodness, one might urge … It would seem as though we were involved in genuine relationships with others, making choices that matter for each other, when in fact nothing of the sort really occurred. Our whole lives would be a charade, a sham, a farce; and we wouldn't have a clue. While such massive deception would not result in an utterly meaningless existence (we would still be self-determining creatures), it isn't obvious that such massive deception about matters so central to our lives would be permissible or loving.

... What other goods, then, would be lost if God were to give us the freedom only to [negatively] affect ourselves? ... [W]e would have no responsibility for each other and we would not be able to enter into the most meaningful relationships; for we are deeply responsible for others and can enter into relationships of love only if we can both benefit and harm others. This point deserves development. We are deeply responsible for others only if our choices actually make a big difference to their well-being, and that cannot happen unless we can benefit them as well as harm them.

[Graham]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
Well, for example, Daniel Howard-Snyder (a philosophy prof at Western Washington University) speculates in an article called "God, Evil and Suffering":


I'm not sure that I agree with the professor. His arguments works somewhat when considering the reason for suffering as a whole but, IMO, is ineffective when, as here, we restrict the discussion to suffering inflicted by other human beings.

[W]e would have no responsibility for each other and we would not be able to enter into the most meaningful relationships; for we are deeply responsible for others and can enter into relationships of love only if we can both benefit and harm others.

This is not true, IMO. Why is it necessary for me to be able to harm someone in order to enter into a meaningful relationship with them?

As I mentioned above, even without the human element, there would still be plenty of things in the world from which human beings would require protection - more than enough to give meaning to responsibility.

We are deeply responsible for others only if our choices actually make a big difference to their well-being, and that cannot happen unless we can benefit them as well as harm them.

Same comments apply, really. Strange swtcheroo at the end though. Surely he means that the other way around?

For if I know nothing I do can harm others, then I won't have the same opportunity to develop my character as I would if it seemed that I could harm others

This is the best argument in the piece, as regards our discussion, IMO.

That said, imagine yourself a cripple and replace consider this:

For if I know I cannot walk on my own two feet, then I won't have the same opportunity to develop my character as I would if it seemed that I could walk on my own two feet

What is so special about the ability to harm others that being without it would fundamentally alter humanity any more than not having legs would?

Graham

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham
This is not true, IMO. Why is it necessary for me to be able to harm someone in order to enter into a meaningful relationship with them?

...

As I mentioned above, even without the human element, there would still be plenty of things in the world from which human beings would require protection - more than enough to give meaning to responsibilityI don't know that this is true of every kind of "meaningful" relationship. However, most people consider that there are certain kinds of meaningful relationships (the possibility of which is a good thing) that entail an element of willing vulnerability (to abandonment, betrayal or malicious acts by the other person, for example). Voluntary submission to that risk by one party (and the correlate assumption of responsibility on the part of the other party) seems to be a good thing - at the very least, it is generally admired as such.

The gravity and dignity of such relationships is partly derived from the risks/responsibilities relating to the danger of harm posed by the other person. In contrast, everyone is susceptible to unintentional, natural harm even before they enter into relationships with other people, so that is not a risk that we associate specifically with forging human bonds.
Originally posted by Graham
Same comments apply, really. Strange swtcheroo at the end though. Surely he means that the other way around?I see what you mean, but I think he was not overly concerned with the order of those words. His point seems to be that that the two concepts are inherently related and equally necessary. Placing things "the other way around", in this case, results in a statement that is substantively identical to the original one.
Originally posted by Graham
What is so special about the ability to harm others that being without it would fundamentally alter humanity any more than not having legs would?I'm having difficulty finding the right formulation of my thoughts on this point, but don't you think that the real possibility to cause harm to others through our actions plays a role in our moral formation and development. Certainly the landscape of morality and conscience would appear radically different in a world in which this possibility were removed utterly. If everyone knew that malice, hatred and selfishness were ultimately innocuous rather than potentially dangerous, it would arguably be more problematic for people develop to a good theoretical grasp of right and wrong.

