There really might be an afterlife

[rocketdodger]

Premise 1) -- consciousness is a type of information processing.

If you disagree with premise 1, then goodbye, this thread is not for you.

Let E(t) be the pattern of information that constitutes consciousness C(t) at time t. Let R be the rules, or the language, used to describe E(t).

Premise 2) -- if another pattern of information P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R, then C(t) will be instantiated by P(n).

Premise 3) -- for every t, there may be some n, at any given time, such that P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R. Extended to infinity, we can assume that there will be some such n.

Conclusion:

It is plausible that "we" are merely a series of information patterns, instantiated randomly throughout some other universe, inhabiting a solipsistic world. In fact, it is plausible that "we" are a single pattern that happens to include all of our memories up to the instant prior, and that only a single instance of a similar pattern existed, and there is no existence beyond the current instant.

At any rate, it is therefore also plausible that there is a pattern P(n == some number) that is isomorphic to E(t == time of death of C) and a series of patterns P(n == some other numbers) that are isomorphic to E(t == some time during an afterlife of C) under R.

In other words, if "we" are merely these random patterns, then there is no good reason why there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in some afterlife.

A corollary is that there is no good reason there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in a whacky world where up suddenly becomes down, or whatever, so in fact there are such patterns and other branches of "we" are experiencing them. This is very close to multiverse theories, I suppose.

EDIT -- this theory does not imply soplisism, after all, because there is no reason each pattern P(n) couldn't be isomorphic to some combination of E1(t), E2(t), .... Em(t), where Em(t) corresponds to the m'th consciousness of some other individual from our point of view.

[Gate2501]

I always like to say:

" I can't not exist, as far as I'm concerned. "

[HansMustermann]

The problem is that it may be less random than you assume, and/or we may not have infinite time.

Let's start with the former problem. Your mental processes aren't random, but determined by your past experiences and memories. Every piece of information that goes through that brain strengthens some connections and weakens other in that giant self-configuring FPG you have upstairs. The very wiring, i.e., the underlying machine, changes over time.

Plus, that's really what makes you "you": that sum of those memories and experiences.

So for someone to be "you" at any given time in their existence, they'd really have to have the same memories and all. They'd have to be born of a mother of the same name, speaking the same language, be bit by a dog at the same age, get the same childhood diseases, see the same movies, fall in love with an identical girl in an identical high school, etc.

Even given infinite time, the conditions change. What's the probability of, say, Sir John Doe, a knight in William The Conqueror's army to be "reborn" in modern day England that way? Well, exactly zero. There is no way for anyone to live the the same experiences all over again, because the world has changed.

A an even less comforting though there is that it's very unlikely to be a continuation. It's more likely to be a repetition. That C(t) as you're dying of old age at, say, 98 years old, will not happen as an identical P(n) in a newborn so you can continue from where you left, but in some other geezer dying of old age at 98 years old.

Second, do we really have infinite time? The universe will die an entropy death sooner or later, and in all fairness it's likely that the human race will die or change into something else long before that.

Even before that, the universe will change at various points enough to make such an isomorphism impossible.

E.g., in 100 billion years, everything outside our galaxy will fall outside the observable universe, due to accelerating expansion. So someone living in that time, even if somehow humanity reset to tribal and reevolved to be an equivalent of late 20'th century, that guy will nevertheless have another perspective of the universe.

E.g., in 5 billion years or so, the Sun will die, so if humanity manages to migrate before that, it will nevertheless have a different perspective. It will not teach their kids that they evolved on whatever planet they are, nor that God created that one planet in 6 days. It will not have 24 hour days or a 365 day year or a 28 day moon cycle. Etc.

So you really have a very finite time for that to realistically happen. And given the tremendous amount of information and connections in a brain, the probability of all that happening again within that finite time window may not be anywhere near 1, to say the least.

[maddog]

Well, if you're using consciousness...

I know someone in her late 80's who has extremely limited consciousness. She kinda gets some things, but... can't remember much of anything, and +/- half of what she does remember is wrong. Can't manage a complex thought anymore, and simple thoughts are... rare and challenging. Mostly she does what her caregivers tell her and/or do to her, for her.

But, she's still alive. Is this an afterlife? A kind of post-consciousness life?

[Third Eye Open]

I can only see this working if there are infinite universes and infinite time. The odds of all the atoms arranging themselves in just the right way to make you're brain containing your memories up till exactly the point of your death are vanishingly small. But with infinite time and space, it has to happen eventually. An infinite number of times, actually.

[rocketdodger]

The problem is that it may be less random than you assume, and/or we may not have infinite time.

Let's start with the former problem. Your mental processes aren't random, but determined by your past experiences and memories. Every piece of information that goes through that brain strengthens some connections and weakens other in that giant self-configuring FPG you have upstairs. The very wiring, i.e., the underlying machine, changes over time.

Plus, that's really what makes you "you": that sum of those memories and experiences.

So for someone to be "you" at any given time in their existence, they'd really have to have the same memories and all. They'd have to be born of a mother of the same name, speaking the same language, be bit by a dog at the same age, get the same childhood diseases, see the same movies, fall in love with an identical girl in an identical high school, etc.

Even given infinite time, the conditions change. What's the probability of, say, Sir John Doe, a knight in William The Conqueror's army to be "reborn" in modern day England that way? Well, exactly zero. There is no way for anyone to live the the same experiences all over again, because the world has changed.

A an even less comforting though there is that it's very unlikely to be a continuation. It's more likely to be a repetition. That C(t) as you're dying of old age at, say, 98 years old, will not happen as an identical P(n) in a newborn so you can continue from where you left, but in some other geezer dying of old age at 98 years old.

Second, do we really have infinite time? The universe will die an entropy death sooner or later, and in all fairness it's likely that the human race will die or change into something else long before that.

Even before that, the universe will change at various points enough to make such an isomorphism impossible.

E.g., in 100 billion years, everything outside our galaxy will fall outside the observable universe, due to accelerating expansion. So someone living in that time, even if somehow humanity reset to tribal and reevolved to be an equivalent of late 20'th century, that guy will nevertheless have another perspective of the universe.

