Battle of Salsu

[McHrozni]

Hello

I'd like to discuss the battle of Salsu wikipedia entry:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_salsu
It's fairly brief, but outlines the basics.

Supposedly, a huge Chinese army numbering 300,000 men was wiped out in a flood. The Koreans have damed the river upstream, then demolished the dam to flood the army while it was crossing the river, then charged and destroyed what little force remained.

Considering the huge numbers involved and the difficulty of building such a dam, and they destroying it without explosives I find the story unlikely to put it mildly. Does anyone have or knows of any other sources about this battle? I'm a little short handed at it :)

McHrozni

[Simon39759]

Interesting, I never heard of it before.

I went to the google machine and looked around but could not find much info, and nobody seems particularly incredulous about it.
The event also seem to have been fairly well documented at the time.


I guess it would be possible if you designed the dam to go of from the get go. Not anchoring it to the ground but rather prop it up with oblique planks and then sacrifice a bunch of slaves (or criminals) to take the planks out at the last minute.

[McHrozni]

Interesting, I never heard of it before.

I went to the google machine and looked around but could not find much info, and nobody seems particularly incredulous about it.
The event also seem to have been fairly well documented at the time.

Yeah, just a few Korean history parts, glorifying the Korean kingdoms. Less than perfect resources for studying one of the greatest military victories of all time, I'd say.

I guess it would be possible if you designed the dam to go of from the get go. Not anchoring it to the ground but rather prop it up with oblique planks and then sacrifice a bunch of slaves (or criminals) to take the planks out at the last minute.

Let me illustrate the problem:
http://www.kmike.com/oz/OzImage/green6.jpg
US forces crossing the river.

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3012/3052183026_f3370937a1.jpg?v=0
Modern image, probably more upstream.

It's a rather large and slow moving river, but possibly quite shallow. A dam would have to be positively huge by modern standards. Extremely wide, but also sufficiently high to be able to more than wet the ankles of the soldiers.
We are also talking about destroying an army of 300,000 men. It would be the bloodiest battle until, uh, 1915?

McHrozni

[Chaos]

How certain is it that the river looked like that at the time?

Besides, if you read the article carefully, it does not state that 300,000 were killed by flood... that casualty figure includes those killed during the retreat home.

So, the dam is broken, "many thousands" are killed, the Sui army is divided in two by the swollen river, cavalry charges the disorganized and probably demoralized troops who have their back against an impassable barrier... that sort of thing tends to get very bloody for the defeated. Then the defeated army is pursued a long way by enemy cavalry, which they probably cannot out run... more bloodshed.

Besides, cavalry tends to be fairly well-trained, as horses are expensive and you want those who ride them to carry their weight in battle. If the Chinese army was made up mostly of peasant levies rather than professional soldiers, professional cavalry forces could very well cut them to pieces, especially if they are disorganized and demoralized.

[McHrozni]

How certain is it that the river looked like that at the time?

I think the valley it is situated in didn't change enough to significantly alter the task needed to be done.

Besides, if you read the article carefully, it does not state that 300,000 were killed by flood... that casualty figure includes those killed during the retreat home.

Right, I saw that but got slightly carried away in the post. The article does state the flood was both artificial and significant, however, and this is the part that bothers me.

So, the dam is broken, "many thousands" are killed, the Sui army is divided in two by the swollen river, cavalry charges the disorganized and probably demoralized troops who have their back against an impassable barrier... that sort of thing tends to get very bloody for the defeated. Then the defeated army is pursued a long way by enemy cavalry, which they probably cannot out run... more bloodshed.

Besides, cavalry tends to be fairly well-trained, as horses are expensive and you want those who ride them to carry their weight in battle. If the Chinese army was made up mostly of peasant levies rather than professional soldiers, professional cavalry forces could very well cut them to pieces, especially if they are disorganized and demoralized.

Again, the problem I have with the whole thing is the artificial flood. Look at how the river looks like. Slow, and the land around it seems very flat. Moreover, if the cavalry assault was to be effective, this is where it would need to be launched. Another problem is that even a major flood in a land like pictured above (the river is in North Korea, making images of the area rather difficult to obtain) would only cause a very wide flood area, but the water level would be shallow - it would wet their ankles as I said earlier, but it would be very difficult to get a large portion to drown.
Moreover, if the ground around is soft - it does look like that in the images, and there is no reason to believe it was significantly different 1400 years ago - it'll turn the landscape into a swamp for a few days. Hardly ideal cavalry ground, I'd say. Many highly trained and well equipped cavalry forces were ruined just by that.

On the other hand, most Chinese armies were peasant levies, I believe. I don't know about this particular period, but what I've seen from Chinese historical reenactments, calling it a peasant levy army is an insult to most peasant levy armies, who were outright war machines compared to that.
It could've been just poor reenactments, however, but I don't see Chinese insulting their own history ... though incompetence could be a role.

McHrozni

[RobRoy]

Interesting concept. I don't have a background on Salsu, or the specific area where the ambush is supposed to take place. If we had actual pictures of the area, that might assist in analysis, although we are dealing with a battle that is nearly 1,400 years ago. Geography would certainly have changed to some degree, rendering modern analysis based on current images somewhat suspect. Still, specific images of the area, at least some reasonable distance up and downstream, would render a better concept.

I did come across this image, which illustrates just how wide the river can be:

http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/101st_issue/Chinese_troops_Cross_Amrok.jpg

An army trying to cross, no matter the size, would find maintaining order tricky. A river crossing is a good place for an ambush just for this reason (I think Sun Tzu has a story illustrating just this manuever). If there was already a bridge in place upriver, it could easily be turned into a temporary dam, and, as Simon suggested, props anticipated for removal could cause the release of enough water to kill/injure a few thousand troops. It would cause confusion and chaos, allowing a strike against the troops who had either already crossed to higher land, or hadn't yet had the opportunity (and were still on high land), to be of the greatest impact. The troops in between the floor and the cavalry strikes would have been, as you suggest, mired in a sudden swamp land and rendered somewhat ineffective. They could have been dealt with later, after the ambush had been successful.

It is also my understanding that the general had been fighting a series of battles up to this point. It may have been that preparation for the ambush was begun in advance of just such a crossing, and thus foresight on the part of the general led to the victory, rather than a sudden and hasty construction.

Another thing to keep in mind is that battlefield reports of both armies and victories tend to be skewed, and accuracy is something for which historians often find difficulty in obtaining. The 300,000 number may be an exaggeration by either side, in an attempt to intimidate the other.

Again, not an expert, just my thoughts regarding the strategy that fit the stated "facts" of this battle.

[McHrozni]

I did come across this image, which illustrates just how wide the river can be:

http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/101st_issue/Chinese_troops_Cross_Amrok.jpg

So did I. The name of the file is "Chinese_troops_Cross_Amrok.jpg". Amrok is another name for Yalu river, to the north of Salsu / Chongchon River.

McHrozni

[RobRoy]

So did I. The name of the file is "Chinese_troops_Cross_Amrok.jpg". Amrok is another name for Yalu river, to the north of Salsu / Chongchon River.

McHrozni

I stand corrected. The caption is below the photo, and my browser brought it up as if it was above, which referenced the river in question.

[McHrozni]

Interesting concept. I don't have a background on Salsu, or the specific area where the ambush is supposed to take place. If we had actual pictures of the area, that might assist in analysis, although we are dealing with a battle that is nearly 1,400 years ago. Geography would certainly have changed to some degree, rendering modern analysis based on current images somewhat suspect. Still, specific images of the area, at least some reasonable distance up and downstream, would render a better concept.

I've been trying to find some for that reason, but haven't had much luck so far. Perhaps Google Earth would be a better tool to map the area, or just a plan geographical map of North Korea. That should be available, but pictures will be difficult to obtain, for obvious reasons.

Considering how the terrain looks like, I doubt there were major changes in terrain. Vegetation, probably, but not landscape, not by a significant degree.

An army trying to cross, no matter the size, would find maintaining order tricky. A river crossing is a good place for an ambush just for this reason (I think Sun Tzu has a story illustrating just this manuever). If there was already a bridge in place upriver, it could easily be turned into a temporary dam, and, as Simon suggested, props anticipated for removal could cause the release of enough water to kill/injure a few thousand troops. It would cause confusion and chaos, allowing a strike against the troops who had either already crossed to higher land, or hadn't yet had the opportunity (and were still on high land), to be of the greatest impact. The troops in between the floor and the cavalry strikes would have been, as you suggest, mired in a sudden swamp land and rendered somewhat ineffective. They could have been dealt with later, after the ambush had been successful.

I have two concerns here.
Firstly, it requires a major bridge to exist across the river beforehand, and that the retreating army does not go that route. This is possible, of course, if there is a significant blocking force there to prevent that ... but that already requires two armies, with enough men between them to force this vast army away. At the very least, this renders the 10,000 men on the other side suspect.

More importantly, it still requires engineering capacity to create an artificial lake several meters deep and a kilometer wide - at least. That, and a cavalry assault over mud make the whole issue suspect.

It is also my understanding that the general had been fighting a series of battles up to this point. It may have been that preparation for the ambush was begun in advance of just such a crossing, and thus foresight on the part of the general led to the victory, rather than a sudden and hasty construction.

That I agree with, but then again, it would require a very complex, difficult and unlikely plan to be put in advance against what would have to be by now an inferior force.

Another thing to keep in mind is that battlefield reports of both armies and victories tend to be skewed, and accuracy is something for which historians often find difficulty in obtaining. The 300,000 number may be an exaggeration by either side, in an attempt to intimidate the other.

That I agree with. Had the Chinese army been said to be on the order of 30,000 men, I would consider this battle to be an interesting turn of events, and not bother with it too much :)

Again, not an expert, just my thoughts regarding the strategy that fit the stated "facts" of this battle.

Thanks for the analysis :)

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

I stand corrected. The caption is below the photo, and my browser brought it up as if it was above, which referenced the river in question.

Yes, I know, it happened to me as well. I came close to posting this image above, but saw the file name in time, and decided to check :)
No real harm done.

McHrozni

[Skeptic]

Probably one of those stories which has a grain of historical truth -- Koreans defeated Chinese in a battle where (somehow) the river helped them -- to this myth. Same is true of many old stories, e.g., in the Bible.

Monty Python's "And the people did feast upon the lambs and sloths, and carp and anchovies, and orangutans and breakfast cereals, and fruit-bats and large..." (... perhaps I'll skip a bit...) describing a feast that might or might not have happened at some time in the past captures this sort of thing quite well.

[Lukraak_Sisser]

Actually flat land next to a slow moving river is ideal for flooding.
You just need to build the dam downstream of the army and close it at night, the next morning they're not in flat grassland but deep in mud. Which is not exactly well conductive for fighting, once you've got them broken you open the dam and can cross again.
No idea if that is what they did, but it worked for the dutch for a very long time :)
(of course it doesnt quite work against planes)

[RobRoy]

Considering how the terrain looks like, I doubt there were major changes in terrain. Vegetation, probably, but not landscape, not by a significant degree.

No offense intended by this, but what's your proof? I mean, if you're a geologist and you've been studying the river over the past decade, then of course I digress to such expertise. If you're just making a guess based on some photos, then allow me to provide this little example. The two photos are taken in the same location (as indicated by the horizon line), with less than 100 years apart. In that interim heavy flooding created an arroyo cutting, which destroyed the lake that you see in the first picture, and created the sharp cliff-structures that you see in the second (Reference (http://biology.usgs.gov/luhna/chap9.html)).

http://biology.usgs.gov/luhna/images/fig9-6a.gif http://biology.usgs.gov/luhna/images/fig9-6b.gif

More than 1,400 years have passed since this battle. The terrain could easily have changed a great deal in that amount of time.

I have two concerns here.
Firstly, it requires a major bridge to exist across the river beforehand . . .

It doesn't require it. It was just a suggestion. A simple bottleneck valley would also suffice.

. . . and that the retreating army does not go that route. This is possible, of course, if there is a significant blocking force there to prevent that ... but that already requires two armies, with enough men between them to force this vast army away. At the very least, this renders the 10,000 men on the other side suspect.

Not if they're unaware of the existence of said bridge. But again, it was just a suggestion on the probability. A bottleneck valley serves the same end.

That, and a cavalry assault over mud make the whole issue suspect.

I addressed this above. The cavalry assault did not necessarily have to cross the flooded area, but could have attacked the disorganized troops on one side of the river, or both sides, leaving those troops in the new swamp area out of the fighting until later. Those troops not caught in the flood, but in the swamp land would be effectively neutralized for the initial cavalry charge.

That I agree with, but then again, it would require a very complex, difficult and unlikely plan to be put in advance against what would have to be by now an inferior force.

Not too terribly complex. It's just a temporary structure. Building a dam that lasts is the real trick. Building one meant to be temporary isn't all that hard.

That I agree with. Had the Chinese army been said to be on the order of 30,000 men, I would consider this battle to be an interesting turn of events, and not bother with it too much :)

Yes, this part is reasonably likely. I'd have to review the documents associated with the battle, and historical evidence, but I'd be surprised if there wasn't at least a few rumbles about the actual size of the forces in the battle.

[Praktik]

Hello

I'd like to discuss the battle of Salsu wikipedia entry:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_salsu
It's fairly brief, but outlines the basics.

Supposedly, a huge Chinese army numbering 300,000 men was wiped out in a flood. The Koreans have damed the river upstream, then demolished the dam to flood the army while it was crossing the river, then charged and destroyed what little force remained.

Considering the huge numbers involved and the difficulty of building such a dam, and they destroying it without explosives I find the story unlikely to put it mildly. Does anyone have or knows of any other sources about this battle? I'm a little short handed at it :)

McHrozni

hah! Good timing.

I just went through the wikipedia pages on major battles on eastern front of WWII and got to the battle of salsu from the Leningrad page cause it linked to a list of highest casualty numbers in battle (or some such thing).

Anyway this was an interesting story - can't comment on the veracity of it..;)

[Simon39759]

Well; I went and look at some of the databases for historical journal and could not find any articles on the subject. It seems to have been pretty forgotten.
Wonder if any archaeological work have been down to locate and dig up the battle site, could be interesting...

Also, keep in mind that the chinese had been building very elaborate bridges for a long time at that point. I don't know about Korea, but Rob Roy's hypothesis is not out of question.

[Simon39759]

What about, the Koreans construct a small, imperfect dam by, basically, cutting trees and throwing them in a narrowing of the river. and then, sand-bagging them.

It is far from perfect, but it blocks the water enough to lower the level of the river downstream.

Then, the Korean army engage the Chinese forces, like the history say they did, and withdraw.
The Chinese follow them and attempt to cross the river at a shallower passage, a ford for example. The water level is not quite dry but low enough for people to cross it, to their waist, for example.
The river is quite wide and it takes a long time (a couple of hours) for the overloaded soldiers to cross in the difficult conditions (overloaded with their armours and equipement, water to their waist, feet stucking in the bottom's mud...)

The Koreans destroy the dam, water levels rise. It takes a while, but by the time the Chinese forces realize what is happening, the troops in the middle have no time to make it to the edges before being submerged. Especially as the narrowness of the ford make any manoeuvre difficult especially once panic starts to kick in.

A relatively small numbers of soldiers actually drown, but the Chinese forces are cut in half, separated by the river, moreover, many of them are exhausted by their ordeal, many abandoned their equipment to save their life, the units' structure has broken down in the chaos of the panic and everybody is demoralised.
The Korean cavalry choose this moment to attack.

Hilarity ensue.

[theprestige]

Simon39759's scenario makes even more sense if we take McHrozni's following complaints seriously:

300,000 Chinese troops - an army this size would have taken over a day to ford a river (based on comparisons to similiar fordings by American troops during the US Civil War).
Muddy terrain - would have slowed down the process even more, guaranteeing large numbers of troops exposed in the flood zone.
Wide, flat terrain - would have greatly extended the breadth of river to be forded, delaying and slowing the operation still further.

