Nazi military goals versus reality. [Archive]

Eddie Dane

23rd September 2009, 12:00 PM

Having read Van Crevelt's Changing Face of War, my view of Nazi military goals has changed. I'm curious what forum members think.

I'd like to pass the moral issue of Nazi strategic goals and focus on the practical side.

My question is this: how could the Nazi's ever believe that their grand plan was realistic?
With the power of hindsight it is painfully clear that there wasn't a chance in hell that the whole plan would work out.

Here's why I think they fell for their own BS:
They had the best army and technology. The German army was superior in every way over all it's enemies (though not combined).
The element of surprise. In Russia at least. Though if Stalin hadn't been so pig-headed and had listened to his spies, he could have prepared.
Groupthink. This one puzzles me as Hitler's general staff must have had a number of hard-nosed realists among them. All with a lot more military sense then Hitler.
Hitler. Essentially the same as groupthink, but Hitler set the boundaries.
Racism. Maybe they really believed that Russians couldn't get their house in order. Or maybe one had to pretend to believe that to be in Hitlers inner circle.

The factors that I see so clearly as "show stoppers" for the German plans today may not have been obvious to military planners at the time. But come on!
Alliances. Apparently Hitler didn't want war with England and the USA. Did he hope or assume that England wasn't going to act on it's commitments? And if he wasn't sure, how the hell could he embark on such an adventure? Generalplan Ost was an impossibility, even of it was the only front (I think). But with a second front, you'd have to be mad to think it could work.
The size of Russia. Even if the Red Army hadn't gotten it's act together and the Nazi's could have driven the Russians behind the Volga, the troops would still need to be supplied. Even under favorable circumstances their logistics were not up to the task.
Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Quite frankly, I'm surprised that it took so long before the German brass tried to blow Adolf's incompetent ass up.

NWO Sentryman

23rd September 2009, 12:06 PM

well, these can be very interesting for the AH.comers

http://alternatehistory.com/Discussion/index.php

Corsair 115

23rd September 2009, 12:08 PM

Here's why I think they fell for their own BS:
They had the best army and technology. The German army was superior in every way over all it's enemies (though not combined).
The element of surprise. In Russia at least. Though if Stalin hadn't been so pig-headed and had listened to his spies, he could have prepared.
Groupthink. This one puzzles me as Hitler's general staff must have had a number of hard-nosed realists among them. All with a lot more military sense then Hitler.
Hitler. Essentially the same as groupthink, but Hitler set the boundaries.
Racism. Maybe they really believed that Russians couldn't get their house in order. Or maybe one had to pretend to believe that to be in Hitlers inner circle.

You could add another item to that list: Victory disease. The winning of several battles in quick succession without major difficulty leads one to think their forces will always succeed without much difficulty because easy success is all they've had.

geni

23rd September 2009, 12:44 PM

Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Why? Stalin managed it. When you are planning to reduce the majority of the population to slavery if not outright kill them occupation is less of a problem than it might otherwise be. Hilter also liked the example of the british position in India where a fairly small British force was able to keep a fair degree of control.

McHrozni

23rd September 2009, 12:55 PM

The size of Russia. Even if the Red Army hadn't gotten it's act together and the Nazi's could have driven the Russians behind the Volga, the troops would still need to be supplied. Even under favorable circumstances their logistics were not up to the task.

Had the Red Army been forced beyond Volga, the problem would be greatly reduced. The Red Army would be reduced to an essentially infantry force, due to the lack of oil from the Caucasus, while the Wehrmacht would control approximately 30-40% of world oil production. Certainly enough to sustain major mobility.

Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Not really a problem, especially if they worked towards that goal from the start. Ukraine was severely impacted by Holodomor a few years earlier, and the people welcomed them as saviors. Many others willingly flocked to their cause, to avoid being put back into the prison that was the USSR. Nationalists and communist hardliners would persist, but they were relatively few. Mass conscription of the Red Army also drew able bodied men away before the area was captured, and moving 20 million workers to the east helped that as well.

Quite frankly, I'm surprised that it took so long before the German brass tried to blow Adolf's incompetent ass up.

His performance as a military leader decreased with time. In 1940, his leadership was ... not impeccable, but rather good, and gave extremely favorable results. 1941 and 42 also saw significant (though against not decisive) victories, especially in Russia. It wasn't until winter of 1942-43 when Wehrmacht began to suffer the first major defeats in the east.

McHrozni

Eddie Dane

23rd September 2009, 01:05 PM

Why? Stalin managed it. When you are planning to reduce the majority of the population to slavery if not outright kill them occupation is less of a problem than it might otherwise be. Hilter also liked the example of the british position in India where a fairly small British force was able to keep a fair degree of control.

Well, this is what I mean.

Big military powers now have the experience that they have trouble holding on to terrain when facing guerrilla tactics (Vietnam, Chinese nationalists vs the communists, Algeria etc).
But the Nazi's had just re-invented war. Combine that with the previous 100 years of history where colonial forces would hold on to vast counties and it may not have been apparent to the Nazi's what they would face.

Also, they destroyed 65% (?) of the Red Army at the beginning of their offensive. That looked like the death blow and they couls reasonably expect the Russian regime to fall apart after such a defeat.

The Russians didn't take long to employ guerrilla tactics though. So on some level it must have been predictable.

Of course all recent examples of guerrilla warfare deal with regular forces trying to hold on to a populated and functioning country. Guerrilla fighters typically hide amongst the population. The Nazi's wanted essentially clear out the population except for agricultural slave labor.

That should have made it easier to hold the terrain.

So, you may be right. Not as stupid as it looks with the power of hindsight.

Simon39759

23rd September 2009, 01:10 PM

I am not sure about your evaluation of Hitler's leadership.
I think the solution is that, initially, Hitler was quite happy to sit back and let his very competent generals be in charge.

When things started to get tough, he started to interfere and use his own 'military genius' more. Also, his paranoia had progressed by then and did not trust his officers as much, especially after several of them got compromised in a series of assassination attempts (that was motivated by both his meddling and the strategic difficulties).
There is also the matter of his personal court of sycophants that reinforced him in his decisions.

Basically, events conspired to his trying to micromanage, which he did with terrible results.

Eddie Dane

23rd September 2009, 01:15 PM

What about the two-front war?

Wasn't it apparent that without complete focus on the Eastern front, Germany had bit off more than it could chew?

Could the Nazi's foresee that the Alliance with Japan could result in the US joining the war in Europe?

Skeptic

23rd September 2009, 01:32 PM

Quite frankly, I'm surprised that it took so long before the German brass tried to blow Adolf's incompetent ass up.

Contrary to post-war claims, the top brass essentially agreed with Hitler on their own superiority, and the hatred and contempt of Jews and Slavs.

Anyway, Goebbles was correct -- for once -- when, after Hitler at long last gave him the emergency powers he demanded for years after the 20th of July, he told his staff: "It takes a bomb under his ass to make Hitler see reason."

Comrade Raptor

23rd September 2009, 01:35 PM

The problem with this approach is that the Germans actually did come very close to pulling it off.

If the balkan sideshow hadn't set back the time-table, or they had ignored Kiev for Moscow, they very well could have taken the city. More than just a prestige victory, it was the center of transport and communications. That would have been decisive.

Then in '42 they could have exploited this advantage and cleared the south and the caucasus. Again, even without taking Moscow they very nearly did (except they passed on a chance to take Stalingrad when it was lightly defended and rather bungled the caucasus adventure).

By '43 they would have had west of the Urals pretty well in hand and been able to transfer surplus materials and units to the other fronts. Bear in mind, as well, that after securing this area from large-scale counter-attack they would not have had such a high loss rate. So not only would they have had surplus units, but they'd have the means to form new units and re-equip existing ones more rapidly.

Considering the fight they put up in the West on what amounts to a shoestring, giving them these extra resources from the East strengthens their capabilities immensely.

Their goals were practical and realistic, this is borne out by the fact that they almost succeeded. They just missed their best opportunities to get it done. They could have knocked Russia out as an effective force well before the American effort was up to steam.

headscratcher4

23rd September 2009, 01:45 PM

If not obvious from my other postings on these subjects, I'm very much influenced of late in my thinking by The Third Reich at War and Hitler's Empire...two farily recent books on the history of the Nazis and WWII.

One thing that interested me was the assertion in Hitler's Empire that while achieving extraordinary quick victories in places like Holland and France, the German invasion of Poland, for example, was while quick not cost free. The two weeks it took Poland to fall...and recall they had a very backward army...and the number of German casulalties suggested some serious weaknesses in both planning and execution of the General Staff...sort of like planning to invade the USSR and not thinking about Winter (or that Napoleon guy).

In addition, the Germans got caught up in the Balkans trying to bail out the Italians and that became a serious burden for Germany that significantly undermined their resources.

And, they completely underestemated not only Stalin but the Russian/Ukranian and slavic people. Once they figured out that they were number two with a bullit after the Jews, their growing resistence as well as strategic and tactical innovativeness spelled doom for the German effort. Yes, Stalin through a lot of bodies at the Germans, but his generals repeatedly out-matched them on the battle field as well. It wasn't just overwhelming force, it was Stalin differing to the generals (so long as they got results) and not interfering, and the generals out-playing their german counterparts.

I think the other thing that has struck me about my recent reading is the conclusion that Germany lost the war pretty early...it wasn't just at the Gates of Moscow or at Stalingrad, but their over-extension, loss of men, lack of resources and planning in the face of a huge enemy and a war on two-fronts basically made the german loss inevitable without some sort of grand knock-out puch...a punch Hitler could never deliver.

Comrade Raptor

23rd September 2009, 01:48 PM

I should also add that the above doesn't even include the advantages they would have gained if they'd mobilized their economy more effectively and begun their rationalization program sooner.

And another critical advantage they would have gained if they'd taken Moscow and cleared west of the Urals would have been enough respite to properly train their forces. The shortage of properly trained units hurt them badly, especially in the air. Given more, and better, Luftwaffe units operating in France in 1944 we'd have a hotly contested airspace. A contested airspace means no free-roaming Jabos picking off columns and preventing movement of armored formations.

So I think the sum of the factors, had they been able to best exploit their opportunities, certainly makes it very possible that their plan could have succeeded. They definitely had the means, they just didn't use them correctly.

Comrade Raptor

23rd September 2009, 01:57 PM

And, they completely underestemated not only Stalin but the Russian/Ukranian and slavic people. Once they figured out that they were number two with a bullit after the Jews, their growing resistence as well as strategic and tactical innovativeness spelled doom for the German effort. Yes, Stalin through a lot of bodies at the Germans, but his generals repeatedly out-matched them on the battle field as well. It wasn't just overwhelming force, it was Stalin differing to the generals (so long as they got results) and not interfering, and the generals out-playing their german counterparts.

Soviet strategy and tactics didn't really develop until 1943. In '41 and '42 they remained very primitive. Indeed, up until the end of the war they tended more towards a brute force approach. By 1943 they were better, but still not really on equal terms (of course we should also bear in mind that as the Russian generals got better, their opposite numbers changed... they weren't fighting the same German generals, and many of the replacements were not the most qualified or the best).

Put Manstein and Zhukov on the field on equal terms and I'd put all my money on Manstein.

NoZed Avenger

23rd September 2009, 02:04 PM

Also, they destroyed 65% (?) of the Red Army at the beginning of their offensive. That looked like the death blow and they couls reasonably expect the Russian regime to fall apart after such a defeat.

I can't speak to the percentages, but the numbers of russian soldiers killed and captured near the beginning was staggering -- in the millions. IIRC, there was a continual feeling from the German leaders that "surely" they had made a huge dent in the number of russians able to fight, and that russia would soon be running out of men. But in the next fight, another ungodly number of russians showed up.

Lukraak_Sisser

23rd September 2009, 02:20 PM

IIRC the german high command plan for the defeat of russia was drawn up with the intention of acting as liberators from communism.
I seem to recall (from randomly remembered books and documetaries, so no links, sorry) that they planned to defeat the red army, consolidate and conscript from the newly conquered regions while setting up friendly cooperation governments.
If Nazi racism hadn't interfered this might very well have worked, but once the SS and einzatsgruppen moved in the wehrmacht suddenly didnt have several hundered kilometers of liberated country, but several hundred kilometers of occupied and hostile country between the front line and germany

MG1962

23rd September 2009, 02:59 PM

What about the two-front war?

Hitler was convinced he had beaten Britian, he just never understood why they did not realise this. So to him it was not a two front war

Wasn't it apparent that without complete focus on the Eastern front, Germany had bit off more than it could chew?

No German inteligence badly miss managed the amount of troops they expected to face. At the start of the war in the East the Germans thought the Russians could muster 120 divisions in the field. In the first 6 months the Germans calculated they had destroyed 105 divisons and it seemed that Russians possibly had as many as 100 divisons still active

Could the Nazi's foresee that the Alliance with Japan could result in the US joining the war in Europe?

No because the Germans always thought the Japanese would attack west through China and into Russia's back door. Stalin also shared this view, and you can see a marked change in Soviet fortunes once the Japanese committed to their course of action, and he could start transfering the massive amount of manpower he had in the East.

MG1962

23rd September 2009, 03:05 PM

I can't speak to the percentages, but the numbers of russian soldiers killed and captured near the beginning was staggering -- in the millions. IIRC, there was a continual feeling from the German leaders that "surely" they had made a huge dent in the number of russians able to fight, and that russia would soon be running out of men. But in the next fight, another ungodly number of russians showed up.

You are correct. It became apparent to the Germans they had no actual clue how big the mapower pool was that the Soviets could draw on.

An interesting sub plot to this was the use of ghost divisons. Apparently in places such as Stalingrad up 6 divisons fought on the Soviet side that offiically did not exist in any Soviet order of battle. I have never heard any explanation for this other than it happened

Doc Daneeka

23rd September 2009, 06:28 PM

Put Manstein and Zhukov on the field on equal terms and I'd put all my money on Manstein.

Probably true. However, one could also say that it's a military truism that phrases such as 'all things being equal' or 'on equal terms' are pretty much meaningless, since the entire point of strategy is to set the terms such that they are as far from equal as humanly possible.

Here's a more interesting question: how would von Manstein have done as commander of a Soviet front in, say 1943?

Doc Daneeka

23rd September 2009, 06:33 PM

You are correct. It became apparent to the Germans they had no actual clue how big the mapower pool was that the Soviets could draw on.

The memoirs of Guderiand and Halder are quite interesting in this regard. It's fascinating to see them slowly realising how the USSR wasn't quite like France:)

An interesting sub plot to this was the use of ghost divisons. Apparently in places such as Stalingrad up 6 divisons fought on the Soviet side that offiically did not exist in any Soviet order of battle. I have never heard any explanation for this other than it happened

A hypothesis: the obverse of the FUSAG ploy. Instead of creating a fictitious unit in order to confuse German SIGINT, they decided to hide some formations. I'd imagine that this would be much harder to pull off than the FUSAG method, but it's hard to say. Everything was so mixed up inside the city at that point that it might have made good sense to try it. Keep in mind that this was a country that went so far as to build secret prewar highways that weren't on the maps. It seems a reasonable idea to me.

Doc Daneeka

23rd September 2009, 06:43 PM

They had the best army and technology. The German army was superior in every way over all it's enemies (though not combined).

This is more debatable that one might at first think. In terms of military technology it's not at all clear that Germany was superior, in a great many areas. The utter shock that German tankers found when first meeting Soviet designs comes to mind. Me-109 vs. Spitfire. Etc, etc etc.

Racism. Maybe they really believed that Russians couldn't get their house in order. Or maybe one had to pretend to believe that to be in Hitlers inner circle.

I think that the results of the war with Finland played a large part in OKW views, really. It would be very hard to be a German general and not thinking along the lines of, "Well, if the bloody Finns could do that much damage, we'll absolutely destroy them!"

Comrade Raptor

23rd September 2009, 07:10 PM

Probably true. However, one could also say that it's a military truism that phrases such as 'all things being equal' or 'on equal terms' are pretty much meaningless, since the entire point of strategy is to set the terms such that they are as far from equal as humanly possible.

Here's a more interesting question: how would von Manstein have done as commander of a Soviet front in, say 1943?