E.g., in 5 billion years or so, the Sun will die, so if humanity manages to migrate before that, it will nevertheless have a different perspective. It will not teach their kids that they evolved on whatever planet they are, nor that God created that one planet in 6 days. It will not have 24 hour days or a 365 day year or a 28 day moon cycle. Etc.

So you really have a very finite time for that to realistically happen. And given the tremendous amount of information and connections in a brain, the probability of all that happening again within that finite time window may not be anywhere near 1, to say the least.

I am not talking about brains here. That is the whole point -- the brain isn't necessary at all, it could happen in any sufficiently complex collection of particles.

In other words "you" might just be a random arrangement of particles in a mountain somewhere that -- just by chance -- happens to be isomorphic to the pattern of information that constitutes "your" consciousness.

[HansMustermann]

A collection of particles which incidentally works like a brain, and incidentally has exactly the memory and configuration of yours?

I'm sorry, but that's such an infinitesimal probability that even giving it a generous 1000 billion years before the universe is cold and dead and can no longer supply it with energy to function, it just won't happen.

Yes, given infinite time and/or infinite universes, anything will happen. But we don't have infinite time, and for all we know there is just one universe. That's where it all breaks down.

[Ron_Tomkins]

Premise 1) -- consciousness is a type of information processing.

If you disagree with premise 1, then goodbye, this thread is not for you.

Let E(t) be the pattern of information that constitutes consciousness C(t) at time t. Let R be the rules, or the language, used to describe E(t).

Premise 2) -- if another pattern of information P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R, then C(t) will be instantiated by P(n).

Premise 3) -- for every t, there may be some n, at any given time, such that P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R. Extended to infinity, we can assume that there will be some such n.

Conclusion:

It is plausible that "we" are merely a series of information patterns, instantiated randomly throughout some other universe, inhabiting a solipsistic world. In fact, it is plausible that "we" are a single pattern that happens to include all of our memories up to the instant prior, and that only a single instance of a similar pattern existed, and there is no existence beyond the current instant.

At any rate, it is therefore also plausible that there is a pattern P(n == some number) that is isomorphic to E(t == time of death of C) and a series of patterns P(n == some other numbers) that are isomorphic to E(t == some time during an afterlife of C) under R.

In other words, if "we" are merely these random patterns, then there is no good reason why there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in some afterlife.

A corollary is that there is no good reason there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in a whacky world where up suddenly becomes down, or whatever, so in fact there are such patterns and other branches of "we" are experiencing them. This is very close to multiverse theories, I suppose.

EDIT -- this theory does not imply soplisism, after all, because there is no reason each pattern P(n) couldn't be isomorphic to some combination of E1(t), E2(t), .... Em(t), where Em(t) corresponds to the m'th consciousness of some other individual from our point of view.

Dude...

[HansMustermann]

Ok, so let's do some maths, since just bare postulates are unbecoming of me:

According to Wikipedia and a quick googling to double-check: A human brain has 100 billion neurons. On the average each has 7000 inputs. (The ones in the cortex more, of course, the others less.) It's estimated that a 3 year old has 10^15 such synapses, though the number decreases as you grow up.

Now the "strength" or sensitivity of a synapse is pretty much how your brain learns, and that's really an analogue number. But let's pretend it's an on-off affair, i.e., binary. I.e., we'll only model here which synapses broke off so far.

We'll also ignore that new connections grow in that self-reconfiguring FPGA.

(We'll _massively_ underestimate the information needed to reproduce that C(t) this way, but I kinda like the idea of an afterlife all of a sudden.;))

So the information needed for even just that carricature of a model is basically 2 to the power 1,000,000,000,000,000. Read that carefully. It's not just a million billions, it's two to the power a million billions! Well, 2^10 is approximately 10^3, so that's approximately 10^300,000,000,000,000. Yes, you write a one and then 300,000,000,000,000 zeroes behind it.

Even assuming that some particles assembled themselves in the equivalence of a brain (already improbable), it would be one chance in 2^1,000,000,000,000,000 that it's configured like yours.

And again: that's just which synapses are completely off. If we go into more details it only gets more ludicrious.

So on the whole I wouldn't set my hopes too high there of it happening by chance. Yes, in infinite time it would, but when I put my pragmatic engineer cap on, I wouldn't bet on it happening.

[dlorde]

Well of course there's no good evidence that we're not already in 'the afterlife' - whatever that really means...

The problem with using infinite time and/or space and/or universes is that (much like the 'Many Worlds' interpretation of QM), anything that can happen will happen somewhere, somewhen, which doesn't really help.

[godless dave]

While information processing is undoubtedly a component of consciousness, this processing happens in living neurons. I don't think it's likely that consciousness can be divorced from the biological tissue that's doing the processing.

[Apathia]

"The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!"

Nietzsche

[X]

I think you are forgetting that the thing those patterns are in rots after death.

If I were to take my computer hard drive, and cut it into tiny pieces, and then melt it down and recycle the metal, does the information in it live on?

[edge]

I think you are forgetting that the thing those patterns are in rots after death.

If I were to take my computer hard drive, and cut it into tiny pieces, and then melt it down and recycle the metal, does the information in it live on?

If the information is truth sure.
Just not in the same form.

[Doc Daneeka]

It is plausible that "we" are merely a series of information patterns, instantiated randomly throughout some other universe, inhabiting a solipsistic world. In fact, it is plausible that "we" are a single pattern that happens to include all of our memories up to the instant prior, and that only a single instance of a similar pattern existed, and there is no existence beyond the current instant.

Plausible, yes. A great many things are plausible. So what?

[rocketdodger]

I think you are forgetting that the thing those patterns are in rots after death.

If I were to take my computer hard drive, and cut it into tiny pieces, and then melt it down and recycle the metal, does the information in it live on?

That has nothing to do with the OP.

The question is, from the moment the universe was born to the moment it dies, will there be any set of information isomorphic to the set on your hard drive (other than the drive itself, of course) ?

[rocketdodger]

Plausible, yes. A great many things are plausible. So what?

Well, although a great many things are plausible, the set of all plausible things is much smaller than the set of all things idiots with no knowledge assert are not only possible but true.

So showing something to be in the plausible set is at least a step in the right direction, no?