Suddenly it seems like there was plenty of time for the Koreans to pull this off.

[RobRoy]

What about, the Koreans construct a small, imperfect dam by, basically, cutting trees and throwing them in a narrowing of the river. and then, sand-bagging them.

It is far from perfect, but it blocks the water enough to lower the level of the river downstream.

Then, the Korean army engage the Chinese forces, like the history say they did, and withdraw.
The Chinese follow them and attempt to cross the river at a shallower passage, a ford for example. The water level is not quite dry but low enough for people to cross it, to their waist, for example.
The river is quite wide and it takes a long time (a couple of hours) for the overloaded soldiers to cross in the difficult conditions (overloaded with their armours and equipement, water to their waist, feet stucking in the bottom's mud...)

The Koreans destroy the dam, water levels rise. It takes a while, but by the time the Chinese forces realize what is happening, the troops in the middle have no time to make it to the edges before being submerged. Especially as the narrowness of the ford make any manoeuvre difficult especially once panic starts to kick in.

A relatively small numbers of soldiers actually drown, but the Chinese forces are cut in half, separated by the river, moreover, many of them are exhausted by their ordeal, many abandoned their equipment to save their life, the units' structure has broken down in the chaos of the panic and everybody is demoralised.
The Korean cavalry choose this moment to attack.

Hilarity ensue.

That's pretty much how I had envisioned it too. The cavalry strike needs to occur on reasonably solid ground, but it doesn't have to account for all of the soldiers, just enough to make it a sound defeat.

[Simon39759]

Well, it is known that after the battle, the Chinese forces withdrew to a nearby Peninsula, where they were engaged again.
Then they decided to retreat and where harassed all the way back to China.

If I remember correctly, the 300.000 casualty figure is for the whole of the ill fated campaign.

[McHrozni]

Well, it is known that after the battle, the Chinese forces withdrew to a nearby Peninsula, where they were engaged again.
Then they decided to retreat and where harassed all the way back to China.

The nearby peninsula is nowadays well in China, but ok.

If I remember correctly, the 300.000 casualty figure is for the whole of the ill fated campaign.

That I know, yes. Still, a sizable portion are said to come from this battle.

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

What about, the Koreans construct a small, imperfect dam by, basically, cutting trees and throwing them in a narrowing of the river. and then, sand-bagging them.

It is far from perfect, but it blocks the water enough to lower the level of the river downstream.

Then, the Korean army engage the Chinese forces, like the history say they did, and withdraw.
The Chinese follow them and attempt to cross the river at a shallower passage, a ford for example. The water level is not quite dry but low enough for people to cross it, to their waist, for example.
The river is quite wide and it takes a long time (a couple of hours) for the overloaded soldiers to cross in the difficult conditions (overloaded with their armours and equipement, water to their waist, feet stucking in the bottom's mud...)

The Koreans destroy the dam, water levels rise. It takes a while, but by the time the Chinese forces realize what is happening, the troops in the middle have no time to make it to the edges before being submerged. Especially as the narrowness of the ford make any manoeuvre difficult especially once panic starts to kick in.

A relatively small numbers of soldiers actually drown, but the Chinese forces are cut in half, separated by the river, moreover, many of them are exhausted by their ordeal, many abandoned their equipment to save their life, the units' structure has broken down in the chaos of the panic and everybody is demoralised.
The Korean cavalry choose this moment to attack.

Hilarity ensue.

This I think would be the most realistic scenario based on the data that we have here right now.

Still, would it be possible to build and then destroy a dam big enough to do this in the 7th century?

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

No offense intended by this, but what's your proof? I mean, if you're a geologist and you've been studying the river over the past decade, then of course I digress to such expertise. If you're just making a guess based on some photos, then allow me to provide this little example. The two photos are taken in the same location (as indicated by the horizon line), with less than 100 years apart. In that interim heavy flooding created an arroyo cutting, which destroyed the lake that you see in the first picture, and created the sharp cliff-structures that you see in the second (Reference (http://biology.usgs.gov/luhna/chap9.html)).

http://biology.usgs.gov/luhna/images/fig9-6a.gif http://biology.usgs.gov/luhna/images/fig9-6b.gif

None taken :) No, I don't have anything significant in this regard that the terrain would be vastly different back then. However considering how it is now, it couldn't have been vastly different. The river probably meanders differently, there may be some small lakes placed differently and so on, but great differance would mean apperance/disapperance of hills or cliffsides, for example. That probably didn't happen in a significant degree.

It doesn't require it. It was just a suggestion. A simple bottleneck valley would also suffice.

I'm not convinced it would be possible to propertly dam it. Does anyone have experience with ancient construction methods, enough to make a rough prediction of how would that be made?

Not if they're unaware of the existence of said bridge. But again, it was just a suggestion on the probability. A bottleneck valley serves the same end.

Considering that would likely be the only bridge across a major river, in an area they campaigned for a while, I find it extremely unlikely that they would be unaware of it. :)

I addressed this above. The cavalry assault did not necessarily have to cross the flooded area, but could have attacked the disorganized troops on one side of the river, or both sides, leaving those troops in the new swamp area out of the fighting until later. Those troops not caught in the flood, but in the swamp land would be effectively neutralized for the initial cavalry charge.

Well, if there were gentle slopes on one or both sides of the river, this is fairly plausible. This would be one terrain feature that could easily disappear in 1400 years. However if that were the case, the flood would be unnecessary.
Assuming an earlier scenario of waist-deep water, any troops crossing or already crossed would be unavailable to assist the attacked forces on the other side. A few might be taken out by the flood and such, but the flood would have a very minor impact - and probably a negative one, since the retreating Chinese would have nowhere to run and would only have two options - fight or die.

Not too terribly complex. It's just a temporary structure. Building a dam that lasts is the real trick. Building one meant to be temporary isn't all that hard.

Hm. Do you have a plan on how such a dam would be built and later demolished? I know that just damaging it in an appropriate place would do quite a bit of damage to it, but if the difference in water levels was small, this would be rather gradual..

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Well; I went and look at some of the databases for historical journal and could not find any articles on the subject. It seems to have been pretty forgotten.
Wonder if any archaeological work have been down to locate and dig up the battle site, could be interesting...

Yeah, it's a very obscure thing. Thanks for looking :)

I doubt there was any archeological work done before 1949. Japanese just weren't interested in rediscovering lost Korean history, and neither were the Russians :) Anything after that would be done by North Korea, and let's just say their archeological work is a little below standards :)
Search on yourtube for "black mountain grape hominoid" to see what I mean :)

Also, keep in mind that the chinese had been building very elaborate bridges for a long time at that point. I don't know about Korea, but Rob Roy's hypothesis is not out of question.

The bridge scenario, while certainly not impossible, requires the retreating Chinese army to be an inferior force, making the flood at the very least a needless complication. OK, it could've been just some redundant tactics, but ..

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Actually flat land next to a slow moving river is ideal for flooding.
You just need to build the dam downstream of the army and close it at night, the next morning they're not in flat grassland but deep in mud. Which is not exactly well conductive for fighting, once you've got them broken you open the dam and can cross again.
No idea if that is what they did, but it worked for the dutch for a very long time :)
(of course it doesnt quite work against planes)

Well, the story says they did it the other way around - built a dam upstream, created a lake, and then released it, killing many by flooding :)

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

What about, the Koreans construct a small, imperfect dam by, basically, cutting trees and throwing them in a narrowing of the river. and then, sand-bagging them.

It is far from perfect, but it blocks the water enough to lower the level of the river downstream.

Sure, but how do you then destroy this quickly enough to create a significant flood. Explosives would do the trick, but moving a substantial number of sandbags and logs without them, in a short enough time?
(assuming they had sandbag technology to fight floods in 612, otherwise it's just logs and maybe some rocks)
I do realise that the power of the river would be a significant help in this case. Does anyone know how significant?

Then, the Korean army engage the Chinese forces, like the history say they did, and withdraw.
The Chinese follow them and attempt to cross the river at a shallower passage, a ford for example. The water level is not quite dry but low enough for people to cross it, to their waist, for example.
The river is quite wide and it takes a long time (a couple of hours) for the overloaded soldiers to cross in the difficult conditions (overloaded with their armours and equipement, water to their waist, feet stucking in the bottom's mud...)

The Koreans destroy the dam, water levels rise. It takes a while, but by the time the Chinese forces realize what is happening, the troops in the middle have no time to make it to the edges before being submerged. Especially as the narrowness of the ford make any manoeuvre difficult especially once panic starts to kick in.

A relatively small numbers of soldiers actually drown, but the Chinese forces are cut in half, separated by the river, moreover, many of them are exhausted by their ordeal, many abandoned their equipment to save their life, the units' structure has broken down in the chaos of the panic and everybody is demoralised.
The Korean cavalry choose this moment to attack.

Hilarity ensue.

As I said earlier, I consider this part to be fairly realistic. A relatively minor flood to induce some panic etcetera, followed by a charge. But again as I said earlier, in that case, the flood was redundant.

McHrozni

[Andrew Wiggin]

A few other possible scenarios.

Heavy rains on higher ground cause a flash flood at an opportune moment, and victorious commander takes credit for utilizing the flood to turn the tide of battle. History and legend changes his role from knowing the local terrain and taking advantage of knowing that a storm in the distance will cause a flash flood on the plain below to him engineering a flood.

A crude dam may have already existed. Certainly the folks in the area have been diverting rivers and flooding plains to grow rice for a long time. Such dams are designed to be breachable, as the ground needs to be flooded only at certain times. In this scenario, korean troops open existing gates in a low dam and drain rice paddies back into the main channel below, raising it just enough to convert the plain to mud. Legend changes it to troops being washed away, when in reality they were mired in mud.

Nothing of the sort happened at all, and the commander of the defeated forces made something up to make it less his fault. Conversely, the commander of the victorious forces made it up to highlight his strategic genius. Call it something like Caligula's invasion of Britain. (If you can't do something heroic, do SOMETHING, lie about it a lot, and call it heroic until people believe)

A.

[McHrozni]

A few other possible scenarios.

Heavy rains on higher ground cause a flash flood at an opportune moment, and victorious commander takes credit for utilizing the flood to turn the tide of battle. History and legend changes his role from knowing the local terrain and taking advantage of knowing that a storm in the distance will cause a flash flood on the plain below to him engineering a flood.

A crude dam may have already existed. Certainly the folks in the area have been diverting rivers and flooding plains to grow rice for a long time. Such dams are designed to be breachable, as the ground needs to be flooded only at certain times. In this scenario, korean troops open existing gates in a low dam and drain rice paddies back into the main channel below, raising it just enough to convert the plain to mud. Legend changes it to troops being washed away, when in reality they were mired in mud.

Nothing of the sort happened at all, and the commander of the defeated forces made something up to make it less his fault. Conversely, the commander of the victorious forces made it up to highlight his strategic genius. Call it something like Caligula's invasion of Britain. (If you can't do something heroic, do SOMETHING, lie about it a lot, and call it heroic until people believe)

A.

I find these three possibilities believable, moreso than any of the deliberate dam scenarios. Especially the first one, I considered that one before. North Korea is prone to flooding, and a flash flood at the right moment certainly isn't impossible, while a general claiming credit for it is in fact what we'd expect most generals to do.
Knowing the exact date of the battle would help a lot, or the month or just the season...

McHrozni

[Chaos]

Interesting... if the cavalry isn´t armored lancers, as we think of cavalry of the time period, but mounted archers, they could have stayed outside the muddy ground, and picked off the helpless infantry without them being able to defend themselves - which rather neatly solves the "what happens to cavalry in muddy terrain" problem we´d get with lancers.

[McHrozni]

Interesting... if the cavalry isn´t armored lancers, as we think of cavalry of the time period, but mounted archers, they could have stayed outside the muddy ground, and picked off the helpless infantry without them being able to defend themselves - which rather neatly solves the "what happens to cavalry in muddy terrain" problem we´d get with lancers.

Cavalry of the area and era was more commonly horse archers.
But horse archers are far from perfect. They're a good skirmishing force, which can wear down a large and more powerful army. But without armored lancers or infantry support, it has but a miniscule chance of destroying another army.

Another problem for horse archers are infantry archers, which typically beat them in range, rate of fire and hit ratio (they present smaller targets, and have a limited ability to dodge).
Around the same time Byzantines wrote their first military manual, which dealt with various tactics. I took the above from that.

McHrozni

[Chaos]

Cavalry of the area and era was more commonly horse archers.
But horse archers are far from perfect. They're a good skirmishing force, which can wear down a large and more powerful army. But without armored lancers or infantry support, it has but a miniscule chance of destroying another army.

Another problem for horse archers are infantry archers, which typically beat them in range, rate of fire and hit ratio (they present smaller targets, and have a limited ability to dodge).
Around the same time Byzantines wrote their first military manual, which dealt with various tactics. I took the above from that.

McHrozni

They don´t have to destroy the army all at once... they inflicted many or most of those casualties on the army´s long retreat home.

They don´t need support, either, since their enemy is essentially a peasant rabble, and stuck in muddy terrain.

And I doubt they had a problem with infantry archers... archery is something you have to train for to be effective - we, on the other hand, are talking about a bunch of press-ganged peasants. They might have had crossbows, but those have the disadvantage of a much lower rate of fire, possibly a shorter range - and the people who use them have arrows raining on them, which usually tends to unnerve people, especially those who were never all that steady to begin with.

[Simon39759]

Did they have cross-bows at the time?


Also, as McHrozni mentioned, I got the idea last night that probably the battle-site was in North Korea which would explain the lack of investigation.
One more reason to wait impatiently until li'l Kim kicks the bucket and some more reasonable regime can establish itself in the region.


I like Andrew's idea, the area was under heavy rain which weakened the ground. The sudden release of water was not that big, all thing considered, but was enough to start a mud-slide.

Also, Korean, like most of the region, had a long experience constructing paddy fields.
I do not know if they were using terrace fields as in some place in China, though, but I guess that, by knocking down dikes between such fields upstream, one could convert them into one big shallow artifical lake.
I don't know how long it would take to bring down such a dike, but it does not seem unreasonable to me that placing a continuous line of soldiers on each side of the dike (it would only take about 3500 men for a mile long dike) would allow bringing it down in a matter of minutes as each pair of men would only have to break down roughly one three feet worth of dike.


Also, it does not seem unreasonable that the Chinese army would have been crossing at multiple point at the same times, for example, splitting and crossing at multiple fords at the same times, to regroup after the fact, in order to save time.
In this case, the whipping out of the fords would have cost more lives.
That does not seem unreasonable, especially if their scout had reported that the bulk of the Korean army was several miles upstream (playing in the mud, haha) and hence, unlikely to spring on them in the middle of the crossing. That'd be consistent with the fact that only the Korean cavalry participated in the following engagement.

[RobRoy]

None taken :) No, I don't have anything significant in this regard that the terrain would be vastly different back then. However considering how it is now, it couldn't have been vastly different. The river probably meanders differently, there may be some small lakes placed differently and so on, but great differance would mean apperance/disapperance of hills or cliffsides, for example. That probably didn't happen in a significant degree.

But see, here's the problem. Without a historic description of the specific area, preferably a few of them to compare and contrast, we can't accurately make this statement. As I showed in my visual example, with only 100 years to separate the two images, the landscape had vastly changed, with the "appearance/disappearance of hills [and a] cliff side". You're talking about 1,400 years, in which wind and weather have certainly changed the landscape. Perhaps not dramatically, but enough that we can't remove this aspect from our theories.

We can, of course, discount this, but we just have to be "good historians" and state we're discounting it and the reasons for such (like unavailability of documents to review :D).

I'm not convinced it would be possible to propertly dam it. Does anyone have experience with ancient construction methods, enough to make a rough prediction of how would that be made?

There is the Grand Anicut Dam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Anicut) in India, over 18 centuries old, and still in use.

