The Ethics of Mutually Assured Destruction

[KingMerv00]

Purely hypothetical:

Imagine you are living during the Cold War in America and you have the sole authority to launch every nuclear weapon in the US arsenal. One day, you are informed that the USSR has fired hundreds upon hundreds of ICBMs at the USA. There is no computer error, the incoming missles are definitely real. Estimates show the damage will be total. After the bombs, the United States will be nothing but a wasteland. You have minutes to act. Do you fire back in kind?

The old policy of MAD never really made any sense to me. At this point, why retaliate? Just to get revenge? Just to ensure both sides lose? I don't see the destruction of two nations as a better outcome than the destruction of one.

[Segnosaur]

Purely hypothetical:

Imagine you are living during the Cold War in America and you have the sole authority to launch every nuclear weapon in the US arsenal. One day, you are informed that the USSR has fired hundreds upon hundreds of ICBMs at the USA. There is no computer error, the incoming missles are definitely real. Estimates show the damage will be total. After the bombs, the United States will be nothing but a wasteland. You have minutes to act. Do you fire back in kind?

The old policy of MAD never really made any sense to me. At this point, why retaliate? Just to get revenge? Just to ensure both sides lose? I don't see the destruction of two nations as a better outcome than the destruction of one.

You're assuming that had the russians launched an attack that it would, in fact, kill every person, not just in the U.S., but in its NATO allies, as well as other friendly democratic nations.

Its quite possible that a soviet "first strike" would leave many people alive in various friendly countries around the world. (After a nuclear strike, Russia could then invade remaining territory with conventional arms.) Launching a retaliation strike would reduce the ability of Russia to engage in those secondary invasions, and would provide protection to remaining democratic populations.

[KingMerv00]

You're assuming that had the russians launched an attack that it would, in fact, kill every person, not just in the U.S., but in its NATO allies, as well as other friendly democratic nations.

Its quite possible that a soviet "first strike" would leave many people alive in various friendly countries around the world. (After a nuclear strike, Russia could then invade remaining territory with conventional arms.) Launching a retaliation strike would reduce the ability of Russia to engage in those secondary invasions, and would provide protection to remaining democratic populations.

Fair enough. Assume then that the USSR fires on Europe too. What then?

[Denver]

I can see how convincing your enemies that you WOULD do this would be ethical. But the spirit of your question seems to be, after all is said and done, is it ethical to follow through?

Mass destruction of human beings is difficult to justify as 'ethical' in pretty much any context (especially when most of the people you are destroying had nothing to do with anything).

So, since there are several ethical frameworks, I am trying to work out in which one this might be justified.

In one, (I think it is called Consequentialist), we measure the net balance of the good consequences versus the bad, from society’s viewpoint (i.e., what if EVERYONE adopted this follow-through behavior). It still leads to increased deaths, so it doesn't sound ethical.

In another (Deontology) we examine the rights of the parties, as well as the duties, and determine who acted, or did not act, in accord with each. The people retaliating had a duty to retaliate: it was their job, and they probably swore to it. The public expects them to perform this duty. So it would be unethical NOT to retaliate.

In another (Acting virtuously) it would probably be better not to launch, and save as many lives as you can, even though they are your enemies. They have already done the harm to you they can, so now you can forgive them, and not retaliate. Its the golden rule: if you launched on them, you sure would hope they wouldn't launch back!

In another (Nuturing relationships), since they have just destroyed any relationships you might have had or been developing, you no longer have any ethical duty to them. So launch away.

And in the "Do not treat people as an ends to a mean" ethic, what are you trying to accomplish by retaliating? So destroying people, because you want revenge, would not be ethical.

So overall, it seems the perspective under which retaliating would be ethical is that we have put people in positions of power and duty whose job it is to retaliate. And it would be unethical for them to shirk that duty. And also, under the relationships ethic, since those who launched at you no longer have any ethical meaning in that sense to you, it would not feel wrong to retaliate.