[rocketdodger]

While information processing is undoubtedly a component of consciousness, this processing happens in living neurons. I don't think it's likely that consciousness can be divorced from the biological tissue that's doing the processing.

I have heard this said, but mathematically there is no argument for why that doesn't boil down to just more information.

Or magic.

[godless dave]

Consiousness is biological, not mathematical.

[Beerina]

Premise 1) -- consciousness is a type of information processing.

If you disagree with premise 1, then goodbye, this thread is not for you.

I used to think that, but in recent decades (!) I find I agree with Searle, the AI researcher.

He pointed out that consciousness, whatever it is, actually exists and is therefore a physical process. It arises somehow out of the interaction of atoms and energies and other particles.

Intelligence, which is not the same thing, does not require consciousness per se. But the phenomonon of the subjective perceptual experience, being real, thus requires a cause from real-world atoms and whatnot.

And therefore it is not based purely on information processing. In other words, we should not expect an electronic brain to have consciousness arise simply because we perfectly duplicate the information processing content of a wetware brain.

A perfect simulation of atoms and chemistry would easily simulate a fire. But that is not real fire. It cannot burn. A simulation of neurons would, at best, create a simulation of a conscious mind, but it would not be conscious (a real phenomenon) any more than the simulated fire would be a real fire, a physical phenomenon that burns real things.

Note this also makes a side prediction that could, in theory, be tested some day: A perfect simulation of all known physics that had a "brain template" plugged into it, would, when "run", have one of three things happen:

1. It runs perfectly, and passes all Turing tests with flying colors. The consciousness is simulated ala the fire.

2. It doesn't run perfectly, or at all, because we've missed something in physics that's needed for true consciousness. Hence our simulation missed it, and no simulated consciousness arose*.

3. What won't happen is the simulation behaves perfectly because it generated a real-world consciousness to go hand-in-hand with its virtual data processing. This is also easier to understand when you realize that "information processing" has meaning only in terms of what the information represents. It's really just molecules and atoms and electrons and energies bouncing around in a complicated way that drives, somehow, creative outputs to varied inputs. But there's no "meaning" in reality beyond that.



The good news: Your argument still holds with this as a minor modification. All the atoms and matter will still be there, and the difficulty then becomes gathering up the individual ones that used to be you and putting them back together exactly as they are for your brain, right now.

Such a thing, which, at best, is a difficult engineering problem, and, at worst, is impossible thanks to the uncertainty principle, has already been given a name: The Techno-Rapture







* The first two ideas will illuminate the issue under discussion, as well as clear up the old philosophical debate about how consciousness could arise. Evolution, presumably, latched onto consciousness as a feature it could use because it was better than "doing it the hard way", which is to say, building high level intelligence as a result of a pure, consciousness-free, processor. So it must therefore offer something, some advantage, either in quality (deeper thought possible) or timeline (much faster to evolve than unconscious, high-level intelligence.)

[realpaladin]

I always like to say:

" I can't not exist, as far as I'm concerned. "

Descartes would love you for modernising his thoughts.

[realpaladin]

So the information needed for even just that carricature of a model is basically 2 to the power 1,000,000,000,000,000. Read that carefully. It's not just a million billions, it's two to the power a million billions! Well, 2^10 is approximately 10^3, so that's approximately 10^300,000,000,000,000. Yes, you write a one and then 300,000,000,000,000 zeroes behind it.

Even assuming that some particles assembled themselves in the equivalence of a brain (already improbable), it would be one chance in 2^1,000,000,000,000,000 that it's configured like yours.


My brain now has a bigger chance to exist... do you know how many neurons just gave up and went home just because I tried to imagine or put in perspective these numbers?

(All would be an obvious response, but then you probably make the infinite number of monkeys that are typing this post angry)

[rocketdodger]

He pointed out that consciousness, whatever it is, actually exists and is therefore a physical process. It arises somehow out of the interaction of atoms and energies and other particles.

Intelligence, which is not the same thing, does not require consciousness per se. But the phenomonon of the subjective perceptual experience, being real, thus requires a cause from real-world atoms and whatnot.

And therefore it is not based purely on information processing. In other words, we should not expect an electronic brain to have consciousness arise simply because we perfectly duplicate the information processing content of a wetware brain.

The third paragraph does not logically follow from the first two.

Saying something is a physical process is useless -- everything is a physical process. Information does not exist independent of a real physical substrate. Indeed, information is the physical substrate, just used a certain way.

So saying consciousness is purely a type of information processing doesn't mean it can exist independent of reality, or is not a real process, or anything of the sort. It simply means it is substrate independent at some level.

Whether or not something that behaves exactly like a biological neuron is a suitable substrate remains to be seen -- strong AI researchers don't think so, and neither do I.

But in any case, your argument here is defeated by the simple fact that both you and I exhibit consciousness, and we do not share the exact same particles. So at the very least there is that level of substrate independence.

Note that this goes for the entire class of things we label as a process -- the existence is independent of a specific system in which the process takes place. Any suitable system will do. The favorite example here on this forum is "running." Where is "running?" Nowhere -- it is a type of behavior that can be exhibited by many things. Does that make "running" non physical?

A perfect simulation of atoms and chemistry would easily simulate a fire. But that is not real fire. It cannot burn. A simulation of neurons would, at best, create a simulation of a conscious mind, but it would not be conscious (a real phenomenon) any more than the simulated fire would be a real fire, a physical phenomenon that burns real things.

The fire would be real in another frame. There is also no way for you to be sure that we are not in a simulation already.

I already had this argument with westprog. His absurd conclusion was that our consciousness is real if we are not in a simulation and not real if we are in a simulation. I happen to think that my consciousness is real regardless. What about you?

Note this also makes a side prediction that could, in theory, be tested some day: A perfect simulation of all known physics that had a "brain template" plugged into it, would, when "run", have one of three things happen:

1. It runs perfectly, and passes all Turing tests with flying colors. The consciousness is simulated ala the fire.

2. It doesn't run perfectly, or at all, because we've missed something in physics that's needed for true consciousness. Hence our simulation missed it, and no simulated consciousness arose*.

3. What won't happen is the simulation behaves perfectly because it generated a real-world consciousness to go hand-in-hand with its virtual data processing. This is also easier to understand when you realize that "information processing" has meaning only in terms of what the information represents. It's really just molecules and atoms and electrons and energies bouncing around in a complicated way that drives, somehow, creative outputs to varied inputs. But there's no "meaning" in reality beyond that.

