Are FT proponents dishonest or merely uneducated? [Archive]

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 02:23 AM

I am getting really sick and tired of the fallacy that if a term is assigned a real value, then that term can necessarily assume all real values.

THIS IS NOT TRUE IN GENERAL

The fact that universal constants are assigned a real value does not imply that they could take on any other real value.

To think otherwise suggests a gross misunderstanding of mathematics. Mathematics is just a way to describe reality. And as with any other language, altering a statement about reality doesn't imply that reality must alter itself to match.

For example, let us describe -- or "model" -- the behavior of a toss of two six sided dice. Let X be the result of die 1, Y be the result of die 2, and Z be the sum of both dice. Then clearly, X + Y == Z.

Now, what happens when we set either X or Y to 7? Does the fact that we can set X or Y to 7 -- after all, the math police don't come and stop our pencil from writing it down, do they? -- imply anything at all about reality?

Well, it implies that if a d6 could land with a seventh side up, the total would indeed be Z. But it does not imply that a d6 actually can land with it's seventh side up -- namely because a d6 has no seventh side.

And if someone asked "but doesn't that beg the question of why a d6 doesn't have seven sides" the answer is no, it does not, because a d6 simply doesn't have seven sides. There isn't anything left to say -- it just doesn't.

Now I am not saying that actual physical relationships that the universal constants describe couldn't be anything besides what they are. I am not saying they are binary, like a coin toss, or can take on only six values, like a d6, or anything similar. What I am saying is that there is no evidence -- at all -- one way or the other.

Thus, any argument based on an assumption one way or the other is only based on an assumption one way or the other. It is simply not true that the likelihood of any unviversal constant being within the small range of values needed to support life as we know it is small at all. In fact, there is as much evidence that the likelihood is 1.0 as there is that it is infinitessimal -- because there is simply zero evidence both ways.

Yet I have never ever seen an FT proponent start out by saying "assume that the constants could take on any real values." I wonder why? Is it because they know that I would immediately stop them there and ask "why do you make that assumption?" or is it because they genuinely don't realize they are making an unfounded assumption?

Dancing David

6th September 2009, 05:58 AM

It is a philosophical argument and as such is follows the logic of philosphy.

bokonon

6th September 2009, 06:21 AM

Marduk

6th September 2009, 06:34 AM

tsig

6th September 2009, 06:56 AM

It is a philosophical argument and as such is follows the logic of philosphy.

You mean it's what's left of the hay when the bull's done with it.

Bikewer

6th September 2009, 08:21 AM

Seems to me that all the fine-tuning and Intelligent Design arguments fall into a cocked hat if there are, as more than a few cosmologists maintain, more than one universe.

If there are an infinity of universes (as in the "cosmic foam" idea), then any conceivable value for the constants would prevail somewhere.... Lucky for us they fell out right for the formation of complex elements here...

andyandy

6th September 2009, 08:39 AM

The fact that the list universe appears "Fine tuned" for life is a statement of fact based on our current knowledge of physics and the large number of constants which have to have precise values to create a universe in which life is possible. This is not really controversial and I would imagine that most cosmologists would accept it. Indeed the multi-verse theory is created out of the need to solve this conundrum without the need for any universal creator. So when you say "FT proponents" are you only talking about people making a religious argument for the existence of God? Because plenty of scientists would subscribe to the fact that based on what we know universal fine tuning needs to be explained, and they are neither "dishonest," or even "uneducated".

It is true that if a term is assigned a real value it can't necessarily have taken on any other value. But we have a situation in which based on everything we know there is no specific constraint giving rise to the values that exist. A better analogy would therefore be having 20 dice each with a thousand sides which upon inspection have all landed on the specific number required for a given result. Given such a situation it is contingent to look for an explanation.

1. Infinitesimal though the probability might be it is simply down to chance.

2. Our knowledge is insufficient, and constraints are acting on the potential outcomes that we are not aware.

3. The dice might have been rolled an incredibly large number of times, and because the "event" gives rise to us we would only be aware of the positive result.

4. The big old beard in the sky is up to his tricks.

Now you can take whichever explanation most appeals, but what you can't do is ignore the problem itself.

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 09:53 AM

The fact that the list universe appears "Fine tuned" for life is a statement of fact based on our current knowledge of physics and the large number of constants which have to have precise values to create a universe in which life is possible.

When you say " 'fine tuned' for life " you are using a preposition(for) that most often suggests a purpose or goal. Was the purpose or goal of these 'fine tuned' constants, life? Because that is exactly the impression that some people will extract from this kind of language.

<snip>...
Now you can take whichever explanation most appeals, but what you can't do is ignore the problem itself.

Why not? The conditional probability of us seeing constants which allow humans to exist is 1. There is no reason to wonder "why" the constants are what they are with respect to the existence of anything in our universe(this is actually an incredibly stupid question to ask).

That said, it is certainly worth exploring "how" they came about.

fuelair

6th September 2009, 09:57 AM

It is a philosophical argument and as such is follows the logic of philosphy.

Which is very different from the actuality of the real world.

PixyMisa

6th September 2009, 10:23 AM

Now you can take whichever explanation most appeals, but what you can't do is ignore the problem itself.
Sure we can.

By definition, we cannot know what process gave rise to the Universe.

We can come up with models, and if a simple model produces the appropriate conditions, we might accept that model. But so long as the model predicts that a Universe such as ours is possible, we cannot test it any further.

So not only can we ignore the problem, it is entirely appropriate to ignore the problem. The fine tuning argument is, and always will be, a non-sequitur. You can't get there from here.

Elizabeth I

6th September 2009, 10:27 AM

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 10:34 AM

But we have a situation in which based on everything we know there is no specific constraint giving rise to the values that exist.

Do you have any evidence to support that conclusion?

You say "everything we know" but as far as I am aware that is, in reality, limited to a lack of knowledge.

And forgive me for sticking the knife of logical reason into the side of your argument and murdering it, but "we know absolutely nothing" is not equivalent to "there is no specific constraint."

A better analogy would therefore be having 20 dice each with a thousand sides which upon inspection have all landed on the specific number required for a given result. Given such a situation it is contingent to look for an explanation.

Do you have any evidence to support that conclusion?

Why is that a better analogy? Why not dice with a million sides, or a billion, or 4?

You simply cannot make probabilistic arguments about events when you have no knowledge of their distribution besides the fact that it is nonzero.

bokonon

6th September 2009, 10:37 AM

Nope, I was just about to ask...
Whew.

There's a reason I don't participate in "fine tuning" threads, and RocketDodger comes close to expressing it in his OP here.

Show me a proton with a different mass, or an electron with a different charge, and we'll talk.

Until then, though I can't necessarily prove that such a thing is impossible, there is no more reason for me to assume that different values are possible than there is for me to assume there exists an element midway between hydrogen and helium.

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 10:57 AM

Whew.

There's a reason I don't participate in "fine tuning" threads, and RocketDodger comes close to expressing it in his OP here.

Show me a proton with a different mass, or an electron with a different charge, and we'll talk.

Until then, though I can't necessarily prove that such a thing is impossible, there is no more reason for me to assume that different values are possible than there is for me to assume there exists an element midway between hydrogen and helium.

Well... doesn't it frustrate you, then, when you see people using arguments that rely upon such a fallacy?

~enigma~

6th September 2009, 11:03 AM

Why must the universe be fine tuned for life instead of life being "tuned" to the universe and if the constants were other than they are there probably would be a different form of life asking the same idiotic question.

bokonon

6th September 2009, 11:07 AM

I don't really regard it as a fallacy. Such things may be possible, but I have no reason to assume they are.

It's similar to what I feel when I see statements from physicists that there's no reason time can't run backwards. I'll believe it when I see it, and until then there are other discussions on which I prefer to waste my time.

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 11:09 AM

Lensman

6th September 2009, 11:27 AM

It's entirely possible that a universe could form with slightly different physical properties & that life could evolve there to match those slightly different physical properties, does that mean that the life there was "fine tuned"?

The Earth could've formed slightly different to how it did form, in which case (if the difference wasn't so extreme as to rule out life forming there at all), then we Earthicans would evolve different to how we are now.

Even with the exact same starting point for the formation of the Earth, if you run the permutations again, we could still have evolved differently to what we are now.

John Jones

6th September 2009, 11:38 AM

I was thinking it was about Fourier transforms

andyandy

6th September 2009, 11:53 AM

Do you have any evidence to support that conclusion?

You say "everything we know" but as far as I am aware that is, in reality, limited to a lack of knowledge.

Evidence? Only the scientific literature. Greene, Kaku, Tegamark amongst others are well worth reading.

And forgive me for sticking the knife of logical reason into the side of your argument and murdering it, but "we know absolutely nothing" is not equivalent to "there is no specific constraint."

Our understanding is based on everything we know. Everything we know from physics. We use everything we know to make predictions about the nature of reality. That is what physics is. If you want to ignore everything that we do know and pretend that actually we "we know absolutely nothing" about any physics, then that is your prerogative. But that is not scientific, but simply an argument for ignorance.

Do you have any evidence to support that conclusion?

Why is that a better analogy? Why not dice with a million sides, or a billion, or 4?

You simply cannot make probabilistic arguments about events when you have no knowledge of their distribution besides the fact that it is nonzero.

it is a better analogy because you make an argument for complete ignorance of all physics as we currently understand it. The analogy works just as well with the dice with any number of very large possible outcomes.

The Universe as a fluke and multiverse theories are necessary options to explain universal fine tuning - the standard model of particle physics has 28 free parameters, cosmology may be said to introduce more, string theory the grand unifier introduces even greater constraints. If the proton to electron ratio were much smaller there would be no stars, if it were much larger, there would be no ordered structures like crystals or DNA, if protons were 0.2% heavier they would decay into neutrons and thus there would be no stable atoms, the list goes on. We can pretend that actually this isn't so, but it is. One can dismiss the conclusions by deciding that actually these parameters can be simplified - but this is not based on current scientific knowledge or reasoning but instead is just post hoc justification of an already held belief.

Based on everything we know the proton to electron ratio (for example) is not subject to any specific constraints which limit it to the precise range in which it falls. Therefore it is perfectly scientifically valid to look at the vast possibilities which that ratio could exist in, and conclude that the precise value range that it does exist in is only one of a vast probability outcome. We don't need to assign exact probabilistic models nor simply retreat to throwing our hands up and pleading for complete ignorance about anything to do with the universe. Your argument as it currently exists goes against the mainstream cosmological understanding. I would suggest that you read a couple of books on the subject. (But, are you actually interested in the science, or are you just looking for a stick to beat the religious regardless of your own ignorance?)

Possibly it is just the latter

.I think I've just remembered what I normally avoid this part of the forum. ;)

~enigma~

6th September 2009, 12:00 PM

simply an argument for ignorance.Is that an argument that we remain ignorant?
The Universe as a fluke and multiverse theories are necessary options to explain universal fine tuning
You do realize that you are using fine tuning as an "explanation" of what you see and are committing the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.

andyandy

6th September 2009, 12:13 PM

Is that an argument that we remain ignorant?
You do realize that you are using fine tuning as an "explanation" of what you see and are committing the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.

Seeking to explain why so many apparently free parameters lie within an incredibly narrow range, given that any deviation from that range would result in a universe without stars or without atomic bonding etc etc. is not a fallacy. As I've said already it requires an explanation (which I've laid out above). There is already a brick wall in terms of this discussion. Unless the people arguing against fine tuning have actually read any of the scientific literature on the subject then the level of the debate is going to struggle to rise above misunderstanding and misapplication. Just because it is the religion section doesn't mean that we should ignore current scientific understanding. I'm sure that there should be a fallacy name for that too. ;)

~enigma~

6th September 2009, 12:25 PM

Seeking to explain why so many apparently free parameters lie within an incredibly narrow range, given that any deviation from that range would result in a universe without stars or without atomic bonding etc etc. is not a fallacy. No but shooting an arrow and drawing a bullseye around it is and that is exactly what the fine tuning argument is.As I've said already it requires an explanation (which I've laid out above). May be true but only to those that commit the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.Unless the people arguing against fine tuning have actually read any of the scientific literature on the subjectThere isn't nor will there ever be any scientific literature that is "pro" fine tuning (aka Texas sharpshooter fallacy).Just because it is the religion section doesn't mean that we should ignore current scientific understanding.Provide it or you just branded yourself a liar.

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 12:27 PM

Seeking to explain why so many apparently free parameters lie within an incredibly narrow range, given that any deviation from that range would result in a universe without stars or without atomic bonding etc etc. is not a fallacy. As I've said already it requires an explanation (which I've laid out above). There is already a brick wall in terms of this discussion. Unless the people arguing against fine tuning have actually read any of the scientific literature on the subject then the level of the debate is going to struggle to rise above misunderstanding and misapplication. Just because it is the religion section doesn't mean that we should ignore current scientific understanding. I'm sure that there should be a fallacy name for that too. ;)

I have read tons of literature on this very subject, and written many essays on the topic, but that is completely irrelevant to the points which I made above.

When you say that the universe is fine-tuned "for" X(x being anything which exists within the universe being observed), you are committing a fallacy. This is non-sequitur reasoning, and frankly, it is putting the cart before the horse. The probability of a universe having constants which allow an object within that universe to exist, that DOES EXIST in that universe, is 1.

Edit: Yes, you are right ~enigma~ it is the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. Good call.

One.

Again:

It is perfectly fine to wonder "how" these constants formed, but wondering "why" with respect to some object existing within the universe, is incredibly stupid.

And before you say it, yes, sometimes scientists can be *incredibly stupid*.

Dancing David

6th September 2009, 12:27 PM

~enigma~

6th September 2009, 12:33 PM

Edit: Yes, you are right ~enigma~ it is the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. Good call.

Thank you. I only wish FT proponents understood the fallacy they are making.

Dancing David

6th September 2009, 12:33 PM

Seeking to explain why so many apparently free parameters lie within an incredibly narrow range,

Numbers, data, citations, evidence. Please read Stengers.

given that any deviation from that range would result in a universe without stars or without atomic bonding etc etc. is not a fallacy. As I've said already it requires an explanation (which I've laid out above). There is already a brick wall in terms of this discussion. Unless the people arguing against fine tuning have actually read any of the scientific literature on the subject then the level of the debate is going to struggle to rise above misunderstanding and misapplication.

Cite some for us to discuss.

Just because it is the religion section doesn't mean that we should ignore current scientific understanding. I'm sure that there should be a fallacy name for that too. ;)

yeah the one where you just assert and don't cite your sources.

Malerin

6th September 2009, 12:50 PM

Evidence? Only the scientific literature. Greene, Kaku, Tegamark amongst others are well worth reading.

I hadn't heard of Tegmark. He has an interesting website. Here's an image of a "fun" article in New Scientist he has a link to that talks about the values of the constants. http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/multiverse.html
(page 28)

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924aa4045e7b8c7.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17494)

edit: Tegmark's solution to the FT dilemma is a vast collection of universes (multiverse).

PixyMisa

6th September 2009, 12:59 PM

Evidence? Only the scientific literature. Greene, Kaku, Tegamark amongst others are well worth reading.
Greene, Kaku and Tegmark are definitely worth reading.

But what is it they actually say which supports the fine tuning argument?

Penrose, for example, made specific calculations which suggested that our Universe was immensely improbable. But he based his calculations on models that we now know are almost certainly false.

tsig

6th September 2009, 01:18 PM

snip

If the proton to electron ratio were much smaller there would be no stars, if it were much larger, there would be no ordered structures like crystals or DNA, if protons were 0.2% heavier they would decay into neutrons and thus there would be no stable atoms, the list goes on.
snip;)

There's the problem with your whole argument right there. "if"

If frogs had wings they wouldn't bump their butt.

Malerin

6th September 2009, 01:21 PM

There isn't nor will there ever be any scientific literature that is "pro" fine tuning (aka Texas sharpshooter fallacy).Provide it or you just branded yourself a liar.

What do you mean "pro" fine-tuning? That the constants are apparently fine-tuned to support life, or that there exists an actual fine-tuner? There are plenty of books and articles written about the former. I posted a screenshot of one already. Paul Davies also comes to mind:
http://www.amazon.com/Cosmic-Jackpot-Universe-Just-Right/dp/0618592261

I wouldn't expect the latter to appear in any scientific journal as it is a philosophical/religious conclusion based on the former. There are certainly theistic physicists and astronomers who believe fine-tuning is evidence for God.

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 01:40 PM

That the constants are apparently fine-tuned to support life

Apparent to those who lack a basic understanding of informal logic and critical thinking. It has been explained by myself and others many times in this very thread precisely why this is a simple non-sequitur.

Appeals to the authority of scientists or authors who subscribe to such fallacious methods of reasoning will not repair the broken logic required to draw conclusions from premises that do not warrant or support them.

Merko

6th September 2009, 01:52 PM

At some point, a long time ago, somebody might have observed how the Earth rushed through space at a great and apparently constant speed. The same person might have observed that Earth curiously turned towards the Sun during its flight, at an apparently constant angle of deflection. This person might then have been amazed that these two 'constants' just happened to perfectly match each other so that Earth did not move away from the life-giving Sun.

Yet, we know that if this person concluded that these parameters were fine-tuned, or that their beneficial relation was extremely unlikely, the person would have been wrong.

So I think people speculating about FT should definitely at least acknowledge the possibility that they may be wrong in exactly this same way.

Malerin

6th September 2009, 02:06 PM

Apparent to those who lack a basic understanding of informal logic and critical thinking.

People like Davies, Hawking, Tegmark, Linde, Hoyle, Carter, Penrose, Kaku, Dyson, Rees, etc? Seriously? They all "lack a basic understanding of informal logic and critical thinking"?

Read this, by Michio Kaku:

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_268924aa415c810e99.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17496)

At what point do you begin to consider that you may be wrong?

tsig

6th September 2009, 02:08 PM

Seeking to explain why so many apparently free parameters lie within an incredibly narrow range, given that any deviation from that range would result in a universe without stars or without atomic bonding etc etc. is not a fallacy. snip

If you want the explanation then start with a four year degree in physics then a masters then graduate studies in your range of interest.

Dancing David

6th September 2009, 02:11 PM

I notice a lot of assertion but no numbers, how much variation in the increase in the nuclear force?

How many numbers fit between the current value and the value at which stars burn too fast? (Infinite)

Between the value of the nuclear force, weak and it's value at 1% higher, there are an infinite number of states.

Malerin

6th September 2009, 02:20 PM

Regarding the OP title, it find it interesting how opponents of even apparent fine-tuning post opinions, while proponents post names of experts, quotes, and links.

Remind me, who's more uneducated?

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 02:26 PM

Evidence? Only the scientific literature. Greene, Kaku, Tegamark amongst others are well worth reading.

Uhh.... Andy, you are simply wrong.

There is no scientific evidence that the constants can actually assume values other than what they are. If you think there is, you are welcome to provide a link. I have heard about studies that suggest constants might have slightly different values in different locations throughout the universe, but even with that data there is no mathematically valid way to generate probability distributions for the constants in general.

Being able to plug a different value into an equation doesn't imply anything about reality. Didn't you read the OP?

Our understanding is based on everything we know. Everything we know from physics. We use everything we know to make predictions about the nature of reality. That is what physics is. If you want to ignore everything that we do know and pretend that actually we "we know absolutely nothing" about any physics, then that is your prerogative. But that is not scientific, but simply an argument for ignorance.

You seem to be unfamiliar with the way science works. Let me explain it as simply as possible:

1) something happens in reality that a person observes
2) we try to describe what we think happens
3) we see if our description fits reality after further testing and observation

Now in the case of physics, we have come up with descriptions in the form of equations. Certain terms in those equations are constants. In order for the equations to describe reality as we know it, the constants must assume a particular value.

And these constant values are constant. To the extent that they change, it is due to our measurements and equations changing, not a fundamental property of the universe changing.

So what happens when you take a constant with a value that reflects known reality and change the value to something that has not yet been observed, while holding everything else in the equation the same? Can you guess?

Based on everything we know the proton to electron ratio (for example) is not subject to any specific constraints which limit it to the precise range in which it falls.

ORLY?

So I could, for example, use a value of 0.0 for that ratio, and still have a valid model? Or what about a value with a sign opposite of what it has in our universe? Would that model still be valid?

Already, you see, there are constraints on the possible values because some just don't make any sense given what we currently know.

Yet, if you just wrote down the equation in front of someone without telling them this, there would be nothing to stop them from using such nonsensical values in a model.

So my question to you is this: What makes you think that our current state of knowledge is any better in this regard? What evidence do you have that there are not constraints on these values that we simply don't know about yet?

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 02:42 PM

Regarding the OP title, it find it interesting how opponents of even apparent fine-tuning post opinions, while proponents post names of experts, quotes, and links.

Remind me, who's more uneducated?

Given that not a single such expert, quote, or link support anything remotely close to refutation of what I stated in the OP, it is pretty clear.

Let me spell this out for you:

1) You can play with the values of terms in a mathematical model.
2) The new values may or may not have any correlate in the real world system the mathematical model seeks to describe.

I already gave you an example in the OP. Here is another one -- the ratio of two masses can't be a negative value. If you have a model of a system and one term represents such a ratio, plugging in negative values might give you interesting results but it doesn't imply that you can actually have an object of negative mass.

I am aware of a ton of research that deals with 1). You yourself have provided many links and sources, thank you for your diligence.

But I am not aware of any research that deals with 2). Look at Tegamark, for example. I read on his site that some of his research results can be interpreted as evidence in support of a multiple universe model. But does he say anything with regard to experimental evidence of the values of the constants in other possible universes? I can't find anything along those lines.

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 03:22 PM

People like Davies, Hawking, Tegmark, Linde, Hoyle, Carter, Penrose, Kaku, Dyson, Rees, etc? Seriously? They all "lack a basic understanding of informal logic and critical thinking"?

At what point do you begin to consider that you may be wrong?

Not only are you appealing to authority instead of addressing my argument, you are, for the most part, misrepresenting the views of these scientists.

They do not think that the universe was "fine tuned" for life. It is quite funny that you cite Carter as one of the scientists that are "pro fine-tuning". Just because a scientist says the words "fine-tuning" does not mean that he is using them in the same context that navel-gazing philosophers do. Most of the scientists that you reference are not putting the cart before the horse.

Malerin

6th September 2009, 03:44 PM

Not only are you appealing to authority instead of addressing my argument, you are, for the most part, misrepresenting the views of these scientists.

Of course I'm appealing to authority! It's a complex cosmological issue and I doubt many people here have PhD's in physics or astronomy. I can't help it if the people I'm quoting all disagree with you.