[Fnord]

You're assuming that had the russians launched an attack that it would, in fact, kill every person, not just in the U.S., but in its NATO allies, as well as other friendly democratic nations.

Its quite possible that a soviet "first strike" would leave many people alive in various friendly countries around the world. (After a nuclear strike, Russia could then invade remaining territory with conventional arms.) Launching a retaliation strike would reduce the ability of Russia to engage in those secondary invasions, and would provide protection to remaining democratic populations.
.
Assuming, of course, that the radioactive fallout and ensuing "Nuclear Winter" didn't eliminate all remaining survivors of the initial exchange.

[KingMerv00]

So overall, it seems the perspective under which retaliating would be ethical is that we have put people in positions of power and duty whose job it is to retaliate. And it would be unethical for them to shirk that duty. And also, under the relationships ethic, since those who launched at you no longer have any ethical meaning in that sense to you, it would not feel wrong to retaliate.

And what would you do?

[Denver]

And what would you do?

I don't think I would agree to take the job and the duty of launching the missiles. And unless I was in that position, I don't think my answer would be worth anything.

But in case that feels like dodging your question, how about we ask: Would I condone the retaliation?

I would condone the people whose job it was to protect us and to launch the missiles. But if they called me out of the blue and told me that a huge part of the command hierarchy had been obliterated and it was my job to take over (ala Laura Roslin in BSG) it would be a battle between my emotions and my humanity. I think I would lean toward not launching, but I can't be sure that would be the winning decision, as it is hard to imagine the extreme emotional state I would be in at the time.

[quixotecoyote]

And what would you do?

Have a nap, than fire ze missiles!

[Marquis de Carabas]

And what would you do?
I'd fire the missiles. In short because to not do so is to admit to not having the will to make good on one's threats (the issue of whether such threats should have been made in the first place is another matter).

Now, making good on one's threats in the moment of ultimate defeat to do nothing but serve your enemy the same may seem insane or even evil, but on the off-chance that the West survives the Soviet nuclear onslaught, what would they have survived for if nobody would ever again take their threats seriously? I would fire to avoid appearing cripplingly weak in the future, no matter how certain it seemed that the future was not to be.

[KingMerv00]

I would fire to avoid appearing cripplingly weak in the future, no matter how certain it seemed that the future was not to be.

So you'd do it to avoid appearing crippled even though it would be true in a matter of minutes?

To me, making good on your threats is not good in and of itself. It is only good if it serves a good purpose.

[Big Les]

.
Assuming, of course, that the radioactive fallout and ensuing "Nuclear Winter" didn't eliminate all remaining survivors of the initial exchange.

From what I've read, that's actually quite unlikely. Nuclear winter may have been overestimated, and millions would have lived outside the known targets. Fallout couldn't kill or render sterile everybody. We're like cockroaches - very difficult to completely eliminate, even with a Cold War arsenal at your disposal.

Have you seen 'Threads'? Pretty realistic by most accounts (though I'm sceptical about the last 15 mins or so).

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2023790698427111488

[Marquis de Carabas]

So you'd do it to avoid appearing crippled even though it would be true in a matter of minutes?
Almost certainly true. I will never be so convinced of my own impending demise that I would abandon all consideration of the future.

To me, making good on your threats is not good in and of itself. It is only good if it serves a good purpose.
If you require a good purpose, how about making sure that the people capable* of initiating such a devastating attack are removed (or at least severely crippled), saving whatever meagre remains of humanity are left from a similar fate?

*Capable not merely meaning practically being able to do so, but morally being able to allow themselves to do so.

[KingMerv00]

Almost certainly true. I will never be so convinced of my own impending demise that I would abandon all consideration of the future.

Hundreds (hell, make it thousands) of nuclear weapons isn't close enough to certain for you?

If you require a good purpose, how about making sure that the people capable* of initiating such a devastating attack are removed (or at least severely crippled), saving whatever meagre remains of humanity are left from a similar fate?