You are missing the crucial point -- if you take this "simulated" consciousness out of the virtual world, and load it onto a substrate in our current world, it will behave the same way relative to the world it inhabits.

In fact, it would be enough to give the "simulated" consciousness mere access to our world. What happens when a virtual consciousness is able to access a non virtual world? The consciousness is no longer virtual, and since the property of being virtual is not dynamic, you can either say the consciousness is suddenly a different consciousness or else it was never virtual to begin with.

The same goes for all information. That is the great thing about information -- it doesn't matter where it comes from, because all information is frame independent.

[Gate2501]

Consiousness is biological, not mathematical.

Why could consciousness only emerge in a biological substratum? What would prevent other information processing mediums from giving rise to consciousness?

Is your argument something like: "I have only seen bananas on Palm Tree Island, therefore, it is impossible for bananas to grow anywhere else but Palm Tree Island."?

[rocketdodger]

Consiousness is biological, not mathematical.

What about running?

Do people with artificial legs no longer run, since those legs are no longer biological?

[HansMustermann]

My brain now has a bigger chance to exist... do you know how many neurons just gave up and went home just because I tried to imagine or put in perspective these numbers?

Actually, it's still the same probability. Just in that binary number with 10^15 digits, different bits are set, but it's still one of the combinations I was talking about :p

[Cosmic Roy]

First of all, I'd like to apologise in advance for the following post. I've read the thread, but I'm on the beer right now, and I'm finding it hard to concentrate.

rocketdodger, I really liked your post. I've thought about this a lot myself, though I've never tried (I wouldn't know how!) putting numbers to the idea. If I'm understanding you correctly, I think this concept was explored in a novel by Greg Egan: Permutation City - you may enjoy it if you haven't read it already.

To make sure I'm not misunderstanding you, I'd like to quickly state in my own words what I think you're driving at. Please correct me if I'm barking up the wrong tree.

You think that, if consciousness is nothing more than the processing of information, the interactions that cause it to arise can occur just as well in one medium as they can in another. So conscious experience would feel the same whether the computational substrate was a biological brain, a network of silicon chips, or the chance interactions of particles in space. So, given a universe extending an infinite time into the future, all possible computations will eventually be performed, and all possible conscious states will therefore be manifested - including those consistent with experience of an afterlife.

Now, I like this idea, but like I said, I wouldn't know how to estimate any given state's probability of occurring within a specified period of time. I appreciate HansMustermann's efforts in this direction.

I've read somewhere (I won't look it up now, sorry - my mind is too cloudy for that) that, if the universe was to end in a Big Crunch, the rate of computation would increase as the universe became hotter and denser, meaning any consciousness manifested by those computations could subjectively live an infinite amount of time (or a near-infinite amount - if that means anything!) even as their computational substrate collapsed rapidly to a singularity. Could the opposite also work? That is, could it be the case that, in the hot, dense state that existed soon after the Big Bang, random interactions occurred at such a rate that the likelihood of a configuration that simulated a consciousness would be much increased?

I'm going to stop writing now. Please remember that the contents of this post do not necessarily reflect the views of the poster.

[realpaladin]

First of all, I'd like to apologise in advance for the following post. I've read the thread, but I'm on the beer right now, and I'm finding it hard to concentrate.
<snip>
I'm going to stop writing now. Please remember that the contents of this post do not necessarily reflect the views of the poster.

*BAM* Now the extended families of aforementioned neurons have slammed the door whilst shouting 'I quit!'.

But a cool notion though.

[realpaladin]

Actually, it's still the same probability. Just in that binary number with 10^15 digits, different bits are set, but it's still one of the combinations I was talking about :p
You are trying to make me think about them numbers again, don't you? :)

[Thabiguy]

The question is, from the moment the universe was born to the moment it dies, will there be any set of information isomorphic to the set on your hard drive (other than the drive itself, of course) ?

I'm afraid you're misusing the word "isomorphic" here. Isomorphism is something that applies to algebraic structures. The contents of a hard drive is not an algebraic structure, it's simply a natural number, X.

If you meant to ask, "will there be anything else that represents the number X in some encoded form", the answer is, of course. Everything represents the number X in some encoded form. It's just a question of choosing a proper decoding function.

[Cosmic Roy]

I'm afraid you're misusing the word "isomorphic" here. Isomorphism is something that applies to algebraic structures. The contents of a hard drive is not an algebraic structure, it's simply a natural number, X.

If you meant to ask, "will there be anything else that represents the number X in some encoded form", the answer is, of course. Everything represents the number X in some encoded form. It's just a question of choosing a proper decoding function.

You may be accustomed to using the term 'isomorphism' in the context of algebraic structures. But surely, 'isomorphic' means something along the lines of 'of the same shape' (I don't know Latin, sorry), and is thus more flexible than you claim.

Edited to add:
Yes, I see that the term 'isomorphism' is used in biology and geology as well as mathematics.

[Thabiguy]

But surely, 'isomorphic' means something along the lines of 'of the same shape' (I don't know Latin, sorry), and is thus more flexible than you claim.

The only relevant issue here is what rocketdodger meant by "isomorphic to the set of information on a hard drive".

If you rotate the data one bit to the left, is the resulting image "isomorphic" to the original (since you can always restore the original by rotating it back)?

If you flip the first bit of the data, is the resulting image "isomorphic" to the original (since you can always restore the original by flipping the bit back)?

If the answer to both question is yes, and this "isomorphism" is transitive (if A is "isomorphic" to B, and B to C, then A is "isomorphic" to C), then any hard drive contents is "isomorphic" to any other contents of that hard drive.

[Gate2501]

The contents of a hard drive is not an algebraic structure, it's simply a natural number, X.

Where are the contents of a hard drive expressed as a natural number, X? I mean, technically you could take ANY non variable phenomena, and quantify it as a number, X, right?

[Cosmic Roy]

The only relevant issue here is what rocketdodger meant by "isomorphic to the set of information on a hard drive".

If you rotate the data one bit to the left, is the resulting image "isomorphic" to the original (since you can always restore the original by rotating it back)?

