Godel was a theist

[!Kaggen]

Any ideas why such a great mathematician was a theist?

[paximperium]

Religion and genius are not exclusive.

[Cavemonster]

There have been great mathematicians and scientists of all major religions or no religion at all.

[!Kaggen]

but did his theism influence his maths or his maths his theism

[elbe]

How does a belief in god, or lack thereof, change math?

[Hokulele]

Isaac Newton was an amazing mathematician and experimental physicist. He was also a complete crackpot when it came to alchemy and theism. Did his crackpottiness affect his math and physics, or did his math and physics affect his crackpottiness?

[Beerina]

There have been great mathematicians and scientists of all major political persuasions, too. That should tell you something about both religion and politics.

[Doc Daneeka]

There has never been a shortage of people who display genius in a particular area and muddled thinking in others. Actually, I believe that we call this 'human'.

[boloboffin]

Jesus died to complete our consistent system.

[!Kaggen]

Logic tells us that math and science is not affected by belief systems or political persuasions.
Science and Math describe reality and personality is a by-product of this reality.
The question is how important is personality in affecting physical reality?
It is comforting to think that physical reality cannot be influenced by personal belief systems and political ideology, but history would appear to tell a different story.
For example climate change has a physical basis which can be verified using science and math.
Our response to this information about climate change however has been determined predominantly by our belief systems and/or political persuasion.
In other words belief systems and/or political persuasion has been the driving force to influence physical changes in the global climate into the future. Science and math are tools to affect these changes, but belief systems and political persuasion are driving force.
Due to the urgency to respond effectively to climate change, we could argue that the solution is to by-pass the general public and install a technocracy which eliminates the influence of belief systems and political persuasion. Whether this is morally correct or even possible without force is questionable.
The traditional "deficit" model (top-down) of scientific communication has had very little impact in affecting public behavior related to climate change and a "dialogue" model which takes into account belief systems and/or political persuasion shows much more promise.
Perhaps the question of why Godel was a Theist requires more investigation in this light?

[PixyMisa]

Godel was a theist, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle believed in fairies, and Kemal Ataturk kept an an entire menagerie of animals, all called Abdul, but dammit, they were Americans, and nothing could keep them from their goal: to blow up the Moon. It's theistic fairy-believing menagerie-keepers like these who got us where we are today - six feet deep in moondust.

[Tricky]

It would seem to me that math and physics would have so little to do with theism that they could safely co-exist with religious beliefs without their spheres overlapping very much. It is in the natural sciences that the vehicle of theistic dogma smacks into the wall of science.
Or at least, that's what Deputy Dan says.

[Beerina]

but did his theism influence his maths or his maths his theism


IIRC the halting problem happens with gods, too.


Imagine a god, Yahweh, who can predict whether he or any other god will halt given an input of instructions.

Now imagine another god, Yaweh', who is constructed from Yahweh by adding the additional feature that if Yahweh <-- Note lack of prime symbol ' , halts on input X, then Yahweh' does not halt, and vice versa.

Now feed Yahweh' an input of Yahweh' and Yahweh+X. If Yahweh' decides Yahweh+X does not halt, then Yahweh' halts, so Yahweh' does not halt. Contradiction. But if Yahweh' decides Yahweh+X does halt, then Yahweh' does not halt, so Yahweh' halts. Another contradiction.


Therefore there are statements that must be true or false that even Yahweh cannot answer.

[lightfire22000]

Euler was one of the staunchest Christian apologist ever.

[!Kaggen]

IIRC the halting problem happens with gods, too.


Imagine a god, Yahweh, who can predict whether he or any other god will halt given an input of instructions.

Now imagine another god, Yaweh', who is constructed from Yahweh by adding the additional feature that if Yahweh <-- Note lack of prime symbol ' , halts on input X, then Yahweh' does not halt, and vice versa.

Now feed Yahweh' an input of Yahweh' and Yahweh+X. If Yahweh' decides Yahweh+X does not halt, then Yahweh' halts, so Yahweh' does not halt. Contradiction. But if Yahweh' decides Yahweh+X does halt, then Yahweh' does not halt, so Yahweh' halts. Another contradiction.


Therefore there are statements that must be true or false that even Yahweh cannot answer.

Looks interesting except did you perhaps forget to leave a "prime symbol" out after you mentioned it?

[bokonon]

Godel was a theist, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle believed in fairies, and Kemal Ataturk kept an an entire menagerie of animals, all called Abdul, but dammit, they were Americans, and nothing could keep them from their goal: to blow up the Moon. It's theistic fairy-believing menagerie-keepers like these who got us where we are today - six feet deep in moondust.
I may not like the cut of your jib, but I'll defend to the death (not mine) your right to cut one.

[Cuddles]

It would seem to me that math and physics would have so little to do with theism that they could safely co-exist with religious beliefs without their spheres overlapping very much. It is in the natural sciences that the vehicle of theistic dogma smacks into the wall of science.
Or at least, that's what Deputy Dan says.

Er, you do realise that physics is one of the natural sciences, right?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Godel was a Platonist like many mathematicians. His theism may have grown from that perspective. There are probably biographies of the man that go into this issue.

