The fine tuning argument [Archive] - Page 2

Yoink

2nd September 2009, 02:46 PM

Only if you were willing to accept a rather large possibility of that conclusion being in error. Generally, outcomes with probability greater than 0.05 are considered to be due to random chance. Since 1/6 > 0.05, I would keep random chance as the preferred explanation in that scenario.
Then all you need to do is keep rolling the die until we're lower than .05 probability and suddenly God pops into existence?

That's not how I would interpret your dataset. :D

But why not? What's the difference? Why is a one-in-a-million outcome on the wheel of fortune different from a one-in-a-million outcome in the wheel-o-universes?

No. In your original example, you postulated a result with a 0.000001 probability. In this example, you have postulated a result with 1.0 probability.

No, I'm doing exactly what you're doing. You're coming along after the universe is already created in this form and saying "wow, what were the odds of the universe being like this!" I'm coming along after I've spun the wheel of fortune" and finding that it ended up on 10,0045 (say) and saying "wow, what were the odds of the wheel ending up on this number.

Where's the difference?

You've labeled every possible outcome as "Winner" for your hypothesis.

No, I labelled the outcome that it happened to end up on as "winner." Which is exactly what you're doing with our universe.

If you want to make your wheel example analogous, pick one of the million outcomes and label it "Winner". Label the other 999,999 outcomes "Loser". If you spin the wheel once and come up a winner, I would reject the claim that it was due to random chance and look for other possible causes.

Oh, so you were around before this universe was created? You postulated before the universe's creation that it would lead to the evolution of sentient life? No, of course you didn't.

In your original example you also postulated that the only two possible causes were random chance and a fine-tuner. I can think of other explanations for why such a wheel might come up "Winner" that don't have anything to do with divine intervention.

Yeah, but that's trivial. It's easy for the sake of analogy to say that ex hypothesi the wheel is a fair wheel and that its results are genuinely random. If it's not a fair wheel then that's the same thing as saying that the universe's parameters are not arbitrarily defined--in which case out goes both chance and "fine tuning" for the universe.

Robin

2nd September 2009, 03:11 PM

An alternate reality is not the same thing as a different physical reality.
I never for a moment suggested otherwise.

I was replying to the claim that the doctrinal Hell was defined as the centre of the Earth and asking for cites to this.

Robin

2nd September 2009, 03:20 PM

Ian Hacking rather famously argued that a multiverse would make no difference to the argument (he called it the "inverse gambler's fallacy"). I think that on this point he's cuckoo for coconuts, but I just want to point out that the argument won't go away even if a multiverse is confirmed.
I have pointed out a couple of times that the Discovery Institute are already rehearsing arguments about how a multiverse would be fine tuned for life.

westprog

2nd September 2009, 03:24 PM

I wonder if those who think that there's something to this "fine tuning" argument would answer a question for me: let us assume that we discover that our universe's parameters are in one possible configuration out of exactly one million equally possible configurations (I know this is unlikely, but for the sake of clarity, let's just assume it).

Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.

Now, would such discoveries, in your view, strongly support the "fine tuning" hypothesis? And (and this is the really important part, for me, of my question): to what extent? In other words: if the odds against a universe in which anything like human life could emerge are 999,999-to-1, does that make the odds of there being a "Fine Tuner" also 999,000-to-1? How, exactly, do we derive the "probability" of a "tuner" from the "improbability" of the event?

If each of the other 999,999 universes are all equally different and "interesting" then we can conclude that this universe is just as likely.

For example - take U2, U3 and U4, where U1 is this universe. The difference between them is that g2 = 100 * g1, g3 = 1000 * g1, and g4 = 100,000 * g1 (the g's being the gravitational constant in each case). Do U2/3/4 look as different from each other as they do from U1?

Robin

2nd September 2009, 03:25 PM

Like hell he isn't! Just because he hasn't explicitly said it yet doesn't mean that isn't his intent -- especially given the fact that he has eventually admitted it in every other thread.

Malerin could be the poster boy for the approach outlined in the Discovery Institute's "wedge" document.
Well perhaps Malerin could clarify.

According to his views the Big Bang never happened so why does he care whether or not the universe is fine tuned for life?

westprog

2nd September 2009, 03:27 PM

O.K., So, in the absence of any other explanations, an outcome the odds of which are 1-in-1,000,000 offer .999999 probability of being deliberately 'guided' by some controlling force.

O.K.

So, say I roll a single die. I get a 4. The odds of my getting a 4 were 1-in-6. So from a single die-roll we can infer odds of 5/6 that there is a mystical controlling intelligence that "selected" that rather unlikely outcome. Correct?

If I roll it again and get a 6, the odds against that sequence are 35/36! The odds of a mystical controlling intelligence selecting that outcome are now staggeringly high! One more roll of the die--let alone two!--and God has been pretty definitively proven!

But hey--I don't even need die. Let me create a "wheel of fortune" type wheel with very long circumference. Let me then place one million divisions around the circumference and then give the wheel a spin. No matter what the outcome, the odds of getting that particular outcome are one-in-a-million. That means that simply by spinning this wheel once, no matter what result I get, and no matter what random fluctuations influence the outcome, I will have proven that the result was "selected" by a "fine tuner"--and I will have done so to a confidence level of .999999--or, in other words, virtual certainty.

I think this little thought experiment shows the problem with the "Fine tuner" hypothesis pretty clearly, don't you?

Say you paint just one division of your wheel red, spin it and it comes up. Would you say "Just as likely as any other" or have a look at the mechanism to see why it happened?

Yoink

2nd September 2009, 03:33 PM

Say you paint just one division of your wheel red, spin it and it comes up. Would you say "Just as likely as any other" or have a look at the mechanism to see why it happened?

And, again, that's not analogous to the case of the universe in the FTA-theory, is it? You found this universe the way it was, then "painted it red" and then asked "gee, what were the odds of it ending up on this red-painted one"?

Again, unless you were around before the creation of the universe and called the shot, all this discussion of "probability" is meaningless.

What the FTA is doing is spinning the wheel without any markers, then when it stops, painting a tiny "winner" sign opposite the pointer, standing back and saying "OMG, what were the odds of that!?"

westprog

2nd September 2009, 03:34 PM

Um, no, that isn't good enough.

You have to generate some kind of distribution for the values of those constants.

And therein lies the problem for FT proponents -- how in the world do you propose to come up with a distribution for an event you know nothing about the cause of?

You can't just say, for example, that the gravitational constant could be any real number without some kind of evidence that it could be any real number.

We know a coin toss is binary. We know a six sided die can take on values 1 - 6. We know a lottery can take on some finite number of values. We know a 32 bit word in computer memory can take on a finite number of values. We know the spatial coordinates of a particle can be any real number, ignoring possible planck discretization, given a coordinate frame.

We do not know which values any universal constant might have been, and even if we did, we wouldn't know the probability it might have been what it might have been.

This seems pretty obvious to me. So obvious, in fact, that I interpret omission of this caveat in any FT argument as deliberate dishonesty. That is why I have about as little respect for Malerin as I did for Kleinman -- it is clear that there is zero evidence that our universal constants could be "any value at all," yet Malerin insists on continuing to rely upon exactly this assumption in all his arguments.

So the question is, are you going to act the same way, or are you going to let reason prevail and admit that the FT argument is currently a dead end because we just don't have enough data?

We shouldn't investigate something because we don't have enough data? What an odd approach to science.

For example, it might turn out that the gravitational constant is tied to the mass of the universe in some unexplained way that ensures that expansion is continuous but just on the balance. We have no way of knowing that now, but in the future we might. And the solution will start, as always, with the statement of the problem. Denying that there is anything to investigate will lead nowhere.

westprog

2nd September 2009, 03:41 PM

FFor chemistry, presuming that an electron can have a definate location at all, the purpose of a wave function is to calculate the probability of where it might be because we cannot determine it for certain.

This is not, AFAIUI, the correct interpretation. The electron does not have a definite location at all. The wave function allows the probability of it having such a location when we look. At least that's the Copenhagen interpretation, as close as I can follow it as a layman.

westprog

2nd September 2009, 03:43 PM

Robin

2nd September 2009, 03:48 PM

The way you establish whether a coin is unbiased is by tossing it. If you toss a coin and get nothing but heads, then you can, after a while, start to assign a probability that the coin is biased.
I agree with this, but you seem to contradict yourself:
One can't state absolute probabilities - but absolute probabilities are a fiction anyway. One can make assumptions, and calculate from those assumptions the likely outcomes.
We might make the assumption that since a coin has two sides then the probability of it landing on one side is 0.5. But of course this assumption could easily be mistaken.

And if an assumption about very simple probability on a very simple, easily observable object could be mistaken - then what use are the assumptions we make about a very complex event in the distant past, about which we know very little and which we have only observed to happen once?

westprog

2nd September 2009, 03:52 PM

And, again, that's not analogous to the case of the universe in the FTA-theory, is it? You found this universe the way it was, then "painted it red" and then asked "gee, what were the odds of it ending up on this red-painted one"?

Again, unless you were around before the creation of the universe and called the shot, all this discussion of "probability" is meaningless.

What the FTA is doing is spinning the wheel without any markers, then when it stops, painting a tiny "winner" sign opposite the pointer, standing back and saying "OMG, what were the odds of that!?"

That would be reasonable if all the different cases looked different. In the case of, say, the gravitational constant, that doesn't appear to be the case.

AFAIAA, there would be three types of universe -

a very diffuse collection of evenly spaced hydrogen molecules
a singularity (black hole)
galaxies, nebulae etc.

The third option being just one slot on the wheel of fortune. In this case, the wheel has been spun once. Should we be considering why option 3 came up? It seems obvious to me that we should at least be looking at it.

There is also the possibility that there is just one slot on the wheel. We have to allow for that too.

westprog

2nd September 2009, 03:55 PM

I agree with this, but you seem to contradict yourself:

We might make the assumption that since a coin has two sides then the probability of it landing on one side is 0.5. But of course this assumption could easily be mistaken.

And if an assumption about very simple probability on a very simple, easily observable object could be mistaken - then what use are the assumptions we make about a very complex event in the distant past, about which we know very little and which we have only observed to happen once?

If we make assumptions that we know to be assumptions, and which only relate to models, and if we avoid drawing conclusions in advance, then we are unlikely to fall into serious error. It's always necessary when considering the AP to avoid assuming the conclusion.

Dancing David

2nd September 2009, 04:27 PM

That would be reasonable if all the different cases looked different. In the case of, say, the gravitational constant, that doesn't appear to be the case.

AFAIAA, there would be three types of universe -

a very diffuse collection of evenly spaced hydrogen molecules
a singularity (black hole)
galaxies, nebulae etc.

The third option being just one slot on the wheel of fortune. In this case, the wheel has been spun once. Should we be considering why option 3 came up? It seems obvious to me that we should at least be looking at it.

There is also the possibility that there is just one slot on the wheel. We have to allow for that too.

Why could the g not vary by smaller factors, like .000001?

Robin

2nd September 2009, 04:28 PM

If we make assumptions that we know to be assumptions, and which only relate to models, and if we avoid drawing conclusions in advance, then we are unlikely to fall into serious error.
You mean, as long as we acknowledge the vanishing improbability of those models relating in any way to reality?

Malerin

2nd September 2009, 06:43 PM

Basically, if Malerin claimed he actually flipped a coin 55 times to get the first one, I wouldn't believe him.
Yes.

Is this based on not getting a run of 4 or more? That is not at all hard to do with 55 tosses (see screenshot).

However, of the two, ironically, the former one looks more like it implies intent than the latter, though I think I was supposed to come to the opposite conclusion.

HHTHTTHTHT
HHHTTHHTHT
HHTTHTHTTT
HTHHHTTHTH
THHTTHTHTH
THHTT

Looks more biased than

HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHH

?

Seriously, you actually believe that? You will see runs of 3 or less on 55 tosses if you spend just a few minutes generating random numbers. You can spend your whole life flipping coins and likely never see 55 heads or tails in a row.

But the sequences definitely do not look random, and they look non-random in a particularly interesting way that tends to point towards intent.

Definitely? This looks pretty random to me. No runs over 3 on 55 "tosses":

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924a9f1df8ee9cb.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17447)

While you often get outcomes that have long runs, you can easily get outcomes like the screenshot I posted.

Edit:

Another screenshot of 55 "tosses" without any grouping higher than three. You have to read this one horizontally across (left to right), as that is how the numbers are technically generated:

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924a9f2a1e0d832.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17449)

Malerin

2nd September 2009, 06:50 PM

I think that gets right to the heart of the matter. A run of all heads or all tails looks significant to anyone, and immediately one starts thinking, "what are the odds of such a rare thing?" even if the odds, strictly speaking, are the same for every possible string of numbers or heads/tails.

However, in the example above, if you know that pi has great significance in mathematics, a typical reaction would be the same as seeing a coin getting all heads. But if you don't know pi, you'd think, eh, looks like a string of random numbers to me.

Right, this is analogous to the situation when the values of the physical constants weren't understood to be so finely balanced. No significance was attached to it. When we discovered the constants have to have very precise values for life to even have a chance, we became like the person who sees the Pi result and understands the mathematical significance. A lottery that gives a Pi result looks like a "put up" job.

The response depends on our subjective reaction to the significance of the results, and not on the actual probability of predicting the results, which is still one out of however many total possibilities.

Our universe is significant to us, because we're here to observe it. Doesn't change the actual probability of it, though.

The probablity is 1 because it alrady happened. But as Westprog points out, that doesn't mean /argument. Luckily, we can look at things counterfactually.

Beth

2nd September 2009, 07:01 PM

No, I'm doing exactly what you're doing. You're coming along after the universe is already created in this form and saying "wow, what were the odds of the universe being like this!" I'm coming along after I've spun the wheel of fortune" and finding that it ended up on 10,0045 (say) and saying "wow, what were the odds of the wheel ending up on this number.