If you flip the first bit of the data, is the resulting image "isomorphic" to the original (since you can always restore the original by flipping the bit back)?

If the answer to both question is yes, and this "isomorphism" is transitive (if A is "isomorphic" to B, and B to C, then A is "isomorphic" to C), then any hard drive contents is "isomorphic" to any other contents of that hard drive.

I concede, I feel blinded by technical terminology. My understanding of rocketdodger's use of the word is that he meant something like 'embodying the same information'. I don't know nearly enough about algebra or computer science to say whether his use of the word was justified. But I can say that, given that the function of language is to convey concepts, rocketdodger's language reached at least one person (if I've interpreted his concept correctly, of course).

[Gate2501]

I concede, I feel blinded by technical terminology. My understanding of rocketdodger's use of the word is that he meant something like 'embodying the same information'. I don't know nearly enough about algebra or computer science to say whether his use of the word was justified. But I can say that, given that the function of language is to convey concepts, rocketdodger's language reached at least one person (if I've interpreted his concept correctly, of course).

I think that RD was talking about the more general definition of Isomorphism that deals with 2 different objects being identical on some level of abstraction. You could apply this more general definition to an object like a hard drive, which you could ALSO apply the strict mathematical definition to in a different way.

Thus, a semantic argument ensues.

[Cosmic Roy]

I think that RD was talking about the more general definition of Isomorphism that deals with 2 different objects being identical on some level of abstraction. You could apply this more general definition to an object like a hard drive, which you could ALSO apply the strict mathematical definition to in a different way.

Thus, a semantic argument ensues.

Indeed! Let's not start a semantic argument, and instead let rocketdodger come and tell us what he meant by it. In the meantime, I will go to the pub.

[Thabiguy]

Where are the contents of a hard drive expressed as a natural number, X? I mean, technically you could take ANY non variable phenomena, and quantify it as a number, X, right?

I guess you could, but that's not what I was getting at. I was merely referring to the simple fact that a hard drive is a device designed to store a very long binary number - these days, usually on the order of hundreds of billions of binary digits (a.k.a. bits) - and allow the drive controller to read and modify portions of its binary representation. A binary number is a natural number.

I concede, I feel blinded by technical terminology.

Sorry about that. What I wrote was really aimed at rocketdodger, whom I expect to understand the terminology.

[Alkatran]

Premise 2) -- if another pattern of information P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R, then C(t) will be instantiated by P(n).

I don't think this premise is valid. It certainly goes against how we perceive consciousness. I certainly perceive it as localized to my own body, so how could some other body existing at the same time have the same consciousness just because they were thinking the same thing?

Also, you haven't explicitly defined what isomorphism you want to use. Same state? Same operations to be performed on states? Same state and operations to be performed on states? These make a big difference! There's also the issue that you can turn operations to be performed into state (ie. a computer program instead of a hard-wired computer).

Premise 3) -- for every t, there may be some n, at any given time, such that P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R. Extended to infinity, we can assume that there will be some such n.

This is just plain wrong. You wave away how unlikely is that two processes will be identical, and then you make a classic "infinity -> whatever the hell I want" mistake.

Just because a system can continue indefinitely does not mean that it will visit every possible state. For example it might get stuck in a small loop, or converge on some state (ie. the heat death of the universe).

[AkuManiMani]

I think its a bit premature to propose a likely mechanism for continuing life after death. Even if some part of us does continue on after we die we've no way of knowing right now if we'll just be some persistent memory trace or if whats left will still even carry our self identity >_<

[Gate2501]

I don't think this premise is valid. It certainly goes against how we perceive consciousness. I certainly perceive it as localized to my own body, so how could some other body existing at the same time have the same consciousness just because they were thinking the same thing?


Let's examine this idea.

Our brains are physical, and the information processing that goes on within them, causes consciousness and a sense of self awareness to emerge. Any consciousness *C* then, should be able to be duplicated given sufficient understanding of what is going on in the brain, and the ability to mirror it. Consciousness C could logically exist in two places at one time.

The problem with this, is that C has come about as a result of the evolution of a biological organism over a buttrillion years. C is hard wired to think that locality is VERY important, and to see itself as a unique identity. Each instance of C, would think that it was the "real" C. However, both would be the real C.

[rocketdodger]

I'm afraid you're misusing the word "isomorphic" here. Isomorphism is something that applies to algebraic structures. The contents of a hard drive is not an algebraic structure, it's simply a natural number, X.

If you meant to ask, "will there be anything else that represents the number X in some encoded form", the answer is, of course. Everything represents the number X in some encoded form. It's just a question of choosing a proper decoding function.

No, that is not quite the whole story. Thats why in my OP I was careful to stipulate "isomorphic under the same set of rules."

So for example, there are a number of rules stipulating how the data is organized on your hard drive. Lets just forget about everything else and suppose it is a string of binary digits. Suppose further that the distinction between the digits are location on the disc, and the value of each digit is represented by the polarity of a magnetic field measured from some location relative to each digit, say the center.

Now, it is quite clear how a finite number can be represented on this substrate given this set of rules -- if the field in a location is closer to one polarity than the other, that location is attributed either a 1 or 0.

Could we do the same with any old system? Not really, because the structure of most systems is not amenable to this set of rules. Where is the distinction between bits in a glass of water, for instance? Or the physical properties that correspond to value?

And given that P1 is that consciousness is information processing, or flow, the complexity of any isomorphism increases exponentially, because it is no longer just a static arrangement that must be accounted for but a dynamic system where each informational component has direction.

[rocketdodger]

Also, you haven't explicitly defined what isomorphism you want to use. Same state? Same operations to be performed on states? Same state and operations to be performed on states? These make a big difference! There's also the issue that you can turn operations to be performed into state (ie. a computer program instead of a hard-wired computer).


The isomorphism shouldn't matter, as long as it is valid.

Think about it. If the isomorphism is valid, that means every component of one system is mapped to a distinct component of the other system, and that every operation on those components in one system is mapped to a distinct operation on the components of the other system. Mathematically that also means that every series of operations performed on the components of either system will have a counterpart in the other that is a series of operations performed on those other components.