We know it's a lot harder to shock the conscience with a fanciful, absurdly unrealizable scenario than with a plausible one. For example, it seems somehow more troubling to the conscience to seriously contemplate strangling one's wife in her sleep than to idly wish for a meteorite to strike her in the head. Presumably in a world without human-caused suffering we would still need to rely on our consciences to keep us from making evil moral choices (even if those choices were necessarily limited to desires rather than actions). But with our consciences handicapped by the certain knowledge of the impossibility of causing harm to others, there might be little to keep us from yielding to the temptation to intently wish ill to other people.

When you get right down to it, I think our moral consciences require some degree of "reality check" (even if only in terms of theoretical possibility) in order to aid in the development of our character, and such a reality check might be impossible in the world we've hypothesized. I believe this is why Professor Howard-Snyder suggested that normal moral character development in a world without human-caused harm would require a massive illusion, because we would need to believe that our choices could potentially harm other people.

[Loki]

ceo_esq,

Good to see you again!

If god brings it about that it is always impossible to follow an immoral course of action, then the moral value of deliberately refraining from an immoral course of action is greatly diminished.
You've started by linking 'violence' with 'immoral'. What about situations where you are faced with causing emotional suffering to either person 'A', or person 'B'? A straight binary decision that cannot be avoided - you'll cause pain/suffering, but is this in fact an immoral act? Isn't there (at least) two types of suffering we can inflict upon each other - necessary/unavoidable, and malicious?

But with our consciences handicapped by the certain knowledge of the impossibility of causing harm to others, there might be little to keep us from yielding to the temptation to intently wish ill to other people.
But since this is a theoretical world similar but different to the current one, perhaps god makes a few additinal changes. Not only are we prevented from enacting our 'immoral/harmful' desires, but the "feedback" for having such immoral thoughts is more immediate/effective? Perhaps we get an instantaneous migraine headache for 3 minutes for each such thought. Perhaps we have an 'Ebenezer Scrooge' moment and we are transported into an alternate reality where we see the possible effects of this act, and are then returned to 'reality'. Perhaps we get an email from heaven each monday morning detailing our thoughts for the past week, and letting us know the current standing of our Soul Investment Portfolio (" At time of maturation of this Policy, we anticipate you will be spending 71,513 years in hell").

The current 'free willl' model works like this :

(a) I conceive of an immoral action against another person
(b) I enact this immoral action
(c) This other person suffers pain/harm
(d) I observe the consequences, and learn something. This (hopefully) makes me a better person, through remorse/guilt.

Graham's model :

(a) I conceive of an immoral act against another person.
(b) I am unable to enact it.
(c) No one else suffers any pain.
(d) I receive some sort of feedback. This (hopefully) makes me a better person, through regret/awareness.

Why isn't the second model at least theoretically feasible?

(from the link) We are deeply responsible for others only if our choices actually make a big difference to their well-being, and that cannot happen unless we can benefit them as well as harm them.
This seems weak to me. I'd hate to think that the strength/depth of my relationship with my children is rooted in the fact that refrain from hurting them. I'd like to think that avoiding causing them pain is an effect[i] of my relationship with them, not a [i]measure of that relationship (although it obviously can serve as a simplistic visible measuring tool).

Do you agree that there are good things that would be lost by modifying the universe in the hypothetical manner you are suggesting?
The main argument I can see against removing 'harm' from the world is essentially encapsulated in the phrase "that which doesn't kill me only makes me stronger". It does seem that sometimes the long term results of 'pain/suffering' can appear to be quite beneficial. Of course, like any simplistic cliche, there are plenty of examples where the pain does far more harm than good. And I think it's yet to be established that any such 'long term good' was unattainable through any other means.

[Graham]

*bump* for Ceq_Esq - I'd like to hear your answers to Loki's questions too!

Graham

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Loki
ceo_esq,

Good to see you again!Thank you Loki. The same to you.
Originally posted by Loki
You've started by linking 'violence' with 'immoral'. What about situations where you are faced with causing emotional suffering to either person 'A', or person 'B'? A straight binary decision that cannot be avoided - you'll cause pain/suffering, but is this in fact an immoral act? Isn't there (at least) two types of suffering we can inflict upon each other - necessary/unavoidable, and malicious?Yes, I should think so. I'm not sure where you're going with this yet, though, so carry on.
Originally posted by Loki
But since this is a theoretical world similar but different to the current one, perhaps god makes a few additinal changes. Not only are we prevented from enacting our 'immoral/harmful' desires, but the "feedback" for having such immoral thoughts is more immediate/effective? Perhaps we get an instantaneous migraine headache for 3 minutes for each such thought. Perhaps we have an 'Ebenezer Scrooge' moment and we are transported into an alternate reality where we see the possible effects of this act, and are then returned to 'reality'. Perhaps we get an email from heaven each monday morning detailing our thoughts for the past week, and letting us know the current standing of our Soul Investment Portfolio (" At time of maturation of this Policy, we anticipate you will be spending 71,513 years in hell").The most complicated part of considering any such scenario is assessing what goods would be lost. But let's briefly consider these.

