Twins and subatomic particles

[subvicepresident]

Thought experiment....
Imagine we have two twins or clones. They are genetically identical. Both have lived exactly the same lives up to a point A in time. By 'exactly the same' i mean to say that all external stimuli have been equal for both twins. I know this is not really possible but lets imagine that situation.

Then, in point A in time we observe both twins. What do we see?
1) Their reactions and thoughts will be identical.
2) Their reactions and thoughts will diverge.

Is there an inherent random factor that determines our thoughts and actions? Does this uncertainty arise from the statistical nature of behavior of subatomic particles. To put it another way: Is the quantum world responsible for free will?

Please discuss. Tnx.

[Molinaro]

Please provide an exact definition of free will.

Thanks.

[athon]

The problem with some thought experiments is that assumptions are made that make any conclusion pointless.

The question of twins and environments is superfluous to the question, which is the run of the mill 'determinism' question.

We have no reason to believe that anything on the macro scale is truly non-deterministic. That is, although certain features of quantum mechanics are random, they amount to deterministic outcomes. Now, it might seem counterintuitive to our sense of absolute free decision making, however ultimately how would any random features of the universe translate into free will?

In the end, free will might just be an illusion. But given it's one that cannot be observed external to the situation, it really doesn't matter. Like most things in science, so long as it looks and behaves as per the description, the rest is is just navel gazing.

Athon

[shuttlt]

I agree with Molinaro. Please define free will. I don't see how randomness and (my personal definition of) free will are related, unless you're implying the randomness is somehow under your control.

[Gord_in_Toronto]

The problem with some thought experiments is that assumptions are made that make any conclusion pointless.

The question of twins and environments is superfluous to the question, which is the run of the mill 'determinism' question.

We have no reason to believe that anything on the macro scale is truly non-deterministic. That is, although certain features of quantum mechanics are random, they amount to deterministic outcomes. Now, it might seem counterintuitive to our sense of absolute free decision making, however ultimately how would any random features of the universe translate into free will?

In the end, free will might just be an illusion. But given it's one that cannot be observed external to the situation, it really doesn't matter. Like most things in science, so long as it looks and behaves as per the description, the rest is is just navel gazing.

Athon

Re the part I bolded.

A comic ray, generated by a random quantum event, can affect the DNA causing a mutation.

[sol invictus]

Then, in point A in time we observe both twins. What do we see?
1) Their reactions and thoughts will be identical.
2) Their reactions and thoughts will diverge.

Certainly 2), even if they were identical down to the level of their wavefunction (i.e. perfectly identical). By how much is open to debate - Athon seems to think not by much, I would say by a lot after some time - but they certainly will diverge.

I'm not sure that has much to do with "free will", though - the same thing is true for an electron.

[shuttlt]

Certainly 2), even if they were identical down to the level of their wavefunction (i.e. perfectly identical). By how much is open to debate - Athon seems to think not by much, I would say by a lot after some time - but they certainly will diverge.

I'm not sure that has much to do with "free will", though - the same thing is true for an electron.
If Panpsychism is true, maybe electrons do have free will.

[subvicepresident]

Please provide an exact definition of free will.

Thanks.

Let's ignore the free will issue since i wouldn't like to get cought up in philosophical arguments.


...
We have no reason to believe that anything on the macro scale is truly non-deterministic. That is, although certain features of quantum mechanics are random, they amount to deterministic outcomes.
...


Do we really have no reason to believe so? It seems to me that sol and Gord_in_Toronto think otherwise.


A cosmic ray, generated by a random quantum event, can affect the DNA causing a mutation.
...



Certainly 2), even if they were identical down to the level of their wavefunction (i.e. perfectly identical). By how much is open to debate - Athon seems to think not by much, I would say by a lot after some time - but they certainly will diverge.


It doesn't seem to me that it is a matter of the measure in which the quantum world affects the macro world but rather it is a simple two-way option - quantum world either affects the macro world and we can measure this effect or it doesn't. Which is it? Or am I missing something?

Isn't it reasonable to assume that if the quantum randomness has any measurable effect on the macro world that therefore the macro world is not deterministic?

[Ziggurat]

Please provide an exact definition of free will.

Thanks.

If a system can respond to its environment non-deterministically, it has free will.