And, mathematically, that means the information flow in each system will be the same -- flow from A --> B --> C in one will be (for example) X --> Y --> Z in the other.

[Thabiguy]

No, that is not quite the whole story.

I see now. Apparently I didn't interpret your post #16 correctly before, and what you meant was a bit different from what I thought you meant.

Thanks for the clarification; this resolves some of the questions I had earlier.

[Skeptic Ginger]

While information processing is undoubtedly a component of consciousness, this processing happens in living neurons. I don't think it's likely that consciousness can be divorced from the biological tissue that's doing the processing.There's certainly no evidence for any non-physical existence.

What evidence supports the OP formula? It's pure nonsense. Throw out some math terms, pretend they have meaning when in reality no meaning has been established and claim you have some debatable hypothesis. Pure nonsense.

[Skeptic Ginger]

Premise 1) -- consciousness is a type of information processing.

If you disagree with premise 1, then goodbye, this thread is not for you.

Let E(t) be the pattern of information that constitutes consciousness C(t) at time t. Let R be the rules, or the language, used to describe E(t).

Premise 2) -- if another pattern of information P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R, then C(t) will be instantiated by P(n).

Premise 3) -- for every t, there may be some n, at any given time, such that P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R. Extended to infinity, we can assume that there will be some such n.

Conclusion:

It is plausible that "we" are merely a series of information patterns, instantiated randomly throughout some other universe, inhabiting a solipsistic world. In fact, it is plausible that "we" are a single pattern that happens to include all of our memories up to the instant prior, and that only a single instance of a similar pattern existed, and there is no existence beyond the current instant.

At any rate, it is therefore also plausible that there is a pattern P(n == some number) that is isomorphic to E(t == time of death of C) and a series of patterns P(n == some other numbers) that are isomorphic to E(t == some time during an afterlife of C) under R.

In other words, if "we" are merely these random patterns, then there is no good reason why there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in some afterlife.

A corollary is that there is no good reason there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in a whacky world where up suddenly becomes down, or whatever, so in fact there are such patterns and other branches of "we" are experiencing them. This is very close to multiverse theories, I suppose.

EDIT -- this theory does not imply soplisism, after all, because there is no reason each pattern P(n) couldn't be isomorphic to some combination of E1(t), E2(t), .... Em(t), where Em(t) corresponds to the m'th consciousness of some other individual from our point of view.
"Premise 2) -- if another pattern of information P(n) is isomorphic to E(t) under R, then C(t) will be instantiated by P(n)."


You've merely stated a false analogy and called it an isomorphism. Come on, there are all kinds of "information processors" which are not alive. And since when does information processing occur without the hardware?


Someday we might be able to transfer all the data from a single brain to an artificial processor that has achieved AI capabilities. In that respect there is the potential for a future afterlife for human individuals. That's about as far as you can take this hypothesis of yours.

[scimystic]

A corollary is that there is no good reason there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in a whacky world where up suddenly becomes down, or whatever, so in fact there are such patterns and other branches of "we" are experiencing them. This is very close to multiverse theories, I suppose.

EDIT -- this theory does not imply soplisism, after all, because there is no reason each pattern P(n) couldn't be isomorphic to some combination of E1(t), E2(t), .... Em(t), where Em(t) corresponds to the m'th consciousness of some other individual from our point of view.

Rocket,

If you haven't yet read 'Anathem' (Neil Stephenson's latest) then get your skates on and head down to B&N. Its basically Plato meets QM, and in particular, the 'many worlds' interpretation. I'm pretty sure you'll like it.

Best regards,

Keith

[HansMustermann]

Let's do even more maths, to put those numbers into perspective.

IIRC the number of electrons in the observable universe is anywhere between 10^79 (for an average one atom of hydrogen per cubic metre) and 10^130 (how many spheres the size of an electron you can pack in it).

Let's say that each electron once a second would form a different configuration equivalent to a different brain. (Absurd, because one single electron isn't enough for a a brain, but let's be unbelievably generous with our upper limit.) Basically it's the "monkeys on keyboards" scenario with as many monkeys as electrons you could fit in the observable universe.

A year is 31 556 926 seconds, and let's give the universe a good 300 billion years for that experiment. That works out to about 10 billion billion seconds, or basically 10^19 seconds.

So if every single electron in the universe formed the equivalent a different brain configuration every single second, the universe would only have time to "try" a maximum of 10^149 different combinations. While your brain is one in 10^300,000,000,000,000 different combinations as shown earlier.

So I _really_ wouldn't set my hopes high of such a clone of your synapse configuration happening randomly.

[rocketdodger]

Let's do even more maths, to put those numbers into perspective.

IIRC the number of electrons in the observable universe is anywhere between 10^79 (for an average one atom of hydrogen per cubic metre) and 10^130 (how many spheres the size of an electron you can pack in it).

Let's say that each electron once a second would form a different configuration equivalent to a different brain. (Absurd, because one single electron isn't enough for a a brain, but let's be unbelievably generous with our upper limit.) Basically it's the "monkeys on keyboards" scenario with as many monkeys as electrons you could fit in the observable universe.

A year is 31 556 926 seconds, and let's give the universe a good 300 billion years for that experiment. That works out to about 10 billion billion seconds, or basically 10^19 seconds.

So if every single electron in the universe formed the equivalent a different brain configuration every single second, the universe would only have time to "try" a maximum of 10^149 different combinations. While your brain is one in 10^300,000,000,000,000 different combinations as shown earlier.

So I _really_ wouldn't set my hopes high of such a clone of your synapse configuration happening randomly.

Well, it doesn't have to be the same configuration, it just has to be isomorphic.

But I understand your point. If this is the only universe, and it's extents are what we understand them to be, then yes the chance is very slim.

[rocketdodger]

You've merely stated a false analogy and called it an isomorphism.

Huh? If it is an isomorphism then it is analagous. I don't think I said anything incorrect here, if you think I did, would you mind being specific?

Come on, there are all kinds of "information processors" which are not alive.

Being alive and being a transient instantiation of a consciousness are two totally different things.

And since when does information processing occur without the hardware?


It doesn't. Hardware "independence" only means it can happen on various kinds of hardware, not in the total absence of hardware.

[HansMustermann]

Well, it doesn't have to be the same configuration, it just has to be isomorphic.