You are correct that strategy is to set the terms that way, yes. Your second question more realistically refines the issue, where instead of creating a false equality as I have we instead put the general on the other side of the fence.

But in answer to your second question, I think Manstein's performance with less than adequate resources and less freedom of action (though this last could be grounds for debate, since Soviet commanders were also on a pretty short chain) would probably give him the edge.

But, it is also true that whatever the merits of a commander he is also at the mercy of the organization and constituency of his forces, factors not necessarily in his sphere of control. Even in 1943 communication within the Red Army was still not up to a wholly satisfactory standard, and this limitation also goes some length to explain why Soviet tactics lacked finesse; it was simply not feasible to engage in detailed, adaptive, complex maneuvers.

So taking this into consideration I will admit that I may be giving Manstein too much credit at the expense of Zhukov or other quality Soviet leaders. Strategy and tactics are, after all, governed by means. In the context of the objectives given to him and the resources provided, Zhukov's methods were probably the correct choice and he produced results.

Doc Daneeka

23rd September 2009, 07:16 PM

Thank you. That's very similar to my own view: that both were excellent generals who did remarkably well within the various limitations that their respective military organisations imposed. I'm not convinced that there's any way to make a good comparison. It's Superman vs. Batman, heh.

Simon39759

23rd September 2009, 08:29 PM

Superman would win.

But then, Captain America did slap Hitler in the face, a feat that always eluded Zhukov...

MG1962

23rd September 2009, 08:37 PM

The memoirs of Guderiand and Halder are quite interesting in this regard. It's fascinating to see them slowly realising how the USSR wasn't quite like France:)

William L. Shirer's Rise and Fall Of the Third Reich talks about this as well. The German planning division OKW were constantly revising the number of active units upwards, much to the consternation of the Generals and suprise to Hitler

A hypothesis: the obverse of the FUSAG ploy. Instead of creating a fictitious unit in order to confuse German SIGINT, they decided to hide some formations. I'd imagine that this would be much harder to pull off than the FUSAG method, but it's hard to say. Everything was so mixed up inside the city at that point that it might have made good sense to try it. Keep in mind that this was a country that went so far as to build secret prewar highways that weren't on the maps. It seems a reasonable idea to me.

You may well be right. It was during a documentary I saw, made up of interviews with veterans of the Soviet Army. My understanding was these men were never officially recognised, and the units never appeared in any official histories of the Soviet Army....sadly I guess it is now something we will never know

MG1962

23rd September 2009, 08:46 PM

This is more debatable that one might at first think. In terms of military technology it's not at all clear that Germany was superior, in a great many areas. The utter shock that German tankers found when first meeting Soviet designs comes to mind. Me-109 vs. Spitfire. Etc, etc etc.

Yes there has been an enduring myth about German weaponary. In some classes they were well ahead of anything else. The 88mm AA gun is a classic example.

However in terms of armour, the Germans had their backsides handed to them by the French a couple of times during the fall of France. The Soviet KV1 tank was more than capable of stopping anything the Germans could put in the field. In both instances it was tactics rather than equipment that carried the day

One area often overlooked was the very poor logistics showing the Germans had all through the war. In terms of battlefield management they were exceptional soldiers both with talent and courage. But without equipment they were as vunerable as anyone else.

The Germans were especially defective in anti tank guns, the little 38mm and 45mm guns quickly earned the nick name of the door knocker, because all they did against enemy tanks was give away their position by harmlessly tapping on the enemy armour with their shells

shuize

23rd September 2009, 09:00 PM

NoZed Avenger

23rd September 2009, 09:41 PM

Well, since we're speaking in hypotheticals, I've always sort of wondered what might have happened had the Germans not wasted as much air power as they did during the Battle of Britain and had it to use during their invasion of the Soviet Union?

Or had they waited a bit longer to get more U-boats into the blockade of Britain. Didn't they go to war with something like 1/3 of the total their navy had planned?

Even worse, for the majority of the war, they weren't even cranking out U-Boats at anywhere near capacity, nor had they or the raider surface vessels recommended by the Navy been given priority.

MG1962

23rd September 2009, 10:27 PM

Well, since we're speaking in hypotheticals, I've always sort of wondered what might have happened had the Germans not wasted as much air power as they did during the Battle of Britain and had it to use during their invasion of the Soviet Union?

Or had they waited a bit longer to get more U-boats into the blockade of Britain. Didn't they go to war with something like 1/3 of the total their navy had planned?

Well Hitler scrapped all the heavy bomber programs for the airforce, so I think long term they would have always been at a disadvantage

And Hitler needed to go when he did because his intended targets were rearming and closing the gap. Waiting would have made Germany stronger, but equally so would the allies

McHrozni

23rd September 2009, 10:59 PM

However in terms of armour, the Germans had their backsides handed to them by the French a couple of times during the fall of France. The Soviet KV1 tank was more than capable of stopping anything the Germans could put in the field. In both instances it was tactics rather than equipment that carried the day

On paper, German tanks of 1940 and 41 were rather weak. They were perhaps somewhat faster than their allied Counterparts, but deficient in armor and weaponry.
However, design-wise, they were well ahead. French tanks, for example, had small turrets, so they could fit more armor to it. Consequently only one man could inhabit it at a time. That man would be either gunner (for aiming firing the gun) or loader (to load the gun before firing) or commadner/observer (to find a target to fire the gun at). Needless to say, this meant finding and engaging a target was a lengthy process, unsuited for mobile warfare.
German Panzer III, the mainstay of German anti-tank tanks of the time, had less armor and a smaller gun, but could fit three men into the turret. Consequently they were able to outfight the French tanks with relative ease.

KV-1 tank was highly effective against the Germans because it could withstand direct hits from German 37mm PaK guns, used by armor and infantry forces. Once the Panzer IIIs were upgunned to 50mm guns (design allowed this as a field modification), they were able to take out the KV-1s, which were quite slow and not very manuverable.
With time, design of Panzer IV showed itself as even more versetile than the III.

All in all, it often was the tactics, but also superior design that allowed Germans to triumph for three years. In time, sheer numbers and supply carried the day, which is good :)

McHrozni

rjh01

23rd September 2009, 11:35 PM

There are several reasons why Germany lost the war. These included
1. Hitler killed or expelled many great people. Albert Einstein is one famous example. He also got rid of all opposition, which would have included many generals.
2. Hitler was always in charge. The USSR started to win when Stalin gave command to his generals.
3. The USSR had the manpower to lose. Germany with only about 1/4 of the population could not lose so many men.
4. Blood transfusions. If a German solder came into hospital with only minor wounds, but had lost most of his blood he was probably going to die. But an American or British solder would probably live as they could get a blood transfusion from a person who gave blood days or weeks before.
5. Enigma. The British broke the German codes.

The British made huge mistakes too. They put too much effort into 'strategic bombing.' If they had put everything into the Battle of the Atlantic they might have cut a year off the war.

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 12:00 AM

3. The USSR had the manpower to lose. Germany with only about 1/4 of the population could not lose so many men.

Towards the end of the war, Soviets were fast approaching the limit of their manpower. Surprising, I know. A vital factor was availability of the western allies, with their resources, which drew a substantial portion of Wehrmacht onto themselves - 250,000 tied down in Norway, 250,000 captured in Africa, a million in France ... this adds up to a large force, which could significantly affect the eastern theathre.
That doesn't mean the Soviet manpower (or their sacrifices) weren't vital, just that their manpower by itself wasn't nearly as superior as commonly believed.

5. Enigma. The British broke the German codes.

Poles did, actually, and presented their findings to the British immediately prior to the beginning of the war. The damage that produced could still be avoided, had the Germans knew the weaknesses of the system and how to get around them. Enigma was a superb coding machine, but operational errors, steming from the fact that the German intelligence network was grossly inadequate, made it into a major weakness.

To a large degree German failings were of their own making. With only minor changes, the entire war could've been a lot more disasterus for the Allies. Not in the terms of who'd win the war, Germany would succumb eventually, but Britain and USSR at least would certainly end the war in a much, much weaker position.

McHrozni

timhau

24th September 2009, 12:58 AM

Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Would that have been such a huge problem if it wasn't for their idiotic strive for ideological (and hence, 'racial') purity? They were initially hailed as liberators in many parts of the USSR, but they saw the local population not as a temporary order-keeping tool but as untermenschen. How unreasonable would it be to suggest that they might have had a window of opportunity there somewhere, but when too many locals decide that it's better to go with the devil you know, they were in big trouble.

Eddie Dane

24th September 2009, 01:11 AM

I think that the results of the war with Finland played a large part in OKW views, really. It would be very hard to be a German general and not thinking along the lines of, "Well, if the bloody Finns could do that much damage, we'll absolutely destroy them!"

I agree there.

If I had observed the Soviets getting their butts kicked in the winter war, I never would heve guessed they would turn into the beast the were in 1943.

rjh01

24th September 2009, 01:30 AM

<snip>
Poles did, actually, and presented their findings to the British immediately prior to the beginning of the war. <snip>

Your post is 100% correct, however this point does need expanding. The Poles did receive information, rejected by France, that enabled them to break an early version of the cipher. However the Germans in 1939 then made the cipher too hard for the Poles to crack. So they gave the results to the British. The British then developed machines, including the first computer that enabled them to break this more advanced cipher, which is probably by far the best cipher developed up to that time.

shuize

24th September 2009, 01:47 AM

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 02:10 AM

Your post is 100% correct, however this point does need expanding. The Poles did receive information, rejected by France, that enabled them to break an early version of the cipher. However the Germans in 1939 then made the cipher too hard for the Poles to crack. So they gave the results to the British. The British then developed machines, including the first computer that enabled them to break this more advanced cipher, which is probably by far the best cipher developed up to that time.

Yes, thank you - this would be the essentials of the story :)

The computers were sadly destroyed after the war.

McHrozni

Eddie Dane

24th September 2009, 02:11 AM

I understand w/r/t the heavy bombers. But, even so, I bet all those medium bombers and fighters lost in the Battle of Britain would have come in handy in the East. Especially considering how close they came to winning at Stalingrad.

Did they? After the Red Army surrounded them they were pretty much toast, or frozen yoghurt if you want a more appropriate food metaphor.

There was a gigantic army waiting to attack at the other side of the Volga and the German flank was completely exposed. The Germans may have been making progress in the city, but could they avoid being surrounded?

Dragon

24th September 2009, 02:44 AM

Your post is 100% correct, however this point does need expanding. The Poles did receive information, rejected by France, that enabled them to break an early version of the cipher. However the Germans in 1939 then made the cipher too hard for the Poles to crack. So they gave the results to the British. The British then developed machines, including the first computer that enabled them to break this more advanced cipher, which is probably by far the best cipher developed up to that time.One small point - the Colossus computer was developed to break the Lorenz code which the Germans used for high-level command/diplomatic communication. The Enigma was broken using the electro-mechanical "Bombes" which, as you say were developed from the earlier work of the Poles.

Dragon

24th September 2009, 03:07 AM

Comsat Angel

24th September 2009, 03:42 AM

Regards Eddie Dane's first post, RIchard Overy's "Why The Allies Won" is well worth reading for a reflection on your question.

One poster above makes the point about logistics. The Germans were always very weak in this area, consistently, in both Russia and North Africa. It wasn't a priority in staff training, apparently, and where there were dense road networks, rail systems and Luftwaffe superiority, it wasn't too big a problem. However, once outside those criteria, the Wehrmacht was hamstrung, big time.

David French, in "Raising Churchill's Armies", comes to a valid conclusion in his introduction: "The British decided they would be soldiers, not warriors", which applies equally to the Americans. Rather than martial prowess on the battlefield, the Allies emphasised technology and firepower. This contrasts with the oft-expressed German opinion that they were the better fighters; they might have been, but it availed them little on the late-war battleground.

Garrette

24th September 2009, 03:50 AM

Superman would win.

Ahem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batman:_The_Dark_Knight_Returns)

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 04:35 AM

One poster above makes the point about logistics. The Germans were always very weak in this area, consistently, in both Russia and North Africa. It wasn't a priority in staff training, apparently, and where there were dense road networks, rail systems and Luftwaffe superiority, it wasn't too big a problem. However, once outside those criteria, the Wehrmacht was hamstrung, big time.

In no small measure, this was also a problem of means. In North Africa, the Afrika Corps was very effective until their supply lines simply became too long to be sustainable. The British suffered from the same problem, and only won in defence once their land lines of supply were about 6x shorter, and only won in offense when they attacked them from both sides, with the ability to supply their forces by sea, and with shorter land supply lines in Algeria. Initial US actions in Libya were major defeats, partially because their supply lines were already overstretched at that point.

Red Army and Western forces both faced paralysing supply situations in winter of 1944-45 - and the Western allies had the dense road network to help them.

The supply problem wasn't unique to Wehrmacht in any way. It's just what saved the Allies at a few critical points - Moscow '41, Stalingrad and El-Alamein '42, mostly, but it didn't save the Germans, other than perhaps move the line of the eventual Soviet occupation a hundred kilometers or so to the east. It's doubtful the Germans could realistically do much better in those three engagements.

David French, in "Raising Churchill's Armies", comes to a valid conclusion in his introduction: "The British decided they would be soldiers, not warriors", which applies equally to the Americans. Rather than martial prowess on the battlefield, the Allies emphasised technology and firepower. This contrasts with the oft-expressed German opinion that they were the better fighters; they might have been, but it availed them little on the late-war battleground.

In the late-war battleground, an average German AFV was more heavily armored and armed than it's Allied counterpart. Again, this was a problem of means, Germany wasn't able to produce and maintain sufficient firepower and technology on the battlefield to offset Allied numeric superiority. This was further compounded by a massive strategic bombing campaign, fuel shortages, allied air superiority in the West ...

The problem wasn't so much in doctrine, as it was in German inability to produce enough war material.

McHrozni

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 06:28 AM

It seems to me that one of the things that gets lost in these type of discussions -- speculating on whether the Germans would have done better if less racist -- is the actual cause and effect. By this I mean that the war was not inevitable, it was a war of Hitler's choice and design. It was by its very nature "racist" in intent and scope. This means, at least as far as I can see, that it was essentially impossible for the German's to manage the situation in the East -- Poland, Ukraine, Russia -- any differently than they did. While not as radical as the SS and the Nazi party hacks, there is little in the history to indicate that the German military as a whole was any thing less than as prejudiced and arrogant when it came to the East. While often aghast at the actions of the SS, they not only didn't really object in any way that changed the situation on the ground. The bottom line is that they didn't want to know or thought that exposure to the SS was bad for their troops moral, but the troops under their command were not fighting a war of liberation from Soviet Bolshivism, they were fighting a war of annihalation of Russia and Russians -- as exhibited the very tentative efforts to create a Russian liberation force that only really got started in 1944 -- as the war was essentially already lost.

Without Hitler's aim of creating German colonies in the East, there would have been no war -- at least not of Germany's starting (arguably, a strong Stalin at somepoint might have advanced on the West, but we'll never know, and certainly it would have taken him years without the German invasion to rebuild his officer corps to the point of executing a war of aggression as opposed to a war of defense).

Arguably, once quick victories were denied the Germans in Russia, the war was over. The best thing the Germans had going for them was Speer who increased production at a huge human cost in the heart of the war, but still could not keep up with loses or failures in supply systems. It is difficult to see how, after 1941, Germany could have managed any war lasting more than another year. As each year ticked away, the abilty of Germany to maintain an army in the field and garison countries in the West and divert resources tot he distruction of Jews and other mass populations was steadilly weaker and weaker.

Anyway, to get back to my basic point, we should not confuse German's actions toward the East as anything other than racist and nationalist. Therefore it is difficult to contemplate -- indeed impossible -- a Germany embarked on an anti-communist crusade. Removing racism -- arguably a central part of German strategy and tactics -- from the battle plan is like removing chocolate from chocolate cake.

MG1962

24th September 2009, 06:36 AM

I understand w/r/t the heavy bombers. But, even so, I bet all those medium bombers and fighters lost in the Battle of Britain would have come in handy in the East. Especially considering how close they came to winning at Stalingrad.