I'm actually not satisfied with the definition I just gave, but if one adopts it, then concluding that quantum mechanics and free will are intimately linked is not absurd. Of course, it's not clear that it means much either since individual electrons appear to have free will under this definition.

[Monketey Ghost]

Re the part I bolded.

A comic ray, generated by a random quantum event, can affect the DNA causing a mutation.

Ray Romano?

[athon]

Do we really have no reason to believe so? It seems to me that sol and Gord_in_Toronto think otherwise.

They're free to. I might be wrong. I personally am not convinced that the randomness of quantum mechanics is something creates randomness on a macro scale, however to be honest a) it's not a concept I'm emotionally married to and b) not a concept I consider myself an expert in (beyond trying to being fundamentally informed in the area), so it wouldn't take much to convince me otherwise.

That said, you ignored the other part of my post (the important part for this conversation) - how does randomness translate into free will?

Athon

[Perpetual Student]

They're free to. I might be wrong. I personally am not convinced that the randomness of quantum mechanics is something creates randomness on a macro scale, however to be honest a) it's not a concept I'm emotionally married to and b) not a concept I consider myself an expert in (beyond trying to being fundamentally informed in the area), so it wouldn't take much to convince me otherwise.

That said, you ignored the other part of my post (the important part for this conversation) - how does randomness translate into free will?

Athon

A random particle decay could cause DNA damage to a single human cell leading to a cancer ending ones life 20 years earlier than otherwise. Is that not conceivable?
However, I agree that random macro results do not necessarily lead one to free will. Something more is needed, but I have no idea what that might be.

[I Ratant]

My siblings grew up with me in the same environment, and yet we are demonstrably different people in just about everything.
Different perceptions and reactions in many situations.
I'd be surprised if it were possible to have a long-term situation with two people that had them both respond identically to every stimulus.

[roger]

Do we really have no reason to believe so? It seems to me that sol and Gord_in_Toronto think otherwise.I think they are interpreting the question in different ways due to how it was worded. I'm not sure what you mean by the question.

Are you asking:

1) at the instant you see them, will they be identical or different already at that instant

2) at the point you see them you now allow them to have different experiences, will they diverge or not.

I assume you meant 1, but the wording was "will diverge", implying a future event, implying version 2.

[athon]

A random particle decay could cause DNA damage to a single human cell leading to a cancer ending ones life 20 years earlier than otherwise. Is that not conceivable?

Yup. Totally.

I apologise for not engaging further in this line of 'true randomness vs. determinism' - it's not that I'm stubbornly holding onto any belief one way or another, but rather that I don't wish to derail this thread further with what I see as a side-note. Happy to learn more in another thread, but here, I don't see what the concept of 'randomness' adds to the notion of free will.

Athon

[KingMerv00]

If Panpsychism is true, maybe electrons do have free will.

If panpsychism is true I will use that free will to eat my hat.

[shuttlt]

If panpsychism is true I will use that free will to eat my hat.
The first thing you'd do upon finding out that you hat was conscious would be to eat it?

[Beth]

I agree with Molinaro. Please define free will. I don't see how randomness and (my personal definition of) free will are related, unless you're implying the randomness is somehow under your control.

Actually, I think the concept of free will does require that the randomness of the particular decisions a person makes iis, to some extent, under their control. I also think this is likely to be true. I think of free will as 'loading the dice' so to speak. Randomness still applies, but the distribution of the probabilities of various outcomes to a decision can be set by the individual based on their preferences.

[shuttlt]

Actually, I think the concept of free will does require that the randomness of the particular decisions a person makes iis, to some extent, under their control. I also think this is likely to be true. I think of free will as 'loading the dice' so to speak. Randomness still applies, but the distribution of the probabilities of various outcomes to a decision can be set by the individual based on their preferences.
In principle, if not in practice, this sounds like a testable claim. You're predicting that the quantum behavior of parts of the brain will not follow the probability distribution that theory would dictate?

The first objection that comes to mind is, if our will can do this, why couldn't it influence a deterministic system? The effect would be detectable in either case.