Where's the difference? The difference is, in the hypothetical question you asked: Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.
That is, you specified that the probability of being a "winner" was one-in-a-million and the other 999,999 possible configurations that the universe could have had were not "winners". The hypothetical situation with the wheel of fortune is different because you are declaring all possible outcomes to be "winners". This difference drastically alters the way I compute the probabilities.

Yeah, but that's trivial. It's easy for the sake of analogy to say that ex hypothesi the wheel is a fair wheel and that its results are genuinely random. If it's not a fair wheel then that's the same thing as saying that the universe's parameters are not arbitrarily defined--in which case out goes both chance and "fine tuning" for the universe.

Okay, for the sake of analogy say that ex hypothesi the wheel is a fair wheel. Out of curiosity, how many spins that land on the single one-in-a-million "winner" without any other outcome coming up would it take before you would consider the possibility of divine intervention? What odds would it take before you would consider - not conclude, just consider - the possibility?

Malerin

2nd September 2009, 07:12 PM

I wonder if those who think that there's something to this "fine tuning" argument would answer a question for me: let us assume that we discover that our universe's parameters are in one possible configuration out of exactly one million equally possible configurations (I know this is unlikely, but for the sake of clarity, let's just assume it).

Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.

Now, would such discoveries, in your view, strongly support the "fine tuning" hypothesis? And (and this is the really important part, for me, of my question): to what extent? In other words: if the odds against a universe in which anything like human life could emerge are 999,999-to-1, does that make the odds of there being a "Fine Tuner" also 999,000-to-1? How, exactly, do we derive the "probability" of a "tuner" from the "improbability" of the event?

You need to refine this just a bit. "human life" is not so special, because that implies that other universes could have produced intelligent non-human life. If 100,000 universes out of a million have intelligent creatures in them, then the existence of our paticular form of intelligent life is not significant.

If, instead of "human life", you mean "life in any form", then it would be very significant to have a one-time event create a universe suitable for life on a 1 in a million shot (that is, the other 999,999 ways the universe could have gone would have ended up lifeless). Without a multiverse or oscillating universe, you would have two viable explanations:

A) Chance
B) Fine-tuning

The existence of life would be much more probable on the existence of a fine-tuner, than on chance alone.

rocketdodger

2nd September 2009, 08:20 PM

We shouldn't investigate something because we don't have enough data? What an odd approach to science.

For example, it might turn out that the gravitational constant is tied to the mass of the universe in some unexplained way that ensures that expansion is continuous but just on the balance. We have no way of knowing that now, but in the future we might. And the solution will start, as always, with the statement of the problem. Denying that there is anything to investigate will lead nowhere.

What kind of a response is this to my post?

Where did I say we shouldn't investigate something? Clearly, as a FT proponent, your primary method of argument is avoiding answering questions and twisting responses into strawmen.

I said that using the assumption in an argument that the universal constants can take on any values whatsoever is deliberate dishonsety unless one can provide evidence to support that assumption.

Do you make that assumption? If you do, then please provide some evidence to support it, or I will have to accuse you of dishonesty as well.

It is dishonest because I know for a fact that people like you and Malerin have read -- and understood -- the arguments of others that explain why that assumption is not valid.

So why do you keep dodging the issue?

rocketdodger

2nd September 2009, 08:24 PM

The probablity is 1 because it alrady happened. But as Westprog points out, that doesn't mean /argument. Luckily, we can look at things counterfactually.

Oh, thats what you are doing, eh? Looking at things counterfactually, with your critical thinking cap on, eh?

Then I am sure you wouldn't mind answering the simple questions you have been asked time and time again for over a year...

...

...

...

arthwollipot

2nd September 2009, 09:02 PM

I just (gasp!) tossed an actual coin 55 times. This is the result:

TTTTHTTTTTHTHHHTHHHTHTHTTTHHTHTTTHHHHHTTTTHTHTTTTH TTTTT

Cynic

2nd September 2009, 09:30 PM

Actually, the electron does not have a definite location at all--the waveform is entirely distinct from any of the possible places the electron can be. This is demonstrated by the fact that "exclusive" possibilities nevertheless affect each other--something that would be impossible if the electron actually had a location at all (canonically, the crests in the waveforms shown in the pattern produced by the double slit experiment, where no electrons (or whatever particle you're using) hit even when sent through one at a time--even though if you cover up either slit, the electrons suddenly appear there).

The purpose of the wave function is to model this, and how these "exclusive" possibilities as a whole effect each other. The wave function represents something more fundamental than the possibilities in this regards.

This stuff is difficult to talk about because in the chaos of imprecise and conflated language coupled with the fact that no one really knows what quantum mechanics represents in reality, any given statement can be picked apart. Suffice it to say that I meant to speak of things like electrons as having locations in so far as fields such as chemistry need to talk about the behavor of such entities, which are not dissimilar from another other bits of matter. If one wants to figure out the "shape" of hybridized bond orbitals, wave functions are what they'll use. (Obviously, most chemists don't need to perform such math, but work from short-cut methods that are known to agress with such an analysis.) Regardless, there is need speak of things like electrons as having something that best translates as a region of influence. Call it location, position, whatever -- point is, wave functions can be used to acurately determine where the action is and isn't. And those functions are based on probability out of necessity.

I don't think you disagree with any of that and I think you understand that I was only using it as an analogy anyway. Probably a bad analogy at that. My general point was and remains that in the case of things that have definate values (such as universal constants), any analysis based purely on probability can lose sight of the fact the value on the face of a tossed die or coin is the result the physical dynamics involved, that the ultimate result was in cards (to bring in more gambling devices) long before it landed.

I'm not really sure what this has to do with the FT... perhaps I'm missing some context.

Singularitarian invoked the "wave function of the universe" on a previous page and tried to use it to justify something to the effect of a superposition of all possible universes from which one emerged. This sort of thinking is ultimately (if not precisely) what gives credence to wondering why "of the possible universes" we have the one we have. I mean, we have pretty much zero idea why the universal constants we have are what they are, and here we are assuming that other ones are possible and assigning probabilities to them. It's absurd.

My primary point in this thread is this: the most parsimonious answer to the question of the probability that the universe has the constant parameters it has is 100%, because those constants -- if the sum total of all previous observations of causation will hold -- are determined and therefore the only possibility under consideration. In a deterministic universe, if it isn't determined, it's not a possibility.

(I don't think there's any credible reason to suggest that we're in anything other than a deterministic universe. Rather than derail this thread with it, however, if anyone wants to discuss it, I'd love to see a thread dedicated to it in the Science section.)

Cynic

2nd September 2009, 09:43 PM

I think it's the idea that probability represents only our lack of knowledge about a deterministic system. But, as you've pointed out, reality is not deterministic. The location of the electron is genuinely random.

Rather than derail this thread, I've created a new one under the Science section entitled "The Universe is Deterministic".

Ironically, after this is posted I'll be able to provide a link...

rocketdodger

2nd September 2009, 09:44 PM

I mean, we have pretty much zero idea why the universal constants we have are what they are, and here we are assuming that other ones are possible and assigning probabilities to them. It's absurd.

Correction: Here certain individuals are assuming that other ones are possible and assigning probabilties to them.

But I do agree that it is absurd.

Cynic

2nd September 2009, 09:44 PM

... which is here:

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5071326#post5071326

westprog

3rd September 2009, 01:36 AM

Why could the g not vary by smaller factors, like .000001?

The "fine-tuning" issue is the amount by which the constants can be altered in the model without changing the outcome. I don't know how finely tuned the gravitational model must be.

westprog

3rd September 2009, 02:10 AM

What kind of a response is this to my post?

Where did I say we shouldn't investigate something? Clearly, as a FT proponent, your primary method of argument is avoiding answering questions and twisting responses into strawmen.

I said that using the assumption in an argument that the universal constants can take on any values whatsoever is deliberate dishonsety unless one can provide evidence to support that assumption.

Do you make that assumption? If you do, then please provide some evidence to support it, or I will have to accuse you of dishonesty as well.

It is dishonest because I know for a fact that people like you and Malerin have read -- and understood -- the arguments of others that explain why that assumption is not valid.

So why do you keep dodging the issue?

The use of assumptions in forming hypotheses is an essential element of science. That's why we call them assumptions - to distinguish them from claims.

In any case, if the physical constants could not have any other value, that still does not remove the question of why models of the universe need to be so precisely fine-tuned.

Pixel42

3rd September 2009, 02:48 AM

yy2bggggs

3rd September 2009, 03:13 AM

Is this based on not getting a run of 4 or more?
No, it's based on the fact that you maxed out at 3, and that you only had 3 runs of 3 or more.
That is not at all hard to do with 55 tosses (see screenshot).
You're running these one at a time?

Try this. Go to the "advanced" page. Select binary format. Because we want 55 flips per sample, and 55 factors into 11 and 5, you can generate 11 bits of number by selecting a range from 0 to 2047, and the default 5 columns gives you one sample per row. Generate your maximum of 10,000 numbers per request, and you get 2,000 samples.

With one such sample I analyzed (gvim/cygwin fun) for run lengths, I came up with the following:

1 *
2 ****
3 **
4 **
5 **********
6 **********
7 ***
8 ***
9 *

Every "*" represents one sample of 55 flips, or 0.05% of the total (so every 2 is 0.1%). This graph shows all of the runs that max out at run lengths of 3. The numbers are the number of runs of 3 in each sample. The theory behind gambler's fallacy patterns in random data is that people tend to avoid run lengths, so fewer and shorter runs count (run lengths equaling 2 are obviously meaningless--to avoid a run of length 2 you have to alternate, which nobody's going to do when trying to look random).

Your sequence had a whopping 3 runs of length 3--there are seven sequences with 3 or fewer runs of length 3 topping out at 3 in this diagram, representing 0.35% (or 0.0035) of the 2,000 samples. There are 0.45% of the border case just after--where there are four or fewer runs of length 3, topping out at 3. Grand total, there are 36 runs that top out at 3, representing 1.8% of the total.

... Looks more biased than ...

Seriously, you actually believe that?
No, I don't believe that. That's why I didn't say that, and in fact, said quite the opposite (that the latter was more special).

What I did say is that the former is a stronger implication of intent. A two headed coin will give you the all heads flips, without even being sentient. But it's a lot to ask of any weighted coin, no matter how you weight it, to show a strong bias towards GF looking patterns. Ordinary weighting doesn't produce those kinds of patterns.
You will see runs of 3 or less on 55 tosses if you spend just a few minutes generating random numbers.Or 15 seconds, and a few minutes analyzing the results of the 2,000 samples. As I said previously, with samples merely going up to 55, we're not dealing with insane probabilities here--we're talking on the order of single digit percentages tending towards the decimal end.You can spend your whole life flipping coins and likely never see 55 heads or tails in a row.Unless it's a two-headed coin, in which case it's certain you'll see it after the 55th flip. If it's a heavily weighted coin, you might see this too.

But there's no ordinary weighted coin that will show you the GF pattern with such likelihood that the two headed coin will show you all heads. Neither ordinary weighted coins, nor two headed coins, are very sentient devices, so you shouldn't describe their outcomes as being intended.

Now, humans can certainly come up with sequences containing all heads. But it's not insanely hard--and it's not even that much harder at all--for them to come up with sequences showing heavy GF patterns. Humans can even, with enough practice, come up with reasonably good random number sequences.

But both humans and a lot of dumb objects can come up with the most special cases--the all heads case. And both humans and real coins can come up with pretty good random number sequences. But where you find more humans in the set, and less non-sentient alternative causes, is in the data that shows GF patterns.

So if you just invert this, then you see that it's not the case that the more special a thing is, the more likely it is that it was done with intent.
Definitely? This looks pretty random to me. No runs over 3 on 55 "tosses":
Here?
http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924a9f1df8ee9cb.jpg
2 1 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 1
1 1 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 1
2 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 2 1
1 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 1 2
1 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 2 2
(TS 2009-09-02 18:37:09 UTC)
Row 2 has two one's at the end. Row 3 continues with two one's. That's a run of four 1's. Right after that, there are three 2's, and carrying to the next row, another 2. So that's two runs of length 4 back to back.
Another screenshot
...that one has 5 runs of length 3. FYI, it'd be easier to analyze these in text form than JPG--the latter requires either manual calculating, or manual typing/verifying, which is prone to error. In the former, I can just split the numbers to different lines and filter by "uniq -c".

westprog

3rd September 2009, 03:13 AM

The best response to the fine tuning argument I've ever seen is that it's the equivalent of me marvelling at the fact that not one of my ancestors, right back to the first cell, died childless. I mean, what were the odds against that? :eye-poppi

The Anthropic Principle is almost unparalleled in its ability to generate inappropriate analogies.

fls

3rd September 2009, 04:42 AM

The best response to the fine tuning argument I've ever seen is that it's the equivalent of me marvelling at the fact that not one of my ancestors, right back to the first cell, died childless. I mean, what were the odds against that? :eye-poppi

I guess it depends upon what could be found to interest us in those billions of invisible children (those whose ancestors did die childless).

Linda

fls

3rd September 2009, 04:44 AM

What I did say is that the former is a stronger implication of intent. A two headed coin will give you the all heads flips, without even being sentient. But it's a lot to ask of any weighted coin, no matter how you weight it, to show a strong bias towards GF looking patterns. Ordinary weighting doesn't produce those kinds of patterns.
Or 15 seconds, and a few minutes analyzing the results of the 2,000 samples. As I said previously, with samples merely going up to 55, we're not dealing with insane probabilities here--we're talking on the order of single digit percentages tending towards the decimal end.Unless it's a two-headed coin, in which case it's certain you'll see it after the 55th flip. If it's a heavily weighted coin, you might see this too.