Without a doubt those planes would have come in handy. My point though is based on the fact enormous amounts of the Soviet industrial complex was relocated East of the Urals, and the Germans just had nothing that could get there and affect production

MG1962

24th September 2009, 06:47 AM

It seems to me that one of the things that gets lost in these type of discussions -- speculating on whether the Germans would have done better if less racist --

You make a good point. The Germans had the oppotunity to be the liberators in the east and rally the populations behind them, especially in the Ukraine, where Stalin was loathed with a passion

Eddie Dane

24th September 2009, 06:50 AM

Anyway, to get back to my basic point, we should not confuse German's actions toward the East as anything other than racist and nationalist. Therefore it is difficult to contemplate -- indeed impossible -- a Germany embarked on an anti-communist crusade. Removing racism -- arguably a central part of German strategy and tactics -- from the battle plan is like removing chocolate from chocolate cake.

I agree.

But when I mentioned racism in the OP. I meant that they didn't think the Russians capable of certain actions.
Such as rebuilding factories behind the Volga and cranking out 22.000 T-34 tanks at high speed.

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 07:30 AM

Therefore it is difficult to contemplate -- indeed impossible -- a Germany embarked on an anti-communist crusade. Removing racism -- arguably a central part of German strategy and tactics -- from the battle plan is like removing chocolate from chocolate cake.

Racism was only part of the whole problem. Rapid application of the final solution in conquered territories, and immediate mistreatment of the locals definitely compounded their problems.
Even so, 800,000 Soviet citizens joined the Wehrmacht, many of them willingly. It wasn't a question if they were liked or not, just if they were hated more than Stalin, or less than Stalin. Had they managed to maintain a more reasonable relationship with the locals, they could achieve more. No doubt, racism was essential, but not all manifestations of racism were.

McHrozni

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 07:40 AM

Racism was only part of the whole problem. Rapid application of the final solution in conquered territories, and immediate mistreatment of the locals definitely compounded their problems.
Even so, 800,000 Soviet citizens joined the Wehrmacht, many of them willingly. It wasn't a question if they were liked or not, just if they were hated more than Stalin, or less than Stalin. Had they managed to maintain a more reasonable relationship with the locals, they could achieve more. No doubt, racism was essential, but not all manifestations of racism were.

McHrozni

Yes, but as I understand it, most of the recruitment of ex-soviet soldiers was already pretty late in the war when the Germans were already falling back and their standards, if you will, were beginning to slip. They were reluctant to arm them and to deploy them. More importantly, they recruted them to be part of the German army, and not -- as Vlasov urged -- as a anti-soviet liberation force. While I think it demonstrates that in extremis, German tactics began to evolve, it was a situation that their own arrogance fored upon them. And, as I said above, the reason for Hitler to go to war was to wipe-out the Russians as much as bolshivism -- he saw that land as a future home for Germans, pushing what was left of the slav masses over the Urals or exterminating them (using the methodologies they were perfecting on the Jews). Again, my point was that the German war in the East was a racist war and they wouldn't have been going there OR making the arguable tactical or strategic mistakes that alienated vast amounts of the population had it been any other kind of effort.

So, I guess speculation about whether Hitler could have over thrown Stalin if he had just been more pragmatic speculates about a leader that was not and could not have been Hitler.

MG1962

24th September 2009, 08:04 AM

So, I guess speculation about whether Hitler could have over thrown Stalin if he had just been more pragmatic speculates about a leader that was not and could not have been Hitler.

A Russian veteran of the war said during an interview discussing why the Russian people didn't get behind Hitler made the comment

"We had the choice of two dictators, one spoke Russian one didn't....the choice was obvious"

Also during the final days of the war, a piece of graffiti appeared on a Berlin wall. "The optimists are learning English, the pesimists...Russian" lol

Comrade Raptor

24th September 2009, 08:38 AM

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 08:56 AM

A Russian veteran of the war said during an interview discussing why the Russian people didn't get behind Hitler made the comment

"We had the choice of two dictators, one spoke Russian one didn't....the choice was obvious"

Also during the final days of the war, a piece of graffiti appeared on a Berlin wall. "The optimists are learning English, the pesimists...Russian" lol

It sort of raises the whole question of the difference between Stalin and Hitler. I suppose arguably Stalin was a much bigger picture man. Essentially kill everyone and let history sort it out, whereas Hitler's vision was really quite limited. Thus, I think, the difference between the gulags and Hitler's racism. Stalin was an equal opportunity murderer not bogged down by the deatils of incoherent racial theories but moved by equally encoherent historical determinism.

I suspect if you were a Russian looking at the two -- even having experienced Stalin -- your chances were better with the Russians than with the Germans. You knew the Germans would eventually get around to killing you...you hoped, with the right combinations of magical marxist words and proper deference to Czar Stalin you might slip through the cracks of the machine.

The Germans picked Vlasov out of the POW camps and tried to build an army around him. He argued -- and lost -- that only a Russian force fighting for a future Russia could defeat Stalin and that Russians wouldn't really fight for Hitler. They gave him a shot in late 44 and by than it was already too late to turn the tide and he never had the trust of the Germans who, at best, thought a Vlasov force as cannon fodder and not the incubus for a revitalized, non-communist Russia (which they never wanted).

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 08:58 AM

Yes, but as I understand it, most of the recruitment of ex-soviet soldiers was already pretty late in the war when the Germans were already falling back and their standards, if you will, were beginning to slip.

See? My point exactly. Had they done this from June 22nd, 1941, they could have 8,000,000 anti-soviet soldiers in their ranks, rather than 800,000. That would significantly impact Soviet morale, as well as significantly correct the Soviet advantage in manpower.

Then again, Hitler would have to face these same men if he wanted to take their land. He obviously had pretty good reasons not to add those men to his ranks. Still, that could be to some extent muted, either by taking only some territories first, as well as loosing a substantial portions of his eastern legions to the Red Army, etc.

He could still fulfill much of his dream, or all of it somewhat later. It would require a bit more foresight and a lot more respect for the enemy than he had. But I believe it would be possible.

McHrozni

Moss

24th September 2009, 09:55 AM

I agree there.

If I had observed the Soviets getting their butts kicked in the winter war, I never would heve guessed they would turn into the beast the were in 1943.

How much did the Soviets learn from the Finnish tactics used against them? Did it have any impact at all?
I lack knowledge regarding the German supply lines, but judging from the distance it would seem to me that it is rather hard to supply moving troops far from your own home turf. How reasonable were the Germans in that regard?

MG1962

24th September 2009, 10:21 AM

I suspect if you were a Russian looking at the two -- even having experienced Stalin -- your chances were better with the Russians than with the Germans. You knew the Germans would eventually get around to killing you...you hoped, with the right combinations of magical marxist words and proper deference to Czar Stalin you might slip through the cracks of the machine.

And human instinct often drives to defend our home. Many times we have seen armies of liberation find themselves entrenched in wars, simply because they are outsiders not for what they are trying to help change

In the same documentary they discussed the attitude of the Russian people to the war. They saw the Germans would come, win, go away, life would go.......as it always had. Gradually news from behind the front began to filter through and the people were. Rut Roh this may not be so simple

Then Stalin made his famous brothers and sisters speech, and suddenly the population realised this was not a normal war, this was life and death, and if they loose the Russian people will cease to exist

The Russian people dug deep. Drew on their courage and sheer determination and the rest is history. However the Russian people (I believe) did not fight for Stalin, the fought for mother Russia

HansMustermann

24th September 2009, 10:39 AM

They had the best army and technology. The German army was superior in every way over all it's enemies (though not combined).

It's a commonly believed myth, but IMHO it's myth.

To focus on Russia alone, the Pz-III was pretty much on par with the BT-5 and vastly inferior to the new T-34. Until the Panther, Germany just didn't have anything on par with the T-34. The KV series was all but impervious to German tanks' weapons, and it took hours or days to take out. The Russians also made much more extensive use of SMGs and arguably their ammo already made them slightly closer to the later mid-range assault rifles than the 9mm Parabellum used by German SMGs. Etc.

German technology was superior in _some_ domains and against _some_ enemies, e.g., in the air against the USSR early in the war, but it was far from being as across-the-board a thing as commonly assumed.

Later in the war it got hairier. For example, the inertial aiming systems used by the Allies are one thing that most people haven't even heard about, but they raised accuracy in air combat insanely, and pretty much made the Luftwaffe as good as obsolete.

Also, it doesn't matter how good technology Germany itself had, when whole sections of the front had to be held by vastly inferior and unmotivated troops from its puppet states. E.g., at Stalingrad the German divisions were trapped because the Russians had no problem smashing through the Romanian, Croatian, Hungarian and Italian divisions holding the front on the Germans' flanks and closing the encirclement.

The element of surprise. In Russia at least. Though if Stalin hadn't been so pig-headed and had listened to his spies, he could have prepared.

I'm not sure exactly how unprepared Stalin really was. The existing divisions should have done a lot better, if the army wasn't (A) paralyzed with fear after the recent purges, and (B) mostly under the command of political commissars who couldn't tell their rear from their elbow when it came to military tactics, and (C) suffering from a _massive_ dissent problem. A lot of people surrendered to the Germans or even welcomed the Germans just because they thought it can't be much worse than life under Stalin. It took a rather brutal awakening to turn that trend around.

Groupthink. This one puzzles me as Hitler's general staff must have had a number of hard-nosed realists among them. All with a lot more military sense then Hitler.

Not sure if it's groupthink. Whatever Hitler wanted, Hitler got. It's as simple as that. Concentration camps and disciplinary battallions were full of realists who didn't know when to just say "Yes SIR!"

Hitler. Essentially the same as groupthink, but Hitler set the boundaries.

Not sure how that's even remotely similar to groupthink. Once you remove the "group" part it's by definition not "groupthink." But maybe I'm just confused about what you mean there.

Racism. Maybe they really believed that Russians couldn't get their house in order. Or maybe one had to pretend to believe that to be in Hitlers inner circle.

TBH, I'm not sure if anyone at the top actually took the Subhumans-vs-MasterRace propaganda as more than just that: propaganda to justify the genocide.

The factors that I see so clearly as "show stoppers" for the German plans today may not have been obvious to military planners at the time. But come on!
Alliances. Apparently Hitler didn't want war with England and the USA. Did he hope or assume that England wasn't going to act on it's commitments?

Quite literally: yes. From Mein Kampf to actual diplomatic attempts, Hitler actually believed that the UK would join in and take France's colonies as a reward. Seriously.

And if he wasn't sure, how the hell could he embark on such an adventure?

Even after it was clear that Britain won't join him, he thought he can knock it out of the war or at least contain it. There even was a Sealion plan for invading the UK and it was actually taken very seriously.

Generalplan Ost was an impossibility, even of it was the only front (I think). But with a second front, you'd have to be mad to think it could work.

Well, I see you answered your own objection :p

But we'll get deeper into it for a bit.

The size of Russia. Even if the Red Army hadn't gotten it's act together and the Nazi's could have driven the Russians behind the Volga, the troops would still need to be supplied. Even under favorable circumstances their logistics were not up to the task.

Well, in addition to the factors already mentioned by other posters, there seemed to be an over-confidence that every country will throw their hands up after receiving a few good punches, so to speak.

And you have to remember that all the early data didn't seem to contradict that. Czechoslowakia, Poland and even France had given up pretty easily. And while some people make fun of France for surrendering, Denmark had thrown its hands up when just _seeing_ the German bombers in the sky. Norway folded against a really tiny invasion force.

So the theory was that, basically, you just have to knock a million people out of the war and the USSR will come out with its hands up. Even against England, there was a genuine confidence that if you just bomb them enough, they'll come begging for peace.

Dumb plan in retrospect, but... well... I guess the best I can say is that at least they did have a plan :p

Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Again, it's something that wasn't exactly considered. And I think it wouldn't have happened, if it weren't for all the executions and pogroms and whatnot. Again, in a _lot_ of places the Germans were actually welcomed as liberators. They only had to leave it at that, to have much less of a partisan problem. Only when they started with the atrocities, and made themselves more hated than Stalin, did the partisans start being a genuine problem.

HansMustermann

24th September 2009, 10:44 AM

How much did the Soviets learn from the Finnish tactics used against them? Did it have any impact at all?

Yes, it had a massive amount of impact. For a start, that war redefined the USSR's tank doctrines and research direction. It's where, for example, the coffin of the multi-turret land-battleship tanks was nailed shut.

coalesce

24th September 2009, 10:50 AM

4. Blood transfusions. If a German solder came into hospital with only minor wounds, but had lost most of his blood he was probably going to die. But an American or British solder would probably live as they could get a blood transfusion from a person who gave blood days or weeks before.

That was something I saw in a documentary a few weeks ago and I was blown away by that simple fact. The German method of blood transfusions involved using two people simultaneously (the donor—ostensibly an able-bodied soldier—and the wounded donee) at the time when the blood was needed, not stored for future use like the Allies did. That meant two soldiers were incapacitated until the transfusion was done. Multiply that over hundreds and thousands of wounded and you can see where that leads.

Didn't the simplicity of Allied technology also make a difference? I had always heard that German technology was in many ways superior to Allied technology but was a pain to repair in the field, whereas Allied technology, such as the Sherman tank, was relatively simple enough to fix on-the-go. How true was that?

Michael

Moss

24th September 2009, 10:55 AM

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 10:57 AM

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 11:00 AM

I seem to recall that about tank treads/tracks but I can't recall which types were involved. Maybe the Tiger?

Panther had an extremely complex suspension, which was excellent in performance, but a nightmare to maintain.

McHrozni

NoZed Avenger

24th September 2009, 11:01 AM

Didn't the simplicity of Allied technology also make a difference? I had always heard that German technology was in many ways superior to Allied technology but was a pain to repair in the field, whereas Allied technology, such as the Sherman tank, was relatively simple enough to fix on-the-go. How true was that?

Somewhat. The Allies, and especially the US, went (generally) for standardization and overall utility over having the absolute best item avaialble. The Sherman was no match for . . . well, for much, really, but they -- and their spare parts -- were churned out in large numbers and fairly easily repaired.

The Japanese, for a slightly different example, had superior firearms in many respects to the US in the Pacific theater, but they were all different calibers and all made for a specific purpose. A soldier may well have boxes of ammo, but still have no ammo that actually fit his weapon. The US went for .45 weapons -- whether it fit in the Colt, the Thompson, etc. Generally, if you had a gun and a bullet, one would fit the other.

Jungle Jim

24th September 2009, 11:09 AM

Even after it was clear that Britain won't join him, he thought he can knock it out of the war or at least contain it. There even was a Sealion plan for invading the UK and it was actually taken very seriously.

Here is a nice essay about the Sealion plan: http://www.alternatehistory.com/gateway/essays/Sealion.html

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 11:12 AM

Somewhat. The Allies, and especially the US, went (generally) for standardization and overall utility over having the absolute best item avaialble. The Sherman was no match for . . . well, for much, really, but they -- and their spare parts -- were churned out in large numbers and fairly easily repaired.

The Japanese, for a slightly different example, had superior firearms in many respects to the US in the Pacific theater, but they were all different calibers and all made for a specific purpose. A soldier may well have boxes of ammo, but still have no ammo that actually fit his weapon. The US went for .45 weapons -- whether it fit in the Colt, the Thompson, etc. Generally, if you had a gun and a bullet, one would fit the other.

On this point I recall reading that Speer, when he became Armaments Minister, encountered, for example, a huge variety of specialty aircraft and had to work hard to pare the number and types of planes down to a more managable level in order to concentrate production on the most needed types of planes.

HansMustermann

24th September 2009, 11:16 AM

There was yet another flaw of the German army -- or so Stephen Ambrose believed -- that became readilly apparent on D-Day. Essentially his thesis was that the Germans were well trained and well armed but very regimented in their battle plan and tactics. You decapitate the unit, the Germans essenatilly fell apart. On the other hand, Ambrose argued that while less well trained and equipped, young Americans on the beach were able to take initative (always easy when you got no place to go?). If the Major or luitenant or sargent was shot and put out of action, another GI would rise up and take the initative in an effort to move off the beaches.

