Iran Nuclear Agreement

[GreNME]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8318258.stm

It appears we're a few days away from what could be a monumental agreement with Iran. If they officially agree, they'll basically be agreeing to allow the nuclear material they have be sent to Russia and France to be enriched and manufactured into fuel rods (respectively), which would go a long way toward solidifying the direction of Iran's nuclear program. Additionally, it would put a huge damper in the speculation about Iran supposedly building nuclear warheads to lob at Israel.

Does anyone think it's not going to happen? Anyone have odds on it?

I'd appreciate opinions in non-slogan, essay format. ;)

[Doctor Evil]

I am not sure. If I understand correctly, the proposed deal is that Iran will have a fixed, but large quantity of Uranium enriched abroad. (~70% of their declared stocks.)

It still leave Iran with Uranium which it can enrich. There is also an unknown, that is, whether Iran has undeclared Uranium.

If Iran has no undeclared Uranium the plan can set a possible nuclear weapon plan back for a while. (Say a year, but that's a guess). If they have Uranium which is not under supervision then they just tricked the rest of the world.

Which is it? I do not know.

[KoihimeNakamura]

54' 40 or fight!

Personally, I expect it to happen but I'm not betting it'll be hugely successful.

[GreNME]

I am not sure. If I understand correctly, the proposed deal is that Iran will have a fixed, but large quantity of Uranium enriched abroad. (~70% of their declared stocks.)

It still leave Iran with Uranium which it can enrich. There is also an unknown, that is, whether Iran has undeclared Uranium.

If Iran has no undeclared Uranium the plan can set a possible nuclear weapon plan back for a while. (Say a year, but that's a guess). If they have Uranium which is not under supervision then they just tricked the rest of the world.

Which is it? I do not know.

Nice response.

Honestly, if Iran agrees to this, I think it's a clear implicit admission that they don't have any viable nuclear weapon program running right now. That wouldn't necessarily mean the Supreme Leader doesn't wish for a viable program, but if wishes were fishes we'd all own boats.

[theprestige]

I think Iran's main concern would wanting uranium that's no longer in easy reach. Behold my list of bullet points!

If Iran plans to perpetrate shenanigans, they won't let any significant amount of uranium out of their control, for fear of not getting it back again when they want it.
Therefore, either they will commit little or none of their known uranium inventory to this agreement...
... Or they have significant amounts of uranium we don't know about...
... Or they think France and/or Russia will work out a favorable arrangement with them in a few months or so, after everybody's milked this "monumental" agreement for all the PR brownie points they can.

[Doctor Evil]

Nice response.

Honestly, if Iran agrees to this, I think it's a clear implicit admission that they don't have any viable nuclear weapon program running right now. That wouldn't necessarily mean the Supreme Leader doesn't wish for a viable program, but if wishes were fishes we'd all own boats.

I disagree. Frankly, I will be very surprised is Iran has no weapon program, for several reasons. One is their active long range missile program which makes no sense by itself. Another is their long history of hiding elements of their nuclear program, the last hidden enrichment center is just one example. There is no sense in hiding information from the IAEA if you are not developing a nuclear weapon.

As far as I remember, a few years ago the IAEA found a computer with nuclear warhead designs in Iran (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/me_iran0194_05_30.asp). These designs probably originated from Pakistan. Again, this points to a nuclear weapons program.

I do not think the deal is that significant. As best, the Iranian are delaying a possible nuclear weapons program by a year or two (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm):
The plan is to take about 75% (1,200kg) of the low-enriched uranium Iran has stockpiled and convert it into fuel rods in Russia and France for use in the research reactor Iran has run for years. This produces isotopes for use in medical treatments.



It is potentially significant because it would lower tension with Iran and get most of the enriched uranium out of Iran, reducing fears that it could be further enriched and made suitable for a nuclear device.



However, Iran will still go on enriching and it could make up the amount in about a year In return they are gaining a big political bonus. Its a mostly positive deal for them, and I do not see how one can conclude from such a deal mean they give up on developing nuclear weapons. They can easily afford the short wait.

[Oliver]

There is no sense in hiding information from the IAEA if you are not developing a nuclear weapon.


Of course, if you're trying to develop nuclear weapons, there is no sense in being an IAEA member and letting them "watch your fingers" at all. ;)

[DC]

I disagree. Frankly, I will be very surprised is Iran has no weapon program, for several reasons. One is their active long range missile program which makes no sense by itself. Another is their long history of hiding elements of their nuclear program, the last hidden enrichment center is just one example. There is no sense in hiding information from the IAEA if you are not developing a nuclear weapon.

As far as I remember, a few years ago the IAEA found a computer with nuclear warhead designs in Iran (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/me_iran0194_05_30.asp). These designs probably originated from Pakistan. Again, this points to a nuclear weapons program.

I do not think the deal is that significant. As best, the Iranian are delaying a possible nuclear weapons program by a year or two (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm):
In return they are gaining a big political bonus. Its a mostly positive deal for them, and I do not see how one can conclude from such a deal mean they give up on developing nuclear weapons. They can easily afford the short wait.

and i have not seen any evidence that leeds to the conclusion that they are developing Nuclear weappons.

[Oliver]

Haaretz today:

Israel, Iran officials met in Cairo to discuss nuke-free Mideast (http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1122798.html)
Meeting between Israeli and Iranian officials was the first of
its kind since the fall of the Shah in 1979.

[Praktik]

Wait, where are the obligatory "making deals with an apocalyptic suicide cult is a fool's errand" postings??

[Darth Rotor]

Making deals with an apocalyptic suicide cult is a fool's errand.

What that has to do with Israel and Iran finally talking to one another in Cairo I don't know, but we aim to please, sir. :D

As a pro nuke power generation person, I am pleased to see that the benefits of nuclear power will be spread to our Persian friends soon if this deal goes through. Risks on weapons? Still greater than zero, but maybe reduced.

DR

[Praktik]

haha! Thanks for filling in Darth..;)

[GreNME]

I disagree. Frankly, I will be very surprised is Iran has no weapon program, for several reasons. One is their active long range missile program which makes no sense by itself. Another is their long history of hiding elements of their nuclear program, the last hidden enrichment center is just one example. There is no sense in hiding information from the IAEA if you are not developing a nuclear weapon.

As far as I remember, a few years ago the IAEA found a computer with nuclear warhead designs in Iran (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/me_iran0194_05_30.asp). These designs probably originated from Pakistan. Again, this points to a nuclear weapons program.

I do not think the deal is that significant. As best, the Iranian are delaying a possible nuclear weapons program by a year or two (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm):

Instead of posting wild speculation on their capabilities-- really, there is not one whiff of publicly available information that the "year or two" thing is even realistic, and I've heard this song-n-dance before (in 2002/2003)-- why not actually discuss things about the cards we can all see right now at this point? I mean, crap, give me sufficiently enriched uranium or plutonium manufactured into the shapes I'd require, and with the resources available to Mozambique I could construct a simple nuclear bomb. The hard work was already done around sixty years ago. That doesn't make me an existent threat to my neighbors, no matter how much crap I talk about them (though it would make me a right a-hole).

In return they are gaining a big political bonus. Its a mostly positive deal for them, and I do not see how one can conclude from such a deal mean they give up on developing nuclear weapons. They can easily afford the short wait.

And most of the world could easily afford a little freaking good faith, but precious little of it gets spent because of crappy partisan excuses. Let's see if a different tactic than chest-beating gets some results for once.

[GreNME]

Making deals with an apocalyptic suicide cult is a fool's errand.

What that has to do with Israel and Iran finally talking to one another in Cairo I don't know, but we aim to please, sir. :D

As a pro nuke power generation person, I am pleased to see that the benefits of nuclear power will be spread to our Persian friends soon if this deal goes through. Risks on weapons? Still greater than zero, but maybe reduced.

This I can agree with. I accept that 'greater than zero' is a reasonable assumption. I predict that the level of actual discussion that goes on during the talks leading up to a decision will determine how much "maybe" that will be reduced.

[Brainster]

Haaretz today:

Israel, Iran officials met in Cairo to discuss nuke-free Mideast (http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1122798.html)
Meeting between Israeli and Iranian officials was the first of
its kind since the fall of the Shah in 1979.

In probably my first post on this board that could be considered anti-Israel, would anybody really trust them on this?

And that's before we talk about Iran.

[theprestige]

Instead of posting wild speculation on their capabilities-- really, there is not one whiff of publicly available information that the "year or two" thing is even realistic, and I've heard this song-n-dance before (in 2002/2003)-- why not actually discuss things about the cards we can all see right now at this point? I mean, crap, give me sufficiently enriched uranium or plutonium manufactured into the shapes I'd require, and with the resources available to Mozambique I could construct a simple nuclear bomb. The hard work was already done around sixty years ago. That doesn't make me an existent threat to my neighbors, no matter how much crap I talk about them (though it would make me a right a-hole).
I'm confused.

Either Iran is more than two or three years away from building a bomb, or building a bomb is so trivial that Iran could build one at any time and it's likely they've built two or three already. Which is it?

On a related note, right a-holes who talk a lot of crap about their neighbors are pretty high on my list of people who probably shouldn't have nuclear weapons.

[GreNME]

I'm confused.

Either Iran is more than two or three years away from building a bomb, or building a bomb is so trivial that Iran could build one at any time and it's likely they've built two or three already. Which is it?

It's the situation without the false dichotomy you've just created.

On a related note, right a-holes who talk a lot of crap about their neighbors are pretty high on my list of people who probably shouldn't have nuclear weapons.

Do you understand what "hubris" means?

[theprestige]

In probably my first post on this board that could be considered anti-Israel, would anybody really trust them on this?
I'd trust them on this.

I mean, I think nuclear weapons suck. I'd prefer a nuke-free world. I'd enter into any discussion about a nuke-free world in good faith. I'd bring to the table a sincere willingness to seriously consider any reasonable proposal.

I would also insist on a strict, bi-lateral principle of "trust, but verify". Obviously.

And I'd trust Israel to do pretty much the same.

And that's before we talk about Iran.
You mean before we talk about how there will never be a nuke-free middle east, no matter how much good faith Israel brings to the table?

Iran won't even let the IAEA trust but verify.

[Brainster]

I'd trust them on this.

I mean, I think nuclear weapons suck. I'd prefer a nuke-free world. I'd enter into any discussion about a nuke-free world in good faith. I'd bring to the table a sincere willingness to seriously consider any reasonable proposal.

There are no discussions about a nuke-free world that are conducted in good faith. It's a pipe dream.

[Oliver]

Haaretz: Report: Iran rejects nuclear draft deal (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1123171.html)
Iran state TV: Tehran proposes buying nuclear fuel
rather than shipping its uranium stockpile to Russia.

[Ziggurat]

There is no sense in hiding information from the IAEA if you are not developing a nuclear weapon.

That's not entirely true. As Saddam demonstrated, one can also hide stuff from inspectors in order to bluff, to make one's enemies think one has such weapons. In particular, Saddam seems to have wanted Iran to think he had WMD's to keep them at bay.

But a number of factors such as the scale and nature of what we DO know about suggest that's not the case with Iran.

[WildCat]

I'm confused.

Either Iran is more than two or three years away from building a bomb, or building a bomb is so trivial that Iran could build one at any time and it's likely they've built two or three already. Which is it?

I think in Iran's case they could probably make a bomb right now if they wanted one, but they don't want one right now. Reason being not because they don't want to become a nuclear power, but that their missile development lags behind.

Once Iran gets an operational long-range missile capable of carrying a nuke they will produce the bomb to go in it. And they are certainly trying to develop that missile.

[Doctor Evil]

That's not entirely true. As Saddam demonstrated, one can also hide stuff from inspectors in order to bluff, to make one's enemies think one has such weapons. In particular, Saddam seems to have wanted Iran to think he had WMD's to keep them at bay.

But a number of factors such as the scale and nature of what we DO know about suggest that's not the case with Iran.

I agree, and was aware of that, but chose to omit this for sake of brevity.

[Doctor Evil]

Instead of posting wild speculation on their capabilities-- really, there is not one whiff of publicly available information that the "year or two" thing is even realistic, and I've heard this song-n-dance before (in 2002/2003)-- why not actually discuss things about the cards we can all see right now at this point? I mean, crap, give me sufficiently enriched uranium or plutonium manufactured into the shapes I'd require, and with the resources available to Mozambique I could construct a simple nuclear bomb. The hard work was already done around sixty years ago. That doesn't make me an existent threat to my neighbors, no matter how much crap I talk about them (though it would make me a right a-hole).


I get the feeling you misinterpret the claim regarding the setback. It is not a claim about the time it would take Iran to make a nuclear weapon. It is rather an estimate of the time it would take Iran to enrich Uranium to replace the amount it would send to Russia under the deal. The latter estimate has less unknowns, but is still somewhat speculative.

The result is that Iran do not give up much in the proposed deal. It only set back one aspect of the program, the Uranium enrichment part. Furthermore, their enrichment effort will be only put back for a year or two. In any case, it is not clear at this time that the deal will actually be signed.

As for your latter point, would it be that the only thing that Iran do is talk crap. Instead they support extremist groups which prefer violence to negotiations, by giving them money and weapons in large quantities.

[Captain.Sassy]

I think in Iran's case they could probably make a bomb right now if they wanted one, but they don't want one right now.

Based on what? I'm not disputing whether or not Iran would be able to build a nuke right now, but I'm curious as to your source on this. My understanding was that the most recent intelligence estimates either said Iran didn't have a nuclear bomb program or was several years away from developing a bomb.

As for long range missiles being useless without a nuclear warhead, I think there's still a rationale for developing long range conventional missiles. The US uses cruise missiles all the time, for example.

[theprestige]

It's the situation without the false dichotomy you've just created.
Don't look at me. You're the one who questions whether or not a "year or two [to build a bomb] is even realistic", and then promptly follows it up by saying that building a bomb is so trivial that Mozambique could do it today if they had the parts (Iran has about 44x the GDB that Mozambique does, by the way).

So which is it?

Do you understand what "hubris" means?
Yes, which is why I don't mis-use it in a sentence.

But to address the point you're trying to make: Last time I checked, it wasn't official US policy to talk a lot of crap about Canada and Mexico. But hey, if you want to expand the neighborhood a bit, I'm perfectly willing to entertain the idea that given his recent statements about Honduras, perhaps the Obama administration shouldn't have access to nuclear weapons...

... Of course, that's one of the nice things about the US, compared to Iran: We get a regime change every four years--more often than that, even, when you consider how often members of the legislature are up for election. Seeing what happened the last time the Iranian people tried to democratically change their regime, I have no qualms at all about putting Iran high on the list of nations that shouldn't have nukes, and the US low on the list of nations that should give up the nukes they have.

Why you're so intent on evening the playing field between the two, I have no idea.

[theprestige]

As for long range missiles being useless without a nuclear warhead, I think there's still a rationale for developing long range conventional missiles. The US uses cruise missiles all the time, for example.
The US is also a world leader in missile guidance systems and target acquisition systems, though. It can actually engage in warfare based on precision strikes against high-value strategic targets with minimal collateral damage.

Before these highly-advanced technologies--still largely unmatched by other advanced nations, let alone developing countries like Iraq--our strategy relied heavily on things like carpet-bombing (and, for a time, even considered battlefield nukes).

For a nation like Iran, which doesn't have precision guidance and targeting tech, and which doesn't really have the industrial base to launch a major strategic missile war, it's much more in their interest to cause as much devastation with as few warheads as possible. The big three--Nuclear, Biological, Chemical--are ideal for this.

tl;dr, long-range missiles with conventional warheads are almost useless in modern warfare.

[MikeMangum]

and i have not seen any evidence that leeds to the conclusion that they are developing Nuclear weappons.

Iran was working feverishly on enrichment of uranium before it even had any power plants that could use them, as noticed by The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/30/iran.julianborger).
[T]here is another huge question mark hanging over Isfahan and Natanz: why is the government in such a rush to enrich fuel, when it has no nuclear power plants in which to use it?

Bushehr uses low enriched uranium pressed into pellets, which is provided by Russia as part of it's deal with Iran on construction and use of the Bushehr reactor, and that reactor will just be coming online this year.

Secondly, it is rather suggestive that Iran has plans for a nuclear warhead (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21777902/).
The agency has been seeking possession of the blueprints since 2005, when it stumbled upon them among a batch of other documents during its examination of suspect Iranian nuclear activities. While agency inspectors had been allowed to examine them in the country, Tehran had up to now refused to let the IAEA have a copy for closer perusal.

...

Both the IAEA and other experts have categorized the instructions outlined in the blueprints as having no value outside of a nuclear weapons program.

When the Lavizan complex was discovered, Iran repeatedly denied requests by the IAEA to visit it. They then razed the entire complex to the ground and THEN agreed to allow the IAEA to visit.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/06/12/wiran12.xml
Fresh evidence has emerged that Iran is working on a secret military project to develop nuclear weapons that has not been declared to United Nations inspectors responsible for monitoring Iran’s nuclear programme.