But there's no ordinary weighted coin that will show you the GF pattern with such likelihood that the two headed coin will show you all heads. Neither ordinary weighted coins, nor two headed coins, are very sentient devices, so you shouldn't describe their outcomes as being intended.

Now, humans can certainly come up with sequences containing all heads. But it's not insanely hard--and it's not even that much harder at all--for them to come up with sequences showing heavy GF patterns. Humans can even, with enough practice, come up with reasonably good random number sequences.

But both humans and a lot of dumb objects can come up with the most special cases--the all heads case. And both humans and real coins can come up with pretty good random number sequences. But where you find more humans in the set, and less non-sentient alternative causes, is in the data that shows GF patterns.

So if you just invert this, then you see that it's not the case that the more special a thing is, the more likely it is that it was done with intent.

That's a very nice explanation of the issue (much better than my attempt).

Linda

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 06:54 AM

The use of assumptions in forming hypotheses is an essential element of science. That's why we call them assumptions - to distinguish them from claims.

In any case, if the physical constants could not have any other value, that still does not remove the question of why models of the universe need to be so precisely fine-tuned.

You just don't seem to get it.

The concept of fine tuning doesn't even make sense unless there are multiple values to be selected from.

And you -- nor anyone else -- has any idea about the number of possible values each constant could take.

Just because researchers can speculate on what would happen were a constant Y to have value X does not imply that constant Y could actually have a value of X.

I can speculate on what the results of a game of yahtzee might be if a six sided die could take on a value of 5.5. Does that mean a six sided die can actually come up 5.5?

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 06:59 AM

The Anthropic Principle is almost unparalleled in its ability to generate inappropriate analogies.

I don't suppose you would care to provide an argument for why that analogy is inappropriate?

Robin

3rd September 2009, 07:13 AM

I just (gasp!) tossed an actual coin 55 times. This is the result:

TTTTHTTTTTHTHHHTHHHTHTHTTTHHTHTTTHHHHHTTTTHTHTTTTH TTTTT
Australian 10 cent coin
THHHHTHTTHTTHTTHTHHTTTHTTTTTHTTTHTHTHHHTTTTTTHTTTT TTTTT

Where would PEAR and GCP be today without those runs?

Now if someone could only cause 55 universes and see how many of them were life supporting we might get somewhere.

fls

3rd September 2009, 07:23 AM

I don't suppose you would care to provide an argument for why that analogy is inappropriate?

I can tell you why I find it inappropriate (don't know if that is why Westprog finds it inappropriate).

We wouldn't find any other way to distinguish between the missed opportunities and the actualized opportunities beforehand (all opportunities result in a human wondering at the improbability of their ancestral chain). The point of considering the universe fine-tuned is that we can independently distinguish between those missed opportunities (universes with different parameter values) and actualized opportunities (our universe) beforehand by looking at what sort of universe will result. The question is whether or not there are other ways to sort universes than by 'maximize the variety of objects'.

Linda

Robin

3rd September 2009, 07:44 AM

No, it's based on the fact that you maxed out at 3, and that you only had 3 runs of 3 or more.

You're running these one at a time?

Try this. Go to the "advanced" page. Select binary format. Because we want 55 flips per sample, and 55 factors into 11 and 5, you can generate 11 bits of number by selecting a range from 0 to 2047, and the default 5 columns gives you one sample per row. Generate your maximum of 10,000 numbers per request, and you get 2,000 samples.

With one such sample I analyzed (gvim/cygwin fun) for run lengths, I came up with the following:

1 *
2 ****
3 **
4 **
5 **********
6 **********
7 ***
8 ***
9 *

Every "*" represents one sample of 55 flips, or 0.05% of the total (so every 2 is 0.1%). This graph shows all of the runs that max out at run lengths of 3. The numbers are the number of runs of 3 in each sample. The theory behind gambler's fallacy patterns in random data is that people tend to avoid run lengths, so fewer and shorter runs count (run lengths equaling 2 are obviously meaningless--to avoid a run of length 2 you have to alternate, which nobody's going to do when trying to look random).

Your sequence had a whopping 3 runs of length 3--there are seven sequences with 3 or fewer runs of length 3 topping out at 3 in this diagram, representing 0.35% (or 0.0035) of the 2,000 samples. There are 0.45% of the border case just after--where there are four or fewer runs of length 3, topping out at 3. Grand total, there are 36 runs that top out at 3, representing 1.8% of the total.

No, I don't believe that. That's why I didn't say that, and in fact, said quite the opposite (that the latter was more special).

What I did say is that the former is a stronger implication of intent. A two headed coin will give you the all heads flips, without even being sentient. But it's a lot to ask of any weighted coin, no matter how you weight it, to show a strong bias towards GF looking patterns. Ordinary weighting doesn't produce those kinds of patterns.
Or 15 seconds, and a few minutes analyzing the results of the 2,000 samples. As I said previously, with samples merely going up to 55, we're not dealing with insane probabilities here--we're talking on the order of single digit percentages tending towards the decimal end.Unless it's a two-headed coin, in which case it's certain you'll see it after the 55th flip. If it's a heavily weighted coin, you might see this too.

But there's no ordinary weighted coin that will show you the GF pattern with such likelihood that the two headed coin will show you all heads. Neither ordinary weighted coins, nor two headed coins, are very sentient devices, so you shouldn't describe their outcomes as being intended.

Now, humans can certainly come up with sequences containing all heads. But it's not insanely hard--and it's not even that much harder at all--for them to come up with sequences showing heavy GF patterns. Humans can even, with enough practice, come up with reasonably good random number sequences.

But both humans and a lot of dumb objects can come up with the most special cases--the all heads case. And both humans and real coins can come up with pretty good random number sequences. But where you find more humans in the set, and less non-sentient alternative causes, is in the data that shows GF patterns.

So if you just invert this, then you see that it's not the case that the more special a thing is, the more likely it is that it was done with intent.

Here?
http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924a9f1df8ee9cb.jpg
2 1 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 1
1 1 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 1
2 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 2 1
1 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 1 2
1 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 2 2
(TS 2009-09-02 18:37:09 UTC)
Row 2 has two one's at the end. Row 3 continues with two one's. That's a run of four 1's. Right after that, there are three 2's, and carrying to the next row, another 2. So that's two runs of length 4 back to back.

...that one has 5 runs of length 3. FYI, it'd be easier to analyze these in text form than JPG--the latter requires either manual calculating, or manual typing/verifying, which is prone to error. In the former, I can just split the numbers to different lines and filter by "uniq -c".

Nominated

westprog

3rd September 2009, 08:23 AM

I can tell you why I find it inappropriate (don't know if that is why Westprog finds it inappropriate).

We wouldn't find any other way to distinguish between the missed opportunities and the actualized opportunities beforehand (all opportunities result in a human wondering at the improbability of their ancestral chain). The point of considering the universe fine-tuned is that we can independently distinguish between those missed opportunities (universes with different parameter values) and actualized opportunities (our universe) beforehand by looking at what sort of universe will result. The question is whether or not there are other ways to sort universes than by 'maximize the variety of objects'.

Linda

I think that's a fair summary.

If we have a bag full of a trillion numbered marbles, then the odds are against any particular number coming up. So to be astonished when we pull out a particular number at trillion to one odds is silly. However, if the bag has a trillion white marbles, a trillion black marbles, and one red marble, and we pull out the red marble on our one and only try, we can be astonished, and wonder how it happened.

One might claim that we only consider this universe special, out of all the other universes which we have modelled, just because we live in it. But if we can say, objectively, using reasonable criteria, that this universe lies in a very small subset of the different types that we model, then we are, I think, entitled to delve a bit deeper.

westprog

3rd September 2009, 08:31 AM

You just don't seem to get it.

The concept of fine tuning doesn't even make sense unless there are multiple values to be selected from.

And you -- nor anyone else -- has any idea about the number of possible values each constant could take.

Just because researchers can speculate on what would happen were a constant Y to have value X does not imply that constant Y could actually have a value of X.

Since you are rephrasing things that I've already said, and serving them back to me, they don't seem very cogent objections.

Either the values could, in some sense, have had different values, or they couldn't. In either case, it's a matter of interest why they have the values they do.

I can speculate on what the results of a game of yahtzee might be if a six sided die could take on a value of 5.5. Does that mean a six sided die can actually come up 5.5?

You are picking an example that you know to be impossible. You don't know that it's impossible for physical constants to have alternative values.

I find it strange that you are objecting to investigation of such matters, and at the same time when I point this out, you deny it. Should we be considering why physical constants have the values they do, or not?

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 08:47 AM

I can tell you why I find it inappropriate (don't know if that is why Westprog finds it inappropriate).

We wouldn't find any other way to distinguish between the missed opportunities and the actualized opportunities beforehand (all opportunities result in a human wondering at the improbability of their ancestral chain). The point of considering the universe fine-tuned is that we can independently distinguish between those missed opportunities (universes with different parameter values) and actualized opportunities (our universe) beforehand by looking at what sort of universe will result. The question is whether or not there are other ways to sort universes than by 'maximize the variety of objects'.

Linda

But that difference only exists if you lack imagination.

The difference between myself and the human that I might have been is slight. The difference between a universe like ours that contains life as we know it and some other universe that contains something else that might wonder about it's existence is grand.

Yet, the two are fundamentally the same type of difference. One is me, the other is not. A totally different universe in no way implies the lack of an entity that could reason about it's existence.

fls

3rd September 2009, 08:55 AM

But that difference only exists if you lack imagination.

The difference between myself and the human that I might have been is slight. The difference between a universe like ours that contains life as we know it and some other universe that contains something else that might wonder about it's existence is grand.

Yet, the two are fundamentally the same type of difference. One is me, the other is not. A totally different universe in no way implies the lack of an entity that could reason about it's existence.

I agree. The fine-tuners are pretending that the bag is full of marbles with only one or a few differing in colour. In reality, the bag is full of a million marbles of different sizes and shapes, half a dozen kittens, a few hundred socks, several sets of house keys, an umbrella, 60,000 glass beads, 20 balls of crumpled paper and a used condom. They are wondering why a kitten was pulled out, considering that there were only a few grey things in the bag.

Linda

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 09:00 AM

Since you are rephrasing things that I've already said, and serving them back to me, they don't seem very cogent objections.

Either the values could, in some sense, have had different values, or they couldn't. In either case, it's a matter of interest why they have the values they do.

But that is not what I am objecting to, and I think you know it.

I am objecting to understanding the above and then proceeding to act otherwise while making an argument. And again I cite Malerin, who knows darn well that there is no data to support the notion that the constants could, for instance, take on any real number, yet proceeds to generate a likelihood of the constants being what they are close to zero as if they could take on any real number.

And you seem to be in the same boat. Do you or do you not support the aspect of the FT argument that claims the likelihood of the constants being what they are is low?

You are picking an example that you know to be impossible. You don't know that it's impossible for physical constants to have alternative values.

If I didn't know about dice, I wouldn't know it was impossible. If all I saw was a single result of a die roll, and someone told me "some process" generated the number, what should I think?

I really would like to hear your answer on that. If an unknown process generates a value, what can you conclude?

I find it strange that you are objecting to investigation of such matters, and at the same time when I point this out, you deny it. Should we be considering why physical constants have the values they do, or not?

I am not objecting to the investigation. I am objecting to the use of results that do not exist since the investigation hasn't even begun.

Of course we should be considering why the constants have the values they do. Do you think I am stupid? What we should not be doing is exactly what Malerin and others are doing, which is assuming the likelihood of any values of the constants.

westprog

3rd September 2009, 09:02 AM

But that difference only exists if you lack imagination.

The difference between myself and the human that I might have been is slight. The difference between a universe like ours that contains life as we know it and some other universe that contains something else that might wonder about it's existence is grand.

Yet, the two are fundamentally the same type of difference. One is me, the other is not. A totally different universe in no way implies the lack of an entity that could reason about it's existence.

Personally, I think that it's quite unlikely that a universe that collapses on itself after an infinitesimal fraction of a second will generate something that will wonder about itself. Nor do I think that a family of such universes, differing only by the tiny difference in time before they collapse, would objectively be considered as different from each other as they are from our universe.

Of course it's difficult to come up with objective standards for classifying universes that only exist in physical/mathematical models, but it's certainly not impossible. To me, many of the hypothetical universes look like black or white marbles, not kittens or bananas.

westprog

3rd September 2009, 09:04 AM

What we should not be doing is exactly what Malerin and others are doing

I suggest you address your concerns to them.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 09:06 AM

I agree. The fine-tuners are pretending that the bag is full of marbles with only one or a few differing in colour. In reality, the bag is full of a million marbles of different sizes and shapes, half a dozen kittens, a few hundred socks, several sets of house keys, an umbrella, 60,000 glass beads, 20 balls of crumpled paper and a used condom. They are wondering why a kitten was pulled out, considering that there were only a few grey things in the bag.

Linda

Oh, so thats what you meant by asking whether there are other ways to sort universes?

westprog

3rd September 2009, 09:08 AM

And you seem to be in the same boat. Do you or do you not support the aspect of the FT argument that claims the likelihood of the constants being what they are is low?

I think that Beth expressed this quite well. When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens. That is the strange phenomenon that we're dealing with.

fls

3rd September 2009, 09:09 AM

Oh, so thats what you meant by asking whether there are other ways to sort universes?

Yes.

Linda

westprog

3rd September 2009, 09:13 AM

Yes.

Linda

Considering alternative ways of sorting universes - which might make this one seem less unique - is certainly one of many possible approaches. I'd be very interested to hear about any such research. I'm far from being an expert on the matter.

However, for the moment, the existence of complex, long-lived structures seems like a good partitioning device to be going along with.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 09:15 AM

Personally, I think that it's quite unlikely that a universe that collapses on itself after an infinitesimal fraction of a second will generate something that will wonder about itself. Nor do I think that a family of such universes, differing only by the tiny difference in time before they collapse, would objectively be considered as different from each other as they are from our universe.