This is a direct quote from Kaku:

"When analyzing the constants of nature, we find that they are "tuned" very precisely to allow for life."

How, exactly, do you think am I misrepresenting Kaku's words? Is the word "apparent" tripping you up? Nobody's claiming that scientists like Kaku believe God created the universe (those some do). Only that the constants appear, prima facie, to be fine-tuned for life to exist. Perhaps you can find some expert who argues there's not even a prima facie case for fine-tuning? There's two or three I can think of...

westprog

6th September 2009, 03:47 PM

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 03:57 PM

This is a direct quote from Kaku:

"When analyzing the constants of nature, we find that they are "tuned" very precisely to allow for life."

My bold.

Actually, in this case, you may very well not be misrepresenting his words. What he is suggesting, that the constants are tuned to allow for life, is exactly the non-sequitur logic that I have been talking about from my first post in this thread. Kaku is committing a fallacy.

The proper way to word that sentence would be: "When analyzing the constants of nature, we find that they are very precise values which also happened to allow life."

Now you are stuck with RD's objection however, which is really even stronger and far more technical than my own.

fls

6th September 2009, 04:15 PM

Thus, any argument based on an assumption one way or the other is only based on an assumption one way or the other. It is simply not true that the likelihood of any unviversal constant being within the small range of values needed to support life as we know it is small at all. In fact, there is as much evidence that the likelihood is 1.0 as there is that it is infinitessimal -- because there is simply zero evidence both ways.

Yet I have never ever seen an FT proponent start out by saying "assume that the constants could take on any real values." I wonder why? Is it because they know that I would immediately stop them there and ask "why do you make that assumption?" or is it because they genuinely don't realize they are making an unfounded assumption?

I don't really understand why this represents ignorance. It seems to reflect a common path of scientific exploration - wondering why things are the way they are when there doesn't seem to be anything that prevents it from being different. And it leads to interesting discoveries. Why is there only a little bit of anti-matter? Why aren't there equal amounts or why isn't it the other way around? Oh, CP violation explains the amount of anti-matter. Cool.

That's the point of looking for a theory of everything. It isn't that everything is consistent with the theory, it's that the theory constrains things to be the way they are and no other way.

It's interesting and useful to wonder why things are the way they are and not some other way. Of course, it has absolutely no bearing on whether or not there is a god. But there's no point in denying legitimate questions just because fine-tuners interpret those questions in a manner that is fallacious.

Linda

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 04:25 PM

I don't really understand why this represents ignorance. It seems to reflect a common path of scientific exploration - wondering why things are the way they are when there doesn't seem to be anything that prevents it from being different. And it leads to interesting discoveries. Why is there only a little bit of anti-matter? Why aren't there equal amounts or why isn't it the other way around? Oh, CP violation explains the amount of anti-matter. Cool.

That's the point of looking for a theory of everything. It isn't that everything is consistent with the theory, it's that the theory constrains things to be the way they are and no other way.

It's interesting and useful to wonder why things are the way they are and not some other way. Of course, it has absolutely no bearing on whether or not there is a god. But there's no point in denying legitimate questions just because fine-tuners interpret those questions in a manner that is fallacious.

Linda

Asking "Why are these constants these specific values?" is a legit question.

Asking "Why are these constants these specific values which happened to allowed life to exist!?" is even a legitimate question.

Asking "Why were these constants set to specific values to allow life???" is putting the cart before the horse, and leads to all sorts of fallacious conclusions.

fls

6th September 2009, 05:02 PM

Asking "Why are these constants these specific values?" is a legit question.

Asking "Why are these constants these specific values which happened to allowed life to exist!?" is even a legitimate question.

Asking "Why were these constants set to specific values to allow life???" is putting the cart before the horse, and leads to all sorts of fallacious conclusions.

I agree.

And suggesting that it was done by a Cart Put Before the Horserer is even worse.

Linda

Malerin

6th September 2009, 05:32 PM

My bold.

Actually, in this case, you may very well not be misrepresenting his words. What he is suggesting, that the constants are tuned to allow for life, is exactly the non-sequitur logic that I have been talking about from my first post in this thread. Kaku is committing a fallacy.

The proper way to word that sentence would be: "When analyzing the constants of nature, we find that they are very precise values which also happened to allow life."

Now you are stuck with RD's objection however, which is really even stronger and far more technical than my own.

Ah, I see. First I was misrepresenting people. Now that it turns out I'm not, we're simply all a bunch of idiots. Well, at least I'm in good company. Have you, perchance, found any physicists/cosmologists/astronomers who agree with you that there's not even a prima facie case for apparent fine-tuning? Or are you like Diogenes, looking for that one honest cosmologist :)

Dancing David

6th September 2009, 05:53 PM

And again in the case of Kaku we have an assertion without numbers or ranges, we have statement of opinion. Not a formal theory or postulate.

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 06:00 PM

I agree.

And suggesting that it was done by a Cart Put Before the Horserer is even worse.

Linda

Am I using the idiom wrong?

I just thought it meant doing things backwards, which is what I would consider questioning why the universe is tailored to us, instead of why we are tailored to the universe.

Gate2501

6th September 2009, 06:07 PM

Malerin

6th September 2009, 06:50 PM

Anyway, as regards the OP title, uneducated, can any fine-tuning opponents actually do anything besides bloviate? It seems the proponents are doing all the educational heavy lifting here.

HansMustermann

6th September 2009, 07:06 PM

Ah, I see. First I was misrepresenting people. Now that it turns out I'm not, we're simply all a bunch of idiots. Well, at least I'm in good company. Have you, perchance, found any physicists/cosmologists/astronomers who agree with you that there's not even a prima facie case for apparent fine-tuning? Or are you like Diogenes, looking for that one honest cosmologist :)

Actually, can you find a real scientist that does take it as more than an interesting hypothesis? Because postulating things which can't possibly be measured or falsified, is pretty much by definition what the scientific method is _not_ about.

The whole proposition fails Occam's Razor alone on so many levels, it's not even funny. As long as there is nothing observable which needs other universes to explain, which can be compared to a predicted value, and which can falsify that hypothesis... that's the end of the line for that idea right there. You can do navel gazing about it in your spare time, but you can't actually make a scientific theory out of it.

Ditto for "fine tuning." Is there anything measurable that would even distinguish between a universe that has been fine-tuned and one that just happened to be this way? Is there any prediction that can be made there? Is there a way to falsify that hypothesis? No? Well, then there is _no_ scientific case to be made for it.

_Can_ those parameters have other values? Well, ditto. As long as there is nothing measurable that needs that or can falsify that, there is no way it'll progress past "interesting hypothesis." Because that's how science works.

Plus, who's tuned to what? IMHO Douglas Adams nailed it marvelously in this quote: "Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in, an interesting hole I find myself in, fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!' This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it's still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything's going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise. I think this may be something we need to be on the watch out for."

For all we know, we're the puddle thinking that the pothole has been designed for exactly its current shape.

HansMustermann

6th September 2009, 07:10 PM

Anyway, as regards the OP title, uneducated, can any fine-tuning opponents actually do anything besides bloviate? It seems the proponents are doing all the educational heavy lifting here.

You mean _pretending_ to educate? Well, ok, a couple of posts are a fine illustration of the Dunning-Kruger effect, so I guess it's kinda educational ;)

Linky: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning-Kruger

Jonnyclueless

6th September 2009, 07:16 PM

Luckily no one needs PhD in asto-physics to understand the fallacy of the FT argument.

rocketdodger

6th September 2009, 08:12 PM

I don't really understand why this represents ignorance. It seems to reflect a common path of scientific exploration - wondering why things are the way they are when there doesn't seem to be anything that prevents it from being different. And it leads to interesting discoveries. Why is there only a little bit of anti-matter? Why aren't there equal amounts or why isn't it the other way around? Oh, CP violation explains the amount of anti-matter. Cool.

That's the point of looking for a theory of everything. It isn't that everything is consistent with the theory, it's that the theory constrains things to be the way they are and no other way.

It's interesting and useful to wonder why things are the way they are and not some other way. Of course, it has absolutely no bearing on whether or not there is a god. But there's no point in denying legitimate questions just because fine-tuners interpret those questions in a manner that is fallacious.

Linda

I use the word ignorance because it has clearly not occured to many FT proponents -- or opponents, for that matter -- that there is simply no evidence to support this huge assumption.

In other words, they are ignorant of it.

And anyway, you don't seem to understand where my beef is. I don't have a problem with looking for answers, I have a problem with using faulty logic and mathematics to construct arguments.

fls

7th September 2009, 06:22 AM

Am I using the idiom wrong?

No, I just thought I'd use your idiom to show just how silly it is to think that "Fine-Tuner" explains anything. Noticing a particular pattern (Putting The Cart Before The Horse) and then simply postulating an entity who Puts The Cart Before The Horse is a pretty meaningless activity. I'm agreeing with you, not disagreeing with you in some sort of back-handed manner. :)

Linda

fls

7th September 2009, 07:04 AM

I use the word ignorance because it has clearly not occured to many FT proponents -- or opponents, for that matter -- that there is simply no evidence to support this huge assumption.

In other words, they are ignorant of it.

But there doesn't have to be evidence for it in order for it to be a valid issue, because the whole problem is that there isn't evidence against it. There isn't an obvious way to exclude other values for those parameters. And I don't know why you'd think that Design* proponents are ignorant of this issue, because it seems to me that all the material they've been referencing explicitly discusses the degree to which other values can be excluded.

And anyway, you don't seem to understand where my beef is. I don't have a problem with looking for answers, I have a problem with using faulty logic and mathematics to construct arguments.

It's quite likely I don't understand or I wouldn't feel the need to ask for clarification. :)

I don't understand why it is faulty logic or mathematics to look at the extent to which various processes depend upon specific values, and to look for ways to exclude specific values from consideration, even though we don't have a priori evidence that these parameters could have different values.

Linda

*I'm thinking that it may be better to call them Design Proponents rather than Fine-tuning Proponents simply to differentiate between the presence or not of fine-tuning (a seemingly valid exercise) and postulating that fine-tuning indicates design (a meaningless exercise).

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 07:23 AM

the whole problem is that there isn't evidence against it.
C'mon Linda. That is like saying I am guilty of assassinating someone because there is no evidence against it. I know you know better.

Dancing David

7th September 2009, 07:34 AM

Anyway, as regards the OP title, uneducated, can any fine-tuning opponents actually do anything besides bloviate? It seems the proponents are doing all the educational heavy lifting here.

Hi Malerin, I disagree with RD's characterization, level of education and understanding has nothing to do with the discussion. That said what Kaku said is not given in any context in your quote, it is a rather braod assertion and not really sciencem, it is more of an opinion.

No appeal to authority is justified because here the argument is meant to stand on it's own basis.

The problem with Kaku's statement is that it is an opinion without the basis , data, theory or explanation of that opinion.

fls

7th September 2009, 07:42 AM

C'mon Linda. That is like saying I am guilty of assassinating someone because there is no evidence against it. I know you know better.

No it's not. And that you would suggest that it is shows that you have failed to grasp what it is that Design proponents are claiming. Why should Design proponents be persuaded that their argument is not legitimate when it is clear to them that at least some of the criticisms are merely strawmen?

Linda

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 07:50 AM

No it's not. And that you would suggest that it is shows that you have failed to grasp what it is that Design proponents are claiming. Why should Design proponents be persuaded that their argument is not legitimate when it is clear to them that at least some of the criticisms are merely strawmen?

Linda
I am not addressing anything but your statement that I quoted. If some arguments against FT are strawmen so what? Your statement saying it is a legitimate line of inquiry because there is no evidence against it is senseless.

ETA - If committing the Texas sharpshooter fallacy by FT proponents is a legitimate line of inquiry, someone needs lessons in logic.

westprog

7th September 2009, 09:10 AM

Ditto for "fine tuning." Is there anything measurable that would even distinguish between a universe that has been fine-tuned and one that just happened to be this way? Is there any prediction that can be made there? Is there a way to falsify that hypothesis?

Certainly it's possible to make predictions. If the FT supposition is correct, future investigation will continue to find that the fundamental constants of the universe need to be within a small range for the universe to have an "interesting" structure - that the "alternative" universes would not all be equally distinctive - that no underlying theory will explain the values that the constants have - and so on. Obviously the predictions made by any given theories will be different. There's no one FT theory at present. A lot of people have simply noted the phenomenon - presumably they are dishonest and uneducated, but not quite so much as the people who put forward possible explanations.

Malerin

7th September 2009, 09:37 AM

*I'm thinking that it may be better to call them Design Proponents rather than Fine-tuning Proponents simply to differentiate between the presence or not of fine-tuning (a seemingly valid exercise) and postulating that fine-tuning indicates design (a meaningless exercise).

This is good, and it's a distinction I tried to make earlier. The FT argument has essentially two parts:

1. There is apparent (prima facie) fine-tuning. This what I've tried to show with quotes by Davies, Kaku, Stanford's philosophy page, an article from New Scientist on Tegmark's webpage, etc. Very non-controversial. There is some work going on to show the physical constants can have a much larger "range" and still produce a life-perimitting universe (Stenger, Adams), but the overwhelming opinion is for apparent fine-tuning.

2. Apparent fine-tuning is better explained by God than by chance alone. This is the philosophical part.

People are conflating 1 and 2. Volumnious amounts of research, articles and books have been written about (1). It is a view held by many of the world's top physicists and astronomers (Max Tegmark, Stephen Hawking, Michio Kaku, Martin Rees, etc.). Any study of fine-tuning will reveal that (1) is broadly accepted.

I find it very strange for a group of scientifically minded people (the vast majority of people posting here), to go completely against numerous scientific experts and accuse them of committing some of the most basic fallacies in logic and statistics. They are not saying the universe is fine-tuned or was created by God. They are simply saying it looks very implausible and science tends to investigate implausible-seeming phenomena. The rejection of even the prima-facia aspect of fine-tuning is very strange, like arguing with 9/11 "truthers".

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 09:49 AM

They are simply saying it looks very implausible and science tends to investigate implausible-seeming phenomena. The rejection of even the prima-facia aspect of fine-tuning is very strange, like arguing with 9/11 "truthers".
Nobody is claiming the universe does not appear fine-tuned. They are claiming that the appearance of fine-tuning is perfectly natural and there is no reason whatsoever for the thought that god did it. The claim that the universe was fine-tuned for life is a fallacy. The claim that life itself is tuned to fit the universe is more apt but that type of tuning is explained by abiogenesis and evolution.

rocketdodger

7th September 2009, 10:05 AM

But there doesn't have to be evidence for it in order for it to be a valid issue, because the whole problem is that there isn't evidence against it. There isn't an obvious way to exclude other values for those parameters.

Normally, I would agree with you.

But in this case, it isn't a variable that is being changed, or a constant in a model of a man made system, or even a constant in a subsystem of reality. It is the very constants that fundamentally define reality.

As of now (since we don't have access to observe other universes yet) they represent the limit of what we can know -- period. When we are smarter, and have figured out how universes arise, there will be another still lower set of knowledge that represents that limit and the universal constants will be like any other constant in any other model of any other natural process.

But for now, the real value we give to the universal constants is just a measured value that we shoehorn in to make all our equations work nicely. The "thing" that such a value represents is beyond the usual mathematical treatment -- we can't approach it from the bottom up like we can everything else.

And I don't know why you'd think that Design* proponents are ignorant of this issue, because it seems to me that all the material they've been referencing explicitly discusses the degree to which other values can be excluded.

Could you show me in an article, perhaps, if you have time? Because all I can find is material that discusses the changes themselves.

As I said before I have heard of some research on the possibility that certain constants have slightly different values at different locations in the universe but other than that I haven't seen anything that addresses what I mention in the OP.

Gate2501

7th September 2009, 10:15 AM

Please stop appealing to authority. We certainly aren't going to get anywhere if you cannot provide your own counter argument.

This is good, and it's a distinction I tried to make earlier. The FT argument has essentially two parts:

1. There is apparent (prima facie) fine-tuning. This what I've tried to show with quotes by Davies, Kaku, Stanford's philosophy page, an article from New Scientist on Tegmark's webpage, etc. Very non-controversial. There is some work going on to show the physical constants can have a much larger "range" and still produce a life-perimitting universe (Stenger, Adams), but the overwhelming opinion is for apparent fine-tuning.

2. Apparent fine-tuning is better explained by God than by chance alone. This is the philosophical part.

People are conflating 1 and 2. Volumnious amounts of research, articles and books have been written about (1). It is a view held by many of the world's top physicists and astronomers (Max Tegmark, Stephen Hawking, Michio Kaku, Martin Rees, etc.). Any study of fine-tuning will reveal that (1) is broadly accepted.

I find it very strange for a group of scientifically minded people (the vast majority of people posting here), to go completely against numerous scientific experts and accuse them of committing some of the most basic fallacies in logic and statistics. They are not saying the universe is fine-tuned or was created by God. They are simply saying it looks very implausible and science tends to investigate implausible-seeming phenomena. The rejection of even the prima-facia aspect of fine-tuning is very strange, like arguing with 9/11 "truthers".

:rolleyes:

fls

7th September 2009, 10:19 AM

I am not addressing anything but your statement that I quoted. Your statement saying it is a legitimate line of inquiry because there is no evidence against it is senseless.

You are mistaken. Pursuing a line of inquiry because there was no evidence against it has given us CP violation, it has given us epigenetics, it has given us Relativity...

Any time you ask "why is it this way and not that?" you are pursuing a line of inquiry because there is no evidence against it.

ETA - If committing the Texas sharpshooter fallacy by FT proponents is a legitimate line of inquiry, someone needs lessons in logic.

This has nothing to do with what I said. I'm not sure why you put it there.

Linda

HansMustermann

7th September 2009, 10:24 AM

Certainly it's possible to make predictions. If the FT supposition is correct, future investigation will continue to find that the fundamental constants of the universe need to be within a small range for the universe to have an "interesting" structure - that the "alternative" universes would not all be equally distinctive - that no underlying theory will explain the values that the constants have - and so on. Obviously the predictions made by any given theories will be different. There's no one FT theory at present. A lot of people have simply noted the phenomenon - presumably they are dishonest and uneducated, but not quite so much as the people who put forward possible explanations.

Actually, between what you say there and what the "fine-tuner" creationism proposes, is only linked by an equivocation fallacy. It's only linked by two meanings of "tuned."

A. The meaning of "tuned" that's supported by those values, and what scientists use, means pretty much "just fit together." It could be a big coincidence, it could be just one of many universes that actually are good for life, or it could be that we'll discover later that there are no other possible values. But anyway, it's "fine tuned" only in that the values fit well together. That's it.

B. The meaning that, from what I can tell, triggered this thread, takes "fine tuned" to mean, in a nutshell, "somebody (must have) tuned it for a specific purpose." It adds an extra entity and an _intent_, which aren't present in version A.

And the two aren't linked by more than that equivocation fallacy, when people come with claims like "but Hawking too said the universe seemed fine-tuned!" Well, yes, but he wasn't using the same meaning of the word. Hawking never even implied the intent or that some super-natural entity actually came and tuned a universe.

Basically it's the same kind of fallacy like when they come with silliness like "but the theory of evolution is only a theory!" Yes, but the meaning of "theory" in science is different. No matter how many scientists they may find who also called it a theory, nevertheless what they do there is an equivocation fallacy.

fls

7th September 2009, 10:26 AM

Normally, I would agree with you.

But in this case, it isn't a variable that is being changed, or a constant in a model of a man made system, or even a constant in a subsystem of reality. It is the very constants that fundamentally define reality.

As of now (since we don't have access to observe other universes yet) they represent the limit of what we can know -- period. When we are smarter, and have figured out how universes arise, there will be another still lower set of knowledge that represents that limit and the universal constants will be like any other constant in any other model of any other natural process.

But for now, the real value we give to the universal constants is just a measured value that we shoehorn in to make all our equations work nicely. The "thing" that such a value represents is beyond the usual mathematical treatment -- we can't approach it from the bottom up like we can everything else.

That's the part I'm getting at - making the attempt to approach it from the bottom up. Since we discovered the usefulness of symmetry about a hundred years ago, there may be a way to get at this. I think that it's legitimate to make the attempt, even if all we discover is that we will necessarily fail. But it seems to me that this is some of the information that physicists try to get at with TOE's and String Theory. It also parallels the development of quantum field theories whereby a way had to be found to cancel out the infinities.

Linda

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 10:27 AM

You are mistaken. Pursuing a line of inquiry because there was no evidence against it has given us CP violation, it has given us epigenetics, it has given us Relativity...Then why is it wrong for me to ask you to pursue a line of inquiry into my "assasination" of Olof Palme which there is no evidence against?
Any time you ask "why is it this way and not that?" you are pursuing a line of inquiry because there is no evidence against it. Once again you are looking at things backwards.

Gate2501

7th September 2009, 10:31 AM

Nobody is claiming the universe does not appear fine-tuned. They are claiming that the appearance of fine-tuning is perfectly natural and there is no reason whatsoever for the thought that god did it. The claim that the universe was fine-tuned for life is a fallacy. The claim that life itself is tuned to fit the universe is more apt but that type of tuning is explained by abiogenesis and evolution.

Not only is it perfectly natural, it would be outright bizarre if the universe did not appear to be "fine tuned" by the common definition of the term(*). We do exist after all, of course we will see a universe that permits life, anything else would be an absurdity.

The fallacy occurs when people take this perfectly benign fact, and reason in reverse, stating that the universe was fine tuned for life.

* I feel that the term "fine-tuned" is itself, loaded. It invites those with a lack of critical thinking skill to reason backwards, and insert "fine-tuners", who did the "fine-tuning". Unfortunately this is settled terminology, so every time a scientist brings the term up, ...this happens.

** Edit: I see that Hans has done a much better job of explaining this(the language issue) than I did, kudos Hans.

HansMustermann

7th September 2009, 10:33 AM

And to illustrate the difference between version A and version B, for whoever actually needs an illustration:

Imagine a small-ish island with only lynxes and rabbits on it. Maybe it was a peninsula once and then something happened. So now it's two species there, predator and prey, nothing else, and none can swim off the island. If you watch the populations for the two for a while, you'll find that an equilibrium forms. Sure, there are fluctuations in population, but on the long-term average it stays around the numbers that that island can sustain.

And now think of all the variables there that could have been different. If one species could swim off, the whole situation would be very different. If there were goats instead of rabbits, the lynxes would do much less population control, and they'd probably overgraze the island into a desert and both species would die. If there were also some birds from the nearby continent, the lynxes could subsist on those when the rabbit population diminishes and over-hunt the rabbits into extinction. (That's what humans did to a few other species.) And if pigs flew, it would be a pretty crappy island all around ;)

But the fact is that none of that is intentional. It's just an island and the normal self-tuning predator/prey equilibrium. There was no divine intervention and no intent. It's a self-tuning situation, actually.