Nuclear experts working for the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna are pressing the Iranians to make a full disclosure about a network of research laboratories at a secret military base outside the capital Teheran.

Suspicions have been growing that Iran has a secret military nuclear research programme since UN inspectors discovered particles of enriched uranium at a research complex at Lavizan, a military base on the outskirts of Teheran, in 2003.

The Iranians agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the Lavizan complex but then razed it to the ground before the inspectors arrived.

Iranian nuclear officials have ignored repeated requests by IAEA officials for a detailed explanation of the Lavizan project. Now the IAEA officials are studying new intelligence indicating that the Lavizan research project has been moved to a secret military location outside Teheran.

Although IAEA officials do not know the precise location of Zirzamin 27, they have comprehensive details of its activities.

“This is a truly alarming development,” said a senior western diplomat working with the IAEA. “This evidence indicates that the Iranians remain committed to developing nuclear weapons, despite their claims to the contrary that their nuclear ambitions are entirely peaceful.”

Those are certainly suggestive pieces of information.

[aviolet4u]

oh bother- I'd be a very happy soul if I didn't hear the word "nuclear" in any of the news, media ever again. But then I'd probably be a corpse wouldn't I? :rolleyes:

[MikeMangum]

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/13/20060513-120435-8643r/
VIENNA, Austria -- U.N. inspectors have found traces of highly enriched uranium on equipment from an Iranian research center linked to the military, diplomats said yesterday -- a revelation likely to strengthen U.S. arguments that Tehran wants to develop nuclear arms.

The diplomats, who demanded anonymity in exchange for divulging the confidential information, cautioned that confirmation still had to come through other laboratory tests.

Still, they said, further analysis could show that the find matches others established to have come from abroad. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined earlier traces of highly enriched uranium were imported on equipment from Pakistan that Iran bought on the black market during nearly two decades of clandestine activity.

Even then, nevertheless, the find would be significant.

Because Iran has previously denied conducting enrichment-related activities at the site -- a former research center at Lavizan-Shian -- the mere fact the traces came from there bolsters arguments that it has hidden parts of a program that can create the fissile material used in nuclear warheads. Additionally, the site's connection to the military weakens Iranian arguments that its nuclear program is purely civilian.

"That has long been suspected as the site of undeclared enrichment research and ... the Iranians have denied that any enrichment research had taken place at that location," said Iran specialist Gary Samore of the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago. "It certainly does reinforce the agency's suspicion that Iran has not fully declared its past enrichment research."

One diplomat said the samples came from vacuum pumps that have various applications, including use in uranium-enriching centrifuges at Lavizan-Shian.

The United States says Iran conducted high-explosive tests that could have a bearing on developing nuclear weapons at the site.

The State Department said in 2004 that Lavizan-Shian's buildings had been dismantled and topsoil removed to hide nuclear weapons-related experiments. The IAEA later confirmed the site had been razed.

http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/ISIS/perspex-isis-Lavizan-061704.htm
The site in Lavizan-Shian, a northeastern neighborhood of Tehran, has been under investigation since 2003 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and likely other governments as a potential undeclared nuclear or nuclear-related site. Adding to suspicions, while these investigations were ongoing the buildings were dismantled, rubble carted away, and the ground was scraped between approximately the first of the year and March 2004. The IAEA is continuing to investigate and will likely soon request a visit to the site.

This site first came to public attention in May 2003 when the Iranian opposition group, National Council for Resistance of Iran, announced that the site, called the Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center, was associated with biological weapons research. They said the Center was affiliated with Malek-Ashtar University and was formed under the Ministry of Defense.

Later, a radiation detection device, called a whole body counter, was discovered to have been delivered to the site from overseas. The equipment itself is not direct evidence of a nuclear weapons program, but it is out of place at a site that was not declared by Iran to have any nuclear activity. Spare parts for the machine were also known to have been sent to the site. These additional pieces of equipment may actually have allowed modifications to the whole body counter that would make it more useful for a nuclear weapons program. However, the actual purpose and current location of the equipment remains unknown.

The site was photographed by DigitalGlobe's Quickbird commercial satellite in August 2003 and March 2004. The first image shows large buildings inside a secure perimeter. In the second image, the buildings were removed and the earth scraped. Even the roads and walkways were removed or covered.

This destruction at the site raised concerns because it is the type of measure Iran would need to take if it was trying to defeat the powerful environmental sampling capabilities of IAEA inspectors. At other sites, less extensive deception measures were employed by Iran, but the inspectors nonetheless discovered traces of enriched uranium, revealing details about activities at the sites and leading Iran to revise its declarations to the IAEA.

There are satellite photos of before and after. BTW, Lavizan isn't a city, it is an army garrison and weapons developement center.

No, no evidence of anything but peaceful power generation at all.

[GreNME]

Haaretz: Report: Iran rejects nuclear draft deal (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1123171.html)
Iran state TV: Tehran proposes buying nuclear fuel
rather than shipping its uranium stockpile to Russia.

Don't you find it interesting how the hyperlink text there claims Iran rejected the deal, when it didn't reject the deal? That doesn't rule out that it might, and their counter-proposal is a pretty regular tactic for them to avoid commitment on any deals, but I think the statement says more about bad faith than honest assessment on the part of commentary.

-----

I get the feeling you misinterpret the claim regarding the setback. It is not a claim about the time it would take Iran to make a nuclear weapon. It is rather an estimate of the time it would take Iran to enrich Uranium to replace the amount it would send to Russia under the deal. The latter estimate has less unknowns, but is still somewhat speculative.

The result is that Iran do not give up much in the proposed deal. It only set back one aspect of the program, the Uranium enrichment part. Furthermore, their enrichment effort will be only put back for a year or two. In any case, it is not clear at this time that the deal will actually be signed.

I didn't misinterpret what you were saying. That's why I pointed out that even I could make a nuke if I had even a fraction of the resources and the key nuclear material. Without the material of a high enough enriched quality, no bomby-bomb. That's the goal of the current deal taking place. Iran would be pretty effectively blocked from the key element to making a nuclear bomb.

As for your latter point, would it be that the only thing that Iran do is talk crap. Instead they support extremist groups which prefer violence to negotiations, by giving them money and weapons in large quantities.

Yes, I'm aware of that as well. So, are we going to invade them for supporting turriss' or are we going to work on getting them to agree to cease the support? Or maybe we're just going to continue trying to come at this government like they're going to stop supporting terrorists because we disapprove? Does this current attempt to find an accord not seem to factor into a larger plan for getting Iran playing nice to you?

-----

It's the situation without the false dichotomy you've just created.
Don't look at me. You're the one who questions whether or not a "year or two [to build a bomb] is even realistic", and then promptly follows it up by saying that building a bomb is so trivial that Mozambique could do it today if they had the parts (Iran has about 44x the GDB that Mozambique does, by the way).

So which is it?

I'll try to re-phrase it: it's neither. The point of getting Iran into some form of accord isn't about whether they can build the bomb parts, because the only important part of the bomb is the fuel (which hey can't build), and speculation on how close they are to having the capability is just that-- speculation (unless you're able to provide proof). No, I'm not going to go through a full explanation of how a nuclear bomb works since you can find that out for yourself with a simple internet search, but the whole point of what I stated had to do with the viability of getting proper fuel for a bomb. The current facilities we know about, even if they had twice the number of that in secret, could accomplish such a feat even if we gave them four years. We keep hearing references to how far along the Iranian nuclear weapon program is but rarely get any glimpse of the actual reasons behind the claims.

You can base your political outlook on confirmation bias if you like, but I'd rather have more actual data.

Do you understand what "hubris" means?

Yes, which is why I don't mis-use it in a sentence.

But to address the point you're trying to make: Last time I checked, it wasn't official US policy to talk a lot of crap about Canada and Mexico. But hey, if you want to expand the neighborhood a bit, I'm perfectly willing to entertain the idea that given his recent statements about Honduras, perhaps the Obama administration shouldn't have access to nuclear weapons...

... Of course, that's one of the nice things about the US, compared to Iran: We get a regime change every four years--more often than that, even, when you consider how often members of the legislature are up for election. Seeing what happened the last time the Iranian people tried to democratically change their regime, I have no qualms at all about putting Iran high on the list of nations that shouldn't have nukes, and the US low on the list of nations that should give up the nukes they have.

Yes, far be it from me to assume that someone could actually experience hubris when they're unwilling to admit their own silliness. Why bother with embarrassment when distraction and denial remove the need?

Assuming that I was aiming at the low-hanging fruit here (the US) would be easy for you to dismiss, I agree, but what about Pakistan and India? How about Israel? Even better, how about Russia? I assume all of the above are countries you don't think deserve nukes, correct?

Why you're so intent on evening the playing field between the two, I have no idea.

Oh, bravo. When faced with a challenge to the typical bad-faith rhetoric, play the only-slightly-more-eloquent-than "why do you hate America?" card. Very creative.

[DC]

Iran was working feverishly on enrichment of uranium before it even had any power plants that could use them, as noticed by The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/30/iran.julianborger).


Bushehr uses low enriched uranium pressed into pellets, which is provided by Russia as part of it's deal with Iran on construction and use of the Bushehr reactor, and that reactor will just be coming online this year.

Secondly, it is rather suggestive that Iran has plans for a nuclear warhead (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21777902/).


When the Lavizan complex was discovered, Iran repeatedly denied requests by the IAEA to visit it. They then razed the entire complex to the ground and THEN agreed to allow the IAEA to visit.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/06/12/wiran12.xml


Those are certainly suggestive pieces of information.

yup, no evidence at all.

[Doctor Evil]

I didn't misinterpret what you were saying. That's why I pointed out that even I could make a nuke if I had even a fraction of the resources and the key nuclear material. Without the material of a high enough enriched quality, no bomby-bomb. That's the goal of the current deal taking place. Iran would be pretty effectively blocked from the key element to making a nuclear bomb.


Not blocked, but delayed, and nor for long either. Which was my main point. Iran do not give up much in this deal.


Yes, I'm aware of that as well. So, are we going to invade them for supporting turriss' or are we going to work on getting them to agree to cease the support? Or maybe we're just going to continue trying to come at this government like they're going to stop supporting terrorists because we disapprove? Does this current attempt to find an accord not seem to factor into a larger plan for getting Iran playing nice to you?


Huh? Where did I say or support that? :rolleyes:

Work on getting them to change their behavior means either putting fairly severe sanctions or working to replace the current regime.

The current attempt seems to me bound to failure. Iran may accept this deal, as they do not have to give up much, and this would pretty much be it. The deal would remove the pressure to do anything else. They would neither change their support for Hizbulla, Hamas, etc, nor stop their nuclear weapons development.

[WildCat]

Based on what? I'm not disputing whether or not Iran would be able to build a nuke right now, but I'm curious as to your source on this. My understanding was that the most recent intelligence estimates either said Iran didn't have a nuclear bomb program or was several years away from developing a bomb.
Actually the latest intelligence has Iran capable of producing abomb now. All they need is the fissile material, and that only takes time, and they already have the equipment.

As for long range missiles being useless without a nuclear warhead, I think there's still a rationale for developing long range conventional missiles. The US uses cruise missiles all the time, for example.
The US can put a cruise missile exactly where they want it, not so much with Iran which doesn't even have cruise missiles at all, let alone ones that can strike with such precision.

Iran's missiles are about as accurate as a Scud, and pretty much useless when fitted with a conventional warhead, as Scuds were. However, you don't need precision accuracy with a nuclear warhead.

[Oliver]

Actually the latest intelligence has Iran capable of producing abomb now.


[/twilightzonetheme]

Also:

Edition.cnn.com
Iran to decide on nuclear deal 'next week' (http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/10/23/iran.nuclear.offer/index.html)

Two days after negotiators reached a draft agreement over Iran's nuclear
activities, Tehran left it unclear whether it would ultimately sign on. Tehran
is "studying the draft proposal" and will have an answer next week, said
Iranian diplomat Ali Asghar Soltanieh, on state-run Press TV..... full story (http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/10/23/iran.nuclear.offer/index.html)

[Dr Adequate]

That wouldn't necessarily mean the Supreme Leader doesn't wish for a viable program, but if wishes were fishes we'd all own boats. If wishes were fishes we'd all own fish. So why would we need boats? The rate of boat-ownership would, if anything, decline, were your radical proposal to be put into practice.

[GreNME]

Not blocked, but delayed, and nor for long either. Which was my main point. Iran do not give up much in this deal.

They give up the pretense to their people that the forces opposing their regime can't be dealt with. That would be a huge blow to the hardliner rhetoric. Also, with this deal they'd give up enough, and the important thing is that they won't be able to make sufficient fuel for a bomb.

Huh? Where did I say or support that? :rolleyes:

You didn't, but I offered three possibilities with the hope that you could clarify what you do think is going to work? The "invasion regime change" has been a mixed bag, to say the least, and our "shake heads and cluck tongues" method (N. Korea) has done about jack toward stopping the bomb. If we're going to try diplomacy, it's going to lead inexorably to negotiations. This isn't going to be pleasant for those who equate negotiation with capitulation. Do you make such an equation?

Work on getting them to change their behavior means either putting fairly severe sanctions or working to replace the current regime.

The current attempt seems to me bound to failure. Iran may accept this deal, as they do not have to give up much, and this would pretty much be it. The deal would remove the pressure to do anything else. They would neither change their support for Hizbulla, Hamas, etc, nor stop their nuclear weapons development.

This is wrong on so many levels, and it seems you do make the equation that negotiation is capitulation and is out of the question. I would agree that the having the current regime out of power of ceasing its extremist support is the ultimate goal, but why does it all have to happen in one fell swoop?

[GreNME]

If wishes were fishes we'd all own fish. So why would we need boats? The rate of boat-ownership would, if anything, decline, were your radical proposal to be put into practice.

It's a phrase I modified slightly. The original (points to identifying the origin) is "If wishes were fishes we'd all cast nets."

[theprestige]

Yes, far be it from me to assume that someone could actually experience hubris when they're unwilling to admit their own silliness. Why bother with embarrassment when distraction and denial remove the need?
Fact: The US does not have a longstanding policy of talking crap about its neighbors. Iran does. Therefore it is not hubris to reject claims of such a policy as a basis for dismantling the US nuclear stockpile, while simultaneously considering such claims as a basis for prohibiting an Iranian nuclear stockpile.

Such claims might be weak for other reasons, but they're not actually hubris.

I'll confess to and repent of any hubris you convict me of. But first you have to actually convict me of hubris. And that means using it correctly in a sentence.

I think what you meant to use here was "hypocrisy", but since the US doesn't talk crap about its neighbors the way Iran does, there's nothing hypocritical in taking Iran to task for talking crap about its neighbors but not doing the same for the US.

Assuming that I was aiming at the low-hanging fruit here (the US) would be easy for you to dismiss, I agree,
Since we're specifically comparing the US and Iran, why would you assume any different? But I'm glad to see that you agree with me regarding policy towards Iran.

but what about Pakistan and India? How about Israel? Even better, how about Russia? I assume all of the above are countries you don't think deserve nukes, correct?
Red herrings. This is a thread about policy towards Iran. You want to talk about Pakistan, India, Israel, or Russia, start your own thread.

That said, I will make a few remarks. First, it's a lot harder to disarm a nuclear power than to prevent them from becoming one. Russia became a nuclear power during a period when nobody in the world was in a position to stop them. I wish it weren't so, but what's done is done. Having seen Russia slip through our grasp, why should we allow Iran to do the same, when we have the power to prevent it?

Second, if I were to make a list of nations that should not acquire nuclear weapons, or should give up the ones they already have, every nation on the world would be on it. And if I were to order the nations on the list by priority; putting those I believed required the most urgent attention, the most forceful action, and the greatest immediate expenditure of resources, I would rank Iran and North Korea much higher on the list than Pakistan, India, Russia, and Israel, and I would rank the US much lower.

I'm not entirely sure how your own list would be ordered, but I get the impression that you would find the idea of such a list offensive, and that you would consider it "hubris" (for some definition of the word, YMMV), for anyone to place Iran higher on it than the US. Is this true?

Oh, bravo. When faced with a challenge to the typical bad-faith rhetoric, play the only-slightly-more-eloquent-than "why do you hate America?" card. Very creative.
I assure you I'm arguing in good faith, to the best of my knowledge.

And I'm quite serious: It seems like you desire to level the nuclear playing field between the US and Iran (i.e., that Iran should have more nukes and the US less). Is this true? If so, why?

If it's not true, could you clarify your preferred policy regarding a potential Iranian arsenal?

[Dr Adequate]

It's a phrase I modified slightly. The original (points to identifying the origin) is "If wishes were fishes we'd all cast nets." And again, I fail to see your reasoning. If wishes were fishes, the act of casting nets would become singularly superfluous, due to the superabundance of fishes we'd have. I for one would be knee-deep in seafood, much of it pornographic in nature.

