The fine tuning argument

[Robin]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

One of the problems is that I have never seen it stated as an actual argument - I thought that I would try to put this in an argument form and see if I have got it right:

The universe is contingent upon something - X
X is unique in all existence
X is capabable of producing only one universe
X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random
Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.
If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.
Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.

Do I have it right, or at least is that the ball-park?

[Hokulele]

It looks like it has been framed correctly, but I have never understood the claim that i must be greater than j by several orders of magnitude. We may be aware of what can be considered the right conditions for our type of life, but what makes anyone so sure that what we see on earth is truly the only way life can start?

[Lord Emsworth]

I am not sure why you would need P3 in the way you stated it. How about:
3. X is capabable of producing one or more universes.

Or better yet, swap "universe" for something else. Contigent worlds, maybe? Contigent state of affairs?

[thaiboxerken]

Uhm.. if X is only capapble of producing one universe, that throws the "all powerful God" notion out the window.

Fine-tuning is just another restatement of the claim "the universe exists, therefore God must exist." It's not an argument at all.

[arthwollipot]

For a start, many of the fine tuning arguments suffer from the logical fallacy of Making Up ************ and Pulling It Out Of Your Ass. They almost never cite the source of the claims of "if such-and-such a parameter was more than one billion-trillionth different". And when they do, it's inevitably quote-mined and provided without context.

Secondly, the fine tuning argument states merely that "if things were different, they would be different", which is so pathetic that it can be easily countered by the equally pathetic Anthropic Principle: If the universe were not capable of producing life, life would not have been produced. The universe has to be the way it is, because otherwise we wouldn't be here.

Thirdly, many of these arguments involve tweaking a single parameter at a time while leaving all the others constant and demonstrating that the universe is not stable enough to produce life under those conditions. There are several solutions for stable universes where all or several of the parameters are changed, for example. We might have been living in one of those, if things were actually different.

Yeah. The Fine Tuning argument falls way short of being convincing.

[Jeff Corey]

The fine tuning argument boils down to "Look how many things had to be just right for us to evolve!"
So what?
We did.
Surprised?

[The Platypus]

For me the fine tuning argument doesn't make sense because except for the surface this little speck of a planet, and the potential for other "earth like" planets, the vast majority of the universe is completely hostile and deadly to us. That's pretty strange for a place that is supposed to be "fine tuned" just for us.

I'd say that if the universe was fine tuned, it's much more tuned for things such stars, black holes, pulsars, etc.

[Gord_in_Toronto]

Whenever, I read one of these discussions I am always reminded of The Triumph of Time (1959) volume of four of James Blish's Cities in Flight series.

At the end of that book the Universe bounces through a Big Crunch and is directed by the protagonist in its resurrection into a completely different form.

If the Universe were completely different, we would not be here to talk about it but the snorglies might well be there to gramish.

[PixyMisa]

Frickin' snorglies!

[Pure Argent]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

Neither have I. Let's look at it, shall we? Your version of it seems to be pretty much accurate.


The universe is contingent upon something - X

This has yet to be proven. The laws of cause and effect can only be shown to be in influence inside our universe. Outside our universe, something may very well come of nothing for no reason at all.
And anyway, where did X come from?

X is unique in all existence

There is no way to prove this. For all we know, there could be hundreds of X's in this not-universe.

X is capabable of producing only one universe

Well, then he's not omnipotent, is he?

X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random

Bare assertion fallacy. In fact, this entire argument has so far been one giant bare assertion fallacy.

Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.

Again, bare assertion. There might be thousands of other ways to configure a universe to support life.

If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.

Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.


Not necessarily, so bare assertion again. The odds against it are astronomical indeed, assuming that i is indeed greater than j by the amount stated above (which we don't know for sure). But if it did happen, then X still might not be a conscious, intelligent force. It could have been chance.
And it's a huge, huge, huge bare assertion fallacy to say that 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are true.

Your summary of the argument was pretty accurate. It's just that the argument you were summarizing is completely idiotic.

EDIT: Tried to get the post formatted correctly, but it's not working. Anyone know how to fix this?

[Robin]

I am not sure why you would need P3 in the way you stated it. How about:
3. X is capabable of producing one or more universes.

By definition it is capable of producing at least one universe. But if it is not limited to 1 or at least a small number then there is no fine tuning argument. I am not saying the premise is correct, but it is necessary for the FTA.
Or better yet, swap "universe" for something else. Contigent worlds, maybe? Contigent state of affairs?
Well, this is another problem, if the universe has a cause then that implies there is or was at least some environment that is not our Universe. So if someone says the Universe was caused and there is no other universe then where is the cause?

[Robin]

Well, then he's not omnipotent, is he?
That occurred to me too. If someone demonstrates the existence of God based on the premiss that this is the only universe that is, could have been or could be, and then goes on to state that God could have produced as many universes as he wished - suddenly one of the main premisses disappears.

As I said before, if you add this to the KCA you end up with a God that is:

Finite
Static
Only capable of producing one universe

[Hokulele]

That occurred to me too. If someone demonstrates the existence of God based on the premiss that this is the only universe that is, could have been or could be, and then goes on to state that God could have produced as many universes as he wished - suddenly one of the main premisses disappears.

As I said before, if you add this to the KCA you end up with a God that is:

Finite
Static
Only capable of producing one universe


In either case, what does one call heaven and/or hell? Wouldn't they be alternate universes with different laws of physics?

[Singularitarian]

In either case, what does one call heaven and/or hell? Wouldn't they be alternate universes with different laws of physics?

According to the Doctrine, Hell isn't really located in some exotic parallel existence, but rather hell is described as being in ''the center of the earth.''

Heaven though, may have such a description.

[Hokulele]

According to the Doctrine, Hell isn't really located in some exotic parallel existence, but rather hell is described as being in ''the center of the earth.''


Really? I hadn't heard that claim. Most descriptions of hell simply describe it as being "not in god's presence". Would you please provide a citation for that?

[Robin]

In either case, what does one call heaven and/or hell? Wouldn't they be alternate universes with different laws of physics?
That brings me to the other problem with FTA debates, one that I touched on in the other thread - the rule that seems to say:

The atheist must use empirically verifiable evidence
The theist can use pure conjecture.

So, for example, if you say that the cause could be some thing that operates according to a slightly different laws of physics the theist says "Ah, but there is no empirical evidence for that", without ever offering to provide empirical evidence for the God hypothesis.

[Singularitarian]

Uhm.. if X is only capapble of producing one universe, that throws the "all powerful God" notion out the window.

Fine-tuning is just another restatement of the claim "the universe exists, therefore God must exist." It's not an argument at all.

The Anthropic Principle, which has four distinctive identities is in fact a fine tuning arguement. Quantum physics has much to say on the subject.

[Robin]

According to the Doctrine, Hell isn't really located in some exotic parallel existence, but rather hell is described as being in ''the center of the earth.''

Heaven though, may have such a description.
Can you provide a cite for this? As far as I know even the Bible describes as Hell existing after the complete destruction of the Earth. Most modern theists (as in since 300 AD) would describe Hell as an alternate reality to physical reality.

As far as I know the "centre of the earth" thing comes from Dante, which is only intended as an allegory in any case.

[Robin]

The Anthropic Principle, which has four distinctive identities is in fact a fine tuning arguement.
The anthropic principle is a method of reasoning about physics and not an argument for the existence of God.
Quantum physics has much to say on the subject.
In what way?

[arthwollipot]

The Anthropic Principle, which has four distinctive identities...To clarify, in my earlier post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5061158#post5061158) I was referring to the Weak Anthropic Principle. No stronger version is required to refute the fine tuning argument, in my opinion.

[thaiboxerken]

The Anthropic Principle, which has four distinctive identities is in fact a fine tuning arguement. Quantum physics has much to say on the subject.

No, it doesn't.

[Malerin]

For a start, many of the fine tuning arguments suffer from the logical fallacy of Making Up ************ and Pulling It Out Of Your Ass. They almost never cite the source of the claims of "if such-and-such a parameter was more than one billion-trillionth different". And when they do, it's inevitably quote-mined and provided without context.

Secondly, the fine tuning argument states merely that "if things were different, they would be different", which is so pathetic that it can be easily countered by the equally pathetic Anthropic Principle: If the universe were not capable of producing life, life would not have been produced. The universe has to be the way it is, because otherwise we wouldn't be here.

Thirdly, many of these arguments involve tweaking a single parameter at a time while leaving all the others constant and demonstrating that the universe is not stable enough to produce life under those conditions. There are several solutions for stable universes where all or several of the parameters are changed, for example. We might have been living in one of those, if things were actually different.

Yeah. The Fine Tuning argument falls way short of being convincing.

Here's some interesting quotes. http://www.godandscience.org/apologetics/quotes.html

A more unbiased site:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/#4.1

[Ron_Tomkins]

For a start, many of the fine tuning arguments suffer from the logical fallacy of Making Up ************ and Pulling It Out Of Your Ass. They almost never cite the source of the claims of "if such-and-such a parameter was more than one billion-trillionth different". And when they do, it's inevitably quote-mined and provided without context.

Secondly, the fine tuning argument states merely that "if things were different, they would be different", which is so pathetic that it can be easily countered by the equally pathetic Anthropic Principle: If the universe were not capable of producing life, life would not have been produced. The universe has to be the way it is, because otherwise we wouldn't be here.

Thirdly, many of these arguments involve tweaking a single parameter at a time while leaving all the others constant and demonstrating that the universe is not stable enough to produce life under those conditions. There are several solutions for stable universes where all or several of the parameters are changed, for example. We might have been living in one of those, if things were actually different.

Yeah. The Fine Tuning argument falls way short of being convincing.

And finally, as Michael Shermer said (though I'm not sure if he was quoting someone), "The universe is not finely tuned for us. We are finely tuned for it". In other words, we had to evolve our way through life to become adapted to the conditions of our planet, and in a broader sense, the Universe. If we had not adapted, if our successful ancestors had not left any offspring, we wouldn't be here. That's not dependent on the Universe, but us.

[Malerin]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

One of the problems is that I have never seen it stated as an actual argument - I thought that I would try to put this in an argument form and see if I have got it right:

The universe is contingent upon something - X
X is unique in all existence
X is capabable of producing only one universe
X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random
Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.
If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.
Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.

Do I have it right, or at least is that the ball-park?

The argument is usually formulated as a probabilistic argument where the evidence (the precise life-permitting values of the physical constants) is more likely given the existence of God than by random chance. The problem for the FT argument is the evidence is equally likely given the existence of a sufficiently large multiverse (or a single oscillating universe).

[Malerin]

And finally, as Michael Shermer said (though I'm not sure if he was quoting someone), "The universe is not finely tuned for us. We are finely tuned for it". In other words, we had to evolve our way through life to become adapted to the conditions of our planet, and in a broader sense, the Universe. If we had not adapted, if our successful ancestors had not left any offspring, we wouldn't be here. That's not dependent on the Universe, but us.

It's possible to counterfactually assign odds to an event (or evidence) you know has already happened. For example, one of the best confirming pieces of evidence for relativity was that it accurately predicted Mercury's eccentric orbit, even though Mercury's eccentric orbit had been known since Newton's time. If the probability of Mercury's orbit had been 1 (because it was already known), it could not have confirmed relativity theory. In the same way, the fact that we exist doesn't mean we can't counterfactually wonder about the likelihood of our existence.

[Ron_Tomkins]

In the same way, the fact that we exist doesn't mean we can't counterfactually wonder about the likelihood of our existence.

Indeed, and I never claimed the opposite.
Wondering about the likelihood of our existence is to be expected.

[Hokulele]

It's possible to counterfactually assign odds to an event (or evidence) you know has already happened. For example, one of the best confirming pieces of evidence for relativity was that it accurately predicted Mercury's eccentric orbit, even though Mercury's eccentric orbit had been known since Newton's time. If the probability of Mercury's orbit had been 1 (because it was already known), it could not have confirmed relativity theory. In the same way, the fact that we exist doesn't mean we can't counterfactually wonder about the likelihood of our existence.


This is not a good example of what you are claiming. Mercury's orbit was known, but could not be modeled by any theory known at the time. When Einstein came up with General Relativity, the model matched reality. No odds or probability needed to be calculated, so your point is basically a non sequitur.

[yy2bggggs]

Relativity explains why Mercury has the particular orbit that it has to high precision. God theory does not explain why Mercury has this particular orbit.

Furthermore, even without a multiverse, what you're left with in terms of FT is whether or not the parameters "just were" what they were, or whether or not there "just was" a god that made the parameters what they were. If you consider it highly unlikely for the parameters to be such that life exists in the first place, why would you not consider it even more unlikely that existence is such that there would be an infinite, omniscient entity in the first place?

[Malerin]

This is not a good example of what you are claiming. Mercury's orbit was known, but could not be modeled by any theory known at the time. When Einstein came up with General Relativity, the model matched reality. No odds or probability needed to be calculated, so your point is basically a non sequitur.

In other words, the model predicted (matched) evidence that was already known to exist (and since it was known to exist, should have had a Pr of 1). I mean, if I have a "premonition" of my wife coming home after she's already walked through the door, that's not much good. Even though my clairvoyance "matched" reality, I did it after the fact. So why did relatavity theory get such a boost predicting (or matching) something that was already known to exist?

[Hokulele]

In other words, the model predicted (matched) evidence that was already known to exist (and since it was known to exist, should have had a Pr of 1). I mean, if I have a "premonition" of my wife coming home after she's already walked through the door, that's not much good. Even though my clairvoyance "matched" reality, I did it after the fact. So why did relatavity theory get such a boost predicting (or matching) something that was already known to exist?


Because none of the other models matched reality. General relativity was the only one that could (at the time).

It would be more like you knew your wife was in the house, but you only knew of people entering houses through door, and since you never saw her coming in a door, her presence was inexplicable. Once she showed you how to climb through a window, her sudden presence made sense.

In other words, your argument regarding Mercury and GR has absolutely nothing to do with fune tuning and probability. Yes, we knew what Mercury's orbit looked like, we just didn't know how to explain it.

[Malerin]

Relativity explains why Mercury has the particular orbit that it has to high precision. God theory does not explain why Mercury has this particular orbit.

God theory explains why the numbers have the values they do: God, so the story goes, is sympathetic towards life, and so fine-tuned a life-permitting universe.


Furthermore, even without a multiverse, what you're left with in terms of FT is whether or not the parameters "just were" what they were, or whether or not there "just was" a god that made the parameters what they were. If you consider it highly unlikely for the parameters to be such that life exists in the first place, why would you not consider it even more unlikely that existence is such that there would be an infinite, omniscient entity in the first place?

Why would I consider it? For one, you're comparing the odds of a natural physical process to the odds of the existence of a supernatural God. Such a God's existence would not be contingent on a set of numbers being the right way, as I think you're suggesting. The Big Bang and God are in two seperate ontological realms. You're implying (I think) that the long odds surrounding one (constants and their life-permitting values) lead to, or are suggestive, the long odds of another. Unless God is somehow inextricablly bound to life-permitting universes, the long odds of one have nothing to do with the odds of the other.

Another way to attack the FT argument is if you assign an extremely low probability to "God Exists". If the odds of all the constants having the right values was 1 in a trillion, and you think the liklihood of the existence of God is also 1 in a trillion (extreme strong atheism), the argument won't mean anything to you. The question would then be, why you have such an extremely strong atheistic position? Problem of evil, etc.

[arthwollipot]

In other words, the model predicted (matched) evidence that was already known to exist (and since it was known to exist, should have had a Pr of 1). I mean, if I have a "premonition" of my wife coming home after she's already walked through the door, that's not much good. Even though my clairvoyance "matched" reality, I did it after the fact. So why did relatavity theory get such a boost predicting (or matching) something that was already known to exist?A model can "predict" data that is known to exist. Where some piece of data that appears arbitrary suddenly becomes derivable within a theory, then that theory is said to have "predicted" that data.

In other words, if we know that X is 4 by directly measuring it, that's data.

If we then come up with a theory that explains why X is 4 - or in other words if we do a calculation within the theory and the solution comes out as X = 4, then that gives us a reason to trust that our theory is accurate.

"Predicting" known values is an important test for a new theory. Take the standard model of particle physics as an example. The masses and force charges of the twelve fermions are known by measurement. Superstring (M) theory has the potential to predict these numbers - in other words, for these numbers to be the results of calculations done within the theory. One reason superstring theory isn't generally accepted yet is that these calculations have not yet been done. If one day the string theorists can say that their theory predicts that the electon should have a mass of 0.51 MeV, that will be strong evidence that the theory is accurate.

This is only an example. Please don't take this as a suggestion to derail the thread into a discussion of superstring theory. :D

[Malerin]

Because none of the other models matched reality. General relativity was the only one that could (at the time).

It would be more like you knew your wife was in the house, but you only knew of people entering houses through door, and since you never saw her coming in a door, her presence was inexplicable. Once she showed you how to climb through a window, her sudden presence made sense.

That's right. Relatavity theory wasn't "rigged" to predict Mercury's orbit. So it got confirmation from an already known piece of evidence.

n other words, your argument regarding Mercury and GR has absolutely nothing to do with fune tuning and probability. Yes, we knew what Mercury's orbit looked like, we just didn't know how to explain it.

You could say something similar: yes, we know life is here, we just don't know how to explain it. Part of explaining why there's life is accounting for the myriad of constants that all had to have just the right values for life to have a chance. Hawking and Davies talk about some kind of weird backwards quantum causation where the present is "informing" the universe's past (I don't get it). Multiverse theory is popular with lots of other physicists. A few are challenging the idea that the constants have to have precise values (Go to Victor Stenger's MonkeyGod program at his website and play around with it).

[Malerin]

A model can "predict" data that is known to exist.

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?

[arthwollipot]

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?Want to read my earlier post again? I covered this in my first point.

[Hokulele]

That's right. Relatavity theory wasn't "rigged" to predict Mercury's orbit. So it got confirmation from an already known piece of evidence.


Yes, which helped lead to its larger acceptance in terms of applying to fields outside of pure orbital mechanics. I don't see how this helps any fine tuning argument.

You could say something similar: yes, we know life is here, we just don't know how to explain it.


This is in no way similar (other than by equivocating over the word "explain"). A fine tuning argument is trying to show that life cannot exist any other way, rather than trying to explain why life exists the way we see it. It is almost the exact opposite of Mercury and GR. It is only if life can exist in no other way can you slip in an argument for a fine tuner.

In other words, one of the main reasons a fine tuning argument is guaranteed to fail is because it is built on a premise of a proven negative.

Part of explaining why there's life is accounting for the myriad of constants that all had to have just the right values for life to have a chance. Hawking and Davies talk about some kind of weird backwards quantum causation where the present is "informing" the universe's past (I don't get it). Multiverse theory is popular with lots of other physicists. A few are challenging the idea that the constants have to have precise values (Go to Victor Stenger's MonkeyGod program at his website and play around with it).


That only works if you are assuming that life cannot exist any other way. The three examples you give can explain how universes could work (of course, I can't think of any way any of these can actually be proven), but do not touch on what life does or does not require.

Granted, we only know of one example of how life can happen, but that says nothing about how life cannot happen. And of course, this assumes that you know what is meant by the term "life" to begin with...

[yy2bggggs]

Why would I consider it? For one, you're comparing the odds of a natural physical process to the odds of the existence of a supernatural God. Such a God's existence would not be contingent on a set of numbers being the right way, as I think you're suggesting.
Can you derive that such a God's existence would not be contingent on a set of numbers being the right way?
The Big Bang and God are in two seperate ontological realms. You're implying (I think) that the long odds surrounding one (constants and their life-permitting values) lead to, or are suggestive, the long odds of another.
Can you derive that they are not?

Without such a derivation, the theory makes no sense, despite the odds you give to mortal life, because you're introducing an entity that is much grander than the one you're trying to explain.
Unless God is somehow inextricablly bound to life-permitting universes, the long odds of one have nothing to do with the odds of the other.
But wait... isn't that exactly what you are arguing--that the long odds of one does have to do with the long odds of the other? Isn't that the crux of the FT argument for God?
Another way to attack the FT argument is if you assign an extremely low probability to "God Exists".A better way to phrase this is that the probability assigned to "God Exists" should be low a priori.
The question would then be, why you have such an extremely strong atheistic position? Problem of evil, etc.
Not quite. Problem of evil has its merit, but it can only argue against one of the tri-omni style gods. The major issue is that it's an extremely grand speculative entity that in itself has to be to be, just as we have to be to be. Said being isn't a great explanation for how we got here until your explanation actually incorporates how said being got here, or at least until you establish that said being is here.

The argument, essentially, is that it's much more likely for this much more grand being to have existed in the first place and then caused us to exist, than it is for us to simply exist. That's not too convincing of an argument without that grand being's presence in the first place.

[Lord Emsworth]

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?

Yes, extremely lucky that we happen to have just the right type of God. A God with opinions and desires amazingly similar to our own. Just imagine that was not the case ... :(


Sorry, if there is a problem somewhere then the "theistic model" does not solve it. There is an infinite amount of things about God that could by just being slightly different prevent the creation of a universe that supports biological life. Fine tuned?

[Dancing David]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

One of the problems is that I have never seen it stated as an actual argument - I thought that I would try to put this in an argument form and see if I have got it right:

The universe is contingent upon something - X
X is unique in all existence
X is capabable of producing only one universe
X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random
Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.
If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.
Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.

Do I have it right, or at least is that the ball-park?

You got the argument right.

Well for one they usually get something basic totaly wrong.

[Dancing David]

Like here where Collins allegedly uses carter to make a point!

http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/Revised%20Version%20of%20Fine-tuning%20for%20anthology.doc


Of course, a billion-fold increase in the strength of gravity is large in absolute terms, but compared to the total range of strengths of the forces in nature (which span a range of 1040 as we saw above), this still amounts to a fine-tuning of one part in 1031.


So a billion fold increase in gravity becomes 10^-30 because of what, he compares the strength of gravity to the strong force.

So in Collin's logic 1,000,000,000=1/1030

Yeah that is fine tuning all right!

[geni]

It looks like it has been framed correctly, but I have never understood the claim that i must be greater than j by several orders of magnitude. We may be aware of what can be considered the right conditions for our type of life, but what makes anyone so sure that what we see on earth is truly the only way life can start?

Basic chemistry. Life needs structures of a certian size to be able to exist in a fairly stable form. Most sets of fundimental constants won't allow for this.

[geni]

For me the fine tuning argument doesn't make sense because except for the surface this little speck of a planet, and the potential for other "earth like" planets, the vast majority of the universe is completely hostile and deadly to us. That's pretty strange for a place that is supposed to be "fine tuned" just for us.

I'd say that if the universe was fine tuned, it's much more tuned for things such stars, black holes, pulsars, etc.

Stars are kinda useful for provideing elements heavier than lithium. black holes and pulsars are rather less common than stars.

[fls]

I think that there are two different fine-tuning arguments. One is an argument for the presence of fine-tuning, and one is an argument that the presence of fine-tuning serves as an argument for the presence of God. This may be bleedin' obvious, but it may help to distinguish that you are talking about the latter.