[!Kaggen]

Godel was a Platonist like many mathematicians. His theism may have grown from that perspective. There are probably biographies of the man that go into this issue.

Very good observation. I have found Platonism to be a common implicit ideology of many scientists who depend a lot on mathematics or abstract thinking in there work. Specifically atomic physicists, chemists and molecular biologists.
They tend to eventually see what they think abstractly as a physical reality rather than an interpretation of physical reality.

Why would Platonism specifically lead to theism?
I would have thought that theist claim to see gods thoughts whereas Platonist see there own?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Very good observation. I have found Platonism to be a common implicit ideology of many scientists who depend a lot on mathematics or abstract thinking in there work. Specifically atomic physicists, chemists and molecular biologists.
They tend to eventually see what they think abstractly as a physical reality rather than an interpretation of physical reality.

Why would Platonism specifically lead to theism?
I would have thought that theist claim to see gods thoughts whereas Platonist see there own?


Platonism is based on the idea of a world behind this world, a "greater reality" that is based in thought -- the Forms are mental/ideal -- so it is natural to see them as the products of a mind. Neoplatonism, in particular, viewed everything as an emanation from God.

Platonists generally view the Forms not as an instance of their own thought, but as participation in the greater reality of God/the Good.

[!Kaggen]

Platonism is based on the idea of a world behind this world, a "greater reality" that is based in thought -- the Forms are mental/ideal -- so it is natural to see them as the products of a mind. Neoplatonism, in particular, viewed everything as an emanation from God.

Platonists generally view the Forms not as an instance of their own thought, but as participation in the greater reality of God/the Good.

In other words a Platonist and specifically a Neo-Platonist views an "ideal" form world based on thoughts which are products of a mind which is not an instance of their own thought but an emanation from God/the Good in which they participate with how exactly?

[Ichneumonwasp]

In other words a Platonist and specifically a Neo-Platonist views an "ideal" form world based on thoughts which are products of a mind which is not an instance of their own thought but an emanation from God/the Good in which they participate with how exactly?


Well, that's the problem with Platonism and all forms of dualism -- I've yet to hear an adequate explanation for the interaction problem from anyone.

[m!g]

but did his theism influence his maths or his maths his theism

His math is accepted by atheists. So, is theism and his math didn't overlap.

[!Kaggen]

His math is accepted by atheists. So, is theism and his math didn't overlap.
I presume you meant "his theism".

In other words atheist only accept the discoveries of theists which are not influenced by their belief in God.
I think you'll find history will supply you with plenty of examples to contradict this assumption.
Newton was most certainly influenced in his discovery's by his belief in a rational God who created an ordered world.

[!Kaggen]

Well, that's the problem with Platonism and all forms of dualism -- I've yet to hear an adequate explanation for the interaction problem from anyone.

Is science not based on the dualism of the observer and the observed?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Is science not based on the dualism of the observer and the observed?


OK you got me. Not all forms of dualism. I really meant substance dualism, or at least property dualism.

Dualism of observed and observer is a conventional issue, not an ontological one.

[!Kaggen]

OK you got me. Not all forms of dualism. I really meant substance dualism, or at least property dualism.

Dualism of observed and observer is a conventional issue, not an ontological one.


I am unclear as to what you mean that Platonism is dualistic in the above sense.
Please elaborate.

[dahduh]

His math is accepted by atheists. So, is theism and his math didn't overlap.
Actually he did apply mathematics to theology, in the form of his ontological proof (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel's_ontological_proof) of the existence of god.

[!Kaggen]

Actually he did apply mathematics to theology, in the form of his ontological proof (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel's_ontological_proof) of the existence of god.

Interesting to read that Godel was concerned what others might have thought about this aspect of his math and reject the premise of his proof rather than studying the logic.
Perhaps Godel was another non-convinced Platonist/theist looking for evidence like most scientists.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I am unclear as to what you mean that Platonism is dualistic in the above sense.
Please elaborate.

The Forms (the ultimate of which is the Good, or God) are immaterial. The body is material. Mind, which apprehends the eternal immaterial forms, must also be immaterial in his system since he posits an eternal soul. He created a form of substance dualism.

The problem as with all forms of substance dualism is how does the immaterial interact with the material? How does the immaterial intellect/soul influence the material body? How do the immaterial Forms interact with or influence the material instances -- how does the Form of Chair produce an actual instance of a chair?

Some mathematicians (I have not really encountered it with physicists or biologists as you seem to have) seem to view number/mathematics as a type of Form -- that mathematics exists independent of our minds. Godel appears to have been in that group.

The question remains as to whether this is actually the case -- that mathematics exists independent of mind -- or if this is an instance of mathematical minds seeing "out there" the order their minds create, much like a flashlight only sees light everywhere it "looks".

[Dr Adequate]

Any ideas why such a great mathematician was a theist? Lots of people are theists. A more interesting question was why he was a paranoid loon who was so afraid of poison in his food that he starved himself to death.