Herodotus recorded information about the cut-masonry Kosheish Dam on the Nile which built around 2900 BCE, but flooded because there was no spillway. Though that account may be aprocraphyl.

The Sadd el-Kafara Dam (http://en.structurae.de/structures/data/index.cfm?id=s0010843) still exists though, and was made from cut masonry around 2600 BCE.

There is also the Du Jiang Yan Dam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Du_Jiang_Yan_Irrigation_System), an earthen dam completed in 251 BCE, is also still in use in China.

But you should keep in mind that each of these dams was intended to be permanent, so the projects were much greater. Damming water is pretty easy (Dam you water! Dam you to hell! :D), but maintaining the dam for an extended period is the trick. A temporary earthen dam could have been made of anything around the area: earth, stone, vegetation. A dam intended to be destroyed, would best be made of a timber crib such as this one at Red Ridge, Michigan:

http://de.structurae.de/files/photos/haer/088809pv.jpg

Second to that, an earthen dam, built against a wooden crib of pylons that could be pulled out would also work nicely.

Considering that would likely be the only bridge across a major river, in an area they campaigned for a while, I find it extremely unlikely that they would be unaware of it. :)

Agreed, a good general should know his terrain, but a poor or mediocre general might not. We are talking about a guy who lost, according to the reports, some 300,000 men on his campaign against an inferior force. It is not out of the question.

Well, if there were gentle slopes on one or both sides of the river, this is fairly plausible. This would be one terrain feature that could easily disappear in 1400 years. However if that were the case, the flood would be unnecessary.

Except as a diversionary tactic and a means to divide your enemy. Crushing half an army, already in chaos and disorder is much easier than crushing a full army in the same situation.

Assuming an earlier scenario of waist-deep water, any troops crossing or already crossed would be unavailable to assist the attacked forces on the other side. A few might be taken out by the flood and such, but the flood would have a very minor impact - and probably a negative one, since the retreating Chinese would have nowhere to run and would only have two options - fight or die.

Or perhaps we have it wrong. It occurs to me that the dam might be downriver of the cross, creating a wider plain of water that had to be crossed by the army. In such a scenario, when the army is half-way through crossing the river, you strike with your cavalry charge. The army is divided, tired from the crossing, some of the men are caught in the river and the rest are on the other side of it, both groups unable to aid those who are being attacked.

Just another scenario that occurred to me, which still used a flood, though not via kinetic action.

Hm. Do you have a plan on how such a dam would be built and later demolished? I know that just damaging it in an appropriate place would do quite a bit of damage to it, but if the difference in water levels was small, this would be rather gradual..

In both of the temporary dams that I suggested above, a full timber crib or a timber and earth crib, you just attach ropes to the wooden uprights, strap the free end to enough horses, soldiers, and/or slaves, and pull the thing apart. Gravity and the weight of the water will do the rest. You're going to lose a chunk of your workers, but you're a general. Collateral damage can easily be figured into the equation, especially if you win.

[Debaser]

...Extremely wide, but also sufficiently high to be able to more than wet the ankles of the soldiers...
McHrozni

I see you've said this a couple of times. However, as an occasional kayaker and therefore swimmer, I can say it doesn't take much depth of (reasonably fast flowing) water, even just a little above the ankles to make crossing a stony river bed tricky to say the least.

I could see that if you're in a tightly packed group (or even queueing line-ahead) and carrying kit in both hands (therefore unable to steady yourself) then anyone upstream in an adjacent column crossing the river who loses their footing suddenly becomes a bowling ball and you and your comrades the pins. Once you're over, getting back up and regaining composure can become surprisingly difficult.

Your enemy only needs to be in a state where they cannot defend themselves due to other circumstances to be completely at your mercy. Did the Koreans have half-decent archers at this battle?

It takes an embarrassingly small amount of water to create an awful lot of trouble.

[RobRoy]

Your enemy only needs to be in a state where they cannot defend themselves due to other circumstances to be completely at your mercy. Did the Koreans have half-decent archers at this battle?

According to this Wiki article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_archery), yes, they had bows at the time, and that it was "the most important weapon in Korean wars with Chinese dynasties".

It takes an embarrassingly small amount of water to create an awful lot of trouble.

Indeed, river crossings can be very advantageous to an enemy who catches you at them, regardless of how small.

[McHrozni]

But see, here's the problem. Without a historic description of the specific area, preferably a few of them to compare and contrast, we can't accurately make this statement. As I showed in my visual example, with only 100 years to separate the two images, the landscape had vastly changed, with the "appearance/disappearance of hills [and a] cliff side". You're talking about 1,400 years, in which wind and weather have certainly changed the landscape. Perhaps not dramatically, but enough that we can't remove this aspect from our theories.

Well, any change to the area would also have to be meaningful. The most major problem I see is the size of the river - and that probably didn't change by much. The other problem is that it is in a flat land, which makes the dam project more difficult and much larger, but at the same time, any other layout of the land would make a cavalry assault equally more challenging.

We can, of course, discount this, but we just have to be "good historians" and state we're discounting it and the reasons for such (like unavailability of documents to review :D).

OK, that and the fact we can't imagine a meaningful change to terrain (correct me if I'm wrong, of course) :)



There is the Grand Anicut Dam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Anicut) in India, over 18 centuries old, and still in use.

Herodotus recorded information about the cut-masonry Kosheish Dam on the Nile which built around 2900 BCE, but flooded because there was no spillway. Though that account may be aprocraphyl.

The Sadd el-Kafara Dam (http://en.structurae.de/structures/data/index.cfm?id=s0010843) still exists though, and was made from cut masonry around 2600 BCE.

There is also the Du Jiang Yan Dam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Du_Jiang_Yan_Irrigation_System), an earthen dam completed in 251 BCE, is also still in use in China.

Hm, interesting. The technology to build a dam was therefore present. The question remains however how long the construction would take, and how easy or how difficult it would be to destroy it. A properly constructed wooden dam might be the best choice (have a few bums cut select few timbers with axes would do the trick).

Agreed, a good general should know his terrain, but a poor or mediocre general might not. We are talking about a guy who lost, according to the reports, some 300,000 men on his campaign against an inferior force. It is not out of the question.

Considering the period, it is very unlikely that there was more than one large bridge across this river, and if there was a major bridge, it would've been on a major trade route.
I find it unlikely to the extreme that this would be unknown to the Chinese, who would be trading across this very bridge.

Except as a diversionary tactic and a means to divide your enemy. Crushing half an army, already in chaos and disorder is much easier than crushing a full army in the same situation.

Suppose you don't make a flood, what will the troops on the other side do? Cross again to fight you? They're in retreat already, and tired from one crossing.
Diversionary tactic I can agree with.

Or perhaps we have it wrong. It occurs to me that the dam might be downriver of the cross, creating a wider plain of water that had to be crossed by the army. In such a scenario, when the army is half-way through crossing the river, you strike with your cavalry charge. The army is divided, tired from the crossing, some of the men are caught in the river and the rest are on the other side of it, both groups unable to aid those who are being attacked.

This would work, as the Dutch have demonstrated, but the source(s) mention(s) a sudden flood as a major factor. A dam downstream wouldn't produce that, and since the landscape is fairly flat, the dam would have to be either very close to the battlefield, or positively huge and set up over a long time period.

In both of the temporary dams that I suggested above, a full timber crib or a timber and earth crib, you just attach ropes to the wooden uprights, strap the free end to enough horses, soldiers, and/or slaves, and pull the thing apart. Gravity and the weight of the water will do the rest. You're going to lose a chunk of your workers, but you're a general. Collateral damage can easily be figured into the equation, especially if you win.

Yeah .. however this almost absolutely requires a relatively narrow valley relatively close to the point of crossing. You can probably see why. It doesn't have to be very deep, however, a few meters would probably do the trick.

McHrozni

[Simon39759]

Or perhaps we have it wrong. It occurs to me that the dam might be downriver of the cross, creating a wider plain of water that had to be crossed by the army. In such a scenario, when the army is half-way through crossing the river, you strike with your cavalry charge. The army is divided, tired from the crossing, some of the men are caught in the river and the rest are on the other side of it, both groups unable to aid those who are being attacked.

Just another scenario that occurred to me, which still used a flood, though not via kinetic action.



Well, the article mentions a flood killing many thousand of men, so the idea of constructing a dam in order to create/increase the size of a river, and hence the need for crossing and the tactical advantage it confers, does not really fit the description. But it sure is interesting.


Ok, I have another idea but I need to make a sketch and such, it will take a little while, don't go anywhere...

[McHrozni]

I see you've said this a couple of times. However, as an occasional kayaker and therefore swimmer, I can say it doesn't take much depth of (reasonably fast flowing) water, even just a little above the ankles to make crossing a stony river bed tricky to say the least.

If the terrain was as the pictures that we have show, it wouldn't be fast flowing or rocky. It would make the crossing slower and trickier, but far from impossible.
It would certainly do far more damage to a charging cavalry.

I could see that if you're in a tightly packed group (or even queueing line-ahead) and carrying kit in both hands (therefore unable to steady yourself) then anyone upstream in an adjacent column crossing the river who loses their footing suddenly becomes a bowling ball and you and your comrades the pins. Once you're over, getting back up and regaining composure can become surprisingly difficult.

Yes, I don't doubt that some considerable damage could be done, just not on the scale the story says :)

Your enemy only needs to be in a state where they cannot defend themselves due to other circumstances to be completely at your mercy. Did the Koreans have half-decent archers at this battle?

Don't know, but I believe the bow was the weapon of choice for Chinese armies for much of the time.

McHrozni

[RobRoy]

Well, any change to the area would also have to be meaningful.

Agreed.

The most major problem I see is the size of the river - and that probably didn't change by much.

Perhaps, but I've stated my reasons for wanting this information. Without it, conjecture along this line is pretty meaningless.

The other problem is that it is in a flat land, which makes the dam project more difficult and much larger, but at the same time, any other layout of the land would make a cavalry assault equally more challenging.

Flat land actually makes building a dam pretty easy, just depends on what you plan to do with the dam. A permanent dam, yeah, flat land is a silly place to put it. You want natural features that help create a more stable containment for the dam. Temporary, and as a weapon of war, and we just need a whole lot of water to be released quickly and take our enemy by surprise.

If this was going to be my tactic, I would want a V-bottleneck valley that opened out onto a reasonably level plain. The V-bottleneck allows the quick building of a dam that could hold a large capacity of water for quick release, which stuns and shocks my enemy, dividing them, perhaps killing a fair portion, or otherwise incapacitating them. The level plain allows for my cavalry to take advantage of the confusion, lack of united front, etc. and mows them down in a few successive charged.

OK, that and the fact we can't imagine a meaningful change to terrain (correct me if I'm wrong, of course) :)

That's correct. All our conjecture could be 100% correct logically, but completely erroneous if there was a meaningful change to the terrain.

Hm, interesting. The technology to build a dam was therefore present. The question remains however how long the construction would take, and how easy or how difficult it would be to destroy it. A properly constructed wooden dam might be the best choice (have a few bums cut select few timbers with axes would do the trick).

For the kind of impact we're going for, and depending on the terrain, anywhere from a few days to a few weeks. I believe either time schedule falls within the time line.

Considering the period, it is very unlikely that there was more than one large bridge across this river, and if there was a major bridge, it would've been on a major trade route.

Why? I'm not denying your contention, I just want to understand what you're basing your conclusions on.

I find it unlikely to the extreme that this would be unknown to the Chinese, who would be trading across this very bridge.

Perhaps, but that depends on the general's knowledge of the area, his use of scouts, locals and extent maps, etc. As I said, if he was a good general, not in contention. If he was not, then problems start to arise. It's a pretty common theme, how an inept general, without doing the proper reconnaissance find himself led into a devastating ambush, and his superior force completely overwhelmed.

Suppose you don't make a flood, what will the troops on the other side do? Cross again to fight you? They're in retreat already, and tired from one crossing.
Diversionary tactic I can agree with.

Sorry, I'm not certain what the scenario is that you are asking about. Can you be a little more specific?

This would work, as the Dutch have demonstrated, but the source(s) mention(s) a sudden flood as a major factor. A dam downstream wouldn't produce that, and since the landscape is fairly flat, the dam would have to be either very close to the battlefield, or positively huge and set up over a long time period.

Agreed. It was just a scenario that occurred to me that would fit the major facts, but be a semi-realistic option. All things being equal (which they rarely are), the general knows the terrain, knows the best spots for fording, but suddenly finds a wider river than he had expected. He crosses anyway, for whatever reason, and falls right into his enemy's trap.

Yeah .. however this almost absolutely requires a relatively narrow valley relatively close to the point of crossing. You can probably see why. It doesn't have to be very deep, however, a few meters would probably do the trick.

Not too close. A sudden rush of enough water would do the trick. I do agree that the optimal impact would occur at a narrow valley close to the ford, but it's not required for the scenario to play out according to the key points of the story.

Well, the article mentions a flood killing many thousand of men, so the idea of constructing a dam in order to create/increase the size of a river, and hence the need for crossing and the tactical advantage it confers, does not really fit the description. But it sure is interesting.

Agreed. It was just a scenario that occurred to me which might also fit the major facts.

Ok, I have another idea but I need to make a sketch and such, it will take a little while, don't go anywhere...

I'm all eyes. This is a very interesting discussion.

If the terrain was as the pictures that we have show, it wouldn't be fast flowing or rocky. It would make the crossing slower and trickier, but far from impossible.

Well, you don't want an impossible crossing. You only want one that the enemy general thinks he can cross, which you can then use to your advantage during the crossing. Add a little extra water, even if it doesn't kill soldiers, it still divides the army, adds chaos, disorders the troops, and provides you with a golden opportunity to take advantage.

It would certainly do far more damage to a charging cavalry.

Only if you attack in the river. If you keep your cavalry where they will do the most damage, on flat, reasonably dry ground, then you're golden.

Yes, I don't doubt that some considerable damage could be done, just not on the scale the story says :)

Probably not. But then there are other historic instances of superior forces being overwhelmed by inferior forces with catastrophic results, so it's not out of the question. Implausible though it may seem to us.

Don't know, but I believe the bow was the weapon of choice for Chinese armies for much of the time.

I address Korean archery in this post (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5069216&postcount=34). We probably crossed posts and so you missed it. :)

[Simon39759]

Ok, here is what I have.

This is a structure you can find in Europeans fish ponds. It allows to control the level of water in the pond and to empty it when the time to harvest the pond as come.
I have no idea what the English term for this structure is, I am not even sure there is one, but the French word translates as 'monk' because, or so the story goes, it was invented by monks in their fish ponds during the middle ages. I have no idea if the story is true but it is possible, Monks did have fish ponds and the design would be within reach of medieval people.
I also have no idea if this design would have existed in Asia at the time, but China does have a fish farming industry going back much further than that, so it is not out of the question that they'd have come up with a similar design on their own.


http://img12.imageshack.us/img12/7369/moine.tif




As you can see, a cunning general could have built a dam, inserting these kind of structures at regular interval.
Then, it would have been possible to remove this planks reasonably fast and have the water empty pretty fast.

Once again, I am not claiming that it happened that way, just that it seems conceivable.

[RobRoy]

I also have no idea if this design would have existed in Asia at the time, but China does have a fish farming industry going back much further than that, so it is not out of the question that they'd have come up with a similar design on their own.

I don't know if they had this particular design (it looks like a simple sluice gate to me), but they certainly had irrigation/flood control type dams.

As you can see, a cunning general could have built a dam, inserting these kind of structures at regular interval.
Then, it would have been possible to remove this planks reasonably fast and have the water empty pretty fast.

Or use a couple guys with axes to destroy the planks.

Once again, I am not claiming that it happened that way, just that it seems conceivable.

Yeah, this is definitely a workable solution, and can certainly fall within the realm of possibility along with the other previously described options. Very nice!

[Simon39759]

Yes, it does look like a Sluice gate, thanks, I had been wondering about this particular technical term for quite some time.