As has been mentioned already, it is part of science, and a valuable exercise, to speculate as to why observations have that pattern and only that pattern. Right now, it appears that the pattern of the universe is such that it allowed for something 'interesting' to happen. I think we can all agree that we aren't necessarily talking about conditions identical to our own, but rather about conditions that could lead to any sort of 'life'. It isn't that we are the puddle wondering how it is that we have just the right shape to fit into this hole, but rather how it is that there are holes in which puddles can form.

Someone made a comment in another thread a while ago that other values for the physical constants lead to universes which don't have the requisite 'granularity' to allow for something 'interesting' to happen. So it is a valuable question - what is the degree of freedom involved in the values for various physical constants and what accounts for or constrains that freedom? But what characteristics can be inferred about the presence of a constraint? More specifically, can we infer that the presence of a constraint would necessarily also have the characteristic of 'capricious interest in humans'? And does that constraint necessarily infer a connection to a set of otherwise completely unrelated observations (i.e. those observations upon which the idea of God was based)?

The fine-tuning argument for the presence of God does not address those issues. At this point it still has the form of the remarkably trivial argument that the sun rising in the morning infers a sun-riser, a lottery winner infers a lottery win-maker, and a watch infers a watch-maker. Which is why I wonder whether the presentation of the argument here is inaccurate, or whether I an forced to consider that seemingly intelligent and thoughtful people are rendered a bit stupid when it comes to Apologetics.

Linda

[Malerin]

Can you derive that such a God's existence would not be contingent on a set of numbers being the right way?


Why would a supernatural being's existence be contingent on natural causes? I can't derive that it's not, but I don't see it as a live possibility, sorry.

Can you derive that they are not?

Without such a derivation, the theory makes no sense, despite the odds you give to mortal life, because you're introducing an entity that is much grander than the one you're trying to explain.

If there is no evidence for or against the existence of such a being, agnosticism would be the default position. Agnositicm would not be the default position regarding the odds of the physical constants having the values they do. Those odds can be calculed, and physcists have done so.

But wait... isn't that exactly what you are arguing--that the long odds of one does have to do with the long odds of the other?

Causally, no. Epistemically, yes.

A better way to phrase this is that the probability assigned to "God Exists" should be low a priori.

That would require argument or evidence. You may claim that it's possible God's existence is contingent on a life-permitting universe, but you have no argument to believe why that should be so, nor any evidence. I could say it's just as likely God's existence is not contingent on anythying physical. Back to agnosticism.

Not quite. Problem of evil has its merit, but it can only argue against one of the tri-omni style gods. The major issue is that it's an extremely grand speculative entity that in itself has to be to be, just as we have to be to be. Said being isn't a great explanation for how we got here until your explanation actually incorporates how said being got here, or at least until you establish that said being is here.

You only have to establish God as a live possibility for the FT argument to work (ignoring the multiverse issue). Even if you think the odds of God existing are 1 in a thousand, you'll get confirmation, because the existence of life is "crushingly improbable". So, what is your evidence that God likely does not exist?

[Beth]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

One of the problems is that I have never seen it stated as an actual argument - I thought that I would try to put this in an argument form and see if I have got it right:

The universe is contingent upon something - X
X is unique in all existence
X is capabable of producing only one universe
X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random
Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.
If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.
Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.

Do I have it right, or at least is that the ball-park?

1 and 5 seem reasonable statements to me. I don't think that the 2, 3, and 4 are necessary, but I don't spend enough time discussing it with proponents to determine if they are a typical part of the argument. The last is the contentious one. It seems to me that it's rational to accept as a hypothesis that the universe might have been designed. But while it's a reasonable conjecture based on the apparently fine-tuning, other explanations are possible so it isn't a particularly convincing argument.

Are people trying to convince you that you should also believe in a god because of this argument, or are they simply using it to establish that their belief in god is rational?

That brings me to the other problem with FTA debates, one that I touched on in the other thread - the rule that seems to say:

The atheist must use empirically verifiable evidence
The theist can use pure conjecture.

So, for example, if you say that the cause could be some thing that operates according to a slightly different laws of physics the theist says "Ah, but there is no empirical evidence for that", without ever offering to provide empirical evidence for the God hypothesis.

It's usually the atheist complaining that the theist has no empirical evidence. :p At any rate, I think the rule is more like this:

The other person must use empirically verifiable evidence to convince me I'm wrong.
I can use pure conjecture to support my beliefs and won't change my mind unless I am presented with empirically verificable evidence against it.

The argument is usually formulated as a probabilistic argument where the evidence (the precise life-permitting values of the physical constants) is more likely given the existence of God than by random chance. The problem for the FT argument is the evidence is equally likely given the existence of a sufficiently large multiverse (or a single oscillating universe).

I wouldn't say it is a problem. It's another option to expain the apparent fine-tuning of the Universe. Both are conjecture at this point. Personally, I see no reason to prefer one of those unsupported conjectures above the other.

I think that there are two different fine-tuning arguments. One is an argument for the presence of fine-tuning, and one is an argument that the presence of fine-tuning serves as an argument for the presence of God. This may be bleedin' obvious, but it may help to distinguish that you are talking about the latter.
As you noted, it's pretty well established by physicists such as Hawking, Penrose and others that the universe appears to be very finely tuned to support interesting structures such as stars and planets which are considered to be necessary pre-cursors to the existance of life. It is whether or not the fine-tuning supports the existance of god that is debated.

So it is a valuable question - what is the degree of freedom involved in the values for various physical constants and what accounts for or constrains that freedom? But what characteristics can be inferred about the presence of a constraint? More specifically, can we infer that the presence of a constraint would necessarily also have the characteristic of 'capricious interest in humans'? And does that constraint necessarily infer a connection to a set of otherwise completely unrelated observations (i.e. those observations upon which the idea of God was based)? Yes, those are all good questions. Personally, while I think that the fine-tuning of our universe does provide support for the idea of a designer, it does not support any particular conception of god other than that of designer.

Beth

[Undesired Walrus]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

One of the problems is that I have never seen it stated as an actual argument - I thought that I would try to put this in an argument form and see if I have got it right:

The universe is contingent upon something - X
X is unique in all existence
X is capabable of producing only one universe
X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random
Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.
If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.
Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.

Do I have it right, or at least is that the ball-park?

First of all, what's so important about life?

[Cynic]

Douglas Adams once suggested that marvelling over the apparently fine-tuned universe was akin to being surprised that the shape of water in a mud puddle should have taken on the contours of the hole in which it lies. Or perhaps he merely quoted someone else's notion to that effect -- can't remember.

Whatever the probability of the universe supporting life is, one thing is clear: the probability of life being compatible with the universe that spawned it is 100%. But what of these probabilities? If there's one thing in life that never ceases to annoy me, it's unwarranted assumption. And that happens as often in disciplines like physics (with regard to interpretation) and cosmology (with regard to cosmology) as it does with religion.

For instance, this particular incarnation of the fine-tuning argument demands that there are many possibilities and suggests that the particular form appropriate for life is "unlikely". First off, when evaluating possibilities, it's useful to eliminate impossibilities. The fine-tuning arguments make the completely unwarranted assumption that the current state of physical reality isn't necessary, that other options are in fact possible.

Yet where in our experience do we see anything play out that way? If I toss a ball in the air, it comes down -- every time. There are no known examples of an effect without a cause, so why would we suddenly assume that the current circumstances of the universe are divorced circumstances that provoked them? That would beg an uncaused cause, which is an inherently religious proposition given the overwhelming evidence that all things have causes (or reasons) without known exception.

How people get from "if everything has a cause than there must be a first cause" is simply beyond my understanding. The universe -- defined here as "all of existence", not "all we can see", is, logically, eternal. No doubt there is a reason for that too.

But given how much we don't understand, to include time itself, people posing arguments such as the fine-tuning argument are playing fast and loose with even what we do understand.

[fls]

As you noted, it's pretty well established by physicists such as Hawking, Penrose and others that the universe appears to be very finely tuned to support interesting structures such as stars and planets which are considered to be necessary pre-cursors to the existance of life. It is whether or not the fine-tuning supports the existance of god that is debated.

"Appears to be very finely tuned" is a meaningless statement. All observations have this appearance until we begin to form explanations which constrain these observations. One could just as easily state (as was done) that the movement of the lights in the night sky were apparently fine-tuned and therefore supported the idea of a designer, given that a variety of seemingly unconstrained constants governed those movements. It turned out that designer does not have a capricious interest in humans, though. ;)

Yes, those are all good questions. Personally, while I think that the fine-tuning of our universe does provide support for the idea of a designer, it does not support any particular conception of god other than that of designer.

Beth

"Designer" seems to (deliberately) carry the baggage of consciousness/choice. If it does not support any other conception of God than 'provides constraint', why not simply get rid of that baggage? I realize that would make it unpalatable to Apologists, but at least it would be deliberately honest.

Linda

[PixyMisa]

Like here where Collins allegedly uses carter to make a point!

http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/Revised%20Version%20of%20Fine-tuning%20for%20anthology.doc (http://home.messiah.edu/%7Ercollins/Fine-tuning/Revised%20Version%20of%20Fine-tuning%20for%20anthology.doc)



So a billion fold increase in gravity becomes 10^-30 because of what, he compares the strength of gravity to the strong force.

So in Collin's logic 1,000,000,000=1/1030

Yeah that is fine tuning all right!
Did he crib that from How to Lie with Mathematics?

It's an important point. We're talking about changes of many orders of magnitude, roughly the difference between the speed of light and the speed of a turtle.

In my book, that's not fine tuning. But I guess the "whacking great change argument" doesn't have the same ring to it.

[Beth]

"Appears to be very finely tuned" is a meaningless statement. All observations have this appearance until we begin to form explanations which constrain these observations. One could just as easily state (as was done) that the movement of the lights in the night sky were apparently fine-tuned and therefore supported the idea of a designer, given that a variety of seemingly unconstrained constants governed those movements. It turned out that designer does not have a capricious interest in humans, though. ;)

I'll have to disagree with you here. Not all observations have this appearance. Some things appear to be random and chaotic. At any rate, I don't see any physicists arguing against the idea that our universe is finely tuned to produce interesting structures. Many variables in their models have to be specified precisely for the models to produce anything like our universe. The debate is only about why the constants that their models require have to be constrained so tightly.


"Designer" seems to (deliberately) carry the baggage of consciousness/choice. If it does not support any other conception of God than 'provides constraint', why not simply get rid of that baggage? I realize that would make it unpalatable to Apologists, but at least it would be deliberately honest.

Linda

I agree that designer carries the baggage of consciousness/choice. I see it as the point of the argument, not a deliberate dishonesty. There are several model parameters that require very precise values imposed by the designers for no reason other than to make it match our perceived reality. I don't see it as an unreasonable conjecture that the reality they are modeling was also specified by an conscious designer. Of course, there are other competing hypotheses. At this point, all we can say is we don't know why the model parameters must have the values they have, we only know that such constrainsts are necessary.

[PixyMisa]

And again, if a god of some description fine-tuned the Universe for life, why is approximately 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999% of it instantly lethal?

The fine-tuning argument tells us two things about God:

(a) He's incompetent.
(b) He's either a bacterium or a beetle.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?


Just get lucky? The problem is that this is a problem for no one who does not begin with a teleological bent. You must first assume that life -- and particularly our life -- was the point all along. There is no reason to assume that.

It's the same issue as trying to work out the enormously ridiculous odds that may right hand is in exactly the position that it is right now. What are the odds? I mean, it's astronomically outrageously unlikely that might right hand would be in the exact coordinates that it is. There is only a problem if one assumes that it should be there in the first place.

When you can't even see your teleological biases you end up spending an enormous amount of time on this non-issue.

[Singularitarian]

Can you provide a cite for this? As far as I know even the Bible describes as Hell existing after the complete destruction of the Earth. Most modern theists (as in since 300 AD) would describe Hell as an alternate reality to physical reality.

As far as I know the "centre of the earth" thing comes from Dante, which is only intended as an allegory in any case.

I will look for it. I am quite certain the Bible makes references to hell being ''a a dark dungeon,'' - (and also one which is in the center of the earth) - i used to be a devoute christian see.

[geni]

And again, if a god of some description fine-tuned the Universe for life, why is approximately 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999% of it instantly lethal?

The fine-tuning argument tells us two things about God:

(a) He's incompetent.
(b) He's either a bacterium or a beetle.

It's a bit hard to come up with a universe where the majority of it can support life. I supose you could somehow set up an intial big bang to generate heavy elements and then play with the cosmological constant and gravity to produce a sort of air filled universe but there would be a shortage of energy sources and larger lifeforms would tend to risk explodeing or turning collapseing into black holes.

You also have the problem that you risk generateing Gödel lambdadust and all the closed timelike curves issues.

The fact is the shear size of the universe means that if you want to build a life friendly universe there is little reason to make more than a small percentage of it life friendly. If you are going to use stars to generate your heavy elements it's probably a good idea to have enough space between them to avoid them knocking planets out of orbit too often. If you are going to use them as your main energy source then it makes sense to avoid too high a level of gravity so that they last long enough to do something useful. These factors will yes tend to produce a univese with a lot of empty space.

[geni]

Just get lucky? The problem is that this is a problem for no one who does not begin with a teleological bent. You must first assume that life -- and particularly our life -- was the point all along. There is no reason to assume that.

It's the same issue as trying to work out the enormously ridiculous odds that may right hand is in exactly the position that it is right now. What are the odds? I mean, it's astronomically outrageously unlikely that might right hand would be in the exact coordinates that it is. There is only a problem if one assumes that it should be there in the first place.

When you can't even see your teleological biases you end up spending an enormous amount of time on this non-issue.

It's not a non issue. "Why is the universe like it is?" is a valid question. "just because" which is what the "due to chance" argument boils down to is not a very useful answer. One attack line is to introduce the concept of more universes (sure it was very unlikely but with so many universes it was bound to happen sooner or later). Another attack line is to introduce a designer. Another is to argue that there is some law which forces physical constants to be the way they are (which then follows on by trying to work out why that should be the case).

[Singularitarian]

Matthew 13:42: "And shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth."

Matt 25:41: "Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." This passage relates to Jesus' judgment of all the world.

Mark 9:43-48: And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched." The reference to fire is repeated three more times in the passage for emphasis.

Luke 16:24: "And he cried and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame." This is a plea described as coming from an inhabitant of Hell.

Revelation 20:13-15: "...hell delivered up the dead which were in them...And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire."

Revelation 21:8: "But the fearful, and unbelieving ... shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone." Brimstone is sulphur. In order for sulphur to form a lake, it must be molten. Thus, its temperature must be at or below 444.6 °C or 832 °F.

Hell is a place of instability. It is described as a lake of fire. Hell is a place where every moment is lived in uncertainty (Matthew 5:21-23; Revelation 20:15)

Hell is a pit of darkness; totally devoid of light. It is pitch black in hell; there's nothing to distract people from their suffering, sorrow, fears, insecurities, and instability. (2 Peter 3-5)

Hell is a place of dissatisfaction. Yeshua described it as a fire; a fiery furnace. It may be a literal fire that creates a physical sensation of burning or just an overwhelming yearning for God, for love, for joy, for peace, for life that will never be. (Matthew 5:22; Matt 13:42 and 50; Matt 18:8-9; Matt 25:41; Mark 9:43, 47-48)

Hell is a place of eternal separation from God. Each person who goes to hell will be separated forever from the source of life, the heart of love, the very One for Whom they were created. Hell is a place where your soul will be destroyed (Matthew 7:23 and 10:27-29).




Where is Hell?

Matthew 11:23 - "Hades" - Strong's Concordance #86

(NIV) - "you will go down to [the depths]"
(KJV) - "shalt be brought down to [Hell]"
(NLT) - "you will be brought down to [the place of the dead]"
Luke 16:23 - "Hades" - Strong's Concordance #86

(NIV) - "In [Hell], where he was in torment, he looked up..."
(KJV) - "And in [Hell] he lift up his eyes, being in torments,"
(NLT) - "And his soul went to [the place of the dead],"
II Peter 2:4 - "Tartaros" - Strong's Concordance #5020

(NIV) - "but sent them to [Hell], putting them in gloomy dungeons to be held for judgment;"
(KJV) - "but cast them down into [Hell],"
(NLT) - "He threw them into [Hell], in gloomy caves and darkness until judgment day"
Amos 9:2 - "Sheol" - Strong's Concordance #7585

(NIV) - "Though they dig down to the depths of [the grave],"
(KJV) - "Though they dig into [Hell],"
(NLT) - "Even if they dig down to [the place of the dead], I will reach down and pull them up."
Numbers 16:31-33 - "Sheol" - Strong's Concordance #7585

(NIV) - "the ground under them split apart and the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them, ...They went down alive into [the grave],"

(KJV) - "the ground clave asunder that was under them. And the earth opened her mouth, and swallowed them up, ...They, ...went down alive into the [pit],"

(NLT) - "the ground suddenly split open beneath them. The earth opened up and swallowed the men, ...So they went down alive into [the grave],"


here is a proof

At this time, He also created the original earth. This should not surprise ... Fourth, God created hell for the devil and his angels. Matthew 25:41 states, ...

[Singularitarian]

Here is a reference to God creating hell (which seems to be earth) for his angels originally

http://pblosser.blogspot.com/2009/08/gods-3-tests-for-his-angels.html

[Singularitarian]

The anthropic principle is a method of reasoning about physics and not an argument for the existence of God.

In what way?

You do realize the Anthropic Principle was created from the soil of physics?

edit> So asking how physics has something to say about the AP is simply retarded.

[Singularitarian]

To clarify, in my earlier post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5061158#post5061158) I was referring to the Weak Anthropic Principle. No stronger version is required to refute the fine tuning argument, in my opinion.

According to Frank J Tipler, the ultimate goal of the Anthropic arguement is to proove the strong arguement.

[yy2bggggs]

Why would a supernatural being's existence be contingent on natural causes? I can't derive that it's not, but I don't see it as a live possibility, sorry.Why not? Isn't it a tad bit arbitrary to just pound the property of "just so" into the being? And if you do that, what then would be wrong of pounding the property of "just so" into the FT parameters? What does such a god actually give you from an explanatory framework?
If there is no evidence for or against the existence of such a being, agnosticism would be the default position.Remind people who haven't been exposed to your line of thinking that by "agnostic" you mean 50:50 odds, please.

Given this, let's carry this out to its logical conclusion. This would imply that 50% of all beings you can imagine for which you have no evidence for, or against, would actually exist. First off, it's nowhere near obvious that this is true. Second, if it were, then what a crowded universe we must live in.
Agnositicm would not be the default position regarding the odds of the physical constants having the values they do. Those odds can be calculed, and physcists have done so.
Nobody knows the odds, because nobody knows what the distribution of possibilities are. Nevertheless, whatever those odds are, they could be interpreted as the odds that the universe is such that we would be here. But they can only be interpreted that way if you take the laws of nature as a fixed given, in which case, to get God, you should go through the odds that the universe is such that God would be here.
Causally, no. Epistemically, yes.
This "agnostic" position you're proposing is poor epistemology. If the FT argument for God works, this implies that the process by which it works is a sound process. And if that's the case, then anything with long odds could be explained by dreaming up any entity that causes it--after all, entities for which I have no evidence one way or the other are 50% likely, right?
That would require argument or evidence.
The absurdity of the alternative is the suggestion that 50% of all entities we can dream up, for which we have no evidence for one way or the other, should exist.
I could say it's just as likely God's existence is not contingent on anythying physical. Back to agnosticism.
...
You only have to establish God as a live possibility for the FT argument to work (ignoring the multiverse issue).
Why should the multiverse issue be an issue at all? Would it be an issue if you simply hadn't thought about it?

If not, why would thinking up the possibility of a multiverse change the odds? If so, then how are you sure there aren't a number of other things you haven't thought about?
Even if you think the odds of God existing are 1 in a thousand, you'll get confirmation, because the existence of life is "crushingly improbable".
Unless, of course, we're talking about this God, in which case we're supposed to apply special pleading and say that this probability should be 50% because we don't know either way.
So, what is your evidence that God likely does not exist?
Silly Malerin. You need evidence that things do exist. And the more extraordinary the thing, the more extraordinary evidence you need.

Essentially, you don't have this evidence. You're trying to get God to be viable via this other, unrelated argument--this notion that the default assumption should be 50% probability. And that argument doesn't fly.

[Ichneumonwasp]

It's not a non issue. "Why is the universe like it is?" is a valid question. "just because" which is what the "due to chance" argument boils down to is not a very useful answer. One attack line is to introduce the concept of more universes (sure it was very unlikely but with so many universes it was bound to happen sooner or later). Another attack line is to introduce a designer. Another is to argue that there is some law which forces physical constants to be the way they are (which then follows on by trying to work out why that should be the case).


It is a valid question for understanding the factors that play into the evolution of the universe.

It is not a valid question as it is commonly used -- as a proof of God's existence -- because when used in that way, it is a circular argument. It assumes, up front, a particular outcome -- this universe -- and then asks the question, "what are the odds?". It uses the fact that the odds are so low to "prove" that the most likely answer is a designer. But, when the argument begins with a purpose -- this universe as the outcome -- it already presupposes purposful action, or a designer (something that would produce this universe).

When no particular outcome is assumed, the means of using this argument for proof of God vanishes.

[Gate2501]

The conditional(we exist) probability of us observing a universe which allows us to exist, is 1.

/argument over?

[PixyMisa]

It's a bit hard to come up with a universe where the majority of it can support life.
Not at all. I can do it easily. I have done it.

I supose you could somehow set up an intial big bang to generate heavy elements and then play with the cosmological constant and gravity to produce a sort of air filled universe but there would be a shortage of energy sources and larger lifeforms would tend to risk explodeing or turning collapseing into black holes.
Of course, all this is imposing constraints upon the creator, which tells us something about the creator. Well, if you assume that there is a creator.

You also have the problem that you risk generateing Gödel lambdadust and all the closed timelike curves issues.
We'll just vacuum afterwards. ;)

[fls]

I'll have to disagree with you here. Not all observations have this appearance. Some things appear to be random and chaotic.

"Random and chaotic" would appear to be the most finely tuned of all. Each movement would require its own equation.

At any rate, I don't see any physicists arguing against the idea that our universe is finely tuned to produce interesting structures.

I have seen arguments that the degree of freedom is 1. However, my point is not that the argument does or doesn't take place, or which answer is valid, but rather that it is essentially the same question as "what is the connection between taking that drug and recovery from this illness?" Yet we don't try to infer God from the latter (or rather we don't try to pretend that it is reasonable to state "I am ignorant therefore God").

Many variables in their models have to be specified precisely for the models to produce anything like our universe. The debate is only about why the constants that their models require have to be constrained so tightly.

How does that differ from the various attempts to model the movements of the lights in the night sky?

I agree that designer carries the baggage of consciousness/choice. I see it as the point of the argument, not a deliberate dishonesty. There are several model parameters that require very precise values imposed by the designers for no reason other than to make it match our perceived reality. I don't see it as an unreasonable conjecture that the reality they are modeling was also specified by an conscious designer.

It is dishonest to pretend that the conjecture reflects anything other than your desire to be the subject of interest, though. It's not anything that can be drawn from the sciency part of the description of the argument.

Linda

[Beth]

"Random and chaotic" would appear to be the most finely tuned of all. Each movement would require its own equation. Only if you want to specify the movement of each particle. Generally, we don't try to model random or chaotic systems to that detail. I don't think it is analogous to the models we're discussing.