Sure, a scientist could look at it and say that the whole system seems remarkably "fine-tuned." But he doesn't actually mean that some deity actually came and actually tuned that island for a purpose.

And then some creationist comes and mis-represents that "fine-tuned" to mean that some "fine-tuner" deity was there at work.

Beth

7th September 2009, 10:35 AM

This is good, and it's a distinction I tried to make earlier. The FT argument has essentially two parts:

1. There is apparent (prima facie) fine-tuning.

2. Apparent fine-tuning is better explained by God than by chance alone. This is the philosophical part.

People are conflating 1 and 2.
I wanted to agree with the above. I would also add that there seems to be conflation of simply giving consideration of the hypothesis of a creator as a possible explanation for your 1 with your 2 above. It's as if speculating on the hypothesis that the universe might have been created in some way implies a belief in the hypothesis and which is often taken to be a belief in a specific god. I'd like to state, with emphasis, the one does not imply the other!

Nobody is claiming the universe does not appear fine-tuned. They are claiming that the appearance of fine-tuning is perfectly natural and there is no reason whatsoever for the thought that god did it.

You are essentially rejecting from consideration the hypothesis of a creator. As long as you don't conclude - "Yes" - (I quite agree that some of the other explanations given in speculation regarding the appearance of fine-tuning are equally viable or more so.), why object to even considering the idea?

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 10:44 AM

You are essentially rejecting from consideration the hypothesis of a creator. ...But why object to even considering the idea?
What is the compelling evidence that there is a creator or do you think everyone should consider Thor, Horus, etc. to be true for some reason?

Malerin

7th September 2009, 10:45 AM

Nobody is claiming the universe does not appear fine-tuned.

Are you reading the same thread as me? :boggled:

They are claiming that the appearance of fine-tuning is perfectly natural and there is no reason whatsoever for the thought that god did it.

In addition to rejecting even the prima facie appearance of fine-tuning.

The claim that the universe was fine-tuned for life is a fallacy.

The claim itself cannot be fallacious. It's simply a proposition that may or may not be true (T or F). I think what you mean here is basing such a claim on apparent fine-tuning is (you think) fallacious. Example:

The roulette wheel will come up red next spin (not fallacious).
The roulette wheel will come up red because it's come up black the past five times and red is "due" (Gambler's Fallacy).

The claim that life itself is tuned to fit the universe is more apt but that type of tuning is explained by abiogenesis and evolution.

Do you think life could "tune" itself to "fit" in a universe with, say, no stars?

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 10:49 AM

Are you reading the same thread as me? :boggled:I am reading this one. Which one are you reading?

The claim itself cannot be fallacious. It's simply a proposition that may or may not be true (T or F). I think what you mean here is basing such a claim on apparent fine-tuning is (you think) fallacious.No....it is fallacious.

Do you think life could "tune" itself to "fit" in a universe with, say, no stars?Human life....obviously no but if you think human life is the only possible for of life you are extremely bigoted in your thoughts.

ETA - Do you think that the "fine-tuning" was for the purpose of allowing bacterial life and humans are just an accident?

HansMustermann

7th September 2009, 10:50 AM

You are essentially rejecting from consideration the hypothesis of a creator. As long as you don't conclude - "Yes" - (I quite agree that some of the other explanations given in speculation regarding the appearance of fine-tuning are equally viable or more so.) But why object to even considering the idea?

Why would you object to even considering (with any degree of seriosity) the existence of:

- invisible pink unicorns

- trolls that turn into ordinary looking rocks when any light would make them visible in their troll shape

- trees (or anything else) that don't make a sound unless there's someone around to hear it (microphones count.)

- extraterestrials from the Andromeda Galaxy living in disguise among us

- a portable hole like in various cartoons, which stays a hole without something to be a hole _in_. In fact, which you can roll up and carry to another object you want a hole in. Hey, we haven't seen one yet, but why not consider it?

Etc.

It would seem to me like a better question would be: why _would_ you give any serious consideration to something for which there is no evidence, nothing that needs it as an explanation, no way to test it, no observable difference between a universe with it and a universe without it?

Plus, what ticks me off about the genuine ID-ers and FT proponents, is that what they propose isn't "consider it", but "it's proven." When really there is no logic connection between the premises and that fine-tuner deity.

HansMustermann

7th September 2009, 11:03 AM

Do you think life could "tune" itself to "fit" in a universe with, say, no stars?

For a start, we don't even know if a universe with the constants like that is genuinely possible.

Let me give an example. Take a guitar string, fixed at both ends. Like, you know on a harp. But really just a wire with both ends fixed.

You may notice that it's such a remarkable coincidence that all harmonics are an integer multiple of the same frequency. What are the odds of that? Why is there no harmonic at, say, 1.33 times or 3.14 times the base frequency? Out of all the possible ratios between those frequencies, what are the _odds_ that they'd be exactly the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and so on? There's a mind-boggling number of increasingly higher pitched harmonics. What are the odds that _all_ of them would have exactly those values? Why not at least one of them being an irrational number?

I figure that must be proof of god! God made that string give exactly that sequence of numbers. Taking each such ratio between a harmonic and the base frequency as a parameter, that's simply too many parameters to assume that it happened by itself.

And what about other universes, where such a string has harmonics at 3/2, 4/3, 5/4, and so on? How would a harp sound in those universes? And would a harp even be possible in such a universe? Clearly God made that sequence for the purpose of allowing harps.

In reality, the whole premise is a nonsense. There are no other frequencies compatible with the constraint that both ends of the string are fixed. The probability of the harmonic ratios forming that sequence are exactly 1, once that constraint is in place.

tsig

7th September 2009, 11:10 AM

snip
1. There is apparent (prima facie) fine-tuning. This what I've tried to show with quotes by Davies, Kaku, Stanford's philosophy page, an article from New Scientist on Tegmark's webpage, etc. Very non-controversial. There is some work going on to show the physical constants can have a much larger "range" and still produce a life-perimitting universe (Stenger, Adams), but the overwhelming opinion is for apparent fine-tuning.

2. Apparent fine-tuning is better explained by God than by chance alone. This is the philosophical part.

.

" * Main Entry: ap·par·ent
* Pronunciation: \ə-ˈper-ənt, -ˈpa-rənt\
* Function: adjective
* Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French apparant, from Latin apparent-, apparens, present participle of apparēre to appear
* Date: 14th century

1 : open to view : visible
2 : clear or manifest to the understanding <reasons that are readily apparent>
3 : appearing as actual to the eye or mind
4 : having an indefeasible right to succeed to a title or estate
5 : manifest to the senses or mind as real or true on the basis of evidence that may or may not be factually valid <the air of spontaneity is perhaps more apparent than real — J. R. Sutherland>"

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apparent

All you're saying is that it looks designed therefore it is designed.

Beth

7th September 2009, 11:13 AM

What is the compelling evidence that there is a creator or do you think everyone should consider Thor, Horus, etc. to be true for some reason?

There is no compelling evidence for it. That's why I don't conclude the hypothesis is true. But I am willing to consider it as one possible explanation among others for the conundrum of what the universe has the appearance of being fine-tuned. But I don't see why I should accept any of the several possibilities conjectured to explain the situation. It appears to me that none of the possible explanations have sufficient certainty to them that I am willing to reject the others. I'm okay with that. Are you okay with that?

Hokulele

7th September 2009, 11:14 AM

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 11:15 AM

There is no compelling evidence for it.Then why should I consider it? More to the point is why should I be ok with considering a myth?

Beth

7th September 2009, 11:16 AM

Do you think life could "tune" itself to "fit" in a universe with, say, no stars?

An interesting question. It would depends on how you define life I suppose. Certainly, carbon based lifeforms as on our own planet would not be possible.

fls

7th September 2009, 11:17 AM

Could you show me in an article, perhaps, if you have time? Because all I can find is material that discusses the changes themselves.

As I said before I have heard of some research on the possibility that certain constants have slightly different values at different locations in the universe but other than that I haven't seen anything that addresses what I mention in the OP.

Let me try to break this down into the steps involved:

1. Various constants can only (as far as we can tell) be determined empirically.

2. It is important to obtain reasonably accurate measures for these values, as changes in the values (wrt orders of magnitude) changes the predicted behaviour.

3. The universe with these particular values contains us.

4. A universe without these values may or may not contain something like us.

5. If you wanted a universe to contain something like us, a priori, you would consider using a universe with these particular values.

This is all fairly uncontroversial, if a bit uninteresting.

Here's where the fallacious reasoning starts:

6. God wants a universe to contain something like us.

(We have no a priori information about God.)

7. God would use a universe with these particular values.

(It's a possibility of an unknown amount.)

8. The presence of a universe with these particular values is more likely to be due to God than it is likely to be due to chance.

(Unknown. It could easily be more likely due to chance than it is due to God even if we knew about and conceded number 6 and 7. In particular, "more likely to be due to God than it is likely to be due to chance" is something which can be the case regardless of whether or not a universe which contains something like us is common or rare.)

My concern is that your criticism is directed at the first 5 steps - the fairly innocuous, uninteresting part of the argument and before the issue of design really enters the picture. It isn't that I don't understand the idea of trying to cut the horse off at the path. It's that it gives the false impression that they are well on their way when they overcome this particular hurdle. And if they are incapable of understanding or conceding the more obvious fallacies which come later on, it's going to take a lot of effort on your part to get them to concede this one. Especially since there is an air of legitimacy about it, just not for the purposes for which it has been hijacked.

Linda

Malerin

7th September 2009, 11:17 AM

I am reading this one. Which one are you reading?

So you think there's a consensus here that there is apparent fine-tuning? You think everyone posting here will agree to that? That would certinaly move things along...

No....it is fallacious.

A proposition, by itself, is not fallacious. It's either true or false: "The universe was created by God" is not fallacious, neither is "The universe was not created by God". Fallacies deal with defects in reasoning, e.g., "The universe was created by God, and this is true because my minister says so".

Human life....obviously no but if you think human life is the only possible for of life you are extremely bigoted in your thoughts.

It would be stupid to think that when we're surrounded by non-human life. However, thinking non-molecular life or life existing without stars is possible is a fairy tale.

So again, do you think life could "tune" itself to "fit" in a universe with no stars or no molecules? Yes/No

ETA - Do you think that the "fine-tuning" was for the purpose of allowing bacterial life and humans are just an accident?

It's kind of silly to ask for the purpose of fine-tuning when I've admitted the fine-tuning argument ultimately does not succeed with the knowledge we have now. However, if a designer exists and wanted just bacterial life, it probably could have engineered some constraint on evolution to prevent more complex lifeforms from forming. Since there is no such mechanism, it's a fair guess that a designer might prefer more complex life forms.

But the FT argument does not argue motives or purpose. It simply argues that
Pr(E/H) is much greater than Pr(E/~H), where E is life (in any form) and H is "the physical constants were fine-tuned for the values they have". It doesn't succeed because multiverse theory is still a very live possibility.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 11:23 AM

A proposition, by itself, is not fallacious. When a proposition is based on a fallacy, it is fallacious.
It would be stupidProof talking to you is a waste of time. Thanks for clearing that up.

Malerin

7th September 2009, 11:24 AM

" * Main Entry: ap·par·ent
* Pronunciation: \ə-ˈper-ənt, -ˈpa-rənt\
* Function: adjective
* Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French apparant, from Latin apparent-, apparens, present participle of apparēre to appear
* Date: 14th century

1 : open to view : visible
2 : clear or manifest to the understanding <reasons that are readily apparent>
3 : appearing as actual to the eye or mind
4 : having an indefeasible right to succeed to a title or estate
5 : manifest to the senses or mind as real or true on the basis of evidence that may or may not be factually valid <the air of spontaneity is perhaps more apparent than real — J. R. Sutherland>"

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apparent

All you're saying is that it looks designed therefore it is designed.

Since I've admittted many times the argument doesn't work, I don't see how I'm saying that. The universe appears fine-tuned, but with the multiverse a possible explanation, we can't conclude it is fine-tuned.

Of course, it may turn out the universe looks fine-tuned because it is fine-tuned. Do you accept that as a possibility?

fls

7th September 2009, 12:13 PM

This is good, and it's a distinction I tried to make earlier. The FT argument has essentially two parts:

1. There is apparent (prima facie) fine-tuning. This what I've tried to show with quotes by Davies, Kaku, Stanford's philosophy page, an article from New Scientist on Tegmark's webpage, etc. Very non-controversial. There is some work going on to show the physical constants can have a much larger "range" and still produce a life-perimitting universe (Stenger, Adams), but the overwhelming opinion is for apparent fine-tuning.

I think you are equivocating two meanings of tuned, as Hans Musterman explained.

2. Apparent fine-tuning is better explained by God than by chance alone. This is the philosophical part.

It is also false. Even if God existed, this universe could be more likely to be due to chance than to God and that may be the case regardless of whether life-permitting universes are rare or common.

People are conflating 1 and 2. Volumnious amounts of research, articles and books have been written about (1). It is a view held by many of the world's top physicists and astronomers (Max Tegmark, Stephen Hawking, Michio Kaku, Martin Rees, etc.). Any study of fine-tuning will reveal that (1) is broadly accepted.

I find it very strange for a group of scientifically minded people (the vast majority of people posting here), to go completely against numerous scientific experts and accuse them of committing some of the most basic fallacies in logic and statistics. They are not saying the universe is fine-tuned or was created by God. They are simply saying it looks very implausible and science tends to investigate implausible-seeming phenomena. The rejection of even the prima-facia aspect of fine-tuning is very strange, like arguing with 9/11 "truthers".

I suspect that because there are so very many things wrong with the Designer argument, it's difficult to know where to start.

Linda

fls

7th September 2009, 12:15 PM

Then why is it wrong for me to ask you to pursue a line of inquiry into my "assasination" of Olof Palme which there is no evidence against?

Why are you assuming that it would be wrong?

Once again you are looking at things backwards.

Surely it's obvious by now that you are simply not yet clear on what I mean?

Linda

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 12:23 PM

Why are you assuming that it would be wrong?I am not assuming Linda. You are the one who said no.

Surely it's obvious by now that you are simply not yet clear on what I mean?

No, it is you who are not clear as you vaccilate between posts telling some of us there is no FT then you try to tell me it is a valid pursuit. All I can do is agree with Mozart when he wrote the words
La donna e mobile.

tsig

7th September 2009, 12:25 PM

The universe appears fine-tuned

snip

This is just an assertion. I can equally well say it does not look fine-tuned.

Until you can show evidence that the constants (let's start with gravity) can be any different than they are you have no argument.

Your statement is more an emotional argument than a rational one.

fls

7th September 2009, 12:27 PM

I wanted to agree with the above. I would also add that there seems to be conflation of simply giving consideration of the hypothesis of a creator as a possible explanation for your 1 with your 2 above. It's as if speculating on the hypothesis that the universe might have been created in some way implies a belief in the hypothesis and which is often taken to be a belief in a specific god. I'd like to state, with emphasis, the one does not imply the other!

I don't think that's it. As far as I can tell, the distinction is based on whether or not someone can tell the difference between an explanation and a description. To say that God explains fine tuning merely describes the characteristics you have created for God.

Linda

You are essentially rejecting from consideration the hypothesis of a creator. As long as you don't conclude - "Yes" - (I quite agree that some of the other explanations given in speculation regarding the appearance of fine-tuning are equally viable or more so.), why object to even considering the idea?[/QUOTE]

fls

7th September 2009, 12:38 PM

I am not assuming Linda. You are the one who said no.

You asked if my statement was like your scenario and I said no. I made no specific comment on your scenario.

No, it is you who are not clear as you vaccilate between posts telling some of us there is no FT then you try to tell me it is a valid pursuit. All I can do is agree with Mozart when he wrote the words
La donna e mobile.

Where have I ever said that there is no fine tuning?

Linda

Malerin

7th September 2009, 12:38 PM

I think you are equivocating two meanings of tuned, as Hans Musterman explained.

I don't think so. ""When analyzing the constants of nature, we find that they are "tuned" very precisely to allow for life."" What, exactly, do you think he means here?

If you read the entire passage, Kaku is even clearer: "Goldilocks zone", "fine-tuned", "just right". Where's the equivocation? It's even clearer in this line:

"So either we are left with the conclusion that there is a God of some sort who has chosen our universe to be just right to allow for life, or there are billions of parallel universes, many of them dead."

How else can you read that other than it's either God or a bunch of parallel universe?

It is also false. Even if God existed, this universe could be more likely to be due to chance than to God and that may be the case regardless of whether life-permitting universes are rare or common.

That's possible, but doesn't help you any since you're left with chance again. It's like trying to explain 10 royal flushes in a row by postulating a cheating dealer who decided not to cheat. That doesn't explain anything. Ten royal flushes is much more probable on the hypothesis of a cheating dealer who is currently cheating. By the same token, fine-tuning is more probable on a fine-tuner who actually fine-tuned the constants than on a fine-tuner who sat back and let it all happen. The latter fails as an explanatory hypothesis.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 12:42 PM

You asked if my statement was like your scenario and I said no. I made no specific comment on your scenario.
So look into my assassination of the Swedish guy in 1986 since there is no evidence saying I didn't do it.

Where have I ever said that there is no fine tuning?
Now it is clear your just being foolish Linda. Keep it up and you know where you go.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 12:46 PM

"So either we are left with the conclusion that there is a God of some sort who has chosen our universe to be just right to allow for life, or there are billions of parallel universes, many of them dead."
And god in that instance means generic omniscient (omnibenevolent, omnipotent - your choice) diety. To think otherwise is just plain stupid...

Malerin

7th September 2009, 01:07 PM

Now it is clear your just being foolish Linda. Keep it up and you know where you go.

Are you like this in real life?

fls

7th September 2009, 01:13 PM

So look into my assassination of the Swedish guy in 1986 since there is no evidence saying I didn't do it.

Why? Is there something special about your not having done it?

Now it is clear your just being foolish Linda. Keep it up and you know where you go.

Huh? What are you going on about?

Linda

JoeTheJuggler

7th September 2009, 01:16 PM

The fact that the list universe appears "Fine tuned" for life is a statement of fact based on our current knowledge of physics and the large number of constants which have to have precise values to create a universe in which life is possible.
Not really. Most of the universe is incompatible with life as we know it here on Earth. We humans are only adapted to a small portion of the surface of our own Earth and could not live without carrying an amenable environment with us in something over 99.99% of the volume of the universe.

Or are we talking about a universe fine-tuned for the existence of very simple bacteria?

3. The dice might have been rolled an incredibly large number of times, and because the "event" gives rise to us we would only be aware of the positive result.
My problem with arguments based on probability like this is that they assume the existence of a fine tuner. For example, imagine I have a 1 million-sided die, but I don't know if any of the faces has a 4 on it. Can I claim that the probability of rolling a 4 is 1 in a million? Really, you have to know the 4 exists as an outcome in order to figure the probability of getting a 4.

If you admit that we don't know whether a fine tuner exists, talking about the probability of a universe that is amenable to life being higher if there is a fine tuner is meaningless (or maybe even begs the question, depending on how you look at it).

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 01:16 PM

Why? Is there something special about your not having done it?

Huh? What are you going on about?

Linda
Bye.

fls

7th September 2009, 01:35 PM

Bye.

Thank you. I appreciate your consideration.

Linda

fls

7th September 2009, 01:59 PM

I don't think so. ""When analyzing the constants of nature, we find that they are "tuned" very precisely to allow for life."" What, exactly, do you think he means here?

If you read the entire passage, Kaku is even clearer: "Goldilocks zone", "fine-tuned", "just right". Where's the equivocation? It's even clearer in this line:

"So either we are left with the conclusion that there is a God of some sort who has chosen our universe to be just right to allow for life, or there are billions of parallel universes, many of them dead."

How else can you read that other than it's either God or a bunch of parallel universe?

Kaku and others could be equivocating as well. :)

To be honest, I don't place any more dependence upon physicists in a philosophy of science discussion than any other random participant. It's okay to use their predictions as to the outcome from varying the values of constants, but I don't know that I'd trust them when it comes to God (there's an interesting book about this by Margaret Wertheim called Pythagoras' Trousers (forgive me if I've butchered the spelling)). The idea is too ubiquitous for it to magically represent a de novo conclusion.

That's possible, but doesn't help you any since you're left with chance again. It's like trying to explain 10 royal flushes in a row by postulating a cheating dealer who decided not to cheat.

Nope. It's like guessing that some dealers cheat and then trying to discover how many cheat by finding yourself in a game where there has just been 10 royal flushes in a row. Does the probability of 10 royal flushes tell you the probability that your dealer is a cheater? What if the dealer won on 10 fairly ordinary hands (a pair of nines to your pair of eights, for example)? Does the probability that your dealer is a cheater tell you how many other dealers cheat? (Hint: the answers are "no").

That doesn't explain anything. Ten royal flushes is much more probable on the hypothesis of a cheating dealer who is currently cheating. By the same token, fine-tuning is more probable on a fine-tuner who actually fine-tuned the constants than on a fine-tuner who sat back and let it all happen. The latter fails as an explanatory hypothesis.

I realize it's counter-intuitive.

Linda

Malerin

7th September 2009, 04:22 PM

Kaku and others could be equivocating as well. :)

To be honest, I don't place any more dependence upon physicists in a philosophy of science discussion than any other random participant. It's okay to use their predictions as to the outcome from varying the values of constants, but I don't know that I'd trust them when it comes to God (there's an interesting book about this by Margaret Wertheim called Pythagoras' Trousers (forgive me if I've butchered the spelling)). The idea is too ubiquitous for it to magically represent a de novo conclusion.

Nope. It's like guessing that some dealers cheat and then trying to discover how many cheat by finding yourself in a game where there has just been 10 royal flushes in a row. Does the probability of 10 royal flushes tell you the probability that your dealer is a cheater? What if the dealer won on 10 fairly ordinary hands (a pair of nines to your pair of eights, for example)? Does the probability that your dealer is a cheater tell you how many other dealers cheat? (Hint: the answers are "no").

I realize it's counter-intuitive.

Linda

I don't think we'll ever agree on this one. But I'm right :p

HansMustermann

7th September 2009, 05:50 PM

If you read the entire passage, Kaku is even clearer: "Goldilocks zone", "fine-tuned", "just right". Where's the equivocation? It's even clearer in this line:

"So either we are left with the conclusion that there is a God of some sort who has chosen our universe to be just right to allow for life, or there are billions of parallel universes, many of them dead."