[Dr Adequate]

Red herrings. Oh, don't you start.

[Doctor Evil]

They give up the pretense to their people that the forces opposing their regime can't be dealt with. That would be a huge blow to the hardliner rhetoric. Also, with this deal they'd give up enough, and the important thing is that they won't be able to make sufficient fuel for a bomb.

I am not convinced on that. Such a deal can be presented as a getting help from outside, without giving any of their rights (to enrich Uranium).

And again, you repetition that they are giving up so much fuel so that they wont be able to make a bomb is at odds with the estimates I saw. All they give up is time, and only a year or two, at the expense of removing most of the external pressure.


You didn't, but I offered three possibilities with the hope that you could clarify what you do think is going to work? The "invasion regime change" has been a mixed bag, to say the least, and our "shake heads and cluck tongues" method (N. Korea) has done about jack toward stopping the bomb. If we're going to try diplomacy, it's going to lead inexorably to negotiations. This isn't going to be pleasant for those who equate negotiation with capitulation. Do you make such an equation?


You use both carrots (diplomacy) and sticks (sanctions). But you either go for one comprehensive deal or no deal at all. You do not suggest a half deal, which is not that substantial. That would only take away the pressure, without actually solving anything.


This is wrong on so many levels, and it seems you do make the equation that negotiation is capitulation and is out of the question. I would agree that the having the current regime out of power of ceasing its extremist support is the ultimate goal, but why does it all have to happen in one fell swoop?

No, I do not. But I do assume that if the Iranian regime has determined that certain policies, including the development of nuclear weapons and support of extremists abroad, are worth pursuing, they did not do so at the spur of the moment. Both are many-year projects which are expensive and carry a large political price abroad. From this I deduce that the Iranian leadership see these as very important, possibly crucial to their country.

Assuming they would give up long range, expensive, projects just because the rest of the world would play nice is embarrassingly naive. It is not impossible to change the course of a country, but the pressures and incentives should have more weight than the weight that the Iranian leadership gives these projects, which happen to be very high.

What I expect is that this deal will be approved, and that would be it. There will be further talks, but without a threat of sanctions there would be no further progress. And, after a year or two Iran would enrich enough Uranium to surpass the level it has now.

[Aggie Boy]

so Iran wants to buy urnaium that his higlyy enriched (higher than just used for electricity) Suspicious

[Aggie Boy]

If they truly wanted it for electrical purposes then this deal would have been fine.

[GreNME]

Fact: The US does not have a longstanding policy of talking crap about its neighbors. Iran does. Therefore it is not hubris to reject claims of such a policy as a basis for dismantling the US nuclear stockpile, while simultaneously considering such claims as a basis for prohibiting an Iranian nuclear stockpile.

Such claims might be weak for other reasons, but they're not actually hubris.

I'll confess to and repent of any hubris you convict me of. But first you have to actually convict me of hubris. And that means using it correctly in a sentence.

I think what you meant to use here was "hypocrisy", but since the US doesn't talk crap about its neighbors the way Iran does, there's nothing hypocritical in taking Iran to task for talking crap about its neighbors but not doing the same for the US.

Just because you wish to narrowly define the parameters of what I was talking about does not mean I have to play that silly game. You went for the low-hanging fruit, and now you're going to have to dig yourself out of it.

Since we're specifically comparing the US and Iran, why would you assume any different? But I'm glad to see that you agree with me regarding policy towards Iran.

I don't see where the current proposed deal with Iran only involves the US and Iran, especially considering Russia and France are being included as parameters of the deal.

Red herrings. This is a thread about policy towards Iran. You want to talk about Pakistan, India, Israel, or Russia, start your own thread.

You should really check the OP, because I started this thread. Don't try to hijack the thread I started. This thread is about the proposed deal with Iran and its implications. Just because you want this to be a head-butting match between the US and Iran only doesn't automagically make it so. Still think I'm using hubris incorrectly?

That said, I will make a few remarks. First, it's a lot harder to disarm a nuclear power than to prevent them from becoming one. Russia became a nuclear power during a period when nobody in the world was in a position to stop them. I wish it weren't so, but what's done is done. Having seen Russia slip through our grasp, why should we allow Iran to do the same, when we have the power to prevent it?

Second, if I were to make a list of nations that should not acquire nuclear weapons, or should give up the ones they already have, every nation on the world would be on it. And if I were to order the nations on the list by priority; putting those I believed required the most urgent attention, the most forceful action, and the greatest immediate expenditure of resources, I would rank Iran and North Korea much higher on the list than Pakistan, India, Russia, and Israel, and I would rank the US much lower.

Excuses, excuses. What do you think your attempts to qualify your statement are showing with regard to absolutism in policy? The reality is that saying "I don't want such-and-such to have nukes" just isn't good enough in the realm of world politics, and for a change the US is actually working toward a resolution-- reducing the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran-- by making use of less absolutist policy. All you're doing is complaining that this is so and using "they support turriss" as your justification. If the world were that simple and absolute this planet would have been a cinder decades ago.

I'm not entirely sure how your own list would be ordered, but I get the impression that you would find the idea of such a list offensive, and that you would consider it "hubris" (for some definition of the word, YMMV), for anyone to place Iran higher on it than the US. Is this true?

You should stop building strawman versions of people holding opposing positions. I don't want Iran waving a nuclear weapon around.

I assure you I'm arguing in good faith, to the best of my knowledge.

And I'm quite serious: It seems like you desire to level the nuclear playing field between the US and Iran (i.e., that Iran should have more nukes and the US less). Is this true? If so, why?

If it's not true, could you clarify your preferred policy regarding a potential Iranian arsenal?

I've been sufficiently clear. Playing "why do you hate America" cards just makes you look like you have a severe lack of tools (and understanding) for addressing the topic.

[GreNME]

They give up the pretense to their people that the forces opposing their regime can't be dealt with. That would be a huge blow to the hardliner rhetoric. Also, with this deal they'd give up enough, and the important thing is that they won't be able to make sufficient fuel for a bomb.
I am not convinced on that. Such a deal can be presented as a getting help from outside, without giving any of their rights (to enrich Uranium).

And again, you repetition that they are giving up so much fuel so that they wont be able to make a bomb is at odds with the estimates I saw. All they give up is time, and only a year or two, at the expense of removing most of the external pressure.

Show me the source of your estimates, and if possible explain to me how those estimates aren't almost complete speculation. You see, "enriched uranium" isn't the fuel needed to make the bomb, it requires an especially highly-enriched specific type of uranium (or plutonium) to make a bomb. It's obviously not impossible to do, but it requires a level of resources that has yet to be displayed in Iran as of yet.

You use both carrots (diplomacy) and sticks (sanctions). But you either go for one comprehensive deal or no deal at all. You do not suggest a half deal, which is not that substantial. That would only take away the pressure, without actually solving anything.

That's preposterous, and in no way indicative of international diplomacy except for the obviously-failed attempt with North Korea-- who now has the bomb. If the goal is to keep the bomb out of Iran's grasp, then demonstrably a "everything or no deal" approach is the wrong way to go.

This is wrong on so many levels, and it seems you do make the equation that negotiation is capitulation and is out of the question. I would agree that the having the current regime out of power of ceasing its extremist support is the ultimate goal, but why does it all have to happen in one fell swoop?

No, I do not. But I do assume that if the Iranian regime has determined that certain policies, including the development of nuclear weapons and support of extremists abroad, are worth pursuing, they did not do so at the spur of the moment. Both are many-year projects which are expensive and carry a large political price abroad. From this I deduce that the Iranian leadership see these as very important, possibly crucial to their country.

Do you not think that Iran hasn't given any consideration to the idea that the US, the UN, and much of the rest of the world has determined a set of goals they're pursuing toward Iran, and consider their goals at least equally as crucial as Iran considers their own? Come on, this is precisely what diplomacy is about-- creating a foundation on which to build as mutually beneficial an agreement as possible while each is still allowing the other to come away feeling they're ahead. It's not going to happen in a single set of negotiations, and the idea that it would or should sets itself up for disappointment.

Assuming they would give up long range, expensive, projects just because the rest of the world would play nice is embarrassingly naive. It is not impossible to change the course of a country, but the pressures and incentives should have more weight than the weight that the Iranian leadership gives these projects, which happen to be very high.

I'm not disagreeing with the idea you're presenting here. In fact, believe it or not, this is how I feel as well. I'm simply of the opinion that moving forward with this agreement or one like it will bring us (outside of Iran) closer to achieving the goals of both keeping a nuke out of Iran and removing a huge political tool used by the hardline regime. I have a secondary hope that it would give the moderate factions in Iran leverage toward gathering more support.

What I expect is that this deal will be approved, and that would be it. There will be further talks, but without a threat of sanctions there would be no further progress. And, after a year or two Iran would enrich enough Uranium to surpass the level it has now.

I don't want to get into a scientific discussion of what it takes to make sufficient nuclear material to create a nuclear bomb, but again I have to point out that what is already shown to be known of the Iranian capabilities this just isn't so, and would actually be more achievable if Iran holds on to 100% of the material they have in their possession as opposed to having a large portion of it shipped off for manufacturing into power plant rods and medical materials (which can't be put into dual-use without obvious steps that would break the agreement).

[Doctor Evil]

Show me the source of your estimates, and if possible explain to me how those estimates aren't almost complete speculation. You see, "enriched uranium" isn't the fuel needed to make the bomb, it requires an especially highly-enriched specific type of uranium (or plutonium) to make a bomb. It's obviously not impossible to do, but it requires a level of resources that has yet to be displayed in Iran as of yet.


I gave a link to a bbc article earlier in this thread, and have seen it repeated in other places. I have no access to detailed information. In any case, any such estimate would be speculative, but not as much as more complicated estimates, such as the time it would take them to manufacture a bomb.

Saying that, I don't understand why you saw the need to include the discussion about enriched uranium here. Maybe you still do not follow what this estimate is about, so I will repeat this again. It is just an estimate for the time it would take Iran to enrich natural uranium, at a quantity equal to the one they give up, to the same (low) enrichment level. This is what they are giving up in this proposed deal. Now, this seems to me something that would be possible to estimate based on the knowledge on their current enrichment ability.

Again, I have no special knowledge, and have not seen any detailed analysis yet. But, this kind of estimate seems to be easy to do and reliable. I see no reason to doubt it that much.


That's preposterous, and in no way indicative of international diplomacy except for the obviously-failed attempt with North Korea-- who now has the bomb. If the goal is to keep the bomb out of Iran's grasp, then demonstrably a "everything or no deal" approach is the wrong way to go.


It failed with North Korea, but worked with Libya. It may or may not work here, but this proposed deal would, in my opinion, turn out be worse, it would take out most of the incentives without solving anything.


Do you not think that Iran hasn't given any consideration to the idea that the US, the UN, and much of the rest of the world has determined a set of goals they're pursuing toward Iran, and consider their goals at least equally as crucial as Iran considers their own? Come on, this is precisely what diplomacy is about-- creating a foundation on which to build as mutually beneficial an agreement as possible while each is still allowing the other to come away feeling they're ahead. It's not going to happen in a single set of negotiations, and the idea that it would or should sets itself up for disappointment.


I do not know what that's even supposed to mean. Lets try to make this more concrete. What steps to you think should be taken, by both sides, and why do you think the Iranian would go along? What exactly would convince Iran to abandon expensive projects which it sees as crucial interests?


I don't want to get into a scientific discussion of what it takes to make sufficient nuclear material to create a nuclear bomb, but again I have to point out that what is already shown to be known of the Iranian capabilities this just isn't so, and would actually be more achievable if Iran holds on to 100% of the material they have in their possession as opposed to having a large portion of it shipped off for manufacturing into power plant rods and medical materials (which can't be put into dual-use without obvious steps that would break the agreement).

Not much known, because the IAEA supervision has always been inefficient. We do know about one enrichment plant. Oh, make that two, with this new one a Qom (which is not operative yet.) This can serve as a basis for an estimate on their ability to enrich uranium and replace the one they would give away.

[GreNME]

I gave a link to a bbc article earlier in this thread, and have seen it repeated in other places. I have no access to detailed information. In any case, any such estimate would be speculative, but not as much as more complicated estimates, such as the time it would take them to manufacture a bomb.

Saying that, I don't understand why you saw the need to include the discussion about enriched uranium here. Maybe you still do not follow what this estimate is about, so I will repeat this again. It is just an estimate for the time it would take Iran to enrich natural uranium, at a quantity equal to the one they give up, to the same (low) enrichment level. This is what they are giving up in this proposed deal. Now, this seems to me something that would be possible to estimate based on the knowledge on their current enrichment ability.

Again, I have no special knowledge, and have not seen any detailed analysis yet. But, this kind of estimate seems to be easy to do and reliable. I see no reason to doubt it that much.

With all due respect, it's also an estimate that's easy to repeat over and over in order to inject it into the public discourse as if it were fact. That, in and of itself, makes it suspect to me and any time I attempt to get more quantification on the matter the available information as to its certainty goes around in circles. I'm not trying to put you specifically on the hot-seat on this point, but I'm underscoring the completely unverified nature of this claim that is often used as a fact.

That's preposterous, and in no way indicative of international diplomacy except for the obviously-failed attempt with North Korea-- who now has the bomb. If the goal is to keep the bomb out of Iran's grasp, then demonstrably a "everything or no deal" approach is the wrong way to go.
It failed with North Korea, but worked with Libya. It may or may not work here, but this proposed deal would, in my opinion, turn out be worse, it would take out most of the incentives without solving anything.

But it didn't work with Libya. Libya never had anything close to Iran's capabilities or resources, let alone those North Korea had-- which Iran does not, by the way... it's a simpler process to get plutonium up to a weaponized level, and Iran is dealing with uranium.

Do you not think that Iran hasn't given any consideration to the idea that the US, the UN, and much of the rest of the world has determined a set of goals they're pursuing toward Iran, and consider their goals at least equally as crucial as Iran considers their own? Come on, this is precisely what diplomacy is about-- creating a foundation on which to build as mutually beneficial an agreement as possible while each is still allowing the other to come away feeling they're ahead. It's not going to happen in a single set of negotiations, and the idea that it would or should sets itself up for disappointment.
I do not know what that's even supposed to mean. Lets try to make this more concrete. What steps to you think should be taken, by both sides, and why do you think the Iranian would go along? What exactly would convince Iran to abandon expensive projects which it sees as crucial interests?

I think that success isn't going to come by expecting both sides to follow a strict script of steps to take along the process. That's inviting failure from the outset. With a regime like Iran, the primary goal is to get them to the table first, then start working forward with getting agreements on steps toward a more amenable interaction between Iran and the rest of the world. As has been the case with Russia, this doesn't mean success on all factors, and not all at once.

Not much known, because the IAEA supervision has always been inefficient. We do know about one enrichment plant. Oh, make that two, with this new one a Qom (which is not operative yet.) This can serve as a basis for an estimate on their ability to enrich uranium and replace the one they would give away.

The Qom installation wasn't new news. It just hadn't come into play as a political tool yet until we heard about it. And when it came up it was used fairly effectively on the part of the US. And while by "effectively" I don't mean it stopped Iran from working on it, I do mean that it showed them that they're not dealing with Western powers who are just playing in blind rhetoric toward their own intentionally provocative nonsense. However, even both of the facilities in question wouldn't have been able to enrich the uranium to weapons-grade levels, this much is also known. I've heard rumblings that Iran may have shopped around for nations who could enrich the uranium to that quality for them, and while I wouldn't doubt that story (which, whether credible in fact or not is certainly credible in motivation for Iran's leadership) I do have reservations that any current nuclear power is willing to take that kind of gamble for as little return as Iran could offer, with the exception of North Korea (but I've pointed out their reliance on a plutonium-powered bomb).

One factor that seems to rarely come into play when assessing the political approach toward Iran is that its power structure has been teetering on the edge of faltering since the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad, which was followed by protests by citizens and political figures practically on the level of this year's re-election of the Ahmadi regime. Strategically, the rest of the world stands a better chance of seeing Ahmadi regime, which has been a huge boon to the hardliners in Iranian politics, get taken mostly out of power by taking their argument about wanting only nuclear power (and medical use) for their program to the negotiating table on its own face value. If they try to get out of that-- which it's predictable they will-- while the rest of the world is taking the stance that they (the world) are willing to accept a good faith gesture, then the Iranian regime's lack of acceptance of the good faith is going to backlash internally and cost them political capital domestically. This has already been the case with regard to the Iranian economy, which very nearly cost Ahmadi the election this year, and in the meantime between now and the next Iranian presidential election there will be parliamentary elections where hardliners stand a chance of defeat to the moderates if their stances continue to cost Iran as a nation the ability to improve itself domestically and attain some better standing on the world stage internationally. It's a long game, but it's one that's been played to pretty positive results with regard to China and despite a few hiccups has played fairly well with Russia. Going into talks with only a set of non-negotiable terms would not only hamper such a long game with Iran, it would guarantee its failure.