[Beth]

The Forms (the ultimate of which is the Good, or God) are immaterial. The body is material. Mind, which apprehends the eternal immaterial forms, must also be immaterial in his system since he posits an eternal soul. He created a form of substance dualism.

This is interesting. I was under the impression that platonism was a form of monism, not dualism and that it differed from materialism in defining what the essential underlying material was.

[Dr Adequate]

Newton was most certainly influenced in his discovery's by his belief in a rational God who created an ordered world. An atheist would have come up with an inverse cube law?

[Oliver]

Religion and genius are not exclusive.


Same is true concerning being a genius and being honest about ones religion. ;)

[!Kaggen]

The Forms (the ultimate of which is the Good, or God) are immaterial. The body is material. Mind, which apprehends the eternal immaterial forms, must also be immaterial in his system since he posits an eternal soul. He created a form of substance dualism.

The problem as with all forms of substance dualism is how does the immaterial interact with the material? How does the immaterial intellect/soul influence the material body? How do the immaterial Forms interact with or influence the material instances -- how does the Form of Chair produce an actual instance of a chair?

Some mathematicians (I have not really encountered it with physicists or biologists as you seem to have) seem to view number/mathematics as a type of Form -- that mathematics exists independent of our minds. Godel appears to have been in that group.

The question remains as to whether this is actually the case -- that mathematics exists independent of mind -- or if this is an instance of mathematical minds seeing "out there" the order their minds create, much like a flashlight only sees light everywhere it "looks".

Ok. So you are specifically referring to the mind/matter dualism.
The observer/observed dualism of science is really the opposite side of the same coin. They both make the presupposition of dualism based on a separation which comes about in the human cognition process. To get around this one should presuppose nothing and begin looking for the starting point of this separation by a critical examination of cognition. This is an artificial process which requires looking for that pre-cognitive point conceptually. The concepts must serve a negative function of removing that which belongs to cognition, like signposts. The starting point cannot be anything with a definition as this involves cognition. Error as such is part of cognition. Any pre-cognitive point therefore cannot have an error. This point can be described as the "directly given". It points to everything that enters our experience in the wider sense such as sensations, perceptions, opinions, feelings, deeds, pictures of dreams and imaginations, representations, concepts,ideas, illusions, hullicinations and even every figment of our own "I".
Within the given there are experiences which on closer examination are "not given" in the sense that they are products of our own activity . These are concepts and ideas (concept being a principle which connects disconnected perceptions, idea being a concept with a greater content). At this point cognition begins in the synthesis of the given with the "not given" by means of thinking. In other words the given is incomplete and only through thinking does it become complete. Reality is the unification of the given through thinking by the activity of the center of human consciousness the "I". No need for dualism and its abstract Forms or observer/observed dichotomy.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Ok. So you are specifically referring to the mind/matter dualism.
The observer/observed dualism of science is really the opposite side of the same coin. They both make the presupposition of dualism based on a separation which comes about in the human cognition process. To get around this one should presuppose nothing and begin looking for the starting point of this separation by a critical examination of cognition. This is an artificial process which requires looking for that pre-cognitive point conceptually. The concepts must serve a negative function of removing that which belongs to cognition, like signposts. The starting point cannot be anything with a definition as this involves cognition. Error as such is part of cognition. Any pre-cognitive point therefore cannot have an error. This point can be described as the "directly given". It points to everything that enters our experience in the wider sense such as sensations, perceptions, opinions, feelings, deeds, pictures of dreams and imaginations, representations, concepts,ideas, illusions, hullicinations and even every figment of our own "I".
Within the given there are experiences which on closer examination are "not given" in the sense that they are products of our own activity . These are concepts and ideas (concept being a principle which connects disconnected perceptions, idea being a concept with a greater content). At this point cognition begins in the synthesis of the given with the "not given" by means of thinking. In other words the given is incomplete and only through thinking does it become complete. Reality is the unification of the given through thinking by the activity of the center of human consciousness the "I". No need for dualism and its abstract Forms or observer/observed dichotomy.

Not really, no. The "dualism" of observer/observed is a conventional issue having to do with the way we use language. Science does not posit that there is a difference in substance between an observer and that which is observed.

We tend to think in terms of there being a difference between mind and body and our language reinforces that notion with words like "mind" and "body", but the underlying assumption of different ontological categories is not really a part of science.

If one assumes monism, then the whole idea of observer/observed collapses, but that's not a problem for science. Science, after all, is process used to investigate the world based in methodological naturalism. It needn't assume any underlying ontology as the right answer.

[Beerina]

For example climate change has a physical basis which can be verified using science and math.
Our response to this information about climate change however has been determined predominantly by our belief systems and/or political persuasion.
In other words belief systems and/or political persuasion has been the driving force to influence physical changes in the global climate into the future. Science and math are tools to affect these changes, but belief systems and political persuasion are driving force.
Due to the urgency to respond effectively to climate change, we could argue that the solution is to by-pass the general public and install a technocracy which eliminates the influence of belief systems and political persuasion. Whether this is morally correct or even possible without force is questionable.