[McHrozni]

Perhaps, but I've stated my reasons for wanting this information. Without it, conjecture along this line is pretty meaningless.

Ok, then we ignore it for the reasons given, I guess :)

Flat land actually makes building a dam pretty easy, just depends on what you plan to do with the dam. A permanent dam, yeah, flat land is a silly place to put it. You want natural features that help create a more stable containment for the dam. Temporary, and as a weapon of war, and we just need a whole lot of water to be released quickly and take our enemy by surprise.

The problem arises when you also require a suitably high water level to facilitate a quick release of water. A rise in water level of 10 cm for two days won't do you much good, whereas a rise of 1 m for two hours could do a much, much larger differance. Flat land is more suitable for the first option than the second.

If this was going to be my tactic, I would want a V-bottleneck valley that opened out onto a reasonably level plain. The V-bottleneck allows the quick building of a dam that could hold a large capacity of water for quick release, which stuns and shocks my enemy, dividing them, perhaps killing a fair portion, or otherwise incapacitating them. The level plain allows for my cavalry to take advantage of the confusion, lack of united front, etc. and mows them down in a few successive charged.

I agree with this part, though we can't show such V-shaped valley was present any more than we can show there wasn't one :)

For the kind of impact we're going for, and depending on the terrain, anywhere from a few days to a few weeks. I believe either time schedule falls within the time line.

Hm. How would you get around such a task? Assuming the river is 100m wide, you need to create a dam high enough to cause substantial impact and weak enough to be able to destroy it quickly enough (high water level behind it helps both causes). Divering the river is too time consuming and out of the question, obviously.

Why? I'm not denying your contention, I just want to understand what you're basing your conclusions on.

Hm, why - why only one bridge or why would there be a major trade route crossing such a bridge?
The second one is quite easy, a bridge of this size is expensive to make and maintain, therefore it would only be constructed and maintained if it was economically viable to do so. There are few other reasons to have a sturdy permanent bridge across such a river.
There are similar reasons as to why would there be only one such bridge. Size and associated costs would pretty much preclude two such bridges. Even if there were more, however, this begs the question why the Chinese army didn't cross at one of the available bridges. An artificial flood might destroy a bridge, but it would have to be pretty severe, more so than the regular yearly floods that are known to be present in the area nowadays.

Perhaps, but that depends on the general's knowledge of the area, his use of scouts, locals and extent maps, etc. As I said, if he was a good general, not in contention. If he was not, then problems start to arise. It's a pretty common theme, how an inept general, without doing the proper reconnaissance find himself led into a devastating ambush, and his superior force completely overwhelmed.

Yes, but finding a bridge would be as simple as following a roadway leading to it. I find it extremely hard to believe a general was this inempt.

Sorry, I'm not certain what the scenario is that you are asking about. Can you be a little more specific?

Assault a withdrawing army while it is making a river crossing, trying to withdraw from you. Would a flood significantly distrupt them?

Agreed. It was just a scenario that occurred to me that would fit the major facts, but be a semi-realistic option. All things being equal (which they rarely are), the general knows the terrain, knows the best spots for fording, but suddenly finds a wider river than he had expected. He crosses anyway, for whatever reason, and falls right into his enemy's trap.

Possible, I'd say, but it doesn't fit the historical record.

Not too close. A sudden rush of enough water would do the trick. I do agree that the optimal impact would occur at a narrow valley close to the ford, but it's not required for the scenario to play out according to the key points of the story.

Wide, flat terrain - the rush of water would be slow, and the increase of level minimal, if the dam would be a significant distance from the crossing.

We can certainly agree that the futher the dam was, the higher it needed to be to have a substantial effect.

Well, you don't want an impossible crossing. You only want one that the enemy general thinks he can cross, which you can then use to your advantage during the crossing. Add a little extra water, even if it doesn't kill soldiers, it still divides the army, adds chaos, disorders the troops, and provides you with a golden opportunity to take advantage.

Yes ... but a wide river would still divide the army without the flood. The troops on the other side would find it very difficult indeed to join the fight.

Only if you attack in the river. If you keep your cavalry where they will do the most damage, on flat, reasonably dry ground, then you're golden.

Or if you create a mudfield through flood. This should be a reasonable concern.

Probably not. But then there are other historic instances of superior forces being overwhelmed by inferior forces with catastrophic results, so it's not out of the question. Implausible though it may seem to us.

The ratio seen here is 30:1. Even if it were 15:1 due to previous losses, it is still twice as bad as the odds Caesar faced at Alesia if we take his (typically exaggarated) claims at face value. There is a limit as to how inferior a force can be to make such things still believable.

I address Korean archery in this post (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5069216&postcount=34). We probably crossed posts and so you missed it. :)

Probably :) We agreed on this point anyway :)

Do we know how powerful their bows were? I know that in Europe this varied widely, between 100N (hunting bows), 150N (short bows), 250-300N (cavalry composite bows) and 800-900N (English longbow). Obviously if their bows were on the order of 600N, their archers would be expected to be a highly effective force, but at 200N, they would be useful for peppering the enemy and destroying unarmored forces, but not much more than a nuisance.

The article you posted puts the range limit at around 150m, which is about half of longbow, consistent with a regular composite bow, but I'm no expert on this field.

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Ok, here is what I have.
(...)
Once again, I am not claiming that it happened that way, just that it seems conceivable.

This does look interesting and fairly promising - thanks :) I'm still concerned that the sheer size of the river would make such construction impractical and time-consuming, plus we don't know how high it would have to be. Probably several meters, and I doubt this design will allow a water level this high.
A preexisting bridge would probably allow a much faster construction, even though it would be destroyed in the flood.

You'd also need to sacrifice the soldiers destroying the dam, but I find this part believable.

I still find it problematic that such a major undertaking (probably a destruction of a valuable bride alongside) would be even attempted. The effect of the flood would still be reasonably minor, had the Koreans just attacked the army when it was halfway at crossing the river, they could probably accomplish a very similar result. The flood seems unnecessary.

McHrozni

[Foolmewunz]

I'd try to find the Chinese records from the time - probably a better source of information.

Let's try this scenario. "Wiki sucks."
The article(s) on this battle were obviously written by a dilettante.

Here's another version, as long as you're trying on scenarios.

The Chinese army and navy, actually about 3 x as large as the force mentioned, was merrily attacking the mid-Korean peninsula, around current day Pyongyang and got its butt kicked. Upon retreating, they were ambushed by the Gorgoryeon flood trick. The troops were not drowned as in Yul Brynner pushing the boys into the Red Sea, but they were divided. The force on the Korean side were defeated (likely a smaller force) and the force on the Chinese side were driven to the Liaodong Peninsula (only about 250 km) but chopped up along the way.

[McHrozni]

I'd try to find the Chinese records from the time - probably a better source of information.

Excellent, could you please?

My Chinese is limited to admiring how lovely properly written Chinese looks, and shaking my head in disbelief they couldn't come up with something more useful in thousands of years. :)

McHrozni

[Foolmewunz]

Well, I cheated.


My Chinese is equally limited. But I have a western friend working up in Qingdao who's an amateur historian - and he does read Chinese. We had something else to discuss today (boring crap about moving containers to Mexico), so I asked him. He gave me that rough synopsis.

I do remember reading about the war, itself, though. There were a series of battles over a decade or so. This was when the Sui were on the descendency and so were the Gorgoryeo. But Gorgoryeo had refused to pay tribute and acquiesce to Sui rule, so this had been going on for a while.

[Foolmewunz]

ETA:

Minor premise proved - Wiki Sux!!!!

From Wiki... I googled "Sui Dynasty & History & Gorgoryeo" and I got a full description.... I was off in that this battle wasn't the end of the wars that was a few years later, but the bit about attacking and getting whupped in the mid-peninsula is there.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goguryeo

One of Sui's most disastrous campaigns to itself was in 612, in which Sui, according to the History of the Sui Dynasty, mobilized 30 Division armies, about 1,133,800 combat troops. Pinned along Goguryeo's line of fortifications on the Liao river, a detachment of 9 Division armies, about 305,000 troops, bypassed the main defensive lines and headed towards the Goguryeo capital of Pyongyang to link up with Sui naval forces which contained reinforcements and supplies. However, Goguryeo was able to defeat the Sui navy, thus when the Sui's 9 Division armies finally reached Pyongyang, they didn't have the supplies for a lengthy siege. Sui troops retreated but General Eulji Mundeok led the Goguryeo troops to victory by luring them into an ambush outside of Pyongyang. At the Battle of Salsu River, Goguryeo soldiers released water from a dam, which split the Sui army and cut off their escape route. Of the original 305,000 soldiers, only 2,700 escaped to Sui China.


p.s. I emailed my friend up north and he says he thinks there was a book published in English on the topic but isn't certain (as he's German-speaking by birth)- he'll try to look it up.

[McHrozni]

ETA:

Minor premise proved - Wiki Sux!!!!

...for anything controvertial. Sure.
It covers many topics surprisingly well.

McHrozni

[Foolmewunz]

Well,I think in this case, the continuity is pretty horrible. The overall history page that I linked is pretty good. I spent some time reading it after I got home, and it's pretty detailed.

But the portion on the battle that you originally cited is pretty bad. It doesn't place it in the scope of the ongoing wars and doesn't discuss the prelude to the battle - the withdrawal from Pyongyan - which is key to understanding the whole scenario, I believe.

ETA: Actually I use Wiki a lot as a stepping stone. I think I was so vehement about this instance as it's the first time I've had it really fail me. I wasn't looking for another Wiki article but some historical reference materials, as that's what we were discussing. I was a little surprised to find a better "macro" article than the "micro" one.

[Simon39759]

This does look interesting and fairly promising - thanks :) I'm still concerned that the sheer size of the river would make such construction impractical and time-consuming, plus we don't know how high it would have to be. Probably several meters, and I doubt this design will allow a water level this high.
A preexisting bridge would probably allow a much faster construction, even though it would be destroyed in the flood.

You'd also need to sacrifice the soldiers destroying the dam, but I find this part believable.

I still find it problematic that such a major undertaking (probably a destruction of a valuable bride alongside) would be even attempted. The effect of the flood would still be reasonably minor, had the Koreans just attacked the army when it was halfway at crossing the river, they could probably accomplish a very similar result. The flood seems unnecessary.

McHrozni

Maybe, but here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Tyre_%28332_BC%29) would be an example of a remarkable feat of engineering constructed in a very short amount of time by an ancient army (if that really happened).


Anyway, Foolmewunz' version seems very interesting.
I love Wikipedia, but, some article are a bit undeveloped. In this case, let's be fair, it's not like information really is forthcoming on that particular subject.

[RobRoy]

Ok, then we ignore it for the reasons given, I guess :)

Yeppers, just so long as we're all aware that we're choosing to ignore this rather important aspect in our research.

The problem arises when you also require a suitably high water level to facilitate a quick release of water. A rise in water level of 10 cm for two days won't do you much good, whereas a rise of 1 m for two hours could do a much, much larger differance. Flat land is more suitable for the first option than the second.

Except you're discounting the permanence versus temporary nature of the dam. If we go with exactly how the battle is told to us, then this damming of the river was definitely intended to be temporary, so any land is suitable relative to the position of the enemy army.

I agree with this part, though we can't show such V-shaped valley was present any more than we can show there wasn't one :)

Which is exactly why we need to understand better the geography of the current area relative to where the battle probably took place, as well as the potential changes in that geography over the last 1,400 years.

But even as a distraction, you don't need much of a V-bottleneck for your dam. If we discount the drowning of thousands of soldiers, I'd say 5-15m of hills would work just fine as a distraction and incapacitating soldiers for a successful series of cavalry charges.

Hm. How would you get around such a task? Assuming the river is 100m wide, you need to create a dam high enough to cause substantial impact and weak enough to be able to destroy it quickly enough (high water level behind it helps both causes). Divering the river is too time consuming and out of the question, obviously.

Get around what task? Throwing up a dam along a flat river valley? Let's coalesce what we've discussed so far to address this. I'll put up three assumptions first, that should be taken into consideration:

First, no, I wouldn't divert the river, that's not necessary. The river is wide, but as you've asserted slow-moving and we'll work under the assumption that this has always been the case. We're not fighting against the relative power of the river, just trying to collect it, so no special diversion is required.

Second, it's important to keep in mind that we're not talking about the need for a permanent structure, just a temporary one. As such, it doesn't even have to be water tight, per se, as a dam would normally strive for. In fact, it would suit our ends if the dam captured the water we required but still allowed some river to flow, thus suggesting nothing amiss. A moderate spillway, whether intended or not would accomplish this.

Third, since we are looking at a temporary dam whose main point is demolition, then it's really not an engineering issue, so much as it is an issue of time and manpower. As manpower increases, time obviously decreases.

With those three assumptions in place, as suggested previously, I would use a mix of the damming methods we've already discussed: earthen with a timber crib and sluice-gate (kudos to Simon for this suggestion). I would start by throwing up earthen arms on either side of the river, using whatever was available to strengthen the heaps: stone, scrub, etc. These would act as a container for the water, so what you have is an open-ended U-shape. Where the bottom of the U is, the river's center, I would drive pairs of timber pylons into the river bed. I would think about 20-30m of gap, with pylon pairs every 2-4m should be sufficient. Planking would be inserted between pylon pairs, working from the bottom up. Working fast enough, the river would simply collect behind my new dam, and I would only have to increase support where the pylon pairs met my earthen arms.

Hm, why - why only one bridge or why would there be a major trade route crossing such a bridge?
The second one is quite easy, a bridge of this size is expensive to make and maintain, therefore it would only be constructed and maintained if it was economically viable to do so. There are few other reasons to have a sturdy permanent bridge across such a river.

There are similar reasons as to why would there be only one such bridge. Size and associated costs would pretty much preclude two such bridges. Even if there were more, however, this begs the question why the Chinese army didn't cross at one of the available bridges.

Sorry, but I disagree with your assertion regarding effort and cost. Given the relative slow-moving nature of this river, a bridge would not have to be an engineering feat of any great measure at all in order to provide a dry-crossing. You simply need support, timber pylons resting on the riverbed, or driven into the bed, or boulders would suffice nicely. The County Safety Inspector isn't going to show up to red-tag the effort, regardless of how rickety it might be or become.

It would take a community effort, but a series of bridges built by local hands would certainly not be out of the question.

An artificial flood might destroy a bridge, but it would have to be pretty severe, more so than the regular yearly floods that are known to be present in the area nowadays.

I'm not certain what you're asserting here. Why is this important in either regard?

Yes, but finding a bridge would be as simple as following a roadway leading to it. I find it extremely hard to believe a general was this inempt.

Not at all. First consider that any ancient road is more of a footpath to begin with. The Romans are well regarded for their engineering because they built roads especially for their armies to move across, but in lieu of such, armies would just as easily move across country as follow a dirt path never intended for the major traffic of a couple thousand, let alone hundreds of thousands, of soldiers.

Second, this army is already in retreat, and even a trade route would likely meander along the natural pathways of the geography, twisting and turning with the countryside, even turning away from a direct line to take in particular villages, etc. An general might find, in some cases, that a straight line was more advantageous that following an obvious planned route along an established roadway. This is especially true if he was trying to move quickly, and remain (as much as you can with 1/3 of a million folk) unknown to his enemy.

And yes, third, as I've said, a mediocre or inept general might not take into consideration all elements when performing such a retreat. Scouts, maps, local guides, etc. might not have been used to best advantage. There are, as I stated, plenty of historical examples where terrain was turned against a superior force exactly for this reason, and even good generals can make bad decisions. Consider the many assumptions that "General" Custer made at the Little Big Horn, and you can quickly see how poor information, bad planning, and the desire to move quickly (Custer rejected the offer of a Gatling battery) can turn even a competent general's command into a massacre.