Of course it's difficult to come up with objective standards for classifying universes that only exist in physical/mathematical models, but it's certainly not impossible. To me, many of the hypothetical universes look like black or white marbles, not kittens or bananas.

But the only reasoning that could lead you to think such a thing is flawed -- induction can't be applied to unknowns.

That is, just because the only intelligent life you know of is humans, and neither humans nor anything remotely similar could evolve never mind exist in such a universe, does not imply that nothing in such a universe will wonder about itself. It doesn't even imply that it is unlikely for something in such a universe to wonder about itself.

When we know more about our own universe, and more about mathematics, and most of all more about the nature of intelligence, then maybe such an assumption would be logically valid. But right now you are just arguing from ignorance, and I am sure you know that is a logical fallacy.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 09:19 AM

I think that Beth expressed this quite well. When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens. That is the strange phenomenon that we're dealing with.

Are you a politician?

That is a non-answer.

Possible answers are "yes" or "no."

From our history together I understand that you in particular are prone to avoiding answers, but cmon, this isn't a trick. I just want to know if you also take the next step and infer that such required precision implies a low likelihood of such precision occuring naturally.

If you don't, then I have no beef with you, and you are correct I need to take up the issue with Malerin (who never responds to me). But I have a feeling you do take that next step.

Yoink

3rd September 2009, 09:25 AM

fls

3rd September 2009, 09:45 AM

I think that Beth expressed this quite well. When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens. That is the strange phenomenon that we're dealing with.

There's nothing strange about that. You have simply described a chaotic system. We have numerous examples in nature, Weather being the classic. Are you claiming that because imprecision leads to predicting smooth sailing in the Caribbean when we are really looking for a hurricane in Florida, it indicates the hand of God? Why would it be strange that the universe is chaotic rather than linear?

Linda

fls

3rd September 2009, 09:48 AM

Considering alternative ways of sorting universes - which might make this one seem less unique - is certainly one of many possible approaches. I'd be very interested to hear about any such research. I'm far from being an expert on the matter.

However, for the moment, the existence of complex, long-lived structures seems like a good partitioning device to be going along with.

Oh great. Now you've introduced a length time bias.

Linda

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 09:49 AM

The "fine-tuning" issue is the amount by which the constants can be altered in the model without changing the outcome. I don't know how finely tuned the gravitational model must be.

But that is whole point, we can't know, it is all speculation.

westprog

3rd September 2009, 09:54 AM

Are you a politician?

That is a non-answer.

Possible answers are "yes" or "no."

From our history together I understand that you in particular are prone to avoiding answers, but cmon, this isn't a trick. I just want to know if you also take the next step and infer that such required precision implies a low likelihood of such precision occuring naturally.

If you don't, then I have no beef with you, and you are correct I need to take up the issue with Malerin (who never responds to me). But I have a feeling you do take that next step.

A probabilistic analysis is restricted by the possibility that the current values are the only ones that are possible. Any statement of probability is conditional on the assumption that all values of the constants are, or were, equally likely, which is of course not based on a belief that this is so.

Indeed, it's the possibility that the values of the constants are not equally likely that is interesting.

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 09:55 AM

westprog

3rd September 2009, 09:56 AM

But that is whole point, we can't know, it is all speculation.

I said it was speculation. There's no shame in that.

westprog

3rd September 2009, 09:58 AM

Oh great. Now you've introduced a length time bias.

Linda

Any method of distinguishing between the models is valid. It's not a bias, it's a way to evaluate them.

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 09:59 AM

Personally, I think that it's quite unlikely that a universe that collapses on itself after an infinitesimal fraction of a second will generate something that will wonder about itself. Nor do I think that a family of such universes, differing only by the tiny difference in time before they collapse, would objectively be considered as different from each other as they are from our universe.

Considering that this is speculation and that it is counter to current observations, it is absolute speculation.

Of course it's difficult to come up with objective standards for classifying universes that only exist in physical/mathematical models, but it's certainly not impossible. To me, many of the hypothetical universes look like black or white marbles, not kittens or bananas.

But it is speculation, what value can g have. Collins makes his case by increasing g by a billion and calling it fine tuning.

It all about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin and how many wear red shoes.

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 10:03 AM

I think that Beth expressed this quite well. When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens. That is the strange phenomenon that we're dealing with.

Except you haven't said what constants and what variation there is, the most quoted person on the net is Robin Collins, and he call 1,000,000,000 a 1/10^32 part.

So what are these 'astonishing degree of precision', you haven't cited them, so fess up or stop saying that they are astonishing. Which values where and to what degree?

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 10:12 AM

Any statement of probability is conditional on the assumption that all values of the constants are, or were, equally likely, which is of course not based on a belief that this is so.

Well I happen to think that if an individual knows such a statement is conditioned like that, and they go about using such a statement in an argument to forward their own view, then there is a high probability the individual believes that it is so.

Otherwise, why would they use such a statement in their own arguments?

Which also begs the question -- why are you avoiding providing a clear answer?

Yoink

3rd September 2009, 10:13 AM

I think that's a fair summary.

If we have a bag full of a trillion numbered marbles, then the odds are against any particular number coming up. So to be astonished when we pull out a particular number at trillion to one odds is silly. However, if the bag has a trillion white marbles, a trillion black marbles, and one red marble, and we pull out the red marble on our one and only try, we can be astonished, and wonder how it happened.

One might claim that we only consider this universe special, out of all the other universes which we have modelled, just because we live in it. But if we can say, objectively, using reasonable criteria, that this universe lies in a very small subset of the different types that we model, then we are, I think, entitled to delve a bit deeper.

The problem is, once again, that you've only colored this marble red after drawing it out. Why do universes that yield beings like us seem special to us? Because we the ones defining the criteria of "specialness."

Let's go back to pulling the one marble out of a bag of a trillion, but now they're just numbered marbles again. Is there a single marble in there that isn't unique? Is there a single marble in there that can't be retroactively defined as part of a relatively small set ("all even numbers that are divisible by no fewer and no more than five prime numbers" or what have you).

The "OMG, but this universe supports LIFE!" argument is parallel to finding this week's lottery winner and constructing a narrative about how extraordinary their win was: they desperately needed the money for an operation, they prayed to the patron St. of Lotteries the night before the drawing, they normally never play the lottery, but some little voice in the back of the head told him to have a go this week...etc. etc. Dig far enough after the event and it will begin to seem wildly improbable (just like the "not a single one of my ancestors died childless" line of thought mentioned above).

Let's imagine for a second that we're all Gods and we're watching our fellow God create a universe on the great universe roulette-wheel (all fundamental physical constants get set at random). Should I be more startled at the "improbability" of the outcome in which physical objects are possible, or at the outcome in which all the physical constants are prime numbers, or the outcome in which the physical constants spell a sentence in our God-Language when the numbers are converted into letters by some basic algorithm, etc. etc. etc.

Every single possible outcome is 'unique' if it is discrete from all the others.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 10:24 AM

The problem is, once again, that you've only colored this marble red after drawing it out. Why do universes that yield beings like us seem special to us? Because we the ones defining the criteria of "specialness."

Let's go back to pulling the one marble out of a bag of a trillion, but now they're just numbered marbles again. Is there a single marble in there that isn't unique? Is there a single marble in there that can't be retroactively defined as part of a relatively small set ("all even numbers that are divisible by no fewer and no more than five prime numbers" or what have you).

The "OMG, but this universe supports LIFE!" argument is parallel to finding this week's lottery winner and constructing a narrative about how extraordinary their win was: they desperately needed the money for an operation, they prayed to the patron St. of Lotteries the night before the drawing, they normally never play the lottery, but some little voice in the back of the head told him to have a go this week...etc. etc. Dig far enough after the event and it will begin to seem wildly improbable (just like the "not a single one of my ancestors died childless" line of thought mentioned above).

Let's imagine for a second that we're all Gods and we're watching our fellow God create a universe on the great universe roulette-wheel (all fundamental physical constants get set at random). Should I be more startled at the "improbability" of the outcome in which physical objects are possible, or at the outcome in which all the physical constants are prime numbers, or the outcome in which the physical constants spell a sentence in our God-Language when the numbers are converted into letters by some basic algorithm, etc. etc. etc.

Every single possible outcome is 'unique' if it is discrete from all the others.

I would also like to point out that the metric for this "specialness" is typically life that can give rise to consciousness that can reason about its own existence.

Yet the very people who oppose things like the computational model of consciousness and assert how mysterious and unknowable consciousness is are the same individuals who are so sure of the conditions that might give rise to such a consciousness.

And that is a fundamental contradiction right there -- If you don't know much about the mechanics of consciousness, you are in no position to know under what conditions it might arise.

fls

3rd September 2009, 10:45 AM

Any method of distinguishing between the models is valid. It's not a bias, it's a way to evaluate them.

Except that you are using the presence of this model as somehow significant when you've just introduced a bias which makes it more likely that this model will be present at any randomly chosen point in time.

Linda

westprog

3rd September 2009, 12:28 PM

Except you haven't said what constants and what variation there is, the most quoted person on the net is Robin Collins, and he call 1,000,000,000 a 1/10^32 part.

So what are these 'astonishing degree of precision', you haven't cited them, so fess up or stop saying that they are astonishing. Which values where and to what degree?

I suggest a referral to a physicist with no axe to grind. I could give you references but what's the point of that? You can find plenty of unbiased information.

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 01:30 PM

I suggest a referral to a physicist with no axe to grind. I could give you references but what's the point of that? You can find plenty of unbiased information.

Excuse me, you are the one who made the claim, and you want ME to back it up. On the Jref ?

Seriously Westprog, that makes it seem you are just making these things up, now doesn't it.

When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision...

That is what you said, and I ask you again what constant and what degree of precision?

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 01:31 PM

Here is someone who has actually modeled universes and guess what they found, besides not quoting Collins misquoting Carter,

the good stuff is about pg 12.

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Cosmo/FineTune.pdf

westprog

3rd September 2009, 01:37 PM

Excuse me, you are the one who made the claim, and you want ME to back it up. On the Jref ?

What claim, precisely, did I make? I've been referring to hypothetical situations throughout. I am not a cosmologist, and I rely on those who are to provide the information.

If it's the case that models of the universe with different values for the fundamental constants give rise to equally complex and long lasting arrangements, then I'd be very interested to hear about it.

westprog

3rd September 2009, 01:44 PM

That is, just because the only intelligent life you know of is humans, and neither humans nor anything remotely similar could evolve never mind exist in such a universe, does not imply that nothing in such a universe will wonder about itself. It doesn't even imply that it is unlikely for something in such a universe to wonder about itself.

Then let's consider a universe that consists entirely of diffuse hydrogen clouds. Is it impossible that something would evolve in such a universe capable of "wondering about itself"? No, of course not. But the point is that such a thing could also come to exist in our own universe, which is amply supplied with diffuse hydrogen.

However, beings such as ourselves - which are the only conscious beings we know to exist - require suns, galaxies, heavy elements, etc. Which seem to require a particular set of parameters in order to exist.

Could the universes that exist for a tiny fraction of time produce conscious beings? Why not? Time scales are relative. Perhaps some arrangement of matter would treat a second as an eon. But such beings could exist in the early stages of our own universe as well.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 02:18 PM

Yoink

3rd September 2009, 02:42 PM

westprog

3rd September 2009, 02:53 PM

Um, not if they require different values of the universal constants...

However, AFAIAA, the hypothetical behaviour of the U2/U3/U4... hydrogen clouds would be pretty much the same as in the U1. We don't really know.

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 03:24 PM

What claim, precisely, did I make? I've been referring to hypothetical situations throughout. I am not a cosmologist, and I rely on those who are to provide the information.

If it's the case that models of the universe with different values for the fundamental constants give rise to equally complex and long lasting arrangements, then I'd be very interested to hear about it.

from post 299

When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens.

What cosmologist where said what?

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 03:26 PM

Good find.

Not mine, I have it from an earlier thread, I wonder how many people who discuss the FTA have ignored those earlier threads, I know Malerin does.

Dancing David

3rd September 2009, 03:29 PM

Then let's consider a universe that consists entirely of diffuse hydrogen clouds. Is it impossible that something would evolve in such a universe capable of "wondering about itself"? No, of course not. But the point is that such a thing could also come to exist in our own universe, which is amply supplied with diffuse hydrogen.

However, beings such as ourselves - which are the only conscious beings we know to exist - require suns, galaxies, heavy elements, etc. Which seem to require a particular set of parameters in order to exist.

Could the universes that exist for a tiny fraction of time produce conscious beings? Why not? Time scales are relative. Perhaps some arrangement of matter would treat a second as an eon. But such beings could exist in the early stages of our own universe as well.

Amd again you are consdering extremes as some sort of argument, what is the expansion rate was so high that there was no coallesing, what if gravity was so low, what if it collapsed so fast.

Sure if you alter things by the billions that sort of stuff would happen. But to quote Carter "if we change this one variable and the others don't change", well if you change one variable by factors of ten , how reasonable is it that the other factors remain the same.

Really read this
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Cosmo/FineTune.pdf

Especially the stuff around page 12.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 03:31 PM

We don't really know.

I just wanted to quote that.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 03:34 PM

Not mine, I have it from an earlier thread, I wonder how many people who discuss the FTA have ignored those earlier threads, I know Malerin does.

Malerin does not "discuss."

He vomits the same flawed arguments over and over ... and over ... while purposefully avoiding discussion.

Robin

3rd September 2009, 03:36 PM

Malerin does not "discuss."

He vomits the same flawed arguments over and over ... and over ... while purposefully avoiding discussion.

Oh well - that sounds a bit rough.

But I would like to hear know from him whether he considers that the Big Bang ever happened.

Malerin

3rd September 2009, 04:32 PM

No, it's based on the fact that you maxed out at 3, and that you only had 3 runs of 3 or more.