An interesting observation, but you are so closely intertwined with the "belief systems and political persuasion" that you miss the even more important issue.

Without nitpicking about the A in AGW, ice age cycles and so on:

Global warming -> And therefore we have to stop it with massive government intervention


Anyone see something missing there? Like why is it so bad? Which includes how fast are things X, Y, and Z happening.


Ok, suppose people answer that. Then we're done, right? Full government intervention, ahoy! Not that we're saps who buy into any particular belief system or political persuasion, including a solution system.


Nahhhh...still missing something. But what are we missing?

Oh yeah. The assumption that government intervention will make the problem better rather than worse, possibly as an unintended side effect by crushing the economy.


Oh, so we grant that for the sake of argument. But it's sophistry. There are (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Eastern_Germany) no (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Poland) examples (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Hungary) of (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Bulgaria) governments (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Czechoslovakia) that (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Romania) were (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Albania) actually (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc#Yugoslavia) worse (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea) for (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_China) their (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam) people (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithuania) than (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latveria) global (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia) warming (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ussr) would (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_arabia) be (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran), right (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimbabwe)?




Personally, I'm gonna wait for someone to try to refute every one of those from the comfort of their air conditioned place in America on their personal computer derived from trillions of private dollars of investment over the decades while munching on tater tots bought from a supermarket down the street overflowing with products. :popcorn1

[Xulld]

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle believed in fairies,
He later admitted that he never believed, but merely accepted that it was possible and that he was compelled to accept the evidence at the time. Critical thinking isnt about never being fooled, its about the steps needed to prevent and if it happen to root out the truth of the situation, the very act of verification requires doubt.

We all have our moments.

I am compelled by the Many worlds interpretation, I do not believe in it however.

[catbasket]

We all have our moments.
Moments?

His book, The Coming of the Fairies (1921) shows he was apparently convinced of the veracity of the Cottingley Fairies photographs, which he reproduced in the book, together with theories about the nature and existence of fairies and spirits. In his The History of Spiritualism (1926), Conan Doyle praised the psychic phenomena and spirit materialisations produced by Eusapia Palladino and Mina "Margery" Crandon.[14]

...

Conan Doyle was friends for a time with the American magician Harry Houdini, who himself became a prominent opponent of the Spiritualist movement in the 1920s following the death of his beloved mother. Although Houdini insisted that Spiritualist mediums employed trickery (and consistently attempted to expose them as frauds), Conan Doyle became convinced that Houdini himself possessed supernatural powers, a view expressed in Conan Doyle's The Edge of the Unknown. Houdini was apparently unable to convince Conan Doyle that his feats were simply magic tricks, leading to a bitter public falling out between the two.[14]

Arthur Conan Doyle

It's only Wiki but that matches what I've read elsewhere.

[!Kaggen]

Not really, no. The "dualism" of observer/observed is a conventional issue having to do with the way we use language. Science does not posit that there is a difference in substance between an observer and that which is observed.

We tend to think in terms of there being a difference between mind and body and our language reinforces that notion with words like "mind" and "body", but the underlying assumption of different ontological categories is not really a part of science.

If one assumes monism, then the whole idea of observer/observed collapses, but that's not a problem for science. Science, after all, is process used to investigate the world based in methodological naturalism. It needn't assume any underlying ontology as the right answer.

Yes not a difference in substance, but a difference in primacy. The observed is the fact (primary/objective; chemistry/physics) and the observer who interprets the facts (secondary/subjective; cognition). What I put forward is that all is fact, but within all the facts are specific facts which the observer "creates" by cognition and reality is how these "created" facts are brought into context with the "given" facts by thinking which is motivated by the center of human consciousness the "I".

I think people confuse science with the scientific method. Indeed science can assume nothing since "it" has no "I" as "it" is a noun which describes a specific branch of knowledge. However the scientific method is practiced by humans to develop science. The scientific method was developed by humans because of the apparent dualism inherent in the human cognitive process whereby the observer, being secondary/subjective, is objectified using an iterative process to eliminate any subjective influence. Monism is definitely not possible within the constraints of the scientific method as Monism does not differentiate between objective and subjective knowledge .

Indeed this is my point that the science has the same underlying foundations as Platonism.
I would go further now and state that science has the same underlying foundation as the Judao-Christian-Islam religious complex which is derived from Platonism.

In my opinion this is were science as practiced now has limits as it is founded on the flawed assumption of dualism.

[UndercoverElephant]

How does a belief in god, or lack thereof, change math?

It might have an effect if you are delving into the mathematics of infinity. Same applies to Cantor.

[Doc Daneeka]

How does a belief in god, or lack thereof, change math?

It might have an effect if you are delving into the mathematics of infinity. Same applies to Cantor.

Is there any chance that you could expand on that, with the understanding that you probably understand the maths far better than I? Just curious...

[boloboffin]

OT: Conan Doyle knew Houdini?

Wow, it's nice to finally get out from under that rock. Any chance Holmes was modeled after Houdini?

[arthwollipot]

About time people realised that whether someone is theist or atheist has very little relation to whether their body of work is accepted, or why.