[Doctor Evil]

With all due respect, it's also an estimate that's easy to repeat over and over in order to inject it into the public discourse as if it were fact. That, in and of itself, makes it suspect to me and any time I attempt to get more quantification on the matter the available information as to its certainty goes around in circles. I'm not trying to put you specifically on the hot-seat on this point, but I'm underscoring the completely unverified nature of this claim that is often used as a fact.


Huh? It is not that hard to figure that it is in the correct ballpark. Iran has enriched its Uranium for how long? Say six years now. During this time, they added more and more centrifuges, and thus their capacity has risen considerably. Considering that, I do not find it surprising that it would take them a year or two to enrich 75% of their quantity to the same low level.



But it didn't work with Libya. Libya never had anything close to Iran's capabilities or resources, let alone those North Korea had-- which Iran does not, by the way... it's a simpler process to get plutonium up to a weaponized level, and Iran is dealing with uranium.


Libya gave up a nuclear program, meaning that the pressures worked. I do not see how the rest is relevant to the point.


I think that success isn't going to come by expecting both sides to follow a strict script of steps to take along the process. That's inviting failure from the outset. With a regime like Iran, the primary goal is to get them to the table first, then start working forward with getting agreements on steps toward a more amenable interaction between Iran and the rest of the world. As has been the case with Russia, this doesn't mean success on all factors, and not all at once.


I fail to see how are you suggesting to convince Iran that perusing nuclear weapons, a strategic goal which they have invested a lot of resources in, should be abandoned. Under your suggested approach they would just take what is offered and give away very little in return, without giving up that goal. In fact, your approach will effectively ensure that Iran do manage to make the last few technological steps needed for them to obtain nuclear weapons.


The Qom installation wasn't new news. It just hadn't come into play as a political tool yet until we heard about it. And when it came up it was used fairly effectively on the part of the US. And while by "effectively" I don't mean it stopped Iran from working on it, I do mean that it showed them that they're not dealing with Western powers who are just playing in blind rhetoric toward their own intentionally provocative nonsense. However, even both of the facilities in question wouldn't have been able to enrich the uranium to weapons-grade levels, this much is also known. I've heard rumblings that Iran may have shopped around for nations who could enrich the uranium to that quality for them, and while I wouldn't doubt that story (which, whether credible in fact or not is certainly credible in motivation for Iran's leadership) I do have reservations that any current nuclear power is willing to take that kind of gamble for as little return as Iran could offer, with the exception of North Korea (but I've pointed out their reliance on a plutonium-powered bomb).


The Qom installation was only reported to IAEA after Iran found out that other countries are aware of its existence. (Several countries were aware of it for a few years.) This is at a time where Iran is suspected of hiding details of their nuclear plans from the world. I can see only two interpretations for it, i) Iran is very stupid or ii) they have tried to keep this hidden and failed. I do not think that the current rulers of Iran are stupid.
(In addition, the Iranians clearly tried to hide this installation, building it in a mountain.)



One factor that seems to rarely come into play when assessing the political approach toward Iran is that its power structure has been teetering on the edge of faltering since the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad, which was followed by protests by citizens and political figures practically on the level of this year's re-election of the Ahmadi regime. Strategically, the rest of the world stands a better chance of seeing Ahmadi regime, which has been a huge boon to the hardliners in Iranian politics, get taken mostly out of power by taking their argument about wanting only nuclear power (and medical use) for their program to the negotiating table on its own face value. If they try to get out of that-- which it's predictable they will-- while the rest of the world is taking the stance that they (the world) are willing to accept a good faith gesture, then the Iranian regime's lack of acceptance of the good faith is going to backlash internally and cost them political capital domestically. This has already been the case with regard to the Iranian economy, which very nearly cost Ahmadi the election this year, and in the meantime between now and the next Iranian presidential election there will be parliamentary elections where hardliners stand a chance of defeat to the moderates if their stances continue to cost Iran as a nation the ability to improve itself domestically and attain some better standing on the world stage internationally. It's a long game, but it's one that's been played to pretty positive results with regard to China and despite a few hiccups has played fairly well with Russia. Going into talks with only a set of non-negotiable terms would not only hamper such a long game with Iran, it would guarantee its failure.

There is no such thing as the Ahmedinijad regime. There is a government headed by Ahmedinijad, which is a part of a larger system, headed by Khamenei. Getting rid of the regime meaning replacing the current theocracy with a different type of government.

The foreign policy of Iran is mostly determined by Khamenei and his advisers. This also holds for the nuclear program. I see no signs that he is willing to abandon that stance.

As for using such a deal to influence internal Iranian politics, I am doubtful. After the last elections the current regime have shown that they are willing to use violence to quell political unrest. They seem to have succeed. I do not see the nuclear issue ever leading to the same amount of unrest. Furthermore, I do not see people risking their lives again so soon after a failed previous attempt to protest. In short, nothing would come out of it for a good few years. It is a wain hope.

[FireGarden]

The Qom installation was only reported to IAEA after Iran found out that other countries are aware of its existence. (Several countries were aware of it for a few years.)

Which countries, and for how many years?Did the USA know before the NIE was written in Dec 2007? And why did they not come forward with the accusation?

ie: what evidence is there that the USA knew anything about Qom before Iran told the IAEA?

This is at a time where Iran is suspected of hiding details of their nuclear plans from the world. I can see only two interpretations for it, i) Iran is very stupid or ii) they have tried to keep this hidden and failed. I do not think that the current rulers of Iran are stupid.
(In addition, the Iranians clearly tried to hide this installation, building it in a mountain.)

I would think it is built in a mountain to make it harder to bomb. And it all depends on when Iran is supposed to inform the IAEA that it is building the plant. No uranium has been enriched at the plant.

If (and I do say if) the USA knew about this facility before Iran announced it, then they were probably hoping that Iran would move Uranium there before telling the world. Then the USA would have evidence to crow about. But this did not happen.

That's just opinion, of course. But at least it explains why the USA (desperate under Bush to portray Iran as a nuclear risk) would withhold "damning" evidence from the world.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran#September_2009_revelations

On September 21, 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was constructing a second enrichment facility.34°53′09″N 50°59′45″E / 34.8859°N 50.9958°E / 34.8859; 50.9958 The following day (September 22) IAEA Director General ElBaradei informed the United States, and two days later (September 24) the United States, United Kingdom and France briefed the IAEA on an enrichment facility under construction at an underground location near Qom.

That's the only order of events I've been able to find. Iran announced then the USA et al said "We've known for years."

[FireGarden]

On the "known about it for years" claim:

Iranian site prompts U.S. to rethink assessment
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/23/AR2009102303757_pf.html

The Qom site has undermined one of the U.S. intelligence community's key assessments of Iran's nuclear program: the assumption that Tehran had abandoned plans to enrich uranium in secret, according to two former senior U.S. officials involved in high-level discussions about Iran.

A landmark U.S. intelligence assessment in 2007 concluded that any secret uranium-processing activities "probably were halted" in 2003 and had not been restarted.

[...] "Qom changed a lot of people's thinking, especially about the possibility of secret military enrichment" of uranium, said one of the former officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the assessments remain classified.

[...] The officials acknowledged that the Qom complex is not yet operational and that no uranium had been enriched at the time the site was revealed last month. They also acknowledged there is no "smoking-gun" evidence that Iran plans to make bomb-grade uranium. But the officials said the Qom site was structurally suited for that purpose, and they concluded that there is no plausible role for the plant in Iran's civilian nuclear power infrastructure.

[...] Exactly when the order was issued to build the Qom facility is unclear, but intelligence officials say they have studied the site at least since 2004.

[...] By last year, a series of breakthroughs confirmed that Iran was building a secret uranium-enrichment plant, and also yielded precise details about how it would be operated, including the number of centrifuges Iran planned to use and how much electricity the facility would consume.

So they've known about the site for a few years, but only worked out the enrichment part of it last year.

Which leaves us with the quesiton: why didn't Bush reveal this data? Did he not want people to think that Iran has secret nuclear ambitions? Or was he waiting for Iran to move Uranium there, and thus be in clear breach of its obligations?

[Captain.Sassy]

The US is also a world leader in missile guidance systems and target acquisition systems, though. It can actually engage in warfare based on precision strikes against high-value strategic targets with minimal collateral damage.

Before these highly-advanced technologies--still largely unmatched by other advanced nations, let alone developing countries like Iraq--our strategy relied heavily on things like carpet-bombing (and, for a time, even considered battlefield nukes).

For a nation like Iran, which doesn't have precision guidance and targeting tech, and which doesn't really have the industrial base to launch a major strategic missile war, it's much more in their interest to cause as much devastation with as few warheads as possible. The big three--Nuclear, Biological, Chemical--are ideal for this.

tl;dr, long-range missiles with conventional warheads are almost useless in modern warfare.

I disagree.

I think that a place like Iran benefits from having long range conventional missiles. It enables it to retaliate against any hypothetical NATO intervention in a way that would be impossible by the Iranian airforce (which would likely be shot down if, for example, they tried to bomb Turkey or Israel in response to an airstrike). So it becomes something other regional states have to consider before any kind of military intervention in Iran. Having conventional missiles that could strike Israel wouldn't be the same deterrent as having nuclear missiles that could do this, but it would nonetheless be a cost that Israel would likely take into consideration when evaluating the costs and benefits of an intervention. Now it could very well be the case that Iran only wants missiles to be able to launch nukes, but there could still be a role for a conventional missile. Also, the C-802 that hezbollah used to explode the destroyer in 2006.

tl;dr conventional missiles allow a regional power to project force in a region where antagonists have air superiority

[Ziggurat]

I think that a place like Iran benefits from having long range conventional missiles. It enables it to retaliate against any hypothetical NATO intervention in a way that would be impossible by the Iranian airforce (which would likely be shot down if, for example, they tried to bomb Turkey or Israel in response to an airstrike).

Hardly. Iran's long-range missiles do not have the precision required to hit small targets, and if you loaded them with conventional explosive warheads, they'd likely do very little damage, because they'd hit a parking lot as easily as a building.

So it becomes something other regional states have to consider before any kind of military intervention in Iran.

Other regional states remember how ineffective Saddam's SCUD missiles were. Iran does too, I'm sure.

Having conventional missiles that could strike Israel wouldn't be the same deterrent as having nuclear missiles that could do this, but it would nonetheless be a cost that Israel would likely take into consideration when evaluating the costs and benefits of an intervention.

Israel can take a few hits from conventional missiles rather easily. They have plenty of times in the past, and in fact Iran's Hezbollah proxies probably pose as much of a threat as Iran itself does in this regard, since they're so much closer. Israel isn't very worried about conventional warheads from Iran.

Also, the C-802 that hezbollah used to explode the destroyer in 2006.

The C-802 is a radar-guided anti-ship cruise missile. It is not a long-range ballistic missile. VERY different creatures, with very different capabilities and purposes. The usefulness of the C-802 to Hezbollah says nothing about the usefulness of ballistic missiles with conventional explosive warheads to Iran.

[Captain.Sassy]

Hardly. Iran's long-range missiles do not have the precision required to hit small targets, and if you loaded them with conventional explosive warheads, they'd likely do very little damage, because they'd hit a parking lot as easily as a building.

I don't know about that. I think their more recent missiles are somewhat more accurate. And while the damage they do might be 'little' in comparison with the damage that a more capable state could exact, it represents nonetheless a retaliatory capability.


Other regional states remember how ineffective Saddam's SCUD missiles were. Iran does too, I'm sure.

Iran used scuds in 2001 agains the MKO in Iraq. This was a use of conventional ballistic missiles. Whether or not Saddam's SCUD attacks on Israel were effective or not is not does not diminish the fact that having a conventional missile capability is still a deterrent. It may not be an absolute deterrent in the way that a nuclear capability might be, but it is a cost that a state has to consider when deciding whether or not to attack Iran.



Israel can take a few hits from conventional missiles rather easily. They have plenty of times in the past, and in fact Iran's Hezbollah proxies probably pose as much of a threat as Iran itself does in this regard, since they're so much closer. Israel isn't very worried about conventional warheads from Iran.

You may be right, but there's a big difference between Hezbollah's katyusha rockets and estimates of the capabilities of Iran's conventional ballistic missiles.



The C-802 is a radar-guided anti-ship cruise missile. It is not a long-range ballistic missile. VERY different creatures, with very different capabilities and purposes. The usefulness of the C-802 to Hezbollah says nothing about the usefulness of ballistic missiles with conventional explosive warheads to Iran.

No duh.

That was more in response to the comment about Iran's lack of technical sophistication in general. As I recall, the launch of the anti-ship missile was interpreted by many analysts of a showcase of Iranian anti-ship technology. I read the same thing about the launching of the SCUDS at MKO.

If Iran isn't planning to use conventional ballistic missiles and doesn't consider them a deterrent, then why would it stockpile hundreds of the things?

?

[Captain.Sassy]

Apparently I'm in good company:

""Missiles are for [Iranians] what both tactical and strategic air power are for the West," said Uzi Rubin, an Israeli engineer considered by U.S. intelligence analysts to be an expert on Middle East missile programs. The Iranians "are transparent. They want to deter any U.S. or Israeli attack [and] Iranian leaders openly wish for U.S. satellites to take pictures of their weapons sites and to see their capability," Rubin said in an interview Sept. 17 with Iran Watch, a Web site maintained by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. "

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/27/AR2009092703295.html

[GreNME]

Huh? It is not that hard to figure that it is in the correct ballpark. Iran has enriched its Uranium for how long? Say six years now. During this time, they added more and more centrifuges, and thus their capacity has risen considerably. Considering that, I do not find it surprising that it would take them a year or two to enrich 75% of their quantity to the same low level.

Why say six years? By all we've been allowed to know publicly, Iran suspended their program in 2003 and reinstated it in 2005. I will agree that the reinstatement was a pretty aggressive one, though. Still, again, the existence of centrifuges won't give the level of enrichment needed. It requires a number of centrifuges working together with high amounts of low-enriched uranium, to produce very small amounts of high-enriched uranium. This is actually another strong case to have the enrichment done elsewhere, for two reasons: 1) had they been spending all this time trying to highly-enrich uranium, the material sent out would show signs, and 2) Iran wouldn't have sufficient amounts of low-grade material to enrich weapons-grade material.

Libya gave up a nuclear program, meaning that the pressures worked. I do not see how the rest is relevant to the point.

Libya didn't have much of a choice to give up their nuke program-- no one would deal with them after the USSR fell. Any chance of Russia or China falling any time soon? If not, then Iran already has access to more international relations with nuclear powers than Libya did, not to mention the connections Iran has with Arab countries that Libya didn't enjoy due to their leader's lack of friendliness with pretty much everyone in the Mid-East. Many of the pressures that were present to Libya aren't present for Iran, so the relevance that should be questioned here is the example of Libya.

I fail to see how are you suggesting to convince Iran that perusing nuclear weapons, a strategic goal which they have invested a lot of resources in, should be abandoned. Under your suggested approach they would just take what is offered and give away very little in return, without giving up that goal. In fact, your approach will effectively ensure that Iran do manage to make the last few technological steps needed for them to obtain nuclear weapons.

If I understand you correctly, you're questioning why a direct approach shouldn't be followed versus a slower, less-direct approach. From your other statements you seem to feel that the slower, less-direct approach will result in a negative outcome. My only answer is that insisting on the direct approach is setting itself up to not work, leaving us with choices that I think neither of us desire as our only available options once those fail. This government isn't going to play ball that way, because the US and other Western powers have as much credibility to use as political capital toward them as they have the other way around-- they have little to lose by cooperating. As such, they need to be given something to lose beyond "we're going to bomb the crap out of you" as an incentive. We keep it up with the "disarm or else" line of negotiation, and pretty soon we're going to have to follow through with the "or else" part.

The Qom installation was only reported to IAEA after Iran found out that other countries are aware of its existence. (Several countries were aware of it for a few years.) This is at a time where Iran is suspected of hiding details of their nuclear plans from the world. I can see only two interpretations for it, i) Iran is very stupid or ii) they have tried to keep this hidden and failed. I do not think that the current rulers of Iran are stupid.
(In addition, the Iranians clearly tried to hide this installation, building it in a mountain.)

There's no doubt that they tried to keep it hidden and it failed. Do you recall how the Iranian government reacted when we went public with the information we had and the IAEA was informed? This is germane to the issue of working toward keeping nukes out of Iran's hands.

There is no such thing as the Ahmedinijad regime. There is a government headed by Ahmedinijad, which is a part of a larger system, headed by Khamenei. Getting rid of the regime meaning replacing the current theocracy with a different type of government.

The foreign policy of Iran is mostly determined by Khamenei and his advisers. This also holds for the nuclear program. I see no signs that he is willing to abandon that stance.