How else can you read that other than it's either God or a bunch of parallel universe?

That he's talking completely outside the realm of science there, since neither hypothesis is supported by any evidence, neither can be tested, neither can be falsified, neither is distinguishable (at the current science and tech level) from a single universe which just happened to be this way.

And, generally, while it's not an equivocation this time, he's committing another fallacy nevertheless: false dillema, with the (not uncommon) spin of presenting the choices as collectively exhaustive when they're not. It's as bogus as saying that a dice must either roll 2 or 5. It just doesn't cover the whole spectrum of possibilities. With just a dash of a couple of other fallacies.

Consider this. Let's say I build the world's only 1-billion sided die, and roll it exactly once. I roll the number 123,456,789. Wow. What's the probability of rolling that number out of 1,000,000,000 choices?

So I conclude that either someone (a fine tuner of sorts) manipulated the roll, or there are a 999,999,999 other such dice which rolled one of the other 999,999,999 available numbers each.

In reality it's a false dichotomy: there are other possibilities there too. Such as that genuinely was only that one die, and it just happened to roll that particular number. _Some_ number had to come up, and that one is as probable as any other.

What makes it even sillier is that there is no support for either of them existing in the first place, other than as a hypothesis. Narrowing it to either hypothesis, or even to the set of both, just on the base of the constants being what they are is a case of Affirming The Consequent fallacy.

The form of the fallacy is this:

P1: If A then B.
P2: B
C: Therefore A.

Let's try it with:

A = "a god tuned the universe with us in mind"
B = "the constants are just right for us"

We get exactly the faulty reasoning that is so dear to FT proponents:

P1: "If a god tuned the universe with us in mind, then the constants are just right for us."
P2: "The constants _are_ just right for us."
C: "Therefore a god tuned the universe with us in mind."

But that conclusion doesn't actually follow from the premises. It's actually just a classic textbook fallacy.

Turning A into a more complex "either A1 or A2" proposition, doesn't change the fact that the argument is still bogus. It's still a fallacy.

I suspect that this is what Gate2501 was calling "putting the cart before the horse". Because that's what it is. It's following an "A => B" in the completely wrong and invalid direction.

JoeTheJuggler

7th September 2009, 06:04 PM

There is no compelling evidence for it. That's why I don't conclude the hypothesis is true. But I am willing to consider it as one possible explanation among others for the conundrum of what the universe has the appearance of being fine-tuned.

Except it's not really an explanation. It doesn't explain anything. In fact it raises one hellaciously important question: if the appearance of fine tuning is so complex that it requires a fine-tuner, how do you explain the fine-tuner? (A fine-tuner-tuner?)

Any form of the creationist "explanation" (Goddidit, Creation Science, Intelligent Design, Fine-Tuner) is just a bunch of words that sound like an explanation, but only serve to give one permission to stop being curious.

Dancing David

7th September 2009, 06:05 PM

Enigma:

I for one do not agree to the apparent fine tuning because it involves unknows, a great many of them.

You can vary all the constants to a certain amount before they mess with probability of life, within each range of variation there are an infinite number of possible vales. So even iff the fine structure constant can vary only .00001% of it's current value, there are an infinite number of states in that variation.
We also have only one universe and no other universes that we can observe, so it is all speculation.

IMNSHO the universe is not fine tuned.

Dancing David

7th September 2009, 06:08 PM

I
If you read the entire passage, Kaku is even clearer: "Goldilocks zone", "fine-tuned", "just right". Where's the equivocation? It's even clearer in this line:

Those are opinions, they lack formal theory or postulates, there is not way of testing a hypothesis because there is not one.

Goldilocks can apparently live in volcanoes and the antartic, hmm those are some big bowls of porridge.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 06:11 PM

Enigma:

I for one do not agree to the apparent fine tuning because it involves unknows, a great many of them.To appear to be something requires unknowns? To be requires unknowns, to have the appearance of requires nothing. Whatever gives you that idea that it does?
IMNSHO the universe is not fine tuned.
You have that right.

JoeTheJuggler

7th September 2009, 06:14 PM

I for one do not agree to the apparent fine tuning because it involves unknows, a great many of them.
Yeah--the notion that we know that stars or life wouldn't be possible if one or another constant were a little different than it is seems awfully presumptive. We don't even know what most of the mass in the universe that actually exists is!

You can vary all the constants to a certain amount before they mess with probability of life, within each range of variation there are an infinite number of possible vales. So even iff the fine structure constant can vary only .00001% of it's current value, there are an infinite number of states in that variation.
We also have only one universe and no other universes that we can observe, so it is all speculation.

IMNSHO the universe is not fine tuned.

I agree. I also agree that it doesn't really appear to be fine-tuned.

It reminds me of the big philosophical question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and its tacit assumption that nothing is the default, even though we all know the universe exists.

Why is there an assumption that the universe as it is is somehow improbable?

(Wow, that sentence had 3 occurrences of the word "is"! I'd better shut up for a while!)

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 06:19 PM

I agree. I'd even say that it doesn't really appear to be fine-tuned.
Humans are pattern seeking animals. Patterns can be found it is just the conclusion that the appearance is in fact true that causes problems. In this case the universe does appear fine-tuned but knowing the underlying truth that it isn't is apparently is seemingly to weak in certain individuals that they can't even allow that to be said.

JoeTheJuggler

7th September 2009, 06:19 PM

To appear to be something requires unknowns? To be requires unknowns, to have the appearance of requires nothing. Whatever gives you that idea that it does?
I think he meant what I just said--saying what the universe would be like if one or another constant were different than it is now is something unknown. Especially since there are so many really big questions about the universe that really exists that we can't yet answer.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 06:22 PM

I think he meant what I just said--saying what the universe would be like if one or another constant were different than it is now is something unknown. Especially since there are so many really big questions about the universe that really exists that we can't yet answer.
The problem is that any combination of constants that would allow any type of sentient life would allow the sentient life to ask if the universe was fine-tuned. The appearance would be there as long as life existed in any sentient form.

Gate2501

7th September 2009, 06:24 PM

I suspect that this is what Gate2501 was calling "putting the cart before the horse". Because that's what it is. It's following an "A => B" in the completely wrong and invalid direction.

Yes, this is exactly what I was getting at. It is backwards reasoning, and as you have said it is a textbook fallacy.

You laid things out in a much more formal manner than I have, thank you for doing that. Kudos to you yet again!

JoeTheJuggler

7th September 2009, 06:24 PM

Humans are pattern seeking animals. Patterns can be found it is just the conclusion that the appearance is in fact true that causes problems. In this case the universe does appear fine-tuned but knowing the underlying truth that it isn't is apparently is seemingly to weak in certain individuals that they can't even allow that to be said.

I think I sorted out what you've said here--but I'm not sure I'm parsing your grammar correctly.

I think you're saying something comparable to the statement that the sunflower pattern appears to be mathematically designed even though we know it's the result of biology and not a designer. I think you're saying (by analogy) that it's valid, nonetheless, to say it is "apparently" designed.

If that's what you mean, I disagree. If we know the thing is not designed, it's not valid to say it's apparently designed. (I understand you're talking about the FT argument and not ID, but I just wanted to see if I understand what you're saying. It seems that a lot hinges on the way you're using the word "apparent".)

JoeTheJuggler

7th September 2009, 06:28 PM

The problem is that any combination of constants that would allow any type of sentient life would allow the sentient life to ask if the universe was fine-tuned. The appearance would be there as long as life existed in any sentient form.
The anthropic principle.

But doesn't that say it's not really meaningful to say the universe is apparently fine-tuned?

At any rate, what you just said puts me in mind of a paraphrasing of Victor Stenger's litany in God the Failed Hypothesis: the universe looks just the way one would expect it to look if there were no Fine-Tuner.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 06:29 PM

I think I sorted out what you've said here--but I'm not sure I'm parsing your grammar correctly.

I think you're saying something comparable to the statement that the sunflower pattern appears to be mathematically designed even though we know it's the result of biology and not a designer. I think you're saying (by analogy) that it's valid, nonetheless, to say it is "apparently" designed.

If that's what you mean, I disagree. If we know the thing is not designed, it's not valid to say it's apparently designed. (I understand you're talking about the FT argument and not ID, but I just wanted to see if I understand what you're saying. It seems that a lot hinges on the way you're using the word "apparent".)
Appear is the word I used. Do you understand what I mean by using it?

ETA - This is an example of something that appears to be an image of the virgin Mary...not claiming it is an image of that but it does appear to be.
http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_132574aa5a61b6a8c8.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17501)

Toke

7th September 2009, 06:41 PM

As far as I can tell the finetuned universe would require a tuner/wacthmaker/god.
How come he left Pi such a silly number instead of just 3, it would have been much easier for everybody.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 06:44 PM

As far as I can tell the finetuned universe would require a tuner/wacthmaker/god.
How come he left Pi such a silly number instead of just 3, it would have been much easier for everybody.
Because the omnipotent god couldn't change the ratio of a circle's radius to it's diameter. What I want to know is if he could throw a rock faster than the speed of light :)

Jonnyclueless

7th September 2009, 06:44 PM

ETA - This is an example of something that appears to be an image of the virgin Mary...not claiming it is an image of that but it does appear to be.
http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_132574aa5a61b6a8c8.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17501)

Does anyone have an original photo of Mary we can compare with?

It could prove the FT argument!

Gate2501

7th September 2009, 06:47 PM

Does anyone have an original photo of Mary we can compare with?

It could prove the FT argument!

I think that the woman in the toast looks like an undead Marilyn Monroe who has just feast upon the brains of the living.

~enigma~

7th September 2009, 06:50 PM

Does anyone have an original photo of Mary we can compare with?

It could prove the FT argument!
I took this picture back in the stable with my brand new 2k digital camera.

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_132574aa5aa2913bc6.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17502)

Baby jesus was a cute little guy wasn't he...

Toke

7th September 2009, 07:02 PM

Because the omnipotent god couldn't change the ratio of a circle's radius to it's diameter.
What a wimp.
What I want to know is if he could throw a rock faster than the speed of light :)

That is a good question too.:D

As a non-physist I see the finetuning discussion as ID in a new disguise.
The physical laws/constants in the universe we live in happen to allow life as we know it, no big surprise there.

tsig

7th September 2009, 07:31 PM

That is a good question too.:D

As a non-physist I see the finetuning discussion as ID in a new disguise.
The physical laws/constants in the universe we live in happen to allow life as we know it, no big surprise there.

And no one has figured out how to change one yet or if it is even possible.

Malerin

7th September 2009, 09:03 PM

That he's talking completely outside the realm of science there, since neither hypothesis is supported by any evidence, neither can be tested, neither can be falsified, neither is distinguishable (at the current science and tech level) from a single universe which just happened to be this way.

Except models can be generated where small changes in the physical constants result in an overwhelming number of universes where no conceivable life can exist. If the constants could have had different values (and in the standard model of physics, the constants aren't set in any way), that begs the question: even knowing we're in a life-permitting universe, how implausible is it that we should be in a life-permitting universe. What kind of odds were against us at the moment of creation? This is a legitimate question that can be asked of events that have already happened.

And fine-tuning is falsifiable. If it can be shown that the kind of universe necessary for life could have existed no matter what the values were, then fine-tuning goes out the window. The multiverse theory could also be confirmed/disconfirmed by new evidence or the development of an accepted physics model that does or doesn't include multiple universes.

And, generally, while it's not an equivocation this time, he's committing another fallacy nevertheless: false dillema, with the (not uncommon) spin of presenting the choices as collectively exhaustive when they're not. It's as bogus as saying that a dice must either roll 2 or 5. It just doesn't cover the whole spectrum of possibilities. With just a dash of a couple of other fallacies.

I read him to be saying, the constants either got their values by chance (multiverse), or did not get their values by chance (God fine-tuned them). What other possibilities do you think there are for how the constants got the values they have? The values could be set, but there's no evidence of that, it goes against the stanard model of particle physics, and it still begs the question of why, if they're set, are they set at just the right values for life?

Consider this. Let's say I build the world's only 1-billion sided die, and roll it exactly once. I roll the number 123,456,789. Wow. What's the probability of rolling that number out of 1,000,000,000 choices?

So I conclude that either someone (a fine tuner of sorts) manipulated the roll, or there are a 999,999,999 other such dice which rolled one of the other 999,999,999 available numbers each.

And now it goes back to basic statistics. Let's take your die example, but let's make it even bigger. A trillion sided die. You would agree that all results are equiprobable, right? But that does not mean that all results are equiplausible. Suppose someone else built your trillion sided die and you take it out for a test roll. It comes up 314,159,265,358. I think you would be a little suspicious. While it's true that that roll is just as likely as any other, getting the first 12 digits of Pi on the one and only roll is far more plausible on the hypothesis the person who made the die is playing a trick on you than on chance alone. But let's say you're not convinced and you roll it again. Same result. Still think the die is fair? But 314,159,265,358 and 314,159,265,358 has the same probability as, say, 177,543,987,561 and 870,892,154,323. but with the former, you would demand your money back. With the latter, you woudn't. Why?

Take coin flips for example: Here are two equally probable sequences for two prima facie fair coins being fairly tossed 45 times:

Coin A: HTTHTHHHHTHHHTHHTHHHTHHTTHTHTHTHHTHHHTTHHTHTT

Coin B: HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

Both sequences have the same chance of coming up on a fair coin (1/2 to the 45th). But we're certain that coin B is extremely biased for Heads, while coin A appears to be a fair coin. But if both results are equiprobable, why are we so sure coin B is biased? Or would you think coin B was biased? If someone offered you 100-1 odds on a $50 bet that a tails would come up on the next toss of coin B, would you take it? That's normally a very good bet.

In reality it's a false dichotomy: there are other possibilities there too. Such as that genuinely was only that one die, and it just happened to roll that particular number. _Some_ number had to come up, and that one is as probable as any other.

Sure, it could be chance, just like it could be chance that a dealer deals himself 10 straight flushes in a row. Would you still stay in a poker game if that happened? :p

What makes it even sillier is that there is no support for either of them existing in the first place, other than as a hypothesis. Narrowing it to either hypothesis, or even to the set of both, just on the base of the constants being what they are is a case of Affirming The Consequent fallacy.

Um, no. If that were true, statistics would come to a grinding halt. Every medical trial ever done would be fallacious.

The form of the fallacy is this:

P1: If A then B.
P2: B
C: Therefore A.

Right...

Let's try it with:

A = "a god tuned the universe with us in mind"
B = "the constants are just right for us"

We get exactly the faulty reasoning that is so dear to FT proponents:

P1: "If a god tuned the universe with us in mind, then the constants are just right for us."
P2: "The constants _are_ just right for us."
C: "Therefore a god tuned the universe with us in mind."

Not so right.
Replace A with "The dealer is cheating to win each hand".
Replace B with "Each hand the dealer deals himself is a winning hand".

P1: "If the dealer is cheating to win each hand, then each hand the dealer deals himself is a winning hand."
P2: "Each hand the dealer deals himself is a winning hand"
C: "Therefore, the dealer is cheating".

Do you see the mistake yet? Try it again:

A = "This experimental drug cures all melanomas"
B = "The experimental group are all cured of melanoma"

P1: "If this experimental drug cures all melanomas, then the experimental group are all cured of melanoma."
P2: "The experimental group are all cured of melanoma."
C: "Therefore, this experimental drug cures all melanomas"

See it yet?

rocketdodger

7th September 2009, 11:37 PM

That's the part I'm getting at - making the attempt to approach it from the bottom up. Since we discovered the usefulness of symmetry about a hundred years ago, there may be a way to get at this. I think that it's legitimate to make the attempt, even if all we discover is that we will necessarily fail. But it seems to me that this is some of the information that physicists try to get at with TOE's and String Theory. It also parallels the development of quantum field theories whereby a way had to be found to cancel out the infinities.

Linda

I agree that it is a great idea to make the attempt.

But again, remember that we are not talking about people who care about making the attempt. We are talking about theists who use the FT argument as a wedge for the rest of theism.

You can't find a clearer example than our very own Malerin. Not once -- not in a single post over years and years in this forum -- has he ever addressed the question of how he generates the probability distributions he uses for the constants. Because that isn't part of the FT argument that theists can use.

They don't start with "how did the constants get the values they have <end of story>?" -- that obviously begs the question and gets them nowhere. They start with "how did the constants get the values they have? Either it was God or random chance acting on a very large distribution."

And did you see that? Did you see what they just did? They completely skipped over the only scientifically meaningful issue and went straight for the philosophical nonsense that uneducated people like to waste keyboard strokes flaming at each other about on the internet.

So it isn't like I am proposing an end to all discussion and just accepting the values of the constants. If anything I am proposing that people pull their heads out of their backsides and realize what the real issue is.

rocketdodger

7th September 2009, 11:41 PM

If the constants could have had different values (and in the standard model of physics, the constants aren't set in any way),

Whoa, whoa, not so fast.

Do you have any evidence that supports such a claim?

I mean, this is exactly what I made this thread to discuss, so I would hope you have something to back up your assertions about it.

For instance, are you saying I can plug in any real value at all for each constant and the resulting model is sure to be a valid description of an actually realizable reality?

rocketdodger

7th September 2009, 11:46 PM

That's possible, but doesn't help you any since you're left with chance again. It's like trying to explain 10 royal flushes in a row by postulating a cheating dealer who decided not to cheat. That doesn't explain anything. Ten royal flushes is much more probable on the hypothesis of a cheating dealer who is currently cheating. By the same token, fine-tuning is more probable on a fine-tuner who actually fine-tuned the constants than on a fine-tuner who sat back and let it all happen. The latter fails as an explanatory hypothesis.

Why are all of your arguments based on the probability distributions of events in human games, Malerin?

So far we have lottery numbers, poker hands, roulette results, coin tosses, etc.

I am just wondering if there is any logical reason to compare the process of generation of universal constants -- something you know nothing about -- with the process of generating a poker hand, or lottery numbers, or tossing a coin.

Eh?

rocketdodger

7th September 2009, 11:50 PM

And if they are incapable of understanding or conceding the more obvious fallacies which come later on, it's going to take a lot of effort on your part to get them to concede this one.

Well, I agree with you 100% on this point.

HansMustermann

8th September 2009, 01:01 AM

Except models can be generated where small changes in the physical constants result in an overwhelming number of universes where no conceivable life can exist. If the constants could have had different values (and in the standard model of physics, the constants aren't set in any way), that begs the question: even knowing we're in a life-permitting universe, how implausible is it that we should be in a life-permitting universe. What kind of odds were against us at the moment of creation? This is a legitimate question that can be asked of events that have already happened.

And fine-tuning is falsifiable. If it can be shown that the kind of universe necessary for life could have existed no matter what the values were, then fine-tuning goes out the window. The multiverse theory could also be confirmed/disconfirmed by new evidence or the development of an accepted physics model that does or doesn't include multiple universes.

Bzzt. Equivocation again. Danger! Danger!

We can theoretically falsify "tuned" in the sense that the values simply happen to fit neatly. We can not falsify "tuned" in the sense that somebody came and tuned it with any kind of intent. Hence any scientists talking about the latter is, basically, talking about personal beliefs not about science.

I read him to be saying, the constants either got their values by chance (multiverse), or did not get their values by chance (God fine-tuned them). What other possibilities do you think there are for how the constants got the values they have?

First of all, "got their values by chance" does not mean "multiverse" in the sense that it actually exists. The fact that some values of the variables could describe a hypothetical other universe, does not justify the leap of faith to claiming that in that case such universes actually exist.

As a simple example: DNA could also create a unicorn. It's just a matter of having the right "digits" there. (After all the whole thing is a base 4 number.) So let's try his kind of silly claim there: "Either God selected only the kind of sequences that actually exist, or unicorns must exist too." It's still bogus. You cannot bridge like that from theoretical possibility to "actually exists."

Bridging from basically "a continuum of universes that are theoretically possibly, by sheer virtue that you can think of different combinations of those variables" to something that actually exists in exactly that form, is exactly a reification fallacy.

Second, even if more universes exist, we don't have any information of what they're like. For all we know, there could be 3 universes total, and 2 are identical to ours.

Basically if you roll a dice six times, you can not expect that you get the numbers 1 to 6. You could get 5 times a 3 and 1 time a 2.

Third, what other possibilities exist? Well, for example that there is some reason we don't know yet, why those values can't take any other values.

E.g., talk of "what if the ratio of electron to proton weight was different" is nonsens in that form, because the two are determined by the mass of the quarks and the energy in the interactions between them. There is a reason at another level for why that ratio is exactly what it is. Now we moved it one step up. Why do the quarks have those masses and not others? Because of some other thing.

Until we actually have pretty much nailed it all the way down, we don't even know what all the actual variables are for that multiverse. It could be that in the end everything is a multiple of the same thing -- like in at resonances of a piano wire example -- and there are no other ratios possible.

Jumping to a conclusion just for not knowing the real reason and for nothing more than a "what other possibilities do you think there are?" is exactly an argument from ignorance.

The values could be set, but there's no evidence of that, it goes against the stanard model of particle physics, and it still begs the question of why, if they're set, are they set at just the right values for life?

Because if they were in the wrong range for life, we wouldn't be here to ask that question. It's really that simple.

And now it goes back to basic statistics. Let's take your die example, but let's make it even bigger. A trillion sided die. You would agree that all results are equiprobable, right? But that does not mean that all results are equiplausible. Suppose someone else built your trillion sided die and you take it out for a test roll. It comes up 314,159,265,358. I think you would be a little suspicious. While it's true that that roll is just as likely as any other, getting the first 12 digits of Pi on the one and only roll is far more plausible on the hypothesis the person who made the die is playing a trick on you than on chance alone. But let's say you're not convinced and you roll it again. Same result. Still think the die is fair? But 314,159,265,358 and 314,159,265,358 has the same probability as, say, 177,543,987,561 and 870,892,154,323. but with the former, you would demand your money back. With the latter, you woudn't. Why?

Note that even in your example, you needed at least a second roll for that suspicion. You can't draw any conclusion from a sample of exactly one, other than maybe via the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy.

So far, for the universes, we don't have that second roll. We have a sample of exactly one universe. We only have that one 314,159,265,358 roll.

Concluding from that one single roll that "either someone manipulated the die, or there are a trillion other dice which rolled the other almost a trillion numbers" is silly. Especially the latter alternative, in the absence of any actual evidence that such dice actually exist. It's reification from the theoretical possibility of other such rolls, to the actual existence of real dice which have actually rolled those numbers.

The rest of the statistics examples suffer from the same problem. Plus a bunch of other problems.