Assault a withdrawing army while it is making a river crossing, trying to withdraw from you. Would a flood significantly distrupt them?

Anything out of the ordinary can disrupt an army, especially if they are not expecting a fight. Now add in that they are fording a river, so they are divided already into three parts: those who have crossed, those who are crossing, and those waiting to cross. Throw enough water down at them to further disrupt, if not actually drown/sweep away some, and yeah you've got a perfect recipe for Army Chaos and a potential recipe for Massacre Soup.

[quote]Possible, I'd say, but it doesn't fit the historical record.

Sure it does. It fits the major facts, that one army used a dam and water as a weapon of war to disrupt a superior force and in the ensuing chaos, defeated them. It does not fit the specific facts which we've called into question.

Wide, flat terrain - the rush of water would be slow, and the increase of level minimal, if the dam would be a significant distance from the crossing.

Yes, correct. The pressure of the dammed water would initially be a very swift rush, but the further that initial release is from the point of contact, the less kinetic activity we're going to see as the stored energy is released via travel along the river bed.

We can certainly agree that the futher the dam was, the higher it needed to be to have a substantial effect.

Absolutely, except for "substantial effect". We only have to increase the amount of water, the speed of the water or both to create a substantial effect. Either one of those three scenarios, and we've achieved our aim.

Yes ... but a wide river would still divide the army without the flood. The troops on the other side would find it very difficult indeed to join the fight.

Oh, absolutely! More so, if the troops either in the river crossing or waiting to cross believe they are outnumbered or going to be killed outright, you've got a rout on your hands. Your men start to flee regardless of the actual strength of the enemy. A superior force can be defeated if it believes that it's going to be defeated, and discipline breaks down completely.

Or if you create a mudfield through flood. This should be a reasonable concern.

Agreed. Of course, depending on how porous the ground is, it might actually take more than just an initial flood of water to create a muddy, swampland through which a cavalry charge is limited or ineffective. If your horse units charge immediately following the flood, even if the ground will become muddy, it may still be stable enough for a series of successful charges.

Even soaked ground such as that found at Crecy, where rain had soaked the field, but the French were still able to mount several cavalry charges.

The ratio seen here is 30:1. Even if it were 15:1 due to previous losses, it is still twice as bad as the odds Caesar faced at Alesia if we take his (typically exaggarated) claims at face value. There is a limit as to how inferior a force can be to make such things still believable.

No argument from me whatsoever. I've already stated it's more than likely that the size of the Chinese army is exaggerated by either side. But even if it's not, the tactics we've been discussing are solid and very much a possibility for victory despite the ratio.

Do we know how powerful their bows were? I know that in Europe this varied widely, between 100N (hunting bows), 150N (short bows), 250-300N (cavalry composite bows) and 800-900N (English longbow). Obviously if their bows were on the order of 600N, their archers would be expected to be a highly effective force, but at 200N, they would be useful for peppering the enemy and destroying unarmored forces, but not much more than a nuisance.

The article you posted puts the range limit at around 150m, which is about half of longbow, consistent with a regular composite bow, but I'm no expert on this field.

Sorry, I don't know as much about Korean archery as I do English archery, especially during The Hundred Years War, when it was at its peak. Bow strength and range would vary, even amongst those using similar bows. Any tool of war can be reduced to a nuisance, or raised to a crushing defeat depending on the general.

[RobRoy]

Whoa, that was way freaking longer than I had intended!

The salient points are that, with the limited information we have for this battle, we can conceive of any number of scenarios that will fit the major facts, and a couple of scenarios that fit the specific facts. Whether those scenarios are plausible or implausible only matters depending on what question you're asking.

If you want to know if it's conceivable, I think we agree that it is, even though it strains credibility.

But it's been fun to wrap my head around the specific tactics and problems to arrive at solutions to each. I'm more than willing to come up with more, or address individual issues.

[McHrozni]

But the portion on the battle that you originally cited is pretty bad. It doesn't place it in the scope of the ongoing wars and doesn't discuss the prelude to the battle - the withdrawal from Pyongyan - which is key to understanding the whole scenario, I believe.

Yes, I agree that this article is very poor. I believe it is in stub category.

Wikipedia as a whole, however, is surprisingly good. This article is way below it's usual standards.

ETA: Actually I use Wiki a lot as a stepping stone. I think I was so vehement about this instance as it's the first time I've had it really fail me. I wasn't looking for another Wiki article but some historical reference materials, as that's what we were discussing. I was a little surprised to find a better "macro" article than the "micro" one.

Yes, so do I. It fails sometimes, however, but overall does a remarkably good job.

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Yeppers, just so long as we're all aware that we're choosing to ignore this rather important aspect in our research.

This implies we have a choice in the matter, which would futher imply we have material available to study the terrain in detail, which we don't, to my best knowledge.
If you know differently, it could be very helpful :)

Except you're discounting the permanence versus temporary nature of the dam. If we go with exactly how the battle is told to us, then this damming of the river was definitely intended to be temporary, so any land is suitable relative to the position of the enemy army.

Perhaps, but some areas would be more difficult to work in than the others. The schedule is pretty tight.

Which is exactly why we need to understand better the geography of the current area relative to where the battle probably took place, as well as the potential changes in that geography over the last 1,400 years.

I agree this would be very useful to know. Do you have any sources on the matter? I couldn't find any, though admittedly, I'm no expert in the field.

But even as a distraction, you don't need much of a V-bottleneck for your dam. If we discount the drowning of thousands of soldiers, I'd say 5-15m of hills would work just fine as a distraction and incapacitating soldiers for a successful series of cavalry charges.

Yes, if the dam was close enough to the crossing army.

On the other hand, the flood itself seems to be reasonably unnecessary. Troops crossing the river and troops already across the river would be unable to intervene anyway. Some confusion and panic is all you'd really get, I think.

First, no, I wouldn't divert the river, that's not necessary. The river is wide, but as you've asserted slow-moving and we'll work under the assumption that this has always been the case. We're not fighting against the relative power of the river, just trying to collect it, so no special diversion is required.

Ok, though as you dam it, even a slow river will gather speed through the remaining portion. It works against you, though the problems are not insurmountable.

Second, it's important to keep in mind that we're not talking about the need for a permanent structure, just a temporary one. As such, it doesn't even have to be water tight, per se, as a dam would normally strive for. In fact, it would suit our ends if the dam captured the water we required but still allowed some river to flow, thus suggesting nothing amiss. A moderate spillway, whether intended or not would accomplish this.

OK, I agree with that.

Third, since we are looking at a temporary dam whose main point is demolition, then it's really not an engineering issue, so much as it is an issue of time and manpower. As manpower increases, time obviously decreases.

Yes, and both are an issue. We don't know how much, unfortunately.

With those three assumptions in place, as suggested previously, I would use a mix of the damming methods we've already discussed: earthen with a timber crib and sluice-gate (kudos to Simon for this suggestion). I would start by throwing up earthen arms on either side of the river, using whatever was available to strengthen the heaps: stone, scrub, etc. These would act as a container for the water, so what you have is an open-ended U-shape. Where the bottom of the U is, the river's center, I would drive pairs of timber pylons into the river bed. I would think about 20-30m of gap, with pylon pairs every 2-4m should be sufficient. Planking would be inserted between pylon pairs, working from the bottom up. Working fast enough, the river would simply collect behind my new dam, and I would only have to increase support where the pylon pairs met my earthen arms.

This seems to be a reasonable way to approach the problem from what I've seen. Can you make a reasonable schedule (not to the day, of course, an rough estimate) for a workforce of, say, 5000 men?

Sorry, but I disagree with your assertion regarding effort and cost. Given the relative slow-moving nature of this river, a bridge would not have to be an engineering feat of any great measure at all in order to provide a dry-crossing. You simply need support, timber pylons resting on the riverbed, or driven into the bed, or boulders would suffice nicely. The County Safety Inspector isn't going to show up to red-tag the effort, regardless of how rickety it might be or become.

It would take a community effort, but a series of bridges built by local hands would certainly not be out of the question.

I will disagree with you about the effort needed, for the reasons I have already stated.

However, even assuming you're completely right, the implication is that there were several bridges across the river in question, yet the Chinese didn't attempt to cross over any of them. The question is obvious: why not?
All bridges would have paths leading to them, used by travellers and locals to get to the bridge. Unless the Chinese army deliberately made an effort to stay off the paths for no reason, this argument is meaningless.
There would be only one reasonable reason: because superior Korean forces were blocking the paths - which would only support my notion that the flood would be an unnecessary effort on behalf of Koreans.

I'm not certain what you're asserting here. Why is this important in either regard?

Because of the scale of the project. A minor flood will not affect much, just waste your time and effort, and probably destroy a few bridges, if they existed, and destroy a few farms.

Not at all. First consider that any ancient road is more of a footpath to begin with. The Romans are well regarded for their engineering because they built roads especially for their armies to move across, but in lieu of such, armies would just as easily move across country as follow a dirt path never intended for the major traffic of a couple thousand, let alone hundreds of thousands, of soldiers.

Yes, but the implications is that none of the Chinese columns would come anywhere near a path. See above as for why is this problematic.

Second, this army is already in retreat, and even a trade route would likely meander along the natural pathways of the geography, twisting and turning with the countryside, even turning away from a direct line to take in particular villages, etc. An general might find, in some cases, that a straight line was more advantageous that following an obvious planned route along an established roadway. This is especially true if he was trying to move quickly, and remain (as much as you can with 1/3 of a million folk) unknown to his enemy.

See above as to why is this problematic.

And yes, third, as I've said, a mediocre or inept general might not take into consideration all elements when performing such a retreat. Scouts, maps, local guides, etc. might not have been used to best advantage.

I find this scenario unlikely to the extreme. It may be possible in theory, but I find it unbelievable by any stretch of imagination. They already crossed this river on their way south, and campaigned in the area for a long while, yet never noted the bridges across a river in the area they temporarily occupied?
No, sorry, I can't consider this a plausible scenario.

There are, as I stated, plenty of historical examples where terrain was turned against a superior force exactly for this reason, and even good generals can make bad decisions. Consider the many assumptions that "General" Custer made at the Little Big Horn, and you can quickly see how poor information, bad planning, and the desire to move quickly (Custer rejected the offer of a Gatling battery) can turn even a competent general's command into a massacre.

In that particular case, add overwhelming numerical superiority, and more useful weaponry (multishot carabines versus single shot rifles) for a bum rush. It wasn't just bad planning and a desire to move quickly, the enemy was also far stronger than intelligence showed.
I don't see how this example is relevant to this case.

Anything out of the ordinary can disrupt an army, especially if they are not expecting a fight. Now add in that they are fording a river, so they are divided already into three parts: those who have crossed, those who are crossing, and those waiting to cross. Throw enough water down at them to further disrupt, if not actually drown/sweep away some, and yeah you've got a perfect recipe for Army Chaos and a potential recipe for Massacre Soup.

I don't dispute it would distrupt them, but would it add anything significant to the battle? The troops crossing the river and the troops across would be reduced to observing anyway.
Perhaps the units that haven't crossed yet would be able to fight in a slightly better order, though they wouldn't have their backs against a swollen river and would be more motivated to fight.

How many times have I stated this upon now, and it has just been ignored?

Sure it does. It fits the major facts, that one army used a dam and water as a weapon of war to disrupt a superior force and in the ensuing chaos, defeated them. It does not fit the specific facts which we've called into question.

Which is, I believe enough to discount the possibility. It's not a bad idea by any means, but it's probably not what happened.

Absolutely, except for "substantial effect". We only have to increase the amount of water, the speed of the water or both to create a substantial effect. Either one of those three scenarios, and we've achieved our aim.

See above as to why this would be important (the ignored part).

Oh, absolutely! More so, if the troops either in the river crossing or waiting to cross believe they are outnumbered or going to be killed outright, you've got a rout on your hands. Your men start to flee regardless of the actual strength of the enemy. A superior force can be defeated if it believes that it's going to be defeated, and discipline breaks down completely.

Oh, absolutely! But if the river is swollen and they can see they cannot cross it, they would have one reason more to fight to the death.
If they can cross the river, it's quite likely many will drown in it anyway through accidents, and the overall resistance to your assault will be lesser.

Agreed. Of course, depending on how porous the ground is, it might actually take more than just an initial flood of water to create a muddy, swampland through which a cavalry charge is limited or ineffective. If your horse units charge immediately following the flood, even if the ground will become muddy, it may still be stable enough for a series of successful charges.

This depends on the soil, yes, and unfortunately this is one thing we can't know how it looked back then. It might have been different.
We do know, however, that rice farming and paddy fields were prevalent in the area, which means water would likely be retained, and cavalry ineffective. But this is more of a speculation than anything else, slightly more supported by evidence than the idea that the soil conditions would allow a cavalry charge across wet terrain, but not greatly so.

Speculation is the best we can do, unfortunately.

Even soaked ground such as that found at Crecy, where rain had soaked the field, but the French were still able to mount several cavalry charges.

Yes, they did just that, and lost a good portion of their heavy cavalry, and approximately 100 of their own men killed for each English soldier killed.
This doesn't really give support to your point, you know.

No argument from me whatsoever. I've already stated it's more than likely that the size of the Chinese army is exaggerated by either side. But even if it's not, the tactics we've been discussing are solid and very much a possibility for victory despite the ratio.

With the exception of the effects of the flood (see above).

Sorry, I don't know as much about Korean archery as I do English archery, especially during The Hundred Years War, when it was at its peak. Bow strength and range would vary, even amongst those using similar bows. Any tool of war can be reduced to a nuisance, or raised to a crushing defeat depending on the general.

Yes, and also depending on the training of the men.

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Whoa, that was way freaking longer than I had intended!

The salient points are that, with the limited information we have for this battle, we can conceive of any number of scenarios that will fit the major facts, and a couple of scenarios that fit the specific facts. Whether those scenarios are plausible or implausible only matters depending on what question you're asking.

If you want to know if it's conceivable, I think we agree that it is, even though it strains credibility.

But it's been fun to wrap my head around the specific tactics and problems to arrive at solutions to each. I'm more than willing to come up with more, or address individual issues.

Yeah, it's been an interesting topic :)

I hope we can get some more sources on this matter. No luck so far :(

McHrozni

[Foolmewunz]

Just thinking out loud, here....

A good topographical map would be a great help. I originally figured the "battle" would've been around Ji'an, which was their ancient capital. But that's decidedly inland, and wouldn't likely be the path that the retreating Siu army would be taking from the mid-peninsula.

There are some small mountains along the route of the Yalu, and it does come down from about 2500 metres, so it'd really depend on where those higher altitudes are in relation to the lower flats where the supposed ambush occurred.

My friend up in Qingdao advises that he doesn't know of any web-based documents from the time - and he's off to Indonesia for the next six days so I can't really bug him too much.

[theprestige]

I still think McHrozni is greatly underestimating the amount of time a large army would need to ford a river. American Civil War accounts of fordings by armies of "only" tens of thousands could take over a day to ford a river--and that in territory they knew fairly well.

I think that an army of over a hundred thousand (let alone the 300,000 claimed), with its supply train, would afford the enemy plenty of time to throw their entire order of march into disarray, in exactly the way described in the article, regardless of McHrozni's terrain considerations.

[RobRoy]

This implies we have a choice in the matter, which would futher imply we have material available to study the terrain in detail, which we don't, to my best knowledge.
If you know differently, it could be very helpful :)

Sorry, that's not what it implies. If we were doing an actual, full-on research of this particular battle, then yes, we would have a whole host of material to sift through. Geological reports, a site visit, access to Chinese and Korean military historians, etc. Given that we're not doing that, then we have to make certain choices for the scenarios we're discussing, which I've explained already.

If you wish to eliminate particular aspects, I'm fine with that, going under the caveat that it may have actually played an important role.

I agree this would be very useful to know. Do you have any sources on the matter? I couldn't find any, though admittedly, I'm no expert in the field.