That isn't completely false on the surface of things, especially concerning Khamenei's part in the overall governance. However, to suggest there is no "Ahmadinejad regime" is definitely false. There are factions of varying types in Iran, even among the hardliners. Ahmadi is one faction, and his connections in the IRGC run pretty deep. However, his connections don't extend to the Iranian Army, and Khamenei has jurisdiction over both. There is a power struggle going on in Iran, and it's not just between the moderates and the hardliners-- we could only be so lucky. Khamenei has definitely used Ahmadi as his attack dog, but to assume that there hasn't been any quid-pro-quo in the power-jockeying is naive or based on too little understanding about Iranian politics. You see, Khamenei has to at least appear to cater to some of the sensibilities of the more moderate and opposition politics, or else he will be taken out of power (his largest opponent heads the only council who can remove the Grand Ayatollah). Ahmadinejad doesn't have to do that as much, as long as he gets enough votes to keep himself and his appointees in office-- though, again, there have been arguments in Iran over political appointments in past years, and Khamenei has thrown out some of Ahmadi's appointments. Khamenei still has most control in Iran, but since 2005 that's been changing, and while Ahmadi still only maintains growing domestic control, he has unprecedented influence over the IRGC, and his antagonistic antics have been aimed at any opposition in the Iranian government as much as it's been toward the West or Israel.

As for using such a deal to influence internal Iranian politics, I am doubtful. After the last elections the current regime have shown that they are willing to use violence to quell political unrest. They seem to have succeed. I do not see the nuclear issue ever leading to the same amount of unrest. Furthermore, I do not see people risking their lives again so soon after a failed previous attempt to protest. In short, nothing would come out of it for a good few years. It is a wain hope.

You don't see people risking their lives, so it makes sense to assume they aren't? Do you understand that there's still protesting and even political figures speaking out against the past elections and the treatment of the protesters? Even during last month's Quds holiday there were protesters out there at the risk of their lives (link (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8263467.stm)). There are people who are fighting for a stronger say in Iranian politics, and there's little that the outside world can do without legitimizing the current regime's claims of existing to protect Iran from threat. But what can be done is call them on their claims that we know aren't honest, particularly with regard to their nuclear program, and expect their government to show good faith by offering them precisely the type of deal that gives them what's needed for a peaceful program while blocking what's necessary for a weapons program.

The current agreement plan isn't a hope, it's part of a strategy. How this current agreement will determine how the Western groups will proceed, but the strategy is to use engagement to give the Iranian government the opportunity to succeed or fail at their promises of a peaceful program. If they fail to follow through and try to maintain these subversive behaviors, they're going to lose any possible support they can manage to get currently, primarily from China and Russia. Other world powers have worked with Iran so far because Iran can claim deniability about their subversion, and because it tweaked the US (I mean, let's be honest about that). The only way to undermine that is to put Iran in a position where it has to pull the stupid crap against their perceived allies that it pulls with impunity against those it has marginal to no relationship with. If they agree to this proposal, that puts their relationship with Russia (and France) under conditions. If an agreement can be had, then it wouldn't hurt to see if China can be included in the future, particularly since China buys oil from Iran. If Iran's key projects get tied to their international relations, then Iran is going to have a whole lot less wiggle room for sword-clanging.

Essentially, if the goal is security and not simply making an example of the Iranian government, then getting Iran's successes tied to other nations who aren't going to be amenable to troublemakers is a tenable option. Whether it plays out that way remains to be seen, and one can surely guess that the Iranian leadership has taken this into account (hence the putting off a decision and counter-proposal). At this point we need to wait and see if the risk assessment they make is either in favor of not having all the control of their own nuclear program. If so, then I expect another proposal from the West for a plan that still keeps full autonomy of their nuclear program off the table, and likely still includes one or more of the nations Iran has remained historically (relatively) friendly with.

[theprestige]

That was more in response to the comment about Iran's lack of technical sophistication in general. As I recall, the launch of the anti-ship missile was interpreted by many analysts of a showcase of Iranian anti-ship technology. I read the same thing about the launching of the SCUDS at MKO.
Guided anti-ship missiles and short-range tactical ballistic missiles are both 1950s-era technology, first successfully demonstrated in the previous decade during World War 2. Pretty impressive for guerrilla insurgents, and about what you'd expect from a developing nation, but hardly in the same category as JDAMs, ICBMs, and such like that.

If Iran isn't planning to use conventional ballistic missiles and doesn't consider them a deterrent, then why would it stockpile hundreds of the things?

"You go to war with the army you have---not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

Besides, as a tactical ballistic missile, hundreds of SCUDs are an effetive deterrent against nearby enemy ground forces attempting a conventional assault. They're also an effective fire support option for a friendly ground forces attempting an assault on a nearby strongpoint.

What they're not, however, is an effective option against enemy command, control and logistics infrastructure at long ranges. The SCUD can't really hit enough bunkers, power junctions, antenna clusters, or major bridges to make a strategic difference. You could lob them at cities, maybe killing a few hundred people here and there, but each one you use in that way is one less you'll have available to use against those ground forces rolling towards you. SCUDs just aren't much of a strategic deterrent...

... Unless you arm them with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. Imagine stockpiling four hundred SCUDs with conventional warheads, and then upgrading a score of them to nukes as soon as the warheads become available. That's enough tactical firepower for one or two large-scale conventional battles, plus a hundredfold increase in your strategic deterrent.

Seriously, it's like you have no idea what warfare is really about, or how it actually works.

[GreNME]

"You go to war with the army you have---not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

Besides, as a tactical ballistic missile, hundreds of SCUDs are an effetive deterrent against nearby enemy ground forces attempting a conventional assault. They're also an effective fire support option for a friendly ground forces attempting an assault on a nearby strongpoint.

What they're not, however, is an effective option against enemy command, control and logistics infrastructure at long ranges. The SCUD can't really hit enough bunkers, power junctions, antenna clusters, or major bridges to make a strategic difference. You could lob them at cities, maybe killing a few hundred people here and there, but each one you use in that way is one less you'll have available to use against those ground forces rolling towards you. SCUDs just aren't much of a strategic deterrent...

... Unless you arm them with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. Imagine stockpiling four hundred SCUDs with conventional warheads, and then upgrading a score of them to nukes as soon as the warheads become available. That's enough tactical firepower for one or two large-scale conventional battles, plus a hundredfold increase in your strategic deterrent.

Seriously, it's like you have no idea what warfare is really about, or how it actually works.

Interesting how right at the ellipses you go off into la-la-land of un-quantified possibilities. Why not also imagine them stuffing a few dozen of the warheads with low-grade nuclear material to make dirty bombs as well while we're in Imagine-Land™?

There's no doubt that Iran wanting a nuke would be for a deterrent measure, but it's doubtful they'd be as asinine to stick them on the fronts of SCUDs.

[Captain.Sassy]

Seriously, it's like you have no idea what warfare is really about, or how it actually works.

lol

Okay there Von Clausewitz

If conventional ballistic missiles are useless as a deterrent then why don't you tell me why China has so many of them pointed at Taiwan?

What they're not, however, is an effective option against enemy command, control and logistics infrastructure at long ranges. The SCUD can't really hit enough bunkers, power junctions, antenna clusters, or major bridges to make a strategic difference.

You have strategy and tactics mixed up here Rommel.

The strategic logic behind a conventional ballistic missile capability is to force Israel or other regional powers to incur a cost for military action against Iran. "if/then"

[Ziggurat]

I don't know about that. I think their more recent missiles are somewhat more accurate. And while the damage they do might be 'little' in comparison with the damage that a more capable state could exact, it represents nonetheless a retaliatory capability.

But no more so than they already have via Hezbollah, but with severe strategic disadvantages.

It may not be an absolute deterrent in the way that a nuclear capability might be, but it is a cost that a state has to consider when deciding whether or not to attack Iran.

That is a cost Israel has already demonstrated itself willing to pay.

You may be right, but there's a big difference between Hezbollah's katyusha rockets and estimates of the capabilities of Iran's conventional ballistic missiles.

Quantity has a quality all its own.

That was more in response to the comment about Iran's lack of technical sophistication in general. As I recall, the launch of the anti-ship missile was interpreted by many analysts of a showcase of Iranian anti-ship technology.

The only interesting thing about that is that they gave it to Hezbollah. It was a Chinese-built missile, not an Iranian one. We know that Iran has access to such weapons, I doubt they could manufacture it themselves.

If Iran isn't planning to use conventional ballistic missiles and doesn't consider them a deterrent, then why would it stockpile hundreds of the things?

Perhaps because nuclear warheads aren't the only non-conventional warheads one could use. Perhaps it's a bluff. Or perhaps Israel isn't the only potential target.

[Childlike Empress]

Perhaps because nuclear warheads aren't the only non-conventional warheads one could use. Perhaps it's a bluff. Or perhaps Israel isn't the only potential target.


Well, they have bought all the nice missile stuff (http://rdanafox.blogspot.com/2007/01/iranian-missile-systems.html) from Russia and China. The Sunburn seems to be an especially nice weapon if you sit on top of a gulf. Some potential targets could include


obviously every ship in the persian gulf including oil tankers and aircraft carriers, making the street of hormuz unpassable and cutting a major supply line for the military in Iraq and the oil for the US.
the harbours and skyskrapers of the arab emirates - imagine what that will do to the financial system
the Saddam Dam in Mosul, flooding half of northern Iraq and cutting another supply line
the green zone and new fancy us embassy in Baghdad
the dozens of US bases around Iran
the BTC-Pipeline

etc pp

[Dr Adequate]

Well, they have bought all the nice missile stuff (http://rdanafox.blogspot.com/2007/01/iranian-missile-systems.html) from Russia and China. The Sunburn seems to be an especially nice weapon if you sit on top of a gulf. Some potential targets could include


obviously every ship in the persian gulf including oil tankers and aircraft carriers, making the street of hormuz unpassable and cutting a major supply line for the military in Iraq and the oil for the US.
the harbours and skyskrapers of the arab emirates - imagine what that will do to the financial system
the Saddam Dam in Mosul, flooding half of northern Iraq and cutting another supply line
the green zone and new fancy us embassy in Baghdad
the dozens of US bases around Iran
the BTC-Pipeline

etc pp You are off-topic. This thread is about fish.

[Childlike Empress]

Oh sorry, i'm afraid even the Sunburn isn't precise enough to hit a herring, even a big red one.

[Darth Rotor]

The only interesting thing about that is that they gave it to Hezbollah. It was a Chinese-built missile, not an Iranian one. We know that Iran has access to such weapons, I doubt they could manufacture it themselves.

Yet.

DR

[Darth Rotor]

Well, they have bought all the nice missile stuff (http://rdanafox.blogspot.com/2007/01/iranian-missile-systems.html) from Russia and China. The Sunburn seems to be an especially nice weapon if you sit on top of a gulf. Some potential targets could include


obviously every ship in the persian gulf including oil tankers and aircraft carriers, making the street of hormuz unpassable and cutting a major supply line for the military in Iraq and the oil for the US.
the harbours and skyskrapers of the arab emirates - imagine what that will do to the financial system
the Saddam Dam in Mosul, flooding half of northern Iraq and cutting another supply line
the green zone and new fancy us embassy in Baghdad
the dozens of US bases around Iran
the BTC-Pipeline

etc pp
Responding to more of the standard CE foolishness here.

A dense minefield would make the Straits of Hormuz close to impassable.

Sunburn makes passage of the straits a higher risk, depending upon what you are sailing in, and who you are. Sunburn is a good missile, but it isn't magic.

Sunburn being used agains the Saddam Dam in Mosul ... fired from Iran? When is the last time you looked at a map? Note for our readers here: Sunburn was designed as an anti ship missile. It has a finite range.

"Attack bases in Iraq." With a Sunburn?

CE, Iranian High Command is grateful that you are not in charge of strike planning, as you have no clue what you are talking about.
You are off-topic. This thread is about fish.
It is not helpful by encourage rubbish dispensers.

DR

[Childlike Empress]

Usual pompous jerkery. There's more than the Sunburn if you care to look. Case is, they are able to cause a lot of havoc. And it would all be in defense.

[Darth Rotor]

Usual pompous jerkery. There's more than the Sunburn if you care to look. Case is, they are able to cause a lot of havoc. And it would all be in defense.

Then maybe you ought not to make such foolish statements as
The Sunburn seems to be an especially nice weapon if you sit on top of a gulf. Some potential targets could include
And follow it with a target list.


"And it would all be in defense."

Right, attacking the Saddam Dam in Iraq from Iran would all be in defense.

You would be well advised to stay out of this line of work, it's not a suitable vocation for fools.

DR

[Childlike Empress]

Then maybe you ought not to make such foolish statements as

And follow it with a target list.


If you were able to understand a paragraph in context and not misunderstand sentence after sentence, maybe you could spare us a lot of your misplaced vitriol.

[GreNME]

And you could spare us a thread-jack by stopping the arguing over whether you comprehend or whether he understands an unrelated statement you made.

[Captain.Sassy]

[Missile strikes] is a cost Israel has already demonstrated itself willing to pay.

If Israel doesn't consider missile strikes on its population as a cost, then why would it launch incursions into the Gaza strip in response to Hamas bottle rockets? Either that was a trumped up pretext or Israel considers missiles exploding in its civilian centres as a cost. If it's the latter (and I could be convinced of either) then Iran's missiles are a cost Israel and other regional powers will consider when evaluating the costs and benefits of attacking Iran. Whether or not Iran's missiles actually do deter Israel from attacking obviously depends on a number of factors, including Israel's (and others') perception of the threat, and their perception of the benefit of launching an attack (or preemptive strike or what have you) on Iran.



The only interesting thing about that is that they gave it to Hezbollah. It was a Chinese-built missile, not an Iranian one. We know that Iran has access to such weapons, I doubt they could manufacture it themselves.
I've read both that it was Chinese made and domestically produced/upgraded (i.e. Noor). In any case, it seems like it was a relatively effective weapon.



Perhaps because nuclear warheads aren't the only non-conventional warheads one could use. Perhaps it's a bluff. Or perhaps Israel isn't the only potential target.
Sure, check the article below. Potential targets could include Israel, US bases, and oil refineries in the GCC. Also, though not a conventional ballistic missile deterrent, Iran has threatened to shut down the strait of Hormuz, which would likely involve a use of anti-ship cruise missiles.

Anyways...

Here's an interesting article on the history and development of Iran's ballistic missile strategic thinking. It notes that developing a nuclear payload is likely a priority, but also points out that conventional ballistic deterrence is a part of Iran's force posture.

"By taking the war to Iran, Iraq terrorized the civilian population, which began to clamor for shelters and to desert the cities in large numbers. Iraq thus imposed a political cost on Iran’s leadership for continuing the conflict. The Iranian government’s conduct of the war became politically damaging, especially as it was unable to offer the population any defense or to riposte in kind. "


"Aside from the disclosures that the war led to, it stimulated Iran’s interest in ballistic missiles by demonstrating their political and military effectiveness. This effectiveness stemmed from the missiles’ three important attributes: defense penetration, pre-launch survivability and long range. Defense penetration refers to the ineffectiveness of existing air defenses in intercepting missiles once they are launched. For instance, the performance of the version of Patriot missiles used in the Gulf War was described as not being "even partially successful." It arises from the fact that missiles fly at many times the speed of sound which means that there is little warning time of an attack making defense difficult. Consequently, they were the only weapons in Iraqi possession that could penetrate American and Israeli defenses. Pre-launch survivability alludes to the difficulty of destroying ballistic missiles before launch. Ballistic missiles and the transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that they are placed on and fired from are road mobile and hence difficult to locate and destroy in wartime. General Schwartzkopf, the commander of the Allied forces in the Gulf War, likened the detection of ballistic missile launchers to finding a needle in a haystack. Iraqi attacks on Israel also demonstrated to Iranian leaders the strategic reach that missiles afforded to countries possessing them."

"The first Gulf war reinforced these perceptions. It clearly illustrated the significance of ballistic missiles for AW purposes. They were the sole weapons Iraq possessed that could penetrate American and Israeli defenses. Because they needed little logistical support to launch and were mobile and easy to conceal they proved extremely difficult to destroy before launch and incidentally but equally importantly they managed to divert a good portion of allied aerial bombing which could have caused greater damage to Iraq if not bound up on Scud hunts. In short, ballistic missiles were Iraq’s only winning cards. Iran did not fail to notice that... In the same context, Iran also continued its WMD program with full force, especially efforts to produce a nuclear device. Iranian leaders believed that nuclear weapons were the ultimate instrument of asymmetric warfare. They held that if Iraq had had nuclear weapons, the United States would never have attacked Iraq."