*Capable not merely meaning practically being able to do so, but morally being able to allow themselves to do so.

That's not the same thing you said above. Defending others would probably qualify as a good cause but that is entirely separate from "making good on your threats". Being consistent with your threats is only useful as a political tool if you will be around the day after tomorrow.

[Marquis de Carabas]

Hundreds, (hell, make it thousands) of nuclear weapons isn't close enough to certain for you?
No.


That's not the same thing you said above.
Nor was it meant to be. You indicated you didn't think I had already proffered a good reason, so I provided another one.

Defending others would probably qualify as a good cause but that is entirely separate from "making good on your threats".
Aye.

[AmateurScientist]

The old policy of MAD never really made any sense to me. At this point, why retaliate? Just to get revenge? Just to ensure both sides lose? I don't see the destruction of two nations as a better outcome than the destruction of one.

The whole point of MAD is deterrence. It assumes rational actors on both sides. It relies on each side being able to make and follow through on credible threats of full-scale nuclear attack. It would make no sense to have a secret policy of a full scale retaliation. That would defeat the whole point of MAD. Secret plans, or ones you do not intend to follow through on, have no deterrent effect. MAD requires two-way communications that are credible.

MAD absolutely depends on both parties making credible threats of complete and thorough retaliation, and both parties believing the other to be sincere, and capable and willing to carry through on the threat. Without that assured destruction, making the first-strike is much more appealing to the players. Mutual assured destruction prevents either side from making a first-strike. It happened to work, despite a few close calls.

Your hypothetical undermines the deterrent effect of MAD if anyone survives. If we were to fail to carry out our threat of retaliation, in the event there were survivors on our side, then our "ethical" decision would serve to place the survivors at greater risk than they would face if we retaliated. Why? Because the enemy would be at full strength and could easily conquer the survivors. It would also have a greater incentive to annihilate the survivors for fear someone might decide to retaliate after all. The enemy's motivation to do so would be to disarm the survivors at that point.

The Marquis is right. You have to assume survivability for some, and consider where a failure to retaliate leaves them. I think it leaves them vulnerable to defeat and/or annihilation at the hands of the enemy.

MAD was a thoroughly rational policy for the Cold War players. Game theory applies to it quite well. Asking whether it's ethical to retaliate is a bit like asking whether it's ethical to bluff at poker. The credibility of the player is vital to the gamesmanship involved in both full-scale nuclear exchange and poker. If you're going to try to apply utilitarian ethics to either endeavor, you're going to lose.

AS

[Fnord]

The lucky ones would be those that die in the first exchange.

[theprestige]

I would follow through. Absolutely. That's the whole point of MAD: It's a hypothetical scenario in which everybody always follows through.

Your hypothetical question in the OP, and my hypothetical response, is a straightforward replay of the the MAD deterrent itself, as it was practiced throughout the Cold War, by heads of state, with the fate of humanity hanging in the balance.

To answer this hypothetical any other way eliminates the deterrent, and replaces it with a much greater likelihood of real nuclear holocaust.

[AkuManiMani]

Purely hypothetical:

Imagine you are living during the Cold War in America and you have the sole authority to launch every nuclear weapon in the US arsenal. One day, you are informed that the USSR has fired hundreds upon hundreds of ICBMs at the USA. There is no computer error, the incoming missles are definitely real. Estimates show the damage will be total. After the bombs, the United States will be nothing but a wasteland. You have minutes to act. Do you fire back in kind?

The old policy of MAD never really made any sense to me. At this point, why retaliate? Just to get revenge? Just to ensure both sides lose? I don't see the destruction of two nations as a better outcome than the destruction of one.

I guess the whole point of the MAD policy was to just deter the other side from striking first /shrug

[geni]

Purely hypothetical:

Imagine you are living during the Cold War in America and you have the sole authority to launch every nuclear weapon in the US arsenal. One day, you are informed that the USSR has fired hundreds upon hundreds of ICBMs at the USA. There is no computer error, the incoming missles are definitely real. Estimates show the damage will be total. After the bombs, the United States will be nothing but a wasteland. You have minutes to act. Do you fire back in kind?