Migraine headaches: the Clockwork Orange school of behavior modification. Does anyone doubt that, in the film, it would have been a greater moral good for Alex to have had a conversion of conscience arising from his contemplation of the consequences of his violent tendencies? For me, one of the lessons of the movie was that crude negative reinforcement therapy was not a substitute for what Alex lacked: a real moral connection to the suffering of other people.

Ebenezer Scrooge: Well, it worked in "A Christmas Carol". But one problem with this is that you never really would get to behold "the possible effects of this act", because by definition the simulated effects aren't possible. It sounds like an elaborate video game: "Let's see what happens if I shoot that innocent bystander in the head - ew, gross! Oops, game over. Better not do that again - good thing I saved my game right before making that decision! Lousy %$#* innocent bystanders." No matter how perfect such simulations become, I doubt whether they could ever entirely transcend their un-realness in the subjective mind. We all know that video game simulations of inflicting pain and harm do not, in practice, effectively engage the conscience. Yet in fact, they arguably might do a better job than the proposed model, because in our universe the pain and suffering one inflicts in a simulation can at least resonate (however weakly) in the mind as an analogue to some real-world counterpart (i.e., I know that I theoretically could kill someone by shooting him in the head, whereas in Graham's proposed universe the very idea would seem an inherently implausible fantasy to me).

Divine e-mails: I love this idea and think you should develop it into a short story. However, the concept suffers from some of the same shortcomings as the ones previously considered. It does not seem to hold the potential for fostering a moral bond with one's fellow human beings. It appears primarily calculated to inspire a sense of fear at the prospect of the subject's punishment in hell (in my view, among the least admirable rationales for moral behavior). Also, it's pretty impersonal. I'm not at all sure how much good it would produce. It reminded me of a personal anecdote, however. My firm's accounting department sends me an automatically generated e-mail several times a week detailing how many days behind I am in updating my client billing records, and warning how serious the consequences will be if I don't update the records on a current basis. These e-mails used to cause me some degree of anxiety, guilt and dread. Now I just delete them without looking at them. Presto! I feel much better.
Originally posted by Loki
The current 'free willl' model works like this :

(a) I conceive of an immoral action against another person
(b) I enact this immoral action
(c) This other person suffers pain/harm
(d) I observe the consequences, and learn something. This (hopefully) makes me a better person, through remorse/guilt.

Graham's model :

(a) I conceive of an immoral act against another person.
(b) I am unable to enact it.
(c) No one else suffers any pain.
(d) I receive some sort of feedback. This (hopefully) makes me a better person, through regret/awareness.

Why isn't the second model at least theoretically feasible?I suppose I wouldn't rule out its theoretical feasibility. It's just that I haven't yet seen - or been able to conceive of - the second model elaborated in a way that appears to hold the same (albeit less than 100%) potential for the moral development of humankind as the first model.

[ceo_esq]

*bump*

In case anyone is still interested in this.

[Graham]

Still interested . . . :)

It seems to me that you're getting bogged down on the details of how this is going to be done.

You need to remember that we're assuming God is going to do it. It's reasonable to assume that, although it might be outside of our petty imaginations, he would be up to the task.

Further, in your example of Clockwork Orange, you say - "For me, one of the lessons of the movie was that crude negative reinforcement therapy was not a substitute for what Alex lacked: a real moral connection to the suffering of other people"

What would you say to the idea that a better moral connection to the suffering of other people is all that would be required to prevent mankind engaging in anti-social/violent behaviour?

By enhancing this "moral connection" God could theoretically remove much of the world's human-induced sufffering without impinging on anyone's free will at all.

Graham

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham
Still interested . . . :)

It seems to me that you're getting bogged down on the details of how this is going to be done.