I'm then struck by the difficulty of our consciousness knowing that if it influences such and such quantum event then that will, through a sea of other random events, trigger a neuron to fire, which will in turn cause a willed decision to be made. If our consciousness is able to do this, it's damn clever. It would be much easier for our consciousnesses to fake it after the fact and pretend whatever we deterministically (with some background unwilled randomness) end up doing is the result of free will.

[Beth]

In principle, if not in practice, this sounds like a testable claim. You're predicting that the quantum behavior of parts of the brain will not follow the probability distribution that theory would dictate? Er, no, at least I don't think so. At any rate, given that what, if any, quantum behavior parts of the brain might have is unknown, we can't actually test this. Possible someday, but I don't think we can at this point.

The first objection that comes to mind is, if our will can do this, why couldn't it influence a deterministic system? The effect would be detectable in either case. I think all systems have randomness inherent to them. It's just that we choose to call deterministic those systems that have probabilities greater than, oh say, .99999999999999.

I'm then struck by the difficulty of our consciousness knowing that if it influences such and such quantum event then that will, through a sea of other random events, trigger a neuron to fire, which will in turn cause a willed decision to be made. If our consciousness is able to do this, it's damn clever. It would be much easier for our consciousnesses to fake it after the fact and pretend whatever we deterministically (with some background unwilled randomness) end up doing is the result of free will. Oh, I don't think it works like that. It's more like, I decide to type these words. So I do. But I don't decide to flip each and every bit that needs flipping inside the computer/network system that that decision requires to be implemented. I am completely and blissfully unaware of the details of that process. I don't need to be aware of the quantum influences of (on?) my nervous system anymore than the computer needs to be aware of the quantum influences on it's network when in order to process my instructions. But I don't think the exact words that appear now on your computer screen were deterministically set before I actually thought about what I wanted to say and chose them.

However, just because I decide to do something doesn't automatically imply that the action will occur. There are other outside events that influence success. In the above example, the power might go out just as I hit the submit button and my words never actually make it to the forum. But the decision itself isn't deterministic as near as I can tell. It's probabilistic. Further, I think the choices we make at any point in time will alter the probability distribution of later choices. That's what I see as free will.

[Singularitarian]

Thought experiment....
Imagine we have two twins or clones. They are genetically identical. Both have lived exactly the same lives up to a point A in time. By 'exactly the same' i mean to say that all external stimuli have been equal for both twins. I know this is not really possible but lets imagine that situation.

Then, in point A in time we observe both twins. What do we see?
1) Their reactions and thoughts will be identical.
2) Their reactions and thoughts will diverge.

Is there an inherent random factor that determines our thoughts and actions? Does this uncertainty arise from the statistical nature of behavior of subatomic particles. To put it another way: Is the quantum world responsible for free will?

Please discuss. Tnx.

If you read doctor Wolfs Spirtual Universe, he seems to believe that particle-uncertainty has something to do with consciousness.

[CurtC]

Let's ignore the free will issue since i wouldn't like to get cought up in philosophical arguments.

But your own OP was a scenario contrived to highlight a question about free will! How can we ignore the free will issue?

My take on it:
Does this uncertainty arise from the statistical nature of behavior of subatomic particles.Yes.

To put it another way: Is the quantum world responsible for free will?I don't see how you can use the term "free will" to refer to quantum fluctuations. Like others have said, this would directly mean that electrons have free will.

[Ashles]

Thought experiment....
Imagine we have two twins or clones. They are genetically identical. Both have lived exactly the same lives up to a point A in time. By 'exactly the same' i mean to say that all external stimuli have been equal for both twins. I know this is not really possible but lets imagine that situation.

Then, in point A in time we observe both twins. What do we see?
1) Their reactions and thoughts will be identical.
2) Their reactions and thoughts will diverge.


By the very nature that they have to occupy physically different space then their perceptions and stimulus will be different from whatever moment we start the 'test' so their stimulus will be different even if it is only slightly.
It cannot logically be the same even if we magic both into existence, fully grown and identical in every conceivable way - from the very first instant they both exist they must diverge as their stimulus must be different. They cannot look out of the same eyes.

[shuttlt]

I think all systems have randomness inherent to them. It's just that we choose to call deterministic those systems that have probabilities greater than, oh say, .99999999999999.

Where does this randomness come from, or are you just observing that everything is to some vanishingly small degree subject to quantum randomness?