No, I don't. This is exactly why I keep pointing out that we can't discount anything out of hand, unless we agree that we're choosing to discount it because we find it inconvenient.

Perhaps, but some areas would be more difficult to work in than the others. The schedule is pretty tight.

What is the schedule?

Yes, if the dam was close enough to the crossing army.

This is not in contention.

On the other hand, the flood itself seems to be reasonably unnecessary. Troops crossing the river and troops already across the river would be unable to intervene anyway. Some confusion and panic is all you'd really get, I think.

Sorry, but that's exactly the point. Confusion and panic is all you need to make a larger, superior force break and rout. I don't know how to make this more clear. If we agree the flood didn't do the damage that is claimed (and we don't know that it didn't) it certainly is plausible that it caused other psychological impacts to the enemy troops which would have played in the ultimate demise of the superior force.

This seems to be a reasonable way to approach the problem from what I've seen. Can you make a reasonable schedule (not to the day, of course, an rough estimate) for a workforce of, say, 5000 men?

That actually makes it quite easy. The Roman Legions built earthworks complete with palisades almost every night of their marches. A typical legion is about the same size as the figure you cite, so you can see that with that many men, working the entire day (as opposed to just the end of a march and wanting to get to sleep before the next day's march) provides quite a bit of manpower to the problem. Using hand tools, including wheelbarrows (which were available) or other earth-moving devices (baskets, hauling packs, carts, etc.), we can run some quick math:

[Caveat: For simplicity sake, I will only use the wheel barrow, under the knowledge that other earth moving devices might have hauled more or less than a barrow, so this provides a reasonable medium ground for discussion.]

A ton of dirt is about 1.5 cubic yards. An average (modern) wheel barrow is about 3-5 cubic feet, so to move a cubic yard (27 cubic feet), it will take 6-9 full wheelbarrow loads. If one person is moving the dirt by themselves (and not trying to kill themselves in the process), they shovel, grab the barrow, wheel it to another spot, dump and return, we're talking about 10-15 minutes round trip. One person can move about 10 tons of dirt, or 15 cubic yards, in six to 12 hours (a full work day). Now multiple this by 5,000 and you can see that the project isn't all that tricky at all. Of course, you're going to want to specialize your workforce. A group of diggers, a group of barrow movers, a group of spreaders. This will reduce the amount of time that each barrow requires to move dirt by half-again to double the original amount: thus a single barrow could move 20 tons of dirt or 30 cubic yards in six to 12 hours, and this is just a conservative estimate.

So I would detail as follows:

1,000 earth movers
3,000 diggers
1,000 men assigned to the timber cribs

However, even assuming you're completely right, the implication is that there were several bridges across the river in question, yet the Chinese didn't attempt to cross over any of them. The question is obvious: why not?

No, there is no implication here. We don't know. We don't have a detailed map of their travel route, or any indication of what methods or means they used. As I stated previously, unless we consciously choose to rule this out, with the limited information we're working from, all plays are fair game.

The bridge scenario is just that: a scenario. It is plausible for all the reasons that I've cited. That doesn't make it the most plausible. But without other evidence, there is no reason to discount it.

All bridges would have paths leading to them, used by travellers and locals to get to the bridge. Unless the Chinese army deliberately made an effort to stay off the paths for no reason, this argument is meaningless.
There would be only one reasonable reason: because superior Korean forces were blocking the paths - which would only support my notion that the flood would be an unnecessary effort on behalf of Koreans.

I've already provided a reason why an army would not follow a trade route, path, road, etc., up to and including the description of such a route as being completely inadequate for most armies of any size. "Roads" in an ancient capacity, are a complete misnomer from what we describe as roads today. They would not necessarily be of benefit to an army, advancing or retreating unless they were specifically designed to handle that level of traffic; a rarity at best.

Because of the scale of the project. A minor flood will not affect much, just waste your time and effort, and probably destroy a few bridges, if they existed, and destroy a few farms.

This doesn't matter. Some communities have been known, prior to more modern methods being employed, to take bridge building in stride with other aspects of seasonal life.

Unless you can provide factual evidence that states no communities in this area ever built a single bridge, this must be taken into consideration. It's not mandatory for the scenarios we've been discussing, but you can't reject it out of hand without more solid evidence.

Yes, but the implications is that none of the Chinese columns would come anywhere near a path. See above as for why is this problematic.

See above as to why is this problematic.

I find this scenario unlikely to the extreme. It may be possible in theory, but I find it unbelievable by any stretch of imagination. They already crossed this river on their way south, and campaigned in the area for a long while, yet never noted the bridges across a river in the area they temporarily occupied?
No, sorry, I can't consider this a plausible scenario.

This goes back to the question of ancient roads which I've already described. It is established that most armies would find their contemporary "roads" to be generally useless unless specifically established for the movement of troops, such as the Romans built. If you have other evidence, please provide it.

In that particular case, add overwhelming numerical superiority, and more useful weaponry (multishot carabines versus single shot rifles) for a bum rush. It wasn't just bad planning and a desire to move quickly, the enemy was also far stronger than intelligence showed.
I don't see how this example is relevant to this case.

Sorry, it was not relevant from a tactics point of view, but from a decision-making and outcome point of view: the concept is that even a good general can misread the land, his enemy, or any number of other factors and lead his army into an unintended massacre. Custer was considered a competent, even meticulous leader, and had advanced to General prior to the end of the American Civil War. Even with all this experience, he made significant mistakes, along with other tactical errors, and we all know the end result.

I don't dispute it would distrupt them, but would it add anything significant to the battle? The troops crossing the river and the troops across would be reduced to observing anyway.

Yes, chaos, confusion, potential fear. As I stated previously, these are all the key elements for an inferior force to rout a superior one.

Perhaps the units that haven't crossed yet would be able to fight in a slightly better order, though they wouldn't have their backs against a swollen river and would be more motivated to fight.

How many times have I stated this upon now, and it has just been ignored?

I do apologize if you feel you're being ignored. That is certainly not my intention. I have addressed how the battle could have taken place to fit the facts as they've been stated. We don't know what the disposition of the army was prior to, or during, the crossing. Once the flood water hits, at whatever level, we still don't know their disposition. We can only guess at what might have occurred, and make those guesses in relation facts. Even then, we are better suited keeping the guesses more general, rather than trying to figure out the specifics of each element of the battle. What units would have remained intact, what units would have broken, which would have been more likely to stand and fight as opposed to which did? All too specific to answer.

So yeah, the units that hadn't crossed might still be in fighting order. Our Korean general might have taken this into account and not attacked on that side, or simply feinted an attack in the hopes of breaking them, or he might have attacked anyhow. Those units might have formed up ranks and driven off the first cavalry charge, or folded under it, or broke and fled after an initial success, or believing their comrades were being massacred, they might have thrown themselves into the river.

We're only guessing here, and I've applied my best guesses to what might have occurred in order to make it fit the general and specific facts that we have. Getting more specific, and we have an Impressionists painting: from far away, it makes a pretty picture, up close and it's a mess. :D

Which is, I believe enough to discount the possibility. It's not a bad idea by any means, but it's probably not what happened.

But this is what happened. A general, of some caliber, maybe good, maybe mediocre, led his men on a catastrophic campaign. He failed utterly to achieve a military victory. However he started (good, bad or indifferent) he ended up losing, which, in regards to the facts we have, means he made some very bad choices. In asking for scenarios, we've presented a plausible one with many different aspects: lack, misuse or poor scouts, lack, misuse or poor maps, lack, misuse or poor local guides, etc. The list goes on.

There's no way to logically discount this as part of what happened.

Oh, absolutely! But if the river is swollen and they can see they cannot cross it, they would have one reason more to fight to the death.

Or one more reason to run screaming, dropping weapons and armor as fast as they can to get away.

If they can cross the river, it's quite likely many will drown in it anyway through accidents, and the overall resistance to your assault will be lesser.

Which adds to the concept that the flood was a significant factor, whether initially or eventually.

Yes, they did just that, and lost a good portion of their heavy cavalry, and approximately 100 of their own men killed for each English soldier killed.
This doesn't really give support to your point, you know.

Sorry, again you've missed the point on this. The outcome of the battle was not the issue. The question is in regards to cavalry charging on a water-soaked battlefield. This happened at Crecy. The French were able to launch at least two significant charges of their cavalry, and were not deterred by the condition of the rain-soaked landscape. What they were deterred by, among other minor things, was the positioning of the English archers on the flanks, and the defenses the English had constructed along the rise of the hill while they waited for the French: ditches, pits, and caltrops meant to break up just such a charge. It is the very presence of such defensive tools that shows how lethal the English regarded the French cavalry charge, the need to break it up before it could reach their lines, and the belief that a water-soaked field would not be adequate to stop them.

With the exception of the effects of the flood (see above).

No, the flood is a part of my discussion of tactics meant to fit the general and specific facts that we have of the battle. I would not remove it unless there is solid evidence against.

[McHrozni]

I still think McHrozni is greatly underestimating the amount of time a large army would need to ford a river. American Civil War accounts of fordings by armies of "only" tens of thousands could take over a day to ford a river--and that in territory they knew fairly well.

I think that an army of over a hundred thousand (let alone the 300,000 claimed), with its supply train, would afford the enemy plenty of time to throw their entire order of march into disarray, in exactly the way described in the article, regardless of McHrozni's terrain considerations.

Why do you think I underestimate the time needed to cross the river? What's the basis for this reasoning?

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Sorry, that's not what it implies. If we were doing an actual, full-on research of this particular battle, then yes, we would have a whole host of material to sift through. Geological reports, a site visit, access to Chinese and Korean military historians, etc. Given that we're not doing that, then we have to make certain choices for the scenarios we're discussing, which I've explained already.

Hm, I see your point.
I would like to point out, however, that site visits are probably out of the question, as are detailed geological studies. This is the barest minimum of problems that we can not avoid.

No, I don't. This is exactly why I keep pointing out that we can't discount anything out of hand, unless we agree that we're choosing to discount it because we find it inconvenient.

Inconvenient and/or impossible :)

What is the schedule?

I don't have one, I don't have a clue how that would be take. That's why I asked. I do know that construction projects of this scale are not done within days or weeks, but I could be wrong. If someone is more knowledgeable than me then please, step forward and provide a possible schedule.

Sorry, but that's exactly the point. Confusion and panic is all you need to make a larger, superior force break and rout. I don't know how to make this more clear. If we agree the flood didn't do the damage that is claimed (and we don't know that it didn't) it certainly is plausible that it caused other psychological impacts to the enemy troops which would have played in the ultimate demise of the superior force.

Yeah, but the larger force would have no choice but to fight, if there was a flood behind them. They would be more likely to fight to the death than rout, because they have nowhere to go.
If the river is not flooded, however, they do have an escape route - which is, incidentally, Sun Tzu's recommendation to do in such cases.

That actually makes it quite easy. The Roman Legions built earthworks complete with palisades almost every night of their marches.

Yeah - a ditch a meter deep and a meter wide, earthworks made from thus displaced soil, and carrying prefabricated infantry obstruction elements with them.
This is not anywhere near what we're talking about.

A typical legion is about the same size as the figure you cite, so you can see that with that many men, working the entire day (as opposed to just the end of a march and wanting to get to sleep before the next day's march) provides quite a bit of manpower to the problem. Using hand tools, including wheelbarrows (which were available) or other earth-moving devices (baskets, hauling packs, carts, etc.), we can run some quick math:

[Caveat: For simplicity sake, I will only use the wheel barrow, under the knowledge that other earth moving devices might have hauled more or less than a barrow, so this provides a reasonable medium ground for discussion.]

A ton of dirt is about 1.5 cubic yards. An average (modern) wheel barrow is about 3-5 cubic feet, so to move a cubic yard (27 cubic feet), it will take 6-9 full wheelbarrow loads. If one person is moving the dirt by themselves (and not trying to kill themselves in the process), they shovel, grab the barrow, wheel it to another spot, dump and return, we're talking about 10-15 minutes round trip. One person can move about 10 tons of dirt, or 15 cubic yards, in six to 12 hours (a full work day). Now multiple this by 5,000 and you can see that the project isn't all that tricky at all. Of course, you're going to want to specialize your workforce. A group of diggers, a group of barrow movers, a group of spreaders. This will reduce the amount of time that each barrow requires to move dirt by half-again to double the original amount: thus a single barrow could move 20 tons of dirt or 30 cubic yards in six to 12 hours, and this is just a conservative estimate.

So I would detail as follows:

1,000 earth movers
3,000 diggers
1,000 men assigned to the timber cribs

Ok, this is good. What would be the approximate volume of soil that would need to be moved in position?

No, there is no implication here. We don't know. We don't have a detailed map of their travel route, or any indication of what methods or means they used. As I stated previously, unless we consciously choose to rule this out, with the limited information we're working from, all plays are fair game.

Yes, but I'm sure you'll agree they are not all equally likely.

The bridge scenario is just that: a scenario. It is plausible for all the reasons that I've cited. That doesn't make it the most plausible. But without other evidence, there is no reason to discount it.

It is unlikely for the reasons I stated before. It is not impossible, of course.

I've already provided a reason why an army would not follow a trade route, path, road, etc., up to and including the description of such a route as being completely inadequate for most armies of any size. "Roads" in an ancient capacity, are a complete misnomer from what we describe as roads today. They would not necessarily be of benefit to an army, advancing or retreating unless they were specifically designed to handle that level of traffic; a rarity at best.

They would also have to benefit no part of the army - which is again, unlikely. They need to gather supplies to feed themselves somehow, and there are bound to be farms with loot along the way.

Can we conclude it is unlikely, but not impossible that there was a bridge in existence that the Chinese didn't know about?

This doesn't matter. Some communities have been known, prior to more modern methods being employed, to take bridge building in stride with other aspects of seasonal life.

On the scale necessary here?

Sorry, it was not relevant from a tactics point of view, but from a decision-making and outcome point of view: the concept is that even a good general can misread the land, his enemy, or any number of other factors and lead his army into an unintended massacre. Custer was considered a competent, even meticulous leader, and had advanced to General prior to the end of the American Civil War. Even with all this experience, he made significant mistakes, along with other tactical errors, and we all know the end result.

This is the same in the same sense as a bonsai tree and a giant sequoia are essentially very similar.

I do apologize if you feel you're being ignored.

Well, our greatest disagreement right now is weather or not it is likely that the Koreans had built a bridge across the river in question, which the Chinese didn't know about.
How likely do you consider that scenario, quantitatively?

We're only guessing here, and I've applied my best guesses to what might have occurred in order to make it fit the general and specific facts that we have. Getting more specific, and we have an Impressionists painting: from far away, it makes a pretty picture, up close and it's a mess. :D

Yes, I do see your point. I don't contend most of the whole thing :)

But this is what happened. A general, of some caliber, maybe good, maybe mediocre, led his men on a catastrophic campaign. He failed utterly to achieve a military victory. However he started (good, bad or indifferent) he ended up losing, which, in regards to the facts we have, means he made some very bad choices. In asking for scenarios, we've presented a plausible one with many different aspects: lack, misuse or poor scouts, lack, misuse or poor maps, lack, misuse or poor local guides, etc. The list goes on.

Having an over sized but poor quality army would also be quite high on the list. This was also probably something outside of his power.

Or one more reason to run screaming, dropping weapons and armor as fast as they can to get away.

This is highly debatable.

Which adds to the concept that the flood was a significant factor, whether initially or eventually.

Or adds to the concept of not flooding the river in the first place would result in fewer of your own deaths. The argument works both ways.

Sorry, again you've missed the point on this. The outcome of the battle was not the issue. The question is in regards to cavalry charging on a water-soaked battlefield. This happened at Crecy. The French were able to launch at least two significant charges of their cavalry, and were not deterred by the condition of the rain-soaked landscape. What they were deterred by, among other minor things, was the positioning of the English archers on the flanks, and the defenses the English had constructed along the rise of the hill while they waited for the French: ditches, pits, and caltrops meant to break up just such a charge. It is the very presence of such defensive tools that shows how lethal the English regarded the French cavalry charge, the need to break it up before it could reach their lines, and the belief that a water-soaked field would not be adequate to stop them.