You need to remember that we're assuming God is going to do it. It's reasonable to assume that, although it might be outside of our petty imaginations, he would be up to the task.I'm not sure that we ought to assume that God could do it without necessarily sacrificing other goods, unless we are willing to engage in question-begging. That's why analyzing such scenarios (which, of course, were proposed by Loki rather than by me) is useful. Granted, we can't consider or even conceive of all the ways in which this might be attempted, but by probing the weaknesses of the best alternative proposals we can imagine, we can hope to learn something about the nature of the moral goods at stake. That, in turn, may give us a sense of how strong the likelihood is that a world containing no possibility of human-caused suffering, but retaining both free will and any moral goods associated with the possibility of such suffering, could be accomplished without creating a logical contradiction or adverse effects for humanity.
Originally posted by Graham
Further, in your example of Clockwork Orange, you say - "For me, one of the lessons of the movie was that crude negative reinforcement therapy was not a substitute for what Alex lacked: a real moral connection to the suffering of other people"

What would you say to the idea that a better moral connection to the suffering of other people is all that would be required to prevent mankind engaging in anti-social/violent behaviour?

By enhancing this "moral connection" God could theoretically remove much of the world's human-induced sufffering without impinging on anyone's free will at all.It might remove much of the world's human-induced suffering, I agree. Yet I am not sure that this fully resolves the problem we have been considering. Isn't that tantamount to saying that if God had created us to be morally better than we start out in this life, such that our inherent capacity for evil decisions was proportionally reduced, there would be less human-induced suffering? My own experience, as well as the thought experiments I've been conducting in relation to Loki's proposed solutions, suggests that perfectly free moral agents do not start out with perfectly formed consciences. Simply creating us to be "more moral" seems like cheating, somehow. I'm still mulling this over, though, so I may revise my thinking on the subject.

[Graham]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
I'm not sure that we ought to assume that God could do it without necessarily sacrificing other goods, unless we are willing to engage in question-begging. That's why analyzing such scenarios (which, of course, were proposed by Loki rather than by me) is useful. Granted, we can't consider or even conceive of all the ways in which this might be attempted, but by probing the weaknesses of the best alternative proposals we can imagine, we can hope to learn something about the nature of the moral goods at stake. That, in turn, may give us a sense of how strong the likelihood is that a world containing no possibility of human-caused suffering, but retaining both free will and any moral goods associated with the possibility of such suffering, could be accomplished without creating a logical contradiction or adverse effects for humanity.
It might remove much of the world's human-induced suffering, I agree. Yet I am not sure that this fully resolves the problem we have been considering. Isn't that tantamount to saying that if God had created us to be morally better than we start out in this life, such that our inherent capacity for evil decisions was proportionally reduced, there would be less human-induced suffering? My own experience, as well as the thought experiments I've been conducting in relation to Loki's proposed solutions, suggests that perfectly free moral agents do not start out with perfectly formed consciences. Simply creating us to be "more moral" seems like cheating, somehow. I'm still mulling this over, though, so I may revise my thinking on the subject.

I'm going to lay out a few points for clarity and then speculate a little further:


Free moral agents do not start out with perfectly formed consciences
In the "Almighty God" scenario, God permits suffering in the world to further the development of conscience
If we accept the last point, then there is some mechanism by which experience of suffering leads to development of conscience


Now, I said: a better moral connection to the suffering of other people is all that would be required to prevent mankind engaging in anti-social/violent behaviour

To which you responded: Simply creating us to be "more moral" seems like cheating, somehow. .

There is a misunderstanding between us here that I think I can clear up.

When I say "moral connection" I am referring to the last point on the list, above - the mechanism by which experience of suffering leads to development of conscience.

When you say "more moral" I think you are referring directly to the result of that mechanism in action.

What I am suggesting is that by improving the mechanism, God could have gotten better results for less suffering.

Is that cheating? It depends, IMO. I we think about mountain climbing, there are those who would say that using ropes and tackle is cheating. Others would say that the important thing is to get to the top, by whatever mehod you have available but if that's your attitude, why climb at all, why not just hire a helicoper and fly?

It depends on whether you're in it for the climb or just to get to the top, really.

It seems to me that, in the "God" scenario, where eternal life is to play for and mortal life is just a means to an end, ropes and tackle at the very least would not be too much to ask for.