I have seen arguments that the degree of freedom is 1. However, my point is not that the argument does or doesn't take place, or which answer is valid, but rather that it is essentially the same question as "what is the connection between taking that drug and recovery from this illness?" Yet we don't try to infer God from the latter (or rather we don't try to pretend that it is reasonable to state "I am ignorant therefore God"). You've lost me here. How is this the same question?


How does that differ from the various attempts to model the movements of the lights in the night sky? The models we have for that have fixed parameters that are based on observed values such as the mass of the sun and the earth, their distance from each other, the length of the earth's revolution around it's axis and rotation around the sun. I'm not aware of parameters in those models that have to be arbitrarily set without any explanantion for why they must have the values they need in order for the model to match observations? Are you aware of any such arbitrary parameter settings being required for models of the movements of the stars?

It is dishonest to pretend that the conjecture reflects anything other than your desire to be the subject of interest, though. It's not anything that can be drawn from the sciency part of the description of the argument.

Linda

My desire to be the subject of interest? How did you manage to infer that from what I wrote? I didn't think I was the subject of discussion at all.

Also, I never said such a conjecture was anything that could be drawn from the sciency part of the argument. It's one possible hypothesis to explain why the best models we currently have require the fine tuning of multiple parameter values, but it's not the only one. That doesn't seem all that controversial a position to me.

[Gate2501]

It's one possible hypothesis to explain why the best models we currently have require the fine tuning of multiple parameter values, but it's not the only one. That doesn't seem all that controversial a position to me.

I really don't like the entire "fine-tuned" terminology, because it leads to semantic debacles like this.

Because the physical constants that we observe in our universe appear to be "fine-tuned" for X to exist(a tautological argument in the first place), they suddenly "require fine-tuning", and some religious nutters take manners a step further and suggest that this must mean that there is a "fine-tuner" with intent, God(s).

Edit: I am not calling you a religious nutter, I am just trying to illustrate how semantics play into this debate.

[Gord_in_Toronto]

If the Universe was "constructed" such that we could not and did not exist, then we would not be here to discuss it. QED.

The rest is window dressing.

[Beth]

I really don't like the entire "fine-tuned" terminology, because it leads to semantic debacles like this.
Because the physical constants that we observe in our universe appear to be "fine-tuned" for X to exist(a tautological argument in the first place), they suddenly "require fine-tuning", and some religious nutters take manners a step further and suggest that this must mean that there is a "fine-tuner" with intent, God(s).

Edit: I am not calling you a religious nutter, I am just trying to illustrate how semantics play into this debate.[/QUOTE]

I'm not adverse to using other terminology, but the current situation is that the best models humans have require many parameter values be set to very precise specific values for no particular reason that the designers of those models can identify. Fine-tuning seems a fair description to me, but if you have another suggestion that would avoid the semantic issues and isn't too unwieldy, I'd use it to avoid such misunderstandings.

[Almo]

If these sorts of weak arguments are all that are left for people trying to ascertain the existence of god...

[Gate2501]

I'm not adverse to using other terminology, but the current situation is that the best models humans have require many parameter values be set to very precise specific values for no particular reason that the designers of those models can identify. Fine-tuning seems a fair description to me, but if you have another suggestion that would avoid the semantic issues and isn't too unwieldy, I'd use it to avoid such misunderstandings.

My bold.

You are still suggesting that it "requires" that the constants "be set". Why not just say "the current situation is that the best models humans have, include many parameter which ARE very precise values for no particular reason that the designers of those models can identify."

These models are based on the constants.

The constants are not based on the models.

[Pure Argent]

Basic chemistry. Life needs structures of a certian size to be able to exist in a fairly stable form. Most sets of fundimental constants won't allow for this.

Partially correct. Other sets of constants may allow for other kinds of life.

[Beth]

My bold.

You are still suggesting that it "requires" that the constants "be set". Why not just say "the current situation is that the best models humans have, include many parameter which ARE very precise values for no particular reason that the designers of those models can identify. Okay. How does that change the implication that the parameter values require fine-tuning?

These models are based on the constants.

The constants are not based on the models.

Actually, I think they are. My understanding is that the constant values those parameters are set to were based on the results the models produced. When values for those parameters differed only very very slightly, the resulting universes were totally unlike ours, lacking such things as stars and galaxies.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Okay. How does that change the implication that the parameter values require fine-tuning?





Technically, it doesn't. It eliminates the initial teleological language in which this argument is awash. You've still left behind a remnant by implying that the parameter valuses require "fine-tuning".

The point is that the argument, as it is used to prove the existence of a fine-tuner, should not presuppose the existence of a fine-tuner, which it does and reveals in the language used.

The argument, as it is used to prove the existence of a fine-tuner, is circular.

[Beth]

Technically, it doesn't. It eliminates the initial teleological language in which this argument is awash. You've still left behind a remnant by implying that the parameter valuses require "fine-tuning".

The point is that the argument, as it is used to prove the existence of a fine-tuner, should not presuppose the existence of a fine-tuner, which it does and reveals in the language used.

The argument, as it is used to prove the existence of a fine-tuner, is circular.

I agree that it does not prove the existance of a fine-tuner. I don't think anyone in this thread is arguing that it does. But the parameter values DO require fine-tuning by the model builders to end up with a universe like ours. Why do you object to the implication that fine-tuning is required when it is true?

[Gate2501]

Okay. How does that change the implication that the parameter values require fine-tuning?

Because:

The very idea that they are fine tuned for X(x can be anything in the universe), is tautological. The entire argument is based on this bunk premise.


Actually, I think they are. My understanding is that the constant values those parameters are set to were based on the results the models produced. When values for those parameters differed only very very slightly, the resulting universes were totally unlike ours, lacking such things as stars and galaxies.

My bold, again.

You are hung up on using loaded language. You are still making an argument that is extrapolated from a tautology.

[fls]

Only if you want to specify the movement of each particle. Generally, we don't try to model random or chaotic systems to that detail. I don't think it is analogous to the models we're discussing.

You've lost me here. How is this the same question?

All we're looking at is ways to tie together observations. The lights in the night sky which move together and the lights which move in respect to other lights. The movement of the lights and the falling of an apple. The presence of a symptom and the presence of tainted grain. The presence of tainted grain and the presence of a particular microscopic organism. A dust storm in Africa and a hurricane in Florida. The mass of an electron and beta radiation. If we know the connection, knowing something about one of those things lets you know something about the other.

Apparent fine-tuning is a continuation of this process, a search for the connection between the strength of the association between objects with mass and the strength of the association between charged particles. If we know the value for one, can we know the value for the other?

The models we have for that have fixed parameters that are based on observed values such as the mass of the sun and the earth, their distance from each other, the length of the earth's revolution around it's axis and rotation around the sun. I'm not aware of parameters in those models that have to be arbitrarily set without any explanantion for why they must have the values they need in order for the model to match observations? Are you aware of any such arbitrary parameter settings being required for models of the movements of the stars?

Before we had Newton's gravity and Galileo's and Copernicus' heliocentrism, there were elaborate and detailed explanations for the movement of the lights in the night sky. But other than their movement around the earth, the lights which we now know represent stars and galaxies were unconnected to those we now know represent planets. And falling apples never even entered the equation. So what we had were seemingly unconstrained descriptions of these movements without a way to explain why they followed the patterns they did. Then heliocentrism provided a constraining and unifying explanation. But we could have an accurate description of how the lights moved and how apples fell to earth, and we could recognize that both were relevant to our existence, and that they would behave in an unrecognizable manner if the parameters were changed, without recognizing that there was a straightforward connection between the two. Was it reasonable that all this was considered evidence for a designer?

My desire to be the subject of interest? How did you manage to infer that from what I wrote? I didn't think I was the subject of discussion at all.

Oh come on. People don't want to call it a "designer" because it likes to go around making universes which contain anti-matter. We think this universe is of interest because it contains us, that the designer is interested in us.

Also, I never said such a conjecture was anything that could be drawn from the sciency part of the argument.

Then why is it even part of the fine-tuning discussion if it can't be drawn from the presence of fine-tuning?

It's one possible hypothesis to explain why the best models we currently have require the fine tuning of multiple parameter values, but it's not the only one. That doesn't seem all that controversial a position to me.

Because it isn't a consequence of hypothesizing about fine-tuning. It's a consequence of musing about how to find a sciency-sounding place for God. To bring up the idea of a designer when talking about fine-tuning gives the dishonest impression that it's a hypothesis that could form in the absence of any pre-conceived notions about God.

Also, you and others keep referring to it as an explanation. Yet it isn't an explanation. It doesn't constrain the supposedly fine-tuned constants unless you arbitrarily decide that it would choose to form universes that would be of interest to us. And that merely reflects our own narcissism, not something which can be drawn from our observations.

Linda

[geni]

Partially correct. Other sets of constants may allow for other kinds of life.

Not really. Life requires that you be able to form structures over quite a range of sizes and that those structures are stable for non trivial time periods. It also requires energy gradents.

For example if we take our universe and turn down the gravity you wouldn't get any life because you wouldn't get any stars which means you don't get any elements other than hydrogen,helium and lithium.

[Beth]

Because:

The very idea that they are fine tuned for X(x can be anything in the universe), is tautological. The entire argument is based on this bunk premise. Actually, I think the original OP had X as the necessary precursor for our universe existing, not something in the universe. That doesn't strike me as a bunk premise; it seems reasonable to me to hypothesize that our universe was caused by something - you can call it X if you like.

My bold, again.

You are hung up on using loaded language. You are still making an argument that is extrapolated from a tautology. There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. It's an extrapolation to assume that the analogous parameters in our physical universe also require similar fine-tuning. That extrapolation may or may not be correct, but it's not a tautology.

[Pure Argent]

Not really. Life requires that you be able to form structures over quite a range of sizes and that those structures are stable for non trivial time periods. It also requires energy gradents.

For example if we take our universe and turn down the gravity you wouldn't get any life because you wouldn't get any stars which means you don't get any elements other than hydrogen,helium and lithium.

But this does not preclude the existence of life. Just life as we know it.
And, in any case, this assumes that only one law was changed. Maybe there isn't any gravity at all. Maybe the speed of light isn't constant. Maybe the laws of cause and effect are nonexistent. None of this explicitly states that there cannot be life. Just that life would be different from the life in our universe.

[Gate2501]

Actually, I think the original OP had X as the necessary precursor for our universe existing, not something in the universe. That doesn't strike me as a bunk premise; it seems reasonable to me to hypothesize that our universe was caused by something - you can call it X if you like.

The "X" that I referred to was unrelated to the "X" in the OP. I was just putting a variable there, to let you know that fine-tuning is tautological when applied to any observable object/event in the universe, not just human life.


There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. It's an extrapolation to assume that the analogous parameters in our physical universe also require similar fine-tuning. That extrapolation may or may not be correct, but it's not a tautology.

Perhaps you do not understand the point that I, and others, have made. The idea that the constants of the universe are "fine-tuned" to allow for the existence of an object within that universe, is tautological in nature.

This is the tautology from which you are extrapolating. It is a plain and simple tautology, and no contingency may be extracted from it. Any attempt to use it as a tool of reasoning are entirely absurd, and will lead to equally absurd conclusions.

[Beth]

Before we had Newton's gravity and Galileo's and Copernicus' heliocentrism, there were elaborate and detailed explanations for the movement of the lights in the night sky. But other than their movement around the earth, the lights which we now know represent stars and galaxies were unconnected to those we now know represent planets. And falling apples never even entered the equation. So what we had were seemingly unconstrained descriptions of these movements without a way to explain why they followed the patterns they did. Then heliocentrism provided a constraining and unifying explanation.
I take it that the answer to my question is no, you are not aware of any any unexplained parameter settings in our current models for how lights move in the sky. Thank you.

But we could have an accurate description of how the lights moved and how apples fell to earth, and we could recognize that both were relevant to our existence, and that they would behave in an unrecognizable manner if the parameters were changed, without recognizing that there was a straightforward connection between the two.


You are basically arguing that there are likely to be unknown constraints that require the parameter values to be fixed they way they are. Quite possible. It's one of the competing hypotheses for the apparent fine-tuning. It's a very reasonable hypothesis. Based on past history, such as that you gave regarding lights in the sky, it's quite possible there is a more unifying comprehensive way to model these things that won't require so many parameter values to be set arbitrarily. I'm no argument with that hypothesis. I think it is the most likely myself. But you can't claim to have knowledge that that one is correct and the 'designer' and the 'multiverse' hypotheses are not. All three are viable hypothesis to explain the situation with our current models. [Not to mention that none of them are mutually exclusive with any of the others.]


Was it reasonable that all this was considered evidence for a designer? Apparently so. My understanding is that Newton himself felt that way.

Oh come on. People don't want to call it a "designer" because it likes to go around making universes which contain anti-matter. We think this universe is of interest because it contains us, that the designer is interested in us.
I'm sorry. I though you were referring to me specifically with your previous comment. I see now you meant it in a more general way. At any rate, I don't agree with the sentiment that a designer, if one exists, must be interested in us. There's nothing to suggest that when hypothesizing a fine-tuner exists.

Because it isn't a consequence of hypothesizing about fine-tuning. It's a consequence of musing about how to find a sciency-sounding place for God. To bring up the idea of a designer when talking about fine-tuning gives the dishonest impression that it's a hypothesis that could form in the absence of any pre-conceived notions about God. You keep using that word 'dishonest'. I do not think it is appropriate here.
The fine-tuning hypothesis does not lead to any further hypotheses about the nature or character of such a designer, but I do find a designer to be a reasonable consequence of hypothesizing about why such apparent fine-tuning is required in our best models. It is one of the three given in the wiki article reference earlier.

Also, you and others keep referring to it as an explanation. Yet it isn't an explanation. It doesn't constrain the supposedly fine-tuned constants unless you arbitrarily decide that it would choose to form universes that would be of interest to us. And that merely reflects our own narcissism, not something which can be drawn from our observations.
I think it does serve as an explanation as to why certain constants have the values they do. It doesn't constrain the designer to only choosing those parameter values, just

It does NOT require the assumption that such a designer would choose to form universes of interest to us. It only requires the assumption that a universe with the parameter values ours possess would be of interest to it. This doesn't seem an unreasonable assumption when you examine the universes that other parameter values lead to. Ours appears to be highly unusual.

[Beth]

The "X" that I referred to was unrelated to the "X" in the OP. I was just putting a variable there, to let you know that fine-tuning is tautological when applied to any observable object/event in the universe, not just human life.



Perhaps you do not understand the point that I, and others, have made. The idea that the constants of the universe are "fine-tuned" to allow for the existence of an object within that universe, is tautological in nature.

This is the tautology from which you are extrapolating. It is a plain and simple tautology, and no contingency may be extracted from it. Any attempt to use it as a tool of reasoning are entirely absurd, and will lead to equally absurd conclusions.

Sorry, but you'll have to explain to me what tautology you think exists in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. It doesn't seem tautological to me. I think most of the humans involved in creating those models would be very happy to do without the fine-tuning. Unfortunately, so far they haven't been able to do so despite some very very smart and motivated people trying very very hard to do so.

[Gate2501]

This doesn't seem an unreasonable assumption when you examine the universes that other parameter values lead to. Ours appears to be highly unusual.

Incorrect.

You are attempting to divorce our universe from the fact that we do in fact exist within it. The probability that we would observe fundamental constants which allow us to exist, in a universe in which we do in fact exist, is 1. Probability = 1 is a far cry from unusual.

[Gate2501]

Sorry, but you'll have to explain to me what tautology you think exists in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. It doesn't seem tautological to me. I think most of the humans involved in creating those models would be very happy to do without the fine-tuning. Unfortunately, so far they haven't been able to do so despite some very very smart and motivated people trying very very hard to do so.

Did you outright ignore my last post? The one that you quoted?

The tautology is as follows:

I exist, I observe a universe with fundamental constants which allow me to exist. I would not observe a universe in which the fundamental constants did not allow me to exist, because I would not exist to make that observation.

[Beth]

Incorrect.

You are attempting to divorce our universe from the fact that we do in fact exist within it. The probability that we would observe fundamental constants which allow us to exist, in a universe in which we do in fact exist, is 1. Probability = 1 is a far cry from unusual.
That's not what I'm referring to. It's the fact that out of all possible parameter values, very very few lead to universes where such things as stars, planets and galaxies form. I forget how Stephen Hawking described the vast majority of results using different paramenter values, but that's what I meant by unusual, not that it possesses creatures such as us to observe that those parameter values are required.

[Gate2501]

That's not what I'm referring to. It's the fact that out of all possible parameter values, very very few lead to universes where such things as stars, planets and galaxies form.

And when you add in that the constants which allowed for the formation of these objects are "fine-tuned" to allow their existence, you are reasoning from a tautology from which contingency cannot be drawn.

You are still making the same mistake.


I forget how Stephen Hawking described the vast majority of results using different paramenter values, but that's what I meant by unusual, not that it possesses creatures such as us to observe that those parameter values are required.

The tautology upon which your argument is based, is not dependent upon observers existing at all.

[Beth]

Did you outright ignore my last post? The one that you quoted?

The tautology is as follows:

I exist, I observe a universe with fundamental constants which allow me to exist. I would not observe a universe in which the fundamental constants did not allow me to exist, because I would not exist to make that observation.

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

[Yoink]

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

I don't think I understand what you mean by "fine tuned" here. Why can't there be an option

D) there's no discoverable reason for these parameters having the values that they do, nor is there a multiverse: this just happens to be the way the universe came out; and that, in turn, allowed us to exist.

What objective proof of "fine-tuning" would you offer to disprove that possibility?

[Beth]

I don't think I understand what you mean by "fine tuned" here. Why can't there be an option

D) there's no discoverable reason for these parameters having the values that they do, nor is there a multiverse: this just happens to be the way the universe came out; and that, in turn, allowed us to exist.

What objective proof of "fine-tuning" would you offer to disprove that possibility?

D is possible (it would be the 'random chance' hypothesis). It can't be disproved [unless one of the other hypotheses are proved]. However, generally speaking, when the probability of a particular outcome arising by chance is extremely low, it's presumed to be due to something other than random chance.

The objective proof of "fine-tuning" is for our models, not the universe. It's an extrapolation to presume that the universe is also fine-tuned. But, given that the models are built to simulate the creation of the universe, it's a reasonable extrapolation.

[Gate2501]

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

Wait what?

The parameters within our own models must be fine-tuned by us to fit reality, so that they are accurate descriptions of what we observe.

What does this have to do with a, b or c??? They totally DO NOT FOLLOW from your reasoning with respect to modeling by humans.

Examples a, b and c, are absolutely classic examples of reasoning drawn from the Anthropic Principle, which is tautological, and cannot be used as a reasoning tool. These are arguments made from fine-tuning. These are arguments made from an entirely circular premise.

[Yoink]

D is possible (it would be the 'random chance' hypothesis). It can't be disproved [unless one of the other hypotheses are proved]. However, generally speaking, when the probability of a particular outcome arising by chance is extremely low, it's presumed to be due to something other than random chance.

The objective proof of "fine-tuning" is for our models, not the universe. It's an extrapolation to presume that the universe is also fine-tuned. But, given that the models are built to simulate the creation of the universe, it's a reasonable extrapolation.

But isn't that just a misunderstanding of probability? I mean, take a lottery in which ten million tickets are sold and after they are all sold, one ticket is randomly selected as the winner. Now, the odds of any one person winning is 1-in-ten million, right? That's astronomical. But you'd be a fool to go find the winner--let's call him Fred Bloggs--and assume that there's something remarkable about him or that it "couldn't have just been chance" that lead to him winning, wouldn't you?

Even if the universe is the way it is simply by sheer luck, I can't see what inference we can draw from that. Had it turned out any other way, we wouldn't be here to ask "why was it this way." Had someone else won the lottery, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in the position of asking "I wonder why I won?" either.

[Gate2501]

The objective proof of "fine-tuning" is for our models, not the universe. It's an extrapolation to presume that the universe is also fine-tuned. But, given that the models are built to simulate the creation of the universe, it's a reasonable extrapolation.

The fact that we must "fine-tune" the parameters within our models to fit reality is nothing more than a reflection OF reality.

What you are doing now is either deliberately dishonest, or you just wikipedia'd all of this a few hours ago and don't really know what you are going on about. All that you are doing is adding another layer on top of what is a bunk premise, and trying to dodge out of the fact that the premise itself is illogical by claiming to reason from this additional layer.

You are still making an argument based on a tautological observation.

[Beth]

But isn't that just a misunderstanding of probability? I mean, take a lottery in which ten million tickets are sold and after they are all sold, one ticket is randomly selected as the winner. Now, the odds of any one person winning is 1-in-ten million, right? That's astronomical. But you'd be a fool to go find the winner--let's call him Fred Bloggs--and assume that there's something remarkable about him or that it "couldn't have just been chance" that lead to him winning, wouldn't you? In that situation, you have millions of tickets sold. That's analogous to the multiverse argument. Are there billions upon billions of universes, with only a few possessing the necessary parameter values to form stars and galaxies?

Even if the universe is the way it is simply by sheer luck, I can't see what inference we can draw from that. Had it turned out any other way, we wouldn't be here to ask "why was it this way." Had someone else won the lottery, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in the position of asking "I wonder why I won?" either. That's the anthromorphic argument, which usually accompanies the multiverse hypothesis. Yes, you're correct, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in that position, but someone else were. The problem we are faced with is more like holding the only lottery ticket known to be in existance and wondering why we happen to have the winning combination. Maybe it's just chance. Sure, if we didn't have the ticket, we wouldn't be wondering about why we have it. But we do and it seems very odd and not very plausible without assuming that millions of other tickets also exist.

[Gate2501]

But isn't that just a misunderstanding of probability? I mean, take a lottery in which ten million tickets are sold and after they are all sold, one ticket is randomly selected as the winner. Now, the odds of any one person winning is 1-in-ten million, right? That's astronomical. But you'd be a fool to go find the winner--let's call him Fred Bloggs--and assume that there's something remarkable about him or that it "couldn't have just been chance" that lead to him winning, wouldn't you?

Even if the universe is the way it is simply by sheer luck, I can't see what inference we can draw from that. Had it turned out any other way, we wouldn't be here to ask "why was it this way." Had someone else won the lottery, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in the position of asking "I wonder why I won?" either.

Yes, most of this argument is based upon a rank misunderstanding of probability. People divorce the probability from conditionals like "X exists"(which make the probability = 1), and then ask "Oh my god, what are the chances of the universe being right for X to exist?!!!".

X can be a person, a galaxy, or a jelly doughnut.

[Yoink]

In that situation, you have millions of tickets sold. That's analogous to the multiverse argument. Are there billions upon billions of universes, with only a few possessing the necessary parameter values to form stars and galaxies?

Fred Bloggs bought only one ticket. And won. Does that prove that he's Destiny's Child?

The fact that there are millions of tickets doesn't alter the case at all. You don't win by holding a ticket, you win by having that ticket's number drawn. That number is drawn just once. So, is it a "miracle" that the number drawn on that sole occasion matches the number on Fred Blogg's ticket? That this single occurrence, out of all possible occurrences, was the one that made Fred Bloggs a multimillionaire?