That configuration is the state _and_ the way those signals are processed. (Actually a massive over-simplification of the state. As I was saying, each synapse is actually an analogue number, not a bit.) Anything which could qualify as being "you", would IMHO need that state or at least most of it.

Note that I didn't put limits on how it's implemented, just that it somehow has that (oversimplified and underestimated) state. I didn't even require that it's able to actually process that state, e.g., in that one electron brain calculation, just that it has it.

But I understand your point. If this is the only universe, and it's extents are what we understand them to be, then yes the chance is very slim.

I think "very slim" doesn't even come close to summing it up, actually. The right wording for that probability is IMHO more like "non-existent".

[Skeptic Ginger]

Huh? If it is an isomorphism then it is analagous. I don't think I said anything incorrect here, if you think I did, would you mind being specific? You made a false analogy and called it an analogy then based your label of isomorphism on that false underlying premise.



Being alive and being a transient instantiation of a consciousness are two totally different things.But this goes to your false analogy. You said the brain was an information processor. For this to be a valid analogy to an afterlife, you'd need to consider all sorts of other things besides just the information processor aspect of the brain.


It doesn't. Hardware "independence" only means it can happen on various kinds of hardware, not in the total absence of hardware.So are you delving into the aspect of processing the brain's information on some hardware in the nether world? Or are you discussing the potential for future downloading as the proposed afterlife?

[rocketdodger]

You made a false analogy and called it an analogy then based your label of isomorphism on that false underlying premise.



But this goes to your false analogy. You said the brain was an information processor. For this to be a valid analogy to an afterlife, you'd need to consider all sorts of other things besides just the information processor aspect of the brain.


So are you delving into the aspect of processing the brain's information on some hardware in the nether world? Or are you discussing the potential for future downloading as the proposed afterlife?

You either did not read the OP at all, or else you tried reading it and did not understand it, or perhaps you understood it but understood it incorrectly.

In any case, you aren't at all talking about what I am talking about.

What probably happened is you read the thread title, assumed I must be speaking about woo (which I find incredible given that I am one of the most outspoken strong AI proponents on these forums), and misinterpreted everything since then accordingly.

Try starting over?

[wuschel]

In other words, if "we" are merely these random patterns, then there is no good reason why there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in some afterlife.Provided that could actually happen, how would anyone be able to tell the difference? (Reminds me of the Multiverse interpretation of QM)

[rocketdodger]

Provided that could actually happen, how would anyone be able to tell the difference? (Reminds me of the Multiverse interpretation of QM)

As in that interpretation, there would be no way to know.

However, what is different here is that the Multiverse interpretation limits the possible branches of reality to instances that are physically possible. For example, if we assume the laws of physics really are the description of some kind of actual "rule" set imposed on physical reality, we can also assume that no branch of reality in the Multiverse interpretation will feature you suddenly being able to fly, or spontaneously combusting, or performing a random metamorphasis into some kind of Kafka-esque "bug."

Not so if we are these random fleeting patterns scattered about -- there is nothing preventing any of that from happening in some branch of the "Multiconsciousness" interpretation described here. In fact, if it were true, one would expect all sorts of random things to happen to the various instances of you -- turning into a turnip, for example -- and the you sitting here reading this post just happens to be the unlucky instance leading a boring "normal" life. Or, you could be one of the luckier ones, considering some of the nasty stuff that could happen to such a randomly generated consciousness...

[wuschel]

Not so if we are these random fleeting patterns scattered about -- there is nothing preventing any of that from happening in some branch of the "Multiconsciousness" interpretation described here. In fact, if it were true, one would expect all sorts of random things to happen to the various instances of you -- turning into a turnip, for example -- and the you sitting here reading this post just happens to be the unlucky instance leading a boring "normal" life. Or, you could be one of the luckier ones, considering some of the nasty stuff that could happen to such a randomly generated consciousness...Aren't you thus assuming that consciousness can be described by a snap shot arrangement of stuff? I would have thought that being conscious takes time, i.e. consciousness was a process , rather than just a plain spacial affair.



and, as such, not independent of the environment, as the resident behaviorist crowd will be more than happy to point out.

[Gate2501]

Aren't you thus assuming that consciousness can be described by a snap shot arrangement of stuff? I would have thought that being conscious takes time, i.e. consciousness was a process , rather than just a plain spacial affair.

I don't think that there is any way to verify that consciousness is anything more than the present moment, or "snapshot", as you say. Any judgment that you could make with regard to it being something more than the current moment of processing, would have to be made within that moment. In other words, we feel as if we are more than this "moment", however, we only ever have access to that "moment" to make that call. It appears to me, that continuity in consciousness, is perpetuated by that current moment of thought processing referencing your memories (I am talking about short term memories of the very near past). Who is to say that they are actually somehow connected by anything else?

Physical locality and memory make us feel as if we are more than just a "snapshot", in my opinion. The snapshot could exist independently of a past or future consciousness, it just would be gone as quickly as it appeared.

For all I know, I am just a fleeting instance of Gate2501, that will be replaced near instantly.

Goodbye cruel world.

Edit: I think I see more what you were saying after thinking about it a bit more. You may very well need some kind of physical process to cause that "snapshot" to emerge. So yeah, this might be more complicated than just the snapshot itself. I have no comment on how much time it would take to poop out a moment of consciousness akin to our own. I would imagine it would be quite a short time frame however given the correct "hardware".

[rocketdodger]

Aren't you thus assuming that consciousness can be described by a snap shot arrangement of stuff? I would have thought that being conscious takes time, i.e. consciousness was a process , rather than just a plain spacial affair.



and, as such, not independent of the environment, as the resident behaviorist crowd will be more than happy to point out.

No, I am not assuming that -- the the delta time of any of these "snapshots" would be nonzero, since consiousness is a process, and thus they aren't really "snapshots" at all. Thats why I use the term "instantiations."

Which just means the requirements that must be met for an isomorphism are that much greater in number, I.E. you would need to look for a system that not only looked like the pattern of information in our brain but also behaved like one over a very small period of time. However, there is no limit to how small that period of time can be -- any nonzero value is suitable.