Certainly, it is an image that plays to an American sense of self, but it seems to me that it contains some truth. THat being that once the first shot is fired all battle plans go out the window. Allied troops stuck on the beach had to move off the beach -- going backward wasn't an option. Germans stuck fighting from fixed positions and caught off-gaurd were acting according to tactics that quickly became obsolete -- made so by allied troops who were essentially improvising in order to save their own lives.

I seriously doubt that. In any army in the world, if you shoot the lieutenant, it's already clear who'll take the command. Any army which doesn't have that drilled in, well, it won't be able to fight much at all.

The Germans stuck to fighting from fortified positions, because that was the orders they had. And, frankly, because while it may feel good to make fun of the Maginot Line, fortifications still worked.

I doubt that, say, the US soldiers had the liberty of saying, "screw this, we'll go storm another beach instead." Well, the same applied to the German soldiers. If their orders were to hold that position or man that bunker, that's what they did.

But rest assured that if a leutnant got a bullet between the eyes, some other soldier took the command and kept fighting.

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 11:20 AM

I seriously doubt that. In any army in the world, if you shoot the lieutenant, it's already clear who'll take the command. Any army which doesn't have that drilled in, well, it won't be able to fight much at all.

The Germans stuck to fighting from fortified positions, because that was the orders they had. And, frankly, because while it may feel good to make fun of the Maginot Line, fortifications still worked.

I doubt that, say, the US soldiers had the liberty of saying, "screw this, we'll go storm another beach instead." Well, the same applied to the German soldiers. If their orders were to hold that position or man that bunker, that's what they did.

But rest assured that if a leutnant got a bullet between the eyes, some other soldier took the command and kept fighting.

Well, perhaps I am not describing it correctly, but I thought Ambrose's history of the D-Day invasion was very good and I was struck by some of the contrast between how the allied military operated and the Germans.

MG1962

24th September 2009, 11:30 AM

Well, perhaps I am not describing it correctly, but I thought Ambrose's history of the D-Day invasion was very good and I was struck by some of the contrast between how the allied military operated and the Germans.

I do understand the point you are making. US soliders have a reputation for independent action. If a circumstance presented itself on the battlefield outside anything encountered in the manual. The soliders felt free enough to give it a go

On the reverse side, the regimented attitude of the Soviet solider was such that they would wait for orders on how exactly to handle the new situation

geni

24th September 2009, 11:42 AM

Back to the topic - was the invasion and conquest of Britain really a goal of the Nazis or did Hitler expect the British to come to an arrangement?

ie allowed to keep the Empire but on condition that they stayed out of Germany's way as they invaded Russia and exterminated the Jews etc.

Hitler's inital plan was the germany would get much of europe and the UK would not get involved. Britian accepting son version of "peace with honuor" in 1940 is one of the few germany winning senarios that doesn't hit the issue that the US goes on to develop nuclear weapons in 1945.

geni

24th September 2009, 11:59 AM

There was yet another flaw of the German army -- or so Stephen Ambrose believed -- that became readilly apparent on D-Day.

They weren't resistent to shellfire? With the amount of rescources the allies threw at those beaches about the only worthwhile lession you can get out of it is that some situations are simply not survivable with the rescources the germans had.

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 12:11 PM

Well, perhaps I am not describing it correctly, but I thought Ambrose's history of the D-Day invasion was very good and I was struck by some of the contrast between how the allied military operated and the Germans.

I don't know, what you wrote just seems at odds with the German mission-based doctrine. This is putting it mildly, it is diametrically opposed to it - German tactical doctrine empathized flexibility to the point of permitting disobeying direct orders, as long as the overall intent of the plan was kept. This would mean that theoretically even if you killed everyone ranked Colonel or above, individual units within a division could still fight effectively, if they received orders and objectives and critical information beforehand.

McHrozni

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 12:15 PM

I don't know, what you wrote just seems at odds with the German mission-based doctrine. This is putting it mildly, it is diametrically opposed to it - German tactical doctrine empathized flexibility to the point of permitting disobeying direct orders, as long as the overall intent of the plan was kept. This would mean that theoretically even if you killed everyone ranked Colonel or above, individual units within a division could still fight effectively, if they received orders and objectives and critical information beforehand.

McHrozni

As I said, it seems I'm not communicating very effectively...I read the book over 10 years ago.

timhau

24th September 2009, 12:15 PM

So, I guess speculation about whether Hitler could have over thrown Stalin if he had just been more pragmatic speculates about a leader that was not and could not have been Hitler.

That is an excellent point. That's pretty much the whole story in a nutshell.

Eddie Dane

24th September 2009, 12:23 PM

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 12:27 PM

As I said, it seems I'm not communicating very effectively...I read the book over 10 years ago.

It could be. It is also possible the book contains major errors. :)

McHrozni

dudalb

24th September 2009, 12:35 PM

Then in '42 they could have exploited this advantage and cleared the south and the caucasus. Again, even without taking Moscow they very nearly did (except they passed on a chance to take Stalingrad when it was lightly defended and rather bungled the caucasus adventure).

I am reading "TO the Gates of Stalingrad", the first volume of a three part history of the Stalingrad campaign by David Glantz, probably the single best Historian of the Eastern Front today, and a main thesis of the book is that the chances for the Germans to suceed in Operation Blau were minimal from the start. He maintains Army Group South did not have the manpower or logistics to have realisitc chance of suceeding, even if they had followed the original plan instead of splitting their forces into 2 and trying to go after both Stalingrad and the Caucasus at the same time.. He descrives Blau as being not conducted on a shoestring, but on a weak piece of dental floss. Interesting read.

NoZed Avenger

24th September 2009, 12:37 PM

On this point I recall reading that Speer, when he became Armaments Minister, encountered, for example, a huge variety of specialty aircraft and had to work hard to pare the number and types of planes down to a more managable level in order to concentrate production on the most needed types of planes.

That's a better example than mine. If Germany had concentrated the navy in submarines and surface raiders for the sea and just a handful of planes, they've have been better off.

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 12:38 PM

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 12:41 PM

A better example. If Germany had concentrated the navy in submarines and surface raiders for the sea and just a handful of planes, they've have been better off.

As an aside, I've always wondered why holocaust deniers don't reason along these lines: "come on! How could they have been so efficient at mechanizing death yet so inefficent at long term planning, armaments and re-supply systems?"

I'm sure someone will get around to it eventually.

Eddie Dane

24th September 2009, 12:53 PM

I must say I'm impressed with the quality, breadth, and depth of knowledge on this board. I don't often come across it on a general topic forum.

Its great isn't it?
I could live here. :)

Corsair 115

24th September 2009, 12:57 PM

The problem with this approach is that the Germans actually did come very close to pulling it off.

But that's due in large part to Russian incompetence. If you look at the actual size of the German military forced tasked to Barbarossa compared to the land area it was assigned, and then factor in the German logistical problems, success was far from assured. And had the Russians not been so bad at the start, it could have easily been quite a bit worse for the Germans.

If the balkan sideshow hadn't set back the time-table...

I've read different accounts on that. Some make the case that the Balkans operation really didn't delay things, as the weather in Russia for operations in early May wouldn't have been favourable anyway, so that mid-June was always the realistic start point for the invasion eastwards.

And another critical advantage they would have gained if they'd taken Moscow and cleared west of the Urals would have been enough respite to properly train their forces. The shortage of properly trained units hurt them badly, especially in the air. Given more, and better, Luftwaffe units operating in France in 1944 we'd have a hotly contested airspace.

Possibly. But one must not leave out the Allied response to larger number of German air units. The Allies could have redirected their forces to counter that, or increased the number of units opposing the Luftwaffe.

As it was, the Luftwaffe's back was broken during the battles in the early part of 1944, once U.S. fighters were released from their escort duties and allowed to aggressively hunt German fighters wherever they found them. It's also an open question as to whether Germany ever could have had sufficient new pilots to allow their veterans to be withdrawn from service to teach the new recruits in the way the Allies did. Between the U.S. and the BCATP, the western Allies had an enormous number of pilots and air crew at their disposal.

No German inteligence badly miss managed the amount of troops they expected to face.

German intelligence was often poor throughout the war. During the Battle of Britain, it consistently underestimated the number of RAF fighters in operation and being produced.

Even worse, for the majority of the war, they weren't even cranking out U-Boats at anywhere near capacity, nor had they or the raider surface vessels recommended by the Navy been given priority.

Not only that, but for much of the earlier part of the war, German torpedoes were of poor quality. (The USN was to suffer the same problem.)

Well Hitler scrapped all the heavy bomber programs for the airforce, so I think long term they would have always been at a disadvantage.

My understanding that the Lufwaffe was always considered in tactical terms rather than strategic. Thus the focus on medium and dive bombers to operate in concert with the army rather than on a strategic heavy bomber force capable of damaging the enemy's economy.

The British made huge mistakes too. They put too much effort into 'strategic bombing.' If they had put everything into the Battle of the Atlantic they might have cut a year off the war.

That's debatable. The RAF's strategic bomber campaign had some important effects on the German military and economy. Granted, these effects were more indirect as compared to the American bombing efforts, but the effects were considerable nonetheless.

One poster above makes the point about logistics. The Germans were always very weak in this area, consistently, in both Russia and North Africa.

Indeed. When horse-drawn carts are one of the main means by which supplies are transported, in a mechanized age it would not seem to bode well for ultimate success.

They weren't resistent to shellfire?

Much of the Allied aerial and shore bombardment on D-Day fell well inland and missed the beaches and shore fortifications completely.

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 01:01 PM

Eddie Dane

24th September 2009, 01:10 PM

"Indeed. When horse-drawn carts are one of the main means by which supplies are transported, in a mechanized age it would not seem to bode well for ultimate success."

An excellent point...for all their vaunted technological superiority, the German invasion of Russia required a huge amount of horse drawn vehicles -- that essentially made large parts of their war machine and supply system no more modern than what Napoleon used in 1814.

This is what I mean. That is such a huge mistake!
How could they think they could supply that many people this way?
Presumably the ammo and engine parts had to come all they way from Germany. How far could they get by train? Oh and trains + partisans = trouble.

Well, at least they got to eat the horses.

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 01:15 PM

IIRC -- Russian rail was a different gauge than German. If IRC, Germany to use Russian Rail lines (at least before the Russians tore them up after implementing scorched earth) would have had to switch supplies onto different rail cars. I could be mis-remembering this. I do know that Russian rail was a different gauge in WWI.

As to the horses, they thought the war would be over quickly. Also the Russians collapsed so fast at the beginning that they got well ahead of their supplies and their planning,

Eddie Dane

24th September 2009, 01:17 PM

Has anyone here read Von Mannstein's Lost Victories?

I'm thinking of buying it.

Corsair 115

24th September 2009, 01:28 PM

ILater in the war it got hairier. For example, the inertial aiming systems used by the Allies are one thing that most people haven't even heard about...

Later in the war, Allied fighter pilots also started using the early version of the G-suit, which gave them yet another advantage.

Ultimately, though, to came down to numbers and training, and in both those areas the Allies had the advantage by early 1944.

Yes there has been an enduring myth about German weaponary. In some classes they were well ahead of anything else. The 88mm AA gun is a classic example.

Speaking of the 88mm, I've often wondered about something. If this versatile bit of artillery was as well-regarded by the Allies as it was, and surely at some point they must have captured some examples of it intact, why wasn't the design ever simply copied by the Allies and put into production for their own use and benefit? Why spend time and effort creating your own sometimes inferior artillery designs from scratch?

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 01:34 PM

IIRC -- Russian rail was a different gauge than German. If IRC, Germany to use Russian Rail lines (at least before the Russians tore them up after implementing scorched earth) would have had to switch supplies onto different rail cars. I could be mis-remembering this. I do know that Russian rail was a different gauge in WWI.

It is true, and moreover, Russian gauge is still different today :)

McHrozni

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 01:38 PM

Speaking of the 88mm, I've often wondered about something. If this versatile bit of artillery was as well-regarded by the Allies as it was, and surely at some point they must have captured some examples of it intact, why wasn't the design ever simply copied by the Allies and put into production for their own use and benefit? Why spend time and effort creating your own sometimes inferior artillery designs from scratch?

The 88mm was either an anti-aircraft gun, or an anti-tank gun. The allies didn't really need a heavy anti-aircraft gun, which was only effective against large bomber swarms the Germans never had, and it didn't work all that well there. Moreover, the US 90mm gun actually had a higher muzzle velocity and a bigger shell, and it was as such better anyway. German gun may have been more accurate, but this was more due to manufacturing quality, which can't be easily replicated. The US gun wasn't fielded in great numbers, because it wasn't needed.

It was a superb anti-tank gun, however, but Allied tactical doctrine empathized high mobility, and used lightly armored tank destroyers with sufficiently powerful guns. As such, the 88mm wasn't suitable for them.

McHrozni

Rogue1stclass

24th September 2009, 01:42 PM

The Japanese, for a slightly different example, had superior firearms in many respects to the US in the Pacific theater...

I've heard the opposite of this, that with a few exceptions, Japanese weapons were notoriously complicated, underpowered, and unreliable. The US, on the other hand, had in the M-1 Garand the best rifle fielded in any numbers during the war, the Thompson and BAR were starting to show the age of their designs, but were still very good, and the 1911 pistol is still in service (albiet in much smaller numbers).

The problem of different kinds of ammunition actually comes from the Japanese at least somewhat recognizing this problem and attempting to change it's standard rifle cartridge to the more powerful 7.7mm. However, neither weapons nor ammunition in this caliber could be produced in sufficient numbers, so they were issued along side weapons that still fired the old 6.5mm cartidge. This could lead to situations where a soldier was equiped with a 7.7mm machine gun and a 6.5mm rifle.

The Italians had a similar issue.

Back on topic, I'm not going to say the German plan couldn't have worked. The USA, after all, managed to fight fairly successfully on two separate fronts. However, there were issues endemic to the German culture at the time that made it much more difficult than it needed to be. Outside of anything listed in the OP, the German penchants for squandering resources on non-vital projects, non-standardized production practices (equipment would be "improved" during production, leading to one run of a vehicle having parts incompatable with others, with no designation on the differences), and generally pissing off everyone who could have if not helped them, at least not hurt them, would have alone made the conquest of Russia very difficult.

HansMustermann

24th September 2009, 01:44 PM

Well, there was nothing magical about the 88mm gun. Everyone had the technology to make equally good high-speed AA guns, since WW1 at the very least. If nothing else, everyone had been producing naval guns for a long time, and there you have the same problem: you have to shoot a shell really really fast.

(If you think I'm kidding some of the later, even higher calibre and speed guns used by the Soviets were converted destroyer gun designs.)

E.g., the Soviets had no trouble coming up with their own 76mm AT guns. And it's a testament to their quality that the Germans too used all they could capture, and vehicles were _designed_ around captured Soviet 76mm guns.

The reason why it took everyone so long to go high calibre was, basically, that a lower calibre was enough, cheaper, easier to transport, easier to camouflage, and you could haul larger numbers of shells around. A high speed 37mm to 40mm gun could defeat any 1939 tank just fine. And very early in the war the Soviets designed a 45mm gun which actually had higher penetration than the 76mm they chose in the end.

Going with the 88mm was more a matter of doctrine, i.e., of having a better idea what to do with them, than any kind of _technological_ superiority. Germany guessed it'll be an advantage to have that kind of an overkill gun, and then mostly for the range. Everyone else guessed otherwise.

But again, there was buggerall in the design of the gun itself worth copying. Hence why nobody needed to.

headscratcher4

24th September 2009, 01:50 PM

I've heard the opposite of this, that with a few exceptions, Japanese weapons were notoriously complicated, underpowered, and unreliable. The US, on the other hand, had in the M-1 Garand the best rifle fielded in any numbers during the war, the Thompson and BAR were starting to show the age of their designs, but were still very good, and the 1911 pistol is still in service (albiet in much smaller numbers).

The problem of different kinds of ammunition actually comes from the Japanese at least somewhat recognizing this problem and attempting to change it's standard rifle cartridge to the more powerful 7.7mm. However, neither weapons nor ammunition in this caliber could be produced in sufficient numbers, so they were issued along side weapons that still fired the old 6.5mm cartidge. This could lead to situations where a soldier was equiped with a 7.7mm machine gun and a 6.5mm rifle.