Boy, you are drowning in statistical white noise. Almost any suffiently large sample of random numbers will yield low-probability statistically insignificant patterns or groupings. Consider:

122221222222222112221222122112

This obviously came from a non-random process (e.g., a person hitting 1's and 2's on a keyboard), as I will clearly demonstrate:

- In the first fifteen digits, there are thirteen 2's! The odds of that happening are very low. Clearly, someone had their finger on the "2" key a little long, then decided to throw a couple 1's in there to not make it too obvious.
- In the next fifteen numbers, there are three times as many 1's as in the first fifteen numbers. Again, not too likely for that to happen. Looks like someone was trying to even out the set by adding three times as many 1's in the 2nd half.
- The runs, in order, are four 2's, nine 2's, two 1's, three 2's, three 2's,
two 2's, and two 1's. A very improbable set of runs! Also, you can see the runs dramatically decrease in size after the nine 2's. This is obviously a sign that the person was afraid another long run would make the sequence appear deliberate.
- The distribution is twenty-two 2's and eight 1's. A fairly improbable distribution. But a skewed distribution is just the sort of thing someone would pull because large random sequences often don't appear random.

When you multiply all these improbabilities together, it is clearly the work of someone just hitting one's and two's on their keyboard. What will they pull next? A max three groupings of three numbers on a 55 number sequence?

In other words, you're taking statistical white noise and making huge extrapolations based on arbitrary patterns/groupings you've picked out. A max of three runs of three numbers is improbable, but not significant, just as a max of two and three number runs following a large nine number run (as in the above example) is improbable but not significant. Maybe it's a person not wanting the sequence to look too deliberate after a large run, or maybe it's just chance.

Contrast that with patterns that are statistically significant (Nothing but HTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTH... all heads, all tails, etc.). But you don't have that in the first sequence of numbers I gave many posts ago. You have a piece of improbable white noise you've convinced yourself is statistically relevant. Well, I think thirteen 2's out of the first fifteen numbers is even more improbable and just as indicative of intent. Esp. the number of small sets right after that large group of 2's! So clearly, I created the above set of numbers.

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924aa0519d4f1c7.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17456)

Oops!

Edit: To tie this all in to the FT argument:

You're arguing that a universe that collapses in on itself after .00012879 seconds is extremely improbable and stastically significant. True, the specific amount of time is improbable, but it is not significant because it is easily explained by chance alone. There is no reason to invoke a multiverse to explain that particular amount of time, nor a fine-tuner.

However, if there are trillions of ways the universe could have gone, and only a few are life-permitting, then that is both extremely improbable and statiscally significant. Chance alone fails to explain it, unless combined with a multiverse or oscillating universe. Some examples of the precise values needed:

"The anthropic constraints associated with the formation of galaxies involve various cosmological parameters, such as the density of the matter in the universe, the amplitude of the initial density fluctuations, the photon-to-baryon ratio and the cosmological constant (an extra term Einstein introduced into his field equations for cosmological reasons and which may cause the universe to accelerate). Some of these parameters might be determined by processes in the early universe rather than being prescribed freely as part of the initial conditions. However, as Martin Rees discussed, even small deviations from the observed values of such parameters would exclude the formation of structures like galaxies and their subsequent fragmentation into stars."

"Heinz Oberhummer, who has studied this resonance in more detail, reported some beautiful work showing how the amount of oxygen and carbon produced in red giant stars varies with the strength and range of the nucleon interactions. His work indicates that the nuclear interaction must be tuned to at least 0.5% if one is to produce both these elements to the extent required for life."

"It seems that aG must be roughly a20 for both "convective" and "radiative" stars to exist (prerequisites for planets and supernovae, respectively) and roughly aW4 for neutrinos to eject the envelope of a star in a supernova explosion (necessary for the dissemination of heavy elements). These "coincidences" might be regarded as examples of the strong anthropic principle."

And the introduction to the article was very interesting:

"Cosmologists who study the link between life in the universe and the values of the physical constants were once viewed with suspicion by other scientists. But a recent high-profile conference at Cambridge showed that the subject is fast becoming academically respectable."

http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/print/3

Malerin

3rd September 2009, 05:12 PM

Oh well - that sounds a bit rough.

But I would like to hear know from him whether he considers that the Big Bang ever happened.

I'm not a strict idealist. I think it has less metaphysical problems than materialism. I would catgorize myself a theist more than anything else, and I have no problem with dualism (an immaterial God interacting with a material universe). So I don't view the Big Bang as impossible or even improbable.

Regarding the FT argument, I don't believe it succeeds at this point. While there is a general consensus that life can only exist along a narrow stretch of physical constant values, that means nothing if we're part of a much larger multiverse (which is also popular with physicists). The jury is still out on whether a multiverse actually exists or not, but as long as it's a live possibility, it provides a credible alternative to the "God did it" explanation.

rocketdodger

3rd September 2009, 07:01 PM

However, if there are trillions of ways the universe could have gone, and only a few are life-permitting, then that is both extremely improbable and statiscally significant. Chance alone fails to explain it, unless combined with a multiverse or oscillating universe. Some examples of the precise values needed:

OOPS -- there it is again.

That darn assumption that has zero evidence to support it...

yy2bggggs

4th September 2009, 02:37 AM

Boy, you are drowning in statistical white noise.
Boy, you're whining a lot!

Here's an off the wall question. How did you generate that first sequence?
Almost any suffiently large sample of random numbers will yield low-probability statistically insignificant patterns or groupings.
That's correct. But coins, weighted or no, still do not produce GF patterns any higher than chance, and the chances get smaller with more flips.

There would otherwise be no need to go over your points demonstrating this, except for this old-hat you drag out, which by now should definitely be considered ultimate fail:
Consider:

122221222222222112221222122112
[Okay, but first off, this is a smaller set. 55 was already right on the border of getting significant results with GF patterns, but you felt the need to go down to 30 flips?]
This obviously came from a non-random process (e.g., a person hitting 1's and 2's on a keyboard), as I will clearly demonstrate:
[It looks okay to me. How about this sequence... is it random or not?:
HHH]

Okay... so here comes the fail... I'm just going to label these...
[1] In the first fifteen digits, there are thirteen 2's! The odds of that happening are very low. Clearly, someone had their finger on the "2" key a little long, then decided to throw a couple 1's in there to not make it too obvious.
[2] In the next fifteen numbers, there are three times as many 1's as in the first fifteen numbers. Again, not too likely for that to happen. Looks like someone was trying to even out the set by adding three times as many 1's in the 2nd half.
[3] The runs, in order, are four 2's, nine 2's, two 1's, three 2's, three 2's,
two 2's, and two 1's. A very improbable set of runs! Also, you can see the runs dramatically decrease in size after the nine 2's. This is obviously a sign that the person was afraid another long run would make the sequence appear deliberate.
[4] The distribution is twenty-two 2's and eight 1's. A fairly improbable distribution. But a skewed distribution is just the sort of thing someone would pull because large random sequences often don't appear random.
...and here it is...
When you multiply all these improbabilities together, it is clearly the work of someone just hitting one's and two's on their keyboard. What will they pull next? A max three groupings of three numbers on a 55 number sequence?
So, Malerin... what on "Bob"'s soiled planet do you think you're calculating by multiplying the probability of events [1] through [4] listed above? What would such a product mean?

westprog

4th September 2009, 02:59 AM

Amd again you are consdering extremes as some sort of argument, what is the expansion rate was so high that there was no coallesing, what if gravity was so low, what if it collapsed so fast.

Sure if you alter things by the billions that sort of stuff would happen. But to quote Carter "if we change this one variable and the others don't change", well if you change one variable by factors of ten , how reasonable is it that the other factors remain the same.

Really read this
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Cosmo/FineTune.pdf

Especially the stuff around page 12.

Yes, I've read it, and it's certainly interesting - but the fact that some of the paremeters are less critical than others is not really earth-shaking stuff. But this paper is the kind of research I think should be occurring.

westprog

4th September 2009, 03:11 AM

What cosmologist where said what?

Fred Hoyle said

The universe looks like a put-up job.

Just Six Numbers - Martin Rees (http://www.ichthus.info/BigBang/Docs/Just6num.pdf)

Dancing David

4th September 2009, 04:56 AM

If N had a few less zeros,

Now that is what I call precise, first off you compare two different forces that have different strengths at different scales (why does gravity the weaker force dominate large scale interactions ?) and then you throw out the word few, that is not 'precise'.
10^36 is a big number and a few zeros could mean a factor of ten to 10,000.

:)

If Є were 0.006 or 0.008, we could not exist.

Funny they don't state what that number is, i will have to look it up, is it the ratio of the weak and the strong force?

The we have omega and lamda, two cosmological factots, um what ios the variance of the universe and how do you define precision in the universe. Still not 'fine tuning'.

:)

A factor of what equals what percetage change in this factor, it is not given.

They are wrong about the dimensions for sure. There are four dimensions.

Dancing David

4th September 2009, 07:46 AM

The one factor I did not identify is likely the fine structure constant: alpha
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-structure_constant

Jonnyclueless

4th September 2009, 08:02 AM

I'm not a strict idealist. I think it has less metaphysical problems than materialism. I would catgorize myself a theist more than anything else, and I have no problem with dualism (an immaterial God interacting with a material universe). So I don't view the Big Bang as impossible or even improbable.

Regarding the FT argument, I don't believe it succeeds at this point. While there is a general consensus that life can only exist along a narrow stretch of physical constant values, that means nothing if we're part of a much larger multiverse (which is also popular with physicists). The jury is still out on whether a multiverse actually exists or not, but as long as it's a live possibility, it provides a credible alternative to the "God did it" explanation.

But even without a multiverse, you still have the burden of proving that the constants even could be different. The universe may be the way it is because it could not possibly exist any other way. Many of these constants as mentioned are dependent on each other and cannot simply be tweaked individually. And there is no evidence to suggest they could be tweaked period.

And of course this only covers life as we know it in our tiny view of the universe. So even if we were to overlook this problem of not being able to show that the universe could even exist with different parameters, we then would have to show that life of any kind, not just what we know could not exist.

westprog

4th September 2009, 10:08 AM

But even without a multiverse, you still have the burden of proving that the constants even could be different. The universe may be the way it is because it could not possibly exist any other way. Many of these constants as mentioned are dependent on each other and cannot simply be tweaked individually. And there is no evidence to suggest they could be tweaked period.

And of course this only covers life as we know it in our tiny view of the universe. So even if we were to overlook this problem of not being able to show that the universe could even exist with different parameters, we then would have to show that life of any kind, not just what we know could not exist.

So if the universe could not possibly exist any other way - why couldn't it exist any other way? It seems like a rephrasing of the problem, not a resolution.

westprog

4th September 2009, 10:13 AM

Now that is what I call precise, first off you compare two different forces that have different strengths at different scales (why does gravity the weaker force dominate large scale interactions ?) and then you throw out the word few, that is not 'precise'.
10^36 is a big number and a few zeros could mean a factor of ten to 10,000.

:)

Funny they don't state what that number is, i will have to look it up, is it the ratio of the weak and the strong force?

The we have omega and lamda, two cosmological factots, um what ios the variance of the universe and how do you define precision in the universe. Still not 'fine tuning'.

:)

A factor of what equals what percetage change in this factor, it is not given.

They are wrong about the dimensions for sure. There are four dimensions.

That's a one page extract from the entire book. Since Rees is a cosmologist, I'd trust him on matters of fact. He might well explain how space-time fits as a dimension.

Jonnyclueless

4th September 2009, 11:15 AM

So if the universe could not possibly exist any other way - why couldn't it exist any other way? It seems like a rephrasing of the problem, not a resolution.

I'm not claiming it cannot, you are claiming it can. Until you can demonstrate that, you don't have an argument.

Jonnyclueless

4th September 2009, 11:17 AM

That's a one page extract from the entire book. Since Rees is a cosmologist, I'd trust him on matters of fact. He might well explain how space-time fits as a dimension.

Someone simply being a cosmologist does not make them right. You can't hide behind someone's credentials, you need to present their work that makes the explanation.

Saying all 4 dimensions is one dimension is nonsensical no matter who says it. Show is work where he exaplins himself.

rocketdodger

4th September 2009, 11:18 AM

So if the universe could not possibly exist any other way - why couldn't it exist any other way? It seems like a rephrasing of the problem, not a resolution.

Why could mathematics not possibly exist any other way?

Why can't 1 + 1 == 3, instead of 2?

Same answer.

You seem to be suffering from a case of the inverse of special pleading, to demand an explanation for things like why the universe is the way it is when you accept many other things as axioms without question.

Furthermore, how on Earth is interjecting a fine tuner not the same thing? How is goddidit a resolution? Because God is axiomatic, maybe? hmmmm

Malerin

4th September 2009, 04:15 PM

Boy, you're whining a lot!

Really? Would you say I'm "vomiting" arguments? :p I like that imagery, RD. :)

Here's an off the wall question. How did you generate that first sequence?

http://www.psychicscience.org/random.aspx

Got in on the 12th sequence. Different sequence than the original I posted, but a max of three sets of three.

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924aa197a5b1c6b.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17473)

You will notice the sequence failed the intertrial independence check, but then so do the sequences at the end, which have larger runs.

That's correct. But coins, weighted or no, still do not produce GF patterns any higher than chance, and the chances get smaller with more flips.

I'm familiar with the Gambler's Fallacy (the erroneous belief that an outcome is "due" based on a prior sequence (e.g., some gamblers believe that "black" is due on a roulette wheel after seeing four "reds")), but "GF patterns" sounds like something you made up. In any case, it isn't widely discussed: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=com.google%3Aen-US%3Aofficial&hs=Iwh&q=%22gambler%27s+fallacy+pattern%22&btnG=Search&aq=f&oq=&aqi=

Ironically, when searching for "GF pattern", the only thing that looked like it had anything to do with statistics is page 8 of this very discussion: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=com.google:en-US:official&hs=zPN&q=%22GF+pattern%22&start=0&sa=N

As Reverend Lovejoy would say, Maybe it's somewhere in the back...