Oh, I don't think it works like that. It's more like, I decide to type these words. So I do. But I don't decide to flip each and every bit that needs flipping inside the computer/network system that that decision requires to be implemented.

And yet, what is your decision but the brain equivalent of flipping those bits? What caused the bits to flip? Where is free will?


I am completely and blissfully unaware of the details of that process. I don't need to be aware of the quantum influences of (on?) my nervous system anymore than the computer needs to be aware of the quantum influences on it's network when in order to process my instructions.

Oh, I realize you aren't claiming any of this is under your specific conscious control, but look.... say we are one planck time unit prior to you making a decision. Your brain is in a given state, various inputs are coming in, or in the act of being processed. Is your decision dictated by this previous brain state with a bit of quantum randomness thrown in? You say you have free will, to me that means that somehow the decision you want to make has to be imposed on your brain which means that just the right quantum events in just the right neurons have to go against chance. I don't see how this could work. If you're just saying that there is some random element in your decision, but you have no control of it, then fine, but I don't see how that's free will.


But I don't think the exact words that appear now on your computer screen were deterministically set before I actually thought about what I wanted to say and chose them.

Perhaps there is enough randomness for what you say to be true. It seems to me though that randomness must be to some degree swamped by determinism in the brain, or it would just be random noise.


However, just because I decide to do something doesn't automatically imply that the action will occur. There are other outside events that influence success. In the above example, the power might go out just as I hit the submit button and my words never actually make it to the forum. But the decision itself isn't deterministic as near as I can tell. It's probabilistic. Further, I think the choices we make at any point in time will alter the probability distribution of later choices. That's what I see as free will.
This isn't what I intended to imply.

[Beth]

Where does this randomness come from, or are you just observing that everything is to some vanishingly small degree subject to quantum randomness?
The latter.

And yet, what is your decision but the brain equivalent of flipping those bits? What caused the bits to flip? Where is free will? That is what I consider to be free will. What did you expect it to be if it does not manifest as the brain equivalent of flipping bits.

Oh, I realize you aren't claiming any of this is under your specific conscious control, but look.... say we are one planck time unit prior to you making a decision. Your brain is in a given state, various inputs are coming in, or in the act of being processed. Is your decision dictated by this previous brain state with a bit of quantum randomness thrown in? You say you have free will, to me that means that somehow the decision you want to make has to be imposed on your brain which means that just the right quantum events in just the right neurons have to go against chance. I don't see how this could work. If you're just saying that there is some random element in your decision, but you have no control of it, then fine, but I don't see how that's free will. I see it as both random (to some extent) and controlled (to some extent).

Perhaps there is enough randomness for what you say to be true. It seems to me though that randomness must be to some degree swamped by determinism in the brain, or it would just be random noise. What does that mean - determinism in the brain? How is that different from free will? We all develop preferences based both in our genetics and our past. I don't think they are completely deterministic (see above), but that's basically what we are - our genetics and our past experiences. Free will, IMO, is making choices based on those preferences and the options we perceive.

This isn't what I intended to imply. I'm not sure what you intended to imply then. Perhaps you could elucidate.

[shuttlt]

OK. Take the quantum randomness out of it for a sec, so that we are completely deterministic. Our choices are dictated by our past. We feel like we have free will because our wish to do something arrises out of those past states, but we could never actually have chosen differently.

In reality a tiny amount of randomness is added to this model so that over time thiings become unpredictable. I don't see though how there is any more free will.

[Beth]

OK. Take the quantum randomness out of it for a sec, so that we are completely deterministic. Our choices are dictated by our past. We feel like we have free will because our wish to do something arrises out of those past states, but we could never actually have chosen differently.

In reality a tiny amount of randomness is added to this model so that over time thiings become unpredictable. I don't see though how there is any more free will.

I guess I don't know what you mean by free will then.

[Ziggurat]

Our choices are dictated by our past. We feel like we have free will because our wish to do something arrises out of those past states, but we could never actually have chosen differently.

In reality a tiny amount of randomness is added to this model so that over time thiings become unpredictable. I don't see though how there is any more free will.