The Italians had a similar issue.

Back on topic, I'm not going to say the German plan couldn't have worked. The USA, after all, managed to fight fairly successfully on two separate fronts. However, there were issues endemic to the German culture at the time that made it much more difficult than it needed to be. Outside of anything listed in the OP, the German penchants for squandering resources on non-vital projects, non-standardized production practices (equipment would be "improved" during production, leading to one run of a vehicle having parts incompatable with others, with no designation on the differences), and generally pissing off everyone who could have if not helped them, at least not hurt them, would have alone made the conquest of Russia very difficult.

While the US did fight a war on two fronts, it wasn't an occupying power. Once it had taken territory or retaken territory (save in the Reich) the US and allies did not have the same problem that Germany had as an occupying force. The had smaller forces in the West that were ill-prepared for the D-Day invasion. They had to garrison troops throughout the Balkans and later in Italy. It was one of the problems of being so universally loved.

MG1962

24th September 2009, 02:37 PM

oing with the 88mm was more a matter of doctrine, i.e., of having a better idea what to do with them, than any kind of _technological_ superiority. Germany guessed it'll be an advantage to have that kind of an overkill gun, and then mostly for the range. Everyone else guessed otherwise.

But again, there was buggerall in the design of the gun itself worth copying. Hence why nobody needed to.

Well the secret to the 88 was the optics which German industry was a world leader in. This allowed kill hits on KV-1 beyond 2000 yards and most ordinary tanks at ranges out to 3000 yards

thesyntaxera

24th September 2009, 02:56 PM

Forgive me if this was posted already...

It seems to me that German military goals were hindered by over reliance on synthetic fuels. Had the Nazi's blitzed their way to the Baku oilfields and any other oil fields in the Caucus region immediately they could have conquered all of Europe and some of Asia and North Africa indefinitely. The Caucus region at the time would have given them 35-40+ percent of the worlds oil reserves. This would have had to happen before any major events of the war, almost without warning, and with great preparation. The entire synthetic industry would have needed to be at peak war capacity before the actual war broke out in order to keep the movement of supplies going for such a campaign.

Instead they relied on the synthetic industry early on that they had created with I.G. Farben and that infrastructure was subject to frequent bombings which in turn crippled their ability to move tanks, men, or supplies.

Lack of planning and oil cost them everything, from the start.

HansMustermann

24th September 2009, 03:28 PM

Well the secret to the 88 was the optics which German industry was a world leader in. This allowed kill hits on KV-1 beyond 2000 yards and most ordinary tanks at ranges out to 3000 yards

Aye, the optics were an advantage in tanks too.

Rogue1stclass

24th September 2009, 04:46 PM

While the US did fight a war on two fronts, it wasn't an occupying power. Once it had taken territory or retaken territory (save in the Reich) the US and allies did not have the same problem that Germany had as an occupying force. The had smaller forces in the West that were ill-prepared for the D-Day invasion. They had to garrison troops throughout the Balkans and later in Italy. It was one of the problems of being so universally loved.

Well, the US did have to deal with Japanese hold-outs in the Pacific, but no, they didn't have to occupy as such. The Japanese weren't any better loved in the lands they took than the Germans, and many islands were more than happy to not only be rid of them but also come under the umbrella of the US, where several of them remain to this very day.

But what I'm saying is that Nazi culture at the time created logistical nightmares that didn't need to exist. German production was completely schitzophrenic. A new truck might be designed to take a part that during the design process the manufacturer decided to improve it in such a way that it no longer worked in the truck. The next line of trucks would be compatable with that part, but now you needed two sets of the same part to keep the trucks in operation. Panzers of different production runs could incorporate more differences then there were between Stuart and the Sherman. This is just stupidly wasteful and when combined with the fact that German blew so much of it's resources on the silly and evil and and didn't really have any allies in the region who could help with the heavy lifting, you can see how difficult the invasion of the USSR would have been without even factoring in the USSR, much less Britain and the USA.

NoZed Avenger

24th September 2009, 05:07 PM

I've heard the opposite of this, that with a few exceptions, Japanese weapons were notoriously complicated, underpowered, and unreliable.

It was a mixed bag; lack of standard issue had some better and some worse -- although the complicated thing was a common complaint. Some of the handguns were pretty delicate in practice.

Doc Daneeka

24th September 2009, 06:01 PM

Has anyone here read Von Mannstein's Lost Victories?

I'm thinking of buying it.

Do buy it. It reads as the typical sort of self-serving memoir common to former German generals (Guderian's are similar, for instance), but is well worth the effort regardless.

Doc Daneeka

24th September 2009, 06:08 PM

Wow, since my last posts, this thread sure has bloomed. It's wonderful to see such a vigorous and knowledgeable discussion on these subjects. Warms me heart, it does.

So. My 2 cents (after inflation, 4.5 cents):

All discussion as to how Germany could have won the war due to improvements in logistics, tactics, technology, etc, misses the fundamental point. Declaring war on the USSR was awfully risky, and probably suicidal. Combine that with having 1.5 open fronts already (ie, the UK and Africa), and it's simply stupid. Add to that a declaration of war on the USA, and it's utterly insane. I understand well how the geopolitical situation and his own biases forced Hitler into each of these decisions, but it's still insane.

The only way that Germany could have won the war after Dec. 7, 1941 was by suddenly developing a way to mass-produce ICBMs with thermonuclear warheads. Or perhaps some sort of magic death ray.

Comrade Raptor

24th September 2009, 10:07 PM

I am reading "TO the Gates of Stalingrad", the first volume of a three part history of the Stalingrad campaign by David Glantz, probably the single best Historian of the Eastern Front today, and a main thesis of the book is that the chances for the Germans to suceed in Operation Blau were minimal from the start. He maintains Army Group South did not have the manpower or logistics to have realisitc chance of suceeding, even if they had followed the original plan instead of splitting their forces into 2 and trying to go after both Stalingrad and the Caucasus at the same time.. He descrives Blau as being not conducted on a shoestring, but on a weak piece of dental floss. Interesting read.

Interesting, I'll have to add that to my list and check it out. Many of my resources, while nice, are pretty old. I think the newest book I have is from 1973.

I never really gave much thought to checking out newer materials, I suppose I just assumed they were mostly re-hashes of an already well-described topic. But from this thread it's apparant that quite a few interesting new perspectives have come about, and that tells me it might be time to update my library.

As is clear from my posts, I'm definitely expressing older beliefs on the matter and newer materials will probably shed new light on the events.

MG1962

24th September 2009, 10:42 PM

Interesting, I'll have to add that to my list and check it out. Many of my resources, while nice, are pretty old. I think the newest book I have is from 1973.

I never really gave much thought to checking out newer materials, I suppose I just assumed they were mostly re-hashes of an already well-described topic. But from this thread it's apparant that quite a few interesting new perspectives have come about, and that tells me it might be time to update my library.

As is clear from my posts, I'm definitely expressing older beliefs on the matter and newer materials will probably shed new light on the events.

It depends on the theatre that interests you. The Western Front has pretty much been well covered by a series of great books. In the East, the fall of the Soviet Union saw a huge amount of archival material available as well as fine Russian writing on the war, that previously the west had not had access too.

McHrozni

24th September 2009, 10:50 PM

All discussion as to how Germany could have won the war due to improvements in logistics, tactics, technology, etc, misses the fundamental point. Declaring war on the USSR was awfully risky, and probably suicidal. Combine that with having 1.5 open fronts already (ie, the UK and Africa), and it's simply stupid. Add to that a declaration of war on the USA, and it's utterly insane. I understand well how the geopolitical situation and his own biases forced Hitler into each of these decisions, but it's still insane.

In regards to declaring war on the USA, it initially changed very little. US forces were attacking the U-Boots in international waters sufficiently west (I don't know the number by heart), and were sending military equipment in considerable quantities to the UK - including, for instance, 50 destroyers for convoy protection.
Declaring war allowed Germany to inflict some damage on the US back. It was more of an acknowledgement of reality than anything else.

The only way that Germany could have won the war after Dec. 7, 1941 was by suddenly developing a way to mass-produce ICBMs with thermonuclear warheads.

Guess what V3 was to be. The nuclear warhead was also a reality, had that Norwegian heavy water facility not been sabotaged, they could have a nuclear bomb in early 1945.
I'd say they were about a year away from bombing London with nuclear missiles when the war ended.

McHrozni

rjh01

24th September 2009, 11:05 PM

The V3 was actually a artillery piece. One that could reach London.

A good book on why Japan lost the battle of Midway is MIDWAY The Japanese Story (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Midway-Japanese-Cassell-Military-Paperbacks/dp/0304361542).

Corsair 115

24th September 2009, 11:29 PM

The nuclear warhead was also a reality, had that Norwegian heavy water facility not been sabotaged, they could have a nuclear bomb in early 1945.

What's your source for that? Everything I've come across says the Germans were not even close to developing an atomic bomb. And they thought they were ahead of everyone else.

It cost the U.S. some $2 billion in 1940s dollars to create the huge amount of infrastructure necessary to develop and produce the atomic bombs. At one point as much as one-seventh of all the electricity generated in the United States was devoted to the Manhattan Project.

It seems quite unlikely that Germany had the necessary resources to spare to a project of similar scale, especially in the face of the pressures from fighting a two-front war and being pounded from the air by strategic bombing. (As it was, the V-1 and V-2 programs consumed large amount of resources for weapons which were militarily useless.)

McHrozni

25th September 2009, 12:13 AM

What's your source for that? Everything I've come across says the Germans were not even close to developing an atomic bomb. And they thought they were ahead of everyone else.

Pwah, it was a book, E=mc^2 I believe, which dealt with various bits and pieces of history of nuclear technology. It is possible it had flaws in it, of course.

It seems quite unlikely that Germany had the necessary resources to spare to a project of similar scale, especially in the face of the pressures from fighting a two-front war and being pounded from the air by strategic bombing. (As it was, the V-1 and V-2 programs consumed large amount of resources for weapons which were militarily useless.)

On the other hand, the massive scale used in Manhattan project is not absolutely necessary. It is possible to manufacture nuclear weapons on a much smaller budget, with much smaller facilities. Of course, appropriate technology is necessary and I indeed don't know if it was available in Germany or not. Possibly indeed not, and that book was wrong.

McHrozni

rjh01

25th September 2009, 12:25 AM

I doubt that the first bomb could be made with a much smaller budget than the Manhattan project. If it could then the USA would have done so. Even the basic questions needed to be answered, like how do you enrich uranium?

McHrozni

25th September 2009, 01:21 AM

I doubt that the first bomb could be made with a much smaller budget than the Manhattan project. If it could then the USA would have done so.

This is the most obvious assertion. However, the US had virtually unlimited resources, and could afford to use simple, ineffecient systems. Germans (or anyone else for that matter) might have to look for more effectient methods.

Even the basic questions needed to be answered, like how do you enrich uranium?

Gaseus centrifuge, 50 times more effecient than gas separation used in project Manhattan, was first proposed in 1919, and first tested in 1934 (on chlorine). It wasn't used for Manhattan project, because the criminally ineffecient gas separation was sufficient due to virtually unlimited resources of the project, and because ti was more developed.

McHrozni

headscratcher4

25th September 2009, 06:39 AM

IIRC, most of the material I've read in the last decade or so suggests that Germany wasn't very close to a bomb at all...and not just because Hitler didn't understand it and only gave limited support to the effort to develop it.

I recommend Heisenberg's War by Thomas Powers which looked at the German nuclear effort and found it to be half-hearted at best.

I also recommend "The Catcher was a Spy" about the Yankess Catcher, Moe Berg, who was part of a group of specialists deployed in Europe after D-Day --often running ahead of the Allied forces -- seeking out the scientists and information on a German bomb effort. My recollection is that they found that the German's were much further behind than they originally thought.

McHrozni

25th September 2009, 07:34 AM

IIRC, most of the material I've read in the last decade or so suggests that Germany wasn't very close to a bomb at all...and not just because Hitler didn't understand it and only gave limited support to the effort to develop it.

It's possible that book was wrong, I don't really know. It did make a rather specific claim that the Germans were able to produce the fission, with a useful method (gun assembly) but lacked a proper neutron damper - which was to be heavy water. The design was said to be sound, but they lacked enough heavy water. It also quoted a leading German researcher (name escapes me at the time, and I don't have the book any more) that if he just had another 1,500 liters of heavy water, he'd have the bomb.
It is possible he was wrong, of course, but the whole thing seemed quite believable when I red it.

McHrozni

Corsair 115

25th September 2009, 08:45 AM

On the other hand, the massive scale used in Manhattan project is not absolutely necessary. It is possible to manufacture nuclear weapons on a much smaller budget, with much smaller facilities.

Yes, but isn't that because of the advantage of hindsight? We know now, for example, what methods are best for extracting U-235 from U-238. But at the time, no one knew for sure what method was best, and only the U.S. had the advantage of sufficient resources to try them all. It also pursued a plutonium-based bomb at the same time as a uranium-based bomb because of the difficulties of enriching uranium, which of course, led in turn to the technical problems around using plutonium in a fission bomb, requiring yet more resources to solve.

And no one was completely sure if any of it would even really work. That's a lot of time, money, and resources to spend on a project of uncertain outcome.

Comrade Raptor

25th September 2009, 09:21 AM

It depends on the theatre that interests you. The Western Front has pretty much been well covered by a series of great books. In the East, the fall of the Soviet Union saw a huge amount of archival material available as well as fine Russian writing on the war, that previously the west had not had access too.

Yep, that's what I was thinking. Up until then mostly all that was available were German records and the official history of The Great Patriotic War.

The latter effort was, to be polite, rather lacking despite its girth.

McHrozni

25th September 2009, 10:07 AM

Yes, but isn't that because of the advantage of hindsight? We know now, for example, what methods are best for extracting U-235 from U-238. But at the time, no one knew for sure what method was best, and only the U.S. had the advantage of sufficient resources to try them all.

The US had the advantage of sufficient resources to take an inefficient, but functional method, that was the difference.

All I tried to say is that the necessary technology to make a nuclear weapon on a much smaller budget than Manhattan project was in existence prior to the start of the war.

McHrozni

headscratcher4

25th September 2009, 10:24 AM

I highly recommend Richard Rhode's The Making of the Atomic Bomb. ITs a very good book and does a suburb job recounting the personalities and challenges of the Manhattan project.

Of course, with respect to Germany, one of the problems they had is that they had either chased away or alienated to exile the truly great physicists of the era (save Heisenberg). My recollection of Heisenberg's War is that Heisenberg wanted the west to believe that he was a bit dillitantish when it came to applying himself to creating a bomb, but the records appear to disupute that. In other words, he applied himself as zealously as he could given the cricumstances, the funding and the application of a "Jewish" science, but couldn't pull it off both because of lack of hard support and because he couldn't do it.

An interesting take on Heisenberg is the Michael Frayn play Copenhagen -- a fictional reconstruation of a private conversation between Heisenberg and Bohr during the heart of the war. Both afterwords were somewhat cryptic as to what transpired -- they had a almost father/son relationship -- Frayn's take is that Heisenberg tried to cajole Bohr into helping him solve some of the big problems he faced in designing a workable bomb.

Eddie Dane

25th September 2009, 11:39 AM

Of course, with respect to Germany, one of the problems they had is that they had either chased away or alienated to exile the truly great physicists of the era (save Heisenberg).

Have you seen their propaganda flick The Eternal Jew?
They actually show Einstein and the voice over goes: "The relativity-Jew Einstein, who concealed his hatred of Germany behind an obscure pseudo-science."

It's a virulent piece of work, but that bit is laugh-out-loud comedy gold.

dudalb

25th September 2009, 12:03 PM

Has anyone here read Von Mannstein's Lost Victories?

I'm thinking of buying it.

It's interesting, but unless you are a hard core Military History Buff,there are better books on the Eastern front for the general reader.
He has the usual German General in World War 2 memoir habit of blaming Hitler ,Goering and Himmler for every mistake, ignoring that the German General Staff made plenty of their own.

headscratcher4

25th September 2009, 12:06 PM

ignoring that the German General Staff made plenty of their own.