Graham

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham

Free moral agents do not start out with perfectly formed consciences
In the "Almighty God" scenario, God permits suffering in the world to further the development of conscience
If we accept the last point, then there is some mechanism by which experience of suffering leads to development of conscience


Now, I said: a better moral connection to the suffering of other people is all that would be required to prevent mankind engaging in anti-social/violent behaviour

To which you responded: Simply creating us to be "more moral" seems like cheating, somehow. .

There is a misunderstanding between us here that I think I can clear up.

When I say "moral connection" I am referring to the last point on the list, above - the mechanism by which experience of suffering leads to development of conscience.

When you say "more moral" I think you are referring directly to the result of that mechanism in action.

What I am suggesting is that by improving the mechanism, God could have gotten better results for less suffering.I understand the distinction that you are trying to draw, but I am not certain that it effectively circumvents the objection. If the hypothetically superefficient mechanism of conscience would be the direct result of God intervening to create it, and a better state of moral goodness would be the direct result of the operation of the improved mechanism, then endowing us with a divinely enhanced mechanism (whatever it is) doesn't seem materially different from creating us with a superior moral nature.
Originally posted by Graham
What I am suggesting is that by improving the mechanism, God could have gotten better results for less suffering.

Is that cheating? It depends, IMO. I we think about mountain climbing, there are those who would say that using ropes and tackle is cheating. Others would say that the important thing is to get to the top, by whatever mehod you have available but if that's your attitude, why climb at all, why not just hire a helicoper and fly?

It depends on whether you're in it for the climb or just to get to the top, really.Well, you've hit the nail on the head when it comes to theodicies of nearly every sort. Is it intrinsically more valuable and worthwhile to struggle for moral development, sophistication and righteousness than simply to "ride a helicopter to the top"? A person's answer to that question (and other variations of the same dilemma) is largely going to determine whether he finds persuasive any theory intended to "justify the ways of God to men" in respect of human-caused suffering.

[Graham]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
I understand the distinction that you are trying to draw, but I am not certain that it effectively circumvents the objection. If the hypothetically superefficient mechanism of conscience would be the direct result of God intervening to create it, and a better state of moral goodness would be the direct result of the operation of the improved mechanism, then endowing us with a divinely enhanced mechanism (whatever it is) doesn't seem materially different from creating us with a superior moral nature.

But the problem is, as you pointed out indirectly in an earleir response, some people are already equipped with a divinely enhanced mechanism or, if not, some people are clearly equipped with a severely malfunctioning mechanism.

The extreme example is a psychopath who has no such mechanism at all.

This brings us neatly back to the original question, IMO. Has God infringed on the free will of the psychopath by not allowing him to make moral choices?


Well, you've hit the nail on the head when it comes to theodicies of nearly every sort. Is it intrinsically more valuable and worthwhile to struggle for moral development, sophistication and righteousness than simply to "ride a helicopter to the top"? A person's answer to that question (and other variations of the same dilemma) is largely going to determine whether he finds persuasive any theory intended to "justify the ways of God to men" in respect of human-caused suffering.

To me, this represents one of the clearest examples of muddled thinking on the part of the religious.

How about another list?


Growth (be it in morals or understanding whatever) is valuable to a person.
Suffering through adversity can stimulate growth as a person.
Suffering through adversity therefore has value.


I, as an atheist, accept the above as true and therefore acknowledge some value to some suffering in my material world, making the best of a bad lot, so to speak.

A believer in an all-powerful god, however, is immediately twisted into a logical pretzel by the glaring problem of perfection.

As I see it (I love these lists):


God is necessarily perfect.
Perfection is possible
In a perfect world suffering would not be necessary for growth.


Perfect is the key word here. We can argue all day about the value of suffering and the benefits of walking over taking a helicopter but I don't think that any reasonable person can deny that in a perfect world you could get exactly the same benefit from taking the easy route.

Why not? It is perfect, after all.

Graham

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Graham
This brings us neatly back to the original question, IMO. Has God infringed on the free will of the psychopath by not allowing him to make moral choices?No. That was Satan, obviously.

:D
Originally posted by Graham
I, as an atheist, accept the above as true and therefore acknowledge some value to some suffering in my material world, making the best of a bad lot, so to speak.