"Although Iranian fears of the US have been the chief driving force behind Iran’s ballistic missile program in the 1990s, secondary threats have also played a part in encouraging Iran’s ballistic missile program. Israeli leaders have on many occasions accused Iran of covertly developing nuclear weapons and have threatened to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the nuclear reactor under construction in Bushehr. Given Israel’s record of attacking Iraqi nuclear facilities in the 1981, Israeli threats are taken very seriously in Tehran. Consequently, the regime has searched for a means to deter Israel from implementing its threats. The first Gulf War demonstrated how ballistic missiles could perform that role. The relative ease with which they penetrated Israeli defenses, the mass fear they caused and the near economic paralysis that resulted from these attacks convinced the regime in Tehran that they were the best deterrent weapons available. Iranian Shahab-3 missiles can reach all parts of Israel in approximately eight minutes. They are also more difficult to defend against than Iraqi al-Husseins because they descend on their targets at a higher speed. In comparison, Iranian Mig-29s and Sukhoi-24s would need an hour to reach Israel (assuming they flew a direct course) and even then it would be highly unlikely that they would survive Israeli air defenses to reach their targets. Iran’s defense minister has on several occasions hinted that part of the reason for the deployment of ballistic missiles is to deter pre-emptive strikes from Israel against Iranian facilities including the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "

"In contrast with the Shah’s regime which pursued ballistic missiles chiefly as a delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons, the present regime considers conventionally armed ballistic missiles to have an equally important role to play."
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=37907&fuseaction=events.event_summary

[Ziggurat]

If Israel doesn't consider missile strikes on its population as a cost

You need to read what I wrote more carefully. I said Israel was willing to pay such costs. Which means, logically speaking, that I must think that they are costs, and that Israel considers them as such.

then why would it launch incursions into the Gaza strip in response to Hamas bottle rockets?

Because they aren't willing to pay those costs for nothing, which is a claim I never made.

I've read both that it was Chinese made and domestically produced/upgraded (i.e. Noor). In any case, it seems like it was a relatively effective weapon.

In either version, its effectiveness stems largely from its accuracy, which is because it's radar-guided. That doesn't really work for ballistic missiles, for rather obvious reasons.

[Darth Rotor]

And you could spare us a thread-jack by stopping the arguing over whether you comprehend or whether he understands an unrelated statement you made.
I as much at fault for kicking at the usual foolishness, so I'll stop in this thread.

DR

[Captain.Sassy]

You need to read what I wrote more carefully. I said Israel was willing to pay such costs. Which means, logically speaking, that I must think that they are costs, and that Israel considers them as such.

Great, so in other words Israel will weigh the possibility of a conventional missile barrage as a potential cost in evaluating whether or not to attack Iran. In other words, Iran's conventional missile capabilities are a deterrent. So Iran has a 'legitimate' strategic reason to develop its ballistic missile capabilities above their potential use as nuclear weapons delivery systems. So we agree.



In either version, its effectiveness stems largely from its accuracy, which is because it's radar-guided. That doesn't really work for ballistic missiles, for rather obvious reasons.

Fine, I was pointing out its effectiveness to counter the arguments that Iran's conventional missiles were unsophisticated. Perhaps by US standards, but they seem to do the job fairly well. If they could hit an Israeli destroyer, it's a cinch they could hit oil tankers sailing along through the Hormuz strait.

Secondly, I don't think Iran's stated and implied strategy of 'deterrence by punishment' is overly reliant on the pinpoint precision of its ballistic missiles.
And in any case, estimates suggest that the accuracy of Iranian ballistic missiles has been improving.

[Ziggurat]

Great, so in other words Israel will weigh the possibility of a conventional missile barrage as a potential cost in evaluating whether or not to attack Iran. In other words, Iran's conventional missile capabilities are a deterrent.

No more of one than it already has via Hezbollah. But which costs quite a bit and cannot be used as easily.

So Iran has a 'legitimate' strategic reason to develop its ballistic missile capabilities above their potential use as nuclear weapons delivery systems.

This isn't an issue of legitimacy. It's an issue of effective allocation of resources. Ballistic missiles with only conventional warheads are not an efficient allocation of resources for Iran. And you have studiously ignored my point about non-conventional non-nuclear warheads. Why?

Fine, I was pointing out its effectiveness to counter the arguments that Iran's conventional missiles were unsophisticated. Perhaps by US standards, but they seem to do the job fairly well. If they could hit an Israeli destroyer, it's a cinch they could hit oil tankers sailing along through the Hormuz strait.

I'm sure their cruise missiles could. That says nothing about the accuracy of their ballistic missiles, which are very different creatures.

Secondly, I don't think Iran's stated and implied strategy of 'deterrence by punishment' is overly reliant on the pinpoint precision of its ballistic missiles.

Indeed, it is not, because the implicit threat is that they will be armed with warheads that will not require pinpoint accuracy for effectiveness. Perhaps Iran is simply bluffing, but without at least the possibility, the deterrent effect is quite weak indeed.

[Captain.Sassy]

No more of one than it already has via Hezbollah. But which costs quite a bit and cannot be used as easily.

This isn't an issue of legitimacy. It's an issue of effective allocation of resources. Ballistic missiles with only conventional warheads are not an efficient allocation of resources for Iran.

Read the article I cited. You'll like it.


Iran shares missiles with Hezbollah, but Iran's own missile arsenal is superior. Not only that, but for launches from within Iran a much wider variety of targets is available. Conventional missiles could be used on population targets, but I've seen other targets suggested; i.e. US bases in the region and oil refineries in the GCC.

Also, missile use for conventional deterrence is a cornerstone of China's Taiwan strategy. So even if the mUlLAHs arE CrAzY, rational states have built up conventional ballistic missiles as a strategic deterrent.




And you have studiously ignored my point about non-conventional non-nuclear warheads. Why?

I didn't studiously ignore your point about CBW warheads, but I didn't answer it as I figured it was just fun speculation as opposed to a cornerstone of your position. If you have some analyses or assessments that suggest that a key component of Iran's missile program is the ability to deliver CBW (in the way that I've provided a number of assessments outlining Iran's strategy of conventional missile deterrence) then I'd be interested in reading it. However, I imagine that using CBW missiles would be counter productive, as it would likely incite a very rapid escalation which would not be in Iran's favour.




Indeed, it is not, because the implicit threat is that they will be armed with warheads that will not require pinpoint accuracy for effectiveness. Perhaps Iran is simply bluffing, but without at least the possibility, the deterrent effect is quite weak indeed.

The strength of the deterrent effect is debatable. Nonetheless, this doesn't negate the fact that conventional deterrence could be (and from what I've read since starting in this thread, likely is) a part of Iran's missile strategy.

Look at Iran's anti-aircraft capabilities. Their 'deterrence through denial' capabilities are very weak in this area, yet they nonetheless have some anti-aircraft systems. Does the fact that their denial capabilities wouldn't be sufficient to dissuade a US airstrike (except marginally) negate the fact that these capabilities were acquired with an air denial rationale?

[WildCat]

Iran shares missiles with Hezbollah, but Iran's own missile arsenal is superior. Not only that, but for launches from within Iran a much wider variety of targets is available. Conventional missiles could be used on population targets, but I've seen other targets suggested; i.e. US bases in the region and oil refineries in the GCC.
Any evidence that Iran's missiles are accurate enough to hit a base or a refinery?

Also, missile use for conventional deterrence is a cornerstone of China's Taiwan strategy.
:confused:

[Captain.Sassy]

Any evidence that Iran's missiles are accurate enough to hit a base or a refinery?

Following Iran's announcement that it test-fired nine long-range and medium-range missiles, RFE/RL correspondent Jeremy Bransten spoke to Doug Richardson, editor of "Jane's Missiles and Rockets" magazine, about Iran's arsenal and its capabilities.

"Richardson: A missile like that, you're not going to use it against a moving target like a fleet. If the fleet had a base, a dockyard within missile range, you could certainly fire at that. But in terms of Tel Aviv, I think you best you could say is that you might hope to hit central Tel Aviv. It would not be practical to say: 'We're going to hit the Israeli Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv.' They don't have that kind of accuracy."

http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=15704

[quote]
:confused:

http://books.google.ca/books?id=DCihrQEdPzAC&pg=PA21&lpg=PA21&dq=china+taiwan+missile+deterrence&source=bl&ots=0wH8qsaqRO&sig=2Wc9iHDV1eOAWlEn7MdLsnKT5iw&hl=en&ei=1dflSt-TJJDllAefjdjoCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CA8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=china%20taiwan%20missile%20deterrence&f=false

Check p. 21 re. China's missiles to deter Taiwan declaring independence.

[WildCat]

Any evidence that Iran's missiles are accurate enough to hit a base or a refinery?

Following Iran's announcement that it test-fired nine long-range and medium-range missiles, RFE/RL correspondent Jeremy Bransten spoke to Doug Richardson, editor of "Jane's Missiles and Rockets" magazine, about Iran's arsenal and its capabilities.

"Richardson: A missile like that, you're not going to use it against a moving target like a fleet. If the fleet had a base, a dockyard within missile range, you could certainly fire at that. But in terms of Tel Aviv, I think you best you could say is that you might hope to hit central Tel Aviv. It would not be practical to say: 'We're going to hit the Israeli Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv.' They don't have that kind of accuracy."

http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=15704
So in other words, no, they don't have the accuracy to hit a base or a refinery.



Check p. 21 re. China's missiles to deter Taiwan declaring independence.
Missiles were only part of it, airplane and naval bombardment would also be used. And the targets would be almost entirely civilian because Chinese missiles also lack accuracy. And this has little to no relevance to the Iran situation.

[Captain.Sassy]

So in other words, no, they don't have the accuracy to hit a base or a refinery.

-targetting US bases and refineries was suggested by the article I cited. I'm assuming they did the back of the envelope calculations re. land area of a refinery or base and accuracy of the missiles.
-the guy from Jane's actually said "the fleet had a base, a dockyard within missile range, you could certainly fire at that", seeming to imply that a stationary target of that size might be something Iran could hit
-targetting bases or refineries is a possible way of deterring aggression, but so is targetting civilian populations in retaliation to an attack



Missiles were only part of it, airplane and naval bombardment would also be used. And the targets would be almost entirely civilian because Chinese missiles also lack accuracy. And this has little to no relevance to the Iran situation.

The relevance to the Iran situation is that the conventional ballistic missiles are a strategic deterrent.

[FireGarden]

The question "would Iran's response to an attack be expensive?" has (very likely) already been discussed in the Bush whitehouse. Bush didn't attack. I assume that is because of the cost/benefit analysis.

One thing to consider is: once attacked, Iran may well abandon the NPT. And US intel is convinced that Iran is capable of making nukes -- which would be a good deal easier without inspectors watching.

So, unless the attack is on the scale of regime change, then it is counterproductive.

Even Bush got some things right.

[Darth Rotor]

"Richardson: A missile like that, you're not going to use it against a moving target like a fleet. If the fleet had a base, a dockyard within missile range, you could certainly fire at that. But in terms of Tel Aviv, I think you best you could say is that you might hope to hit central Tel Aviv. It would not be practical to say: 'We're going to hit the Israeli Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv.' They don't have that kind of accuracy."

Yet.

Do you think that the advance of tech in general has made it harder, or easier, to harness a GPS guidance package to ... pretty much anything?

Not military quality sooper special GPS, but run of the mill GPS that you or I use in a car.

In rough terms:

With a ballistic missile, given the terminal phase being basically "falling down" at speeds that render the wind vector nearly moot, (absent anomalous winds) all you need to do to get the kind of accuracy that you need to hit the Israeli MoD is establish the delta between your globe model, WG 84 or whatever you are using, and then altitude corrections from that datum plane. X seconds before your last course correction and Y altitude, you correct for deviation from ideal track to damned near.

And you also launch more than one missile, if you really want to hit the MoD.

I think there are enough intelligent mathematicians in Iran to provide a large enough brain pool to figure that out.

This ain't quantum physics. Where the cost comes is in in getting reliability up to an acceptable percentage, and getting a high confidence factor in the PHit of the weapons system.

DR

[Ziggurat]

Do you think that the advance of tech in general has made it harder, or easier, to harness a GPS guidance package to ... pretty much anything?

Small problem for Iran: we can turn GPS off any time we want to. We can probably even do worse: make it read wrong. Do you really think Iran is going to trust their ballistic missile guidance to GPS?

[WildCat]

Yet.

Do you think that the advance of tech in general has made it harder, or easier, to harness a GPS guidance package to ... pretty much anything?

Not military quality sooper special GPS, but run of the mill GPS that you or I use in a car.
As Zigurrat pointed out we can turn it off any time we like, or simply encrypt it so our military can use it and theirs can't.

I don't think Iran is stupid enough to use a GPS guided missile.

[9/11-investigator]

Responding to more of the standard CE foolishness here.

A dense minefield would make the Straits of Hormuz close to impassable.

Sunburn makes passage of the straits a higher risk, depending upon what you are sailing in, and who you are. Sunburn is a good missile, but it isn't magic.

Reality check for Dart Rotor: http://exiledonline.com/the-war-nerd-this-is-how-the-carriers-will-die/

Picture of American carrier sinking: http://exiledonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/uss_oriskany_sinking-450x384.jpg

Interesting article by the war nerd organized around a telling statement from the Navy:

The Chinese military has developed a ballistic missile, Dong Feng 21, specifically designed to kill US aircraft carriers: “Because the missile employs a complex guidance system, low radar signature and a maneuverability that makes its flight path unpredictable, the odds that it can evade tracking systems to reach its target are increased. It is estimated that the missile can travel at mach 10 and reach its maximum range of 2000km in less than 12 minutes.” That’s the US Naval Institute talking, remember. They’re understating the case when they say that, with speed, satellite guidance and maneuverability like that, “the odds that it can evade tracking systems to reach its target are increased.”

You know why that’s an understatement? Because of a short little sentence I found farther on in the article—and before you read that sentence, I want all you trusting Pentagon groupies to promise me that you’ll think hard about what it implies. Here’s the sentence: “Ships currently have no defense against a ballistic missile attack.”

So there you have it: large war ships anno 2009 are useless, even the US navy implicitly admits it. These carriers might have been effective against these single engine Japanese fruit flies like those in 1942 but today they are sitting ducks and financial bleeders.

Telluric nations - Thalassic nations 1 - 0
Russia................USA
China
Iran

[Captain.Sassy]

As Zigurrat pointed out we can turn it off any time we like, or simply encrypt it so our military can use it and theirs can't.

I don't think Iran is stupid enough to use a GPS guided missile.

DF-21A/CSS-5 Mod 2
The DF-21A was operational by 1996 and has improved accuracy, with both GPS and a radar-based terminal guidance system in a redesigned nose. It is thought to have a lower yield, around 90kt, but longer range (up to 2500 km).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DF-21#cite_note-5

This is interesting. I wonder if Wikipedia is right?

[Ziggurat]

Hitting a mobile target with a ballistic missile is rather difficult. The war nerd seems to be ignoring this challenge completely. He's trying to argue from historical perspective, but there's no historical precedent for doing that. I'm not saying it can't be done, but it hasn't been done, because it's bloody hard. Unless China wants to load nukes onto those missiles, they've got to have some pretty fancy targeting and guidance, because between launch and impact, a carrier can move several kilometers.

[WildCat]

DF-21A/CSS-5 Mod 2
The DF-21A was operational by 1996 and has improved accuracy, with both GPS and a radar-based terminal guidance system in a redesigned nose. It is thought to have a lower yield, around 90kt, but longer range (up to 2500 km).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DF-21#cite_note-5

This is interesting. I wonder if Wikipedia is right?
I don't see anything saying Iran has those? :confused:

And if the US is fighting a power that uses GPS to guide it's missiles those missiles will be quite ineffective.

And radar-guided missiles can be jammed.

[GreNME]

“Ships currently have no defense against a ballistic missile attack.”

Funny. I can think of a fairly simple one: move.

ETA: and for the less simple, there's also the Phalanx (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phalanx_CIWS) systems, some of which are going to be backed up by SeaRAMs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-116_Rolling_Airframe_Missile) as well.

How's that for a reality check?

[Darth Rotor]

Picture of American carrier sinking: http://exiledonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/uss_oriskany_sinking-450x384.jpg
Even Air Launched Cruise Missiles have a targeting problem to solve, and they tend to have active terminal homing.

Your fantasies are obviously fascinating to you, but the USS Oriskany hasn't been afloat for how many years?
At the end of the Cold War and the subsequent reduction of the U.S. Navy's active force, Oriskany was recognized as being obsolete and was struck from the Naval Vessel Register in 1989. Her hull was stripped of all equipment that could be reused or recycled. The ship's bell (removed during decommissioning in 1976) is now on display in Oriskany, New York, and various parts were scavenged to support the USS Hornet museum in Alameda, California and other Navy ship museums.

Oriskany received two battle stars for Korean War service and five for Vietnam War service.

Proposals were made in the early 1990s to refurbish ex-Oriskany and display her in Tokyo Bay as part of a planned "City of America" exhibit. Congressional legislation was initiated to transfer Oriskany, but the project failed due to lack of financing.