[HansMustermann]

I just would like to point out that when you go "infinite parallel universes" for that hypothesis, basically you're just trading one unscientific unverifiable hypothesis (heaven and hell) for another one that's just as unverifiable and thus unscientific (multiple universes.)

Yes, it's one way to imagine QM -- in much the same way as imaginary numbers make a neat representation of alternating current circuits -- but it doesn't mean they necessarily exist. Just like imaginary numbers don't actually represent a quantity that actually exists.

And it has the same caveat as Pascal's Wager: really, which version of parallel universes is the real one? E.g., the ones in String Theory (ok, string hypothesis, really) are whole different beasts than the aforementioned QM interpretation, _and_ there might actually be a finite number of universes (worst case scenario: ONE) where the paramters are just right so actually baryonic matter forms, or fusion is possible, and so on.

And there's no experiment to prove or disprove any of those universes anyway. So it's really no more scientific than just believing in the Bible or the teaching of the Alleged Historical Buddha or Tao Te Ching or whatever floats your boat, and being done with it.

That is, if you take it as anything more than just an illustration of another way in which using infinity in an equation screws it up.

[Babbylonian]

Is there any utility to this mental exercise, even if we assume its [potential] validity? I mean, I don't really care if a perfect duplicate of my consciousness randomly "comes together" billions of years in the future because my awareness of said duplicate would be exactly zero (given that my current consciousness would be fairly long dead). The only way it could matter to anyone is if we assume that there is something eternal about our current awareness/consciousness, which is very much wooerific.

[rocketdodger]

And there's no experiment to prove or disprove any of those universes anyway. So it's really no more scientific than just believing in the Bible or the teaching of the Alleged Historical Buddha or Tao Te Ching or whatever floats your boat, and being done with it.

Well, it might not be more scientific -- since there is no way to disprove the hypothesis or hypotheses -- but at least it is logically coherent.

[rocketdodger]

Is there any utility to this mental exercise, even if we assume its [potential] validity? I mean, I don't really care if a perfect duplicate of my consciousness randomly "comes together" billions of years in the future because my awareness of said duplicate would be exactly zero (given that my current consciousness would be fairly long dead). The only way it could matter to anyone is if we assume that there is something eternal about our current awareness/consciousness, which is very much wooerific.

No, there is no utility.

There might indeed be something eternal about our current awareness/consciousness, though, and it has nothing to do with woo. Is there something eternal about, say, the fundamental patterns of mathematics, such as "isosceles triangles" or "spheres," etc?

The idea being that just as every instance of an isosceles triangle really is an isosceles triangle, every instance of the "you" process would indeed be "you," regardless of where or when that instance occurs.

[wuschel]

The idea being that just as every instance of an isosceles triangle really is an isosceles triangle, every instance of the "you" process would indeed be "you," regardless of where or when that instance occurs.Yeah, and if there was an infinite number of Universes - all running by the same script - each of these containing an exact copy of "you" -> which particular one is "you?".

[Gate2501]

Yeah, and if there was an infinite number of Universes - all running by the same script - each of these containing an exact copy of "you" -> which particular one is "you?".

The one that "you" are.

That is like asking: "which one of the copies would be himself?". It is a ridiculous question.

[wuschel]

The one that "you" are.How would "you" know?

[Babbylonian]

There might indeed be something eternal about our current awareness/consciousness, though, and it has nothing to do with woo. Is there something eternal about, say, the fundamental patterns of mathematics, such as "isosceles triangles" or "spheres," etc?

The idea being that just as every instance of an isosceles triangle really is an isosceles triangle, every instance of the "you" process would indeed be "you," regardless of where or when that instance occurs.
Sorry, but that is indeed woo. One isosceles triangle has no consciousness or an awareness of what it is and there's no scientific reason to suspect/assume that a second isosceles triangle has any connection to the first beyond its shape.

There's a continuity inherent in a human's sense of self. I'm conscious of the fact that I was conscious yesterday, the day before, etc. Even if we postulate infinite time and enough randomness to produce a second being with exactly the same combination of matter and experience as I possess, he can't be me. I can't be aware of his experience as I am of mine because I'm locked into my own mind and body, and once I "go the way of all flesh" I'm gone, never to return. My doppleganger can live exactly the same life, making all the same decisions, and having exactly the same life events, but my consciousness won't experience it. He is, to be succinct, a "coincidence." :)

[rocketdodger]

Sorry, but that is indeed woo. One isosceles triangle has no consciousness or an awareness of what it is and there's no scientific reason to suspect/assume that a second isosceles triangle has any connection to the first beyond its shape.

Well, the computational model of consciousness states that there is no scientific reason to suspect/assume that your current consciousness has any connection to the one an instant prior beyond it's mathematical properties.

[wuschel]

Well, the computational model of consciousness states that there is no scientific reason to suspect/assume that your current consciousness has any connection to the one an instant prior beyond it's mathematical properties.In the OP, you assert it being a matter of information processing, however.

A single snap shot, thus, won't do it.

[rocketdodger]

In the OP, you assert it being a matter of information processing, however.

A single snap shot, thus, won't do it.

Didn't I already say that?

[wuschel]

Didn't I already say that?
Yet you also wrote:
Well, the computational model of consciousness states that there is no scientific reason to suspect/assume that your current consciousness has any connection to the one an instant prior beyond it's mathematical properties.
...which, to me, is not the same.

May be I misread you and this is just another variation of the "what if the Universe started last Tuesday" theme. Most notably, I fail to see the connection with what could reasonably be referred to as an afterlife - versus the cloning problem where you are teleported but the original "you" is not destroyed - resulting in two individuals, each absolutely certain to be "you".

Isn't this whole confusion merely the result of our comprehension of "self" as being necessarily "unique" and so on... which maybe just so happened to be a trait to withstand selection pressure in a world full of individuals with no sense of self-importance, whatsoever?

[rocketdodger]

Most notably, I fail to see the connection with what could reasonably be referred to as an afterlife

I guess I didn't make that clear -- the only connection is that it is possible an instance of you will pop up that is in some kind of "afterlife" from the perspective of the instance.

In other words, if the universe was created last tuesday, and by chance your universe happens to correspond to, say, something like the heaven in "What Dreams May Come," then you could say that that instance of you is experiencing an "afterlife."