[Kopji]

The ontological argument is worth reading. Anselm's Ontalogical arugument for God is one of the wackier semantic lies for God. Compare it to what Goedel wrote.

Goedel does fascinate me (I've read at least a couple books about his life but it has been years ago so don't hold me to the details). He seems to understand that there is a similarity between what he goes about proving in mathematics and an old philosophical problem called the 'liar's paradox'.

I think at least part of the reason he went crazy was because he was a true believer - but if his work was true it proved that the idea of 'deity' is a mathematical certainty that would ALWAYS occur independent of the actual existence of the deity.

Would you want to be the believer who proved that God did not exist?
:|

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes not a difference in substance, but a difference in primacy. The observed is the fact (primary/objective; chemistry/physics) and the observer who interprets the facts (secondary/subjective; cognition). What I put forward is that all is fact, but within all the facts are specific facts which the observer "creates" by cognition and reality is how these "created" facts are brought into context with the "given" facts by thinking which is motivated by the center of human consciousness the "I".

I think people confuse science with the scientific method. Indeed science can assume nothing since "it" has no "I" as "it" is a noun which describes a specific branch of knowledge. However the scientific method is practiced by humans to develop science. The scientific method was developed by humans because of the apparent dualism inherent in the human cognitive process whereby the observer, being secondary/subjective, is objectified using an iterative process to eliminate any subjective influence. Monism is definitely not possible within the constraints of the scientific method as Monism does not differentiate between objective and subjective knowledge .

Indeed this is my point that the science has the same underlying foundations as Platonism.
I would go further now and state that science has the same underlying foundation as the Judao-Christian-Islam religious complex which is derived from Platonism.

In my opinion this is were science as practiced now has limits as it is founded on the flawed assumption of dualism.


Um, OK. But that is not Platonism. That our minds work dualistically -- probably, and this is the point I was trying to stress, because of the structure of Indoeuropean language. -- I think most would agree.

I think it would be more correct to lay the "blame" at the feet of Western Culture for the dualism in which we all seem to partake. It's built into our language; and it's built into our culture and approach to the "outside world".

Platonism is not just any form of dualism, though. Plato seems to have had the idea that the Forms had an existence separate from the ideas in men's minds (we discover their existence through rational thought). Yes, he included mind-body dualism, but the fact that he thought there is matter and that mind or soul is separate from matter doesn't completely cover the way he seemed to think of the Forms. The reason I say this is because, even if we all agree that we tend to think dualistically (mind-body dualism), I don't think it is fair to claim that science is based on the same assumptions as Platonism.

But I also do not think that science (the body of knowledge) nor the scientific method are inherently dualistic. Sure, people speak in dualistic terms about them; but that does not mean that the process or the knowledge base necessarily imply any particular ontology.

The scientific method is equally valid with dualism or monism; in fact, scientific thining is often accused of arising from a materialistic monism. The way that we speak about it should differ depending on our underlying ontological assumptions; and we are terrible at speaking about it in this culture because of our dualistic language. But that does not imply that science is dualistic.

This type of dualism -- what you identify as part of science -- might more properly be viewed as a dualism of value (or how you've phrased it in terms of primacy). With that I agree. Within Western culture there is a clear difference in value between the person and the "world", where one is to be manipulated by the other. That's just not Platonism.

[!Kaggen]

Ichneumonwasp, I have not ignore your last post.
Just a bit busy. Will reply soon.

[Pure Argent]

In regards to the OP:

No matter how many people of how high a standing believe a false theory, the theory remains false. So it matters not.

[!Kaggen]

Um, OK. But that is not Platonism. That our minds work dualistically -- probably, and this is the point I was trying to stress, because of the structure of Indoeuropean language. -- I think most would agree.

I think it would be more correct to lay the "blame" at the feet of Western Culture for the dualism in which we all seem to partake. It's built into our language; and it's built into our culture and approach to the "outside world".

Platonism is not just any form of dualism, though. Plato seems to have had the idea that the Forms had an existence separate from the ideas in men's minds (we discover their existence through rational thought). Yes, he included mind-body dualism, but the fact that he thought there is matter and that mind or soul is separate from matter doesn't completely cover the way he seemed to think of the Forms. The reason I say this is because, even if we all agree that we tend to think dualistically (mind-body dualism), I don't think it is fair to claim that science is based on the same assumptions as Platonism.

But I also do not think that science (the body of knowledge) nor the scientific method are inherently dualistic. Sure, people speak in dualistic terms about them; but that does not mean that the process or the knowledge base necessarily imply any particular ontology.

The scientific method is equally valid with dualism or monism; in fact, scientific thining is often accused of arising from a materialistic monism. The way that we speak about it should differ depending on our underlying ontological assumptions; and we are terrible at speaking about it in this culture because of our dualistic language. But that does not imply that science is dualistic.

This type of dualism -- what you identify as part of science -- might more properly be viewed as a dualism of value (or how you've phrased it in terms of primacy). With that I agree. Within Western culture there is a clear difference in value between the person and the "world", where one is to be manipulated by the other. That's just not Platonism.