Oriskany was sold for scrap by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service on 9 September 1995 to Pegasus International, a start-up company at the former Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo, CA. The contractor towed the ship from Bremerton to Vallejo, but the contract was terminated for default on 30 July 1997 due to lack of progress. While berthed at Mare Island in rusted and decrepit condition, ex-Oriskany was used as a setting for the Robin Williams film, What Dreams May Come (1998) as part of the representation of Hell.

The Navy retook possession of the ship and after a few more years at the former Mare Island Navy Yard, the ship was towed in 1999 to the Maritime Administration's Beaumont Reserve Fleet in Beaumont, Texas, for storage pending availability of funding for its disposal.

Please, stop it with the stupid. My God, do you take special pills for this condition?

DR

[Captain.Sassy]

I don't see anything saying Iran has those? :confused:

And if the US is fighting a power that uses GPS to guide it's missiles those missiles will be quite ineffective.

And radar-guided missiles can be jammed.

Well, you said you didn't think Iran was stupid enough to use a GPS guided missile. I just put this up to see what you had to say about it cause I was curious why China would use one.

Then I saw this on the FAS website:
"With the addition of GPS targeting the [shahab 3] warhead accuracy is greatly enhanced"
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumfolder/shahab-3.html
Seems corroborated here:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/shahab-3.htm

As for China, from what I can ascertain Chinese missiles make use of either GPS or the Beidou, which is an independent Chinese satellite guidance system they're setting up.

Here's an interesting note of the Chinese use of satellite guidance systems for missiles (if anyone thinks they're clever and points out that this is a cruise missile I'm gonna flip)

"The potential use of the American GPS system would render this system vulnerable to jamming of the unencrypted civil signal (CA code) from GPS satellites within view of the Chinese area of operations, or to local jamming and spoofing in the target area. Chinese cruise missiles could still find their targets using inertial navigation system (INS) technology, but without GPS updates they would be significantly less accurate.

It is likely that even if the US tried to deny GPS signals to China, the PLA’s cruise missiles could still function via the Russian GLONASS, or in the future the European GALILEO navigation signals. China is also developing its own “Compass Satellite Navigation System”, which would eventually comprise 5 Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites and 30 medium Earth orbit satellites to provide a global cover."
http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/cruisemissile.asp

In Iran's case I'm guessing/hoping that Russia would also take steps to jam their non-military satellite signals in the event of an Iranian missile attack even assuming the Iranian missile could use the Russian network.

It does seem weird that Iran would put GPS in its missiles.

[Darth Rotor]

As Zigurrat pointed out we can turn it off any time we like, or simply encrypt it so our military can use it and theirs can't.

I don't think Iran is stupid enough to use a GPS guided missile.
I don't think you've looked at this deeply enough.

Think about this. GPS is used for a whole lot of stuff.

1. If used as a first strike, GPS is a viable application, particularly if nobody know that GPS is how you guide the weapon.

It's passive, not active.

2. So, first strike happens, someone guesses "they used GPS" and they turn GPS off. Didn't stop the strike, and flipping that switch just screwed over a whole lot of tactical capability with one flick of the switch, not to mention US ARTC. Flipping over to back up takes X time, and then ...

Not as easy to counter as you think, if their development of such a package remains their version of Top Secret or above.

DR

[Ziggurat]

1. If used as a first strike, GPS is a viable application, particularly if nobody know that GPS is how you guide the weapon.

Yes. But is Iran willing to assume that "if"? And a weapon that is only useful in first strike mode and cannot be relied upon for retaliatory strikes is strategically crippled. Ballistic missile first strikes with conventional warheads would be bloody stupid for Iran to use (wasn't the argument that they have strategic value to provide disincentives to others to strike first?) because they would provoke a military response but wouldn't do much real damage, and nukes can probably get close enough with inertial guidance so GPS isn't much of a concern there.

2. So, first strike happens, someone guesses "they used GPS" and they turn GPS off. Didn't stop the strike, and flipping that switch just screwed over a whole lot of tactical capability with one flick of the switch, not to mention US ARTC.

You don't have to turn all of GPS off. The military and civilian signals are different, and the military signal can be encrypted. Turning off the civilian signal won't stop the military signal. And if the military has been smart about this, they don't even have to turn off the entire civilian signal, they can silence just the birds over Iran.

Lastly, of course, while GPS receivers are indeed quite common, none of the receivers on the civilian market are able to operate above about 60,000 ft and faster than 515 m/s. This makes them unsuitable for use in ballistic missiles. So Iran would need to develop their own GPS receivers. And, well, they aren't exactly known for their electronics industry.

[Darth Rotor]

Yes. But is Iran willing to assume that "if"?
I don't know.
And a weapon that is only useful in first strike mode and cannot be relied upon for retaliatory strikes is strategically crippled.
But politically useful.
Ballistic missile first strikes with conventional warheads would be bloody stupid for Iran to use (wasn't the argument that they have strategic value to provide disincentives to others to strike first?) because they would provoke a military response but wouldn't do much real damage, and nukes can probably get close enough with inertial guidance so GPS isn't much of a concern there.
A better point, to be sure.
You don't have to turn all of GPS off.
The impact, globally, on all users of GPS is non trivial if you "just shut it off." It's all pervasive.
The military and civilian signals are different, and the military signal can be encrypted. Turning off the civilian signal won't stop the military signal. And if the military has been smart about this, they don't even have to turn off the entire civilian signal, they can silence just the birds over Iran.
Only if you know, suspect, that is how the guidance at the TARGET end is going, which means turn off the GPS over Israel in the scenario I mention, an attack on Israel's MoD.

Once again, the terminal guidance of a falling body, see also GPS guidance for a 2000 lb bomb (velocity vector a bit different, of course) is all that GPS is needed for in the above strike package. Even if GPS fails, or gets no signal, the missile still hits sorta close.
Lastly, of course, while GPS receivers are indeed quite common, none of the receivers on the civilian market are able to operate above about 60,000 ft and faster than 515 m/s. This makes them unsuitable for use in ballistic missiles. So Iran would need to develop their own GPS receivers. And, well, they aren't exactly known for their electronics industry.
Zigg, look at what the GPS guidance is supposed to achieve. They only need to receive the signal as I described, in end game, within the parameters you so rightly point out. If you think the end game, roughly a vertical track, with little lateral displacement, is the same problem as moving 515 m/s laterally, OK, maybe it's a bit trickier than my simple outline investigates. Your average F-16 dropping a GPS weapon puts the ballistic weapon into a basket by flying to a "spot" in three dimensional space. Your TBM, Scud, for example, does likewise. As I have not gone all stubby penci on this, it may well be that the number of seconds remaining in the end game from roughly 60K feet is exceeded by the seconds and fractions needed to get that last correction in, at that terminal downward velocity, with the fins/airfoils at supersonic speed. I haven't field tested this, of course.

Getting to the end game position remains the function of all the INS and aiming in the first place. The point wasn't to guide missile from launch to hit with GPS. That isn't necessary. You adapt an already extant tech to a falling body.

NO, you won't get the extra cheese accuracy of US mil GPS, when finely tuned, whose CEP is not gonna say it's nobody's business wonderful.

Look at my scenario, and look at the CEP you need.

I also nowhere stipulated this as a one trick pony, but to be crystal clear, as an adjunct capability to present capability.

It need not be gold plated to work. Foxbat taught us that.

Also note: using something other than GPS, US ballistic missile warheads, in the seventies, could reasonably expect to land in about a tennis court sized target (OK, two together).

DR

[Ziggurat]

Zigg, look at what the GPS guidance is supposed to achieve. They only need to receive the signal as I described, in end game, within the parameters you so rightly point out. If you think the end game, roughly a vertical track, with little lateral displacement, is the same problem as moving 515 m/s laterally, OK, maybe it's a bit trickier than my simple outline investigates.

That 515 m/s isn't a limit on lateral velocity, it's a limit on velocity. Any velocity. The limits were chosen specifically to prevent the use of civilian GPS receivers in ballistic missiles. Since I think the designers knew what they were doing, I suspect those limits will achieve that purpose.

Also note: using something other than GPS, US ballistic missile warheads, in the seventies, could reasonably expect to land in about a tennis court sized target (OK, two together).

And 1940's US tech could produce a nuclear weapon from scratch. Iran can't match 1940's US technology on their own, they had to buy stolen designs. And the F-14's which they have are also 1970's designs, but they can't make replacement parts for them either. Why would you expect them to be able to match us in ballistic missile technology when they can't match us in anything else?

[9/11-investigator]

Hitting a mobile target with a ballistic missile is rather difficult. The war nerd seems to be ignoring this challenge completely. He's trying to argue from historical perspective, but there's no historical precedent for doing that. I'm not saying it can't be done, but it hasn't been done, because it's bloody hard. Unless China wants to load nukes onto those missiles, they've got to have some pretty fancy targeting and guidance, because between launch and impact, a carrier can move several kilometers.

Uh, moving target? That's 30 miles/hour against Mach 3-10! Ziggurat seems to think that elephants have never been shot because there are 'mobile'. :D

And no historical precedent?! I guess that around 1980 most of you were probably busy filling diapers but there was a little intermezzo called the Falkland war. There you had first world nation Britain trying to take back some silly rocks from a second world country, Argentina, whose ruling generals had decided to invade their way out of internal economic mess. The deciding point of who won that war was about the question whether Argentina could yes/no lay their hands on a few more of those fancy frenchy exocet rockets. That was the central issue at the time.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands_War

On 4 May, two days after the sinking of Belgrano, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile picket far from the British carriers. She was struck amidships, with devastating effect, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. The ship was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on 10 May.

Much more damage was done:

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on 21 May, HMS Antelope on 21 May, and MV Atlantic Conveyor (struck by two AM39 Exocets) on 25 May along with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to HMS Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword after being ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentinian aircraft from other ships at San Carlos Bay.[41] HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged.

I remember vividly that the Argentinians desperately tried to buy more of these exocet rockets but they were prevented to do so by application of pressure by Western governments to potential sellers. Had they succeeded the Brits could have tried to continue to 'project power' from the bottom of the sea.

That was 1980. That was Argentina against Britain. Now we are almost in 2010. We have Mach 3-10 missiles. There is only one conclusion that even the US Navy has drawn: ships are indefensible. Ships, because of their costs are an asset to the enemy because they tie useful resources in useless sitting ducks. The US has 12 of these floating graveyards with, how many again, 5,000 sailors per piece? My friendly advice: scuttle the junk in the Atlantic, make cruise ships out of them, or post modern floating apartment buildings, shopping malls or sell them to China, anything. But get rid of them. They are useless. The role of the classical navy is over. Too big, too slow, too vulnerable.

[Ziggurat]

Uh, moving target? That's 30 miles/hour against Mach 3-10!

Speed differentials are irrelevant. You can probably throw a ball a lot faster than I can run, but if I'm thirty yards away, you won't be able to hit me. Between launch and impact of a ballistic missile, a carrier can move several kilometers. The missile would need a way to track these movements and perform appropriate course corrections throughout its flight in order to hit the carrier. That is not an easy task, and nobody has done it yet.

Ziggurat seems to think that elephants have never been shot because there are mobile. :D

Elephants are not typically shot from ranges where they move tens of body lengths between when the gun is fired and the bullet strikes.

And no historical precedent?!

Yes, no historical precedent for the use of ballistic missiles against moving targets.

I guess that around 1980 most of you were probably busy filling diapers but there was a little intermezzo called the Falkland war.

Which involved no ballistic missiles used against warships. The Exocet is not a ballistic missile. And contrary to your link's claim, neither is the Harpoon.

But get rid of them. They are useless. The role of the classical navy is over. Too big, too slow, too vulnerable.

You are rather demonstrably wrong. They have proven themselves quite useful over the last few decades, and will likely continue to do so. While their use against an enemy like China may be somewhat constrained, China is far from the only security concern we have.

[9/11-investigator]

More on the exocet: Mach 1, range up to 180km.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exocet

Interesting detail: the warhead of the eocet that hit the HMS SHeffield did not even go off, it was just the kinetic energy:

The Exocet that struck the HMS Sheffield impacted on the second deck, 2.4 metres (7 ft 10 in) above the waterline and penetrated deeply into the Sheffield's control room,[6] near to the forward engine room, cracking the hull open roughly 1.2 by 3 metres (3.9 ft × 9.8 ft). It appears that the warhead did not explode.

It's a recurring pattern in the history of warfare, everybody is preparing for a war just like the last one. Carriers were usefull during the battle of Midway, now they are a bad joke.

[Ziggurat]

More on the exocet: Mach 1, range up to 180km.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exocet

And from the description, it's rather obvious that they aren't ballistic missiles.

Carriers were usefull during the battle of Midway, now they are a bad joke.

Really? They were extremely useful for the two wars that the US fought this decade.

[9/11-investigator]

Speed differentials are irrelevant. You can probably throw a ball a lot faster than I can run, but if I'm thirty yards away, you won't be able to hit me.

That's an irrelevant comparisson because my ball is not equiped with radar to follow the moving target. According to your 'logic' warplanes have no chance of hitting each other because of their high speed. We all know better than that, take for instance flight93 or the KAL-airliner. Even the exocet developed as early as 1975 had an active radar guidance system.


Between launch and impact of a ballistic missile, a carrier can move several kilometers. The missile would need a way to track these movements and perform appropriate course corrections throughout its flight in order to hit the carrier. That is not an easy task, and nobody has done it yet.

Huh, 'ballistic'? You mean thingies that operate under F=M*g and s= g*t*t/2, these nice parabolic curves, without adaptive control? I just quoted extensively from the Falklands war where scores of ships were sunk. You seem the think that we still live in the times of the canons of Navarone or the Dicke Bertha.

Elephants are not typically shot from ranges where they move tens of body lengths between when the gun is fired and the bullet strikes.

There are rifles with which one can shoot an elephant from a distance of several kilometers with 100% change of a hit.

Yes, no historical precedent for the use of ballistic missiles against moving targets.

Poor Nelson probably would be disagreeing with you but lucky for you he is dead now. Because of something ballistic. (I had a discussion with a fine British officer a few years ago while visiting Southhampton and the HMS Victory who told me that dead Nelson had been conserved during the trip home from Trafalgar in a barrel of whiskey. During the long journey Nelson had become 'muffy' as the officier put it and had started to expand causing the lid of the barrel to break and the remains of Nelson to pop up from the barrel causing the crew to believe that Nelson had been rising from the dead :D)

You are rather demonstrably wrong. They have proven themselves quite useful over the last few decades, and will likely continue to do so. While their use against an enemy like China may be somewhat constrained, China is far from the only security concern we have.

No they have not, because the US has a preference to pick a fight with third rate adversaries. Against a serious enemy like China, Russia or Iran (that has Russian Sunburn rockets) the Navy will experience what 'Gary Brecher' has predicted: carrier going belly up in the straight of Hormuz.

"You just sunk my carrier."

[theprestige]

That's an irrelevant comparisson because my ball is not equiped with radar to follow the moving target. According to your 'logic' warplanes have no chance of hitting each other because of their high speed. We all know better than that, take for instance flight93 or the KAL-airliner. Even the exocet developed as early as 1975 had an active radar guidance system.
Which is why it's not a ballistic missile.

Huh, 'ballistic'? You mean thingies that operate under F=M*g and s= g*t*t/2, these nice parabolic curves, without adaptive control? I just quoted extensively from the Falklands war where scores of ships were sunk. You seem the think that we still live in the times of the canons of Navarone or the Dicke Bertha.
Scores of ships were sunk by non-ballistic missiles.

Ballistic missiles are a specific category of missile that are aimed, launched, and guided on a ballistic trajectory towards a specific set of coordinates. They do not track targets, they do not correct their course in response to a moving target.

Non-ballistic missiles, conventionally known as "guided missiles" are a totally different category of missile. Stop confusing the two, and stop using guided missiles to support your claims about ballistic missiles.

[Ziggurat]

That's an irrelevant comparisson

You made it, not me.

According to your 'logic' warplanes have no chance of hitting each other because of their high speed.

I made no such claim.

Huh, 'ballistic'? You mean thingies that operate under F=M*g and s= g*t*t/2, these nice parabolic curves, without adaptive control?

No, I do not mean that they cannot have adaptive control. But they do follow largely ballistic trajectories. One of the consequences of that is that they move bloody fast, much faster than non-ballistic missiles. Including the Exocet.

[Captain.Sassy]

This is a cool report. I am going to read it as soon as I have a chance.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf

On ASBMs:

p.21
http://img263.imageshack.us/img263/4759/missilec.png
Analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to the “second island chain.” One area of investment involves combining conventionally-armed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) based on the CSS-5 (DF-21) airframe, C4ISR for geo-location and tracking of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships. As described in an authoritative 2004 article for the Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-munitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control tower and other easily damaged and vital positions.” This capability would have particular significance, as it would provide China with preemptive and coercive options in a regional crisis.