Like not taking Hitler out in 1932? ;)

Eddie Dane

25th September 2009, 12:41 PM

It's interesting, but unless you are a hard core Military History Buff,there are better books on the Eastern front for the general reader.
He has the usual German General in World War 2 memoir habit of blaming Hitler ,Goering and Himmler for every mistake, ignoring that the German General Staff made plenty of their own.

Well, the last book I read (http://www.amazon.com/Julius-Caesar-Soldier-Tyrant-Paperback/dp/0306804220/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1253907309&sr=1-1) was from a general's hand.
It was hard work and I concluded that I'm not a hard-core military history guy.

Not if it's this dry, anyway.

Comsat Angel

25th September 2009, 12:48 PM

Oh boy oh boy, where do I start?

The Sherman: if you Google "Sherman vs Tiger" you'll probably come up with enough tread-head fora discussions to keep you into 2109. This really deserves it's own thread, but - put simply in Comsat's terms: the Sherman was not perfect. It had too high a profile, the side armour was completely vertical, and the 75mm gun wasn't of sufficiently high velocity by 1944. However - it was incredibly reliable, especially compared to the native British clunkers that had been foisted on the British & Commonwealth up to late 1942 (reliability is much under-rated in a lot of gun vs. armour vs. speed vs. camo-scheme arguments about tanks). It was available in Very Large Numbers - 40,000 according to Chamberlain & Ellis.
The Tiger was a mobile metal fort by comparison. It had extremely thick armour, and a huge gun, and was Bad News if you were an enemy encountering it on the battlefield. However! It was also underpowered, extremely unreliable and broke down if merely looked-at-in-a-hostile-fashion. Given it's weight, it had severe problems using roads and bridges. It was a gas hog. The suspension system caused endless problems with stones, mud and ice causing clogging in the interleaving suspension. It was extremely expensive to produce, hence the small production run.

The 88: an anti-aircraft gun pressed into service as an anti-tank gun. With a large shell fired at very high velocity in a very flat trajectory, the 88 did sterling service in North Africa, where there was little terrain to get in the way. However! It was as big as two barn doors nailed together, and was very vulnerable out in the open as a result. To dig it in took an enormous amount of effort, given it's size. Once the B & C got tanks capable of firing HE shells, the 88 promptly lost a lot of it's relevance.

The 3.7": a British AA gun not often used as an anti-tank gun. Reason one being that it was even bigger than the 88, and thus made an even bigger target. It didn't use attached optical sights. As doctrine, the B & C kept it in the Nile Delta to shoot at Axis aircraft, instead of having it front and centre in the desert to shoot at occasional aircraft. See Shelford and Bidwell's "Firepower" and P. Griffith's "Battle Tactics of the Western Desert" for more details.

"Verloren Seigen": Manstein's "Lost Victories". Worth reading, if with a sizeable pinch of salt - guilty of the "Oh-if-only-Hitler-had-listened-to-me-" school of memoir.

Comrade Raptor, you should invest in a couple of volumes by John Erickson: "The Road to Stalingrad" and "The Road to Berlin". These are epochal works on the Eastern Front from a Soviet point of view, with an enormous bibliography. They were published after 1977, IIRC. John Erickson is by all accounts a chap who knows his stuff, and I concur.

Mchrozni: I can't supply chapter and verse, but I do recall it being stated elsewhere that the Nazi's could have had either: 1) The V weapon programme OR 2) A nuclear weapon programme. Not both. The money, time and resources allocated to one programme would preclude the other being established.

Any mention of Operation Sealion deserves another thread. I reserve the right to pontificate on that one, too, however.

McHrozni

25th September 2009, 01:35 PM

Mchrozni: I can't supply chapter and verse, but I do recall it being stated elsewhere that the Nazi's could have had either: 1) The V weapon programme OR 2) A nuclear weapon programme. Not both. The money, time and resources allocated to one programme would preclude the other being established.

Interesting speculation, that's all I can say, really. Although North Korea has demonstrated what can be done on a shoestring budget, if you have a positively ruthless state, which has access to natural resources and lots of slave labor.

McHrozni

headscratcher4

25th September 2009, 01:44 PM

Mchrozni: I can't supply chapter and verse, but I do recall it being stated elsewhere that the Nazi's could have had either: 1) The V weapon programme OR 2) A nuclear weapon programme. Not both. The money, time and resources allocated to one programme would preclude the other being established.

.

This comports with my memory also...they were making some hard choices starting in 1942 based on limited resources...as things developed (and degenerated) they opted for the V program.

geni

25th September 2009, 02:14 PM

It's possible that book was wrong, I don't really know. It did make a rather specific claim that the Germans were able to produce the fission, with a useful method (gun assembly) but lacked a proper neutron damper - which was to be heavy water. The design was said to be sound, but they lacked enough heavy water. It also quoted a leading German researcher (name escapes me at the time, and I don't have the book any more) that if he just had another 1,500 liters of heavy water, he'd have the bomb.
It is possible he was wrong, of course, but the whole thing seemed quite believable when I red it.

McHrozni

The gun type design requires highly enriched uranium. Not pratical. The german attempt appeared to be more focused on plutonium but you can't really build a gun type design useing that.

geni

25th September 2009, 02:20 PM

Doc Daneeka

25th September 2009, 04:52 PM

In regards to declaring war on the USA, it initially changed very little. US forces were attacking the U-Boots in international waters sufficiently west (I don't know the number by heart), and were sending military equipment in considerable quantities to the UK - including, for instance, 50 destroyers for convoy protection.
Declaring war allowed Germany to inflict some damage on the US back. It was more of an acknowledgement of reality than anything else.

True, but it was never about initial impact. The long term impacts were profound: the American public was now behind a full-out war effort against Germany. The German formal declaration of war has always seemed to me as akin to deciding to punch Muhammad Ali on the theory that, since he had been making fun of you for a while anyway, why not? What could go wrong?

Guess what V3 was to be. The nuclear warhead was also a reality, had that Norwegian heavy water facility not been sabotaged, they could have a nuclear bomb in early 1945.
I'd say they were about a year away from bombing London with nuclear missiles when the war ended.

McHrozni

From what I have read, the Germans were never even remotely near producing a bomb, and their entire program was laughable. That is certainly what allied intelligence concluded after the war in Europe was over.

dudalb

25th September 2009, 05:18 PM

It was a mixed bag; lack of standard issue had some better and some worse -- although the complicated thing was a common complaint. Some of the handguns were pretty delicate in practice.

The real weakness of Japanese Small arms were their machineguns, which constantly jammed. They used 3 models in WW2,but none were really first rate.
The Ariska rifle was a good weapon, although the cartridge was underpowered by Western Standards.

But the Italian small arms were even worse.....

rjh01

25th September 2009, 06:51 PM

The problem with Italy was that it was fighting on the wrong side. The men wanted to fight Germany, so I do not know of any significant Italian victory in WW2.

Corsair 115

26th September 2009, 01:48 AM

All I tried to say is that the necessary technology to make a nuclear weapon on a much smaller budget than Manhattan project was in existence prior to the start of the war.

But that still requires making the right bets on which processes will work the best right at the start. Bet wrong, and your program is going to fail. The U.S. had the luxury of being able to pursue all potential avenues, so having to make only the right bet wasn't necessary.

NoZed Avenger

26th September 2009, 07:43 AM

True, but it was never about initial impact. The long term impacts were profound: the American public was now behind a full-out war effort against Germany. The German formal declaration of war has always seemed to me as akin to deciding to punch Muhammad Ali on the theory that, since he had been making fun of you for a while anyway, why not? What could go wrong?

I think this is true -- even with the declaration, FDR was under a huge amount of pressure to go after Japan first because of Pearl Harbor. Without Germany's declaration, it would have been even harder to try and concentrate as many forces on the European theater before Japan was dealt with.

WildCat

26th September 2009, 10:37 AM

Alliances. Apparently Hitler didn't want war with England and the USA. Did he hope or assume that England wasn't going to act on it's commitments? And if he wasn't sure, how the hell could he embark on such an adventure? Generalplan Ost was an impossibility, even of it was the only front (I think). But with a second front, you'd have to be mad to think it could work.
I think this was a big part of it. I think Germany figured the UK would make peace with them and didn't anticipate the US getting involved.

But the UK doggedly fought on and then Japan made things worse by bringing the US directly into the war.

Still, invading the USSR while still fighting the UK in the British Isles and Africa was a huge blunder. But a fortunate one.

geni

27th September 2009, 03:51 AM

The problem with Italy was that it was fighting on the wrong side. The men wanted to fight Germany, so I do not know of any significant Italian victory in WW2.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_on_Alexandria_%281941%29

Eddie Dane

27th September 2009, 01:13 PM

Skeptic

27th September 2009, 01:52 PM

OK,

Based on what I've read till now, the plan wasn't as stupid as I thought.
The Nazi's thought they could keep the UK and US out of the war.

Is it known if the Japanese communicated their intentions to attack Pearl Harbour to their allies?

Or did Hitler have to read in the papers that he was screwed?

Hitler was not screwed by Pearl Harbor. He screwed himself.

The treaty with Japan only required Germany to declare war if Japan were attacked by a foreign nation. It said nothing at all about having to declare war in case Japan attacked a foreign nation. Besides, Hitler of all people would have hardly not felt forced to keep a treaty if he thought it was against his interests.

Congress originally declared war on Japan. Then, four days later, Hitler declared war on the USA. Nothing forced him to do so -- not even a piece of paper. It was all his own doing.

Doc Daneeka

27th September 2009, 06:23 PM

Hitler was not screwed by Pearl Harbor. He screwed himself.

The treaty with Japan only required Germany to declare war if Japan were attacked by a foreign nation. It said nothing at all about having to declare war in case Japan attacked a foreign nation. Besides, Hitler of all people would have hardly not felt forced to keep a treaty if he thought it was against his interests.

Congress originally declared war on Japan. Then, four days later, Hitler declared war on the USA. Nothing forced him to do so -- not even a piece of paper. It was all his own doing.

The Toland bio of Hitler quotes him (and I haven't seen it elsewhere, so hmm) saying something to the effect of, "Now we have an ally who hasn't been defeated in 3000 years! We can't possibly lose now."

Whether apocryphal or not, it's interesting. And demented.

Doc Daneeka

27th September 2009, 06:26 PM

I think this is true -- even with the declaration, FDR was under a huge amount of pressure to go after Japan first because of Pearl Harbor. Without Germany's declaration, it would have been even harder to try and concentrate as many forces on the European theater before Japan was dealt with.

Incidentally, I also believe that even had the USA gone with a 'Japan first' strategy, German defeat would still have been nearly inevitable. The world would eventually have seen Soviet troops marching through Koln, Hamburg and Strasbourg, and presumably some sort of mad dash by the western allies to grab whatever they could before the Soviets overran it.

Scary.

rjh01

27th September 2009, 11:02 PM

The Russians only could move west from Moscow with the help of the UK and USA. Poland and other countries were put under Soviet control with the active support of the USA.

McHrozni

27th September 2009, 11:33 PM

But that still requires making the right bets on which processes will work the best right at the start. Bet wrong, and your program is going to fail. The U.S. had the luxury of being able to pursue all potential avenues, so having to make only the right bet wasn't necessary.

We're basically speculating at this point. The technology could be made to work, but there is no guarantee it will, and it is not the most likely or easiest of methods to make to the goal, and that's all we can conclude from the information at hand. It would be possible, and I'd leave it at that.

McHrozni

Simon39759

28th September 2009, 09:37 AM

The Toland bio of Hitler quotes him (and I haven't seen it elsewhere, so hmm) saying something to the effect of, "Now we have an ally who hasn't been defeated in 3000 years! We can't possibly lose now."

Whether apocryphal or not, it's interesting. And demented.

Might be an expression of Hitler's racial views.
These long streak of victory being an expression of the 'Japanese race' being a warrior one rather than weak and degenerate like the American were (supposed to be).

Meh.
Also. 3000 years? While not any actual war, Japan did not fare to well in the handful confrontations with the Western powers before to the Meji era.
Also, prior to that, they had to give up on a few invasion attempts in Korea...

HansMustermann

28th September 2009, 10:12 AM

Might be an expression of Hitler's racial views.
These long streak of victory being an expression of the 'Japanese race' being a warrior one rather than weak and degenerate like the American were (supposed to be).

Meh.
Also. 3000 years? While not any actual war, Japan did not fare to well in the handful confrontations with the Western powers before to the Meji era.
Also, prior to that, they had to give up on a few invasion attempts in Korea...

Again, I doubt that Hitler's racial views actually were like that or a real factor in that, given that they had already been altered more than once, as fits whatever situation at hand. A racial theory which in mere years changes its views of who's aryan and who isn't, based purely on who wants to ally with you and who doesn't... I just can't take it seriously, sorry.

Doc Daneeka

28th September 2009, 06:59 PM

Again, I doubt that Hitler's racial views actually were like that or a real factor in that, given that they had already been altered more than once, as fits whatever situation at hand. A racial theory which in mere years changes its views of who's aryan and who isn't, based purely on who wants to ally with you and who doesn't... I just can't take it seriously, sorry.

I never took it that way either. To me, the quote seems to be another manifestation of the German version of victory disease (otherwise known as confirmation bias). Had the geopolitical situation been reversed, and somehow the USA allied with Germany and attacked Japan, I'm sure he'd have said something similar.

"The USA has never lost a war in its entire history! We can't possibly lose now!"

I'd be curious to hear the opinions of a good psychologist right about now.

dropzone

28th September 2009, 09:02 PM

I seriously doubt that. In any army in the world, if you shoot the lieutenant, it's already clear who'll take the command. But at Normandy the pillboxes were manned by the old and the Slavic. Guys who were not exactly ardent Nazis. The non-com or lieutenant was often the the only guy who bought too deeply into The Cause and the escape routes were as closed by mines for the grunts as the Allies. If the invaders didn't provide a bit of .30 or .303cal surgery, something close to it could be provided. I have a family, so my crew (less one German) would've waved the white flag as soon other pillboxes were taken and before the 5-inchers of the destroyers could get my range.

This is why I admire the latter part of the Italian war effort. Downside: Taking Ethiopia. Upside: Surrendering to the Brits as soon as it was obvious that it was the way to go. Read a book by a head of the Long Range Desert Group (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_Range_Desert_Group) and the author tells of an Italian garrison whose leader wouldn't surrender before having a proper lunch with his conquerors. It was the only interesting anecdote in the book. Being a Brit, he dried out every story--note that these are the guys the series "The Rat Patrol" was based on, except the TV show only left one machine gun on a vehicle while the real guys would load a dozen or more and drive lengthwise down an Axis convoy, spraying the trucks with machine gun fire.

dropzone

28th September 2009, 09:23 PM

Well Hitler scrapped all the heavy bomber programs for the airforce, so I think long term they would have always been at a disadvantage

And Hitler needed to go when he did because his intended targets were rearming and closing the gap. Waiting would have made Germany stronger, but equally so would the alliesEven early on, they had only long-range expectations to go with their long-range bombers. (http://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-over-America-Secret-United/dp/185367608X) Years, and even those expected only nuisance raids that MIGHT knock out an aluminum plant--but more likely just put the East Coast under blackout conditions--in 1943 or 1944. Production of planes that could make a round trip wasn't expected until '46. Even Hitler had bought a clue by late '44, but by then even the most pessimistic Vegas oddsmaker would've called it for the Allies.

The problem with French tanks was not just with their armament--a high-velocity 75mm shell from their main turret would make mincemeat of the first couple generations of German or Czech tank--but because France believed tanks were to support the infantry, and their tanks wouldn't move that much faster, AND they were tied to the infantry commanders. The Germans changed the rules and, temporarily, held the field.

Regarding logistics, though cavalry was considered silly, in WWII Germany had the army that was the most horse-drawn. We think of them as highly mechanized because of the Panzers, but on D-Day most infantry units closest to the invasion could either march to the sound of war or ride their bicycles.

Eddie Dane

29th September 2009, 01:42 AM

Regarding logistics, though cavalry was considered silly, in WWII Germany had the army that was the most horse-drawn. We think of them as highly mechanized because of the Panzers, but on D-Day most infantry units closest to the invasion could either march to the sound of war or ride their bicycles.