First we should realize that "Form" in Platonism is really idea as Aristotle has pointed out in his critique of Platonism. I prefer the term concept.
As I have indicated we create concepts which we perceive. This is the dualism inherent in our cognition. Platonism and Science do not recognize this aspect of our cognition. This translates to the dualism of primary knowledge and secondary knowledge. Science and Platonism regards concepts as primary and percepts as secondary. Scientific knowledge is summarized in concepts. Yes observations are part of this knowledge, but only as far as confirming a concept using another concept(mathematical significance). This removes the observer which has the percept. The reason for this is historical and relates to the mistrust of the senses which originated in Judao-Christian religion, the precursor of the Western Science. Most scientist will deny this, but history tells us otherwise. Platonism does the same thing except it is honest in that it admits to be stuck on the primacy of concepts. Platonism then hypothesis that concepts must therefore have a life of their own out in the world independent of the observer and are responsible in a creative sense for existence. As you have pointed out we have no knowledge of this. In other words using scientific terminology, we have no evidence that concepts somehow create the world. Science on the other hand presumes concepts are percepts to be discovered in the world. In order to overcome dualism of these types we need to think about where cognition starts and/or what is pre cognition. However any form of knowledge, even scientific knowledge, cannot be used to understand pre cognition. Pre cognition is by definition not real and knowledge is uniquely a description of what is real. Science does not deal with this dualism. Science just proceeds using knowledge without question to analyse where cognition begins. This does not mean that we must just give up on trying to understand where knowledge begins. We must use knowledge to do this, but first we need to do this critically. Science uses this knowledge in a positive sense by adding it to our consciousness and even attempts to explain pre cognition this way. I suggest the only method to find the starting point of cognition is in a negative sense of removing knowledge from our consciousness until we are left with what I call The Given . Now we realize that cognition begins when we differentiate The Given into percepts and concepts. However knowledge only begins when we use thinking as initiated by our "I" to join concept and percept. Therefore we overcome dualism by recognizing the "I" and the thinking it initiates as essential in rejoining concept with percept.

[Elizabeth I]

OT: Conan Doyle knew Houdini?

Wow, it's nice to finally get out from under that rock. Any chance Holmes was modeled after Houdini?

Holmes was based on a professor Doyle studied with in medical school.

[Beerina]

Conan Doyle and Houdini were good friends and pen pals, actually. They began to split apart when Doyle kept bringing cool spiritual events to Houdini, and Houdini kept shooting them down.

It finally got too far when Doyle's own wife started doing fraudulent seances, but Doyle believed in them, and Houdini told him with infinite gentleness that she was fakin' it.

[Robin]

It might have an effect if you are delving into the mathematics of infinity. Same applies to Cantor.
I don't think that anybody has felt that the mathematics of infinity say anything about God since the middle ages - Nicolas of Cusa and all that.

[Robin]

The ontological argument is worth reading. Anselm's Ontalogical arugument for God is one of the wackier semantic lies for God.
And yet disproving it yielded an insight that has been invaluable in the development of mathematical logic.

Russell mentions this fact and it's relationship to his on PM. Goedel's original argument was specifically about Russell's PM.

So there is a specific (albeit roundabout) relationship between Anselm's arugment and Goedel's.
Goedel does fascinate me (I've read at least a couple books about his life but it has been years ago so don't hold me to the details). He seems to understand that there is a similarity between what he goes about proving in mathematics and an old philosophical problem called the 'liar's paradox'.
Yes, in fact he makes this explicit in the preamble to his first paper

[Ichneumonwasp]

First we should realize that "Form" in Platonism is really idea as Aristotle has pointed out in his critique of Platonism. I prefer the term concept.


First we should realize that Aristotle criticized Platonism because he disagreed with it. Platonism did not view the forms as an idea in men's minds but as a separate ontological category with which our minds could somehow participate. Aristotle's criticism was that this idea was daft, that it was impossible to make complete sense of it. That is why he often began his works with criticisms of Plato.

Science is not Platonism. It is closer to Aristotle's view but without the teleology with which Aristotle embues it.


As I have indicated we create concepts which we perceive. This is the dualism inherent in our cognition. Platonism and Science do not recognize this aspect of our cognition.

Platonism doesn't recognize this aspect of thought -- as mentioned above -- but science certainly does. I'm not sure where you got the idea that the neurosciences do not view cognition as a construction from inherent categories.