If I was a citizen of the US of course. Anyone wishing to destory my country can reasonably expect to end up dead and I would be justified in killing them.


The old policy of MAD never really made any sense to me. At this point, why retaliate? Just to get revenge? Just to ensure both sides lose? I don't see the destruction of two nations as a better outcome than the destruction of one.

It isn't which was rather the problem. The trick was to make sure you had people in place who wouldn't be too concerned about that stuff and make sure the other side realised that they were their. It also requires an excess of weapons since at least some local commanders would refuse to fire.

[KingMerv00]

To answer this hypothetical any other way eliminates the deterrent, and replaces it with a much greater likelihood of real nuclear holocaust.

After the launch, deterrence is meaningless. Real nuclear holocaust is already upon you.

[HansMustermann]

Yes, but it isn't already upon you, precisely because both sides have made it perfectly clear that they will follow through in such a scenario. As was said, if there was reasonable doubt that the other side actually does, the sane move would be to launch a first strike.

So, yes, cruel and inhuman as it may seem, it's necessary to be fully prepared to do just that. Otherwise you'd already be glowing so hard, you wouldn't need a light to pee at night.

Both sides are basically in the stalemate position of two people with a grenade and a pistol each in a small room. And the grenade is primed and held squeezed. The first who shoots will most assuredly rest in (many small) pieces.

But it only works because it's primed to be assured destruction if you do. If the other guy had his grenade in his pocket and maybe he won't get to use it, there's little to stop you from just shooting him.

[Jungle Jim]

After the launch, deterrence is meaningless. Real nuclear holocaust is already upon you.

AmateurScientist explained it quite well. If the USSR unloaded on us then they did so understanding that we would respond in kind. They made their decision. They (and their people) will have to live (and die) with it. I frankly do not see an ethical issue here.

[theprestige]

After the launch, deterrence is meaningless. Real nuclear holocaust is already upon you.
Which in no way changes my hypothetical decision in your hypothetical scenario.

I'll try this one more time: The whole point of the MAD policy was to deter nuclear holocaust by laying out exactly the hypothetical scenario you laid out, and then laying out exactly the hypothetical response that I laid out.

Asking "yeah, but would you really do it?", totally ignores the point of MAD policy, and seriously undermines its real value in averting nuclear war.

You're trying to sidestep the single, simple characteristic of MAD: Yes, of course, really. That's the only ethical answer to your question. Any other answer, and it's not even MAD anymore, it's "mad dog":

I know what you're thinking, punk. You're thinking "did he fire six shots or only five?" Now to tell you the truth I forgot myself in all this excitement. But being this is a .44 Magnum, the most powerful handgun in the world and will blow you head clean off, you've gotta ask yourself a question: "Do I feel lucky?" Well, do ya, punk?

Now, if you want to argue the merits of the "maybe I'll retaliate, maybe I won't" strategy to deterring the Soviet Union, go right ahead. But that's not MAD. And I'm glad it was never the policy of the US.

[gtc]

The movie War Games was based on the premise that the people tasked with firing the missiles in response to a first strike wouldn't be able to bring themselves to do so.

[Thunder]

well, it appears that MAD worked!!

we are debating the merits of the policy..therefore it did its job. Russians are doing the same thing as we speak.

but if the USSR had been suicidal enough to have launched a first strike, I'd say hit em' back, just for the hell of it.

now eat, drink, and be merry.

[Skeptic]

One solution was "tying yourself to the mast": making sure one's reaction is preordained (e.g., by making the launch of the counter-strike automatic) and no longer a choice. This way there is only one chooser -- the USSR -- and only one choice -- e.g., mutual annihilation or peace. By making the choice automatic, one removes the third choice -- annihilation of only one side.

This, of course, is extremely ethical, since the removal of this one choice means that the USSR will never choose to attack, saving everybody's life, as opposed to having a choice (only USA is destroyed) which would kill hundreds of millions.