A believer in an all-powerful god, however, is immediately twisted into a logical pretzel by the glaring problem of perfection.

As I see it (I love these lists):


God is necessarily perfect.
Perfection is possible
In a perfect world suffering would not be necessary for growth.


Perfect is the key word here. We can argue all day about the value of suffering and the benefits of walking over taking a helicopter but I don't think that any reasonable person can deny that in a perfect world you could get exactly the same benefit from taking the easy route.I, likewise an atheist, agree that suffering can have practical benefit. I also agree that it would be theoretically possible for God, if he existed, to create a universe in which every conceivable benefit of the hard route was conferred on those who take the easy route, with one important possible qualification.

The qualification is this: some people (religious or not) posit that there is an inherent value associated with the struggle itself. As John Hick has written, "The answer ... appeals to the principle that virtues which have been formed within the agent as a hard won deposit of his own right decisions in situations of challenge and temptation, are intrinsically more valuable than virtues created within him ready made and without any effort on his part." The truth of that principle can be debated, but it clearly is not without appeal.

In a perfect world, could God cause the easy route and the hard route to generate equal amounts of good? Let's consider an analogous example. In Universe 1, you struggle to earn $100 through hard work. You're now $100 richer, and your side benefits include learning the value of honest labor, better character, etc.
In Universe 2, you fortuitously happen upon $100. However, through some divine mechanism, God simultaneously imparts to you the same lessons and experiences, and improves your character to the same extent, that you would have received if you'd worked hard for the money. You emerge from the experience psychologically identical to the "other you" in Universe 1.
Which scenario is more meritorious?

Many would answer that it's the first, because regardless of any other discernible benefit to any party, nothing changes the simple fact that the money was earned in Universe 1 and unearned in Universe 2. If one believes that theory which ascribes intrinsically greater merit to a thing gained through struggle than to an unearned thing, then the problem persists even in a perfect world - for not even a hypothetically omnipotent God can make a thing both simultaneously.

That difficulty, which is of a logical order, cannot be dispensed with by simply saying "it's a hypothetical perfect world, so assume that God somehow overcomes the difficulty".

[Loki]

ceo_esq,

I've been slow to reply because I've been "pondering" your replies. After a few days, I've discovered no interesting new thoughts, so I'll just barge in with a few of the old ones :)

(Graham wrote): This brings us neatly back to the original question, IMO. Has God infringed on the free will of the psychopath by not allowing him to make moral choices?

(ceo_esq wrote):No. That was Satan, obviously.
Despite the surface appeal (and humour) of your answer, I think Graham's question is a good one, and not really adequately answered by "the Devil made me do it".

If one believes that theory which ascribes intrinsically greater merit to a thing gained through struggle than to an unearned thing, then the problem persists even in a perfect world - for not even a hypothetically omnipotent God can make a thing both simultaneously.
I have two "details" that muddy this picture somewhat, even if I accept the premise of "intrinsic merit".

First, if this takes place in our hypothetical "perfect world" then it seems to me to be quite pausible that the "suffering" and "temptations" that must be overcome could be structured in such a way that the victim of your failures is yourself. This would still preserve "the journey", and offer real loss and gain (for yourself), while removing the possibility of inflicting pain on others.

Second, I have trouble seeing the "intrinsic merit" in the long, drawnout battle of young children against fatal illness for the child. Twisting Graham's mountain climbing analogy somewhat, this scenario is neither taking the helicopter to the Top, nor climbing to the Top. Instead, this seems to be the equivalent of forcing an unwilling participant to start climbing, then letting them fall to their death a quarter of the way there.

[Globert]

Perhaps we get an email from heaven each monday morning detailing our thoughts for the past week, and letting us know the current standing of our Soul Investment Portfolio (" At time of maturation of this Policy, we anticipate you will be spending 71,513 years in hell").


Hehe Godspam:D

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Loki
Despite the surface appeal (and humour) of your answer, I think Graham's question is a good one, and not really adequately answered by "the Devil made me do it".OK, I’ll be serious. To recap, Graham’s question was this: "Has God infringed on the free will of the psychopath by not allowing him to make moral choices?" I agree that the free will of an insane person is diminished by reason of his insanity. So what are the implications of insanity for free-will defenses to the problem of evil?