That's the anthromorphic argument, which usually accompanies the multiverse hypothesis. Yes, you're correct, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in that position, but someone else were. The problem we are faced with is more like holding the only lottery ticket known to be in existance and wondering why we happen to have the winning combination. Maybe it's just chance. Sure, if we didn't have the ticket, we wouldn't be wondering about why we have it. But we do and it seems very odd and not very plausible without assuming that millions of other tickets also exist.

I think this is just a rank misunderstanding of probability (and yes, I know that some esteemed philosophers have defended this position; I just take that to be further proof of the deleterious effect faith has on people's ability to reason).

There's simply a contradiction here: on the one hand you're saying "this universe could have had any parameters at all (--in other words, there were millions of lottery tickets). But on the other hand you're saying "and whatever form the universe takes we must regard it as miraculous 'fine tuning' that it took that form rather than some other form."

I mean, either it's random or it isn't. If it's random, then we have no right to be surprised by any particular outcome. If it's not random, then there's no basis for the "fine tuning" argument at all.

[Robin]

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?

Why does an Idealist care anyway?

[Robin]

1 and 5 seem reasonable statements to me. I don't think that the 2, 3, and 4 are necessary, but I don't spend enough time discussing it with proponents to determine if they are a typical part of the argument.
Mostly they do get left out, but they are nevertheless implicit.

If they were not true then no improbability could be demonstrated. I just believe in making implicit assumptions explicit.

[Robin]

If the Universe was "constructed" such that we could not and did not exist, then we would not be here to discuss it. QED.

The rest is window dressing.
But the usual answer to that is to consider the man who is anaesthetised, but first told that he will not be revived unless he wins every lottery in the USA over the coming month.

He wakes up and finds he is alive and people say "aren't you amazed that you won every lottery in the USA over a month?" and he answers "No, if I didn't win them I wouldn't be here to discuss it".

[Robin]

Actually, I think the original OP had X as the necessary precursor for our universe existing, not something in the universe. That doesn't strike me as a bunk premise; it seems reasonable to me to hypothesize that our universe was caused by something - you can call it X if you like.
Actually I said the Universe was contingent upon X, rather than "precursor" or "cause" since these things seem to imply time. If time began at the big bang then there could be no "precursor" unless the cause also had some kind of time.

Saying it is "contingent" does not have the same implication of there being a "before" the big bang.

[Beth]

Mostly they do get left out, but they are nevertheless implicit.

If they were not true then no improbability could be demonstrated. I just believe in making implicit assumptions explicit.

I'm not following you here. They don't seem necessary to me. If they were not true, why would that affect the improbability argument?

[Ichneumonwasp]

I agree that it does not prove the existance of a fine-tuner. I don't think anyone in this thread is arguing that it does. But the parameter values DO require fine-tuning by the model builders to end up with a universe like ours. Why do you object to the implication that fine-tuning is required when it is true?


You can only argue that fine-tuning is required if you already intend for this universe to pop out. The problem is in the perspective. When you begin with the end in mind, the only way that anyone can get to one particular end is by placing an enormous number of constraints on the system -- so that it looks designed.

The problem is that beginning with a particular end in mind always colors the approach.

Take away the end and you see something like this -- the constants are what they are and we end up with this sort of universe. Things could have been very different.

When it comes to us trying to understand if there is something deeper to the process of "why these constants?", then no one has any objection as far as I can tell.

But let's get real. That is not why this argument continues to surface.

[geni]

But this does not preclude the existence of life. Just life as we know it.

Yes it does. Life is a structure that can use energy for the perpose of it's own reporduction.

Without energy gradents this is of course imposible.

Structures are needed to facilitate energy flow and reproduction. In the no stars universe such structures are imposible. The structures need to be around long enough for reproduction to take place (so very hot universes may be a problem).



And, in any case, this assumes that only one law was changed. Maybe there isn't any gravity at all. Maybe the speed of light isn't constant. Maybe the laws of cause and effect are nonexistent. None of this explicitly states that there cannot be life. Just that life would be different from the life in our universe.

Dealing with one law change at a time makes it easy to deal with the outcome. The more changes you make the stranger the result is likely to be and the less likely life is. Changeing the speed of light has all sorts of problematical effects.

[Pure Argent]

Yes it does. Life is a structure that can use energy for the perpose of it's own reporduction.

Without energy gradents this is of course imposible.

Structures are needed to facilitate energy flow and reproduction. In the no stars universe such structures are imposible. The structures need to be around long enough for reproduction to take place (so very hot universes may be a problem).

Dealing with one law change at a time makes it easy to deal with the outcome. The more changes you make the stranger the result is likely to be and the less likely life is. Changeing the speed of light has all sorts of problematical effects.

:/
Y'know, I'm pretty sure you're right. But the fact is that neither of us can prove either side of the argument. We can't know what the other universes would be like, or whether they would support life, or if that life would even be recognized as "life" in our universe.
But it's cool to think about!

[Robin]

I'm not following you here. They don't seem necessary to me. If they were not true, why would that affect the improbability argument?
If you roll a die once, what is the probability that it will land a 6?

If you roll a die 20 times, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?

If you roll 20 dice, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?

[Beth]

You can only argue that fine-tuning is required if you already intend for this universe to pop out. Right The problem is in the perspective. When you begin with the end in mind, the only way that anyone can get to one particular end is by placing an enormous number of constraints on the system -- so that it looks designed. No argument there.

The problem is that beginning with a particular end in mind always colors the approach.
Wanting to end up with a model that produces a universe that looks like ours certainly fits that bill.

Take away the end and you see something like this -- the constants are what they are and we end up with this sort of universe. Things could have been very different. Maybe. Maybe not. We really don't know at this point. There are certainly a lot of very different universes that pop out of our models without those constraints.
When it comes to us trying to understand if there is something deeper to the process of "why these constants?", then no one has any objection as far as I can tell.
Sure seems like I get a lot of objections to insisting that the question is currently unanswered.
But let's get real. That is not why this argument continues to surface.

Maybe. But that's not why I argue it.

[Gate2501]

If you roll a die once, what is the probability that it will land a 6?

If you roll a die 20 times, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?

If you roll 20 dice, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?

If you rolled a dice 14 billion years ago and it landed on a 6, what are the odds today that it landed on a 6 14 billion years ago.

:cool:

[rocketdodger]

The argument is usually formulated as a probabilistic argument where the evidence (the precise life-permitting values of the physical constants) is more likely given the existence of God than by random chance.

And that is why it utterly fails to hold water -- there is zero evidence that random chance has anything to do with anything.

[Beth]

If you roll a die once, what is the probability that it will land a 6?

If you roll a die 20 times, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?
0.9739

If you roll 20 dice, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?
0.9739 It doesn't matter whether you roll one die 20 times or 20 dice once, if the dice are all fair and honest, the probabilities are identical.

But I'm still not following you. How do are you relating those probability statements relate to the idea that:

X is unique in all existence or X is capabable of producing only one universe

or X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random

I don't see why any of these statements are necessary or implicit in the fine-tuning argument. Why does X need to be unique? What can X be capable of producing only one universe? And while I don't object to the assumption that there are a vast number of different ways that X might produce a universe, I don't see why we need assume that X might have produced any of them at random.

[Beth]

Actually I said the Universe was contingent upon X, rather than "precursor" or "cause" since these things seem to imply time. If time began at the big bang then there could be no "precursor" unless the cause also had some kind of time.

Saying it is "contingent" does not have the same implication of there being a "before" the big bang.

Okay. So what do you mean by "contingent" then?

I thought you were meaning that the universe required X in order to come into being. If that's not what you mean, how is X involved in the fine-tuning argument? If that is what you meant, how does being contingent differ from being a precursor or a cause?

[Singularitarian]

0.9739

0.9739 It doesn't matter whether you roll one die 20 times or 20 dice once, if the dice are all fair and honest, the probabilities are identical.

But I'm still not following you. How do are you relating those probability statements relate to the idea that:

X is unique in all existence or X is capabable of producing only one universe

or X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random

I don't see why any of these statements are necessary or implicit in the fine-tuning argument. Why does X need to be unique? What can X be capable of producing only one universe? And while I don't object to the assumption that there are a vast number of different ways that X might produce a universe, I don't see why we need assume that X might have produced any of them at random.

I can't understand what is exactly being said either, and what X implies.

With this said, i suppose its a condition of the universe? If it is, then its much more complicated than just saying X. There are many variables to consider, such as why the universe has exactly three+one dimensions capable for sustaining complex systems... any less dimensions, and would never have survived, including all forms of life. Indeed, why did the inflationary phase of the universe occur exactly when it did? What about the variables which conducted the superiority of ordinary particles over antiparticles, what are the chances there? Hoyle himself even calculated the odds of a single enzyme to be around 10^{40,000} to one, and even Smolin calculated the odds of life to 10^{250} to 1(approx.).What about the fundamenta particles? Unless the types of particles are indeed few in number (we know around 450 particles of the standard model) then why did the universe choose the baryons it did, and the quantity in which they arrived?

There are manyu variables to consider.

[Olowkow]

Hoyle himself even calculated the odds of a single enzyme to be around http://www.randi.org/latexrender/latex.php?10%5E%7B40,000%7D to one, and even Smolin calculated the odds of life to http://www.randi.org/latexrender/latex.php?10%5E%7B250%7D to 1(approx.)That's enough to make one believe in god-didit.:D
What are the odds of all the pool balls on the table winding up in their final positions upon break, to an accuracy of a Planck length?

[Beth]

There's simply a contradiction here: on the one hand you're saying "this universe could have had any parameters at all (--in other words, there were millions of lottery tickets). But on the other hand you're saying "and whatever form the universe takes we must regard it as miraculous 'fine tuning' that it took that form rather than some other form." If I say that there are millions of possible combination of numbers to select from for your lottery ticket, does that imply that a lottery ticket was created and sold for every possible combination of numbers? That there are more possible outcomes than are actually realized is not a contradiction. It's a basic fact of nature as I understand it.



I mean, either it's random or it isn't. If it's random, then we have no right to be surprised by any particular outcome. Just because something is random doesn't imply that all outcomes are equally likely. If you throw two dice, you're far more likely to get a 7 than a 12. If you throw 20 dice and they all come up 6, would you believe it was due to random chance or would you consider other explanations? If it's not random, then there's no basis for the "fine tuning" argument at all. If you assume it's not random, that the designer hypothesis is one way to explain the non-randomness of the outcome.

[Singularitarian]

That's enough to make one believe in god-didit.:D
What are the odds of all the pool balls on the table winding up in their final positions upon break, to an accuracy of a Planck length?

Do you mean a planck seperation between two balls... would never happen, couldn't happen. And if it could, then it would be a matter of geometry, odds i couldn't possibly calculate.

[Singularitarian]

I can however, for the sake of arguement gives the odds that the entire vacuum could have arisen due to quantum mechanics.

Qouting Gate2501; ''The conditional(we exist) probability of us observing a universe which allows us to exist, is 1.''

Is not true at all from quantum mechanics. For there to arise a singular region in spacetime in some distant past is actually governed by the wave function, meaning that the conditions of this universe where ''chosen'' from an infinite amount of possible start-up conditions. Because every possibility of the universe existed in a superpositioned state (meaning all possible states of vacuums), then the chances of one of these states appearing is a massive 1 out of an \infty (the infinity symbol.)

[Robin]

If you roll a die once, what is the probability that it will land a 6?

If you roll a die 20 times, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?
0.9739
If you roll 20 dice, what is the probability that at least one of them will be a six?
0.9739 It doesn't matter whether you roll one die 20 times or 20 dice once, if the dice are all fair and honest, the probabilities are identical.
Err... is there a reason you did not answer the first question????

Is that probability identical too?

[Gate2501]

I can however, for the sake of arguement gives the odds that the entire vacuum could have arisen due to quantum mechanics.

Qouting Gate2501; ''The conditional(we exist) probability of us observing a universe which allows us to exist, is 1.''

Is not true at all from quantum mechanics. For there to arise a singular region in spacetime in some distant past is actually governed by the wave function, meaning that the conditions of this universe where ''chosen'' from an infinite amount of possible start-up conditions. Because every possibility of the universe existed in a superpositioned state (meaning all possible states of vacuums), then the chances of one of these states appearing is a massive 1 out of an \infty (the infinity symbol.)

So are you saying that the conditional(we exist) probability of us observing a universe which allows us to exist is not 1?

On what grounds? I am scared to argue with you, because it looks like you have employed the word salad style further compounded by quantum mechanical jutsus.

Very powerful techniques indeed. :boxedin:

[Robin]

Okay. So what do you mean by "contingent" then?

I thought you were meaning that the universe required X in order to come into being. If that's not what you mean, how is X involved in the fine-tuning argument? If that is what you meant, how does being contingent differ from being a precursor or a cause?
I don't think you read my first explanation, so I am not sure how saying it again would help.

If you say the universe came into being, then this implies, doesn't it, that before the universe began there was no universe?

So tell me - was there time before time began? If not, then was there a "before" the universe began?

[rocketdodger]

Even if you think the odds of God existing are 1 in a thousand, you'll get confirmation, because the existence of life is "crushingly improbable".

No.

And we have been over this before. Multiple times.

Each time, you get trounced. Do you come back hoping people have forgotten you? Do you forget? Are you actively dishonest, or merely prone to fail to remember things?

You have zero evidence that the existence of life is "crushingly improbable."

You have never cited any.

You never will cite any.

So why do you keep at this game?

[Yoink]

If I say that there are millions of possible combination of numbers to select from for your lottery ticket, does that imply that a lottery ticket was created and sold for every possible combination of numbers? That there are more possible outcomes than are actually realized is not a contradiction. It's a basic fact of nature as I understand it.

You're missing my point. The "contradiction" is that on the one hand you are saying "any of these outcomes is possible" and then whatever outcome actually happens you're saying "OMG, it's a miracle! Out of all the possible outcomes, it was this one!!!!"

Either you think they are all possible, or you don't. If they're all possible, why the surprise that one of the many possible outcomes occurred? Where, in other words, is the evidence of "fine tuning"?

Just because something is random doesn't imply that all outcomes are equally likely. If you throw two dice, you're far more likely to get a 7 than a 12. If you throw 20 dice and they all come up 6, would you believe it was due to random chance or would you consider other explanations? If you assume it's not random, that the designer hypothesis is one way to explain the non-randomness of the outcome.

Where did I say anything about "equally likely"? Who here has any evidence about how "likely" this universe is? If the "fine tuning" argument is to mean anything AT ALL, however, it requires that the physical parameters of this universe not be intrinsically necessary. If they are intrinsically necessary then there's no "fine tuning"": there simply is "the way things have to be." So, it's the "fine tuning" argument that requires the assumption that things could just as easily have been otherwise in order for there to be surprise and amazement that they happened to turn out this way.

So, ex hypothesi, the fine tuning argument says "our universe turned out in one of many, many, many possible ways." Great; but presumably it had to turn out in some way, right? So why should I be excited about the fact that it is this way.

Here's what you're not seeing about the 20-dice analogy. Every single possible throw of 20 dice is equally improbable. If I throw 20 dice and get
1,3,6,4,2,6,1,6,5,4,3,2,5,2,3,4,6,1,1,1--that's just as unlikely as 6,6,6, etc. The error that the "fine tuning" people make is that they start from the assumption that there's something particularly "interesting" about an outcome in which we happen to end up evolving and then ask "what are the odds"??? That's like starting from the requirement that the dice come up 20x6. But what reason do we have for thinking there's anything so "interesting" about an outcome in which we end up to ask about that outcome?

Again, if every single possible universe is "wildly improbable," then what makes the one we've got different from any other one? Where's the evidence of "fine tuning."

[Singularitarian]

So are you saying that the conditional(we exist) probability of us observing a universe which allows us to exist is not 1?

On what grounds? I am scared to argue with you, because it looks like you have employed the word salad style further compounded by quantum mechanical jutsus.

Very powerful techniques indeed. :boxedin:

In the beginning, there was nothing. In fact, this beginning is not described by the time vector of the current universe. This beginning is timelessness, a void, with nothing, absolute nada. Then, suddenly, spawned a creation of matter and gas.

For the matter and gas, space and time to unfold, the wave function of quantum mechanics dictates that the universe had to choose the initial conditions from an infinite amount of choices [1]. In effect, the wave function had smeared all the possible universes which could arise in the universe, and fundamentally dictating any of the events which so occured afterwards. This means our very chances of standing here on earth, as thought lit upon a magicians darkened stage, and we ponder mindlessly about the foundations in which we can inexorably observe.

Interestingly, the wave function did not provide a finite amount of solutions from a Copenhagen Point of View. The universe had to choose from an infinite amount of possible universes, so the chances of any universe being observable would actually infer 1 in an infinite amount.

[1] - F. A Wolf. Parallel Universes; The Search for Other Worlds.

[Beth]

Err... is there a reason you did not answer the first question????

Is that probability identical too?

Sorry, I didn't realize you wanted an answer to that one too :p. It's one out of six.

Beth

[Gate2501]

In the beginning, there was nothing. In fact, this beginning is not described by the time vector of the current universe. This beginning is timelessness, a void, with nothing, absolute nada. Then, suddenly, spawned a creation of matter and gas.

For the matter and gas, space and time to unfold, the wave function of quantum mechanics dictates that the universe had to choose the initial conditions from an infinite amount of choices [1]. In effect, the wave function had smeared all the possible universes which could arise in the universe, and fundamentally dictating any of the events which so occured afterwards. This means our very chances of standing here on earth, as thought lit upon a magicians darkened stage, and we ponder mindlessly about the foundations in which we can inexorably observe.

Interestingly, the wave function did not provide a finite amount of solutions from a Copenhagen Point of View. The universe had to choose from an infinite amount of possible universes, so the chances of any universe being observable would actually infer 1 in an infinite amount.

[1] - F. A Wolf. Parallel Universes; The Search for Other Worlds.

Answer the question, yes or no.

Do you believe that it would be possible for us to observe a universe(the one we live in), with fundamental constants that never allowed life to form, barring our own existence.

[Singularitarian]

Answer the question, yes or no.

Do you believe that it would be possible for us to observe a universe(the one we live in), with fundamental constants that never allowed life to form, barring our own existence.

No, as that would be an oxymoron... a paradox of sorts.

[Beth]

I don't think you read my first explanation, so I am not sure how saying it again would help.

If you say the universe came into being, then this implies, doesn't it, that before the universe began there was no universe? It implies that this universe didn't exist. Whether any other universes existed then or now is unknown.

So tell me - was there time before time began? If not, then was there a "before" the universe began? I don't know. I suppose it depends on what else might have been around. I'm sorry I didn't understand your first explanation, but I would appreciate if you could give it another try.

[Gate2501]

No, as that would be an oxymoron... a paradox of sorts.

Then you why did you argue with my statement that the probability of us observing a universe which allowed life to exist, given the condition that we do in fact exist, is 1?

I'm confused. You are a confusing fella.

[Singularitarian]

Then you why did you argue with my statement that the probability of us observing a universe which allowed life to exist, given the condition that we do in fact exist, is 1?

I'm confused. You are a confusing fella.

Because your ratio is incorrect. Saying 1 alone, is like saying it takes 1 to do anything.

[Dancing David]

the probability of an event that has happened is 1.

In the case of the universe, the occurance of the universe is 1, the number of known universes is 1, so we divide the number of existing universes by the number of known universes and we get 1.

[Beth]

You're missing my point. The "contradiction" is that on the one hand you are saying "any of these outcomes is possible" and then whatever outcome actually happens you're saying "OMG, it's a miracle! Out of all the possible outcomes, it was this one!!!!"

Either you think they are all possible, or you don't. If they're all possible, why the surprise that one of the many possible outcomes occurred? Where, in other words, is the evidence of "fine tuning"? I don't know if they are all possible. As near as I can tell, no one does. Apparently, the physicists who create such models know of no reason why they would not all be possible. However, out of all the possible parameter values, only a very few result in universes like ours. The remaining universes are very similar and, if you presume many universes, far more common that universes like ours. That isn't a contradiction, nor am I saying "OMG, it's a miracle!". I'm saying that according to the smartest physicists on the planet, it appears that a universe like ours is very unlikely to have occurred by random chance and therefore, it's reasonable to consider other possibilities.

If the "fine tuning" argument is to mean anything AT ALL, however, it requires that the physical parameters of this universe not be intrinsically necessary. If they are intrinsically necessary then there's no "fine tuning"": there simply is "the way things have to be." So, it's the "fine tuning" argument that requires the assumption that things could just as easily have been otherwise in order for there to be surprise and amazement that they happened to turn out this way. I don't think so. It seems to me that it's the multiverse hypothesis that assumes things could just have easily been otherwise and ours is just the one that randomly happened to have those parameters. The fine-tuning argument assumes that they were deliberately set or chosen in order to achieve this sort of universe. It does assume that they could have been chosen differently.

So, ex hypothesi, the fine tuning argument says "our universe turned out in one of many, many, many possible ways." Great; but presumably it had to turn out in some way, right? So why should I be excited about the fact that it is this way.
Because turning out this particular way is very very rare. Generally, things that are rare are interesting and often they are something to get excited about.
Here's what you're not seeing about the 20-dice analogy. Every single possible throw of 20 dice is equally improbable. If I throw 20 dice and get
1,3,6,4,2,6,1,6,5,4,3,2,5,2,3,4,6,1,1,1--that's just as unlikely as 6,6,6, etc. For that particular sequence, yes. However, if you merely specify five ones, three twos, three threes, three fours, two fives and four sixes rather than the exact sequence, the probability of getting it is much higher than that of getting 20 6's. If you get a result similar to the one you specified, are you going to scratch your head and wonder whether the dice were loaded the way you would if you got 20 sixes in row?
The error that the "fine tuning" people make is that they start from the assumption that there's something particularly "interesting" about an outcome in which we happen to end up evolving and then ask "what are the odds"??? That's like starting from the requirement that the dice come up 20x6. But what reason do we have for thinking there's anything so "interesting" about an outcome in which we end up to ask about that outcome? The same reason you'd find it interesting if you threw a dice 20 times and they were all sixes versus throwing the sequence you specified above. One is similar to what would be expected, even though unlikely to be exactly predicted. The other is reason to suspect there is something going one with the dice that causes that particular outcome.

Again, if every single possible universe is "wildly improbable," then what makes the one we've got different from any other one? Where's the evidence of "fine tuning."
Apparently, the parameter values that result in a universe like ours are very rare. The vast majority end up quite differently and unable to form any type of structure.

[Dancing David]

As to the improbability of life existing, how can you make a statistical argument about what is unknown?

If you vary the cosmological constant by what factor?
If you vary the EM field by what factor?

We can not say what variability there would be in the constants of the universe.

It is factors of hundred, one or fractions of one.

How many states are there between 1.1 and 1.2, if you adjust by .1 then 1, if by .01 then 10, by .001 then a hundred and so on, in an unknown state you CAN NOT give the probability for how 'finely tuned' the constants are becuase you have no idea what they could vary by.

penrose sattes that the possible outcomes og the universe was something like 10^10^123 and then concludes that this means the universe is improbable. And so is a single atom of hydrogen, out of ~10^80 partciles what are the odds of a single atom of hydrogen. If you randomly get one 1/10^80, but if it is already the one you have in a jar, then it is 1/1.

The universe may have had 10^10^123 possible states, but we know nothing about them or what properties they have had, so you can say NOTHING about the probability of life arising in one of them.