E.g. in any drug trial, or generally statistics, they don't "prove" logic in that direction, they calculate a degree of confidence that their result is significant. Basically you end up saying "chances are 20 to 1 that this drug actually works". There still is the possibility that it was all a big coincidence.

So, no, you still can't follow logic in that direction. There still is the possibility that for all B being true, A is still false.

Plus any such trial involves disproving the null hypothesis, e.g., via a control group which doesn't get the drug. What those trials measure is the difference between two situation, not follow the logic in the wrong direction like you imply.

In your example you have an implied null hypothesis, namely the knowledge of what melanoma does when untreated. If talking about a Disease X that we know nothing about, you couldn't make the inferrence like you did, because maybe it heals by itself just as well. So even your example implicitly measures a difference, not follow the "A => B" from B to A.

But anyway, without a null hypothesis, without measuring a difference, there is simply no statistical significance in such a trial.

Until (A) we can also see universes without a fine-tuner and measure the difference, and (B) we actually have a sample big enough to calculate a probability, the whole argument you make simply does not apply.

So, basically, at the risk of being offensive, it just illustrates how one could get to ask himself the question in the thread title. Not picking particularly on you, but it's an easy enough impression to be left with when you look at the FT arguments. Is it genuine lack of knowledge of those statistics, or is he trying to pull a quick sophistry? I'll vote for honest mistake in this case, just for the benefit of the doubt, but when you see some proponents do it again and again, well, you know, see you example with the coin that rolls the same thing again and again.

fls

8th September 2009, 04:51 AM

I agree that it is a great idea to make the attempt.

But again, remember that we are not talking about people who care about making the attempt. We are talking about theists who use the FT argument as a wedge for the rest of theism.

You can't find a clearer example than our very own Malerin. Not once -- not in a single post over years and years in this forum -- has he ever addressed the question of how he generates the probability distributions he uses for the constants. Because that isn't part of the FT argument that theists can use.

They don't start with "how did the constants get the values they have <end of story>?" -- that obviously begs the question and gets them nowhere. They start with "how did the constants get the values they have? Either it was God or random chance acting on a very large distribution."

And did you see that? Did you see what they just did? They completely skipped over the only scientifically meaningful issue and went straight for the philosophical nonsense that uneducated people like to waste keyboard strokes flaming at each other about on the internet.

So it isn't like I am proposing an end to all discussion and just accepting the values of the constants. If anything I am proposing that people pull their heads out of their backsides and realize what the real issue is.

Ah, I've got it now.

I totally agree.

Linda

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 05:28 AM

To appear to be something requires unknowns? To be requires unknowns, to have the appearance of requires nothing. Whatever gives you that idea that it does?
You have that right.

We don't know what parameters the constants could have other than what they are, so unknown.

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 05:30 AM

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 05:31 AM

The problem is that any combination of constants that would allow any type of sentient life would allow the sentient life to ask if the universe was fine-tuned. The appearance would be there as long as life existed in any sentient form.

The statement that the universe allows for life is not equal to the statement that the universe is fine tuned for life.

Volcanoes and ice fields.

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 05:33 AM

Appear is the word I used. Do you understand what I mean by using it?

ETA - This is an example of something that appears to be an image of the virgin Mary...not claiming it is an image of that but it does appear to be.
http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_132574aa5a61b6a8c8.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17501)

Appears to you does not equal appears to me. It doesn't look like the BVM to me.

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 05:34 AM

I took this picture back in the stable with my brand new 2k digital camera.

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_132574aa5aa2913bc6.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=17502)

Baby jesus was a cute little guy wasn't he...

Is it true he pooped out gold coins?

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 05:37 AM

Except models can be generated where small changes in the physical constants result in an overwhelming number of universes where no conceivable life can exist.

Except you haven't shown what constants and which small change leads to that, now have you? Formal theories, formal postulates, formal hypothesis.

And it can also be shown that within that small amount of variation, if it is small, that an infinite number of values exist where the universe where life could exist. So infinity equals infinity.

No overwhelming there.

cyborg

8th September 2009, 06:01 AM

And it can also be shown that within that small amount of variation, if it is small, that an infinite number of values exist where the universe where life could exist. So infinity equals infinity.

That's the real problem here if arbitrary values are allowed: either there must be one, and only one, possible universe with constants tuned for life or there must be an infinite number in the range - however small - of allowed values and then fine tuning doesn't look so great.

HansMustermann

8th September 2009, 06:04 AM

But "can those variations exist?" is IMHO still a better question. Because otherwise "where are they?" or "what are the odds?" are just begging the question.

Let me harp on the wire harmonics example some more. (Bad pun intended;))

Let's say we detect some signals from space with the frequencies 700 Khz and 2.2 MHz, coming from the same place. The ratio is approximately 3.14, i.e., pretty amazingly close to Pi within the error margin of the instruments used to measure. OMG, someone is beaming Pi at us.

What are the odds of that happening with exactly that ratio between frequencies? Imagine if one of them was just 1% more or less than those exact values?

But what if they're respectively the 7'th and 22'nd harmonic of a natural 100 KHz oscilator of some kind?

In that case "what if it was only 1% higher or lower ratio between them?" is a stonking nonsense. That's not how harmonics work, simply put. If it's harmonics of a fixed frequency oscilator, there is no way for one to go up by 1% without the other one _also_ going up by 1%, hence leaving the ratio unchanged. The ratio cannot change by just a little, because both must be integer multiples of the same base frequency.

rocketdodger

8th September 2009, 08:56 AM

That's the real problem here if arbitrary values are allowed: either there must be one, and only one, possible universe with constants tuned for life or there must be an infinite number in the range - however small - of allowed values and then fine tuning doesn't look so great.

So here is another mathematical fact that kills the FT argument.

Question is -- are any FT proponents going to pay attention?

Already it seems like our local proponents are utterly ignoring the posts about this issue.

rocketdodger

8th September 2009, 08:59 AM

But "can those variations exist?" is IMHO still a better question.

It is still great to have a mathematical fact that defeats the argument at all levels.

I might make a new thread about the fallacy present at each level of the fine tuning argument, just to show how absolutely cruddy the argument actually is when you look at it all together.

HansMustermann

8th September 2009, 09:17 AM

It is still great to have a mathematical fact that defeats the argument at all levels.

Oh, no doubt about that.

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 10:43 AM

Well facts don't get in the way of a good philosophy argument. I miss Interesting Ian.

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 10:55 AM

And now it goes back to basic statistics. Let's take your die example, but let's make it even bigger. A trillion sided die. You would agree that all results are equiprobable, right?
No I would not.

"Results" that are not on the die are not possible.

If the trillion-sided die does not have a 4 on it, the probability of rolling a 4 is zero.

If there are a billion 4s, then the probability is 1:1000.

The point is, we don't know whether or not there is a 4 on it at all (or if there is, how many of them there are), so you cannot possibly calculate a real probability of rolling a 4.

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 11:06 AM

I agree that it is a great idea to make the attempt.

But again, remember that we are not talking about people who care about making the attempt. We are talking about theists who use the FT argument as a wedge for the rest of theism.

Exactly.

That's the point I was trying to make in reply to Beth's post earlier. F.T. is not a real explanation of anything. It's just a way to stop asking for an explanation. What's the phrase? . . ."premature satisfaction of curiosity".

ETA: Imagine if all physicists suddenly accepted FT as true. Would it somehow change the way they do physics? Would the Large Hadron Collider no longer be relevant? Would any equations or formulas change?

Also, there's the history of old-fashioned dishonesty among the people who started off promotion Creationism, then changed it to "Creation Science", then change it to "Intelligent Design" who are now pushing "Fine Tuning".

I think the next step from "cdesign proponentist" is going to be "infine tunerign".

Beth

8th September 2009, 11:54 AM

I don't think that's it. As far as I can tell, the distinction is based on whether or not someone can tell the difference between an explanation and a description. To say that God explains fine tuning merely describes the characteristics you have created for God.

Linda

Except it's not really an explanation. It doesn't explain anything. In fact it raises one hellaciously important question: if the appearance of fine tuning is so complex that it requires a fine-tuner, how do you explain the fine-tuner? (A fine-tuner-tuner?)

Any form of the creationist "explanation" (Goddidit, Creation Science, Intelligent Design, Fine-Tuner) is just a bunch of words that sound like an explanation, but only serve to give one permission to stop being curious.

I can only say that I respectfully disagree with this sentiment. Whatever answer we may find to the question, it will not be the end of curiousity. Personally, if a creator were the explanation, it would only make me more curious. Where did it come from? Why did it create the universe? So I agree, such an answer would create many more questions. So? That doesn't make it inconceivable as a possibility nor is it any less of an explanation than random chance.

cyborg

8th September 2009, 12:10 PM

That doesn't make it inconceivable as a possibility nor is it any less of an explanation than random chance.

No, it's not any more of an explanation.

As to what is inconceivable when forming an explanation that is limited only by the imagination of the explainer: good art, lousy science.

Pure Argent

8th September 2009, 12:11 PM

I can only say that I respectfully disagree with this sentiment. Whatever answer we may find to the question, it will not be the end of curiousity. Personally, if a creator were the explanation, it would only make me more curious. Where did it come from? Why did it create the universe? So I agree, such an answer would create many more questions. So? That doesn't make it inconceivable as a possibility nor is it any less of an explanation than random chance.

The existence of a creator isn't impossible on its own. However, most of the major religions - Christianity especially - hold that this creator is the SUPREME creator. It is when this condition is added that the fine-tuning argument becomes nonsensical.
The fine-tuning argument could be taken as true on its own, given that the participants take as true several assumptions regarding the possible values of universal constants. But it is never presented on its own. It is presented, instead, packaged together with a bunch of religious dogma, all tied up very neatly with a little bow on top. And the main piece of dogma is almost always something along the lines of "The fine-tuner is the SUPREME fine-tuner. He has always been and always will be; he was not created, because if he was created then there is something greater than him, and that is impossible."
A creator of the universe isn't impossible. It may be highly unlikely, there may be no evidence to support it, there may not be any need for one given the fact that cause-effect relations are probably not the same outside our universe, but it isn't impossible. It is the combination of the fine-tuning argument and religion that is impossible.

HansMustermann

8th September 2009, 12:12 PM

westprog

8th September 2009, 01:18 PM

That's the real problem here if arbitrary values are allowed: either there must be one, and only one, possible universe with constants tuned for life or there must be an infinite number in the range - however small - of allowed values and then fine tuning doesn't look so great.

Are you asserting that it's impossible to use probabilistic reasoning if infinitesimals are involved? IOW, does the fact that we can continuously subdivide any range indefinitely imply that all the values in any range are equally likely?

I'd like to know if this is actually being proposed before discussing it.

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 01:28 PM

I can only say that I respectfully disagree with this sentiment. Whatever answer we may find to the question, it will not be the end of curiousity. Personally, if a creator were the explanation, it would only make me more curious. Where did it come from? Why did it create the universe? So I agree, such an answer would create many more questions. So? That doesn't make it inconceivable as a possibility nor is it any less of an explanation than random chance.

Historically, the same people who argue in favor of the Creator "explanation" have also attempted to stifle learning. I don't bet on that trend changing in the future.

Also, if what you say is so, then how does "Fine Tuner" or "Creator" or "Intelligent Designer" explain anything, if all it does is raise more questions?

Also, there's the issue that such an "explanation" is unnecessary.

I don't think saying Goddidit, or any variation thereof, explains anything. It's just some undefined term (Creator, God, Designer, Tuner) that's put in a sentence that mimics an explanation.

ETA: Another way of showing that it's not an explanation is the business I added in my previous post. Would our physics equations change to account for a Fine-Tuner? Would the scientific method somehow change? Would science be any different than if we didn't have this "explanation"?

Look at how first Newton then the new physicists revolutionized the way we understand the natural world. Look at how the theory of evolution by natural selection came to be the central organizing principle of biology. Does belief in a Fine-Tuner similarly change any scientific discipline? We know there is such a thing as evolutionary biology, but is there such a thing as fine-tuner physics?

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 01:34 PM

Are you asserting that it's impossible to use probabilistic reasoning if infinitesimals are involved? IOW, does the fact that we can continuously subdivide any range indefinitely imply that all the values in any range are equally likely?
I don't think he said "infinitesimals" but rather that values given are "arbitrary"--or as I would prefer to express it, "utterly unknown".

If you're allowed to pull numbers out of thin air to assign the probability of our universe existing, then you can pretty much prove anything you like.

Again, consider the trillion-sided die. If you claim the probability of a given outcome is some ratio, you've got to know that there are a trillion equally-probably outcomes and you have to know how many of those are the outcome whose probability you're calculating.

Since we don't know those values, any values you give for those probabilities are made up and meaningless in a proof.

When I say there's a 1:6 probability of rolling a four on a normal, fair die, I damn well better know that it has six equally probably outcomes and exactly one of them is a four. If I don't know that, I can say anything about the probability.

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 02:34 PM

Are you asserting that it's impossible to use probabilistic reasoning if infinitesimals are involved? IOW, does the fact that we can continuously subdivide any range indefinitely imply that all the values in any range are equally likely?

I'd like to know if this is actually being proposed before discussing it.

No two factots
1. If we say that a constant can only vary by a small amount, there are an infinite number of values in that variation.

2. It is all speculation. You can not assign probabilities to the unknown.

fls

8th September 2009, 02:45 PM

That doesn't make it inconceivable as a possibility nor is it any less of an explanation than random chance.

Well, random chance has the obvious advantage of existing. And explaining. Other than that, they're just the same.

Linda

fls

8th September 2009, 03:44 PM

It might be helpful to discuss what it means to provide a useful explanation. An explanation is useful if it makes specific predictions - a planet will move in this direction, not that direction. It allows us to act on theory, rather than wait for empirical measures - we can launch a rocket into orbit without trying out a range of trajectories to see which one leads to the outcome we desire. It makes predictions which can falsify the explanation - if the speed of light is the same traveling with or against the motion of the earth, there is no aether.

It is not useful if it describes what we already observe, but does not predict a novel observation - what intelligently designed organ will be added to our body next? It is not useful if any subsequent observations would fit the explanation - I pray for my husband's recovery, and his death, his recovery or his coma are all the result of God's will. It is not useful if it encompasses a fairly trivial subset of what we observe - it doesn't tell us about evolution, gravity, dark energy, aspirin, relativity, electromagnetism, mirror neurons, phonons, the jet stream, or the Marianas trench...it only tells us that humans are the centre of attention.

An 'explanation' is an explanation if it constrains the possibilities a priori. Taking something that already exists, something that already serves as a useful explanation, one can look at its properties a priori and see if it has any novel applications. The explanation for the movement of the heavenly bodies also constrains a priori the falling of an apple from a tree. If something has not been demonstrated to exist, i.e. you wish to postulate a new entity, it provides additional constraint by making novel predictions which are subsequently observed, or it ties together two previously unrelated explanations. A Theory of Everything would tie together the currently unconnected QM and Relativity.

An explanation has a rigid and unyielding form, so that when it is found to fit exactly into a missing part of the puzzle, you go "wow!" It is not a lump of clay which has been used to fill a hole.

A useful explanation brings new information to the table. It does not regurgitate suspiciously self-serving statements.

Linda

HansMustermann

8th September 2009, 04:02 PM

Darn best summary of it I've read in ages. Cheers.

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 04:19 PM

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 04:20 PM

Too late to edit this, but I meant to type:

If I don't know that, I can't say anything about the probability.

Malerin

8th September 2009, 04:52 PM

Bzzt. Equivocation again. Danger! Danger!

We can theoretically falsify "tuned" in the sense that the values simply happen to fit neatly.

This is fallacious. You don't know the values "simply happen to fit neatly". If they were fine-tuned then they don't "simply happen" to fit; they were fine-tuned that way. You're assuming your conclusion to be true.

We can not falsify "tuned" in the sense that somebody came and tuned it with any kind of intent. Hence any scientists talking about the latter is, basically, talking about personal beliefs not about science.

No, it can be falsified if, for example, Stenger's work turns out to be correct. Victor Stenger argues that changes in the values don't have much effect on whether the universe would support life or not (check out his program "Monkeygod"). If Stenger is right, there is no fine-tuning argument.

First of all, "got their values by chance" does not mean "multiverse" in the sense that it actually exists. The fact that some values of the variables could describe a hypothetical other universe, does not justify the leap of faith to claiming that in that case such universes actually exist.

Right, because there is a competing hypothesis: they were fine-tuned to have those values. The hypothesis that doesn't make sense is that this is the only universe, and we just got incredibly lucky. The multiverse is popular with physicists like Tegmark and Andrei Linde precisely because it defeats the Fine-tuning argument by offering a plausible explanation for the apparent design of the physical constants.

As a simple example: DNA could also create a unicorn. It's just a matter of having the right "digits" there. (After all the whole thing is a base 4 number.) So let's try his kind of silly claim there: "Either God selected only the kind of sequences that actually exist, or unicorns must exist too." It's still bogus. You cannot bridge like that from theoretical possibility to "actually exists."

I don't follow you on this one. DNA could create a unicorn, but there are no unicorns. A fine-tuner could have fine-tuned the constants, and the constants appear to be fine-tuned. Big difference.

Bridging from basically "a continuum of universes that are theoretically possibly, by sheer virtue that you can think of different combinations of those variables" to something that actually exists in exactly that form, is exactly a reification fallacy.

"a continuum of universes that are theoretically possibly, by sheer virtue that you can think of different combinations of those variables"

This is unclear. Multiverse theory is theoretically possible regardless of fine-tuning.

Second, even if more universes exist, we don't have any information of what they're like. For all we know, there could be 3 universes total, and 2 are identical to ours.

Yes, it would have to be a sufficiently large multiverse. So?

Basically if you roll a dice six times, you can not expect that you get the numbers 1 to 6. You could get 5 times a 3 and 1 time a 2.

Right. You would also not expect to get 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111111111 on a fair die. Agreed?

Third, what other possibilities exist? Well, for example that there is some reason we don't know yet, why those values can't take any other values.

That's not really a possibility, that's just saying we don't know. Either the constants were fine-tuned or they weren't. Admitting we don't know if they were designed or not doesn't open up a new possibility. Even admitting our ignorance, it's still the case they were either fine-tuned or they weren't.

E.g., talk of "what if the ratio of electron to proton weight was different" is nonsens in that form, because the two are determined by the mass of the quarks and the energy in the interactions between them. There is a reason at another level for why that ratio is exactly what it is. Now we moved it one step up. Why do the quarks have those masses and not others? Because of some other thing.

In the standard model, these constants are freely adjustable. There are attempts to derive some from other constant values, but no success yet in tying them all together in one grand unified theory.

Until we actually have pretty much nailed it all the way down, we don't even know what all the actual variables are for that multiverse. It could be that in the end everything is a multiple of the same thing -- like in at resonances of a piano wire example -- and there are no other ratios possible.

Not knowing the variables in a particular universe in a multiverse does not make the mutilverse a poor candidate to explain apparent fine-tuning. Given enough multiverses, and random values for the physical constants, there will be a few life-permitting universes, just be chance.

Jumping to a conclusion just for not knowing the real reason and for nothing more than a "what other possibilities do you think there are?" is exactly an argument from ignorance.

What you're saying is we're ignorant of entire fields of study (astronomy, cosmology, physics). I don't accept that and neither do the people who study this stuff for a living.

Because if they were in the wrong range for life, we wouldn't be here to ask that question. It's really that simple.

Not really. It possible to question probabilities of events you are intricately tied to and already know the outcome of. See the sharpshooter analogy.

Note that even in your example, you needed at least a second roll for that suspicion. You can't draw any conclusion from a sample of exactly one, other than maybe via the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy.

No, I already stated you would be suspicious of a Pi result on the first roll, and this can be shown with a Bayesian calculus. Think of it this way: There's a 50 number lottery starting. The very first drawing gives the following result:
3141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375

A lottery that gave that result on the first drawing would never give a second result- it would be shut down for investigations of fraud. This can be concluded with only one drawing.

So far, for the universes, we don't have that second roll. We have a sample of exactly one universe. We only have that one 314,159,265,358 roll.

You don't need a 2nd roll when the odds are long enough.

Concluding from that one single roll that "either someone manipulated the die, or there are a trillion other dice which rolled the other almost a trillion numbers" is silly.

I agree. It's much more probable someone with mathematical knowledge rigged the die. It would be absurd to believe the die was fair, even after one toss.

E.g. in any drug trial, or generally statistics, they don't "prove" logic in that direction, they calculate a degree of confidence that their result is significant. Basically you end up saying "chances are 20 to 1 that this drug actually works". There still is the possibility that it was all a big coincidence.

So, no, you still can't follow logic in that direction. There still is the possibility that for all B being true, A is still false.

You don't get it. Your formulataion of P1, P2, and C was wrong. This is the proper formulation of the FT argument (weak version):

P1: If life can exist only along an extremely narrow range of physical constant values, then the existence of a multiverse or fine-tuner is probable.
P2: Life can exist only along an extremely narrow range of physical constant values
C: The existence of a multiverse or fine-tuner is probable

No fallacy. You had the premises all mixed up, is all. P2 is the prevailing view, at the moment (Tegmark, Hawking, Rees, Dyson, Kaku, Hoyle, etc.). P1 is where the real argument is.

westprog

8th September 2009, 04:52 PM

No two factots
1. If we say that a constant can only vary by a small amount, there are an infinite number of values in that variation.

And what are the implications of this observation?

2. It is all speculation. You can not assign probabilities to the unknown.

In fact, it's only to unknowns that one can assign probabilities. Probabilities are always based on our degree of ignorance and our assumptions. If we had perfect knowledge, then everything would be either probability 1 or 0. (Excepting quantum probability which is something else entirely.)

Malerin

8th September 2009, 05:06 PM

It might be helpful to discuss what it means to provide a useful explanation. An explanation is useful if it makes specific predictions - a planet will move in this direction, not that direction.

What prediction does "O.J. Simpson is a murderer" make? He'll kill again? Stab someone with a shiv in prison? Confess in a fit of remorse? It doesn't predict anything, but it explains a whole hell of a lot ;)

Explanations can have zero predictive value and still be extremely useful. Police deal with those kinds of explanations all the time.

But this doesn't have anything to do with fine-tuning, because all explanations of apparent fine-tuning make no predictions. God, chance, multiverse, doesn't matter. They're all invoked to explain a seemingly implausible set of circumstances. No one who advances God or chance or a multiverse as an explanation is trying to predict the next big bang. They're trying to show that Pr(E/H) is much greater than Pr(E/~H).

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 05:10 PM

In fact, it's only to unknowns that one can assign probabilities. Probabilities are always based on our degree of ignorance and our assumptions. If we had perfect knowledge, then everything would be either probability 1 or 0. (Excepting quantum probability which is something else entirely.)
You're wrong.