So basically, we have a incomparable situation. The presence of English battle works in no way shows the cavalry charges would be effective without them, just that the English were concerned over them - which may have been an unnecessary concern.

No, the flood is a part of my discussion of tactics meant to fit the general and specific facts that we have of the battle. I would not remove it unless there is solid evidence against.

The flood also needs to be both artificial and deliberate. I don't dispute there probably was a flood that affected the battle, but was it artificial or natural is an open question. I can certainly envision a general taking credit for a natural phenomenon far better than investing a major effort in an unnecessary dam, which may provide some help and some hindrance in the upcoming battle. Today the area is prone to seasonal flooding, so it is not unreasonable to assume that a natural flood is within the realm of possibility.

McHrozni

[theprestige]

Why do you think I underestimate the time needed to cross the river? What's the basis for this reasoning?
Because you repeatedly imply or question whether the Koreans would have had enough time to create the flood, while the Chinese army was properly at risk from such a strategy:

Sure, but how do you then destroy this quickly enough to create a significant flood. Explosives would do the trick, but moving a substantial number of sandbags and logs without them, in a short enough time?

I find these three possibilities believable, moreso than any of the deliberate dam scenarios. Especially the first one, I considered that one before. North Korea is prone to flooding, and a flash flood at the right moment certainly isn't impossible...

Hm, interesting. The technology to build a dam was therefore present. The question remains however how long the construction would take, and how easy or how difficult it would be to destroy it.

A preexisting bridge would probably allow a much faster construction, even though it would be destroyed in the flood.

Perhaps, but some areas would be more difficult to work in than the others. The schedule is pretty tight.

ETA: I reason, based on historical example, that large armies require a large amount of time to ford a river, and that the Koreans had plenty of time to prepare such a dam.

Incidentally, the size of the Chinese army provides a plausible explanation for why they opted not to use a bridge (assuming one was present in the region): Unless the bridge were constructed with the timely passage of a 300,000 man army (and its supply train) in mind, it would end up being a significant bottleneck, putting the army just as much at risk in crossing as being flooded out while fording.

A broad, shallow ford could easily be a much more optimal site at which to cross a river, compared to a (relatively) narrow or flimsy bridge. Even the bridges on a regional trade route aren't going to be built with hundreds of thousands of troops and all their baggage wanting to use them in a single three-day period, for example.

[theprestige]

Yeah, but the larger force would have no choice but to fight, if there was a flood behind them. They would be more likely to fight to the death than rout, because they have nowhere to go.
If the river is not flooded, however, they do have an escape route - which is, incidentally, Sun Tzu's recommendation to do in such cases.
It's entirely possible to give them an escape route anyways. You seem to be assuming that the Korean cavalry is required to surround the enemy on three sides, anchoring their flanks on the river at each end of their line.

In fact, they could just as easily anchor their right flank on the river upstream from the Chinese army, and leave their left flank "in the air" as they attack, providing an escape route downstream along the river bank.

[RobRoy]

Inconvenient and/or impossible :)

Sort of. I mean we can generally discount that fluffy pink unicorns showed up with rainbow power and transformed the Chinese army into New York cheesecake, sure. Let me try another tack: There is well-grounded research, logical, reviewable and publishable; we are not doing this. Then there is plausible scenario creation. We are doing the this. So while we can reject one aspect of a scenario if we find it inconvenient, it's very hard, barring the unicorn analogy, to call such aspects impossible.

I don't have one, I don't have a clue how that would be take. That's why I asked. I do know that construction projects of this scale are not done within days or weeks, but I could be wrong. If someone is more knowledgeable than me then please, step forward and provide a possible schedule.

Alright, I'm confused then. You stated: "The schedule is pretty tight." This seemed to me to indicate that you had a time frame in mind. I'm willing to work the scenarios into any time frame you think is appropriate, but I need to know what they are. If you don't have a time frame, then such statements as "The schedule is pretty tight." shouldn't be made. I'm not admonishing you, but I am confused between these two assertions.

Yeah, but the larger force would have no choice but to fight, if there was a flood behind them. They would be more likely to fight to the death than rout, because they have nowhere to go.
If the river is not flooded, however, they do have an escape route - which is, incidentally, Sun Tzu's recommendation to do in such cases.

Only if the Koreans are capable of fielding a cavalry of a size and disposition such that all avenues of escape are cut off for the Chinese. I was not working under this assumption, as I considered the Korean force inferior, and thus only capable of attacking from one or two directions on either side of the river. I don't think it's feasible to think that a general capable of pulling off this kind of a rout would believe he could crush the Chinese army outright. As you say, it would corner the Chinese, put their back to the wall (of water) and force them to make a pitched fight of it, something the Koreans could not withstand.

Yeah - a ditch a meter deep and a meter wide, earthworks made from thus displaced soil, and carrying prefabricated infantry obstruction elements with them.
This is not anywhere near what we're talking about.

Sorry, you've missed the point again, and you're taking my comments out of context. I provided the caveat that the Romans would be marching during the day, then quickly establish a fortified position via earthworks, similar in nature (but not size) to what we are discussing. It is a basis for comparison that we need only scale up to make fit our scenario, which I also provided for.

Ok, this is good. What would be the approximate volume of soil that would need to be moved in position?

Depends on what you want to achieve. If you just want a diversion, you need to move a lot less dirt than if want a flood of Biblical proportions. If we go with the numbers I've provided, and go conservative, my 3,000 dirt haulers can move 60,000 to 90,000 cubic yards of dirt each day. Even at that level, we're talking quite a bit of water in a single day.

Yes, but I'm sure you'll agree they are not all equally likely.

Of course not. But then history is filled with quite unlikely events, so we have to be careful when we label things as "likely" or "unlikely".

They would also have to benefit no part of the army - which is again, unlikely. They need to gather supplies to feed themselves somehow, and there are bound to be farms with loot along the way.

Again, this depends on what the army's goal is. If it's to get the heck out of Dodge, then it would move as quickly as possible, and most roads wouldn't help this end at all. In fact, it could be quite a hindrance, since you're following a pre-determined route, which your enemy is most likely familiar, and thus capable of harassing and setting traps! :D

Can we conclude it is unlikely, but not impossible that there was a bridge in existence that the Chinese didn't know about?

No, we cannot.

On the scale necessary here?

What scale is that? As a starting place for a temporary dam? Sure! An extent structure that could quickly be converted in fashion I've described above would be a definite benefit to the Korean general. Save him a lot of time and effort.

This is the same in the same sense as a bonsai tree and a giant sequoia are essentially very similar.

I'm sorry, you must not be seeing the point regarding a "good" general making a series of bad choices that end in catastrophe. You suggested that a general would have to be completely inept, beyond the range of plausibility, in order for the scenario to occur where he wasn't aware of the terrain enough to permit a massacre . . . and yet that's exactly what history tells us happened here. Custer is a fine example of an experienced and "good" leader who made a series of unfortunate mistakes. He was not inept by any stretch, yet he was fallible. The scale of the mistake hardly matters. The conclusion is the same.

Well, our greatest disagreement right now is weather or not it is likely that the Koreans had built a bridge across the river in question, which the Chinese didn't know about.
How likely do you consider that scenario, quantitatively?

In order to quantify a question like this we have to take additional specifics into consideration:

1 - How experienced and capable was the general.
2 - How familiar with the terrain was he?
3 - How good was his intelligence (if any).

If you'd like to provide some guesses as to each of these, then I'd be willing to try to quantify the likelihood of the scenario, under the caveat that even in the best of circumstances (excellent general, familiar with the area, with perfect intelligence) he still could have made a series of poor choices.

Having an over sized but poor quality army would also be quite high on the list. This was also probably something outside of his power.

Agreed. Veteran troops can be relied upon, generally, to hold the line where raw recruits will tend to break at the first sign of trouble. The more training an army has, the better prepared it is for when chaos on a battlefield starts occurring, and the more likely it is to stand, rather than rout.

This is highly debatable.

Of course it is, as is any single aspect of the scenarios we've been discussing. That's what separates what we're doing in this discussion, from actual historical research. There is no aspect of what we've said so far that isn't subject to much debate.

So basically, we have a incomparable situation. The presence of English battle works in no way shows the cavalry charges would be effective without them, just that the English were concerned over them - which may have been an unnecessary concern.

No, actually, it's quite comparable. Both scenarios have a water-soaked field. Crecy had been soaked with rain over a period of two days (if memory serves), while Salsu will only have been presented with water for a period of minutes. At Crecy, the cavalry not only were capable of forming a charge over the soaked field and up the hill, they charged several times. Their first two charges, again, over a water-soaked terrain, almost broke the English lines. The other defensive measures, formed by men who had field experience, shows that they knew, even over a water-soaked field, that cavalry have the capacity to charge, and win the day. If the defensive measures had not been taken, the French charge, over the water-soaked field, had the capacity of defeating the English.

This is so very comparable that I'm having a hard time understanding where you aren't seeing the parallels.

The flood also needs to be both artificial and deliberate. I don't dispute there probably was a flood that affected the battle, but was it artificial or natural is an open question. I can certainly envision a general taking credit for a natural phenomenon far better than investing a major effort in an unnecessary dam, which may provide some help and some hindrance in the upcoming battle. Today the area is prone to seasonal flooding, so it is not unreasonable to assume that a natural flood is within the realm of possibility.

Definitely possible. Hard to say if this is the most likely scenario, but this is where we go back to being a well-researched argument, versus what we're doing here.

[RobRoy]

It's entirely possible to give them an escape route anyways. You seem to be assuming that the Korean cavalry is required to surround the enemy on three sides, anchoring their flanks on the river at each end of their line.

In fact, they could just as easily anchor their right flank on the river upstream from the Chinese army, and leave their left flank "in the air" as they attack, providing an escape route downstream along the river bank.

This is pretty much how I assumed the Korean general would have arrayed his forces. Attempting to encircle the superior Chinese army would have been a recipe for utter failure.

[Foolmewunz]

I would think that "flooding" doesn't necessarily, as I mentioned earlier, mean a great deluge of water like that scene in The Ten Commandments, with soldiers being swept away and drowned. It's mentioned in one of the accounts that the river is very low at that time of year. Would've been an easy crossing.

Ergo, if they just released a dam, upstream and the river rose to the point where it was difficult, if not impossible to cross, then you've effectively split their forces without having to envision that great wall of water. Most rivers that flood don't actually have a tidal wave coming downstream. They rise an inch or two at a time.

You then attack the forces on the eastern bank and harass the larger forces on the western bank, who, being routed, headed southwest to the (I think it's called) Liaonang peninsula. All accounts mention this retreat and that by the time the skirmishes and battles were finished there (some 200 km from the crossing) the Chinese army had been decimated.

I think it's important, also, to remember that this wasn't an invading army, straining at the yoke to get into battle. This was the remaining one third of a million man force that had been routed earlier, greatly due to their collapsed supply chain. They were escaping homewards, very likely tired and hungry and not in the best of condition. And when you consider that million man army, you have to reckon the Koreans were throwing similar numbers into the battles. This was essentially a mop-up operation. A very large scale mop-up, but a mop-up nonetheless.

[McHrozni]

I would think that "flooding" doesn't necessarily, as I mentioned earlier, mean a great deluge of water like that scene in The Ten Commandments, with soldiers being swept away and drowned. It's mentioned in one of the accounts that the river is very low at that time of year. Would've been an easy crossing.

Ergo, if they just released a dam, upstream and the river rose to the point where it was difficult, if not impossible to cross, then you've effectively split their forces without having to envision that great wall of water. Most rivers that flood don't actually have a tidal wave coming downstream. They rise an inch or two at a time.

You then attack the forces on the eastern bank and harass the larger forces on the western bank, who, being routed, headed southwest to the (I think it's called) Liaonang peninsula. All accounts mention this retreat and that by the time the skirmishes and battles were finished there (some 200 km from the crossing) the Chinese army had been decimated.

I think it's important, also, to remember that this wasn't an invading army, straining at the yoke to get into battle. This was the remaining one third of a million man force that had been routed earlier, greatly due to their collapsed supply chain. They were escaping homewards, very likely tired and hungry and not in the best of condition. And when you consider that million man army, you have to reckon the Koreans were throwing similar numbers into the battles. This was essentially a mop-up operation. A very large scale mop-up, but a mop-up nonetheless.

This is a very good point, especially in regard to the effect of the actual flood. A low river and a reas suddenly swelling would do far more than more than an already difficult crossing becoming simply more difficult. In addition, this would greatly reduce concerns regarding mud, since the river would have a basin to flow in, greatly reducing the spillage. The dam would also have to be smaller, and it wouldn't necessarily create a substantial lake to hold the water in.

All in all, I believe this is the most likely scenario presented thus far, and it fits the historical facts rather well :)

It certainly beats bickering about how likely it is that there was a major bridge across the river that the Chinese didn't know about. Especially since we don't know if such a bridge, in fact, existed. :)

It was an interesting discussion, all things considered. Thanks all for participating :)

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

In fact, they could just as easily anchor their right flank on the river upstream from the Chinese army, and leave their left flank "in the air" as they attack, providing an escape route downstream along the river bank.

How about not flooding the river at all, wouldn't that accomplish the same, only better and with much less work? No matter how you think of it, this is an easier, and probably much better solution. Alas, I believe we have a better scenario now, see above :)

McHrozni

[Foolmewunz]

@MCHROZNI,
Got an email from my friend - he just remembered the book he was thinking of.... Ironically, I used to own a copy but I can't remember what city or country I would've left it in - possibly Taiwan.

CP Fitzgerald, The Son of Heaven.

It's out of print, unfortunately, and I can't recall the section on the Sui/Goruyean wars, but he says the opening of the book is dedicated to the downfall of the Sui Dynasty - the book itself is about the starting ot the Tang Dynasty. I did find a copy on a rare/collector site for about 268 pounds, but I think that's web-debating above and beyond the call of duty!

At any rate, he's got his copy back in Europe, and says that as a prologue to the rise of the Tang, there's an excellent several chapters on the ongoing military disasters that the Sui got themselves into in the last decades of their own rule, particularly the major effort they put into trying to subjugate Goruyea.

[McHrozni]

@MCHROZNI,
Got an email from my friend - he just remembered the book he was thinking of.... Ironically, I used to own a copy but I can't remember what city or country I would've left it in - possibly Taiwan.

CP Fitzgerald, The Son of Heaven.

It's out of print, unfortunately, and I can't recall the section on the Sui/Goruyean wars, but he says the opening of the book is dedicated to the downfall of the Sui Dynasty - the book itself is about the starting ot the Tang Dynasty. I did find a copy on a rare/collector site for about 268 pounds, but I think that's web-debating above and beyond the call of duty!

At any rate, he's got his copy back in Europe, and says that as a prologue to the rise of the Tang, there's an excellent several chapters on the ongoing military disasters that the Sui got themselves into in the last decades of their own rule, particularly the major effort they put into trying to subjugate Goruyea.

Hm, very interesting indeed. I tried searching through all libraries in the country (using a comprahensive search engine for them, approximately a minute of work :)), and came out blank, obviously.
I found the author, though, and two of his works that might be relevant. They are "China: a short cultural history" and "A concise history of East Asia".
The latter might include at least some relevant general information. If I get some time to waste, I might get around to browse through it.

Another obsevation, Sui dynasty apperantly suffered many military setbacks, which lends support to the teory that they had poor generals (though I still think missing a major bridge on a river they're crossing is out of the question :)) and, very likely, poor quality soldiers. Both would favor this scenario.
The mere fact they tried to invade Korea with an army four times larger than their logistics could possibly supply implies both.