There would otherwise be no need to go over your points demonstrating this, except for this old-hat you drag out, which by now should definitely be considered ultimate fail:

[Okay, but first off, this is a smaller set. 55 was already right on the border of getting significant results with GF patterns, but you felt the need to go down to 30 flips?]

Random.Org wouldn't display a single column of 55 to fit the screen. PsychicScience does.

[It looks okay to me. How about this sequence... is it random or not?:
HHH]

Sample size is too small to avoid a type I/II error.

Okay... so here comes the fail... I'm just going to label these...

...and here it is...

I guess I missed the label. Where's the fail?

So, Malerin... what on "Bob"'s soiled planet do you think you're calculating by multiplying the probability of events [1] through [4] listed above?

Um, the improbability of all four patterns occuring in the same set?

What would such a product mean?

Nothing, which was my point. You can cherrypick numerous improbabilities in nearly any set, as you ended up doing. Unless they're significant they mean nothing.

Several large runs:

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924aa19fab8529e.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17475)

This one failed and has several runs of 4:
http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924aa19fc82f74b.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17476)

It is not hard at all to generate a sequence that fails such a check.

But this is all a needless derail. The original question was, which coin is biased, based on the two sequences I originally gave. Let's stick to that, shall we?

Malerin

4th September 2009, 04:30 PM

I'm not claiming it cannot, you are claiming it can. Until you can demonstrate that, you don't have an argument.

The same problem arises if the physical constants are "set" in some way. We can still generate models of what the universe would be like if the constants had different values, and nearly all those models fail to produce life-permitting universes, which begs two questions:

1. Is it just chance that the physical constants happen to be set at just the right values for life to appear?

2. If the constants are set at life-permitting values, that means it was impossible for the universe to be anything other than life-permitting. The impossibility of a life-less universe, to me at least, would be much more suggestive of a universe creator.

porch

4th September 2009, 05:53 PM

rocketdodger

4th September 2009, 05:58 PM

2. If the constants are set at life-permitting values, that means it was impossible for the universe to be anything other than life-permitting. The impossibility of a life-less universe, to me at least, would be much more suggestive of a universe creator.

What about the impossibility of a mathematics system where 1 + 1 != 2 ?

Why isn't that suggestive of a mathematics creator?

yy2bggggs

5th September 2009, 01:16 AM

Here's an off the wall question. How did you generate that first sequence?
http://www.psychicscience.org/random.aspxGot in on the 12th sequence. Different sequence than the original I posted, but a max of three sets of three.
That doesn't answer the question.
I'm familiar with the Gambler's Fallacy (the erroneous belief that an outcome is "due" based on a prior sequence (e.g., some gamblers believe that "black" is due on a roulette wheel after seeing four "reds")), but "GF patterns" sounds like something you made up.
...
In any case, it isn't widely discussed:You literally searched for the exact phrase "gambler's fallacy patterns"?

Try "clustering illusion". The term "gambler's fallacy pattern" isn't technical--I'm using it simply because I was talking about the gambler's fallacy earlier, so to refer to the pattern left by this, I say gambler's fallacy pattern.

And if you want to see the test I'm using somewhere else, try this (http://faculty.rhodes.edu/wetzel/random/mainbody.html#3tests) (random.org links to this site too... by the way).
Random.Org wouldn't display a single column of 55 to fit the screen. PsychicScience does.
It would if you read my instructions.

But that's okay... I can make this so easy to follow, even you can do it!
Spoilered to prevent accidental usage (you only get 1,000,000 bits per day--this uses 110,000 of them).
2000 sets of 55 flips courtesey of random.org (http://www.random.org/integers/?submit&base=2&num=10000&min=0&max=2047&col=5)
One per row, as a set of 5 eleven-digit binary numbers; 2,000 such rows.
I guess I missed the label. Where's the fail?
The fail isn't merely in your error--it's in the fact that we've been through this before talking about this very thing.

Given P(A) and P(B), here's how you get $$P\left(A \cap B \right)$$:
$P\left(A \cap B\right)=P\left(A \right)P\left(B \middle| A \right)$
This equation is always true. The product of P(A)P(B) means absolutely nothing useful, unless A and B are mutually independent, in which case $$P\left(B \right)=P\left(B \middle| A \right)$$.

So let's see if these events are mutually independent...
[2] is impossible if there are 6 or more 1's in the first 15. [1], coincidentally, can only possibly happen if that's the case. So [1] and [2] are dependent.
[1] and [2] together are a special case of [4], so they are dependent.

And as for [3], that deserves an entire new paragraph. The only way to get those successive "runs of 2" is to put a 1 in between. That would leave ambiguity of where to add the final 1, except for the fact that the last run has to be two 1's, so if you put it at that end, it would not match (that makes the last a run of 3). If you pair it with any other 1, it wouldn't be "the runs, in order" either (whichever 1 you pair it with suddenly creates a run of 2). You can't stick it inside one of the runs of 2 either, because you said exactly how long those were. The only place left is to stick that 1 on the left...

Meaning... that your description of [3] is simply another way to state the exact sequence in the first place. So [3] is a special case of [1], [2], and [4], and is identical with what you gave anyway. Its probability is exactly 2-30.

Your meaningless product is going to be smaller than the probability that you get the exact sequence by chance.
Um, the improbability of all four patterns occuring in the same set?Not even in the same ball park.

Several large runs:...
...and what are you trying to show exactly? Step back a moment.

I analyzed 2,000 samples of 55 head flips using random.org, showing you the results. I didn't go and click over and over again trying to figure out just the right one to show you, I just did one run. You, on the other hand, are running individual runs, trying to look for interesting patterns, and showing them to me one at a time.

Do you somehow think that by providing me anecdotal single samples that you personally ran through your confirmation bias filters, you somehow will nullify the results of my 2,000 samples?
But this is all a needless derail. The original question was, which coin is biased, based on the two sequences I originally gave. Let's stick to that, shall we?
This thread was started by Robin, and the topic of this thread is "The Fine Tuning argument". Therefore, I propose an alternative... let's just stick to things applicable to that topic as opposed to whatever points you were making, shall we?

Dancing David

5th September 2009, 06:19 AM

The same problem arises if the physical constants are "set" in some way. We can still generate models of what the universe would be like if the constants had different values, and nearly all those models fail to produce life-permitting universes, which begs two questions:

Um sure if you set gravity to a billion time it's current set, then it doesn't work, and considering that there is an infinite set of numbers larger than a billion, you have an infinite set of number where adjusting the strength of graivity causes the universe to collapse.

But there is also an infinite set of numbers between 2 and three.

So which set of infinity is larger Malerin?

We can generate an equal number of models where the conditions are favorable to life as well. Infinity is infinity.

So what was you point?

1. Is it just chance that the physical constants happen to be set at just the right values for life to appear?

Are there bacteria in boiling hot water?

2. If the constants are set at life-permitting values, that means it was impossible for the universe to be anything other than life-permitting. The impossibility of a life-less universe, to me at least, would be much more suggestive of a universe creator.

So every time you don't roll a six on a four sided die it indicates that god messed with the dice?

Jonnyclueless

5th September 2009, 11:39 AM

The same problem arises if the physical constants are "set" in some way. We can still generate models of what the universe would be like if the constants had different values, and nearly all those models fail to produce life-permitting universes, which begs two questions:

1. Is it just chance that the physical constants happen to be set at just the right values for life to appear?

2. If the constants are set at life-permitting values, that means it was impossible for the universe to be anything other than life-permitting. The impossibility of a life-less universe, to me at least, would be much more suggestive of a universe creator.

And you still run into the same problem. You have to first demonstrate that they even COULD be different. You just want to skip this step, make a huge baseless assumption that the constants we see in the universe cna be made to anything and a universe will be created regardless.

When you stop skipping this first step for which the rest of your argument is based on, then come talk to me.

And then you will need to define what you mean by life permitting. Because right now you define that is life as we know it. So your next step after filling in the first step you keep skipping will be to prove that the life we know is the ONLY kind of life that can possibly exist.

Good luck to you and we look forward to your research.

Malerin

5th September 2009, 12:06 PM

And you still run into the same problem. You have to first demonstrate that they even COULD be different.

That is where cosmology is right now. Nobody has discovered a principle for why the FS constant has the value it has. The value can't be derived from other values- it must be measured. If you want to defeat the FT argument by arguing that the values are "set" in some way, you need to provide evidence for that. But even this is besides the point.

All I have to demonstrate is that we can produce models of universes with different physical constant values. We can do this. Even small changes in constant values result in universes that have no stars, no atom formation, etc. Once you establish a narrow range of life-permitting universes, it doesn't matter if the constants are set or not, because the same question arises: A) if they're "fixed", why are they set at the precise values necessary for life? B) if they're not "fixed" why do they have life-permitting values they do?

Ironically, discovering that the values are set would knock out a competing explanation for God Did It (the multiverse or oscillating universe). If the values can't be anything other than what they are, a multiverse simply means innumerable life-perimitting universes. It would be like a lottery where the winning numbers always appear.

You just want to skip this step, make a huge baseless assumption that the constants we see in the universe cna be made to anything and a universe will be created regardless.

It's not a baseless assumption: there is no current model that shows the constants are set in any way. Maybe there will be 20 years from now, but it doesn't matter, as I just explained.

When you stop skipping this first step for which the rest of your argument is based on, then come talk to me.

Um, Ok.

And then you will need to define what you mean by life permitting. Because right now you define that is life as we know it.

What else would I define it as? Life as we don't know it? :rolleyes:

So your next step after filling in the first step you keep skipping will be to prove that the life we know is the ONLY kind of life that can possibly exist.

You can attack the FT this way, but you're going to be arguing against all the biological evidence that's been accumulated so far. For example (as Victor Stenger argues), you can claim that non-carbon based life is possible. But you have no evidence for that, and I have plenty of evidence that carbon is a necessary condition for life: every living thing so far examined is carbon-based. So if you attack the FT argument that way, all the biological evidence is against you and you're just throwing out fairy tales of non-molecular life, non-planetary life, etc.

Good luck to you and we look forward to your research.

Is that like the royal we?

Jonnyclueless

5th September 2009, 12:37 PM

That is where cosmology is right now. Nobody has discovered a principle for why the FS constant has the value it has. The value can't be derived from other values- it must be measured. If you want to defeat the FT argument by arguing that the values are "set" in some way, you need to provide evidence for that. But even this is besides the point.

Again, this is still incorrect for the reasons I explained the first time you said this. I am not arguing that the constants are fixed. YOU argued that they can be chance and therefore can be different. I am not the one who is making the assumption, you did. I simply cannot assume that the universe can exist in any combination. Thus my argument that you or anyone making the FS argument must first prove this assertion before they can continue. You cannot sit there and pretend I am making the assumption when I certainly am not.

All I have to demonstrate is that we can produce models of universes with different physical constant values. We can do this. Even small changes in constant values result in universes that have no stars, no atom formation, etc. Once you establish a narrow range of life-permitting universes, it doesn't matter if the constants are set or not, because the same question arises: A) if they're "fixed", why are they set at the precise values necessary for life? B) if they're not "fixed" why do they have life-permitting values they do?

And the ability to make models of different universes is not the issue. No one questions the ability to make models of them. And using terms like 'small changes" is subjective. Define small. Who's to say what small is. And as I pointed out earlier, you still have skipped the first step in this argument by making the assumption that it's even possible for a universe to exist under those models.

It's not a baseless assumption: there is no current model that shows the constants are set in any way. Maybe there will be 20 years from now, but it doesn't matter, as I just explained.

It is. You do not have any evidence to show that it is either fixed or that it can be variable. So without providing any evidence of that, you cannot assert that there was any chance at all. As I explained previously.

What else would I define it as? Life as we don't know it? :rolleyes:

Well then you should be able to see your error then. So all other combinations could support life. What does it matter if only one could support life as we know it. You could change your constants and you could result in a different form of life with the same intelligence potentials as we have.

You can attack the FT this way, but you're going to be arguing against all the biological evidence that's been accumulated so far. For example (as Victor Stenger argues), you can claim that non-carbon based life is possible. But you have no evidence for that, and I have plenty of evidence that carbon is a necessary condition for life: every living thing so far examined is carbon-based. So if you attack the FT argument that way, all the biological evidence is against you and you're just throwing out fairy tales of non-molecular life, non-planetary life, etc.

No I am not. I am not going against any evidence accumulated what so ever. I don't need evidence for non-carbon based life. I am not claiming it exists. YOU are claiming it does not and assuming that carbon based life is the only possibility. So again, not only am I not attacking biological evidence, you are making a completely false claim about my position.

Is that like the royal we?

No, 'we' as in 'we'.

Dancing David

5th September 2009, 12:38 PM

That is where cosmology is right now. Nobody has discovered a principle for why the FS constant has the value it has. The value can't be derived from other values- it must be measured.

It is derived from other values and measured, I could be wrong.
(from the wiki page)
e is the elementary charge;
ħ = h/2π is the reduced Planck constant;
c is the speed of light in a vacuum;
ε0 is the electric constant;
μ0 is the magnetic constant or vacuum permeability, a defined conversion factor;
ke is the constant of Coulomb's law.

In electrostatic cgs units, the unit of electric charge, the statcoulomb, is defined so that the permittivity factor, 4πε0, is 1 and dimensionless. The fine-structure constant then becomes

rocketdodger

5th September 2009, 01:48 PM

It would be like a lottery where the winning numbers always appear.

Not quite.