When I play poker, I have no way of knowing what the next card will be. However, it's only because I have some information (the cards I have, the cards already showing, the number of cards and which kind are in the deck) that I can calculate the probability of my hand being the winning hand. If I didn't know those values, I could not possibly calculate my probability of winning.

Back to the trillion sided die--if you don't know that a 4 exists on at least one face of this die, you can't say what the probability of getting a 4 will be.

If probability means what you think it means, then why can't you just set the probability of a Fine Tuner at 1:1 or very close to it when you try to make a logical argument for the existence of a Fine Tuner? (After all, since we're ignorant of the pertinent information, and we're allowed to pull numbers out of thin air, what's wrong with setting the probability at 1:1?) Then we could save a lot of hassle manipulating probabilities by noting that your conclusion is contained in your premise, and the argument is circular. And you could see that your argument is basically, "There is a fine tuner because I really believe there is one."

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 05:14 PM

What prediction does "O.J. Simpson is a murderer" make?

That's pretty easy: if O.J. Simpson murdered Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman, we would expect to find physical evidence that supports it. We would expect the DNA of blood left at the seen to match (to some degree of confidence) DNA from a sample known to have come from Simpson. You would expect that Simpson wouldn't have an alibi that proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was elsewhere when the murders took place. And so on.

All of these are predictions that can be tested against the hypothesis/explanation "O.J. Simpson is a murderer."

ETA: Your observation would be true if all that other stuff would look the same whether Simpson murdered Brown and Goldman or not, which is the case of the universe and a Fine Tuner. If you could say "the evidence looks just like you'd expect it to look even if Simpson weren't the killer" then you'd reject that hypothesis/explanation.

Toke

8th September 2009, 05:38 PM

Malerin,
It reads to me as you are making assorted sematic arguments for finetuning as an option.
Would you mind comming out and stating your purpose?
Is it some version of ID?

LordoftheLeftHand

8th September 2009, 06:18 PM

If we had perfect knowledge, then everything would be either probability 1 or 0. (Excepting quantum probability which is something else entirely.)
That does not seem right to me. If probabilities at the smallest scales can't be reduced to 0 and 1, how could they be reduced to this at larger scales? Since larger objects are just a bunch of smaller objects "in a big pile".

There is already a long thread arguing whether the universe is deterministic or not. Regardless of which way someone weighs in on that topic I don't think most people would agree that the universe is not deterministic at small scales but is (entirely) deterministic at large scales.

Malerin

8th September 2009, 06:35 PM

That's pretty easy: if O.J. Simpson murdered Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman, we would expect to find physical evidence that supports it.

We would? Every murderer leaves behind physical evidence that implicates themselves?

We would expect the DNA of blood left at the seen to match (to some degree of confidence) DNA from a sample known to have come from Simpson.

Why wouldn't you expect it to match the victim's?

You would expect that Simpson wouldn't have an alibi that proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was elsewhere when the murders took place. And so on.

No murderer has ever had an alibi?

Regardless, the predictions you ascribe to "OJ simpson is a murderer" all predict things that have already happened. Long before OJ was considered a murderer, there were blood stains, a bloody glove, etc. Events that happened after the fact, when the probability of the events were 1 (because they already happened). Are you now saying you can make predictions of events that have already happened? :eek:

Try this one: D-Day was succesful because the Germans believed the Allies would land at Pas de Calais. Explains a lot, right? So tell me, what predictions (conclusions about events that have not yet happened) does that explanation make?

Malerin

8th September 2009, 06:37 PM

Malerin,
It reads to me as you are making assorted sematic arguments for finetuning as an option.
Would you mind comming out and stating your purpose?
Is it some version of ID?

I don't know what you mean by semantic argument , but yes, I believe there are two credible hypotheses: either there is a vast multiverse of universes and we happened to luck out, or something fine-tuned the constants.

rocketdodger

8th September 2009, 06:43 PM

In the standard model, these constants are freely adjustable.

This is the very fallacy that the thread is about.

First, what does that mean, "freely adjustable?"

Does that mean I can plug in any values whatsoever and still be confident that the resulting instance of the model is valid?

Second, can you cite any credible references where someone actually states this?

Because looking at a term from an equation in some book and saying "ah, that term is a letter, and I know from maths that letters can take on values, so I must be able to replace it with any value I want" is not equivalent to the term being "freely adjustable."

rocketdodger

8th September 2009, 06:48 PM

You're wrong.

When I play poker, I have no way of knowing what the next card will be. However, it's only because I have some information (the cards I have, the cards already showing, the number of cards and which kind are in the deck) that I can calculate the probability of my hand being the winning hand. If I didn't know those values, I could not possibly calculate my probability of winning.

Back to the trillion sided die--if you don't know that a 4 exists on at least one face of this die, you can't say what the probability of getting a 4 will be.

If probability means what you think it means, then why can't you just set the probability of a Fine Tuner at 1:1 or very close to it when you try to make a logical argument for the existence of a Fine Tuner? (After all, since we're ignorant of the pertinent information, and we're allowed to pull numbers out of thin air, what's wrong with setting the probability at 1:1?) Then we could save a lot of hassle manipulating probabilities by noting that your conclusion is contained in your premise, and the argument is circular. And you could see that your argument is basically, "There is a fine tuner because I really believe there is one."

In fact, if statistics are used as they *should* be (and I thank drkitten for explaining this to me), any given value of the constants should have a completely uniformed prior probability of 0.5.

That reflects a state of complete ignorance and minimizes error.

So ... what were you saying, westprog?

rocketdodger

8th September 2009, 06:57 PM

Are you now saying you can make predictions of events that have already happened?

Are you serious?

You aren't aware that probability reflects an agent's knowledge about reality rather than reality itself?

There is zero difference between an event that has occured and an event that has not from the standpoint of an agent that is unaware of both.

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 07:14 PM

We would? Every murderer leaves behind physical evidence that implicates themselves?
That doesn't logically follow the statement that I made. If OJ Simpson killed Brown and Goldman, it would predict that the evidence that was gathered would be consistent with the hypothesis that Simpson killed them.

If, on the other hand you proposed a hypothesis (like Goddidit) where the stuff your using in your argument would look exactly the way we'd expect it to look if God-didn't-do-it, you don't have an explanation that explains anything.

Why wouldn't you expect it to match the victim's?
You're not being serious now, are you?

No murderer has ever had an alibi?
An alibi (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/alibi) is a defense where the accused attempts to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. So yes, no murder has ever had an alibi. They may have made a failed attempt at an alibi defense, but that doesn't mean they actually had an alibi. The hypothesis "Simpson killed Brown and Goldman" predicts, among other things, that Simpson won't have an alibi. It also predicts that you'd find evidence that Simpson was at the murder scene at the time of the murder and that nothing else would rule out that possibility.

Regardless, the predictions you ascribe to "OJ simpson is a murderer" all predict things that have already happened. Long before OJ was considered a murderer, there were blood stains, a bloody glove, etc. Events that happened after the fact, when the probability of the events were 1 (because they already happened). Are you now saying you can make predictions of events that have already happened?
You're wrong again. (This is the same thing as the Creationist drivel that says the theory of evolution makes no predictions (http://www.talkorigins.org/indexcc/CA/CA210.html)!) The hypothesis, "Simpson killed Brown and Goldman" predicts that when you run the DNA analysis of the killer's blood it will match Simpson's (or in the lingo that would "not exclude" him). I guarantee you, the prediction was made before the test was run. In fact, that prediction is the reason why the DNA tests (http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Simpson/Dna.htm)were done. If no one suspected Simpson (that is, if no one made the hypothesis that he was the killer), there would be no reason to collect his DNA for comparison.

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 07:18 PM

Try this one: D-Day was succesful because the Germans believed the Allies would land at Pas de Calais. Explains a lot, right? So tell me, what predictions (conclusions about events that have not yet happened) does that explanation make?
Do we really need to go through it again with this example? Read what Rocketdodger said. Also read the link I gave to TalkOrigins (since you're making the same argument Creationists make--gee what a coincidence!). See especially point number 2 in the "Response" section.

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 07:21 PM

JoeTheJuggler

8th September 2009, 07:34 PM

Some of the stuff posted here (by Hans and others) that argues that all these "mind boggling coincident" values of constants aren't so mind boggling since they're not really free to vary and this bit from Stenger's essay on FT (http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Cosmo/FineTune.pdf) (link is to a PDF file):

Press and Lightman (1983) have shown that the physical properties of matter, from the dimensions of atoms to the order of magnitude of the lengths of the day and year, can be estimated from the values of just four fundamental constants (this analysis is slightly different from Carr and Rees [1979 ]). Two of these constants are the strengths of the electromagnetic and strong nuclear interactions. The other two are the masses of the electron and proton. Although the neutron mass does not enter into these calculations, it would still have a limited range for there to be neutrons in stars, as discussed earlier.

is why I don't believe the universe even "appears" to be fine-tuned for humans or life or anything in particular.

Gate2501

8th September 2009, 07:50 PM

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 08:11 PM

And what are the implications of this observation?

there are an infinite set of values where univesres don't exist and an infinite set of values where they do, and without a theory to predict why the values are what they are, there is no way to say what variation there is. One set of infinity equals another set of infinity.

In fact, it's only to unknowns that one can assign probabilities. Probabilities are always based on our degree of ignorance and our assumptions. If we had perfect knowledge, then everything would be either probability 1 or 0. (Excepting quantum probability which is something else entirely.)

Not sure how to respond to that, probability requires understanding the factors of frequency distribution in systems. Or the measurement of large occurences of an event to determine frequencies.

In randomly shuffled decks, there is a 1/13 chance of drawing a particlular rank of card, a 1/4 chance of drawing a particular suit, a 1/52 of drawing the rank&suit. We can assign those probabilities because they are known.

In other situations we measure the frequency distribution and look for patterns.

I think we are using terms differently. There is only absolute knowledge at macro scales and much of it is chaotic/semi-random. (Such as the path of a photon in a star, a probability can be assigned through known factors of transmission and absorbition and a chance given that it will radiate from the star's surface. Or an inference of the star's production of photons can be compared to the star's surface radiation.) At QM scales there is no determinsism or Bells theorem is overturned, which it isn't yet. (I think you hinted at that.)

Dancing David

8th September 2009, 08:15 PM

Malerin,
It reads to me as you are making assorted sematic arguments for finetuning as an option.
Would you mind comming out and stating your purpose?
Is it some version of ID?

Purpose to philospohy?

Now there is a novel idea.

rocketdodger

8th September 2009, 10:29 PM

I was trying to use a prior of 0 for a bayesian in another thread, and drkitten pwnd the everloving crap out of me, educating me greatly in the process.

That is why I love this forum. I learn a lot. It makes me upset when I see someone simply reword their argument or use a different analogy after it has been demonstrated that they are operating with faulty logic.

I was also using a value of 0 for the completely uninformed prior.

My thinking was that there is an infinite amount of possible events, and since you don't know anything about the event in question (hence "completely uninformed"), the chances of it occuring approaches zero.

Was that the logic you were using as well?

Incidentally, it is valid logic, it just isn't the proper way do things in the context of bayesian analysis.

HansMustermann

9th September 2009, 01:41 AM

This is fallacious. You don't know the values "simply happen to fit neatly". If they were fine-tuned then they don't "simply happen" to fit; they were fine-tuned that way. You're assuming your conclusion to be true.

Ok, let me rephrase that: all we can falsify is that they fit neatly. Not that someone tuned them.

No, it can be falsified if, for example, Stenger's work turns out to be correct. Victor Stenger argues that changes in the values don't have much effect on whether the universe would support life or not (check out his program "Monkeygod"). If Stenger is right, there is no fine-tuning argument.

But that again just falsifies whether or not those variables are that good a fit or not. It doesn't address the existence or non-existence of a tuner per se.

I.e., whether the variables are "tuned" or not, the "tuner" is still an unnecessary and unfalsifiable extra entity tacked to it.

Right, because there is a competing hypothesis: they were fine-tuned to have those values. The hypothesis that doesn't make sense is that this is the only universe, and we just got incredibly lucky. The multiverse is popular with physicists like Tegmark and Andrei Linde precisely because it defeats the Fine-tuning argument by offering a plausible explanation for the apparent design of the physical constants.

So, basically yet another appeal to authority instead of addressing the actual objections? Who cares what unsupported hypothesis is popular with whom? What matters is if there is actual evidence for it.

And no, "what are the odds?" handwaving -- about odds you don't even actually even know -- does not evidence make. Essetially it all boils down to another textbook fallacy: argument from personal disbelief. Just that you don't believe in those (unknown) odds, isn't evidence.

Colour me unimpressed.

I don't follow you on this one. DNA could create a unicorn, but there are no unicorns. A fine-tuner could have fine-tuned the constants, and the constants appear to be fine-tuned. Big difference.

There is no difference. It's the same argument applied to something else than tuning the constants. DNA is a gigantic base 4 number. Giving values from 0 to 3 to the 4 possible base pairs, each individual's DNA can be basically writing as a gigantic number like 30122133213112[...] I.e., it'sa value that can be tuned. But nevertheless not all possible combinations exist.

That's what I'm trying to say: it's outright silly to just handwave from "possible to exist" to "must exist", be it about alternate universes or unicorns. And even sillier to create false dichotomies between two equally fallacious alternatives.

This is unclear. Multiverse theory is theoretically possible regardless of fine-tuning.

Bingo. Keyword: theoretically. You can't bridge from a theoretical construct to acting like it must exist.

Yes, it would have to be a sufficiently large multiverse. So?

But the point is that you don't know that.

Right. You would also not expect to get 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111111111 on a fair die. Agreed?

Red herring. It has nothing to do with what I was talking about there.

That's not really a possibility, that's just saying we don't know. Either the constants were fine-tuned or they weren't. Admitting we don't know if they were designed or not doesn't open up a new possibility. Even admitting our ignorance, it's still the case they were either fine-tuned or they weren't.

Except "either they were tuned or they aren't" isn't even remotely the same argument as "either they were tuned or billions of other universes exist." Kindly stop moving the goal posts like that.

Not knowing the variables in a particular universe in a multiverse does not make the mutilverse a poor candidate to explain apparent fine-tuning. Given enough multiverses, and random values for the physical constants, there will be a few life-permitting universes, just be chance.

Except see Linda's post about what counts as an "explanation" in science. Makeshift unsupported beliefs aren't it. As long as there is no genuine measurable evidence for more universes, it is simply not an explanation in any scientific sense.

Ditto for the existence of a fine tuner.

So basically it's a false dichotomy between two non-scientific personal beliefs.

The whole argument kinda gives me this mental image: I wake up one morning and find a 1 Euro coin in my bed. So I conclude that either the Tooth Fairy finally showed up for that tooth I put under the pillow in primary school, or the Ninja Gnomes are trying to pay me tribute.

What you're saying is we're ignorant of entire fields of study (astronomy, cosmology, physics). I don't accept that and neither do the people who study this stuff for a living.

What I'm saying is that we don't know nearly enough to make the case for either of those bogus alternatives.

No, I already stated you would be suspicious of a Pi result on the first roll, and this can be shown with a Bayesian calculus. Think of it this way: There's a 50 number lottery starting. The very first drawing gives the following result:
3141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375

A lottery that gave that result on the first drawing would never give a second result- it would be shut down for investigations of fraud. This can be concluded with only one drawing.

Ah, ok, so you genuinely don't understand statistics.

You don't need a 2nd roll when the odds are long enough.

Ditto.

I agree. It's much more probable someone with mathematical knowledge rigged the die. It would be absurd to believe the die was fair, even after one toss.

Ditto.

You don't get it. Your formulataion of P1, P2, and C was wrong. This is the proper formulation of the FT argument (weak version):

P1: If life can exist only along an extremely narrow range of physical constant values, then the existence of a multiverse or fine-tuner is probable.
P2: Life can exist only along an extremely narrow range of physical constant values
C: The existence of a multiverse or fine-tuner is probable

No fallacy. You had the premises all mixed up, is all. P2 is the prevailing view, at the moment (Tegmark, Hawking, Rees, Dyson, Kaku, Hoyle, etc.). P1 is where the real argument is.

I can't help the feeling that that's in no way addressing my objection quoted above it. That's _still_ not how drug trials work. But ok.

Except that that still solves nothing. Now it depends on the completely unsupported P1. Yes, that's the part that would be missing to make it not be affirming the consequent. As long as that part is effectively missing -- because nobody managed to support it with more than personal beliefs and fallacies -- it doesn't change much.

And that is the part that I see supported by pretending that if "A => B" then you can turn it around into "B => A". Each time you ask a FT proponent to prove that "if A then B" that forms your P1, they invariably go into a detour that ends up with them arguing actually "if B then A." I.e., turning it silently into an affirming the consequent anyway. Hence the accusation of putting the cart before the horse.

But ok, let's take it like that. So what?

Now instead of being based on one fallacy, it's based on another: false premise fallacy, until P1 itself is adequately proven. Exactly what did that achieve then? It still doesn't support the conclusion.

Essentially what that structuring means is "P1 and P2 => C". But as long as P1 is not known to be true, "P1 and P2 is also not in a position to support any inferrence. You can only use "A => B" to make a claim about B, if A is indeed true. You can't infer C from an unproven dubious assertion.

Essentially the only thing supportable in there is P2. But what C depends on is "P1 and P2", not "P1 or P2". So P2 alone doesn't support C.

fls

9th September 2009, 04:44 AM

In fact, if statistics are used as they *should* be (and I thank drkitten for explaining this to me), any given value of the constants should have a completely uniformed prior probability of 0.5.

That reflects a state of complete ignorance and minimizes error.

So ... what were you saying, westprog?

A prior probability of 0.5 is not an uninformed prior. It is a prior which allows little influence on the posterior probability when you are working with a normal hypothesis (like 'more people will recover on Drug A than placebo'), but it adds potentially invalid information under states of complete ignorance and actually represents a state of maximum error.

What is better under those circumstances is not to do Bayesian analysis at all, but rather to make an attempt to gather some information. Once you know enough to begin to form a probability distribution, then you have enough to say something about the prior. If you have to use a prior, then rather than using a specific value, you should choose a distribution which is least likely to add information, so as to maximize the information which was obtained from your 'evidence' and minimize that which came from your choice of distribution (given that you pulled the distribution out of your ass).

As a common sense demonstration...how can "what is the chance I will be hit by lightning?" reasonably be 0.5 when I don't know anything at all about lightning and 0.00001 when I do?

Linda

fls

9th September 2009, 06:08 AM

What prediction does "O.J. Simpson is a murderer" make?

It predicts (as has already been mentioned) that information specific to OJ can be found with regards to MMO.

He'll kill again? Stab someone with a shiv in prison? Confess in a fit of remorse? It doesn't predict anything, but it explains a whole hell of a lot ;)

I don't think you understand what is meant by 'prediction'. It doesn't mean 'future event'. It means that you can take the explanation and use that to postulate observations which are specific to that explanation and not specific to other explanations. It is information collected in light of a specific hypothesis, but it isn't necessarily information which hasn't previously been available. There are several ways that this information can be considered 'new', but 'future event' is only one of the ways. It could be additional information which is sought specific to OJ's guilt, it could be information which had already been obtained but it's connection to a specific perpetrator or to this murder hadn't yet been made, it could be information which depends upon future technology, etc. All that is considered 'new' in addition to 'future actions of OJ'.

Explanations can have zero predictive value and still be extremely useful. Police deal with those kinds of explanations all the time.

They are called unsolved cases without leads.

But this doesn't have anything to do with fine-tuning, because all explanations of apparent fine-tuning make no predictions. God, chance, multiverse, doesn't matter. They're all invoked to explain a seemingly implausible set of circumstances. No one who advances God or chance or a multiverse as an explanation is trying to predict the next big bang. They're trying to show that Pr(E/H) is much greater than Pr(E/~H).

You are right that it doesn't have anything to do with fine-tuning, because a Designer has none of the defining characteristics of an explanation, let alone a useful explanation. Chance provides an explanation in the sense that we independently know how chance operates and so we can make predictions from what we already know. The multiverse is barely an explanation and I don't think it is particularly useful. The only thing it really has going for it is that it is predicted by chance and it has come up as an explanation when considering other issues in cosmology and physics. However, none of them are useful, for the very reason raised in the OP. There is no point in looking for an explanation for something that has not been demonstrated to even exist. Until you have some information about the probability distribution of the various parameters, it is utterly useless to postulate explanations as to why you would see one particular set of probability distributions.

Linda

Soapy Sam

9th September 2009, 06:44 AM

There is only one "FT".
Given this thread isn't about the Financial Times and this link is so slow I can't hope to read more than page 1 and 5, I conclude it's about the Anthroposophistic Principle.

There seems to me to be a small flaw in that- namely that apart from a spherical shell about 5 miles thick around a single planet, so far as we know, the universe in fact appears to be utterly inimical to life. Human life particularly.

Perhaps we might propose a counter principle- that the universe was specifically designed to prevent the occurrence of life, but somebody dropped the ball?

I find that far more satisfactory.

And nearly as daft.

fls

9th September 2009, 07:55 AM

By the way, after participating in this thread a little bit, my answer to the question proposed is that it's both. I'm basing this largely on the fact that Malerin seems to be genuinely ignorant of some of this stuff, but I know for a fact that we've explained many of these points to him already, so in that, he's just being dishonest.

Also, the silly remark about the DNA matching the victim's DNA shows he's not even communicating honestly.

I agree that fighting to maintain ignorance in the face of explanation gives the appearance of dishonesty, but I think that there is another choice which the OP does not mention. Cognitive dissonance makes us stupid. Relieving cognitive dissonance may require that we erect a barrier to the use of the logical processing centres in our brain. It may not be that anyone is refusing to see the nose in front of their face, it may be that their brain has blocked out that part of their visual field.

Linda

rocketdodger

9th September 2009, 10:07 AM

A prior probability of 0.5 is not an uninformed prior. It is a prior which allows little influence on the posterior probability when you are working with a normal hypothesis (like 'more people will recover on Drug A than placebo'), but it adds potentially invalid information under states of complete ignorance and actually represents a state of maximum error.

Wait, I thought it was the other way around. I thought 0.5 was the starting point that minimized error, and should be used as the beginning of an iterative application of Bayes rule.

What is better under those circumstances is not to do Bayesian analysis at all, but rather to make an attempt to gather some information. Once you know enough to begin to form a probability distribution, then you have enough to say something about the prior. If you have to use a prior, then rather than using a specific value, you should choose a distribution which is least likely to add information, so as to maximize the information which was obtained from your 'evidence' and minimize that which came from your choice of distribution (given that you pulled the distribution out of your ass).