[Robin]

Sorry, I didn't realize you wanted an answer to that one too :p. It's one out of six.

Beth
And so you would agree, wouldn't you that 1 in six is not the same as 0.9739?

And yet you ask why stipulating the number of attempts and the number of agents is necessary to the probability argument.

So suppose someone says: "Give me twenty dollars and if I don't roll a six on a die I will give you ten thousand dollars"

So would you take the bet? Suppose some trusted person could act as guarantor?

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that the six must be off the first roll?

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that he throw only one die?

Would you think it necessary that he only stipulate one of the above conditions?

Or would you have to ask him to stipulate both in order to get the 1 in 6 odds that you were expecting?

The same principle applies with the cause of the universe - the probability argument will not be valid if the cause has produced countless other universes. And the probability argument will not be valid if the cause is an entity among many like entities all producing universes.

I don't get what you don't get about that.

[rocketdodger]

As to the improbability of life existing, how can you make a statistical argument about what is unknown?

If you vary the cosmological constant by what factor?
If you vary the EM field by what factor?

We can not say what variability there would be in the constants of the universe.

It is factors of hundred, one or fractions of one.

How many states are there between 1.1 and 1.2, if you adjust by .1 then 1, if by .01 then 10, by .001 then a hundred and so on, in an unknown state you CAN NOT give the probability for how 'finely tuned' the constants are becuase you have no idea what they could vary by.

penrose sattes that the possible outcomes og the universe was something like 10^10^123 and then concludes that this means the universe is improbable. And so is a single atom of hydrogen, out of ~10^80 partciles what are the odds of a single atom of hydrogen. If you randomly get one 1/10^80, but if it is already the one you have in a jar, then it is 1/1.

The universe may have had 10^10^123 possible states, but we know nothing about them or what properties they have had, so you can say NOTHING about the probability of life arising in one of them.

Exactly.

And frankly, I am sick and tired of the dishonesty that propagates this misinformation. When people like you and I try to get an answer on this from FT proponents, it never happens. Ever.

What I have seen in the past is people come in and ask other questions and individuals like Malerin are able to avoid answering because they pretend to get "sidetracked" with other posts.

How about we draw a line in the sand, on this thread, and refuse to move forward until this point is addressed?

[Robin]

It implies that this universe didn't exist. Whether any other universes existed then or now is unknown.
But you are quite confident, are you, that there was time before time began?
I don't know. I suppose it depends on what else might have been around. I'm sorry I didn't understand your first explanation, but I would appreciate if you could give it another try.
Again, I am not quite sure what it is that you didn't understand.

Was there time before time began?

[rocketdodger]

I don't get what you don't get about that.

She is an FT proponent with a vested psychological interest in proving the existence of God (to herself) by any means possible.

I don't get what you don't get about that. ;p

[Singularitarian]

the probability of an event that has happened is 1.

In the case of the universe, the occurance of the universe is 1, the number of known universes is 1, so we divide the number of existing universes by the number of known universes and we get 1.

In the case of the universe, and the wave function which governed the initial beginning, the probability is 1 in an infinity.

This is a big difference in understanding, than merely saying the probability is 1.

[Singularitarian]

As to the improbability of life existing, how can you make a statistical argument about what is unknown?

If you vary the cosmological constant by what factor?
If you vary the EM field by what factor?

We can not say what variability there would be in the constants of the universe.

It is factors of hundred, one or fractions of one.

How many states are there between 1.1 and 1.2, if you adjust by .1 then 1, if by .01 then 10, by .001 then a hundred and so on, in an unknown state you CAN NOT give the probability for how 'finely tuned' the constants are becuase you have no idea what they could vary by.

penrose sattes that the possible outcomes og the universe was something like 10^10^123 and then concludes that this means the universe is improbable. And so is a single atom of hydrogen, out of ~10^80 partciles what are the odds of a single atom of hydrogen. If you randomly get one 1/10^80, but if it is already the one you have in a jar, then it is 1/1.

The universe may have had 10^10^123 possible states, but we know nothing about them or what properties they have had, so you can say NOTHING about the probability of life arising in one of them.


David, you over-estimate these calculations. For instance, there is something ''like'' 10^80 particles in this universe. The conditions and boundaries we are allowed to work with comes from the experimental soil of physics and measurement. The statistics of life are obviously not accurate, but if the standard model is correct, we are sure we cannot be far off.

[rocketdodger]

we are sure we cannot be far off.

Then why are you so far off?

[arthwollipot]

According to Frank J Tipler, the ultimate goal of the Anthropic arguement is to proove the strong arguement.I consider Tipler to be a nutcase.

I'm just sayin'.

[Beth]

And so you would agree, wouldn't you that 1 in six is not the same as 0.9739 wouldn't you? Yes

And yet you ask why stipulating the number of attempts and the number of agents is necessary to the probability argument. No. That I understand. I was asking why you wanted to the know the probability of getting at least one 6 out of twenty throws of the same dice or one throw of twenty dice. Those are the same.

So suppose someone says: "Give me twenty dollars and if I don't roll a six on a die I will give you ten thousand dollars"

So would you take the bet? Suppose some trusted person could act as guarantor? Depends. I'm generally not much of a gambler, but if the details of the bet are specified and the odds were in my favor, I might. On the other hand, the only person likely to offer me a bet like that is someone who is probably trying to cheat me out of my money, so I might pass even so.

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that the six must be off the first roll? I'd be willing to let him have two or three throws at those odds. :D

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that he throw only one die? That would be my expectation. If he wanted more, yes, I would want to know how many and how many throws he wanted to take.

Would you think it necessary that he only stipulate one of the above conditions? It would be necessary if he wanted something other than one throw with one die, as that would the expectation from your phrasing above.

Or would you have to ask him to stipulate both in order to get the 1 in 6 odds that you were expecting? I'd want to examine the die too.

The same principle applies with the cause of the universe - the probability argument will not be valid if the cause has produced countless other universes. And the probability argument will not be valid if the cause is an entity among many like entities all producing universes. I agree. We can only talk about the probabilities in regard to our various models of the universe and the what the possible parameters are for those. The physicists build models trying to use as few rules and set as few parameters as possible. We can examine the models they have and determine what percentage of universes produced by such models are like ours. The answer is almost none. They only get universes like ours when they fine-tune many different parameters.

I don't get what you don't get about that. I get all that fine. What I don't understand is what you mean by "contingent" in your OP. What does your definition of contingent have to do with the probabilities you're talking about here?

[Singularitarian]

I consider Tipler to be a nutcase.

I'm just sayin'.

What about John Barrow then? He co-authored the theory in the Anthropic Principle?

[Yoink]

I don't know if they are all possible. As near as I can tell, no one does. Apparently, the physicists who create such models know of no reason why they would not all be possible. However, out of all the possible parameter values, only a very few result in universes like ours. The remaining universes are very similar and, if you presume many universes, far more common that universes like ours. That isn't a contradiction, nor am I saying "OMG, it's a miracle!". I'm saying that according to the smartest physicists on the planet, it appears that a universe like ours is very unlikely to have occurred by random chance and therefore, it's reasonable to consider other possibilities.

You're getting confused--perhaps because you're engaging with multiple interlocuters. The question of whether or not it is true that the universe "could have been otherwise" is not the point. The point is for the "fine tuning" argument to mean anything at all, it must be assumed to be possible. If the universe could not have been otherwise, then it wasn't "fine tuned."

Nor is the bald statement that "a universe like ours is unlikely to have occurred by random chance" acceptable in the context of this discussion. It is, after all, the very thing that is under discussion.
I don't think so. It seems to me that it's the multiverse hypothesis that assumes things could just have easily been otherwise and ours is just the one that randomly happened to have those parameters. The fine-tuning argument assumes that they were deliberately set or chosen in order to achieve this sort of universe. It does assume that they could have been chosen differently.
Exactly; if they could have been chosen differently, then they could have just as easily been otherwise. If they could not have been otherwise then there was no "choice" involved and therefore no "fine tuning." This is not a complicated or difficult point.
Because turning out this particular way is very very rare. Generally, things that are rare are interesting and often they are something to get excited about.
But, again, ex hypothesi turning out any way is "very very very rare." Why am I more struck by the "fine tuning" of this way than I should be by the "fine tuning" of a universe in which, say, gravity was twice as strong, or 3.4 times as strong, or 1.987 times as strong? "Gosh, of all the infinite setting it could have had, it got that one!"
For that particular sequence, yes. However, if you merely specify five ones, three twos, three threes, three fours, two fives and four sixes rather than the exact sequence, the probability of getting it is much higher than that of getting 20 6's. If you get a result similar to the one you specified, are you going to scratch your head and wonder whether the dice were loaded the way you would if you got 20 sixes in row?
But now you're cheating (and revealing the cheat in your initial position). You are starting from the assumption that there's something particularly wonderful about a universe that ends up with us in it (your "all 6's" one). But, again, every single possible result of a cast of 20 dice is equally 'improbable.' That's simply a fact.

What gives you the right to say "every single die showing 6" is inherently a more interesting result than die one showing 1, die two showing 4, die three showing 2 etc. etc. etc.? The answer--translated into universes--is that you're saying that any universe with us in it is special and needs a special explanation, but any of the myriad possible alternative universes that don't have us in them aren't interesting. So you're sweeping all the universes in which we can't live under the same pile as the 1,4,3,5... die cast and the 5,4,3,1... die cast because you don't happen to find an interesting difference between those two varieties of "non ordered results." But that just proves that you're begging the question. Just like the person who finds the lottery winner and asks "what made you so special," you've defined "universe that produced us" as the lottery winner and you're asking that universe "what makes you so special"?
The same reason you'd find it interesting if you threw a dice 20 times and they were all sixes versus throwing the sequence you specified above. One is similar to what would be expected, even though unlikely to be exactly predicted. The other is reason to suspect there is something going one with the dice that causes that particular outcome.
ETA: This REALLY shows your anthropic bias. Why is 1,4,5,2,6...any more "what would be expected" than 6,6,6,6,6,....? That's the classic lottery-ticket blunder: the idea that the sequence 1,2,3,4,5,6 is less likely to turn up than something that looks more "random" because most lottery results "look random." Surely you understand why that's an error, don't you? The universe we can't live in with parameter x=1 is exactly as improbable or probable as the universe we can't live in with parameter x=1.1 and exactly as improbable or probable as the universe we can live in which happens to have parameter x=1.2. If that's not the case, then our parameters aren't arbitrary and there's not "fine tuning" argument to be made. /ETA
Apparently, the parameter values that result in a universe like ours are very rare. The vast majority end up quite differently and unable to form any type of structure.
And, again, so? If the universe had turned out not to be able to maintain any type of structure and with its parameters set at x=1,y=2,z=3...., that's no more and no less improbable (ex hypothesi) than a universe unable to maintain any type of structure with its parameters set at x=1.1, y=2.2, z=3.3 etc. That's no more or no less improbable than a universe with it's parameters set at x=1.3, y=2.3, z=3.3 etc. etc.

The fact that we wouldn't be there to ask "what makes this universe so special" does nothing at all to alter the odds or to make it more less "miraculous."

Either the creation of the universe was arbitrary or it wasn't. If it wasn't arbitrary then there's no room for a "fine tuning" argument. If it was arbitrary, then the only person who would be able to make the "fine tuning" argument would be someone who spoke to the "tuner" before the creation of the universe. If you spoke to the "tuner" and the tuner said "you know what, I'm gonna make a universe, but I'm leave it entirely up to chance what the parameters are. But you know what, I'd really, really like a universe that ends up evolving human beings!" then you'd have a really good argument for saying "oh, come on now--you're telling me that quite by chance this was the result?" Just as, if you see someone roll 20 dice and they say "I'm really hoping for 20 sixes" just before they roll them, you can be pretty sure that either the dice are crooked or they have telekinetic powers if they then roll 20 sixes.

But this way round what you're doing is the equivalent of data mining a string of random numbers looking for the longest ordered string you can find and then saying "wow, that can't have been by accident! Consider the odds against it!" You found a universe that happened to have it's dice rolled in a certain way and then asked "what were the odds against that particular roll." Probability doesn't work that way.

[Robin]

Yes No. That I understand. I was asking why you wanted to the know the probability of getting at least one 6 out of twenty throws of the same dice or one throw of twenty dice. Those are the same.
So why do you have to stipulate that your opponent in the dice game throw only one die and throw it only once?

According to your argument you should only stipulate that he throw only one die or he throw it once in order to get 1 in 6.

All those two premisses in the argument I presented says you have to stipulate both.
I'd want to examine the die too.
Very true. The same goes for the universe - we should examine the die more closely before jumping to conclusions about it's origins.
What does your definition of contingent have to do with the probabilities you're talking about here?
Nothing - who ever said it did? You are confusing two separate arguments.

I asked you a question regarding that "Are you confident that there was time before time began?"

[Lord Emsworth]

Okay. So what do you mean by "contingent" then?

I thought you were meaning that the universe required X in order to come into being. If that's not what you mean, how is X involved in the fine-tuning argument? If that is what you meant, how does being contingent differ from being a precursor or a cause?

I'd say being contigent simply is broader than (strict) causation would be. X is necessary for a range of phenomena Y1-Yn, if none of Y1-Yn were possible without X; but X does not (necessarily) cause Yk.

There are also no temporal implications. It does not have to be "before"; "concurrency" suffices.

[Beth]

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

Wait what?

The parameters within our own models must be fine-tuned by us to fit reality, so that they are accurate descriptions of what we observe. Yes. That's how models get built. Do you have a problem with that?

What does this have to do with a, b or c??? They totally DO NOT FOLLOW from your reasoning with respect to modeling by humans. Question: Why do the best models our physicists are able to build model to simulate the beginning of our universe requires that they specific parameters to very specific values?

I don't understand know the exact models nor do I understand all of the variables they are using in those models. What I do understand is that the best and brightest physicists working today are perplexed by the many different variables and are working hard to figure out a better model that doesn't require so many.

However, if we assume that our universe developed similarly to their models, then the possible reasons why can be grouped into the three general categories I listed above. I'm also willing to add Yoink's group D.


Examples a, b and c, are absolutely classic examples of reasoning drawn from the Anthropic Principle, which is tautological, and cannot be used as a reasoning tool. These are arguments made from fine-tuning. These are arguments made from an entirely circular premise.

No. I don't think so. What is the circular premise? Please cite a premise I've specified, not one you've made up and I don't agree with. The only one that comes close is the premise that our universe is like our models. That one's iffy, but it is kind of inherent in building models of the universe. We build the models to figure out what we don't know.

[Olowkow]

You're getting confused--perhaps because you're engaging with multiple interlocuters. ... You found a universe that happened to have it's dice rolled in a certain way and then asked "what were the odds against that particular roll." Probability doesn't work that way.

Very nice post. Why can't or won't people understand this?

[arthwollipot]

How about we draw a line in the sand, on this thread, and refuse to move forward until this point is addressed?Yes, cause that's always worked in the past... :rolleyes:

What about John Barrow then? He co-authored the theory in the Anthropic Principle?I'm not as familiar with his work. Suffice to say that I don't buy anything stronger than the Weak Anthropic Principle, and I find that to be so weak as to be utterly pathetic.

It's good enough to counter the equally pathetic fine tuning argument though.

[Robin]

There are also no temporal implications. It does not have to be "before"; "concurrency" suffices.
Which is what I said in the first place.

[Yoink]

Very nice post. Why can't or won't people understand this?

Because everyone wants to feel special.

[Malerin]

You're getting confused--perhaps because you're engaging with multiple interlocuters. The question of whether or not it is true that the universe "could have been otherwise" is not the point. The point is for the "fine tuning" argument to mean anything at all, it must be assumed to be possible. If the universe could not have been otherwise, then it wasn't "fine tuned."

That only moves the problem up a level: if the constants are "set" at certain values, we still know that the vast vast majority of these values result in inhospitable universes. Why should the values be set at the precise amounts needed to make life possible? Also, if the constants are set, than that would mean it was impossible for the universe to be anything other than life-permitting. A strange result, wouldn't you say? If there is a multiverse with the same set values that we observe, and you surveyed all the universes in it, they would all be life-permitting. That would be stronger evidence for a universe-designer than anything the FT argument can manage.



But now you're cheating (and revealing the cheat in your initial position). You are starting from the assumption that there's something particularly wonderful about a universe that ends up with us in it (your "all 6's" one). But, again, every single possible result of a cast of 20 dice is equally 'improbable.' That's simply a fact.

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)

[Malerin]

No.

And we have been over this before. Multiple times.

Each time, you get trounced. Do you come back hoping people have forgotten you? Do you forget? Are you actively dishonest, or merely prone to fail to remember things?

You have zero evidence that the existence of life is "crushingly improbable."

You have never cited any.

You never will cite any.

So why do you keep at this game?

You seem to be taking this personally. Weren't you the one who started the ill-fated "Why Malerin is wrong" thread?

[Robin]

For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)
Depends entirely on the numeric value of "a bunch of times" - if the value is in the ballpark of 65 then certainly the second coin. If the value is in the ball park of several trillion then I could not say one way or the other without seeing the result of the rest of the throws.

[fls]

I take it that the answer to my question is no, you are not aware of any any unexplained parameter settings in our current models for how lights move in the sky. Thank you.

It is my understanding that G is an unexplained parameter setting.

You are basically arguing that there are likely to be unknown constraints that require the parameter values to be fixed they way they are. Quite possible. It's one of the competing hypotheses for the apparent fine-tuning. It's a very reasonable hypothesis. Based on past history, such as that you gave regarding lights in the sky, it's quite possible there is a more unifying comprehensive way to model these things that won't require so many parameter values to be set arbitrarily. I'm no argument with that hypothesis. I think it is the most likely myself. But you can't claim to have knowledge that that one is correct and the 'designer' and the 'multiverse' hypotheses are not. All three are viable hypothesis to explain the situation with our current models. [Not to mention that none of them are mutually exclusive with any of the others.]

Two are viable hypotheses (i.e. they propose to explain). The 'designer' is not a hypotheses as it doesn't explain the setting of the parameter values.

Apparently so. My understanding is that Newton himself felt that way.

And doing so was fallacious which tells us that it was (and is) unreasonable.

I'm sorry. I though you were referring to me specifically with your previous comment. I see now you meant it in a more general way. At any rate, I don't agree with the sentiment that a designer, if one exists, must be interested in us. There's nothing to suggest that when hypothesizing a fine-tuner exists.

You keep using that word 'dishonest'. I do not think it is appropriate here.
The fine-tuning hypothesis does not lead to any further hypotheses about the nature or character of such a designer, but I do find a designer to be a reasonable consequence of hypothesizing about why such apparent fine-tuning is required in our best models. It is one of the three given in the wiki article reference earlier.

It is mentioned in the wiki article because the wiki article is about the use of fine-tuning to rationalize belief in God, not because the wiki article is about reasonable hypotheses as to the contingent conditions for the universe.

I think it does serve as an explanation as to why certain constants have the values they do. It doesn't constrain the designer to only choosing those parameter values, just

It does NOT require the assumption that such a designer would choose to form universes of interest to us. It only requires the assumption that a universe with the parameter values ours possess would be of interest to it. This doesn't seem an unreasonable assumption when you examine the universes that other parameter values lead to. Ours appears to be highly unusual.

Again, this assumption is not something one can derive a priori, and therefore doesn't serve to explain our universe. It is merely a description. To say that there is a force which moves object A from position 1,2,3 to position 1,2,4 does not explain that movement, it describes it.

Linda

[Lord Emsworth]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance.

No, it isn't hard to grasp at all. In fact it is quite easy, almost self-understood.

For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)

The second one looks like a world where there is one and only one thing. Like a world where there is only sand, and nothing but sand. I mean, if you happen to like sand, why not? The first looks more varied, and might be likened to a possibly exciting landscape. This is paint-by-Coin-Toss, right?

The point is though, that there is nothing objectively marvellous about our universe - to come back to the FTA. There are no objective standards by which you could tell that a biological life supporting universe rates 'higher' than other possible universes or worlds. What you have is a collection of subjective (and very, very limited) opinions, and they all say "Biological Life - Good." Then you take these opinions and transfer them onto some FineTuningDevice, then you forget that you just did that, and totally surprised find out that the FineTuningDevice also thinks "Biological Life - Good."

And then you offer it as a solution to the possible, but (maybe!) unlikey world where "Biological Life" is true.

You probably cannot even begin to understand that to some FineTuningDevice a world, which to you looks as messy/undesirable/boring as trillions of others, might be the one and true masterpiece.



Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)

Second. Based on my perspective and experience. Something which you, in the case of unverses/possible worlds do not even have.

[rocketdodger]

You seem to be taking this personally. Weren't you the one who started the ill-fated "Why Malerin is wrong" thread?

1) You still haven't cited evidence that life is "crushingly improbable."

2) The thread "Why Malerin is wrong" was not ill-fated according to any definition of "ill-fated" because:

a) I learned something about probability.

b) It was shown that you are indeed wrong in your naive application of Bayes rule.

[rocketdodger]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)

What does this have to do with the FT argument?

Hint: Try providing a mathematical argument for either coin being more analagous to our universe.

Hint #2: Try providing a mathematical argument for why a device that produces a value of a binary variable is remotely similar to the device that produces universal constants.

[Hokulele]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)


The answer depends on which result you were trying for originally. If you wanted the perfect mix of results, the first coin is biased in the direction you require. The second one, not so much.

[rocketdodger]

Why should the values be set at the precise amounts needed to make life possible?

Why shouldn't they be?

Are you ever going to even attempt to provide an argument for your position here, or are you going to continue merely repeating the assertion in the hopes that we will buy it eventually?

[rocketdodger]

The answer depends on which result you were trying for originally. If you wanted the perfect mix of results, the first coin is biased in the direction you require. The second one, not so much.

I think you can mathematically show that coin B is indeed more "biased."

The proof proceeds by setting up probabilities that a string of X tosses will have at least Y heads and Z tails. Do that enough times, for all combinations of X, Y, and Z that can fit in the given strings, and it should be clear that coin A satisfies more possible descriptions than B. And as far as probability is concerned that means it is more likely in a sense.

EDIT: More possible distinct descriptions, that is.

[Hokulele]

I think you can mathematically show that coin B is indeed more "biased."

The proof proceeds by setting up probabilities that a string of X tosses will have at least Y heads and Z tails. Do that enough times, for all combinations of X, Y, and Z that can fit in the given strings, and it should be clear that coin A satisfies more possible descriptions than B. And as far as probability is concerned that means it is more likely in a sense.

EDIT: More possible distinct descriptions, that is.


And as Robin noted, we can only go by what is already observed, which says nothing about "do that enough times" or "combinations of X, Y, and Z".

In the case described by Malerin, bias only exists when a particular outcome is desired, and to have the exact strings he listed are equally unlikely. In other words, in Malerin's example, bias can be claimed for either coin.

[rocketdodger]

And as Robin noted, we can only go by what is already observed, which says nothing about "do that enough times" or "combinations of X, Y, and Z".

In the case described by Malerin, bias only exists when a particular outcome is desired, and to have the exact strings he listed are equally unlikely. In other words, in Malerin's example, bias can be claimed for either coin.

No thats not what I meant.