It would be like what you thought was a lottery, where the winning numbers always appear, but it turns out there is only one number to begin with.

rocketdodger

5th September 2009, 01:54 PM

All I have to demonstrate is that we can produce models of universes with different physical constant values. We can do this. Even small changes in constant values result in universes that have no stars, no atom formation, etc. Once you establish a narrow range of life-permitting universes, it doesn't matter if the constants are set or not, because the same question arises: A) if they're "fixed", why are they set at the precise values necessary for life? B) if they're not "fixed" why do they have life-permitting values they do?

All I have to demonstrate is that we can produce models of universes where 1 + 1 != 2. We can do this. Even small changes in the value of the successor to 1 result in universes that are completely whacky. Once you establish a narrow range of non-whacky universes, it doesn't matter if the successor to 1 is set or not, because the same question arises: A) if it is "fixed," why is it set at the precise value necessary for mathematics to make sense? B) if it is not "fixed," why does it have the coherent formal system permitting value it does?

porch

5th September 2009, 03:23 PM

All I have to demonstrate is that we can produce models of universes with different physical constant values. We can do this. Even small changes in constant values result in universes that have no stars, no atom formation, etc. Once you establish a narrow range of life-permitting universes, it doesn't matter if the constants are set or not, because the same question arises: A) if they're "fixed", why are they set at the precise values necessary for life? B) if they're not "fixed" why do they have life-permitting values they do?

Again I'll ask, why is it that you focus on life in particular for the fine tuning argument? For the existence of life to be suggestive of a creator with intent, you have to presume that if this creator exists, you know what it's intent would be. Do you know the mind of God? As far as we know, the constants are set the way they are because God really digs stars, and life is a byproduct that he doesn't give a rat sass about. Then again, as far as we know, God doesn't exist.

Malerin

5th September 2009, 07:56 PM

Again I'll ask, why is it that you focus on life in particular for the fine tuning argument? For the existence of life to be suggestive of a creator with intent, you have to presume that if this creator exists, you know what it's intent would be. Do you know the mind of God? As far as we know, the constants are set the way they are because God really digs stars, and life is a byproduct that he doesn't give a rat sass about. Then again, as far as we know, God doesn't exist.

It's not knowing the mind of God. It's what is the probability of the existence of some supernatural life-preferring being capable of creating the universe? This would cover most definitions of God: that God is powerful enough to create the universe, and generally likes to have living things around, for whatever reason. As long as I don't think the odds of this type of being existing are very very small, then the FT argument will have the result that the existence of life is grounds to believe either in such a being, or a suffiently large multiverse, because Pr(E/H1) is much greater than Pr(E/~H1).
(E = life, H1 = a supernatural life-preferring being exists).

Also note that Pr(E/H2) is much greater than Pr(E/~H2) where
H2 = a suffieciently large multiverse exists.
This doesn't mean we know any properties of a multiverse (other than that it contains a large number of universes). Just that the existence of life is more probable given a multiverse than given chance alone. This is the view of some atheist phyicists. An oscillating universe works too, but that's not a very popular view these days, I think.

Think of it this way. Suppose the first astronaught on Mars finds a rock like the picture on the bottom, but with straighter sides and more of a pyramid shape. Each side has similar indentations. The first indentation is by itself. The second is a group of 2, then a group of 3, 5, 7, etc. All the primes up to 101 on every side. There are two ways to explain the existence of such a stone:
1. Chance (weathering or some natural process)
2. Design

The chance hypothesis, while logically possible, is so remote as to not be worth consideration. That leaves design. Specifially, that means design by an extra terrestial being with some knowledge of mathematical concepts. That does not mean we "know the mind" of such a being because we're assuming it knows about math. That's just the only way the design hypothesis can work. There's nothing ad hoc about it.

This is the same reasoning the FT proponent is using: if chance seems unlikely, what kind of being could possibly adjust the physical constants to have life-permitting values? A life-hating being? A being not powerful to alter the physical constants? That would be just as absurd as assuming the being that made the indentations on the Martion rock was mathematically ignorant.

http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/image/0401/adirondack_spirit.jpg

Jonnyclueless

5th September 2009, 08:21 PM

Malerin

5th September 2009, 09:45 PM

Why are you limiting yourself to only 2 possibilities? Why just chance and design. It could be neither. A long time ago we assumed fairy rings were made by fairies because they were perfectly round and came up over night. But they weren't designed. And they didn't happen by chance. They happened by a natural phenomenon that was guided by a natural process. And there's always "I don't know".

ID tries so hard to set up a scenario where they can say it's either chance, or they can insert whatever they want. And this is why they can't get a peer reviewed paper. Because you can only -pull off such arguments on an internet forum. Just ask Dembski.

In the scenario I described (the Martian rock), do you think anyone would be content to say, "Beats the Hell out of me.", step over the rock, and be on their merry way? Personally, I would want to investigate it a little bit further. "I don't know" sounds an awful lot like a cop out, like "God works in mysterious ways", which I think is a theistic cop out a lot of theists take, esp. for the Problem of Evil. The FT argument got going because physicists began noticing that small deviations in the physical constant values resulted in universes very inhospitable to life. Nobody said "to hell with it".

As far as a third hypothesis, can you think of one? I can only think of two: chance or design. Where I agree with you on "I don't know" is in choosing either a multiverse or God to explain the existence of life, at this stage in the game.

yy2bggggs

5th September 2009, 10:09 PM

In the scenario I described (the Martian rock), do you think anyone would be content to say, "Beats the Hell out of me.", step over the rock, and be on their merry way?
So make it less hypothetical, Malerin. What would you say? That God must have designed Mars that way?

Lord Emsworth

5th September 2009, 10:39 PM

It's not knowing the mind of God. It's what is the probability of the existence of some supernatural life-preferring being capable of creating the universe? This would cover most definitions of God: that God is powerful enough to create the universe, and generally likes to have living things around, for whatever reason. As long as I don't think the odds of this type of being existing are very very small,

Sorry, to cut your sentence in half. But the odds of this type of being existing ARE very small.

There is a probably infinite range of preferences a "[...]-preferring being capable of creating the universe" could have. Aside from biological life.

In addition there is a probably infinite range of objects that a "[...]-preferring being capable of creating [...]" could be capable of creating. Aside from (pathetic) universes reliant on (miserable) 'fine-tuning constants.'

Andrew Wiggin

5th September 2009, 10:39 PM

This seems to me to be complicating the heck out of a simple concept, especially by conflating it with the concept that improbability equals impossibility. A full house is improbable but they happen. Winning the lottery is improbable, but it happens. I don't even see probability having a place in the argument. This is like a pathetic magic trick where you turn over a card, look at it, and announce what it is. It would be improbable to announce it BEFORE turning it over, but after you've observed it it's a sure thing.

Here's how I see it, more or less. This is pretty much off the cuff.

The universe has a set of properties. If those properties were different in some way then the universe would (very hypothetically) be unable to support life.

No universe with properties unable to support life will contain life.

Life of some sort is required to support consciousness, and consciousness is required to support the act of observation.

No universe, inhabited or otherwise, can be observed from outside, so only universes that can support life can have observers.

We observe our universe to exist, therefore our universe is among the set that can support life.

I think this is at least as sound as some of the theological mumbo jumbo I've seen thrown around.

A.

Jonnyclueless

5th September 2009, 10:53 PM

In the scenario I described (the Martian rock), do you think anyone would be content to say, "Beats the Hell out of me.", step over the rock, and be on their merry way? Personally, I would want to investigate it a little bit further. "I don't know" sounds an awful lot like a cop out, like "God works in mysterious ways", which I think is a theistic cop out a lot of theists take, esp. for the Problem of Evil. The FT argument got going because physicists began noticing that small deviations in the physical constant values resulted in universes very inhospitable to life. Nobody said "to hell with it".

As far as a third hypothesis, can you think of one? I can only think of two: chance or design. Where I agree with you on "I don't know" is in choosing either a multiverse or God to explain the existence of life, at this stage in the game.

Well for one thing, the rock you point out isn't something that would really leave one wondering very much.

"I don't Know" is absolutely not a cop out. And it doesn't mean we don't look for explanations. It simply means we don't make **** up when we don't have one. you seem think that it's not a cop out when you can't find an explanation and simply inject "god did it", than to be honest in a situation where one actually does not know.

Nobody said to hell with the universe, but they DO say "we don't know exactly the reasons they are the way they are". As opposed to the cop out of "well god then did it" (also referred to as 'design'.

Yes, YOU can only think of 2. That's the problem. I gave you an example of fairy circles. They did not come about by chance OR design. And your model of limiting yourself to only 2 choices would have gotten you in trouble. And "unknown" works in all situations when something is unknown. Unknown or "i don't know" is NOT "I am not going to bother to find out". "I don't know" Isn't "I am going to move on and forget about it". If anything, that's what I would say about limiting one to only 2 possibilities.

Malerin

5th September 2009, 11:01 PM

This seems to me to be complicating the heck out of a simple concept, especially by conflating it with the concept that improbability equals impossibility.

Nobody's claiming that. Given enough chances, the most improbable events can happen, which is why the possibility of a multiverse is a competing hypothesis (though, if we find out the constants are set in some fundamental way, a multiverse might cease to be a viable competing hypothesis).

A full house is improbable but they happen.

Sure, and ten royal flushes in a row can happen, but I doubt you'd want to play with the guy who just dealt them to himself ;) All poker card combinations are equally probable (2d, 2c, 6d, 8s, 9s has the same chance as 10h, Jh, Kh, Qh, Ah), but some are statisically significant, because they are more probable on the theory of cheating than random chance. Hence our unwillingness to play with someone who keeps dealing themselves great hands.

Winning the lottery is improbable, but it happens.

If the same person won, say, 5 times in a row, would you think maybe they're rigging the game? At what point would you become suspicious?

I don't even see probability having a place in the argument. This is like a pathetic magic trick where you turn over a card, look at it, and announce what it is. It would be improbable to announce it BEFORE turning it over, but after you've observed it it's a sure thing.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Are you saying that since life exists, we can't claim it's improbable life exists?

Here's how I see it, more or less. This is pretty much off the cuff.

The universe has a set of properties. If those properties were different in some way then the universe would (very hypothetically) be unable to support life.

No universe with properties unable to support life will contain life.

Life of some sort is required to support consciousness, and consciousness is required to support the act of observation.

No universe, inhabited or otherwise, can be observed from outside, so only universes that can support life can have observers.

We observe our universe to exist, therefore our universe is among the set that can support life.

Sure, this sounds like the "if the universe had happened any other way, we wouldn't be here to talk about it, so what's the big deal?". I don't think it works as an objection, personally. I like the Sharpshooter Analogy (here, with a critique: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/tuning.html)

Malerin

5th September 2009, 11:16 PM

Well for one thing, the rock you point out isn't something that would really leave one wondering very much.

Really? A rock on Mars with markings corresponding to all the primes to 101 wouldn't make you wonder at all? Don't you think that would be big news? Hell, a little robot crawling around on Mars shooting pictures of rocks was big news for awhile.

"I don't Know" is absolutely not a cop out. And it doesn't mean we don't look for explanations. It simply means we don't make **** up when we don't have one. you seem think that it's not a cop out when you can't find an explanation and simply inject "god did it", than to be honest in a situation where one actually does not know.

Not at all. I'm at the "I don't know" stage right now. I think it's either God or a multiverse. I don't know. We need to investigate more.

Nobody said to hell with the universe, but they DO say "we don't know exactly the reasons they are the way they are". As opposed to the cop out of "well god then did it" (also referred to as 'design')

Why is that a cop out? If it's possible "God did it", shouldn't that be explored too? In anycase, fine-tuning been kicking around for decades and voluminous amounts of research and speculation has been done on it.

Yes, YOU can only think of 2. That's the problem. I gave you an example of fairy circles. They did not come about by chance OR design.

Aren't fairy rings fungal growths in grass? That sounds like chance to me. When I say chance, I mean a natural process, like the weathering example I gave for the Martian rock: erosion just happened to wear away spots on the rock that corresponded to prime numbers. Fairy rings happen to be circular fungal growths. I'm sure people attached significance to it before they understood the natural causes. In the same way, if we discover life can exist no matter what the values of the constants, then the natural explanation would win out.

And your model of limiting yourself to only 2 choices would have gotten you in trouble. And "unknown" works in all situations when something is unknown. Unknown or "i don't know" is NOT "I am not going to bother to find out". "I don't know" Isn't "I am going to move on and forget about it". If anything, that's what I would say about limiting one to only 2 possibilities.

Again, I agree with you. The FT argument doesn't work because we can legitimally say we don't know whether a multiverse exists or not. But we DO know, at the moment, that life can only exist in a very narrow range of physical constant values. That sets up the improbablity of life, which leads to the multiverse/God dichotomy.

westprog

6th September 2009, 02:43 AM

westprog

6th September 2009, 02:46 AM

All I have to demonstrate is that we can produce models of universes where 1 + 1 != 2. We can do this. Even small changes in the value of the successor to 1 result in universes that are completely whacky. Once you establish a narrow range of non-whacky universes, it doesn't matter if the successor to 1 is set or not, because the same question arises: A) if it is "fixed," why is it set at the precise value necessary for mathematics to make sense? B) if it is not "fixed," why does it have the coherent formal system permitting value it does?

You do this trick a lot, but changing a few words to make a nonsensical post doesn't make the original post nonsensical. It isn't possible to make 1+1 = 2 - we know this and can prove it.

Jonnyclueless

6th September 2009, 03:14 AM

Really? A rock on Mars with markings corresponding to all the primes to 101 wouldn't make you wonder at all? Don't you think that would be big news? Hell, a little robot crawling around on Mars shooting pictures of rocks was big news for awhile.[quote]

I see no sch thing in your picture. But in the spirit of the conversation, a McDonalds on mars would also possibly perk my curiosity. So would a 1 eyes one horned flying purple people eater.