Right, but according to drkitten (if I understand drkitten correctly), if you were to do a Bayesian analysis on something you know nothing about, the proper protocol is to start with a prior of 0.5 and then modify that prior in an iterative fashion upon subsequent applications of Bayes rule as your knowledge improves.

But didn't you argue with drkitten about this very thing?

As a common sense demonstration...how can "what is the chance I will be hit by lightning?" reasonably be 0.5 when I don't know anything at all about lightning and 0.00001 when I do?

Because probability simply reflects a state of knowledge and you didn't know anything about lightning.

And don't forget, that prior is unconditional, which is utter nonsense in a pragmatic sense, because everything is conditioned in reality. It only really means anything in the context of Bayesian analysis. I think.

Gate2501

9th September 2009, 10:45 AM

I was also using a value of 0 for the completely uninformed prior.

My thinking was that there is an infinite amount of possible events, and since you don't know anything about the event in question (hence "completely uninformed"), the chances of it occuring approaches zero.

Was that the logic you were using as well?

Incidentally, it is valid logic, it just isn't the proper way do things in the context of bayesian analysis.

Yes, that was exactly my logic. I was trying to set up a system of determining probability for existential claims for which there is zero evidence. It all started because someone here, I forget who it was, was attempting to say that unobservable god beings "aren't improbable" because you cannot assign them a probability due to the fact that evidence for them is impossible to gather. I am pretty sure that they were privately taking the "it isn't improbable(because you can't assign it a probability)" to mean "it's totally probable". It is as probable as any other unobservable phenomena of equal complexity, was the point I wanted to make.

It was a learning experience for me.

fls

9th September 2009, 10:57 AM

Wait, I thought it was the other way around. I thought 0.5 was the starting point that minimized error, and should be used as the beginning of an iterative application of Bayes rule.

No, 0.5 maximizes error. And when you think about it, this has to be the case. Going back to my example of lightning...the estimate of 0.5 has to reasonably encompass a real probability of 0.00001, which means that it has to have a huge error range, and that most of the values will contribute substantially to the total error.

Right, but according to drkitten (if I understand drkitten correctly), if you were to do a Bayesian analysis on something you know nothing about, the proper protocol is to start with a prior of 0.5 and then modify that prior in an iterative fashion upon subsequent applications of Bayes rule as your knowledge improves.

Only if you wish to go about in a highly inefficient manner. Like I said, you can do this and eventually end up at the right answer. But the number of iterations it takes is large for any but a narrow range of frequencies (i.e. those that are in the mid-range to begin with). And it's only viable if the knowledge you are applying is specific and accurate. This is why this is not the way hypotheses are tested in normal science. Rather knowledge is built up first, then hypotheses are tested in the face of knowledge so that reasonably accurate posterior probabilities will result from each experiment, because we only test each hypothesis with a few, rather than hundreds of, experiments. However, it does represent, in a very informal manner, the way that we build up that knowledge. The posterior distribution reflects the knowledge we have gathered, rather than prior assumptions.

As I said, there are better strategies to use in the face of ignorance. Because let's get real here. You are going to pretend to some accuracy in your posterior probability based on the result of one or a few tests. Malerin crows about his success after a single example, yet the sort of scenario he describes may easily take a hundred iterations before it even began to narrow down the range of error to something less than 0.5.

But didn't you argue with drkitten about this very thing?

Yes. I was being polite at the time. :) And I did point out that the argument under discussion (Malerin's FT argument - the same one we're discussing here) failed to have the characteristics which would make this a viable strategy (mostly because there is no specific or accurate information at any stage).

Because probability simply reflects a state of knowledge and you didn't know anything about lightning.

Exactly. Which means that picking a number represents maximum ignorance.

And don't forget, that prior is unconditional, which is utter nonsense in a pragmatic sense, because everything is conditioned in reality. It only really means anything in the context of Bayesian analysis. I think.

A prior of 0.5 is appropriate if we are truly indifferent about the outcomes. But as you point out, when are we truly indifferent? We are certainly not indifferent when it comes to a Designer.

Linda

westprog

9th September 2009, 11:04 AM

there are an infinite set of values where univesres don't exist and an infinite set of values where they do, and without a theory to predict why the values are what they are, there is no way to say what variation there is. One set of infinity equals another set of infinity.

Consider a dart flung randomly at a dart board. It can hit an infinite number of positions inside the bullseye. It can also hit an infinite number of positions outside the bullseye. Can we therefore assume that it is equally likely to hit either?

Dancing David

9th September 2009, 11:26 AM

Consider a dart flung randomly at a dart board. It can hit an infinite number of positions inside the bullseye. It can also hit an infinite number of positions outside the bullseye. Can we therefore assume that it is equally likely to hit either?

See you just described the dart board and that is fine. You can not describe the intial conditions of the universe, nor can you describe the structure that supports the uinverse.

How I can i say what the probability of striking the dartboard is when I can't see the dart board, the trower of the locale that it is located in?

All FT is based upon speculation into the unknown. You can not assign a probability to the unknown.

It is division by zero.

(Now Guth and the budding univesres is great speculation as well, but i won't go there, because it is speculation. But there could be reiterative processes in universes that don't collapse creating other universes that don't collapse. But it means nothing, it is all speculation.)

fls

9th September 2009, 12:38 PM

And don't forget, that prior is unconditional, which is utter nonsense in a pragmatic sense, because everything is conditioned in reality. It only really means anything in the context of Bayesian analysis. I think.

To elaborate on this a little more...a prior of 0.5 is indifferent. Which means that you are indifferent as to which direction is specified beforehand. That is, a Designer is as likely to not form universes with these constants as it is to do so, your target is as likely to be within the bullseye as it is without, etc. If this is honestly the case, then you can start with a prior of 0.5. This also demonstrates the vacuity of the Designer argument, though. Since the test itself - the observation that this universe is fine-tuned - does not indicate a direction either way.

Linda

Dancing David

9th September 2009, 02:36 PM

See you just described the dart board and that is fine. You can not describe the intial conditions of the universe, nor can you describe the structure that supports the uinverse.

How I can i say what the probability of striking the dartboard is when I can't see the dart board, the trower of the locale that it is located in?

All FT is based upon speculation into the unknown. You can not assign a probability to the unknown.

It is division by zero.

(Now Guth and the budding univesres is great speculation as well, but i won't go there, because it is speculation. But there could be reiterative processes in universes that don't collapse creating other universes that don't collapse. But it means nothing, it is all speculation.)

That should be 'thrower or'

ARGH!

thought_fugitive

9th September 2009, 03:25 PM

westprog

9th September 2009, 04:05 PM

See you just described the dart board and that is fine. You can not describe the intial conditions of the universe, nor can you describe the structure that supports the uinverse.

That's an entirely different point. I'd like to deal with one point at a time. The assertion was that because there were an infinite number of values within a given range that the calculation of probabilities is impossible. That's the point I'm disputing, and I think that the dartboard example makes it clear why.

westprog

9th September 2009, 04:14 PM

I'm a newbie to a lot of specific and (somewhat) modern philosophy / science-philosophy such as this and I just have a few questions:

Is there any history of the notion of a "fine-tuned universe"? When did it first appear? If not specifically known, did it exist in any form before the discovery of the fundamental physical constants that it today postulates as being fine-tuned?

Is a requisite condition of fine-tuning a universe that it's mutually exclusive from the multiverse hypothesis? Could fine-tuning exist amongst any form of multiverse? Is fine-tuning a process, in the same way that we (humans) think of fine-tuning as a process? And is a requisite condition of it that there is an intelligent decision behind said fine-tuning?

If the universe was fine-tuned for life, why is it that the conditions allowing for life as we know it are a statistically negligible volume of the universe? Moreover, why did it take 8? billion years for any form of life as we know it to come into existence, and why did it take >13 billion years for intelligence as we know it to come into existence?

Those are what I'm curious about, and it feels like I'm misinterpreting the matter at hand. I guess I'll try and elaborate some more: since the FT argument seems to be resting upon the hypothetical variation of aspects of the standard model and how the subsequent results would make life as we know it fundamentally impossible, is it maintained that life as we know it is the only type of life possible? And since intelligence as we know it is only (and extremely rarely) occurring in life as we know it, is it only possible in life as we know it?

This is another extension that probably wouldn't be reached, but if it's true that life as we know it is only possible in the narrow range of possible values for the supposedly variable constants, and if it's true that intelligence as we know it is only possible in life as we know it, wouldn't be contingent that the intelligent fine-tuner is a carbon-based life form in a universe with similarly fine-tuned physical constants?

So, even if there really is only a dichotomy between "fine-tuned" and "multiverse" and even if we can develop an experiment that could prove one or the other conclusively, isn't the following result that in either circumstance, further specific knowledge would be unknowable?

I think I'm repeating some questions already asked, more or less, but if anyone or Malerin could specifically point out where my strawmen are or where the more important tasks of proving fine-tuning are?

Regards.

I've been making the same point repeatedly. If my understanding of what the cosmologists say is true, when values that differ by tiny amounts from the actual constants, the model produces universes which typically don't have any elements beyond hydrogen and helium, and have no stars. While it is possible that a universe without stars, consisting of diffuse hydrogen, might produce some form of life, it seems probable that if it did, it would also exist in this universe. It's also possible that some of these universes would only exist for a tiny fraction of a second before collapsing. Again, it's not impossible that self-awareness could arise in such a universe, but if so, it probably existed in the initial stages of our own.

What makes this difficult to discuss is that most of the web resources on the subject are heavily skewed to personal agendas. I will have to find one of my physics books that deals with the matter.

I'd be interested in whether the anti-FT people think that this makes any difference - whether the nature of the models produced by different values of the constants are of any interest whatsoever.

Gate2501

9th September 2009, 04:15 PM

Beth

9th September 2009, 04:23 PM

I'm a newbie to a lot of specific and (somewhat) modern philosophy / science-philosophy such as this and I just have a few questions:
I'll answer what questions I can, but I can't answer all of them and I have a feeling that whatever answers you get will be disputed extensively

Is there any history of the notion of a "fine-tuned universe"? When did it first appear? If not specifically known, did it exist in any form before the discovery of the fundamental physical constants that it today postulates as being fine-tuned? I don't know much about the history of such arguments, but I'm not aware of any argument specific to the origin of the universe prior to physicists such as Stephen Hawking noting that the fundamental physical constants seem remarkable in that their values are precisely such that the universe as we know it was able to develop.

Is a requisite condition of fine-tuning a universe that it's mutually exclusive from the multiverse hypothesis? Could fine-tuning exist amongst any form of multiverse? Is fine-tuning a process, in the same way that we (humans) think of fine-tuning as a process? And is a requisite condition of it that there is an intelligent decision behind said fine-tuning?
My take on these questions are: No, Undetermined (I'd guess Yes), Undetermined (I'd guess probably not). The last question, I'm not sure exactly what you are asking. The hypothesis of a fine-tuner is assuming that the constants are set precisely because whatever created the universe wanted them set there. However, I wouldn't agree that an intelligent conscious decision was required. It seems to me the hypothesis of a fine-tuner requires only that a deliberate rather than arbitrary decision was made. Do bees make an intelligent conscious decision about the shape they will make their honeycombs?

If the universe was fine-tuned for life, why is it that the conditions allowing for life as we know it are a statistically negligible volume of the universe? Moreover, why did it take 8? billion years for any form of life as we know it to come into existence, and why did it take >13 billion years for intelligence as we know it to come into existence? Good questions. To accept that the physical constants appear to be fine-tuned to create a universe like ours is one thing. It is another thing to conclude that it was fine-tuned for life, us, or anything else we observe within it. Personally, while I willing to give some credence to the hypothesis of a creator as an explanation of why the physical constants appear fine-tuned, I'm not willing to speculate about the motivations and/or goals of such a creator in doing so.
Those are what I'm curious about, and it feels like I'm misinterpreting the matter at hand. I guess I'll try and elaborate some more: since the FT argument seems to be resting upon the hypothetical variation of aspects of the standard model and how the subsequent results would make life as we know it fundamentally impossible, is it maintained that life as we know it is the only type of life possible? And since intelligence as we know it is only (and extremely rarely) occurring in life as we know it, is it only possible in life as we know it? Also good questions, the responses to those are pretty diverse and hotly debated in threads of their own along with their underlying assumptions. For example, is intelligence really that rare among life forms? Seems to me that intelligence is a continuum from rocks to humans (I do think we score at the top), but most species of mammals at least display the rudiments of intelligence.

This is another extension that probably wouldn't be reached, but if it's true that life as we know it is only possible in the narrow range of possible values for the supposedly variable constants, and if it's true that intelligence as we know it is only possible in life as we know it, wouldn't be contingent that the intelligent fine-tuner is a carbon-based life form in a universe with similarly fine-tuned physical constants? That seems a reasonable extrapolation of your premises. I'm no so sure about the premises though. :)

So, even if there really is only a dichotomy between "fine-tuned" and "multiverse" and even if we can develop an experiment that could prove one or the other conclusively, isn't the following result that in either circumstance, further specific knowledge would be unknowable?
I seems likely to me that we'll not find any answers in my lifetime. However, it's possible a unified theory of everything might lead to constraints on the physical constants that make a universe such that the conundrom vanishes. While not negating either the creator or the multiverse hypotheses, such a theory would make those hypotheses unnecessary because there would no longer be any "fine-tuning" to try to explain.

I think I'm repeating some questions already asked, more or less, but if anyone or Malerin could specifically point out where my strawmen are or where the more important tasks of proving fine-tuning are?

Regards.

I hope this helps.

Dancing David

9th September 2009, 04:23 PM

Dancing David

9th September 2009, 04:25 PM

thought_fugitive

9th September 2009, 04:31 PM

Thanks much for the complete effort Beth. I feel as though I'm closer to the correct page now.

rocketdodger

9th September 2009, 04:34 PM

That's an entirely different point. I'd like to deal with one point at a time. The assertion was that because there were an infinite number of values within a given range that the calculation of probabilities is impossible. That's the point I'm disputing, and I think that the dartboard example makes it clear why.

David is correct, westprog -- your analogy is not valid.

The claim of FT proponents is that there is a small number of states tuned for life compared to an overwhelming number of states that are not.

Without knowing anything else -- and we don't know anything else -- this is false, because there is indeed an infinite number of states that are tuned for life.

So if you wanted to calculate a probability -- which I don't think is valid to begin with, as I state in the OP -- all you can do is compare the number of tuned states with the number of non-tuned states. And both of those numbers are infinity, so it leads nowhere.

fls

9th September 2009, 05:14 PM

I'm a newbie to a lot of specific and (somewhat) modern philosophy / science-philosophy such as this and I just have a few questions:

Is there any history of the notion of a "fine-tuned universe"? When did it first appear? If not specifically known, did it exist in any form before the discovery of the fundamental physical constants that it today postulates as being fine-tuned?

Is a requisite condition of fine-tuning a universe that it's mutually exclusive from the multiverse hypothesis? Could fine-tuning exist amongst any form of multiverse? Is fine-tuning a process, in the same way that we (humans) think of fine-tuning as a process? And is a requisite condition of it that there is an intelligent decision behind said fine-tuning?

If the universe was fine-tuned for life, why is it that the conditions allowing for life as we know it are a statistically negligible volume of the universe? Moreover, why did it take 8? billion years for any form of life as we know it to come into existence, and why did it take >13 billion years for intelligence as we know it to come into existence?

Those are what I'm curious about, and it feels like I'm misinterpreting the matter at hand. I guess I'll try and elaborate some more: since the FT argument seems to be resting upon the hypothetical variation of aspects of the standard model and how the subsequent results would make life as we know it fundamentally impossible, is it maintained that life as we know it is the only type of life possible? And since intelligence as we know it is only (and extremely rarely) occurring in life as we know it, is it only possible in life as we know it?

This is another extension that probably wouldn't be reached, but if it's true that life as we know it is only possible in the narrow range of possible values for the supposedly variable constants, and if it's true that intelligence as we know it is only possible in life as we know it, wouldn't be contingent that the intelligent fine-tuner is a carbon-based life form in a universe with similarly fine-tuned physical constants?

So, even if there really is only a dichotomy between "fine-tuned" and "multiverse" and even if we can develop an experiment that could prove one or the other conclusively, isn't the following result that in either circumstance, further specific knowledge would be unknowable?

I think I'm repeating some questions already asked, more or less, but if anyone or Malerin could specifically point out where my strawmen are or where the more important tasks of proving fine-tuning are?

Regards.

I think Victor Stenger's article, quoted earlier, gives a reasonably accessible overview.

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Cosmo/FineTune.pdf

And to repeat the link the Hokulele provided, just 'cuz E8 is so cool:

http://science.howstuffworks.com/theory-of-everything.htm

Linda

westprog

10th September 2009, 05:48 AM

David is correct, westprog -- your analogy is not valid.

The claim of FT proponents is that there is a small number of states tuned for life compared to an overwhelming number of states that are not.

Without knowing anything else -- and we don't know anything else -- this is false, because there is indeed an infinite number of states that are tuned for life.

So if you wanted to calculate a probability -- which I don't think is valid to begin with, as I state in the OP -- all you can do is compare the number of tuned states with the number of non-tuned states. And both of those numbers are infinity, so it leads nowhere.

I fail to see how my infinite range within an infinite range is a poor analogy for your infinite range within an infinite range.

If we are randomly selecting a single real number within a range, then the probability of choosing any given number is 0. The probability of choosing in a different range must also be 0. Does this mean that it is impossible to determine the likelihood that a number lies within a range? Of course not. The problem of the ratios of infinitesimals was mathematically resolved by Newton and Leibnitz several hundred years ago. The dartboard analogy is valid when selecting any real number from within a given range as compared to another range. As one would intuitively expect, it's relative to how big the respective ranges are.

This is quite a seperate issue as to whether the physical constants can vary or not.

Dancing David

10th September 2009, 05:59 AM

I fail to see how my infinite range within an infinite range is a poor analogy for your infinite range within an infinite range.

If we are randomly selecting a single real number within a range, then the probability of choosing any given number is 0. The probability of choosing in a different range must also be 0. Does this mean that it is impossible to determine the likelihood that a number lies within a range? Of course not. The problem of the ratios of infinitesimals was mathematically resolved by Newton and Leibnitz several hundred years ago. The dartboard analogy is valid when selecting any real number from within a given range as compared to another range. As one would intuitively expect, it's relative to how big the respective ranges are.

This is quite a seperate issue as to whether the physical constants can vary or not.

But you do not know what the setting is, so you can not just say what the ratio is at all. You can not determine a ratio at all, you do not know what the range of possible values is at all.

There may not be a range of possible variables at all, you are just speculating.

You can not determine the ratio without knowing what the possible states are.

It is a game of "What is in the pocket?", but you don't even know where the pockets is ,what it is made of or if it even exists.

westprog

10th September 2009, 07:08 AM

Can you do more than a handwave at Hoyle, who said what constants where?

Or do you mean 'like three cosmologists'?

;)

I've noticed an unwillingness to address this issue. I certainly intend to examine what a selection of dishonest and uneducated cosmologists have said about the issue. I'm interested in whether the "there is no fine-tuning problem" people accept that the nature of the models generated by different values actually matter, or if it's all meaningless.

Gate2501

10th September 2009, 07:37 AM

rocketdodger

10th September 2009, 09:56 AM

I fail to see how my infinite range within an infinite range is a poor analogy for your infinite range within an infinite range.

Because in the dart board example you are assuming a uniform distribution. I agree with you that in the case of a uniform distribution you can generate probability distributions using different ranges of infinities. But that isn't good enough.

What if I gave you a dart board on which the bullseye occupied as much area as the entire rest of the board combined?

Then your analogy fails because the range of infinities within the bullseye is equal to the range outside the bullseye.

What if I gave you a dart board that was just a huge bullseye with a little teeny rim of non-bullseye?

Then your analogy fails because the range of infinities within the bullseye is greater than the range outside the bullseye.

What if I gave you a dart board that had a strong magnet on the bullseye, that attracted the darts?

Then your analogy fails because the dart will strike the range within the bullseye disproportionately more often.

All of these failure cases are non uniform distributions.

Furthermore, you can't even make the case that the values the constants might take should be from a uniform distribution, because uniform distributions are pretty much a man made thing -- you don't find them often at all in nature.

Which is why, incidentally, every FT argument you are ever going to see uses a man made process for an example. Poker hands, roulette wheels, lotteries, random number generators, dart boards, whatever. It subconsciously conditions the listener to expect unknown probability distributions to be uniform.

Dancing David

10th September 2009, 10:07 AM

I've noticed an unwillingness to address this issue. I certainly intend to examine what a selection of dishonest and uneducated cosmologists have said about the issue. I'm interested in whether the "there is no fine-tuning problem" people accept that the nature of the models generated by different values actually matter, or if it's all meaningless.

Back off, I did not say the cosmologists were dishonest or uneducated. You may notice that I am not Rocket Dodger.

I asked what specific values they said were the ones that would cause a problem, so you can answer the question or not. I may be wrong but I believe your answer was brief: "Fred Hoyle".

I am asking what values and where. So far we have had very few specifics and either the EM binding energy or the fine structure constant. So when you say 'cosmologists' I am asking, who ,where, said what ?

I see four issues issues, if you go for what Carter said in misrepresenting Carter then we have an issue of strangeness where 1,000,000,000 becomes 10-31.

Or we have Kaku saying 'small amount' but not defining teh small amout as to which forces and what amounts. Which is why I ask who said, what, where, about what.

Then as Stenger points out, having values vary means different things, should you just vary one constant or all?

Lastly, it is all speculation, one can not assign probablities to unknowns. (Even though there is speculation that counters the FTA as well, it is still speculation)

HansMustermann

10th September 2009, 11:46 AM

I've been making the same point repeatedly. If my understanding of what the cosmologists say is true, when values that differ by tiny amounts from the actual constants, the model produces universes which typically don't have any elements beyond hydrogen and helium, and have no stars. While it is possible that a universe without stars, consisting of diffuse hydrogen, might produce some form of life, it seems probable that if it did, it would also exist in this universe. It's also possible that some of these universes would only exist for a tiny fraction of a second before collapsing. Again, it's not impossible that self-awareness could arise in such a universe, but if so, it probably existed in the initial stages of our own.

What makes this difficult to discuss is that most of the web resources on the subject are heavily skewed to personal agendas. I will have to find one of my physics books that deals with the matter.

I'd be interested in whether the anti-FT people think that this makes any difference - whether the nature of the models produced by different values of the constants are of any interest whatsoever.