[lionking]

AmateurScientist explained it quite well. If the USSR unloaded on us then they did so understanding that we would respond in kind. They made their decision. They (and their people) will have to live (and die) with it. I frankly do not see an ethical issue here.
I fully agree. I would push the button.

[LightningStrike]

It is either Old Testament or New Testament: an eye for an eye, or turn the other cheek.

The only possible hope would be to turn the other cheek. There would be a small chance that the missile engines would fail and they would fall harmlessly in the water unexploded. Just a chance of it. I would be pretty pleased if that happened. Nuclear death averted, died of old age.

[AmateurScientist]

One solution was "tying yourself to the mast": making sure one's reaction is preordained (e.g., by making the launch of the counter-strike automatic) and no longer a choice. This way there is only one chooser -- the USSR -- and only one choice -- e.g., mutual annihilation or peace. By making the choice automatic, one removes the third choice -- annihilation of only one side.

This, of course, is extremely ethical, since the removal of this one choice means that the USSR will never choose to attack, saving everybody's life, as opposed to having a choice (only USA is destroyed) which would kill hundreds of millions.

And of course, that is essentially, although not literally, exactly what the policy of the US was. The declared policy, and by declared I mean thoroughly made public so the Soviets knew of it as well, repeatedly, was this:

1) The US will never engage in a first-strike of strategic nuclear weapons against the USSR; and

2) The US will immediately retaliate, without hesitation, against any nuclear attack against it or its allies with a full-scale nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.

This policy was the US' role in Mutual Assured Destruction. It relied of course on the credibility of the stated policy. We of course knew the Soviets were thoroughly engaged in spying on our activities with human intelligence, signals intelligence, and technological surveillance (spy planes, and eventually, spy satellites). We trained our military leaders in the relevant roles not only to maintain and launch our nuclear weapons, but also to do so as their sworn duty upon receiving the command to do so. That training, and that commitment, unlike the silly and unrealistic hesitation portrayed in much Cold War literature and many films about the subject, was vital to the policy, and to the credibility of our threat.

Stated another way, it is precisely the impotent sort of ethical question posed in the OP that would entirely undermine the effectiveness of the US policy. I am very glad utilitarian philosophers were of no influence on the political and foreign policy makers in the US with regard to US policy on the use of strategic nuclear weapons during the Cold War. If they had been, the Soviets would surely have discovered this flaw in our plan, and they would have figured out that we did not actually intend to fulfill, or could not actually carry out, our promise of a full-scale retaliation. This would have been the fatal chink in our armor against a Soviet first-strike.

Thankfully, for not only the US, but also for the rest of the world, US leaders did not allow such weak, mealy-mouthed utilitarian nonsense into the discussion. If it had, we likely would have in fact experienced a large scale nuclear attack by the Soviets. It was the fear of the price of such an attack that held it at bay. That is the essence of MAD. Again, it was a thoroughly rational strategy and policy on both the part of the US and the USSR.

Arguably, MAD was the only rational policy under the circumstances. Game theory as I understand it would support that conclusion.

Paradoxically, utilitarian ethics as espoused by the likes of Jeremy Bentham or Peter Singer, for example, considering the greatest good for all -- and implied by the OP -- fails to inform the "ethical" response to a first-strike. It chooses the wrong choice and thus results in the worse response for everyone. It fails.

Game theory is a much better model for informing the decisions of a rational player in what is properly considered a two-player "game" of nuclear exchange, at least in the context of the Cold War.

AS

[Big Les]

Great post.

Now back to my game of Fallout 3...

[gtc]

One solution was "tying yourself to the mast": making sure one's reaction is preordained (e.g., by making the launch of the counter-strike automatic) and no longer a choice. This way there is only one chooser -- the USSR -- and only one choice -- e.g., mutual annihilation or peace. By making the choice automatic, one removes the third choice -- annihilation of only one side.