Let me start the proof -- for each coin, add up all of these values:

a) The occurences of at least one H in a substring of 1
b) The occurences of at least one T in a substring of 1
c) The occurences of at least two H in a substring of 2
d) The occurences of at least two T in a substring of 2

.
.
.
n) The occurrences of at least Y H in a substring of Z
n+1) The occurences of at least Y T in a substring of Z
n+2) The occurences of at least one T AND one H in a substring of 2

.
.
.
m) The occurences of at least two T AND one H in a substring of 3
m+1) The occurences of at least two H AND one T in a substring of 3

.
.
.

o) <some permutation of T AND H> in a substring of <length of the original string>

As you can see, up until line n) coin B has accumulated a higher number. But the additional lines past that more than make up for it. By the time you get to line o), coin A has easily taken the lead.

And I think you can make a formal argument showing that, for instance, a string of all H with just a single T is less "biased" than the string of all H, and a string with 2 T is even less "biased," etc.

EDIT -- actually, I think you are correct - coin A is not less biased in a general sense. Because above I used the concept of "at least" instead of "exactly," and if you look for "exactly" a certain configuration (for example, occurences of exactly HHH in a substring of a given length) then coin B is indeed less biased than A.

Malerin, do you have anything to say about that? Care to give a formal argument against our conclusion?

[Hokulele]

OK, I can see where you are going with this (other than the fact that m comes before n :p). I guess my main objection to Malerin's analogy is that is the universe that we observe a series of coin flips, or a whole bunch of coins flipped simultaneously?

[yy2bggggs]

HHTHTTHTHT
HHHTTHHTHT
HHTTHTHTTT
HTHHHTTHTH
THHTTHTHTH
THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)
Actually, both of them look biased to me. Using successive tosses, the former gives P(H|T) of 60.2%, and P(T|H) of 30.8%. Hopefully I'm not making an error when I calculate the probability of a coin doing such a thing by chance at about 0.0002.

Mind you, doing the same analysis on the other, P(H|T) is undefined and P(T|H) zero, giving a much smaller probability, which I think was part of the point. However, of the two, ironically, the former one looks more like it implies intent than the latter, though I think I was supposed to come to the opposite conclusion.

[Dancing David]

How about we draw a line in the sand, on this thread, and refuse to move forward until this point is addressed?

Well, the the waves wash away the line, it is part of the process, we discuss critical thinking. There is no resolution.

[Dancing David]

In the case of the universe, and the wave function which governed the initial beginning, the probability is 1 in an infinity.

This is a big difference in understanding, than merely saying the probability is 1.

Hiya, and really, you know about the wave function at the beginning. Okay dokay.

Tell me what you can really say about that.

[Dancing David]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)


Um really?

The chance that a single outcome of the set occurs is exactly teh same in both cases.

(1/2)55

Just because you have that one run of 55 that comes up all heads does not mean that the coin is biased. While it seems likely, you have to do what?

You have to have another trial. If over numerous trials you ascertain that the coin always lands H up then you have a probability argument. You can not determine a frequency distribution of single trial.

So you toss a coin 55 times and say that randomly (unbiased coin) you get all HHHHHH, what is the probability for the unbiased coin that the 56th toss will be an H?

Is it (1/2)56 or is it 1/2?

[Dancing David]

David, you over-estimate these calculations. For instance, there is something ''like'' 10^80 particles in this universe. The conditions and boundaries we are allowed to work with comes from the experimental soil of physics and measurement. The statistics of life are obviously not accurate, but if the standard model is correct, we are sure we cannot be far off.

Show me the equation and then we can talk, they always leave out the billions and billions of particles over billions and billions of years.

Say you have a set of two partcles, they meet once a year and there is a 1/1,000,000 chance that they will combine. What is the chance they will combine over a billion years?

What if they are more likely to combine, they bump more often and there are more of them?

Seriously there are molecular clouds just full of the precursors to amino acids, what is the likelyhood that some of those molecules will make amino acids?
Fred Hoyle and others forget that.

[!Kaggen]

Surely chance is not a hypothesis?

[PixyMisa]

penrose sattes that the possible outcomes og the universe was something like 10^10^123 and then concludes that this means the universe is improbable. And so is a single atom of hydrogen, out of ~10^80 partciles what are the odds of a single atom of hydrogen. If you randomly get one 1/10^80, but if it is already the one you have in a jar, then it is 1/1.

The universe may have had 10^10^123 possible states, but we know nothing about them or what properties they have had, so you can say NOTHING about the probability of life arising in one of them.
Actually, Penrose's argument is a bit better than that. He calculates that, if certain assumptions about the formation and curvature of the Universe, and of the modelling of universal entropy are correct, then the Universe as it exists is extremely improbable.

However, his assumptions include the Universe being closed and cyclic, which as far as we can tell is not correct, so his calculations simply don't apply.

[rocketdodger]

Actually, both of them look biased to me. Using successive tosses, the former gives P(H|T) of 60.2%, and P(T|H) of 30.8%. Hopefully I'm not making an error when I calculate the probability of a coin doing such a thing by chance at about 0.0002.

Mind you, doing the same analysis on the other, P(H|T) is undefined and P(T|H) zero, giving a much smaller probability, which I think was part of the point. However, of the two, ironically, the former one looks more like it implies intent than the latter, though I think I was supposed to come to the opposite conclusion.

Ahh, that looks like a much more elegant way to put what I was getting at.

yy2bggggs, am I correct in thinking that the distribution of the two conditionals you mention above will look something like a standard curve, given enough strings of 55 tosses of a fair coin?

And that still doesn't address the important point that the only reason we think of coin B as being biased is that we know what the behavior of a fair coin tends to look like but we have no idea what the behavior of a fair universe generator tends to look like.

In other words -- as I said before -- the coin toss example illustrates literally nothing about the universe.

[Gord_in_Toronto]

But the usual answer to that is to consider the man who is anaesthetised, but first told that he will not be revived unless he wins every lottery in the USA over the coming month.

He wakes up and finds he is alive and people say "aren't you amazed that you won every lottery in the USA over a month?" and he answers "No, if I didn't win them I wouldn't be here to discuss it".


I really don't see that that is an answer at all. :confused:

[Yoink]

That only moves the problem up a level: if the constants are "set" at certain values, we still know that the vast vast majority of these values result in inhospitable universes. Why should the values be set at the precise amounts needed to make life possible? Also, if the constants are set, than that would mean it was impossible for the universe to be anything other than life-permitting. A strange result, wouldn't you say? If there is a multiverse with the same set values that we observe, and you surveyed all the universes in it, they would all be life-permitting. That would be stronger evidence for a universe-designer than anything the FT argument can manage.





Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)

I'm sorry, but you fail Probability 101.

[fls]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTH THHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which? ;)

The latter sequence suggests that there is a constraint on the result - this is similar to noting that any settings for the parameter values result in life or that there is a recognizable constraint to the values those parameters can hold. So the latter sequence would suggest no fine-tuning - it's fairly obviously a two-headed coin or strongly biased and wouldn't raise any questions in our mind.

Which leaves us with the former sequence. It superficially looks like chance. To get that same sequence (which is what is meant by fine-tuning) looks like it would require intent as there's no obvious explanation for the pattern, so I'm willing to pretend that it looks like a fine-tuned universe.

Now, one can, of course, make an algorithm which generates that exact sequence. The first question is whether that algorithm can be shorter than the sequence it specifies. The next question is whether the characteristic which allows it to be shorter corresponds to a characteristic which would be necessary and sufficient to specify a designer. I think we'd all agree that the algorithm 'print H 55 times' doesn't have any characteristic that would even suggest a designer (let alone in a necessary and sufficient manner). Looking at the fine-tuned sequence above it, I am curious as to how you'd make the algorithm to generate the first sequence shorter than the sequence itself and then how that method specifies a designer. What did you have in mind for that?

Linda

[Singularitarian]

Hiya, and really, you know about the wave function at the beginning. Okay dokay.

Tell me what you can really say about that.

Don't attempt patronize me son.

I tell you, that scientists became very aware a long time ago that when applying the mechanics to the beginning of time would need to involve fields, probabilistic and physical.

For reference to applying the wave function, read

F. A. Wolf, Parallel Universes, 1985

He states that in the beginning, the universe needed to have chosen from an infinite amount of states which is defined by the wave function.

okey dokey?

[Singularitarian]

Show me the equation and then we can talk, they always leave out the billions and billions of particles over billions and billions of years.

Say you have a set of two partcles, they meet once a year and there is a 1/1,000,000 chance that they will combine. What is the chance they will combine over a billion years?

What if they are more likely to combine, they bump more often and there are more of them?

Seriously there are molecular clouds just full of the precursors to amino acids, what is the likelyhood that some of those molecules will make amino acids?
Fred Hoyle and others forget that.

Fred Hoyle never missed anything; its just that the work needed far exceedes valuable time sometimes... suffice to say, a man can only do so much work. He is dead now afterall.

I cannot show you desisive euations (i am missing a letter, the board doesn't work, guess which one? ;) - i never done statistical math of that magnitude. I can assure you however that there are many factors, and the more you raise including any others only serve the Anthropic Principle even more.

[~enigma~]

i never done statistical math of that magnitude.
From your previous posts, I see you have NEVER done any correct math either. BTW, has your search for the singularity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singularitarianism) been fun?

[Singularitarian]

From your previous posts, I see you have NEVER done any correct math either. BTW, has your search for the singularity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singularitarianism) been fun?

Ahem.

You are a complete and utter liar, and should never be listened to.

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=150007

Apart from sharma not being wholey appreciated, the math was actually very correct. So i do everything wrong do I? Go back to the place you crawled from.

[Dancing David]

Don't attempt patronize me son.

Nope that is your job.


I tell you, that scientists became very aware a long time ago that when applying the mechanics to the beginning of time would need to involve fields, probabilistic and physical.

Uh huh, tell me another story Grandpa, please tell me what you know about the wave function prior to t=~1/10^40 sec. Please in detail.

Don't refer me to vague speculation, show me where you know the value was infinity.

For reference to applying the wave function, read

F. A. Wolf, Parallel Universes, 1985

He states that in the beginning, the universe needed to have chosen from an infinite amount of states which is defined by the wave function.

Uh huh, so a guy in a book says it and you repeat it. Must be true everywhere except a sceptics forums.

he does not know that it was infinite, nor do you.


okey dokey?

Fine by me, you don't know and you claim knowledge you do not have.

[Dancing David]

Fred Hoyle never missed anything; its just that the work needed far exceedes valuable time sometimes... suffice to say, a man can only do so much work. He is dead now afterall.

I cannot show you desisive euations (i am missing a letter, the board doesn't work, guess which one? ;) - i never done statistical math of that magnitude. I can assure you however that there are many factors, and the more you raise including any others only serve the Anthropic Principle even more.

Nope, I know what my thoery is and why the anthropic principle is irrelevant to the probability of life arising.

Maybe you don't.

My theory is that many players over long periods of time equals self organizing sets.

Hoyle may have been smart but he can also be every wrong.

[Singularitarian]

Nope that is your job.

Uh huh, tell me another story Grandpa, please tell me what you know about the wave function prior to t=~1/10^40 sec. Please in detail.

Don't refer me to vague speculation, show me where you know the value was infinity.

Uh huh, so a guy in a book says it and you repeat it. Must be true everywhere except a sceptics forums.

he does not know that it was infinite, nor do you.


Fine by me, you don't know and you claim knowledge you do not have.

David i do not need you to entice enigma and his derogatory nature. You can believe all you want about my knowledge of physics, but if you are going to refute everything i say without little thought into the matter, it's yourself only you are not being fair too.

Also, two more things. I take it that you are asking me to define the wave function before Planck Scales? Cannot be done so far. And the man i recited is in fact A PhD, so i am quite assured i am not taking things ''willy nilly.''

ps. keep all personal attacks to yourself. Reported.

[Singularitarian]

Also, David, assuming the wave function did not have control over the initial beginnings, means we are ultimately being biased, that somehow the laws of quantum mechanics do not apply to the very initial beginning, which is ridiculous.

[Cynic]

Also, David, assuming the wave function did not have control over the initial beginnings, means we are ultimately being biased, that somehow the laws of quantum mechanics do not apply to the very initial beginning, which is ridiculous.

Quantum mechanics does not, in fact, apply to a lot of things -- it's incomplete. Ridiculous is making assumptions and trying to force theories to do things they aren't qualified to do. For instance, assuming that time (and the universe!) began at the start of the big bang. Not only can that not be shown, it can't be shown that time or the universe had a beginning. Too many people make the assumption that what we see is all there is. "Universe" might be a fine word for all we can see, but it has a deeper meaning as "all there is". Conflating one with the other is illogical.

And time is very poorly understood.

This whole conversation is of the angels on the head of a pin variety, and the fact that so many physicists and cosmologists and otherwise genuine scientists choose to operate beyond the ability of the tools they're using doesn't help matters one bit.

The most inane (and relevant) piece here is this weird assumption that the rules of the universe are somehow "randomly" determined at the "start". First, nothing is random, ever. Causation doesn't allow it. Second, causation also doesn't allow for a beginning. If ever there was a need to invoke Ockham's Razor, it's in cosmology. There has never been a documented case of an uncaused event, nor has a need for one ever been demonstrated.

All the probability business in QM stems from the need to make intelligent guesses in the absence of concrete data due to the impossibility of obtaining that data. It was never intended to be interpreted in the ways that most people seem to want to. The words "I don't know" are very difficult for those of faith and science alike to say.

[Dancing David]

David i do not need you to entice enigma and his derogatory nature. You can believe all you want about my knowledge of physics, but if you are going to refute everything i say without little thought into the matter, it's yourself only you are not being fair too.

Also, two more things. I take it that you are asking me to define the wave function before Planck Scales? Cannot be done so far. And the man i recited is in fact A PhD, so i am quite assured i am not taking things ''willy nilly.''

ps. keep all personal attacks to yourself. Reported.

So you can't describe the wave function so you don't know what it is, which is what I asked you. say saying that it has infinite possibilities is a problem.

You imagine too much, you need to stick to my comments, you got snotty, I got snotty back.

You made a claim you can't support and just because someone witha PhD says something does not make it so.

[Dancing David]

Also, David, assuming the wave function did not have control over the initial beginnings, means we are ultimately being biased, that somehow the laws of quantum mechanics do not apply to the very initial beginning, which is ridiculous.

"please tell me what you know about the wave function prior to t=~1/10^40 sec. Please in detail.

Don't refer me to vague speculation, show me where you know the value was infinity."

You made a claim you can't support.

[Singularitarian]

"please tell me what you know about the wave function prior to t=~1/10^40 sec. Please in detail.

Don't refer me to vague speculation, show me where you know the value was infinity."

You made a claim you can't support.

Would you answer a question of mine first, it may help me respond to your own easier.

Do you know anything about the wave function?

Is the wave function the thing which governs probabilities? Does not this field of probability initiate a smear of possibilities over an infinite amount of space, with many of the possible locations are highly unlikely? Does the wave function govern such a superpositioning?

If yes to all of them, then the universe had to initiate quantum mechanics in the fold. Quantum mechanics never just ''suddenly'' appeared a few thousand of years after big bang, but the laws of quantum mechanics dictates the universe, even from the very first instant - which was 10^{-44}, which is a chronon.


ps/ I think i have supported my claim quite well. I've not only given your ignorance a reference, but i have also shown above why quantum mechanics and statistical fields work the way they do, and why the beginning of time can be no different.

[Singularitarian]

Quantum mechanics does not, in fact, apply to a lot of things -- it's incomplete. Ridiculous is making assumptions and trying to force theories to do things they aren't qualified to do. For instance, assuming that time (and the universe!) began at the start of the big bang. Not only can that not be shown, it can't be shown that time or the universe had a beginning. Too many people make the assumption that what we see is all there is. "Universe" might be a fine word for all we can see, but it has a deeper meaning as "all there is". Conflating one with the other is illogical.

And time is very poorly understood.

This whole conversation is of the angels on the head of a pin variety, and the fact that so many physicists and cosmologists and otherwise genuine scientists choose to operate beyond the ability of the tools they're using doesn't help matters one bit.

The most inane (and relevant) piece here is this weird assumption that the rules of the universe are somehow "randomly" determined at the "start". First, nothing is random, ever. Causation doesn't allow it. Second, causation also doesn't allow for a beginning. If ever there was a need to invoke Ockham's Razor, it's in cosmology. There has never been a documented case of an uncaused event, nor has a need for one ever been demonstrated.

All the probability business in QM stems from the need to make intelligent guesses in the absence of concrete data due to the impossibility of obtaining that data. It was never intended to be interpreted in the ways that most people seem to want to. The words "I don't know" are very difficult for those of faith and science alike to say.


Half of this is irrelevent to the main discussion. However, in logic, quantum mechanics aim is to explain everything, whether you like that or not.

[Malerin]

I'm sorry, but you fail Probability 101.

The standard (maybe overused) example is flipping a fair coin. “Fair” means, technically, that the probability of heads on a given flip is 50%, and the probability of tails on a given flip is 50%. This doesn't mean that every other flip will give a head — after all, three heads in a row is no surprise. Five heads in a row would be more surprising, and when you've seen twenty heads in a row you're sure that something fishy is going on.

http://math.arizona.edu/~kerl/doc/prbstat/prbstat.html

Soooooo, if we're sure something's fishy after 20 heads in a row, 45+ heads in a row must make us what? Less suspicious? :rolleyes:

Here's a better one. The numbers in a lottery come out in this order:

314159265358979323846264338

A fair lottery, or was it rigged? Hmmmmmmmm...

[Yoink]

The standard (maybe overused) example is flipping a fair coin. “Fair” means, technically, that the probability of heads on a given flip is 50%, and the probability of tails on a given flip is 50%. This doesn't mean that every other flip will give a head — after all, three heads in a row is no surprise. Five heads in a row would be more surprising, and when you've seen twenty heads in a row you're sure that something fishy is going on.

http://math.arizona.edu/~kerl/doc/prbstat/prbstat.html

Soooooo, if we're sure something's fishy after 20 heads in a row, 45+ heads in a row must make us what? Less suspicious? :rolleyes:

Here's a better one. The numbers in a lottery come out in this order:

314159265358979323846264338

A fair lottery, or was it rigged? Hmmmmmmmm...

So, if someone offered you a two lottery tickets, one with the numbers 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 on it and the other with 21,3,45,6,7,16,33, would you have a preference for which one you took? And why?

[Dancing David]

Would you answer a question of mine first, it may help me respond to your own easier.

Do you know anything about the wave function?

Enough to lnow I don't know much. But you have still made a claim about the potential of the universe at a time that is not understood, so to say that there were an infinite number of possibilities is flase. You can not make accurate claims about the unknown.

So whatever posture you want to take is fine, you and your source can only speculate.

That is speculation not knowledge.


Is the wave function the thing which governs probabilities? Does not this field of probability initiate a smear of possibilities over an infinite amount of space, with many of the possible locations are highly unlikely? Does the wave function govern such a superpositioning?

One can not discuss possible outcome and say that they have X number of possibilities when that situation is unknown, you seem to have already admitted we can not know what the initial conditions were, so the rest is speculation.


If yes to all of them, then the universe had to initiate quantum mechanics in the fold. Quantum mechanics never just ''suddenly'' appeared a few thousand of years after big bang, but the laws of quantum mechanics dictates the universe, even from the very first instant - which was 10^{-44}, which is a chronon.

And again, that is fine, you made a statement that the universe was one of an infinite number of possibilities. Which is a statement you and your source can not confirm. It is speculation.



ps/ I think i have supported my claim quite well. I've not only given your ignorance a reference, but i have also shown above why quantum mechanics and statistical fields work the way they do, and why the beginning of time can be no different.


No you are speculating and just won't admit it.

Your quote

In the case of the universe, and the wave function which governed the initial beginning, the probability is 1 in an infinity.



And I ask you plainly, how do you know the value is inifinity? You do not know that nor does your source. You speculate.

Simple question, how do you know it is infinity? Eh ?

[Singularitarian]

Enough to lnow I don't know much. But you have still made a claim about the potential of the universe at a time that is not understood, so to say that there were an infinite number of possibilities is flase. You can not make accurate claims about the unknown.

So whatever posture you want to take is fine, you and your source can only speculate.

That is speculation not knowledge.

One can not discuss possible outcome and say that they have X number of possibilities when that situation is unknown, you seem to have already admitted we can not know what the initial conditions were, so the rest is speculation.

And again, that is fine, you made a statement that the universe was one of an infinite number of possibilities. Which is a statement you and your source can not confirm. It is speculation.



No you are speculating and just won't admit it.

Oh, how semantic this has become, quivelling over what is speculation in physics. Physics is greately speculation. But there are many speculations which are just taken for granted, such as big bang itself. But are we not informed by physics that a big bang probably happened? This is the same stance. Physics tells us that the universe probably was ruled by the quantum wave function. It's not unheard of. Entire planets, galaxies and to the entire universe, the wave function governs everything; this is even written in the wave function article i am sure on wiki.

[Robin]

The standard (maybe overused) example is flipping a fair coin. “Fair” means, technically, that the probability of heads on a given flip is 50%, and the probability of tails on a given flip is 50%. This doesn't mean that every other flip will give a head — after all, three heads in a row is no surprise. Five heads in a row would be more surprising, and when you've seen twenty heads in a row you're sure that something fishy is going on.

http://math.arizona.edu/~kerl/doc/prbstat/prbstat.html

Soooooo, if we're sure something's fishy after 20 heads in a row, 45+ heads in a row must make us what? Less suspicious? :rolleyes:
So what you mean by your example is that if you roll two coins 55 times and get the results:
Coin A
HHTHTTHTHT
HHHTTHHTHT
HHTTHTHTTT
HTHHHTTHTH
THHTTHTHTH
THHTT

Coin B

HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHH

Then coin A has a probability of approximately 0.5 of landing heads and coin B has a probability of approximately 1 of landing on heads.

Yes?

Here's a better one. The numbers in a lottery come out in this order:

314159265358979323846264338

A fair lottery, or was it rigged? Hmmmmmmmm...
On the other hand if you have a lottery with 6 balls picked and you get 31,41,59,26,53,58 would you be confident that this lottery was rigged? How would you calculate that confidence?

[Beth]

So why do you have to stipulate that your opponent in the dice game throw only one die and throw it only once?

According to your argument you should only stipulate that he throw only one die or he throw it once in order to get 1 in 6. No. That's not my argument. I said that throwing at least one six with one die twenty times had the same probability as 20 dice once.

All those two premisses in the argument I presented says you have to stipulate both. It's been a while, but I don't think I was disagreeing with you about that. I wasn't seeing the connection you were making from that example to our discussion.

Very true. The same goes for the universe - we should examine the die more closely before jumping to conclusions about it's origins. Certainly. But I haven't noticed anybody here jumping to conclusions about the origin of the universe. We have been discussing the viability of various hypotheses about it. Some people apparently feel quite confident that they can dismiss the designer hypotheses as being unworthy of consideration. I don't. Seems to me just as viable a hypothesis as the others.

I asked you a question regarding that "Are you confident that there was time before time began?"
I'm sorry. I thought I answered that. I have no idea if there was time before time began in our universe. In fact, I have no idea if time had a beginning at all. It's a very weird concept to grasp.

