Iranian adviser says "Mousavi is an American agent"!!

[Thunder]

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-07-04-iran-mousavi_N.htm?csp=34

wow. this guy must read Prisonplanet.

:D

I bet Mousavi is also a crypto-Jew. And he hates puppies.

[Caustic Logic]

GreNME has some thoughts on this one.

For my part, I don't know much but that he's routineley portrayed in Westrn media as the positive plausible choice for change, which everyone just wants so bad, etc... the Pepsi of the new Persian generation, etc... If there's been much outside meddling (who truly knows?), it was towards supporting the elements supporting Moussavi at least. So, whatever his well-built street cred at home, is he the annointed friendly guy or does he just seem that way?

original wording Shariatmadar used was "It has to be asked whether the actions of (Mousavi and his supporters) are in response to instructions of American authorities."
It seems worth asking, a bit vague. "Instructions" is probably too strong, "agent" only in the vaguest sense maybe.

I dunno. Dalek. :dalek:

[GreNME]

This is actually quite different than what Prison Planet numb-skullery is out there. It has different origins, serving a different purpose.

Those in the Iranian government have long known quick ways to stir up public anger, and two surefire ways are to invoke the American CIA and Israeli military and intelligence (what the CT-ists incorrectly call 'the Mossad'). They usually get brought up whenever there are activities like insurrection-like movements, protests (like the late 1980's/early 1990's and the late 1990's), or terrorist activities (especially since the Afghan War began), and are politically safer than accusing Saudi extremist groups or other neighboring countries that might be harboring organizations that are attacking in Iran. That the CIA played a role in the Shah coming to power and the US military got intelligence on Itan's nuclear program from the terrorist group MEK provide a basis for the Iranian regimes to blame the US, and the hostile rhetoric that's ebbed and flowed between Iran and Israel over the years (along with the primary complaints most Mid-Eastern nations have with Israel) keeps them as a naturally effective scapegoat.

The article overestimates Ahmadinejad's popularity and mistakenly considers the limits of credibility Mousavi has. Mousavi was prime minister during the Iran-Iraq War, and in Iran was lauded as an effective administrator of the national economy during the war, keeping it relatively strong and stable despite the huge death toll Iran had during the war. Ahmadinejad's credibility comes from him being a former Basiji leg-breaker, which has historically been populated by the poorer classes who tend to be more religiously conservative. However, Ahmadinejad's regime has seen record unemployment and job loss, which has weakened his influence, and Mousavi's past record as a competent economic influence (along with his previous positive connections to Supreme Leader Khomeini) had gained him unprecedented support from the droves of people who have lost their jobs as well as many in the religious establishment, the latter of which have grown more critical of Khamenei's leadership (which is how Rafsanjani was elected as head of the Assembly of Experts). The article also ignores the contentions between the religious leaders and the power struggles between the establishment and the growing group of clerics who want a shift in the leadership from the head religious and political position in Iran (the office of Supreme Leader), which has been at a low boil for at least a decade and has been championed by Rafsanjani (the head of the Assembly of Experts) and Grand Ayatollah Montezeri (who was once in line to be the Supreme Leader himself). Additionally, two former Iranian presidents-- Rafsanjani and Khatami-- are supportive of Mousavi's campaign and have stoked the complaints about Ahmadinejad's regime constantly for the better part of the last year or so, which has had a toll on Ahmadinejad's popularity since he won the last election on a platform of economic reforms.

Ultimately, while the political regime might be using the US as a scapegoat, their rhetoric won't go any further than their own borders, and won't be anything more than superficial. An analogy to the type of political wrangling that the Iranian regime is engaging in would be the "tea parties" that the far right have engaged in here in the US-- using an issue that is sure to have public sympathy to forward an extreme political position and keep the discussion diverted from the actual issues.