I think those were our bicycles.

ETA: The German army confiscated bicycles from the Dutch citizens. It is still the running joke here.
At Dutch-German soccer matches Dutch fans sometimes still carry signs saying: 'I want my bicycle back' in German.:)

Tolls

29th September 2009, 04:29 AM

The Toland bio of Hitler quotes him (and I haven't seen it elsewhere, so hmm) saying something to the effect of, "Now we have an ally who hasn't been defeated in 3000 years! We can't possibly lose now."

Whether apocryphal or not, it's interesting. And demented.

I think it might be in Weinberg as well. Anyway, taking that book (World At Arms), Weinberg makes the point that Hitler was always after a navy, as that was the one thing Germany could not put together, due to demands elsewhere on their resources (army and airforce). So he allied with Italy, though theirs was blocked up in the Med.

And then Japan attacked the US. German intelligence (and Hitlers own ideology) held the US in very low esteem, so he grabbed at the chance to take the war to the US...ie give a free hand to the UBoats in the Atlantic. After all, from his point of view, the US would now be forced to concentrate on the Pacific for years. They wouldn't be able to fight on both Oceans.

He was, of course, very...very wrong.

Simon39759

29th September 2009, 06:55 AM

NoZed Avenger

29th September 2009, 08:29 AM

Hitler wanted to believe in victory and stretched out a fact to help convincing himself?
I can buy that.

The first part of the war in the Pacific probably helped him keep that thought alive for quite a while, as well. The Japanese navy appeared all but unstoppable until at least Coral -- and really, until Midway. Before that, it was a series of stinging defeats for the US navy.

Corsair 115

29th September 2009, 11:14 AM

The Japanese navy appeared all but unstoppable until at least Coral -- and really, until Midway. Before that, it was a series of stinging defeats for the US navy.

That's true enough, but a defeat at Midway for the U.S. wouldn't have changed the outcome in the long run. In a competition to produce new ships and aircraft, the Japanese had no chance against the U.S.

drkitten

29th September 2009, 11:31 AM

That's true enough, but a defeat at Midway for the U.S. wouldn't have changed the outcome in the long run. In a competition to produce new ships and aircraft, the Japanese had no chance against the U.S.

Only if you look at the Pacific War in isolation. A defeat at Midway would have forced the Americans to shift more of their industry and resources to replace the lost carriers, which in turn would have cost the UK much of their support in the critical 1942-1943 period. A weakened UK that can't support the Royal Navy isn't much of a threat, freeing up much of the ground forces elsewhere for the Soviet campaign in the Caucasus. If the Germans are successful there, that's their oil problem licked.

By the time the American production had ramped up enough to be able to take on the Japanese and win (which I agree, all the charts suggest it would have), the world military position might have changed enough to make a negotiated settlement practical....

NoZed Avenger

29th September 2009, 12:25 PM

That's true enough, but a defeat at Midway for the U.S. wouldn't have changed the outcome in the long run. In a competition to produce new ships and aircraft, the Japanese had no chance against the U.S.

Probably true (though drkitten makes a good point), but I was looking more at the perception of events at the time. A lot of people were looking at the Japanese as unstoppable supermen with regard to the war in the Pacific right up until Midway, and though some appreciated the industrial and production might being brought to bear by the US (cough*Yamamoto*cough), even a fair number of military minds did not apprecite those facts.

patchbunny

29th September 2009, 12:32 PM

The real weakness of Japanese Small arms were their machineguns, which constantly jammed. They used 3 models in WW2,but none were really first rate.
The Ariska rifle was a good weapon, although the cartridge was underpowered by Western Standards.

But the Italian small arms were even worse.....

The General, an old gaming magazine publsihed by Avalon Hill, had a wonderful article on the Japanese military for the game Advanced Squad Leader, which included a long commentary on Japanese small arms. Don't have it near me, but IIRC there were something like 7 different small arms calibers for their rifles and machine guns, none of which were interchangable. Now there's a logistics nightmare even if you have the ability to get stuff to the front lines.

Doc Daneeka

29th September 2009, 08:23 PM

I think it might be in Weinberg as well. Anyway, taking that book (World At Arms), Weinberg makes the point that Hitler was always after a navy, as that was the one thing Germany could not put together, due to demands elsewhere on their resources (army and airforce).

Very good point. That is enough to explain it, at least for me. Thanks. Now I'm going to have to reread Weinberg:)

horza66

30th September 2009, 02:14 AM

There's been a discussion here about the importance of superiority of German arms which has a fairly common, but mistaken, emphasis as the explanation for superior German prowess in 1939-42. German equipment was *not* superior in many cases. It was doctrine, informed by experience, applied as operational warfare that gave them their early superiority. A few examples:

Armour: The PzKfw Is and IIs used in the majority by the early Panzer divisions were inferior to British and French tanks in quality and quantity. However the Germans learned in their brief experience in Poland that Guderian's theories could be applied successfully, that armour employed en masse could have an effect beyond its numbers, exploiting breakthroughs and penetrating far to the enemy rear. The Allies learned the same lesson eventually, but were behind the learning curve.

Aircraft: The Bf109 was a fine plane, but not significantly superior to its contemporaries. The key difference was how it was flown. Thanks to the experience of the Condor Legion in Spain the Luftwaffe adopted flying formations that gave them significant advantages over France, which fed into experience that was applied in Russia.

Guns: The 88mm has been specifically mentioned, and its development is great example of how experience, doctrine and application feed into each other. The 88mm Flak gun was deployed in Spain as an AA weapon, and in the same period the British had a 17pdr AA gun, the Americans a 90mm. However also in Spain were Soviet T-26s, that the existing minimal anti-tank weaponry found almost impossible to defeat. The 88s were used in desperation with their high explosive rounds, with some success. The Germans took the lesson learned back with them, and developed an anti-tank round for the 88, and started development on stronger dedicated AT weapons. In Poland and France the 88 went from being an AT weapon of last resort, to an element of operational planning. In the later war the 88 appeared in the turret of the Tiger. Again the Allies learned the same lessons, but behind the curve. AT rounds for the 17pdr and 90mm had to be developed, and the guns themselves adapted to fit tank turrets.

The key thing to recognise about the Wehrmacht of the period is that while they had insane leadership at the top, the German staff officers were strongly rational and not impeded by WWI doctrines. They got early experience, and generally learned the correct lessons from it. There was no inherent superiority to German arms - they treated war as a science, applied it first, and everyone else scrabbled to catch up. Which they did, but not until '44-5.

a_unique_person

30th September 2009, 03:55 AM

The size of Russia. Even if the Red Army hadn't gotten it's act together and the Nazi's could have driven the Russians behind the Volga, the troops would still need to be supplied. Even under favorable circumstances their logistics were not up to the task.

To the end of the war, the Germans were still using the horse and cart for transport, while they had the V1, the V2, the best tank and the best fighter. It didn't add up.

Tolls

30th September 2009, 07:58 AM

drkitten

30th September 2009, 08:09 AM

Not convinced by that argument.
A defeat at Midway would not have opened up Hawaii, for example, or the West Coast. So why would it have significantly effected the build up in the Atlantic? Unless you are proposing that it would be enough to shift the US from a Germany first position?

That's exactly what I'm suggesting, yes. Replacing lost carriers isn't cheap and most carriers were built in the same Virginia shipyards that were turning out destroyers all through 1942 instead. More carriers = fewer destroyers.

I'm also not sure why you suggest that a defeat at Midway would not have opened up Hawai'i or the West Coast. With what would the United States have defended them? The battle wagons were mostly underwater at Pearl, and the flattops are (hypothetically) underwater off Midway.

Tolls

30th September 2009, 09:31 AM

drkitten

30th September 2009, 10:02 AM

As for carrier replacements, I would say it's almost as likely that the pacific would be placed on the back burner entirely, or at least receive no more resources than it did in real life.

I disagree (obviously). That would have been politically impossible (and militarily unwise).

Remember that the Germans had not actually threatened the United States in any serious way. US Army troops didn't get into actual action in the European theater until nearly six months after Midway, while the Japanese had directly attacked US soil and were definitively engaged in combat operations against US military forces. At the time of Midway, the US hadn't even managed to get bomber crews to launch strikes against Axis-controlled Europe.

I can't imagine how you think that the Roosevelt government would have been able to justify ignoring the Japanese and putting the Pacific war "on the back burner entirely."

dasmiller

30th September 2009, 10:02 AM

The key thing to recognise about the Wehrmacht of the period is that while they had insane leadership at the top, the German staff officers were strongly rational and not impeded by WWI doctrines.

It's probably easier to re-think the doctrines used in the previous war if you lost the previous war. Related to that, Germany's post-WWI disarmament forced the military to be more receptive to creative approaches for strategy & tactics.

A counter-argument would be that at the beginning of WWII, the Japanese naval combat tactics were considerably better than the Americans, and the Japanese certainly didn't have a major defeat in the recent past. Maybe facing a larger opponent forces the military to be more receptive to creative approaches?

drkitten

30th September 2009, 10:11 AM

NoZed Avenger

30th September 2009, 10:22 AM

drkitten

30th September 2009, 10:28 AM

Some took longer than others cough*Montgomery*cough.

Well, just because you "re-think" doesn't mean you'll come to a better answer the second time than the first.

dudalb

30th September 2009, 11:05 AM

The first hellcats went into service the same month as Midway...from that point on the Zero was outclassed.

The ability of the Japanese to conduct any sort of offensive operation beyond Midway was distinctly limited, in my view, and would not be capable of launching an attack on Hawaii with the forces at Midway for several weeks at least (not that that was actually on their minds). And I think I'm being generous there.

As for carrier replacements, I would say it's almost as likely that the pacific would be placed on the back burner entirely, or at least receive no more resources than it did in real life.

If Midway had been a defeat for the US, a shift of resources to the Pacific would have been a certainity, for political reasons. The pressure from the West Coast to beef up defenses would have been impossible to resist.
That Japan could have done nothing more then a spectacular but militarily useless hit and run raid..a sort of Japanese version of the Doolittle raid...would have been irrevelent.

dasmiller

30th September 2009, 11:46 AM

A better counter-argument, I think, is that experience counts.

The Germans had been fighting a "junior varsity" war in Spain since 1936 and had pioneered most of their tactics there; the Japanese had been fighting in Manchuria since 1931. They got a chance to "rethink the doctrines" used in WWI in the thirties; the Allies had to wait until the 40s to do that.

I'll acknowledge that the Spanish Civil War gave the Germans a chance to practice, although everybody else was watching and certainly should have learned many of the lessons that the Germans learned.

I'm not sure that the Japanese experience in Manchuria contributed substantially to their naval combat philosophy.

drkitten

30th September 2009, 12:27 PM

I'm not sure that the Japanese experience in Manchuria contributed substantially to their naval combat philosophy.

Except that one of the big lessons we learned in WWII -- and we learned later than the Japanese -- is that you can't separate "naval combat" from "ground combat," i.e. the importance of combined arms tactics. In particular, the use of the airplane as a weapons platform really came into its own in the Second World War, and the proper use of a floating airfield (i.e. carrier doctrine) follows.

Similarly, the Japanese pilots were simply better as a result of their Manchurian experience. Actual combat piloting experience will do that to you.

You can see the results historically. How many battleships did Yamamoto send on the Pearl raid? He recognized -- in part from the Manchukuo experiences -- that carrier-based planes were capable of devastating targets from far beyond the range of battleships' guns. The US didn't learn that until it ran out of battleships and had to use carriers because that was all that was left.

But the whole way to launch a large-scale plane attack was learned in Manchuria (http://books.google.com/books?id=RFpdzZFGXccC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+states+carrier+tactics+before+pearl&source=bl&ots=dCk-BVJ_BB&sig=bfkDg9QpBhTns9csgNO70AWuuSE&hl=en&ei=3a7DSoT1LIOplAeJ2Z3IBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3#v=onepage&q=&f=false):

The reports of air warfare in the Sino-Japanese Incident, which broke out in 1937, revealed the magnificant capability of fighter aircraft. When the enemy had powerful defensive fighters, we would have to increase the sacrifice of our attacking bombers if we did not provide a substantial fighter cover of our own. Moreover, our bombers would not have been able to secure the desired results if we had not attacked with large concentrated formations. Of course, this was a lesson learned from land operations, but it still suggested considerable modification to the conventional way of thinking within the Japanese Navy. [...] This idea, which was later used at Pearl Harbor, was practiced in our Combined Fleet in 1939-1940. The results were satisfactory and we thus concluded that no other offensive techniques were to be considered.

(Minoru Genda)

horza66

30th September 2009, 02:13 PM

It's probably easier to re-think the doctrines used in the previous war if you lost the previous war. Related to that, Germany's post-WWI disarmament forced the military to be more receptive to creative approaches for strategy & tactics.

A counter-argument would be that at the beginning of WWII, the Japanese naval combat tactics were considerably better than the Americans, and the Japanese certainly didn't have a major defeat in the recent past. Maybe facing a larger opponent forces the military to be more receptive to creative approaches?

I'd say there are two elements that contributed to the latter situation.

The first is that when the Washington Naval Treaty was signed Japan was in the process of building battle ships (the second 8-8-8 program). Those that were on the yards already were converted to carriers, providing a nucleus for an early carrier task force.

However the US was pushed into carrier building by the same treaty, so I think the main factor is the second element : Isoruku Yamamoto. Despite being anti-war (with the US at least) and hated by Tojo he was recognised by all as the leading Naval strategist by far, and irreplaceable. I don't think it too outlandish to compare his impact with that of Nelson. He established the doctrine of carrier-led warfare, and made it happen.

Corsair 115

30th September 2009, 02:22 PM

Only if you look at the Pacific War in isolation. A defeat at Midway would have forced the Americans to shift more of their industry and resources to replace the lost carriers, which in turn would have cost the UK much of their support in the critical 1942-1943 period.

Well, the U.S. did lose one of its three carriers at Midway. Even if all three carriers had been lost, the USN still would have had the Saratoga, and the Wasp was already on its way to the Pacific. Certainly, this force reduction would have seriously curtailed the American ability to respond to Japanese operations; Guadalcanal would almost certainly have fallen to the Japanese, for instance.

But the U.S. already had plenty of carriers under construction or planned. The conversion of nine Cleveland-class light cruisers into Independence-class light carriers had been undertaken prior to Midway. The U.S. had laid down seven Essex-class carriers prior to Midway, and another two more were laid down by the end of the year, plus another two in January of 1943. Add to this the large number of escort carriers that were on the way (19 Casablanca-class CVEs were commissioned during 1943 alone). At the end of 1942, the USN had 4 CV/CVL and 12 CVE operational; at the end of 1943, just a year later, the numbers had grown to 19 CV/CVL and 35 CVE; at the end of 1944 the U.S. had 25 CV/CVL and 65 CVE in active service. Then there were the carriers cancelled during construction or were cancelled while still on order (two and six, respectively, Essex-class carriers for example).

Given these numbers, it seems clear the U.S. had already committed itself in a large way to the construction of aircraft carriers, quite apart from whatever the results of the Battle of Midway might have been.

Similarly, the Japanese pilots were simply better as a result of their Manchurian experience. Actual combat piloting experience will do that to you.

In terms of Japanese Navy pilots, my understanding is that one of the reasons for their performance was due to the incredibly demanding nature of their training prior to the war. The standards were set so high that the training program washed out plenty of candidates who still would have made excellent pilots.

How many battleships did Yamamoto send on the Pearl raid? He recognized -- in part from the Manchukuo experiences -- that carrier-based planes were capable of devastating targets from far beyond the range of battleships' guns.

On the other hand, why was he sitting on the world's largest and most powerful battleship, along with another two battleships sailing beside it, in the operation's 'Main Force' during the battle? This would tend to indicate some thought that the battleship still played a pre-eminent role in naval battles.

Comsat Angel

30th September 2009, 03:49 PM

Some took longer than others cough*Montgomery*cough.

/runs from the British contingent.

Not entirely sure what you mean by the above. Would you care to elucidate?