[Robin]

No. That's not my argument. I said that throwing at least one six with one die twenty times had the same probability as 20 dice once.
And no-one has, to my knowledge, suggested otherwise.
It's been a while, but I don't think I was disagreeing with you about that. I wasn't seeing the connection you were making from that example to our discussion.
You were asking why I included premisses that stipulate that there is only one agent and that the agent can produce only one universe.

I said that the probabilities would be different unless both these stipulations were met. You asked me how these stipulations affected the probability and I gave the analogy of the dice game

In the dice game the other person has a greater probability of losing than winning if there is the stipulation of one die, one roll. Without both of these stipulations he has almost no chance of losing.

Same thing goes for the universe - if the chances of a life producing universe were a gazillion to one for a particular cause producing one particular universe, the odds would be different if there were a gazillion causes all producing universes, or one cause producing gazillions of universes.
Certainly. But I haven't noticed anybody here jumping to conclusions about the origin of the universe.
You are right, nobody has jumped to that conclusion in this thread.
We have been discussing the viability of various hypotheses about it. Some people apparently feel quite confident that they can dismiss the designer hypotheses as being unworthy of consideration. I don't. Seems to me just as viable a hypothesis as the others.
Currently none of them are viable as hypotheses since there is no way of falsifying or testing any of them.

Whether the intelligent designer conjecture might at some future time become viable as a hypothesis will depend upon whether there can be empirical verification of an intelligent designer. This would only be possible, I suggest, if the intelligent designer in question were able and willing to participate in the experiments.

So we can only judge the plausibility of each conjecture at the moment. But I would point out that a mechanism that can produce the same effect twice is not significantly more complex than a mechanism that can produce that effect once.

A mechanism that can produce the same effect trillions of time is not significantly more complex than a mechanism that can produce that effect once.

On the other hand a mind that can design and operate that mechanism is significantly more complex than the mechanism itself.

So if the choices were really between a cause that produces many universes and a cause that is capable of intentionally designing and executing a universe, then the former would seem to be less extravagant.
I'm sorry. I thought I answered that. I have no idea if there was time before time began in our universe. In fact, I have no idea if time had a beginning at all. It's a very weird concept to grasp.
Well exactly. We cannot assume that there is such a thing as "before" the universe, so we cannot assume that it has a precursor or that it came into existence or that any of these are even meaningful concepts.

In another thread I made the distinction between "has a beginning" and "began to exist". This is not some atheistic semantic trap, St Thomas Aquinas made the same distinction.

Therefore I am using the term "contingent" as something that might be the reason for the universe, without the implication that something which is the reason for the universe had to precede the universe

In other words it leaves open the possibility that the reason for the universe might be something non-temporal.

It does not in any way lock out the possibility of a intelligent designer.

[Cynic]

Half of this is irrelevent to the main discussion. However, in logic, quantum mechanics aim is to explain everything, whether you like that or not.

The sentiment expressed in the phrase "like it or not" is a good one. So many problems can be avoided in life if more people would simply acknowledge that one's preference in a given matter does not affect the truth of it. For instance, take quantum mechanics. As much as quantum mechanics might wish it were appropriate in its current form to "explain everything", the reality is it can't. Consequently, anyone wishing to use quantum mechanics to achieve goals that lie on the other side of those limitations are placed in the same predicament.

It's funny you should mention logic. It's an all-or-nothing proposition, logic. You can't use it to justify one part of an argument and then turn around ignore it when it gets inconvenient. Scientists are often guilty of that -- that's why there's peer-review. Theists do it incessantly -- that's why there're churches.

Using a tool, like QM, to try to accomplish a task it isn't up to isn't logically consistent. It's dishonest, at best. Accepting illogical results isn't either. Much is made about how QM is non-intuitive and people use that as a license to just accept any old garbarge as reality. But "non-intuitive" doesn't mean "contradictory". It just means we don't know the whole story yet.

[Malerin]

So what you mean by your example is that if you roll two coins 55 times and get the results:
Coin A
HHTHTTHTHT
HHHTTHHTHT
HHTTHTHTTT
HTHHHTTHTH
THHTTHTHTH
THHTT

Coin B

HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHH

Then coin A has a probability of approximately 0.5 of landing heads and coin B has a probability of approximately 1 of landing on heads.

Well, you don't roll coins, but basically yes. In the first coin there were 55 tosses. 28 of them came of heads, 26 came up tails (that doesn't add up to 55, but I don't feel like recounting. Close enough). This is what we would expect with a fair coin (unless the pattern was HTHTHTHTHTHTHTHT or something similarly strange). Therefore, you would predict the next toss has basically a 50/50 chance of coming up heads.

The second coin is so far beyond the normal threshold for statistical significance, that you'd have to be an idiot to think it was a fair coin. The chances of it being a loaded coin are 99. (a bunch of 9's) percent. Nor is there the danger of a type 1 or type 2 error, as there would be if we flipped it three times, got three heads in a row, and based a conclusion off that.
55 heads in a row is a very large sample size. Therefore, you would predict, with almost absolute certainty, that the next toss would be heads, nor, with so many tosses, would you have any fear of committing an error with this prediction.


On the other hand if you have a lottery with 6 balls picked and you get 31,41,59,26,53,58 would you be confident that this lottery was rigged? How would you calculate that confidence?


In your example, if the number range on each ball is from 1-59, yes it would be almost certain that the lottery was rigged. The odds of a Pi result
are 1/59 to the 6th: 1 / 42,180,533,641
Even if you ran a million lotteries, you would have very strong confidence that the lottery was rigged. This is because a Pi result (E) is much more probable on the hypothesis that someone messed with the lottery (H) than on random chance alone: Pr(E/H) >> Pr(E/~H)

[Robin]

Well, you don't roll coins...
I noticed that later - I had just been talking about dice
..., but basically yes.
In which case I agree. You have good evidence that coin B is biased to heads (or that Tom Stoppard is writing the script).
In your example, if the number range on each ball is from 1-59, yes it would be almost certain that the lottery was rigged. The odds of a Pi result
are 1/59 to the 6th: 1 / 42,180,533,641
Even if you ran a million lotteries, you would have very strong confidence that the lottery was rigged. This is because a Pi result (E) is much more probable on the hypothesis that someone messed with the lottery (H) than on random chance alone: Pr(E/H) >> Pr(E/~H)
I make out the odds to be 1/32,441,381,280 or 1/36,045,979,200 if the balls are numbered 1-60, but basically that makes no difference to the overall argument.

But what if you had 1 million lotteries and they had been running twice a week for the past 30 years? Wouldn't that decrease your confidence level?

[rocketdodger]

Well, you don't roll coins, but basically yes. In the first coin there were 55 tosses. 28 of them came of heads, 26 came up tails (that doesn't add up to 55, but I don't feel like recounting. Close enough). This is what we would expect with a fair coin (unless the pattern was HTHTHTHTHTHTHTHT or something similarly strange). Therefore, you would predict the next toss has basically a 50/50 chance of coming up heads.

The second coin is so far beyond the normal threshold for statistical significance, that you'd have to be an idiot to think it was a fair coin. The chances of it being a loaded coin are 99. (a bunch of 9's) percent. Nor is there the danger of a type 1 or type 2 error, as there would be if we flipped it three times, got three heads in a row, and based a conclusion off that.
55 heads in a row is a very large sample size. Therefore, you would predict, with almost absolute certainty, that the next toss would be heads, nor, with so many tosses, would you have any fear of committing an error with this prediction.

What does any of this have to do with the FT argument? Note that I am not the only person who has asked you this in this thread ...

To make it easy for you, just answer this question:

What evidence do you have that the generation of universal constants is in any way analagous to a series of 55 flips of a coin?

In your example, if the number range on each ball is from 1-59, yes it would be almost certain that the lottery was rigged. The odds of a Pi result
are 1/59 to the 6th: 1 / 42,180,533,641
Even if you ran a million lotteries, you would have very strong confidence that the lottery was rigged. This is because a Pi result (E) is much more probable on the hypothesis that someone messed with the lottery (H) than on random chance alone: Pr(E/H) >> Pr(E/~H)

What does any of this have to do with the FT argument? Note that I am not the only person who has asked you this in this thread ...

To make it easy for you, just answer these two questions:

1) What is the distribution of the values of the universal constants that God had to select from (analagous to the uniform distribution of 1-59 above) ?

2) What is the unconditional probability of God? (corresponding to your H above) ?

And, lest you forget your errors in previous threads, you don't get to use P(God) = 0.5 because we are not uninformed with regard to God. In particular, you are able to pull a value for P(life | God) out of your backside, a fact which drives down P(God) considerably.

[Robin]

Actually I don't think Malerin is actually pushing the God hypothesis in this case - in fact from his point of view the Big Bang never actually happened.

[yy2bggggs]

Ahh, that looks like a much more elegant way to put what I was getting at.
Ah, it might look more elegant, but I don't think what I've done is all that meaningful (after all, I'm doing post hoc analyses of different things, and multiplying "independent" probability like this is sure to decrease my numbers arbitrarily low anyway--I think I'm one off anyhow... was playing with Pascal's Triangle and spreadsheets, cause it's fun that way--nevertheless, each of the analyses I performed in the previous post were in the range of statistical significance).

But the sequences definitely do not look random, and they look non-random in a particularly interesting way that tends to point towards intent. Running 10 random sequences of length 55 each using random.org, here is what they should look like:
HHTHTTHTHHTHHHTTTHHHTHHHHTHHHHHHTTHHHTHHHHTHHTTTTH HHHHT
HHTHHTTTHTHHHTHTHHHHHHHTHHTHTTTHHHTTTTTTTTTHTTTTHH THTTT
TTTHHHHHHHHHHHTTTHHTHHTHTTTTHTTTHHHTTTTHHTHHTHTTTT THTTH
TTTHHHTTHHTHTHTHTTTHHTHHTHHTTTHHHHTTTTTHHHTHHTTTTT HHHHT
THHTTTHHTHHHHHHTHHTTTHHTHHTHHTTTHHHHTHTTHHHTTHHHHH HTTTT
HHHHTTHTHHTTTTTHTTTTTTTHTTHTTHHHHHTHTTHTHHTTHTTTHH HTHTT
TTTHTHTHTTTTTTTHTTHHTHTHTHTHTTTTTTTTTHTHTTHTTTHHTT HHHTT
HHTHTHHHHTTTHHTHTHTTTHHTHHTHTTTTHTHTHTTTHHHTTHHTTH HTTTT
TTTTHTTTHHTTHTTHHHTTTTTHHHHHTTTHTHHHHTTTTTHHTTTHTH HHTHH
TTHTTHTTHTHTTTTTHTTHHTTTTTTTTHTHTHHTHHTTTTHTHTHTTT HTHTT
One thing that sticks out like a sore thumb is run lengths. The longest run in the above sequence is the run of 11 heads on row 3... the flattest is on row 8, which show three runs of length 4 and four runs of length 3 (for a total of seven runs of at least length 3). People who come up with random sequences have a tendency to commit a form of gambler's fallacy--they feel that if they put too many repetitions in, the sequence isn't "random" enough, which is equivalent here to saying that the more heads you have, the more likely your next flip would be tails. Malerin's first data set maxes out with a measly 3 runs of length 3, so it shows this property pretty strongly.

It would take quite an elaborate form of weighting for a coin to commit this sort of gambler's fallacy. The all heads flip, however, could easily be the product of a heavily weighted or two headed coin (though in context, it obviously wasn't).

Basically, if Malerin claimed he actually flipped a coin 55 times to get the first one, I wouldn't believe him.
yy2bggggs, am I correct in thinking that the distribution of the two conditionals you mention above will look something like a standard curve, given enough strings of 55 tosses of a fair coin?Yes.

[Dancing David]

Oh, how semantic this has become, quivelling over what is speculation in physics. Physics is greately speculation. But there are many speculations which are just taken for granted, such as big bang itself. But are we not informed by physics that a big bang probably happened? This is the same stance. Physics tells us that the universe probably was ruled by the quantum wave function. It's not unheard of. Entire planets, galaxies and to the entire universe, the wave function governs everything; this is even written in the wave function article i am sure on wiki.


No it is not semantic, you made a claim you can't support.

[westprog]

Can you provide a cite for this? As far as I know even the Bible describes as Hell existing after the complete destruction of the Earth. Most modern theists (as in since 300 AD) would describe Hell as an alternate reality to physical reality.

An alternate reality is not the same thing as a different physical reality.

[Malerin]

Ah, it might look more elegant, but I don't think what I've done is all that meaningful (after all, I'm doing post hoc analyses of different things, and multiplying "independent" probability like this is sure to decrease my numbers arbitrarily low anyway--I think I'm one off anyhow... was playing with Pascal's Triangle and spreadsheets, cause it's fun that way--nevertheless, each of the analyses I performed in the previous post were in the range of statistical significance).

But the sequences definitely do not look random, and they look non-random in a particularly interesting way that tends to point towards intent. Running 10 random sequences of length 55 each using random.org, here is what they should look like:
HHTHTTHTHHTHHHTTTHHHTHHHHTHHHHHHTTHHHTHHHHTHHTTTTH HHHHT
HHTHHTTTHTHHHTHTHHHHHHHTHHTHTTTHHHTTTTTTTTTHTTTTHH THTTT
TTTHHHHHHHHHHHTTTHHTHHTHTTTTHTTTHHHTTTTHHTHHTHTTTT THTTH
TTTHHHTTHHTHTHTHTTTHHTHHTHHTTTHHHHTTTTTHHHTHHTTTTT HHHHT
THHTTTHHTHHHHHHTHHTTTHHTHHTHHTTTHHHHTHTTHHHTTHHHHH HTTTT
HHHHTTHTHHTTTTTHTTTTTTTHTTHTTHHHHHTHTTHTHHTTHTTTHH HTHTT
TTTHTHTHTTTTTTTHTTHHTHTHTHTHTTTTTTTTTHTHTTHTTTHHTT HHHTT
HHTHTHHHHTTTHHTHTHTTTHHTHHTHTTTTHTHTHTTTHHHTTHHTTH HTTTT
TTTTHTTTHHTTHTTHHHTTTTTHHHHHTTTHTHHHHTTTTTHHTTTHTH HHTHH
TTHTTHTTHTHTTTTTHTTHHTTTTTTTTHTHTHHTHHTTTTHTHTHTTT HTHTT
One thing that sticks out like a sore thumb is run lengths. The longest run in the above sequence is the run of 11 heads on row 3... the flattest is on row 8, which show three runs of length 4 and four runs of length 3 (for a total of seven runs of at least length 3). People who come up with random sequences have a tendency to commit a form of gambler's fallacy--they feel that if they put too many repetitions in, the sequence isn't "random" enough, which is equivalent here to saying that the more heads you have, the more likely your next flip would be tails. Malerin's first data set maxes out with a measly 3 runs of length 3, so it shows this property pretty strongly.

It would take quite an elaborate form of weighting for a coin to commit this sort of gambler's fallacy. The all heads flip, however, could easily be the product of a heavily weighted or two headed coin (though in context, it obviously wasn't).

Basically, if Malerin claimed he actually flipped a coin 55 times to get the first one, I wouldn't believe him.
Yes.

I easily got a max run length of 4, several times:

12111221112112211212221212211211212122112211112121 22221

22111211221212211112121221122121221112121122221122 21222

And this was my last run through:

12112112112112221121212212121212221121222122122212 21211

Max run length of 3, I believe. I ran the program about 20 times to get the top 3 results.

http://www.random.org/integers/?num=55&min=1&max=2&col=1&base=10&format=html&rnd=new

[westprog]

Basic chemistry. Life needs structures of a certian size to be able to exist in a fairly stable form. Most sets of fundimental constants won't allow for this.

The anthropic principle asserts, IIHUIC, that the universe is finely balanced so that a very little chemistry can happen. In different concentrations of matter, chemistry mostly doesn't occur.

[Beth]

You were asking why I included premisses that stipulate that there is only one agent and that the agent can produce only one universe.

I said that the probabilities would be different unless both these stipulations were met. You asked me how these stipulations affected the probability and I gave the analogy of the dice game Ah...thank you. Now I see why you have included them.

Same thing goes for the universe - if the chances of a life producing universe were a gazillion to one for a particular cause producing one particular universe, the odds would be different if there were a gazillion causes all producing universes, or one cause producing gazillions of universes. Okay, this is what I call the multiverse approach. You are correct, most people arguing the fine-tuning approach as evidence for a designer are assuming one creator and one universe. I don't find it necessary to limit it to one, some limitations on the of creators/created universes is assumed for that hypothesis.

Currently none of them are viable as hypotheses since there is no way of falsifying or testing any of them. Okay, call them potential hypotheses then.
Whether the intelligent designer conjecture might at some future time become viable as a hypothesis will depend upon whether there can be empirical verification of an intelligent designer. This would only be possible, I suggest, if the intelligent designer in question were able and willing to participate in the experiments. I think the intelligent designer hypothesis could be, well falsified probably isn't quite the right word. If physicists can develop good simulations or models that lead to universes like ours without the current need for 'fine-tuning', the intelligent designer hypothesis becomes superflous - like it has for the creation of all the different species of plants and animals on earth.

So we can only judge the plausibility of each conjecture at the moment. But I would point out that a mechanism that can produce the same effect twice is not significantly more complex than a mechanism that can produce that effect once.

A mechanism that can produce the same effect trillions of time is not significantly more complex than a mechanism that can produce that effect once.

On the other hand a mind that can design and operate that mechanism is significantly more complex than the mechanism itself.

So if the choices were really between a cause that produces many universes and a cause that is capable of intentionally designing and executing a universe, then the former would seem to be less extravagant. Except, of course, for the problem of resources. Where does all the matter and energy for all those universes come from? Our universe seems a pretty extravagent thing all by itself in that regard. While the complexity of an intelligent creator is high, the resources required are much lower than that required for trillions of universes.

In other words it leaves open the possibility that the reason for the universe might be something non-temporal.

It does not in any way lock out the possibility of a intelligent designer.

Interesting. I've sometimes wondered if it would be possible for creatures like us, perhaps even our descendants, who live within our universe to attain the knowledge, understanding and technology to be capable of creating it. Not terribly plausible, but an interesting paradox IMO.

[sphenisc]

By definition it is capable of producing at least one universe. But if it is not limited to 1 or at least a small number then there is no fine tuning argument. I am not saying the premise is correct, but it is necessary for the FTA.



Not at all. The capacity to produce many universes merely puts an upper limit on the number actually produced.

[westprog]

It's not a non issue. "Why is the universe like it is?" is a valid question. "just because" which is what the "due to chance" argument boils down to is not a very useful answer. One attack line is to introduce the concept of more universes (sure it was very unlikely but with so many universes it was bound to happen sooner or later). Another attack line is to introduce a designer. Another is to argue that there is some law which forces physical constants to be the way they are (which then follows on by trying to work out why that should be the case).

If it's a non-question, then the multi-universe explanation is as unnecessary as the God made it up explanation.

[westprog]

The conditional(we exist) probability of us observing a universe which allows us to exist, is 1.

/argument over?

The probability of any event is either 0 or 1. It happens or it doesn't. That doesn't mean that probability is an entirely vacuous concept. We regularly estimate probabilities of events that have already happened. We know that since it happened, the probability must have been 1. That does not mean /argument over.

[westprog]

Before we had Newton's gravity and Galileo's and Copernicus' heliocentrism, there were elaborate and detailed explanations for the movement of the lights in the night sky.

And there were probably people who said "That's just the way they move, there's no need to look for an explanation."

[westprog]

Wait what?

The parameters within our own models must be fine-tuned by us to fit reality, so that they are accurate descriptions of what we observe.




But most physical models do not need to be fine tuned. If we wish to examine the path of a thrown brick, we get proportionately more accurate depending on what values we put in for gravity, initial force, weight and shape of brick, effects of air and so on. The cosmological models don't work like this. They need to have very precise values input in order to predict a universe anything like the one we have.

[westprog]

:/
Y'know, I'm pretty sure you're right. But the fact is that neither of us can prove either side of the argument. We can't know what the other universes would be like, or whether they would support life, or if that life would even be recognized as "life" in our universe.
But it's cool to think about!

Why can't we know what the other universes would be like? We know how gravity works. What is difficult about putting a different value for g into the equations?

[westprog]

Um really?

The chance that a single outcome of the set occurs is exactly teh same in both cases.

(1/2)55

Just because you have that one run of 55 that comes up all heads does not mean that the coin is biased. While it seems likely, you have to do what?

You have to have another trial. If over numerous trials you ascertain that the coin always lands H up then you have a probability argument. You can not determine a frequency distribution of single trial.

So you toss a coin 55 times and say that randomly (unbiased coin) you get all HHHHHH, what is the probability for the unbiased coin that the 56th toss will be an H?

Is it (1/2)56 or is it 1/2?

The way you establish whether a coin is unbiased is by tossing it. If you toss a coin and get nothing but heads, then you can, after a while, start to assign a probability that the coin is biased.

[Cavemonster]

Someone,accidentally dropped an apple behind a shelving unit in my house.

Let's say he put it down, was distracted by a note on the counter just at the moment the cat ran through. The cat werved around a chair that was pulled out and bumped the shelf just enough to make the fruit fall. Then my housemate's phone rang and he had to leave the room and forgot about the apple.

If any of those things had been different. If he had placed the fruit an inch differently, if the chair hadn't made the cat swerve, if the phone had rung two seconds early or later, the fruit couldn't have ended up there. If he had been a little bit hungrier and the apple more important to him, he would have looked for it after the phone call etc etc.

Things like this happen every day.

That fruit begins to sprout life, and from the perspective of this mold, it is the only mold in the universe, it only was able to grow because the apple was lodged in this forgotten spot which was due to all those actions listed above. Surely all those actions were fine tuned on purpose by a being that loved mold and wanted it to thrive, after all, if any of those parameters had been a little bit off, the apple behind the shelves, and the mold, couldn't be there at all.

[Singularitarian]

No it is not semantic, you made a claim you can't support.

David, forgive me, but you must be somewhat, dillusioned and misplaced.

Did i note recite a reference? A rhetorical question of course, but one inexorably due, since what is generally-considered to provide a proof, is by such an action. So you are making yourself look more and more foolish when you confabulate the extremities of your assertions impying that i have not given any proof, or cannot back it up.

[westprog]

Someone,accidentally dropped an apple behind a shelving unit in my house.

Let's say he put it down, was distracted by a note on the counter just at the moment the cat ran through. The cat werved around a chair that was pulled out and bumped the shelf just enough to make the fruit fall. Then my housemate's phone rang and he had to leave the room and forgot about the apple.

If any of those things had been different. If he had placed the fruit an inch differently, if the chair hadn't made the cat swerve, if the phone had rung two seconds early or later, the fruit couldn't have ended up there. If he had been a little bit hungrier and the apple more important to him, he would have looked for it after the phone call etc etc.

Things like this happen every day.

That fruit begins to sprout life, and from the perspective of this mold, it is the only mold in the universe, it only was able to grow because the apple was lodged in this forgotten spot which was due to all those actions listed above. Surely all those actions were fine tuned on purpose by a being that loved mold and wanted it to thrive, after all, if any of those parameters had been a little bit off, the apple behind the shelves, and the mold, couldn't be there at all.

If this is a model, then it assumes the cat and the shelf and the phone. We only have the apple.