This, of course, is extremely ethical, since the removal of this one choice means that the USSR will never choose to attack, saving everybody's life, as opposed to having a choice (only USA is destroyed) which would kill hundreds of millions.

I understand this logic perfectly. However, if that doctrine failed, I would hate to be put in the position where I was ordering the deaths of millions of civillians.

[AmateurScientist]

I understand this logic perfectly. However, if that doctrine failed, I would hate to be put in the position where I was ordering the deaths of millions of civillians.

I suggest you don't understand what "tying yourself to the mast" means in this context if you posit that you might then be in a position to order the deaths of millions of civilians. In this context, by committing to do so in advance, you have tied yourself to the mast, as Odysseus did. You cannot get down from the mast and change your mind. If you could, then you didn't tie yourself sufficiently -- you didn't truly commit to doing it.

That's the essence of MAD -- being fully committed to retaliating and making the opponent fully aware of your commitment. If you aren't committed, then you are half-assing the game, and you aren't engaged in MAD.

AS

[coldcanuk]

KingMerv00 you cannot simply disregard deterrence when speaking about M.A.D. It is part of it. Mutual Assured Destruction and the potential horror of nuclear holocaust promoted deterrence. We can get into the elaborate details and theories of M.A.D. based on Cold War doctrine, however, it sounds like you are looking at this from a video game point of view. "They launch, then we launch -> what's the point?" This essentialized stand-point does not allow for the various facets of MAD to be explored. Example: Policy
AmateurScientist has an excellent post about policy which makes some valid points about utilitarian philosophy and its absence in the forming said policy.
If you see MAD as pointless, then please explain its non-impact in the Cuban Missile Crisis? Russia in Afghanistan and the proxy war? (Why didn't the US have a physical presence back in the day? Why didn't they actually want to fight Russia face-2-face?)

All I'm saying is that there is more to Mutual Assured Destruction then "you shoot / I shoot" paraphrase.

[gtc]

I suggest you don't understand what "tying yourself to the mast" means in this context if you posit that you might then be in a position to order the deaths of millions of civilians. In this context, by committing to do so in advance, you have tied yourself to the mast, as Odysseus did. You cannot get down from the mast and change your mind. If you could, then you didn't tie yourself sufficiently -- you didn't truly commit to doing it.

That's the essence of MAD -- being fully committed to retaliating and making the opponent fully aware of your commitment. If you aren't committed, then you are half-assing the game, and you aren't engaged in MAD.

AS

No, I understand what that term means. I am just not certain that doctrine was ever implemented to the extent that a retaliatory strike was automated.

[AmateurScientist]

No, I understand what that term means. I am just not certain that doctrine was ever implemented to the extent that a retaliatory strike was automated.

It was not automated as in set up to be performed by machines. It was effectively automated to be performed by human beings because it was preordained. Once a strike by the Soviets was detected, everyone's response was already determined, and all they had to do was carry it out.

No reflection was required or desired. No one was given the opportunity to chicken out. The training instilled in them would make their reactions reflex-like, or what you might call automatic because it had been drilled into them by repetitive training.

Just as basketball players are trained by rote to go for the rebound upon someone's taking a shot on goal, those in a position to launch nuclear weapons were trained by rote to launch them upon the detection of a strike by the enemy. No thought, no discretion, no reflection was required or desired. Effectively, the process was automatic, only it was carried out by humans, not machines.

AS

[themusicteacher]

Gotta' agree with AmateurScientist on this one. The policy, obviously, did work (and is still working today) and it's a good thing the totality of the concept was acknowledged by everyone on either side. BTW, AS, good analogy with the rebound. Of course the players could choose NOT to go after the ball but they never would choose not to since they were trained, from the very beginning, to always go after it. Ultimately, there really is no choice involved at the end because the choice was made from the beginning. Thankfully, as WarGames illustrated, the only logical choice was to not play at all.

[This Guy]

Snip

1) The US will never engage in a first-strike of strategic nuclear weapons against the USSR; and

SNIP

AS

Was this actually a stated policy? Do you have a reference?