This translates to the dualism of primary knowledge and secondary knowledge. Science and Platonism regards concepts as primary and percepts as secondary. Scientific knowledge is summarized in concepts. Yes observations are part of this knowledge, but only as far as confirming a concept using another concept(mathematical significance). This removes the observer which has the percept. The reason for this is historical and relates to the mistrust of the senses which originated in Judao-Christian religion, the precursor of the Western Science. Most scientist will deny this, but history tells us otherwise. Platonism does the same thing except it is honest in that it admits to be stuck on the primacy of concepts. Platonism then hypothesis that concepts must therefore have a life of their own out in the world independent of the observer and are responsible in a creative sense for existence. As you have pointed out we have no knowledge of this. In other words using scientific terminology, we have no evidence that concepts somehow create the world. Science on the other hand presumes concepts are percepts to be discovered in the world. In order to overcome dualism of these types we need to think about where cognition starts and/or what is pre cognition. However any form of knowledge, even scientific knowledge, cannot be used to understand pre cognition. Pre cognition is by definition not real and knowledge is uniquely a description of what is real. Science does not deal with this dualism. Science just proceeds using knowledge without question to analyse where cognition begins. This does not mean that we must just give up on trying to understand where knowledge begins. We must use knowledge to do this, but first we need to do this critically. Science uses this knowledge in a positive sense by adding it to our consciousness and even attempts to explain pre cognition this way. I suggest the only method to find the starting point of cognition is in a negative sense of removing knowledge from our consciousness until we are left with what I call The Given . Now we realize that cognition begins when we differentiate The Given into percepts and concepts. However knowledge only begins when we use thinking as initiated by our "I" to join concept and percept. Therefore we overcome dualism by recognizing the "I" and the thinking it initiates as essential in rejoining concept with percept.

What you are describing here is not science but a correspondence theory of truth. Some folks may believe that (and many seem to write as though it is their underlying presumption of how the world works), but it is not a pre-requisite for science or the scientific method. Science need not presume any particular ontology nor a particular theory of truth.

[!Kaggen]

[QUOTE=!Kaggen;4941667]First we should realize that "Form" in Platonism is really idea as Aristotle has pointed out in his critique of Platonism. I prefer the term concept.


First we should realize that Aristotle criticized Platonism because he disagreed with it. Platonism did not view the forms as an idea in men's minds but as a separate ontological category with which our minds could somehow participate. Aristotle's criticism was that this idea was daft, that it was impossible to make complete sense of it. That is why he often began his works with criticisms of Plato.

This is what I said about Platonism already which is in line with your comment above. I agree with Aristotle and give specific epistemological reasons why.

Platonism then hypothesis that concepts must therefore have a life of their own out in the world independent of the observer and are responsible in a creative sense for existence

Science is not Platonism. It is closer to Aristotle's view but without the teleology with which Aristotle embues it.

First I think we should agree that "Science" with a capital "S", is knowledge which we derive specifically using a method of thinking, the scientific methodwithin the cognitive process. "science" with a small "s" being knowledge in general derived from the cognitive process. "science" is the original meaning of the word (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scienceword) and "Science" is the current one.
I am referring to the current meaning when I refer to Science.

The point I am making is that Science does not deal with the cognitive process critically, it only assumes a definition of cognition which it derives from specific method. The problem is that if one does not analyze how knowledge in general is produced within cognition, but ignore this and only use a specific method within cognition then you end up with putting the proverbial cart in front of the horse. You assume concepts are real if many concepts can be derived from them. This realness is based on generalization.
The more one can generalise/model/theorise the more reality we have.
I am not saying a scientist that practices Science believes these concepts have a life of there own. They cannot since they use cognition to derive their concepts. However when they look at the world they don't see the difference between concepts they themselves create and percepts which are part of "the given" (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=4941434#post4941434) and end up with an imbalance of more concepts than percepts. In the end they build concept upon concept upon concept without reference to percepts.
Platonism does the same but because the results often prove fruitful, such as in mathematics, they then hypothesize that the concepts are not created by us, but discovered by us. In other words both scientists that practice Science and Platonists believe "a priori synthetic judgements" are true.
In order to do this they both presuppose two things which can not begin a Theory of Knowledge.
1. We need other means of gaining knowledge besides experience
2. All knowledge gained through experience is only approximately valid


As I have indicated we create concepts which we perceive. This is the dualism inherent in our cognition. Platonism and Science do not recognize this aspect of our cognition.

Platonism doesn't recognize this aspect of thought -- as mentioned above -- but science certainly does. I'm not sure where you got the idea that the neurosciences do not view cognition as a construction from inherent categories.

The part that neuroscience does not deal with is that thinking initiated by the "I" overcomes this dualism inherent when cognition tackles "the given" (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=4941434#post4941434). It gets stuck in the process of cognition which creates dualism and does not attempt to overcome dualism. In other words stuck with concepts which describe more concepts.