Many of the ideas we've been considering here are based on the premise (which I think we've accepted, if only for the purpose of argument) that a world that contains creatures who freely perform good or evil actions is better and more valuable than a world made up entirely of creatures who perform actions (even fully good actions) because they cannot do otherwise. Let's call this the "Free Will Principle".

One may observe that in human beings, free will (assuming it exists at all) is never invincible. It can be diminished, and in some cases overwhelmed, by factors (such as instinct, habit, ignorance, immaturity, extreme emotion, psychological disorder and various external influences) that to a greater or lesser degree may reduce the deliberate character of an act, and hence its moral significance for the actor. The category of persons who cannot effectively exercise their faculty of free will with respect to many or most actions at a given moment, of course, includes not only persons who happen to be deranged at that moment, but also, say, persons who happen to be infants or are unconscious at that moment.

Now let's assume that God is responsible for the fact that, at any given time, some persons are mentally unbalanced, in a state of infancy, or unconscious. In that case, God has infringed upon their free will. In fact, one can argue that the fact that the exercise of free will is so frequently hindered by the other "deterministic" factors I mentioned, indicates that God has deliberately created a world that does not contain nearly as many manifestations of free will as it might.

However, it is not clear to me that this situation formally contravenes the "Free Will Principle" as I stated it before. Free will seems to me not so much a good thing per se - that is, purely for its own sake - as a precondition for certain other goods and virtues. Likewise, while a substantial degree of free will appears to me to be an essential element of a "good universe" scenario, it does not necessarily follow from this that the only universe worthy of an omnipotent, omniscient, all-good creator is one in which each individual's free will is taken to the maximum possible extreme at all times. So while I can't identify with certainty what possible "counterbalancing" goods might arise from the fact that Charles Manson is insane (whereas most people are in possession of their voluntary faculties) and justify it, on the other hand I don't see why his insanity need be logically inconsistent with the existence of a good deity whose values include (but are not limited to) free will.

To continue, I suppose there are cases of insanity that are actually the result, whether direct or remote, of human agency, but I'll exclude such cases from the discussion. In the majority of cases, insanity, as a disease or defect of the mind, would appear to fall into the category of "natural" or "physical" evils generally not provoked by human beings (such as tornadoes, deformities, diseases and so forth). Now let's also consider another logical, if highly speculative, possibility in an entirely different vein.

My earlier speculation about Satan causing insanity was in jest, but Alvin Plantinga (http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga) has pointed out that the hypothetical creation by God of a set of free nonhuman spirits who are responsible for all of the world's physical evil is not logically inconsistent with the proposition that God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Thus, the same arguments available to the free will defender in relation to human moral evil are available to him in relation to earthquakes and schizophrenia. This is not to say that the hypothesis of demons being responsible for physical evil is at all probable; it merely demonstrates that on a purely logical level there is no reason, if human moral evil does not refute God's existence, why physical evil (such as insanity) should. And of course, as Plantinga also observes, "it is likely that any premises worth considering which yield the conclusion that hypotheses about devils are nonsensical will yield the same conclusion about the hypothesis that God exists."

Anyhow, when I have more time I'll devote some thought to the other observations you made.

[Loki]

ceo_esq,

Free will seems to me not so much a good thing per se - that is, purely for its own sake - as a precondition for certain other goods and virtues.
...
I don't see why his insanity need be logically inconsistent with the existence of a good deity whose values include (but are not limited to) free will.

Oooh -you're good! Next time I'm in court I want you on my side. :)

So Free Will is a tool we can use to achieve virtue (or disgrace), and yet there may be other ways to do this? Good answer.

...has pointed out that the hypothetical creation by God of a set of free nonhuman spirits who are responsible for all of the world's physical evil is not logically inconsistent with the proposition that God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent.
Well, not inconsistent if you assume that "omnibenevolent" means "as benevolent as possible, all things considered". But really, the only thing this sort of concept seems to lead to is "god moves in mysterious ways". The Catholics in particular seem fond of drawing a firm veil across god's methods, while still claiming full knowledge of his intentions.

...as Plantinga also observes, "it is likely that any premises worth considering which yield the conclusion that hypotheses about devils are nonsensical will yield the same conclusion about the hypothesis that God exists."

Quite true - and the fact that theroies about (the christian) God and devils are about as plausible as each other is trying telling us something, IMO.