Under the definition of free will I gave earlier, a tiny amount of randomness makes all the difference in the world. You can't answer the question of what difference it will make unless you have a definition. As I said before, I'm not actually satisfied with the definition I gave, but it looks to me like the only precise definition that's been given so far in this thread.

[subvicepresident]

If a system can respond to its environment non-deterministically, it has free will.
...


I think your definition of free will is good. Why are you not satisfied with it?

Under the definition of free will I gave earlier, a tiny amount of randomness makes all the difference in the world. You can't answer the question of what difference it will make unless you have a definition. As I said before, I'm not actually satisfied with the definition I gave, but it looks to me like the only precise definition that's been given so far in this thread.

And this is the point of the twins mental experiment. If two twins are exactly the same down to wave-functions and live in parallel but equivalent realities up to a point in time and then their action or thoughts suddenly diverge - then that is what i would call free will. It is just an example of your definition.

So, I'd like to know why you think it's inadequate?

ps. tnx everybody for informative and to the point posts

[Molinaro]

I would think that Ziggurat does not think that definition is adequate, because as he said earlier, by that definition we would have to say that an electron has free will.

[Singularitarian]

I would think that Ziggurat does not think that definition is adequate, because as he said earlier, by that definition we would have to say that an electron has free will.


He actually assumes too much. He say's, and i qoute:

''If a system can respond to its environment non-deterministically, it has free will.''

This is actually a relative view. Free-will can easily arise out of the undetermined from our mortal minds, whilst the universe independantly can retain predeterminism.

[subvicepresident]

I would think that Ziggurat does not think that definition is adequate, because as he said earlier, by that definition we would have to say that an electron has free will.

So be it then. Or we could put a restriction on the definition and say that it applies only to sentient beings.

[Ziggurat]

I think your definition of free will is good. Why are you not satisfied with it?

Because I don't like the consequences of it. In particular, it feels wrong to assign the same amount of free will to a mindless object as I assign to myself. I recognize that my dissatisfaction has little bearing on the utility of that definition, nor is there any guarantee that a consistent and useful definition exists which will satisfy me. Reality itself is under no obligation to cater to my whims, though I resent it daily for not doing so. But nonetheless, my dissatisfaction with the definition exists. It would be easier if it weren't a useful definition, because then I could discard it completely and feel good about doing so.

So, I'd like to know why you think it's inadequate?

It's not inadequate, it's unsatisfactory. The former implies some objective criteria by which it fails (for example, inconsistency or ambiguity), but it is only subjective criteria on which I can find fault.

[Yoink]

I can see how "responding non-deterministically" gets you some kind of "freedom"--I don't see how it gets you any kind of "will."

An electron can act "nondeterministically"--how is that related to the "will" of the electron?

Similarly, even if the human brain is subject to certain kinds of quantum indeterminacy, what does that have to do with "willing"? Are we suggesting that there is some kind of superposition of possible states and then the mind "selects" which will prevail? But what is the "selection" process? How did it break free of either determinacy or quantum flux?

This seems to lead to infinite regression.

[Singularitarian]

I can see how "responding non-deterministically" gets you some kind of "freedom"--I don't see how it gets you any kind of "will."

An electron can act "nondeterministically"--how is that related to the "will" of the electron?

Similarly, even if the human brain is subject to certain kinds of quantum indeterminacy, what does that have to do with "willing"? Are we suggesting that there is some kind of superposition of possible states and then the mind "selects" which will prevail? But why is the "selection" process? How did it break free of either determinacy or quantum flux?

This seems to lead to infinite regression.

Come now, if there is anything deterministic in the universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic. It would radically mean that we have no information relevent to understand such a situation.

[Yoink]

Come now, if there is anything deterministic in the universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic. It would radically mean that we have no information relevent to understand such a situation.

I expect you mistyped this, because it doesn't seem to make sense as it is.

"If there is anything deterministic in the Universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic": no, it wouldn't. The existence of Wooden things in the universe doesn't imply that the will is made of wood.

"It would radically mean..."--I don't know what "It" refers to here.

[Ziggurat]

I expect you mistyped this, because it doesn't seem to make sense as it is.

I'm afraid that's not an indicator of a typo for him.

[Singularitarian]

I expect you mistyped this, because it doesn't seem to make sense as it is.