This translates to the dualism of primary knowledge and secondary knowledge. Science and Platonism regards concepts as primary and percepts as secondary. Scientific knowledge is summarized in concepts. Yes observations are part of this knowledge, but only as far as confirming a concept using another concept(mathematical significance). This removes the observer which has the percept. The reason for this is historical and relates to the mistrust of the senses which originated in Judao-Christian religion, the precursor of the Western Science. Most scientist will deny this, but history tells us otherwise. Platonism does the same thing except it is honest in that it admits to be stuck on the primacy of concepts. Platonism then hypothesis that concepts must therefore have a life of their own out in the world independent of the observer and are responsible in a creative sense for existence. As you have pointed out we have no knowledge of this. In other words using scientific terminology, we have no evidence that concepts somehow create the world. Science on the other hand presumes concepts are percepts to be discovered in the world. In order to overcome dualism of these types we need to think about where cognition starts and/or what is pre cognition. However any form of knowledge, even scientific knowledge, cannot be used to understand pre cognition. Pre cognition is by definition not real and knowledge is uniquely a description of what is real. Science does not deal with this dualism. Science just proceeds using knowledge without question to analyse where cognition begins. This does not mean that we must just give up on trying to understand where knowledge begins. We must use knowledge to do this, but first we need to do this critically. Science uses this knowledge in a positive sense by adding it to our consciousness and even attempts to explain pre cognition this way. I suggest the only method to find the starting point of cognition is in a negative sense of removing knowledge from our consciousness until we are left with what I call The Given . Now we realize that cognition begins when we differentiate The Given into percepts and concepts. However knowledge only begins when we use thinking as initiated by our "I" to join concept and percept. Therefore we overcome dualism by recognizing the "I" and the thinking it initiates as essential in rejoining concept with percept.

What you are describing here is not science but a correspondence theory of truth. Some folks may believe that (and many seem to write as though it is their underlying presumption of how the world works), but it is not a pre-requisite for science or the scientific method. Science need not presume any particular ontology nor a particular theory of truth.

Using the definition of "science" above. What I have described is Epistemology, the "science" of knowledge.
Oh, but this is exactly my point all knowledge is derived from cognition and as such knowing were cognition starts is essential to understanding all systems of knowledge even "Science".
Any other questions of knowledge outside of cognition is metaphysics.

[Foster Zygote]

We need other means of gaining knowledge besides experience.

Such as?

[Ichneumonwasp]

[QUOTE=Ichneumonwasp]This is what I said about Platonism already which is in line with your comment above. I agree with Aristotle and give specific epistemological reasons why.


And that's fine. But what you initially seemed to say was that science was like Platonism -- with that I disagree. I think Aristotle was much closer to the way things appear to be than Plato was too. Modern Western science grew out of Aristotle interpreted by the church, not Plato. The early scientists and philosophers from the Age of Reason simply decided to alter the method of gaining knowledge by jettisoning authority as the final arbiter and replacing authority with evidence gained through the senses. It was still Aristotelean at its core, however.


First I think we should agree that "Science" with a capital "S", is knowledge which we derive specifically using a method of thinking, the scientific methodwithin the cognitive process. "science" with a small "s" being knowledge in general derived from the cognitive process. "science" is the original meaning of the word (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scienceword) and "Science" is the current one.
I am referring to the current meaning when I refer to Science.


Well, I really don't want to get into equivocation games or definition arguments. Yes, we call the body of knowledge gained from the sicentific method "science". That body of knowledge is often portrayed as the result of a particular ontological perspective -- materialist monism. But the process of doing science does not depend on that or any other ontology. It is not inherently dualistic ontologically. Types of dualism enter the picuture in the communication of scientific data all the time, though.

But, again, that is not Platonism.

The point I am making is that Science does not deal with the cognitive process critically, it only assumes a definition of cognition which it derives from specific method. The problem is that if one does not analyze how knowledge in general is produced within cognition, but ignore this and only use a specific method within cognition then you end up with putting the proverbial cart in front of the horse. You assume concepts are real if many concepts can be derived from them. This realness is based on generalization.
The more one can generalise/model/theorise the more reality we have.
I am not saying a scientist that practices Science believes these concepts have a life of there own. They cannot since they use cognition to derive their concepts. However when they look at the world they don't see the difference between concepts they themselves create and percepts which are part of "the given" (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=4941434#post4941434) and end up with an imbalance of more concepts than percepts. In the end they build concept upon concept upon concept without reference to percepts.
Platonism does the same but because the results often prove fruitful, such as in mathematics, they then hypothesize that the concepts are not created by us, but discovered by us. In other words both scientists that practice Science and Platonists believe "a priori synthetic judgements" are true.
In order to do this they both presuppose two things which can not begin a Theory of Knowledge.
1. We need other means of gaining knowledge besides experience
2. All knowledge gained through experience is only approximately valid






The part that neuroscience does not deal with is that thinking initiated by the "I" overcomes this dualism inherent when cognition tackles "the given" (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=4941434#post4941434). It gets stuck in the process of cognition which creates dualism and does not attempt to overcome dualism. In other words stuck with concepts which describe more concepts.





Using the definition of "science" above. What I have described is Epistemology, the "science" of knowledge.
Oh, but this is exactly my point all knowledge is derived from cognition and as such knowing were cognition starts is essential to understanding all systems of knowledge even "Science".
Any other questions of knowledge outside of cognition is metaphysics.


I'm afraid that I disagree with your analysis. While many people do think that way, it is not inherent to science.

I know that you are describing epistemology, but you are also putting science in the realm of a particular epistemic position -- the correspondence theory of truth. Sure, there are plenty of people who think that way. Is is not, however, inherent to science or to scientific thinking.

Of course science presupposes that we have other means of gaining knowledge than simply by experience -- that has been a core feature of philosophy since Kant. Without some structure -- categories -- knowledge itself is not possible, the data of the world would simply be a blooming buzzing mess.