(Comsat Angel = no friend of Montgomery/President of the Auchinlek Fan Club/Associate of the Wavell Was Wonderful Society).

dasmiller

30th September 2009, 04:40 PM

But the whole way to launch a large-scale plane attack was learned in Manchuria (http://books.google.com/books?id=RFpdzZFGXccC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+states+carrier+tactics+before+pearl&source=bl&ots=dCk-BVJ_BB&sig=bfkDg9QpBhTns9csgNO70AWuuSE&hl=en&ei=3a7DSoT1LIOplAeJ2Z3IBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3#v=onepage&q=&f=false):

I'd been unaware of that connection. Thanks.

NoZed Avenger

30th September 2009, 10:02 PM

Not entirely sure what you mean by the above. Would you care to elucidate?

(Comsat Angel = no friend of Montgomery/President of the Auchinlek Fan Club/Associate of the Wavell Was Wonderful Society).

Several historians and/or strategists (Liddell Hart being one of them, IIRC, but it's been a while) accused Montgomery of using WWI strategies in much of the Africa campaign. One of the battles in North Africa was referred to as the last battle of WWI -- artillery barrage, barbed wire and all.

Since moving from my house at the end of last year, I don't have access to most of my books (or room to keep them), so I can't get more detailed than that at the moment; it's been a good 10-12 years since I even looked at that stuff, perhaps longer.

rjh01

1st October 2009, 12:10 AM

McHrozni

1st October 2009, 01:06 AM

In Africa there was only a small area in which solders could fight. If they went any further inland they would be bogged in the sand. Tanks could be easily destroyed by anti tank weapons. So WWI tactics would not be the wrong tactics.

Rommel would disagree, and his tactics were extremely effective in North Africa. That 20-50km stretch of land was the ideal tank country. Shorter supply lines and superior air power won the day in North Africa, not superior tactics by any means.

McHrozni

Tolls

1st October 2009, 01:12 AM

...stuff on the US construction plans...

(this is actually in response to dr kitten, but your post had all the relevant bits I was going to use myself).

And it is the existence of that construction program that, for me, sees no reason for the US to shift priorities. On top of that, there is the massive army build up. Let the Atlantic front die off and you have an army hundreds of thousand strong go to waste, pure and simple.

The die had already been cast prior to Midway as to the choice of where to focus. I don't see Midway changing that significantly either way, simply because shifting construction plans (which are aimed months in advance for naval building) on a whim is not good. See previous post about the shifting priorities for Germany in 1941 from army to navy and back again.

Tolls

1st October 2009, 01:17 AM

Not entirely sure what you mean by the above. Would you care to elucidate?

(Comsat Angel = no friend of Montgomery/President of the Auchinlek Fan Club/Associate of the Wavell Was Wonderful Society).

Ditto.
Auchinlek especially, who really got a raw deal in '42.
:)

Several historians and/or strategists (Liddell Hart being one of them, IIRC, but it's been a while) accused Montgomery of using WWI strategies in much of the Africa campaign. One of the battles in North Africa was referred to as the last battle of WWI -- artillery barrage, barbed wire and all.

Since moving from my house at the end of last year, I don't have access to most of my books (or room to keep them), so I can't get more detailed than that at the moment; it's been a good 10-12 years since I even looked at that stuff, perhaps longer.

"One of the battles" was Alamein itself, but it was by no means a WW1 battle. Monty used all the resources to hand to try and ensure the Germans were beaten and weren't going to turn around again. He made mistakes (the narrow corridors through the minefield for example), and he failed to follow up as quickly as might be hoped, but his basic plan was pretty sound.

Rommel would disagree, and his tactics were extremely effective in North Africa. That 20-50km stretch of land was the ideal tank country. Shorter supply lines and superior air power won the day in North Africa, not superior tactics by any means.

McHrozni

At Alamein there was precious little room for manouevre. That's why Rommell chose it as the point to build his defences. Supply is a part of tactics and strategy...he who forgets that loses.

McHrozni

1st October 2009, 02:15 AM

At Alamein there was precious little room for manouevre. That's why Rommell chose it as the point to build his defences.

That is true, to an extent. I don't know where specifically it was alledged that WW1 tactics were used and in what context, but to say North African battlefield wasn't well suited for mobile warfare is, well, wrong.

Supply is a part of tactics and strategy...he who forgets that loses.

True, however given the circumstances, I don't see how Rommel could've played the hand he was dealt much better. Not going after Montgomery might have been more prudent in hindsight, but we shouldn't forget that the British won the defense at El-Alamein by the skin of their teeth. A victory there would've been a major blow to the British operations in Mediterranean, possibly to the extent of forcing them to evacuate the eastern Mediterranean within months.

McHrozni

Comsat Angel

1st October 2009, 03:17 AM

"True, however given the circumstances, I don't see how Rommel could've played the hand he was dealt much better."

Well, he could have stopped after capturing Tobruk and co-operated in the planned joint Axis air and amphibious invasion of Malta, which had been agreed already - instead of haring off like the chancer he was!

His tactics were questionable on several occasions and he had no concept of logistics, regarding it as "someone else's problem". His way was eased by the 8th Army's appalling radio security, his extremely efficient radio intercept service and the Italian's obtaining the British codes and cyphers. Tellingly, once the AK's radio intercept unit was wiped out pre-Alamein, Rommel's uncanny ability suddenly dried up.

NoZed - I think the battle you refer to is El Alamein, as mentioned in posts above. It was a set-piece, methodical, by-the-numbers kind of battle that the Axis couldn't prevail in.

McHrozni

1st October 2009, 03:50 AM

Well, he could have stopped after capturing Tobruk and co-operated in the planned joint Axis air and amphibious invasion of Malta, which had been agreed already - instead of haring off like the chancer he was!

I doubt invasion of Malta was fesiable for the Axis, and moreover, had little to do with Afrika Korps to begin with. Malta is a small island and would require powerful air and naval force to be commited, alongside assault engineers and other infantry units. Compare this to Afrika Corps, which had the most need for mobility and armor, only required navy for supply operations, and was severely limited in operating aircraft by both terrain (desert sand played havoc on aircraft engines) and difficulty in supplying the aircraft in any event.

On the other hand, keeping his forces contained in Tobruk area to wait for British counterattack could conserve some of his strength and allow him to last longer in Libya, thereby staving the allied invasion of Sicily by a few weeks to a few months, if that much.
Hardly something that could change the course of well, anything, really.

McHrozni

Comsat Angel

1st October 2009, 12:46 PM

Actually Malta was part of the scissors-paper-stone warfare in North Africa. The British (and by "British" by definition I mean British, Commonwealth and various elements of Occupied Europe) submarine, surface warships and aircraft based on Malta regularly intercepted Italian convoys headed for North Africa, thanks to ULTRA. Not infrequently they sank the Regio Nautica escorts along with the convoy itself, playing merry hell with the logistics of the Axis in North Africa. Operation Crusader, the 8th Army's winter offensive in late 1941, had two imperatives: 1) raise the siege of Tobruk and, more pertinently, 2) establish air cover for supply convoys to Malta.
Rommel turned his back on Malta in June 1942; the island recovered rapidly and by August his logistics were being strangled by the self-same island.

The feasibility of an invasion of Malta deserves another thread entirely! The German experience on Crete made them extremely wary of any more airborne invasion attempts. However, I think Kenneth Macksey has written a "what-if" mock history of WW2 that centres on a successful Axis invasion of Malta - sorry, can't remember the title.

Apologies to anyone not interested in the slightest about the British experience in North Africa, but it is a particular interest of mine.

NoZed Avenger

1st October 2009, 02:00 PM

Apologies to anyone not interested in the slightest about the British experience in North Africa, but it is a particular interest of mine.

Malta is one of the most interesting bits of the war, IMO.

McHrozni

2nd October 2009, 01:25 AM

The feasibility of an invasion of Malta deserves another thread entirely! The German experience on Crete made them extremely wary of any more airborne invasion attempts.

I couldn't agree more. Fall of Malta could be determinal to the German situation in Africa, which could at least noticably affect other theatres...

Although Italian navy routinely delivered supplies to Tunisia in excess of what was needed, but then the land routes couldn't deliver enough to the front lines...

McHrozni

Tolls

2nd October 2009, 01:49 AM

True, however given the circumstances, I don't see how Rommel could've played the hand he was dealt much better.

He frequently went further than he ought to, though the British often did the same...hence the see-saw nature of those 2 years. He honestly thought (and this shows his poor grasp of logistics at times) that he could get to Suez.

Not going after Montgomery might have been more prudent in hindsight, but we shouldn't forget that the British won the defense at El-Alamein by the skin of their teeth. A victory there would've been a major blow to the British operations in Mediterranean, possibly to the extent of forcing them to evacuate the eastern Mediterranean within months.

McHrozni

After Auchinlek stopped Rommel at the first Alamein (a battle we won soundly, though the counter-attacks were ineffective), there was no chance of a German breakthrough. No matter what happened in Cairo (referring to the panic prior to that battle).

Alam Halfa was the last throw of the dice, and really stood little chance of success in any meaningful way. So by 2nd Alamein a defeat for the British would simply have meant "not advancing". It would not have meant "loss of Egypt". Especially since the Torch landings occurred only about a fortnight after the battle had started.

McHrozni

2nd October 2009, 02:00 AM

He frequently went further than he ought to, though the British often did the same...hence the see-saw nature of those 2 years. He honestly thought (and this shows his poor grasp of logistics at times) that he could get to Suez.

Had he won at El-Alamein, he would've reached Kairo and the Nile. At that point, he would concievably be able to get supplied through the ports there, greatly improving the supply situation.
Admittedly, the Royal navy would be able to interdict some of those supplies, but with their own ports in range of German altillery, this wouldn't last very long.

Especially since the Torch landings occurred only about a fortnight after the battle had started.

This would've carried much more weight, I agree. Ultimately the British victory in the desert owed the most to their superior numbers and superior ability to keep their men supplied than anything else.

McHrozni

Tolls

6th October 2009, 01:01 AM

Had he won at El-Alamein, he would've reached Kairo and the Nile. At that point, he would concievably be able to get supplied through the ports there, greatly improving the supply situation.
Admittedly, the Royal navy would be able to interdict some of those supplies, but with their own ports in range of German altillery, this wouldn't last very long.

But by second alamein, and arguably to be honest 1st alamein (two battles prior), Rommel simply didn't have the resources to do the job he envisaged. They simply didn't exist. The nature of the battlefield around Alamein, and it's why Auchinlek chose it as his defensive position, meant end runs round the allied flank simply couldn't be made in the same way that allowed his earlier victories. This meant a stand up fight in which he was outgunned.

If he couldn't win at 1st Alamein, or at Alam Halfa, there was no chance of victory (such that he could counter attack as opposed to simply hold his position) by 2nd Alamein against a full strength 8th Army.

This would've carried much more weight, I agree. Ultimately the British victory in the desert owed the most to their superior numbers and superior ability to keep their men supplied than anything else.

McHrozni

Yes. And ultimately it's why Germany failed in the war as a whole. They failed to produce stuff in the most efficient way, and failed to supply their troops at the front with the same efficiency achieved by the west and, by 1943ish, the Soviets (withthe help of lend lease trucks and rolling stock).

McHrozni

6th October 2009, 01:10 AM

B
If he couldn't win at 1st Alamein, or at Alam Halfa, there was no chance of victory (such that he could counter attack as opposed to simply hold his position) by 2nd Alamein against a full strength 8th Army.

Probably true, and had he known then what we know now, he probably would've made different choices.

Yes. And ultimately it's why Germany failed in the war as a whole. They failed to produce stuff in the most efficient way, and failed to supply their troops at the front with the same efficiency achieved by the west and, by 1943ish, the Soviets (withthe help of lend lease trucks and rolling stock).

That, and the game of numbers also played a major role, I'd say. Even with optimal production and optimal models to produce, they would be very hard pressed indeed to win the war. In theory, there were a few brinks where they had a realistic chance of knocking another major opponent out - like Battle for Britain, Moscow, Stalingrad - at least to the point where they would be incapable of undertaking any offensive action for an extended period of time (a year or two), which could end the war differently.
A total victory over all allies, however, remained out of their reach even in theoretical terms, however.

McHrozni

rjh01

6th October 2009, 01:52 AM

horza66

6th October 2009, 03:03 AM

I think the Battle of Britain showed the weakness of German leadership. If the Germans had gone for the airports and radar stations and told the protecting fighters to hit the fighters that were in the air they would have wiped out the British air force.

The initial Luftwaffe strategy was to hit the airfields and radar stations. This only changed as it became clear that the aggressive confrontation with the RAF was resulting in unsustainable casualties.

There was poor leadership at the highest level in the Luftwaffe - Goring did not attempt to resolve differences in strategy between Sperrle and Kesselring. However at no point was the RAF in danger of being "destroyed". The worst case scenario would have been a withdrawal from the forward airfields to allow pilot strength to recover. This would have given Germany possibly a two week window of air superiority to attempt an initial landing. This would likely have been an even worse result for Germany - as soon as a landing was attempted both the RAF and RN would have sortied in strength, and the Wehrmacht would have taken massive casualties.

Wikipedia is actually very good on the Battle of Britain and other well documented parts of WWII. It's worth a look.

If Germany had ignored Norway they would have had enough ships to invade Britain.

This is an odd statement. Germany lost 10 destroyers during the Norway battles - the RN 4 destroyers and an aircraft carrier. 10 destroyers is not a significant amount compared to the strength of the British Home Fleet, and would not have made much of a difference to the result of Sealion.

McHrozni

6th October 2009, 03:20 AM

I think the Battle of Britain showed the weakness of German leadership. If the Germans had gone for the airports and radar stations and told the protecting fighters to hit the fighters that were in the air they would have wiped out the British air force.

They had gone for both, but bombed cities alongside.

If Germany had ignored Norway they would have had enough ships to invade Britain.

German losses in Norway included 10 destroyers and a heavy cruiser. A miniscule force, compared to the Royal Navy.
Had Germany not gone into Norway, the RAF would have bases practically on the German border.

McHrozni

Fraser

6th October 2009, 03:25 AM

But by second alamein, and arguably to be honest 1st alamein (two battles prior), Rommel simply didn't have the resources to do the job he envisaged. They simply didn't exist. The nature of the battlefield around Alamein, and it's why Auchinlek chose it as his defensive position, meant end runs round the allied flank simply couldn't be made in the same way that allowed his earlier victories. This meant a stand up fight in which he was outgunned.

If he couldn't win at 1st Alamein, or at Alam Halfa, there was no chance of victory (such that he could counter attack as opposed to simply hold his position) by 2nd Alamein against a full strength 8th Army.

Yes. And ultimately it's why Germany failed in the war as a whole. They failed to produce stuff in the most efficient way, and failed to supply their troops at the front with the same efficiency achieved by the west and, by 1943ish, the Soviets (withthe help of lend lease trucks and rolling stock).

I've read that British hygene discipline made a massive difference in North Africa. Partly due to a long history of overseas service due to the commitments of the British Empire, the British Army had laid out detailed rules for contruction of latrines in the field. The Afrika Korps troops tended to just walk into the desert and defecate in the open. This resulted in flies spreading infection and the much higher rate of sickness in German troops than British. It was a significant factor in maintaining British superiority of numbers.

Tolls

6th October 2009, 06:59 AM

NoZed Avenger

6th October 2009, 07:15 AM

I've read that British hygene discipline made a massive difference in North Africa. Partly due to a long history of overseas service due to the commitments of the British Empire, the British Army had laid out detailed rules for contruction of latrines in the field. The Afrika Korps troops tended to just walk into the desert and defecate in the open. This resulted in flies spreading infection and the much higher rate of sickness in German troops than British. It was a significant factor in maintaining British superiority of numbers.

True of much earlier conflicts, too, IIRC.

Britain originally went with the "foul air" theory of disease (prior to the discovery of germ theory, etc.). As part of that, the British army adopted strict rules on the locations of latrines -- simply to make sure the bad smelling air was well away from the troops (the obvious cause of problems like malaria (swamp gas = bad air and people near swamps = get malaria, therefore swamp gas *causes* malria. QED). Although they missed the real cause of a lot of problems, this had the side effect of decreasing the number of soldiers catching all sorts of things.

By WWII, they had worked out the whole "germ" thing, though. So similar rresults, but different reasoning.