[Myriad]

After the bombs, the United States will be nothing but a wasteland.


This is the part that makes it an abstract ethics question rather than a realistic Cold War scenario.

The idea that a full-scale nuclear war would kill everyone on the planet (or at least, in the targeted nation(s)) except for a few motorcycle gangs was always a myth, oddly comforting to those who couldn't deal with imagining a more messy, painful, realistic aftermath. But the governments involved had to deal with those scenarios, and had to make plans for whatever degree of survival and recovery might be possible. They were, of course, relentlessly mocked for doing so. (One example: for a large thermonuclear air burst, there's a vast area outside the non-survivable blast radius where the blast and nuclear radiation are easily survivable but the thermal radiation would likely be lethal or crippling if you're standing in the open. There's a simple way to survive this threat: get out of line of sight of the fireball. In other words: "duck and cover." That the government tried to teach people this is considered a big joke today. Of course, people today spend so much less time outdoors than decades ago, the advice might be obsolete anyhow.)

Part of those plans took into account that a first strike was likely to be a prelude to an invasion, so as others pointed out upthread, if the retaliatory capability failed to deter, it would still be a major counterblow against that invasion.

So, my answer to a more realistic version of the OP, compared to which "total wasteland" is a gross exaggeration, is yes, I would be ready to retaliate and I would retaliate.

There was, of course, quite a lot of thought and discussion of this question during the Cold War itself. One example I recall is an Arthur C. Clarke short story (sorry, I forget the title) in which an "ultimate deterrent" weapons platform in space receives its final orders in almost exactly the same scenario as the OP (except that the first strike has already hit, removing all doubt). The orders are to surrender rather than retaliate. (The twist at the end is that it turns out it's a Soviet weapons platform, and the orders are to surrender to the U.S., but that's pretty much irrelevant to the story's point. I wonder if an editor insisted that it be that way.)

But in that story, the weapons were futuristic so the proposition was total destruction, no one left alive after retaliation. In that hypothetical case, I might not retaliate -- but because of that, knowing that the enemy's spies might get access to my psychological profile, I wouldn't be in that position to begin with. For the deterrence to work, I'd have ceded that place to someone who was as sure to push the button as anyone could possibly determine.

Respectfully,
Myriad

[Darth Rotor]

Purely hypothetical:

Imagine you are living during the Cold War in America and you have the sole authority to launch every nuclear weapon in the US arsenal. One day, you are informed that the USSR has fired hundreds upon hundreds of ICBMs at the USA. There is no computer error, the incoming missles are definitely real. Estimates show the damage will be total. After the bombs, the United States will be nothing but a wasteland. You have minutes to act. Do you fire back in kind?

The old policy of MAD never really made any sense to me. At this point, why retaliate? Just to get revenge? Just to ensure both sides lose? I don't see the destruction of two nations as a better outcome than the destruction of one.
Yes, I shoot back while I have time to act.

That was the whole point, which is why USSR didn't do that. Deterrence isn't worth much if you won't act.

Bedford Incident: If he fires one, I'll fire one.
DR

[KingMerv00]

Maybe I'm being misunderstood.

I don't really have an ethical or logical problem with using MAD as a deterrent. What I don't get is pushing the button if deterrence has failed and the missles are already underway. The survival of an evil nation is better than the survival of no nations.

The only good argument I've heard is defence of Europe argument.

[Mark6]

Maybe I'm being misunderstood.

I don't really have an ethical or logical problem with using MAD as a deterrent. What I don't get is pushing the button if deterrence has failed and the missles are already underway. The survival of an evil nation is better than the survival of no nations.

The only good argument I've heard is defence of Europe argument.
See Myriad's post above. In the event of full-scale nuclear war, quite a few millions of people would have survived, in both US and USSR.

[AmateurScientist]

Was this actually a stated policy? Do you have a reference?