[QUOTE]Not at all. I'm at the "I don't know" stage right now. I think it's either God or a multiverse. I don't know. We need to investigate more.

Well it's one thing to think. We all have our opinions. I think there's live out there in the universe, but there's nothing to support it. I just wouldn't want to limit myself to only 2 possibilities when it's all unknown.

Why is that a cop out? If it's possible "God did it", shouldn't that be explored too? In anycase, fine-tuning been kicking around for decades and voluminous amounts of research and speculation has been done on it.

What makes it a possible 'god did it'? No it shouldn't be explored. What should be explored is the evidence, not a conclusion. In order to get to the god conclusion, one is required to make some big assumptions first. Not making those assumptions and not including a conclusion as evidence does not mean you are ruling out a god. If there is a god behind it, then the evidence will show that. So there's no point in trying to start with a conclusion. That just sets one up for errors. But I hope you at least agree that if for the sake of argument a god were behind it, then the evidence would show that at some point if not now. No need to look specifically for a god.

Aren't fairy rings fungal growths in grass? That sounds like chance to me. When I say chance, I mean a natural process, like the weathering example I gave for the Martian rock: erosion just happened to wear away spots on the rock that corresponded to prime numbers. Fairy rings happen to be circular fungal growths. I'm sure people attached significance to it before they understood the natural causes. In the same way, if we discover life can exist no matter what the values of the constants, then the natural explanation would win out.

Chance is certainly not an appropriate word for natural causes. Chance means it could go either way or implies it was a random coincidence. It's like saying evolution is dictated by chance. that would be outright incorrect because there's no real chance involved (generally speaking only). Natural selection isn't chance. It's a natural process. So using the word chance if you just mean natural process is misleading, and bordering dishonest.

For example with your rock. It could be that it's placed in a spot where there is wind blowing from 3 directions that meet in that spot. And being that there are rocks everywhere, there would almost have to be one in that meeting area. And so it gets worn by wind and sand from 3 sides and creates a pyramid shape. That's not chance. That's just the expected outcome of the conditions of the environment. Chance would be you have a bunch of rocks and no such phenomenon, but one rock just happens to by chance get worn evenly in that way. That WOULD be chance.

We would also win out if we found the universe couldn't exist without the constants being the way they are. Or that life could exist in any number of ways with different constants.

Again, I agree with you. The FT argument doesn't work because we can legitimally say we don't know whether a multiverse exists or not. But we DO know, at the moment, that life can only exist in a very narrow range of physical constant values. That sets up the improbablity of life, which leads to the multiverse/God dichotomy.

I don't think it works regardless of there being a multiverse or not. I think it fails even if we assume there is no multiverse. Because it is based on assumptions. Ones I have presented already. As soon as someone can prove that the universe can exist with different constants, then they can argue that the universe just happened into fall into this combination. It wouldn't prove a god by any stretch, but FT would no longer be a logical fallacy.

Singularitarian

6th September 2009, 03:53 AM

Here is one for you all. The binding of the fine structure of \alpha is itself an indication of fine-tuning, but there is even more at work.

Electrons themselves have just the correct ratio of charge, which is as we have all learned from High School as being negative to balance the repelling force of the proton. If the electron where any stronger, it would be able to penetrate the once impervious protons repulsive charge and nothing would exist at all because the electron would go spiralling into the proton. This would happen in about one hundred microseconds (a microsecond is a millionth part of one second). This would be a catastrophic depletion in the nucleons structure and all atoms would shrink in size. But this does not happen because the uncertainty forbids the electron to be so well defined to the center of the nuclei of atoms thus being a fine-tuned balance within itself.

fls

6th September 2009, 04:37 AM

Think of it this way. Suppose the first astronaught on Mars finds a rock like the picture on the bottom, but with straighter sides and more of a pyramid shape. Each side has similar indentations. The first indentation is by itself. The second is a group of 2, then a group of 3, 5, 7, etc. All the primes up to 101 on every side. There are two ways to explain the existence of such a stone:
1. Chance (weathering or some natural process)
2. Design

What do you make of the examples that we already have of this sort of mathematics writ in stone? Sunflowers have phi on their face. Why don't scientists find that to be proof of God?

Linda

Beth

6th September 2009, 05:45 AM

Some do.

fls

6th September 2009, 05:58 AM

"Proof" as in 'testing the truth of something'.

Linda

AdinDraco

6th September 2009, 06:30 AM

Stupid question: people keep going on about how improbable that the universe is, and that it's too improbable to be natural/chance/whatever. My question is how do we know thats it's too improbable? What's the magic number or are we just assuming that the odds are so huge as to be self evident? Do we have some objective method or do the odds of the universe being the way that it is just obviously too big? Why?

Also, since we don't know if there is a multiverse/something-else or the nature of it or what came before the big bang (if there was a before) how do we know the odds of our universe coming to exist as it does? Can calculating the odds of our universe being the way it is be compared to the tired old creationist argument "look at the giraffe, it's too improbable for evolution to create that". There's an assumption of the giraffe/current universe being some sort of end goal. If evolution was re-run we wouldn't get the giraffe, but we'd get something. If the big bang was re-run, could we end up with a universe with different numbers in many of the constants but still viable in some way?

This may be newbie concerns/questions but to quote a recent example at random, I can see that someone winning the lottery say...6...times would be super extremely suspicious and be cause for an exhaustive investigation. But if no other evidence of cheating is found, surely the act of winning that many times is not, by itself, definite proof of anything? (I mean, if 1 or 2 wins is not proof of cheating, but 6 obviously is...how many wins over how long changes it from luck/obsessive-lottery-playing to proof-of-cheating).

Or have I completely missed the point?

fls

6th September 2009, 06:51 AM

westprog

6th September 2009, 08:49 AM

FT proponents are somehow blind to this...

The probability that the occurrence of an event was due to chance is not the probability of that event due to chance.

They merrily proceed to pretend the two are equivalent and the rest is history. :)

Linda

Yes, if the alternative universes are all equally differentiated, then the existence of this one, no matter how unlikely, would not be particularly remarkable or in need of explanation. It's only significant if this universe possesses objective properties which the vast majority of the other universes do not. The objective properties need not include the presence of life. It can be the number of different objects, the existence of stars, or elements, or chemistry.

I've noticed that the FT opponents tend to assume that all the alternative universes will have equally relevant properties. If so, they should point them out.

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 09:45 AM

You do this trick a lot, but changing a few words to make a nonsensical post doesn't make the original post nonsensical. It isn't possible to make 1+1 = 2 - we know this and can prove it.

ORLY?

How would you go about proving it, might I ask?

Would you, for example, check the consistency of the resulting formal system where 1 + 1 != S(1) ?

Hmmm... isn't that kind of like, for example, the fact that we would not exist the way we do if the constants were much different?

I mean, this is all I am saying. Mathematics describes reality. 1 + 1 == S(1) because that is consistent with reality. Likewise, the values of the constants are what we have measured them to be because that is consistent with reality.

So going and changing the values of constants in equations in models is not guaranteed to be consistent with reality any more than changing the value of the successor to 1.

Reality is what it is, whether you like it or not westprog.

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 09:49 AM

I've noticed that the FT opponents tend to assume that all the alternative universes will have equally relevant properties. If so, they should point them out.

I've noticed that FT proponents tend to assume that the alternate universes ... actually can exist. If so, they should point them out.

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 09:54 AM

fls

6th September 2009, 09:57 AM

Yes, if the alternative universes are all equally differentiated, then the existence of this one, no matter how unlikely, would not be particularly remarkable or in need of explanation. It's only significant if this universe possesses objective properties which the vast majority of the other universes do not. The objective properties need not include the presence of life. It can be the number of different objects, the existence of stars, or elements, or chemistry.

This stipulation has absolutely nothing to do with what I said. I can only presume that you think it does, which pretty much makes my case for me. ;)

All we have stipulated is that it is this sort of universe which is of interest.

Linda

Andrew Wiggin

6th September 2009, 01:33 PM

The question still remains - why does the universe need to have observers?

The universe doesn't need to have observers, but no universe without observers has anyone to look around and say 'hey cool, life!'

A

Andrew Wiggin

6th September 2009, 01:45 PM

Another fallacy I'm seeing here is something that for lack of vocabulary and the fact that I'm not an astrophysicist, I'll approach by analogy.

We know that our own planet has a set of properties that support life. We know this because we look around and see life, including ourselves. We can hypothesize that the exact conditions of this planet are necessary for life to exist, and therefore life doesn't exist anywhere but here, but there's no way to prove that. In fact, the great variety of life found here and the vast differences in the environments in which it is found (anywhere from algae that live on the antarctic ice sheet to creatures that live in superheated chemical laden water from volcanic vents in the deepest oceans) shows that a range of conditions can support life, and even if ONLY places with conditions somewhere within this range can support life, then these conditions are diverse enough to be less unlikely than they initially seem.

Similarly, I don't see any proof or even any way of proving that life would be made impossible by tiny changes in the conditions of the universe. More likely it would mean that life in a universe with different conditions would be different.

A.

Singularitarian

6th September 2009, 02:16 PM

Singularitarian

6th September 2009, 02:17 PM

The universe doesn't need to have observers, but no universe without observers has anyone to look around and say 'hey cool, life!'

A

Atually. recent evidence has shown the universe would still exist, but not as we know it. Particles and all arrays of systems take on bizarre natures. I will find the reference.

REF http://www.economist.com:80/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13226725

Singularitarian

6th September 2009, 02:20 PM

For those who may not understand the reference, i wrote it in words which might help clarify it for the layman:

Qoutations from article, and bolded by my replies

''In the 1990s a physicist called Lucien Hardy proposed a thought experiment that makes nonsense of the famous interaction between matter and
antimatter—that when a particle meets its antiparticle, the pair always annihilate one another in a burst of energy''

This is due to the wave function. Because ultimately the observer-effect of Copehagen left the whole universe ghostly and unpredictable without
an observer, when two opposite particles of CP invariance, that is, an electron and a positron come together, they would normally anihilate. However,
since no one is around to define the collapse very well, such as an arbitrary observer, then it would have been possible for them not to release their
energies

''Dr Hardy’s scheme left open the possibility that in some cases when their interaction is not observed a particle and an antiparticle could
interact with one another and survive. Of course, since the interaction has to remain unseen, no one should ever notice this happening, which
is why the result is known as Hardy’s paradox.''

Needless to say, quantum decoherence, the ability for quantum wave in some kind of solution to decohere and collapse without an observer has been known
experimentally since 1996 by Dr Alain Aspect and his team. However, this takes time, and statistical averages still would allow Hardy's pardox

''The two teams used the same technique in their experiments. They managed to do what had previously been thought impossible: they probed reality without
disturbing it. Not disturbing it is the quantum-mechanical equivalent of not really looking. So they were able to show that the universe does indeed
exist when it is not being observed.''

The choice of words in the article is somewhat, surprisingly misleading. It has been known from a quantum mechanical viewpoint and even speculated
by nuerophysicists that reality would exist, just not very well defined. Dr Fred Alan Wolf once said, ''you might be lucky enough to see an atom quantum
leap at the corner of your eye,'' suggesting that events will still happen, even if not collapsed by any direct measurement.

''What the several researchers found was that there were more photons in some places than there should have been and fewer in others. The stunning result,
though, was that in some places the number of photons was actually less than zero. Fewer than zero particles being present usually means that you have
antiparticles instead. But there is no such thing as an antiphoton (photons are their own antiparticles, and are pure energy in any case), so that cannot
apply here.''

Basically, if current theory on photons is correct, then the results are showing that Hardy's Paradox explains how mathematically consistent objects
equivalent to antipartners would behave is certainly polorized photons cancelling each other out in some parts of space, but not in others. Needless to say
and totally unrelated to your questions, is that i raised the idea that we might have our contentions on antiphoton possibilities wrong, but there is
my two cents

westprog

6th September 2009, 02:52 PM

Similarly, I don't see any proof or even any way of proving that life would be made impossible by tiny changes in the conditions of the universe. More likely it would mean that life in a universe with different conditions would be different.

A.

There's no way to prove it, but I think we can make certain assumptions about universes that last less than a millionth of a second, or consist entirely of diffuse hydrogen.

Singularitarian

6th September 2009, 03:05 PM

There's no way to prove it, but I think we can make certain assumptions about universes that last less than a millionth of a second, or consist entirely of diffuse hydrogen.

Of course things can be proved that is unless the theory is beyond rationality. The theory in question however is not.

Think of this as a cautionary tale to your response.

Dancing David

6th September 2009, 03:21 PM

There's no way to prove it, but I think we can make certain assumptions about universes that last less than a millionth of a second, or consist entirely of diffuse hydrogen.

yes but there are also an infinite number of possible universes where that does not happen, say the fine structrure constant can only vary .01% from it's current value.
There are an infinite number of values between the current value and the one where is fails. So how do you say that there are a higher number of universes where the value doesn't work, fine there are an infinite number of universes where it does work. two mutual sets of infinity, neither is bigger.

Now gravity on the other hand can vary widely.

Jonnyclueless

6th September 2009, 05:54 PM

It is true folks.

Imagine you where given a magickal set of cards, cards of an infinite amount. Each card is a universe and if only one of those cards are manifested ''or chosen by the proverbial assistent'', then the question to why this universe arose from so many persist. But if every card was played, then there was no choice but to have the tunings we have in this universe because there are an infinite amount of universes with large and small quantum differences to ours. Literally-speaking, multiverse theory removes the importance and superiority of this universe. It also redefined what ''universe'' is meant to mean.

Imagining a set of cards is the same as assuming there is more than one card. So FT fails even without a mulltiverse. I can't simply assume the universe could exist in any other variations. Maybe it can, maybe it can't. All we know for sure is that one set of constants is possible. We have no evidence other ones are yet. And while it's great fun to theorize other types of universes, it's not proof that we just happened to get lucky with this one.