It is precisely to deduce whether the cat and the shelf and the phone exist that we consider these issues. Clearly we can't deduce them from the mould. We can guess though.

[Pup]

Here's a better one. The numbers in a lottery come out in this order:

314159265358979323846264338

A fair lottery, or was it rigged? Hmmmmmmmm...

I think that gets right to the heart of the matter. A run of all heads or all tails looks significant to anyone, and immediately one starts thinking, "what are the odds of such a rare thing?" even if the odds, strictly speaking, are the same for every possible string of numbers or heads/tails.

However, in the example above, if you know that pi has great significance in mathematics, a typical reaction would be the same as seeing a coin getting all heads. But if you don't know pi, you'd think, eh, looks like a string of random numbers to me.

The response depends on our subjective reaction to the significance of the results, and not on the actual probability of predicting the results, which is still one out of however many total possibilities.

Our universe is significant to us, because we're here to observe it. Doesn't change the actual probability of it, though.

[Dancing David]

The way you establish whether a coin is unbiased is by tossing it. If you toss a coin and get nothing but heads, then you can, after a while, start to assign a probability that the coin is biased.

But not from a single run. Yes if you have two sets of 55 tosses that are all HHHHH that is more likely an unbiased coins, and so one. But a single run is not indicative, it is suspicious.

[westprog]

But not from a single run. Yes if you have two sets of 55 tosses that are all HHHHH that is more likely an unbiased coins, and so one. But a single run is not indicative, it is suspicious.

There is no difference between a single run of 110 and two runs of 55, or 110 runs of 1. It's merely a matter of how we consider them.

What we are interested in the case of the universe is to decide whether the coin is unbiased, in effect.

[Dancing David]

David, forgive me, but you must be somewhat, dillusioned and misplaced.

Did i note recite a reference? A rhetorical question of course, but one inexorably due, since what is generally-considered to provide a proof, is by such an action. So you are making yourself look more and more foolish when you confabulate the extremities of your assertions impying that i have not given any proof, or cannot back it up.

No your source can not state that the initial wave function of the universe was anything. That is my point, you can ignore it, that is your choice.

Your source can speculate as to the initial wave function, but please that is on them.

If you meant that I delusional, that is an insult.

You are avoidning the issue, and I can spell it out for you.

No one knows or can model teh intial state of the universe with and effective model at this time. therefore all statements about the initial conditions of the universe are speculative. Until GUT unifies QM and relativity or another thoery comes up, there is no way to state with knowledge verified through testing and observation, what the initial state os the universe is.

Your source and you are speculating and you have contradicted yourself as well.

You rudeness will not cover your speculation.

[Cavemonster]

If this is a model, then it assumes the cat and the shelf and the phone. We only have the apple.

It is precisely to deduce whether the cat and the shelf and the phone exist that we consider these issues. Clearly we can't deduce them from the mould. We can guess though.

You miss the point, the cat, the shelf and the phone are analagous to those constants that must be "fine tuned".

The model is meant to show that "perfect conditions" in no way imply intelligence.

[rocketdodger]

Actually I don't think Malerin is actually pushing the God hypothesis in this case - in fact from his point of view the Big Bang never actually happened.

Like hell he isn't! Just because he hasn't explicitly said it yet doesn't mean that isn't his intent -- especially given the fact that he has eventually admitted it in every other thread.

Malerin could be the poster boy for the approach outlined in the Discovery Institute's "wedge" document.

[Dancing David]

There is no difference between a single run of 110 and two runs of 55, or 110 runs of 1. It's merely a matter of how we consider them.

What we are interested in the case of the universe is to decide whether the coin is unbiased, in effect.

The number of trials is crucial in determining a frequency of occurance. the more you toss teh coin, the better the ferquency. And a run of ten is less certain than a run of a hundred, and much less certain than a run of ten thousand. The larger the data set the more likely the inference that it is a biased coin.

Which is irrelevant to the fine tuning argument, you can not state probabilities on the unknown.

[rocketdodger]

What we are interested in the case of the universe is to decide whether the coin is unbiased, in effect.

Since Malerin is content to be silent on the issue -- which we expected, given his history -- would you care to explain how one would go about deciding that?

[westprog]

The number of trials is crucial in determining a frequency of occurance. the more you toss teh coin, the better the ferquency. And a run of ten is less certain than a run of a hundred, and much less certain than a run of ten thousand. The larger the data set the more likely the inference that it is a biased coin.

Which is irrelevant to the fine tuning argument, you can not state probabilities on the unknown.

One can't state absolute probabilities - but absolute probabilities are a fiction anyway. One can make assumptions, and calculate from those assumptions the likely outcomes.

[Yoink]

I wonder if those who think that there's something to this "fine tuning" argument would answer a question for me: let us assume that we discover that our universe's parameters are in one possible configuration out of exactly one million equally possible configurations (I know this is unlikely, but for the sake of clarity, let's just assume it).

Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.

Now, would such discoveries, in your view, strongly support the "fine tuning" hypothesis? And (and this is the really important part, for me, of my question): to what extent? In other words: if the odds against a universe in which anything like human life could emerge are 999,999-to-1, does that make the odds of there being a "Fine Tuner" also 999,000-to-1? How, exactly, do we derive the "probability" of a "tuner" from the "improbability" of the event?

[westprog]

Since Malerin is content to be silent on the issue -- which we expected, given his history -- would you care to explain how one would go about deciding that?

Firstly one can look at the likely nature (given current knowledge) of the universe if the fundamental constants had different values. This is doable, I believe. Thus we can establish whether this particular universe is unique or special. If most of the other universes appear to be similar, then it tends one towards a belief that there is some reason for it.

Then it's a matter of what explanation one prefers - multiverse, creator, simulation, hidden laws of physics or anything else.

[westprog]

I wonder if those who think that there's something to this "fine tuning" argument would answer a question for me: let us assume that we discover that our universe's parameters are in one possible configuration out of exactly one million equally possible configurations (I know this is unlikely, but for the sake of clarity, let's just assume it).

Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.

Now, would such discoveries, in your view, strongly support the "fine tuning" hypothesis? And (and this is the really important part, for me, of my question): to what extent? In other words: if the odds against a universe in which anything like human life could emerge are 999,999-to-1, does that make the odds of there being a "Fine Tuner" also 999,000-to-1? How, exactly, do we derive the "probability" of a "tuner" from the "improbability" of the event?

But it's not possible to allocate probabilities for the myriad of explanations which can be plugged in. How can one say that a simulation is more or less likely than a multiverse?

[yy2bggggs]

I easily got a max run length of 4, several times:Sure... that's fairly likely.
And this was my last run through:
Sure... it can happen. Keep in mind, though, that for this "gambler's fallacy" property, I'm also counting the runs. A sequence of 55 is also fairly small, so we're not really talking insane odds here (though 1 in 20 is 5%, and in this context, it falls just into the realm of what is typically considered statistically significant)--the main point, rather, is that there are such properties which suggest intent--things that are characteristic of the actual entities we know float around in the real world.

If you pit weighted coins against typical people off the street generating random numbers, then both the most "special" sequences, and the least "special" ones, are coin flips (least special would be fair coins... most special, heavily weighted). Humans pulled off of the street would tend to develop sequences that follow particular patterns.

This applies to the FT argument for God--note that the parameters we're talking about that "make life possible" are, not entirely coincidentally, also the ones that maximize the variety of objects.

[Yoink]

But it's not possible to allocate probabilities for the myriad of explanations which can be plugged in. How can one say that a simulation is more or less likely than a multiverse?

I'm simply asking for an explanation of the understanding of "probability" in a given hypothetical case. Whether or not the hypothetical is realistic (of course it isn't) has no effect whatsoever on the mathematics of probability. We have many people in this thread arguing that if our universe is "improbable" we should be able to infer something about the "probability" of a "Fine Tuner" from that "improbability." Well, I've given a hypothetical case of very precise "improbability" and I'd be interested to see exactly what level of "probability" that implies for a "Fine Tuner"--and how that result is derived.

[rocketdodger]

Firstly one can look at the likely nature (given current knowledge) of the universe if the fundamental constants had different values.

Um, no, that isn't good enough.

You have to generate some kind of distribution for the values of those constants.

And therein lies the problem for FT proponents -- how in the world do you propose to come up with a distribution for an event you know nothing about the cause of?

You can't just say, for example, that the gravitational constant could be any real number without some kind of evidence that it could be any real number.

We know a coin toss is binary. We know a six sided die can take on values 1 - 6. We know a lottery can take on some finite number of values. We know a 32 bit word in computer memory can take on a finite number of values. We know the spatial coordinates of a particle can be any real number, ignoring possible planck discretization, given a coordinate frame.

We do not know which values any universal constant might have been, and even if we did, we wouldn't know the probability it might have been what it might have been.

This seems pretty obvious to me. So obvious, in fact, that I interpret omission of this caveat in any FT argument as deliberate dishonesty. That is why I have about as little respect for Malerin as I did for Kleinman -- it is clear that there is zero evidence that our universal constants could be "any value at all," yet Malerin insists on continuing to rely upon exactly this assumption in all his arguments.

So the question is, are you going to act the same way, or are you going to let reason prevail and admit that the FT argument is currently a dead end because we just don't have enough data?

[rocketdodger]

And, I should add, when we do have enough data it is highly likely that the data will defeat the FT hypothesis anyway.

Because the only way to confirm any ideas we have about the possible distribution of the values of universal constants will be to observe other universes where those values are different -- and once other universes are observed the multiverse hypothesis is implicitly confirmed.

[Yoink]

And, I should add, when we do have enough data it is highly likely that the data will defeat the FT hypothesis anyway.

Because the only way to confirm any ideas we have about the possible distribution of the values of universal constants will be to observe other universes where those values are different -- and once other universes are observed the multiverse hypothesis is implicitly confirmed.

Ian Hacking rather famously argued that a multiverse would make no difference to the argument (he called it the "inverse gambler's fallacy"). I think that on this point he's cuckoo for coconuts, but I just want to point out that the argument won't go away even if a multiverse is confirmed.

[Dancing David]

One can't state absolute probabilities - but absolute probabilities are a fiction anyway. One can make assumptions, and calculate from those assumptions the likely outcomes.

I did not say absolute, I said that without frequency you can not observe the actual probability of an event.

You can not say if the universe has a bias when you can not say how many sides the die has.

[Dancing David]

Firstly one can look at the likely nature (given current knowledge) of the universe if the fundamental constants had different values. This is doable, I believe. Thus we can establish whether this particular universe is unique or special. If most of the other universes appear to be similar, then it tends one towards a belief that there is some reason for it.

Then it's a matter of what explanation one prefers - multiverse, creator, simulation, hidden laws of physics or anything else.

Yes but we can not know what the factors of change in the constants are 1000, 100, 10, 1, .1, .01, .001, etc...

So you can't sya anything about what might or might not be.

[Cynic]

David, forgive me, but you must be somewhat, dillusioned and misplaced.

Did i note recite a reference? A rhetorical question of course, but one inexorably due, since what is generally-considered to provide a proof, is by such an action. So you are making yourself look more and more foolish when you confabulate the extremities of your assertions impying that i have not given any proof, or cannot back it up.

Citing a reference in this case would be tantamount to arguing from authority, since you cannot show how any of your arguments work.

[Beth]

I wonder if those who think that there's something to this "fine tuning" argument would answer a question for me: let us assume that we discover that our universe's parameters are in one possible configuration out of exactly one million equally possible configurations (I know this is unlikely, but for the sake of clarity, let's just assume it.

Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.

Now, would such discoveries, in your view, strongly support the "fine tuning" hypothesis? And (and this is the really important part, for me, of my question): to what extent? In other words: if the odds against a universe in which anything like human life could emerge are 999,999-to-1, does that make the odds of there being a "Fine Tuner" also 999,000-to-1? How, exactly, do we derive the "probability" of a "tuner" from the "improbability" of the event?

If the 'tuner' is the only other explanation possible, then the probability of the tuner is one minus the probability of getting those constants by random chance alone - using your numbers, it would be 0.999999. A fairly convincing probability IMO. However, if it isn't the only other hypothesis, then the combined probability of the other hypotheses will sum to .999999.

[Yoink]

If the 'tuner' is the only other explanation possible, then the probability of the tuner is one minus the probability of getting those constants by random chance alone - using your numbers, it would be 0.99999. A fairly convincing probability IMO. However, if it isn't the only other hypothesis, then the combined probability of the other hypotheses will sum to .99999.

Thanks for the answer. Is .99999 a typo, though? Why isn't it .999999?

[Beth]

Thanks for the answer. Is .99999 a typo, though? Why isn't it .999999?


Yes, I fixed it. Thanks.

[fls]

I'm simply asking for an explanation of the understanding of "probability" in a given hypothetical case. Whether or not the hypothetical is realistic (of course it isn't) has no effect whatsoever on the mathematics of probability. We have many people in this thread arguing that if our universe is "improbable" we should be able to infer something about the "probability" of a "Fine Tuner" from that "improbability." Well, I've given a hypothetical case of very precise "improbability" and I'd be interested to see exactly what level of "probability" that implies for a "Fine Tuner"--and how that result is derived.

Ah, yes. The Statistical Hypothesis Inference Testing fallacy as outlined by Jacob Cohen in "The Earth is Round (p<0.05) (http://individual.utoronto.ca/MSL/papers/Cohen_94_Earth_is_Round.pdf)".

Linda

[Yoink]

Yes, I fixed it. Thanks.

O.K., So, in the absence of any other explanations, an outcome the odds of which are 1-in-1,000,000 offer .999999 probability of being deliberately 'guided' by some controlling force.

O.K.

So, say I roll a single die. I get a 4. The odds of my getting a 4 were 1-in-6. So from a single die-roll we can infer odds of 5/6 that there is a mystical controlling intelligence that "selected" that rather unlikely outcome. Correct?

If I roll it again and get a 6, the odds against that sequence are 35/36! The odds of a mystical controlling intelligence selecting that outcome are now staggeringly high! One more roll of the die--let alone two!--and God has been pretty definitively proven!

But hey--I don't even need die. Let me create a "wheel of fortune" type wheel with very long circumference. Let me then place one million divisions around the circumference and then give the wheel a spin. No matter what the outcome, the odds of getting that particular outcome are one-in-a-million. That means that simply by spinning this wheel once, no matter what result I get, and no matter what random fluctuations influence the outcome, I will have proven that the result was "selected" by a "fine tuner"--and I will have done so to a confidence level of .999999--or, in other words, virtual certainty.

I think this little thought experiment shows the problem with the "Fine tuner" hypothesis pretty clearly, don't you?

[fls]

I wonder if those who think that there's something to this "fine tuning" argument would answer a question for me: let us assume that we discover that our universe's parameters are in one possible configuration out of exactly one million equally possible configurations (I know this is unlikely, but for the sake of clarity, let's just assume it).

Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.

Now, would such discoveries, in your view, strongly support the "fine tuning" hypothesis? And (and this is the really important part, for me, of my question): to what extent? In other words: if the odds against a universe in which anything like human life could emerge are 999,999-to-1, does that make the odds of there being a "Fine Tuner" also 999,000-to-1? How, exactly, do we derive the "probability" of a "tuner" from the "improbability" of the event?

You can't.

The two bits of information are independent, so one is not the complement of the other.

Linda

[Yoink]

You can't.

The two bits of information are independent, so one is not the complement of the other.

Linda

I agree absolutely, but I wanted to see if the proponents of the FTA had some sort of argument to get us from "improbability of random occurrence" to "probability of 'tuned' outcome." So far it seems not.

[fls]

O.K., So, in the absence of any other explanations, an outcome the odds of which are 1-in-1,000,000 offer .999999 probability of being deliberately 'guided' by some controlling force.

O.K.

So, say I roll a single die. I get a 4. The odds of my getting a 4 were 1-in-6. So from a single die-roll we can infer odds of 5/6 that there is a mystical controlling intelligence that "selected" that rather unlikely outcome. Correct?

If I roll it again and get a 6, the odds against that sequence are 35/36! The odds of a mystical controlling intelligence selecting that outcome are now staggeringly high! One more roll of the die--let alone two!--and God has been pretty definitively proven!

But hey--I don't even need die. Let me create a "wheel of fortune" type wheel with very long circumference. Let me then place one million divisions around the circumference and then give the wheel a spin. No matter what the outcome, the odds of getting that particular outcome are one-in-a-million. That means that simply by spinning this wheel once, no matter what result I get, and no matter what random fluctuations influence the outcome, I will have proven that the result was "selected" by a "fine tuner"--and I will have done so to a confidence level of .999999--or, in other words, virtual certainty.

I think this little thought experiment shows the problem with the "Fine tuner" hypothesis pretty clearly, don't you?

It illustrates that the set-up was incorrect. You are essentially creating a set which contains all the possible outcomes and their frequency, in the presence of a fine-tuner. What you really wish to create is a set of all possible causes and their frequency in the presence of a particular sequence of die rolls. Unfortunately, that information is the very information that is in question.

Linda

[fls]

I agree absolutely, but I wanted to see if the proponents of the FTA had some sort of argument to get us from "improbability of random occurrence" to "probability of 'tuned' outcome." So far it seems not.

Oops. I was supposed to let them dig themselves even further into their hole?

Linda

[Yoink]

It illustrates that the set-up was incorrect. You are essentially creating a set which contains all the possible outcomes and their frequency, in the presence of a fine-tuner. What you really wish to create is a set of all possible causes and their frequency in the presence of a particular sequence of die rolls. Unfortunately, that information is the very information that is in question.

Linda

In what sense is someone rolling die equivalent to a "fine tuner"?

I don't think anybody uses the Fine Tuner argument to assert the possibility of a god who "plays dice with the universe" do they?

[Yoink]

Oops. I was supposed to let them dig themselves even further into their hole?

Linda

Yes, but never mind--I think the hole is pretty clearly defined by now.

[fls]

In what sense is someone rolling die equivalent to a "fine tuner"?

I don't think anybody uses the Fine Tuner argument to assert the possibility of a god who "plays dice with the universe" do they?

Is this another question I'm not supposed to answer?

Linda

[Yoink]

Is this another question I'm not supposed to answer?

Linda

No, go ahead: I don't understand your objection to my debunking of the "Fine Tuner" hypothesis.

[Beth]

O.K., So, in the absence of any other explanations, an outcome the odds of which are 1-in-1,000,000 offer .999999 probability of being deliberately 'guided' by some controlling force.

O.K.

So, say I roll a single die. I get a 4. The odds of my getting a 4 were 1-in-6. So from a single die-roll we can infer odds of 5/6 that there is a mystical controlling intelligence that "selected" that rather unlikely outcome. Correct? Only if you were willing to accept a rather large possibility of that conclusion being in error. Generally, outcomes with probability greater than 0.05 are considered to be due to random chance. Since 1/6 > 0.05, I would keep random chance as the preferred explanation in that scenario.

If I roll it again and get a 6, the odds against that sequence are 35/36! The odds of a mystical controlling intelligence selecting that outcome are now staggeringly high! One more roll of the die--let alone two!--and God has been pretty definitively proven!
That's not how I would interpret your dataset. :D

But hey--I don't even need die. Let me create a "wheel of fortune" type wheel with very long circumference. Let me then place one million divisions around the circumference and then give the wheel a spin. No matter what the outcome, the odds of getting that particular outcome are one-in-a-million. That means that simply by spinning this wheel once, no matter what result I get, and no matter what random fluctuations influence the outcome, I will have proven that the result was "selected" by a "fine tuner"--and I will have done so to a confidence level of .999999--or, in other words, virtual certainty.

I think this little thought experiment shows the problem with the "Fine tuner" hypothesis pretty clearly, don't you?

No. In your original example, you postulated a result with a 0.000001 probability. In this example, you have postulated a result with 1.0 probability. You've labeled every possible outcome as "Winner" for your hypothesis. If you want to make your wheel example analogous, pick one of the million outcomes and label it "Winner". Label the other 999,999 outcomes "Loser". If you spin the wheel once and come up a winner, I would reject the claim that it was due to random chance and look for other possible causes. In your original example you also postulated that the only two possible causes were random chance and a fine-tuner. I can think of other explanations for why such a wheel might come up "Winner" that don't have anything to do with divine intervention.

[Cynic]

I can think of other explanations for why such a wheel might come up "Winner" that don't have anything to do with divine intervention.

For instance, because the winning slot on the wheel represents that which is necessitated by conditions. All this talk about "randomness", IMO, gives far more credence to fine-tuning argument than it deserves. But indulging in it, the impression is made that they've got even that much correct. And they don't.

There's no such thing as random. Wave functions exist for one reason and one reason only -- because we can't know enough to work without them. They are not -- not! -- a replacement for actual knowledge. For chemistry, presuming that an electron can have a definate location at all, the purpose of a wave function is to calculate the probability of where it might be because we cannot determine it for certain. Nevertheless, the position of said electron is not dependent on that function. It's a tool -- limited tool, whose very existence is owed to that limitation.

(I'm not arguing against anything you said, Beth. Just using your statement above as a segway to my point.)

[fls]

No, go ahead: I don't understand your objection to my debunking of the "Fine Tuner" hypothesis.

If the probability of one is meant to be the complement of the other, then you need both to be part of a complete set of possible outcomes. That is, if you roll the die two times for a total of 36 trials, and get a 4 and a 6 each time, one of those outcomes is due to chance (c) and the other 35 are due to x, y, z, a, b, d, e, f...*

The question you asked is, what can we say about g given what we know about c? Since we don't know what the set contains besides c (i.e. that is the very information we are looking for), obviously we can't say anything.

Linda

*Please note that the assumption that one of the die rolls would be due to chance because the probability of obtaining that die roll is 1/36 is erroneous, but I'm willing to go along with it in order to not complicate matters.

[yy2bggggs]

For chemistry, presuming that an electron can have a definate location at all, the purpose of a wave function is to calculate the probability of where it might be because we cannot determine it for certain.
Actually, the electron does not have a definite location at all--the waveform is entirely distinct from any of the possible places the electron can be. This is demonstrated by the fact that "exclusive" possibilities nevertheless affect each other--something that would be impossible if the electron actually had a location at all (canonically, the crests in the waveforms shown in the pattern produced by the double slit experiment, where no electrons (or whatever particle you're using) hit even when sent through one at a time--even though if you cover up either slit, the electrons suddenly appear there).

The purpose of the wave function is to model this, and how these "exclusive" possibilities as a whole effect each other. The wave function represents something more fundamental than the possibilities in this regards.

I'm not really sure what this has to do with the FT... perhaps I'm missing some context.

[fls]

I changed my mind. :)

Now that I think about it, it is this error which is getting people mixed up, so there's no point in letting it slide. It is erroneous to assume that if the chance of a particular pair of die rolls is 1 in 36, that a set containing those particular die rolls will be due to chance only 1 time in 36 and will be due to something else all of the other times.

Let me provide an illustrative example. Let's take the infamous HIV screening test. Let's say that the possibility of getting a positive HIV test due to chance is 1% - that is, some of you would try to say that out of a set of 100 positive HIV tests, one of those would be due to chance. But if you screen a general population with a one in a thousand incidence of HIV with a test with a 95% sensitivity, the set of 100 positive HIV tests will contain 91 people who are there due to chance. It simply doesn't work that way.

Linda