No, not handy. That is my recollection from my high school civics class in 1977-78. An international relations course I took in college in the early 80s did nothing to undermine that understanding. Nevertheless, it is probably overly simplistic.

For instance, it does not take into account counterforce strategies and their functional equivalence with a first-strike capability. I did find a lengthy book at lunchtime I can revisit that makes the case (circa 1980) that the US had a first strike option as a workable strategy and capability beginning in the early 1950s and continuing up until the time the book was written. It places heavy emphasis on the dynamics of the policy and strategy, especially how it changed considerably to include clear plans for a limited nuclear strike in response to conventional attacks under President Nixon and James Schlesinger. Those sorts of plans would seem contrary to the "no first-strike" policy, but I did qualify my assertion that we would not engage in a strategic strike, which implies full-scale rather than limited use. The book even contains excerpts from the testimony before a Congressional committee by a General Jones of the USAF denying that MAD was part of US nuclear strategy or policy. I'm not sure what to make of that.

Nevertheless, I'm not vested enough in the assertion to defend it until the cows come home. It's just my recollection off the top of my head from more than 30 years ago, and not thoroughly researched. If you have knowledge or a reasonable belief that I am mistaken on that count, please feel free to share your thoughts or information.

AS

[AmateurScientist]

Maybe I'm being misunderstood.

I don't really have an ethical or logical problem with using MAD as a deterrent. What I don't get is pushing the button if deterrence has failed and the missles are already underway. The survival of an evil nation is better than the survival of no nations.

The only good argument I've heard is defence of Europe argument.

Myriad is right about survivability.

Also, your question seems to fail to take into account that your response must be pre-ordained, in effect, in order for MAD to work. Your credibility that you can and will retaliate to such an extent that the enemy will be devasted is essential. You must tie yourself to the mast, thus removing any consideration of not retaliating from the equation.

If you even ponder not retaliating, then you are not engaged in deterrence using MAD. You are playing some other game and being foolish. MAD fails to deter your opponent if you're not serious about it. Questioning your resolve results in your bolstering your opponent's willingness to strike against you first, thus increasing the likelihood that your will suffer nuclear attack. It backfires.

There is no sense in posing the hypothetical the way you do, such that the question only arises after a first strike. If there has been a first strike and you have committed in advance to a full scale retaliation, then you will make good on your commitment because it is pre-ordained. You already have set everything in place to occur without anyone having to deliberate the ethics of it, or even having the opportunity to do so.

AS

[Jungle Jim]

King: why do you assume no nations would survive? If it was an exchange between the USSR and the US, Africa, South America, Europe and Asia would all survive (not counting the potential for a "nuclear winter" which has not been addressed and somewhat speculative). In any case, the human race would survive. Why give a free pass to nation that starts the conflagration?

[Skeptic]

I am very glad utilitarian philosophers were of no influence on the political and foreign policy makers in the US with regard to US policy on the use of strategic nuclear weapons during the Cold War. If they had been, the Soviets would surely have discovered this flaw in our plan, and they would have figured out that we did not actually intend to fulfill, or could not actually carry out, our promise of a full-scale retaliation. This would have been the fatal chink in our armor against a Soviet first-strike.

It depends WHAT KIND of utilitarianism you are talking about. Naive "act utilitarianism" -- make every act the one that makes the most happy -- does not work in this case, since, once the USSR attacks, the best choice is to do nothing.

But act utilitarianism has many other problems. To give one hypothetical example, it makes it ethical to kidnap and kill one healthy person if his organs can be used to save two people.

Usually, when we speak about utilitarianism, we mean 'rule utilitarianism' -- e.g., follow the general rules that give us the best outcome on the whole, such as "thou shall not kill innocents", even if in specific cases they might well lead to a path with more suffering (two dead instead of one, in this case).

In this case, rule utilitarianism -- following a rule such as "do not submit to nuclear blackmail" or "deter the destruction of your country" -- would say to do what the USA did in fact do ("short-circuit" the decision process by making retaliation automatic).