Well, it depends on where you're going with it. Basically: of interest for what or in what way?

There are some constants for which we don't know why they have those values. That much is clear.

We can also imagine what would the universe look like, if this or that variable had a different value.

That's not the problem so far.

The problem is when one tries to turn it into "therefore someone tuned it, with some intent" (e.g., so we could exist.) That's where that affirming the consequent and equivocation fallacies get to work overtime. Because there's no other way to bridge from A="those values fit neatly together" to B="someone tuned them." There simply is no evidence for the latter, in any form or shape. So people get to either equivocate them via an ambiguous word, or argue "if B then A" and then pretend that they just proven (or otherwise can handwave) "if A then B". And often the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy is thrown in for good measure, and actually by both camps.

Yes, for some other values of those constants, life as we know it wouldn't be possible. But that's really about all one can say with scientific honesty. Anything conclusion more profound than that is really just speculation and personal belief.

Basically it's not those observations that I have a problem with, but rather with some kinds of fallacious arguments which are built from there.

Werdum

10th September 2009, 02:17 PM

Hello everyone,
I find this topic very interesting but must admit that I'm almost completely ignorant of the "real" science behing it. As a lay person in the field I have some opinions that may be way off base and I would appreciate anyone who could straighten me out realizing that an overly technical will probably go over my head.
Pi is an "untunable" constant is it not reasonable to think that most constants are immutable for similar reasons although beyond understanding by present day science. If all constants are tunable don't we get into the whole square circle arguement.
My grasp of the statistics being thrown around is over 20 years old and that may be why I have a problem with the dice or card analogies. The fact is that I can't know first off if the dice are loaded. If I know the dice are loaded it can only go in two ways. Totally unpredictable because the tuner can change the dice whenever they want or a predictable loading wich leads me to the constant . In the first case I can never know the probability and in the second case its 100%. So with dice we can have only three probabilities. 1/6, infinite, 6/6. If we find the dice are loaded it does not prove a tuner at all it could just lead us to another dice game that determined how our dice are loaded.
If we must have had a tuner to enable us to exist who tuned the univers so that the tuner could exist?

thanks in advance for your patience.

westprog

10th September 2009, 04:31 PM

Because in the dart board example you are assuming a uniform distribution. I agree with you that in the case of a uniform distribution you can generate probability distributions using different ranges of infinities.

Good. Then perhaps we can abandon that particular approach.

westprog

10th September 2009, 04:42 PM

You may notice that I am not Rocket Dodger.

I'm willing to accept that point.

rocketdodger

10th September 2009, 05:14 PM

Good. Then perhaps we can abandon that particular approach.

Abandon the approach of assuming a uniform distribution? Yes, I would like to abandon that very much. That is kind of why I made this thread, after all...

westprog

11th September 2009, 08:15 AM

Abandon the approach of assuming a uniform distribution? Yes, I would like to abandon that very much. That is kind of why I made this thread, after all...

Misrepresentation isn't very persuasive in a thread where you accuse everyone who disagrees with you of dishonesty.

Almo

11th September 2009, 08:21 AM

FT presumably = "fine tuning". Perhaps I've just saved some poor soul out there the several minutes it took me to figure that out. Or alerted everyone that I'm just not as quick on the uptake as most.

Thanks. I didn't know either. FT is stupid, because if constants were different, life would have adapted to take advantage of whatever they were.

I've often thought about what would happen if physical bumps happened faster than light could travel. Hearing would be much more useful than sight if the speed of light and sound were swapped. :D

Almo

11th September 2009, 08:23 AM

Pi is an "untunable" constant is it not reasonable to think that most constants are immutable for similar reasons although beyond understanding by present day science. If all constants are tunable don't we get into the whole square circle arguement.

In my opinion, if we consider the very fabric of the universe to be what results in the constants, pi is tunable. The value of pi is a result of the topography of the 2D plane in our universe, isn't it? Suppose space were somehow hyperbolic instead? :boggled:

westprog

11th September 2009, 08:29 AM

In my opinion, if we consider the very fabric of the universe to be what results in the constants, pi is tunable. The value of pi is a result of the topography of the 2D plane in our universe, isn't it? Suppose space were somehow hyperbolic instead? :boggled:

But there is no 2d plane in the universe. Space may not be hyperbolic, but it is curved. pi is an entirely abstract notion, and would be the same in any universe - since its value is independent of any physical reality. Even if the universe were a dream or a simulation, pi would be the same.

westprog

11th September 2009, 08:41 AM

Thanks. I didn't know either. FT is stupid, because if constants were different, life would have adapted to take advantage of whatever they were.

I've seen numerous variations on this argument from the opponents of FT, and there's been no evidence offered as to how this would take place in the universes modelled with different values for the constants.

rocketdodger

11th September 2009, 09:23 AM

Misrepresentation isn't very persuasive in a thread where you accuse everyone who disagrees with you of dishonesty.

Wait... you replied to only the portion of my earlier response that did not show you to be wrong, as if it was the only thing I wrote, with the statement Good, then perhaps we can abandon that particular approach. and you are accusing ME of "misrepresentation?"

I guess I need to make another thread titled "Are all FT proponents hypocrites or merely unable to read their own posts?"

rocketdodger

11th September 2009, 09:27 AM

But there is no 2d plane in the universe. Space may not be hyperbolic, but it is curved. pi is an entirely abstract notion, and would be the same in any universe - since its value is independent of any physical reality. Even if the universe were a dream or a simulation, pi would be the same.

Well, pi would be different if we weren't using a base 10 number system.

And so would all the universal constants.

But of course this doesn't matter to FT proponents because apparently God uses base 10.

Gate2501

11th September 2009, 09:36 AM

I've seen numerous variations on this argument from the opponents of FT, and there's been no evidence offered as to how this would take place in the universes modelled with different values for the constants.

This is a meta-argument, a break off from the argument of FT proponents that these models actually could come into existence under different constants. It assumes an unproven(unprovable?) hypothesis, and makes a weak argument from there.

I wouldn't use this argument personally. It is very weak compared to the objection stated in the OP, or my own objections to fine-tuning which have been stated by myself, Hans, and some others in this thread.

Why not tackle those objections instead?

westprog

11th September 2009, 10:30 AM

This is a meta-argument, a break off from the argument of FT proponents that these models actually could come into existence under different constants. It assumes an unproven(unprovable?) hypothesis, and makes a weak argument from there.

I wouldn't use this argument personally. It is very weak compared to the objection stated in the OP, or my own objections to fine-tuning which have been stated by myself, Hans, and some others in this thread.

Why not tackle those objections instead?

I'd like, if possible, to get some consensus on the irrelevant sidelines. If it's generally agreed that the fact that the constants can be expressed as real numbers is not an issue, and that it is not established that all the alternative model universes would necessarily produce life, then we can address other issues.

westprog

11th September 2009, 10:35 AM

Wait... you replied to only the portion of my earlier response that did not show you to be wrong, as if it was the only thing I wrote, with the statement and you are accusing ME of "misrepresentation?"

I guess I need to make another thread titled "Are all FT proponents hypocrites or merely unable to read their own posts?"

I replied to the only part of your post that addressed the point I was actually making. This was in order to avoid confusion. The points were entirely separate and were best considered in isolation.

It was quite clear that I was referring to one thing - and you decided to reply as if I was referring to another. I can't see any other reason for this except to distort what I was actually saying.

westprog

11th September 2009, 10:40 AM

Well, pi would be different if we weren't using a base 10 number system.

And so would all the universal constants.

But of course this doesn't matter to FT proponents because apparently God uses base 10.

The representation of pi has nothing to do with the value of pi. Hence when an apple falls from a tree, the rate at which it falls does not depend on the way that g is represented.

Incidentally, Gate, if "objections" such as this weren't being thrown in at every turn, we might get to the nub of the matter a bit more quickly.

rocketdodger

11th September 2009, 10:54 AM

I replied to the only part of your post that addressed the point I was actually making. This was in order to avoid confusion. The points were entirely separate and were best considered in isolation.

It was quite clear that I was referring to one thing - and you decided to reply as if I was referring to another. I can't see any other reason for this except to distort what I was actually saying.

This is another dishonesty, because not once have you stated that you are proceeding under the assumption that the probability distribution for the possible values of universal constants is uniform.

So no, westprog, that was not the only part of my post that addressed your point.

If you want to clear things up, then by all means state clearly that you are proceeding under the assumption that the distribution in question is uniform.

But you won't do this, will you, for the very reason I pointed out in the OP.

rocketdodger

11th September 2009, 11:11 AM

The representation of pi has nothing to do with the value of pi. Hence when an apple falls from a tree, the rate at which it falls does not depend on the way that g is represented.

Incidentally, Gate, if "objections" such as this weren't being thrown in at every turn, we might get to the nub of the matter a bit more quickly.

There are so many things I could say about how wrong every sentence of that post is that I don't know where to begin. If there was ever a post that exemplified the concept of fractal wrongness it is that one.

So I am just going to say " ... wow ... " and leave it at that.

On the flip side, westprog, if you were right, then that second statement sort of invalidates the FT argument in one fell swoop -- if the actual value of the gravitational constant does not depend on the representation of the constant then what is all this talk of varying the values of the constants in physics models?

*sigh*

Gate2501

11th September 2009, 11:25 AM

There are so many things I could say about how wrong every sentence of that post is that I don't know where to begin. If there was ever a post that exemplified the concept of fractal wrongness it is that one.

So I am just going to say " ... wow ... " and leave it at that.

On the flip side, westprog, if you were right, then that second statement sort of invalidates the FT argument in one fell swoop -- if the actual value of the gravitational constant does not depend on the representation of the constant then what is all this talk of varying the values of the constants in physics models?

*sigh*

I *think* that Westprog was attempting to illustrate that the values which we assign to things like circles or gravity do not alter the underlying reality. The apple would still fall in the same way.

I don't think that he could have possibly meant what his post literally says.

rocketdodger

11th September 2009, 12:35 PM

I *think* that Westprog was attempting to illustrate that the values which we assign to things like circles or gravity do not alter the underlying reality. The apple would still fall in the same way.

Yes, that is what I assume as well. Usually I don't like to assume in such a manner but that post leaves us no choice.

But, if our assumption is true, this brings up the question of why on Earth does he think such a point advances his argument, given that this is exactly the point I make in the OP?

Furthermore, why does he think equivocating the underlying reality that we label as "pi" with the underlying reality that we label as "gravity" advances the FT argument at all, since as he says himself the underlying reality of pi is the same in every possible universe?

westprog

11th September 2009, 04:17 PM

There are so many things I could say about how wrong every sentence of that post is that I don't know where to begin. If there was ever a post that exemplified the concept of fractal wrongness it is that one.

So I am just going to say " ... wow ... " and leave it at that.

On the flip side, westprog, if you were right, then that second statement sort of invalidates the FT argument in one fell swoop -- if the actual value of the gravitational constant does not depend on the representation of the constant then what is all this talk of varying the values of the constants in physics models?

*sigh*

Do you really think that it makes any difference if pi is represented in binary or octal - or Roman numerals for that matter? Because if you really do think that then I really don't think there's any point in continuing. That's gone beyond the point where I am able to engage in meaningful discussion.

westprog

11th September 2009, 04:21 PM

Furthermore, why does he think equivocating the underlying reality that we label as "pi" with the underlying reality that we label as "gravity" advances the FT argument at all, since as he says himself the underlying reality of pi is the same in every possible universe?

It's impossible for pi to have a different value, regardless of the laws of physics, or indeed the very existence of the universe. We could, of course, decide to name pi differently, but giving a different name to the same thing wouldn't make it a different thing.

Toke

11th September 2009, 04:34 PM

It's impossible for pi to have a different value, regardless of the laws of physics, or indeed the very existence of the universe. We could, of course, decide to name pi differently, but giving a different name to the same thing wouldn't make it a different thing.

No, pi would not get a different value in a different base.
An almighty tuner should have no problem setting pi to a sensible value like 3.
Since that is not the case, we can pretty much rule out the tuner, Right.

rocketdodger

11th September 2009, 05:20 PM

Do you really think that it makes any difference if pi is represented in binary or octal - or Roman numerals for that matter? Because if you really do think that then I really don't think there's any point in continuing. That's gone beyond the point where I am able to engage in meaningful discussion.

No of course I don't think it makes any difference.

That is my point -- do you think it makes any difference if a universal constant is represented in binary or octal or Roman numerals?

rocketdodger

11th September 2009, 05:23 PM

It's impossible for pi to have a different value, regardless of the laws of physics, or indeed the very existence of the universe. We could, of course, decide to name pi differently, but giving a different name to the same thing wouldn't make it a different thing.

I know.

So why are you equivocating pi to the gravitational constant?

westprog

12th September 2009, 04:09 AM

Because in the dart board example you are assuming a uniform distribution.

Which is an entirely different issue. If the distribution is non-uniform, then it doesn't matter whether there are an infinite number of values or not.

I really don't know why it's necessary to confuse things like this. It is not normally the sign of a strong case.

westprog

12th September 2009, 04:17 AM

I know.

So why are you equivocating pi to the gravitational constant?

I did no such thing. A point was made that in a different universe pi could have a different value. I showed that this would not be the case, and indeed, could not be the case. This issue related only to mathematical as opposed to physical constants

You then made a different point, that constants could be changed by considering them in different number bases. If this were true - which of course, it is not - then it applies equally to mathematical and physical constants. I used the example of a physical constant, but I could equally well have used pi.

I do find it wearisome that there's this never-ending series of silly, obviously wrong points being made, and when I address them I'm accused of dodging the issue by not addressing some other point, and also accused of equivocation by not sufficiently explaining how these are different issues.

I certainly think that the subject heading applies to anyone who claims that you can change the value of the gravitational constant by representing it in binary.

Dancing David

12th September 2009, 06:49 AM

Gate2501

12th September 2009, 09:54 AM

I do find it wearisome that there's this never-ending series of silly, obviously wrong points being made, and when I address them I'm accused of dodging the issue by not addressing some other point, and also accused of equivocation by not sufficiently explaining how these are different issues.

The point that you disputed with RD with respect to the value of gravitational constant is a semantic misunderstanding related to the word "value".

I didn't accuse you of outright dodging, however, you are tackling these weak(read: easy to attack) meta-objections which assume part of the fine-tuning premise to be correct when this has not been demonstrated to be so in reality. It seems like you are being forced to attack these weak points, because they are your only real targets. If you attempt to assault the major objections, you end up like Malerin. Hand waving and puking out a new(and equally silly) analogy every time your old one is crushed.

Errr... So I guess I am accusing you of outright dodging now. lol

rocketdodger

12th September 2009, 10:22 AM

I did no such thing. A point was made that in a different universe pi could have a different value. I showed that this would not be the case, and indeed, could not be the case. This issue related only to mathematical as opposed to physical constants

You then made a different point, that constants could be changed by considering them in different number bases. If this were true - which of course, it is not - then it applies equally to mathematical and physical constants. I used the example of a physical constant, but I could equally well have used pi.

I do find it wearisome that there's this never-ending series of silly, obviously wrong points being made, and when I address them I'm accused of dodging the issue by not addressing some other point, and also accused of equivocation by not sufficiently explaining how these are different issues.

I certainly think that the subject heading applies to anyone who claims that you can change the value of the gravitational constant by representing it in binary.

So some other westprog made this statement? The representation of pi has nothing to do with the value of pi. Hence when an apple falls from a tree, the rate at which it falls does not depend on the way that g is represented.

This seems pretty clear to me.

The value of pi is locked in at the ratio of a circle's circumference to diameter, regardless of the system used.

The value of the gravitational constant is locked in at one of the forces objects exert on each other, regardless of the system used.

That is where you left off, and that is pretty clearly equivocation if you ask me.

And this is why I find it odd that you would try to even suggest a similarity between the two, given that you are pushing for the notion that the value of the gravitational constant can just be changed at whim to whatever real value one wishes to plug in there and the resulting instance of the model will be just as valid as the current one.

Because that doesn't happen with pi -- if you change pi, the model is invalidated.

rocketdodger

12th September 2009, 02:39 PM

Which is an entirely different issue. If the distribution is non-uniform, then it doesn't matter whether there are an infinite number of values or not.

I really don't know why it's necessary to confuse things like this. It is not normally the sign of a strong case.

It is you who is confused. Here is the history of this discussion:

1) David mentioned that the component of the FT argument that relies upon many more possible universes being unable to support life as we know it compared to possible universes that support life as we know it is fallacious because there is an infiite number of both. This component of the FT argument does not address anything to do with probability distributions, it is just a naive comparison of set size, and David was merely pointing out that both sets are actually the same size.

2) You disagree with something that David didn't even say, which is that one cannot use probabilistic arguments concerning sets of infinite size. Nobody ever said this. Certainly not David. So you threw out the dart board analogy as a counterexample to David's point. Only it isn't a counterexample because that wasn't David's point.

3) At least three people pointed out that it is (also) an invalid analogy for use in the FT argument because of the assumption of a uniform distribution -- something you have still failed to address.

You are correct that there are two different issues here, but you are incorrect about us being confused. The issue of range of infinities is a red herring that nobody even disagrees with you on. Furthermore, there is no reason other than dishonesty to try to keep the issues separate. Why do you keep dodging the uniform distrubution issue, and insist on returning to the strawman you incorrectly claim David brought up? The reason I -- and everyone else -- immediately moved on to the uniform distribution issue rather than bothering to argue with you about the range of infinities issue is that we all consider it obvious that you are purposefully stalling regarding the former.

westprog

12th September 2009, 03:22 PM

The point that you disputed with RD with respect to the value of gravitational constant is a semantic misunderstanding related to the word "value".

I didn't accuse you of outright dodging, however, you are tackling these weak(read: easy to attack) meta-objections which assume part of the fine-tuning premise to be correct when this has not been demonstrated to be so in reality. It seems like you are being forced to attack these weak points, because they are your only real targets.l

It's perfect. If I answer the arguments, I'm dodging the real arguments. If I don't, I'm still dodging. Someone just posted that if God existed, pi would be 3. What do I do - treat it like a sensible argument from a reasonable adult or ignore it as a piece of trivial nonsense? You tell me, Gate.

Rocketdodger, as usual, even when I explicitly explain exactly what I mean, is now backtracking through the posts he misunderstood to try to prove that I meant something else. Should I engage in this kind of recursive descent or should I leave him to it?

I will be dealing with the argument about uniform distribution shortly, and I'll explain why it doesn't actually address the FT problem at all. In the meantime, if you want to list which of the anti-FT arguments are worth talking about, and which are spurious nonsense, it might save everyone a bit of time.

westprog

12th September 2009, 03:25 PM

It is you who is confused. Here is the history of this discussion:

1) David mentioned that the component of the FT argument that relies upon many more possible universes being unable to support life as we know it compared to possible universes that support life as we know it is fallacious because there is an infiite number of both. This component of the FT argument does not address anything to do with probability distributions, it is just a naive comparison of set size, and David was merely pointing out that both sets are actually the same size.

So he made up an invalid argument and then answered it? What's the point of that? I certainly wasn't relying on the cardinality of infinite sets.

Isn't it more productive to assertain what people are actually claiming and argue with that?

westprog

12th September 2009, 03:32 PM

The issue of range of infinities is a red herring that nobody even disagrees with you on.

So why has it wasted all this time? Why bring it up in the first place? Why all this nonsense about number bases and pi?

The reason that the point about uniform distribution makes no sense is that FT claim is that it is highly improbable that the constants could have an equal probability distribution. You are using the fundamental assertion of FT - that it's very, very unlikely that the constants could have emerged from an even probability distribution - and simply quoted it back.

Clearly if the values are not random then they don't have the same probability as other values. The assumption of FT is that the values aren't random, and don't emerge from an even probability distribution.

rocketdodger

12th September 2009, 05:29 PM

So he made up an invalid argument and then answered it? What's the point of that? I certainly wasn't relying on the cardinality of infinite sets.

Huh?

David didn't make up any invalid argument. Are you paying attention here at all?

A very popular form of the FT argument presupposes that the cardinality of the set of possible universes that can support life as we know it is far smaller than the cardinality of the set of possible universes that could not.

David simply pointed out that this presupposition is wrong -- the size of both sets are infinity.

Isn't it more productive to assertain what people are actually claiming and argue with that?

Yes, so why don't you do it!!!!!!!!!!!

David was never claiming that if you choose a random number between 0 and 1 it has the same probability of being in the range [0,0.1] as [0.1,1].

rocketdodger

12th September 2009, 05:30 PM

Rocketdodger, as usual, even when I explicitly explain exactly what I mean, is now backtracking through the posts he misunderstood to try to prove that I meant something else. Should I engage in this kind of recursive descent or should I leave him to it?

I am sorry, but to me you are definitely not explaining exactly what you mean.

Perhaps I am just slow, but nevertheless ...

rocketdodger

12th September 2009, 05:43 PM

So why has it wasted all this time? Why bring it up in the first place? Why all this nonsense about number bases and pi?

Because everyone else here wants to make sure that people don't read a single post in isolation and get the wrong idea.

David showed a common FT argument to be wrong. You responded with a dart board analogy. Yes, we understand that your dart board analogy wasn't *explicitly* linked with another form of the FT argument, but that is what this thread is about, and it sure seems like you were trying to conceptually link the two.

If you weren't, and were simply making a statement about mathematics, with no plans to ever comment on the FT argument, then I personally would have made that clear to everyone.

I mean cmon this debate isn't taking place in a vacuum ya know.

The reason that the point about uniform distribution makes no sense is that FT claim is that it is highly improbable that the constants could have an equal probability distribution. You are using the fundamental assertion of FT - that it's very, very unlikely that the constants could have emerged from an even probability distribution - and simply quoted it back.

Clearly if the values are not random then they don't have the same probability as other values. The assumption of FT is that the values aren't random, and don't emerge from an even probability distribution.

No you have it backwards -- I am saying that you assume a uniform distribution when you use a dart board example.

If you generate a random number from 0 to 1 and the distribution for the generator is uniform, then statistically you have a 10% chance of the value being in the range [0,0.1] and a 90% chance of it being in the range [0.1,1].

The form of the FT argument you seem to be supporting is that since the RANGE of values of constants that support life as we know it is so small compared to the RANGE of values that do not, statistically the chance of getting a universe with good values is very small as well. But that is only if you assume a uniform distribution of the possible values.

If the distribution was such that a value in the range [0,0.1] was choosen 90% of the time, then the FT argument is totally wrong.

Do you understand what I mean now? You had the right idea -- perhaps I didn't make it clear enough what I was speaking of when I said "uniform distribution."