McHrozni

[Foolmewunz]

One of the problems with accounts of the Sui is that the histories are one-sided, there just aren't any historical records from the Korean side of this, and additionally, there is not that much in contemporary evidence from the Sui side that isn't tainted by historians from later dynasties who generally like to burst the balloons of early dynasties and inflate their own.

I'm not sure if I agree with this - after all, the Sui are known (and celebrated) for building the Grand Canal and for solidifying the territories.... and much lesser known for not being able to conquer the Goruyeans. This also sells the Goruyeans short. They were a major power in their own right, which is why the Sui were fighting so hard to turn them into a vassal state. The states in the mid-peninsula (of modern day Korea) actually paid tribute to Goruyea, meaning they were a master-state in their own right.

It appears that the Koreans of the time were just damned good fighters. But then again, fighting on your home turf against an invading army with very long supply lines is always an advantage.

[McHrozni]

One of the problems with accounts of the Sui is that the histories are one-sided, there just aren't any historical records from the Korean side of this, and additionally, there is not that much in contemporary evidence from the Sui side that isn't tainted by historians from later dynasties who generally like to burst the balloons of early dynasties and inflate their own.

This is always a problem, but it is possible to avoid the problem somewhat. A careful study typically reveals inconsistencies in the story, and it is doubtful all records were falsified. For example, if we knew the amount of food that was provided for the army over a period of time (not an unreasonable record to find), that would provide a fairly acceptable estimate of it's size, likely within 20% or so of the actual number.
Likewise if we have a historical record of an earlier or later dynasty of the military training and equipment provided and no record of any major effort to improve one or the other, that would indicate their troops were of comparable quality. This isn't perfect, but is doable.

I'm not sure if I agree with this - after all, the Sui are known (and celebrated) for building the Grand Canal and for solidifying the territories.... and much lesser known for not being able to conquer the Goruyeans. This also sells the Goruyeans short. They were a major power in their own right, which is why the Sui were fighting so hard to turn them into a vassal state. The states in the mid-peninsula (of modern day Korea) actually paid tribute to Goruyea, meaning they were a master-state in their own right.

Chinese Suzretanity was a bit weird much of the time. They demanded tribute from smaller neighbors, but provided them with "gifts" of "equal or greater value". That's not much different from Chinese economy today :)
Most of their neighbors didn't particularly mind this trade, which somewhat undermines the necessity of having a strong army. We do know China tried and failed to subdue it's neighbors for centuries, for example.

It appears that the Koreans of the time were just damned good fighters. But then again, fighting on your home turf against an invading army with very long supply lines is always an advantage.

Yes, and don't forget the size of the Chinese army worked against it as well. Their army was so large it couldn't support itself by foraging, and the supply lines were long, primitive and consequently severely limited.
Had they left 40% of their army to starve to death and continue to campaign with the remaining 60% they might (might, not necessarily) actually achieve better results, including in their own deaths.

McHrozni

[RobRoy]

All in all, I believe this is the most likely scenario presented thus far, and it fits the historical facts rather well :)

You know that we stated this way back toward the beginning, right?

It certainly beats bickering about how likely it is that there was a major bridge across the river that the Chinese didn't know about. Especially since we don't know if such a bridge, in fact, existed. :)

I didn't realize we were bickering. I thought we were arguing a detailed point to discuss its plausibility. <shrug>

[theprestige]

How about not flooding the river at all, wouldn't that accomplish the same, only better and with much less work? No matter how you think of it, this is an easier, and probably much better solution. Alas, I believe we have a better scenario now, see above :)

McHrozni
I disagree. No matter how you think of it, maybe, but that only goes so far. Obviously the people reporting the event in Wikipedia think of it differently. Several people on this thread--including me--think of it differently.

Your thinking in this thread boils down to three things: an admitted ignorance of the subject, an appeal to incredulity, and an appeal to authority (your own).

Why should we accept your analysis as definitive?

[McHrozni]

You know that we stated this way back toward the beginning, right?

Hm, I don't, actually. I must've missed it, sorry.

I didn't realize we were bickering. I thought we were arguing a detailed point to discuss its plausibility. <shrug>

At first, yes, but it degenerated into bickering within a few posts IMHO. :)

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Why should we accept your analysis as definitive?

Has anyone shown how making an already difficult river crossing more difficult would give the Koreans a significant advantage over the existing situation? I did ask for it several times, and the point was ignored, you know.

I don't dispute that making a relatively easy river crossing difficult would benefit them substantialy. However, making an already difficult crossing more difficult (or even next to impossible) would be rather pointless, and I have explained why several times, I believe. If you can argue why this is not the case, I'm all ears (or eyes, since this is a forum).

McHrozni

[theprestige]

Has anyone shown how making an already difficult river crossing more difficult would give the Koreans a significant advantage over the existing situation? I did ask for it several times, and the point was ignored, you know.

I don't dispute that making a relatively easy river crossing difficult would benefit them substantialy. However, making an already difficult crossing more difficult (or even next to impossible) would be rather pointless, and I have explained why several times, I believe. If you can argue why this is not the case, I'm all ears (or eyes, since this is a forum).

McHrozni
Simple: The crossing was easy, the Koreans made it difficult, part of the Chinese army was caught mid-stream (literally), and substantial tactical advantage accrued to the Korean army thereby.

Alternatively: The crossing was moderately difficult, the Koreans were not convinced it was difficult enough to ensure their success, they made it more difficult, part of the Chinese army was caught mid-stream (literally), and substantial tactical advantage accrued to the Korean army thereby (though it may have been there already, which doesn't mean the Korean army shouldn't make doubly sure of their advantage).

Why you feel you have to go out of your way to doubt these simple, obvious, and eminently plausible explanations is beyond me.

[RobRoy]

Hm, I don't, actually. I must've missed it, sorry.

I and others stated repeatedly that any river crossing was a great place for an ambush. Add a little extra water at an opportune point, and it only increased that difficulty. It's on the first page of the discussion.

At first, yes, but it degenerated into bickering within a few posts IMHO. :)

Perhaps for you. This is highly unfortunate. I put a lot of time, research and thought into addressing your concerns. I sought very specifically to not be argumentative, but provide legitimate, reasonable, and plausible answers to questions and concerns, while stating various scenarios that fit the general and the specific facts.

In the future, let someone know when you're just bickering with them rather than interested in legitimate discussion. It will save a great deal of frustration when they've become increasingly involved in what they considered a useful exercise.

Has anyone shown how making an already difficult river crossing more difficult would give the Koreans a significant advantage over the existing situation? I did ask for it several times, and the point was ignored, you know.

Yes. I know that I did, several times. I'm pretty certain others addressed this very question also.

I don't dispute that making a relatively easy river crossing difficult would benefit them substantialy. However, making an already difficult crossing more difficult (or even next to impossible) would be rather pointless, and I have explained why several times, I believe. If you can argue why this is not the case, I'm all ears (or eyes, since this is a forum).

Yes, I can see that you're just bickering now. Very unfortunate since I thought you were interested in legitimate discussion. We've already discussed, in some detail, why increasing the difficulty of the crossing would be advantageous, cause greater chaos, potential morale decrease and result in the rout of a superior force by an inferior one. This has been the main point of the entire discussion. I'm quite flabbergasted that you would make such accusations after so many people put such time and detail into their responses to your questions and concerns. That it would come down to saying no one has addressed these points, or that you can't see any strategic benefit, is rather disingenuous to say the least and smacks of a hidden agenda.

[McHrozni]

Why you feel you have to go out of your way to doubt these simple, obvious, and eminently plausible explanations is beyond me.

Try reading what you quoted again. You said exactly the same what I did. :)

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

I and others stated repeatedly that any river crossing was a great place for an ambush. Add a little extra water at an opportune point, and it only increased that difficulty. It's on the first page of the discussion.

Geez, not again. Try reading what the guy above you quoted.

Perhaps for you. This is highly unfortunate. I put a lot of time, research and thought into addressing your concerns. I sought very specifically to not be argumentative, but provide legitimate, reasonable, and plausible answers to questions and concerns, while stating various scenarios that fit the general and the specific facts.

I don't dispute that your input was very valuable, it's just that general that doesn't know about a bridge he could use that bothers me :)
That, and the difficult crossing being made somewhat more difficult. You haven't addressed all points there. But if the battle took place during the time when the river was low, this too is irrelevant.

McHrozni

[theprestige]

Try reading what you quoted again. You said exactly the same what I did. :)

McHrozni
If we're both saying the same thing, then I must assume you agree with me that the account of the battle that you presented in the OP is both physically plausible and tactically prudent. Is this the case?

[RobRoy]

Geez, not again. Try reading what the guy above you quoted.

I have no idea to what you're referencing from theprestige's post. You said you had missed where I and others had addressed an issue you've offered as being "ignored". I stated a summary of what has already been posted, and offered where it had been posted, i.e. the first page of the discussion. Given that your appearance has taken a deliberately argumentative or deliberately obtuse point of view, I feel no obligation to hunt down the specific posts for you.

I don't dispute that your input was very valuable, it's just that general that doesn't know about a bridge he could use that bothers me :)

Already addressed, and provided a parallel historical example which you seem to be ignoring in favor of your own predetermined point of view.

That, and the difficult crossing being made somewhat more difficult. You haven't addressed all points there. But if the battle took place during the time when the river was low, this too is irrelevant.

Yes, I did. Several times and in several different scenarios. Again, you seem to be ignoring a great deal of discussion in favor of your own predetermined point of view.

[theprestige]

Well, if we're going to get into who's ignoring who, what about McHrozni ignoring my point that a bridge might be a perfectly cromulent skeleton upon which to build a temporary dam, yet still be rejected by a general as inadequate to the task of fording a 300,000-man army?

[McHrozni]

If we're both saying the same thing, then I must assume you agree with me that the account of the battle that you presented in the OP is both physically plausible and tactically prudent. Is this the case?

With a few reservations or additional factors not mentioned there: low river initially, low quality Chinese troops, notably lower Chinese casualties during the battle itself (though it is noted that the list is for campaign) and that only relatively few casualties are caused by the river itself, then yes, I do consider it plausible and tactically prudent.
I'm sure you'll agree that none of the above reservations are unreasonable. :)

Unlike some people, I am capable of changing my views in light of new information :)

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

Well, if we're going to get into who's ignoring who, what about McHrozni ignoring my point that a bridge might be a perfectly cromulent skeleton upon which to build a temporary dam, yet still be rejected by a general as inadequate to the task of fording a 300,000-man army?

I didn't see that point when it was made.

Maybe if the bridge was used as a platform for construction, this scenario would be somewhat plausible. Resting the water against the pylons (through sluice gate, for example) would make it rather unlikely - the bridge would have to be both immensly strong and yet inadequate for the army to cross. In addition, fording just the cavalry across the bridge, or the supply train, would already offer substantial benefit and wouldn't require a large bridge.

I do consider this option quite plausible if the river was sufficiently easy to cross for the bridge to offer only a small benefit in the first place, however.

McHrozni

[McHrozni]

I have no idea to what you're referencing from theprestige's post.

He presented the scenario where the flood made an easy (or moderate) crossing difficult prior to the attack. I agree that this is a plausible scenario, and have said so in what he quoted - though I do see the sentence structure was probably confusing :)

Already addressed, and provided a parallel historical example which you seem to be ignoring in favor of your own predetermined point of view.

We'll have to "agree to disagree" on this one. Although I hate the term, I consider this a case where your scenario is highly unplausbile, whereas you consider it "possible". The two are not mutually exclusive. Since we don't know if there even were any bridges across the river at the time, I think that this part of the debate already recieved far more attention than it deserved :)

McHrozni

[fuelair]

With a few reservations or additional factors not mentioned there: low river initially, low quality Chinese troops, notably lower Chinese casualties during the battle itself (though it is noted that the list is for campaign) and that only relatively few casualties are caused by the river itself, then yes, I do consider it plausible and tactically prudent.
I'm sure you'll agree that none of the above reservations are unreasonable. :)

Unlike some people, I am capable of changing my views in light of new information :)

McHrozniUnfortunately, the liklihood of new information on this topic is vanishingly low. New guesses/theorizing near certain!!

[McHrozni]

Unfortunately, the liklihood of new information on this topic is vanishingly low. New guesses/theorizing near certain!!

I concur. I'll try not to open it again. :)

Even so, I am quite pleased with the explanations and information given. Granted, I'm not willing to accept everything some people have proposed, as a possibility but by and large, I got a scenario which explains historical record rather well.
Thanks again to all participating, even if we argued over some details in a less than cordial way :) I hope there will be no permanent bad blood :)

McHrozni

[RobRoy]

He presented the scenario where the flood made an easy (or moderate) crossing difficult prior to the attack. I agree that this is a plausible scenario, and have said so in what he quoted - though I do see the sentence structure was probably confusing :)

I still fail to see how this is meant in reference to the points which you were referring.

We'll have to "agree to disagree" on this one. Although I hate the term, I consider this a case where your scenario is highly unplausbile, whereas you consider it "possible". The two are not mutually exclusive. Since we don't know if there even were any bridges across the river at the time, I think that this part of the debate already recieved far more attention than it deserved :)

You do realize that the bridge scenario was only one of several which I provided. It is only tangentially linked to the issue which you are calling "highly implausible": good, competent leaders making poor decisions. History is rife with examples. Your concept that this is "highly implausible" is incorrect.

[McHrozni]

I still fail to see how this is meant in reference to the points which you were referring.

I stated, admittedly in somewhat confusing way, that I accept the scenarios with a relatively easy river crossing become much more difficult by the flood to be both plausible and tactically prudent.
With some paraphrasing, he then asked me why I can't accept a scenario where an easy river crossing became difficult by the flood as plausible or tactically prudent.
(some paraphrasing was done, to better point out what doesn't fit, the meaning is accurate)

My conclusion is that he misread my initial statement.

You do realize that the bridge scenario was only one of several which I provided.

Yes, and you do realize it is the only point I have a major issue with? I do believe the rest to be at least plausible.

McHrozni

[RobRoy]

Yes, and you do realize it is the only point I have a major issue with? I do believe the rest to be at least plausible.

Then I'm confused as to your issue regarding good leaders making poor decisions.

[McHrozni]

Then I'm confused as to your issue regarding good leaders making poor decisions.

The notion that I have an issue with is that there was a major bridge, that the Chinese didn't know about, or decided not to use for reasons unknown, even though it would be of much use to their crossing.

It may be somewhat sensible if the river was shallow enough to make a crossing easy and the bridge unnecessary, but not if the crossing was difficult. Even so, a bridge would be of much use in the crossing if they had wagons with them (which I do realize may not have been the case). I'm sorry, bad generalship and bad scouting only goes so far, they've spent something like a year in the area. This alone is reason enough to believe that if there was a bridge that would be of use in creating the flood, they decided not to use it, for whatever reason.

McHrozni

[RobRoy]

The notion that I have an issue with is that there was a major bridge, that the Chinese didn't know about, or decided not to use for reasons unknown, even though it would be of much use to their crossing.

[snip]

I'm sorry, bad generalship and bad scouting only goes so far, they've spent something like a year in the area. This alone is reason enough to believe that if there was a bridge that would be of use in creating the flood, they decided not to use it, for whatever reason.

Then I believe we're through here. You aren't reading what other people wrote, you aren't reviewing the historical facts provided, and you're only trying to make the events fit your personal view. Unfortunate.

[McHrozni]

Then I believe we're through here. You aren't reading what other people wrote, you aren't reviewing the historical facts provided, and you're only trying to make the events fit your personal view. Unfortunate.

I believe you're making too much from this one scenario. I'm trying to fit things into something that is plausible and believable. Not knowing about a bridge in this time, after such a long time in the area is not believable, and furthermore, it is not necessarily relevant.

Plus I am reading what you wrote, I just don't find it relevant to this case. I believe I said so before.

We better end debate before we get a major personal vendetta from, well, nothing :)

Your imput was very useful, so thanks again :)

McHrozni