"If there is anything deterministic in the Universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic": no, it wouldn't. The existence of Wooden things in the universe doesn't imply that the will is made of wood.

"It would radically mean..."--I don't know what "It" refers to here.

No, is it intended to mean that free will itself does not indicate a non-deterministic world. Ziggurat should know that.

[Ziggurat]

No, is it intended to mean that free will itself does not indicate a non-deterministic world. Ziggurat should know that.

Depends on how you define free will. I have given a definition. It is not the only possible definition. But under that definition, well, you're obviously wrong.

[Singularitarian]

Depends on how you define free will. I have given a definition. It is not the only possible definition. But under that definition, well, you're obviously wrong.

Would you confabulate more on this, so that i can adjust to this ''self-interpretation'' of free-will?

[Ziggurat]

Would you confabulate more on this, so that i can adjust to this ''self-interpretation'' of free-will?

"Free will" does not have a universally agreed upon meaning. The definitions commonly given are vague, and of little use in the current context. I gave a definition which is precise, and can be used to answer questions in the current context. It is not the only possible definition, and I think everyone understands that. If you want to use a different definition than the one I gave, that will not make any of my conclusions wrong, it will merely mean that those conclusions may not apply under your other definition. But you have not given an alternative definition, so we have no way of evaluating whether or not that's true.

[Singularitarian]

"Free will" does not have a universally agreed upon meaning. The definitions commonly given are vague, and of little use in the current context. I gave a definition which is precise, and can be used to answer questions in the current context. It is not the only possible definition, and I think everyone understands that. If you want to use a different definition than the one I gave, that will not make any of my conclusions wrong, it will merely mean that those conclusions may not apply under your other definition. But you have not given an alternative definition, so we have no way of evaluating whether or not that's true.

The alternative solution i would provide would be a contingeant basis on the human perception. I conclude its only logical to assume that the sense of having a free will is essentially subliminal. Because of this painfully-obvious fact, it seems that no theory as yet can assertain whether free-will is completely subliminal, and not dependant on the nature or configuration of the universe (such as a deterministic plan).

Free will so far, can only be applied therefore to a system like ourselves who are incapable of completely reconciling whether our actions are by choice and undetermined factors, or whether one where such a universe can obide by the condition of predeterminism. Interestingly, the Bohmian Interpretation has the wave function defined from the very first instant of the universe. This defined state in the wave function would mean that everything in the universe actually followed a predetermined path through space and time, through instantaneous actions.

If we take the Bohmian Interpretation seriously, then free will would need to remain an illusion - so theoretically, non-predeterminism is not a prerequisite of the actual experience of it.

[shuttlt]

I don't see how you can use the term "free will" to refer to quantum fluctuations. Like others have said, this would directly mean that electrons have free will.
Unless Beth is right and free will is something like loading the quantum dice. Although, I still don't see how that could work.

[athon]

Unless Beth is right and free will is something like loading the quantum dice. Although, I still don't see how that could work.

I don't either.

In fact, the very notion of randomness, to me, seems to go against free will. The concept of choice seems to insinuate that consciousness can influence events in a particular direction. It would suggest that free will determines the outcome of completely random events, rather than having a random factor playing any role within it itself.

Athon

[Beth]

I don't either.

In fact, the very notion of randomness, to me, seems to go against free will. The concept of choice seems to insinuate that consciousness can influence events in a particular direction. It would suggest that free will determines the outcome of completely random events, rather than having a random factor playing any role within it itself.

Athon


Interestingly enough, I don't understand why the notion of randomness goes against free will. Consider this, you respond to this thread. You select this post. There are a variety of ways you could respond. You select one. There is a random component within the selection. There is a genetic/deterministic component to your choices. The exact response is not fixed until you press the submit button. Why does having a random aspect of the choice prevent that response from being the result of your 'free will'?

eta: I guess, for me, the fact that there a random aspect to it is what allows it be 'free will'. If your response is determined, that isn't free will. Since it isn't determined, why doesn't that make it free will?

[QED]

eta: I guess, for me, the fact that there a random aspect to it is what allows it be 'free will'. If your response is determined, that isn't free will. Since it isn't determined, why doesn't that make it free will?

You seem to equate "non-deterministic" with "free" and in a way it is free (namely, of determinism), but by doing so aren't you throwing the "will" over board? If you aren't the agent in control of decision making, what does it mean to be your "will" in the first place?

[Beth]

You seem to equate "non-deterministic" with "free" and in a way it is free (namely, of determinism), but by doing so aren't you throwing the "will" over board? If you aren't the agent in control of decision making, what does it mean to be your "will" in the first place?

No, I don't think so. You make choices. That there is a random aspect to those choices doesn't take 'will' away IMO. You and I can make conscious unpredictable choices about our future actions. How is that not 'free will'?

ETA: I guess that for me, the key is making conscious decisions. Of course, consciousness is even harder to define than free will, so it doesn't really resolve the issue.

[Yoink]

No, I don't think so. You make choices. That there is a random aspect to those choices doesn't take 'will' away IMO. You and I can make conscious unpredictable choices about our future actions. How is that not 'free will'?

ETA: I guess that for me, the key is making conscious decisions. Of course, consciousness is even harder to define than free will, so it doesn't really resolve the issue.

The word you are looking for is "arbitrary" not "random." If our decisions are "random" then they are not "chosen."

But it's hard to see what quantum indeterminacy could have to do with a power of arbitrary decision.

[Molinaro]

The alternative solution i would provide would be a contingeant basis on the human perception.

Is there a typo or 2 in the bolded part you want to fix? Otherwise, I can't get any meaning out of those words in that order.

I conclude its only logical to assume that the sense of having a free will is essentially subliminal.

I conclude that it is highly illogical to say that people don't notice the sense of having free will. Why would it be talked about so much if people didn't notice it or think they had it?

Because of this painfully-obvious fact, it seems that no theory as yet can assertain whether free-will is completely subliminal, and not dependant on the nature or configuration of the universe (such as a deterministic plan).

Why can't something subliminal, which free will is most certainly not, be deterministic? Either that or you are using some personal definition of the word subliminal.

Free will so far, can only be applied therefore to a system like ourselves who are incapable of completely reconciling whether our actions are by choice and undetermined factors, or whether one where such a universe can obide by the condition of predeterminism.

Your bolded alternative after the word or, does not seem to be an or, with respect to what came before. You begin by stating what free will can be applied to, namely us. You then say 'or', but what comes next does not look like something to which free will can apply. So why or?

Interestingly, the Bohmian Interpretation has the wave function defined from the very first instant of the universe This defined state in the wave function would mean that everything in the universe actually followed a predetermined path through space and time, through instantaneous actions.

Meaning there is no free will? But why take the Bohmian view when it's a hidden variable theory, all of which are contradicted by Bell's Theorem?


If we take the Bohmian Interpretation seriously, then free will would need to remain an illusion - so theoretically, non-predeterminism is not a prerequisite of the actual experience of it.

That conclusion is only correct, if the assumption, that the Bohmian view is correct holds. What reason is there to think that's the case?

[Singularitarian]

Is there a typo or 2 in the bolded part you want to fix? Otherwise, I can't get any meaning out of those words in that order.



I conclude that it is highly illogical to say that people don't notice the sense of having free will. Why would it be talked about so much if people didn't notice it or think they had it? (1)



Why can't something subliminal, which free will is most certainly not, be deterministic? Either that or you are using some personal definition of the word subliminal. (2)



Your bolded alternative after the word or, does not seem to be an or, with respect to what came before. You begin by stating what free will can be applied to, namely us. You then say 'or', but what comes next does not look like something to which free will can apply. So why or? (3)



Meaning there is no free will? But why take the Bohmian view when it's a hidden variable theory, all of which are contradicted by Bell's Theorem? (4)




That conclusion is only correct, if the assumption, that the Bohmian view is correct holds. What reason is there to think that's the case? (5)

(1) - Not the definition i was shooting for. By subiminal, i mean the experience we have of free-will is purely the product of the mind.

(2) - In this case, i can agree have used it in a different context.

(3) - Simple. Free-will, or the experience of it does not necesserily imply a non-deterministic universe. I would like evidence to show why it should.

(4) - The Bohmian interpretation is not obsolete.

(5) - How about that its a theory? It's not osbolete, and it still holds as a possible mathematical description of the universe at large, that's why.