On conventional ballistic missiles for Taiwan deterrence and ASBMs:

From the executive summary:

Regional Conventional Strike. • Since 2000, China has continued its build-up of conventional ballistic missiles, building a nascent capacity for conventional short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) strikes against Taiwan into what has become one of China’s primary instruments of coercion, not only of Taiwan but of other regional neighbors. In 2000, China’s SRBM force was limited to one “regimental-sized unit” in southeastern China. China has expanded the force opposite Taiwan to seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 missiles, and is augmenting these forces with conventional medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems, such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, and at least two land attack cruise missile (LACM) variants capable of ground or air launch. Advanced fighters and bombers, combined with enhanced training for nighttime and overwater flights, provide the PLA with additional capabilities for regional strike or maritime interdiction operations.

On satellite navigation and guidance:
p.26
Navigation and Timing: China is pursuing multiple possibilities for satellite navigation independence. Currently, the PRC uses the U.S. global positioning system (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS, and its own BeiDou-1 (regional) systems for navigation. The BeiDou-1 system consists of three satellites and serves both civil and military purposes. The Beidou-1 system will be replaced by a BeiDou-2 system (expected to be operational in 2011) that will become a regional complement to the worldwide BeiDou-2/Compass system expected to be operational in 2015-2020.


Now, this could just be fear mongering from the DoD in order to convince congress to invest in more military capital despite Gates' stated preference for a more low-tech military. But there's probably something to this.

[GreNME]

TNo they have not, because the US has a preference to pick a fight with third rate adversaries. Against a serious enemy like China, Russia or Iran (that has Russian Sunburn rockets) the Navy will experience what 'Gary Brecher' has predicted: carrier going belly up in the straight of Hormuz.

"You just sunk my carrier."

Except for all those carriers sporting the phalanx anti-missile systems.

Welcome to reality, Holocaust denier.

[Darth Rotor]

That 515 m/s isn't a limit on lateral velocity, it's a limit on velocity. Any velocity. The limits were chosen specifically to prevent the use of civilian GPS receivers in ballistic missiles. Since I think the designers knew what they were doing, I suspect those limits will achieve that purpose.
I'll take your word for that, and need to get a peak at the terminal velocity of a GBU-31 before I comment further. If your TBM warhead is shaped like a GBU-31, I think its terminal velocity will tend to be the same. GBU-31 is a GPS guided weapon that I am rather familiar with, in particular its exceptional effectiveness and accuracy. Not convinced those "safeguards" are fool proof, nor hack proof.
And 1940's US tech could produce a nuclear weapon from scratch. Iran can't match 1940's US technology on their own, they had to buy stolen designs. And the F-14's which they have are also 1970's designs, but they can't make replacement parts for them either. Why would you expect them to be able to match us in ballistic missile technology when they can't match us in anything else?
They don't have to make it themselves. There are a lot of places they might buy it, under the radar. Hmm, how did Pakistan get the bomb? Hmm, let's look at the tech explosion in China, and then look at how Chinese morals and ethics in international affairs play out in Africa.

It's a jungle out there. We can't assume tech stasis on the part of our enemies, unless we are dying to get hit with tech surprise when we need it least.

No, Iran need not generate it from scratch, the tech is out there. All that's needed is making a deal.

DR

[theprestige]

This is a cool report. I am going to read it as soon as I have a chance.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf

On ASBMs:

p.21
http://img263.imageshack.us/img263/4759/missilec.png
Analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to the “second island chain.” One area of investment involves combining conventionally-armed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) based on the CSS-5 (DF-21) airframe, C4ISR for geo-location and tracking of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships. As described in an authoritative 2004 article for the Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-munitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control tower and other easily damaged and vital positions.” This capability would have particular significance, as it would provide China with preemptive and coercive options in a regional crisis.

On conventional ballistic missiles for Taiwan deterrence and ASBMs:

From the executive summary:

Regional Conventional Strike. • Since 2000, China has continued its build-up of conventional ballistic missiles, building a nascent capacity for conventional short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) strikes against Taiwan into what has become one of China’s primary instruments of coercion, not only of Taiwan but of other regional neighbors. In 2000, China’s SRBM force was limited to one “regimental-sized unit” in southeastern China. China has expanded the force opposite Taiwan to seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 missiles, and is augmenting these forces with conventional medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems, such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, and at least two land attack cruise missile (LACM) variants capable of ground or air launch. Advanced fighters and bombers, combined with enhanced training for nighttime and overwater flights, provide the PLA with additional capabilities for regional strike or maritime interdiction operations.

On satellite navigation and guidance:
p.26
Navigation and Timing: China is pursuing multiple possibilities for satellite navigation independence. Currently, the PRC uses the U.S. global positioning system (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS, and its own BeiDou-1 (regional) systems for navigation. The BeiDou-1 system consists of three satellites and serves both civil and military purposes. The Beidou-1 system will be replaced by a BeiDou-2 system (expected to be operational in 2011) that will become a regional complement to the worldwide BeiDou-2/Compass system expected to be operational in 2015-2020.


Now, this could just be fear mongering from the DoD in order to convince congress to invest in more military capital despite Gates' stated preference for a more low-tech military. But there's probably something to this.

Of course there's something to this: China is working on cutting-edge, next-generation, anti-ship missiles that mate ballistic launch vehicles to sophisticated warheads sporting very advanced technology terminal guidance systems.

It's the obvious next step. It's also obviously not operational yet. For China, which is spearheading the technology for its own reasons.

What's not at all obvious is that Iran is anywhere close to developing missile systems with comparable technology (nor the independent satellite-based guidance system China's missiles will be relying on). What else is not obvious is that Iran will be in a position to buy substantial numbers of such missiles (assuming China even cares to sell them) any time in the near future.

Extrapolating from a Chinese R&D program that has yet to produce a confirmed operational prototype, to an Iranian strategic antiship ballistic missile arsenal, is kind of lame.

[Ziggurat]

They don't have to make it themselves. There are a lot of places they might buy it, under the radar.

Possibly. But there aren't many countries which could both develop GPS guidance and which would be willing to sell it to Iran. The two obvious choices are Russia and China. I don't Russia trusts us enough to spend any real resources making military GPS systems (they're working on their own equivalent). China's the most likely source, but they're still trying to work out their own missiles, I don't think they're at the point where they can credibly market such weapons abroad. And not even Iran is going to buy expensive weapons without some sort of test record that they work as advertised.

Hmm, how did Pakistan get the bomb?

I don't know about the bomb specifically, but I know they stole their centrifuge designs from Europe. And subsequently sold them to Iran.

It's a jungle out there. We can't assume tech stasis on the part of our enemies, unless we are dying to get hit with tech surprise when we need it least.

I'm not suggesting we do. But anti-ship ballistic missiles from Iran are not a serious threat at this point in time. Hell, China is still in the process of developing them, for a strategic use rather different from what Iran faces. Most of the pentagon discussion about that threat is in terms of what could happen in the future, not what would happen today, and between then and now there is time for us to improve our defenses too (Aegis + Standard, for example).

Iran would be much better off trying to swarm us with lots of small boats and conventional anti-ship missiles than trying out. Which would pose a danger, to be sure, but we already have defenses against those threats and they don't spell automatic doom for a carrier group.

[Darth Rotor]

I'm not suggesting we do. But anti-ship ballistic missiles from Iran are not a serious threat at this point in time.
I am not the moron discussing that, I was the guy chatting with you about GPS guided TBM's going after land targets, specifically the Israeli MoD. The problem of terminal velocity is still to be resolved for me. I either will or won't. Someone else will or won't.
Iran would be much better off trying to swarm us with lots of small boats and conventional anti-ship missiles than trying out. Which would pose a danger, to be sure, but we already have defenses against those threats and they don't spell automatic doom for a carrier group.
As I will not again waste my time on a maritime warfare discussion -- thanks to the amount of rubbish I encountered last time, a few years back - y'all play on without me. 9-11 idjitstigator isn't even amusing.

DR

[Slayhamlet]

lol at Iran being a serious enemy like China or Russia. Holocaust deniers do say the darnedest things.

[Darth Rotor]

lol at Iran being a serious enemy like China or Russia. Holocaust deniers do say the darnedest things.
Control of the Straits of Hormuz isn't a laughing matter, until Oil is no longer the critical resource for second and third wave economies. That makes Iran of more than passing interest.

Location, location, location.

DR

[Captain.Sassy]

Of course there's something to this: China is working on cutting-edge, next-generation, anti-ship missiles that mate ballistic launch vehicles to sophisticated warheads sporting very advanced technology terminal guidance systems.

It's the obvious next step. It's also obviously not operational yet. For China, which is spearheading the technology for its own reasons.

What's not at all obvious is that Iran is anywhere close to developing missile systems with comparable technology (nor the independent satellite-based guidance system China's missiles will be relying on). What else is not obvious is that Iran will be in a position to buy substantial numbers of such missiles (assuming China even cares to sell them) any time in the near future.

Extrapolating from a Chinese R&D program that has yet to produce a confirmed operational prototype, to an Iranian strategic antiship ballistic missile arsenal, is kind of lame.

Welcome back Zhukov.

I never said Iran had them.

I initially suggested Iran might have a strategic purpose behind building up a conventional ballistic missile capability outside of just delivering a nuclear warhead. You called me nuts and, as I recall, said that conventional ballistic missiles had gone the way of the dodo.

I posted this report as I felt it was relevant to the discussion people were having about Chinese missile capabilities.

[Captain.Sassy]

Possibly. But there aren't many countries which could both develop GPS guidance and which would be willing to sell it to Iran.

What do you make of the sources above stating the Shahab-3 uses GPS? Is the Federation of American Scientists a credible source?


ETA:
Improving Accuracy: The flight-tested Shahab-3 is believed to use an outdated Chinese navigation system with a circle error probability of 3,000 meters. However, there have been attempts to upgrade or replace this system.28 Longer-range missiles using this guidance system would be even less accurate since accuracy decreases with range. Most ballistic missiles employ inertial navigation systems (INS), which allow guidance without resorting to external sensing or measurement. During the boost phase, the missile makes flight corrections based on guidance system inputs to actuators (or other devices) controlling various thrust vectoring modalities. There are some reports that suggest that the Shahab-3 guidance systems have been enhanced with the addition of a Global Positioning System (GPS).29 Such a system would also more accurately establish the missile’s position at launch, thus potentially improving its circular error probability to 190 meters.30 However, many in the analytical community doubt the use of GPS guidance in Iranian missiles.
http://inesap.org/node/93

[Slayhamlet]

Control of the Straits of Hormuz isn't a laughing matter, until Oil is no longer the critical resource for second and third wave economies. That makes Iran of more than passing interest.

Location, location, location.

DR

Sure, no doubt. But Iran's strategic position and ability to disrupt vital trade wasn't really what 9/11Denier was talking about, was it?

[Ziggurat]

What do you make of the sources above stating the Shahab-3 uses GPS? Is the Federation of American Scientists a credible source?

Credible in the sense that they aren't making stuff up, sure. But I can't really speak to their accuracy regarding weapons systems they don't actually have access to. The Wikipedia page has no mention of GPS, for example, and while I don't consider Wikipedia definitive, that suggests that GPS capabilities are at least not a given.

Iran has a history of talking up weapons systems that they don't actually deliver, so it wouldn't surprise me in the least if they said they had GPS guidance even if they didn't. I've found some google search results suggesting that they obtained their guidance system from the Chinese (whom I said would be the most likely source), so maybe they did, but I can't find any reports that Iran ever demonstrated that they have the thing working. So I'd classify GPS guidance on Iranian missiles as unknown.

As for Chinese-developed GPS systems, the Chinese would certainly be able to get around the altitude and velocity limits that we impose on civilian gps. But it's not clear if they can get around the military encryption. And that matters, because the civilian GPS signals can be jammed without too much difficulty (the military signal can be too, but not as easily). So even if we didn't turn off the GPS signal, Israel might still produce the same effect. And they've certainly got the electronics expertise to develop GPS jammers.

[Captain.Sassy]

So even if we didn't turn off the GPS signal, Israel might still produce the same effect. And they've certainly got the electronics expertise to develop GPS jammers.

Interesting. Does their ability to jam the GPS signal in the region depend upon the system being GPS proper, or could they also jam the GLONASS (if the Iranians were using it?)

[Ziggurat]

Interesting. Does their ability to jam the GPS signal in the region depend upon the system being GPS proper, or could they also jam the GLONASS (if the Iranians were using it?)

Any signal can be jammed, GLONASS is certainly not immune. The difference probably becomes one of range: how far away can they jam the signal? The farther they can jam it, the less guidance any missile will have. Not every system is equally susceptible, and while I know the civilian GPS is easier to jam than the military signal, I don't know how GLONASS compares. I wouldn't be surprised if it's harder than civilian GPS, though. GPS has also been around longer, so the requirements for jamming might be better understood, but that's really just speculation on my part.

[Darth Rotor]

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8963529

According to this news story, internal Iranian debate has put the damper on an agreement being reached any time soon. The enrichment deal with Russia does not seem to please Iran's government.

Senior Iranian lawmakers rejected on Saturday a U.N.-backed plan to ship much of the country's uranium abroad for further enrichment, raising further doubts about the likelihood Tehran will finally approve the deal. The UN-brokered plan requires Iran to send 1.2 tons (1,100 kilograms) of low-enriched uranium — around 70 percent of its stockpile — to Russia in one batch by the end of the year, easing concerns the material would be used for a bomb.


DR

[WildCat]

Interesting. Does their ability to jam the GPS signal in the region depend upon the system being GPS proper, or could they also jam the GLONASS (if the Iranians were using it?)
In a perfect world they'd be able to hack the signal so that it tricks the missiles into thinking that Tehran is Tel Aviv.

[FireGarden]

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8963529

According to this news story, internal Iranian debate has put the damper on an agreement being reached any time soon. The enrichment deal with Russia does not seem to please Iran's government.

DR

Not entirely. It sounds like they're wary of paying in advance.

Kazem Jalali, another senior lawmaker, said Iran wants nuclear fuel first before agreeing to ship its enriched uranium stocks to Russia and France even if it decides to strike a deal.

[...] The lawmaker said France has reneged on previous agreements and that Tehran doesn't trust Paris.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1031/p02s04-usfp.html

Iran, insisting that Western countries have not lived up to deals reached in the past, suggested that it fears the uranium would never return. So it's indicating that it may demand a step-by-step exchange – of a portion of the uranium for the return of another portion suitable for use in a Tehran research reactor.

I don't get why it has to be Iran's Uranium which is enriched to 20%

Why not give them the fuel they need and ask for payment in the low enriched uranium? It seems to achieve the same effect: Iran's LEU stockpile will be reduced in return for the MEU (which is mixed in an alloy, making it harder to weaponise -- somehow).

Is it impossible to provide the required fuel by the end of the year?

[GreNME]

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8963529

According to this news story, internal Iranian debate has put the damper on an agreement being reached any time soon. The enrichment deal with Russia does not seem to please Iran's government.

DR

Thanks for the update, DR, and for getting the topic back on subject.

-----

I don't get why it has to be Iran's Uranium which is enriched to 20%

Why not give them the fuel they need and ask for payment in the low enriched uranium? It seems to achieve the same effect: Iran's LEU stockpile will be reduced in return for the MEU (which is mixed in an alloy, making it harder to weaponise -- somehow).

Is it impossible to provide the required fuel by the end of the year?

It might actually be. The process takes a few months to produce, so if we don't have a ready supply now there could very well be the manufacturing overhead in time along with the operational and logistical overhead.

Actually, I think sending them MEU fuel rods with a dampening alloy mixed in (to reduce weaponizing feasibility) is a great idea. I wonder if it's been floated as a possible compromise? That would certainly give the Western powers involved in the process a stance of beneficial leverage-- harder to complain when one gets what one is directly asking for.

[Oliver]

Just in ...

[/URL][URL="http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1126198.html"]IAEA: We found 'nothing to worry about' at secret Iran nuke site (http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1126198.html)
Head of UN nuclear watchdog: Uranium enrichment site is 'bunker to
protect things' in case Natanz is bombed.

[Darth Rotor]

Just in ...

That news leads me to believe that Iran will build another secret facility in case Qom site gets bombed ... :cool:

[Skeptic]

In related news, Israel just caught a ship with 60 tons of advanced weaponry smuggled by Iran en route to Syria and Hizbullah.

But I'm sure these folks will keep their words on pieces of paper they sign where they promise not to do something.

[Darth Rotor]

In related news, Israel just caught a ship with 60 tons of advanced weaponry smuggled by Iran en route to Syria and Hizbullah.

But I'm sure these folks will keep their words on pieces of paper they sign where they promise not to do something.
Try this: just rearming the poor oppressed Hozebaggah's to defend them against Israeli aggression.

DR

[WildCat]

Just in ...
The IAEA has declined to comment on whether the inspectors came across anything surprising or were able to obtain all the documentation and on-site access they had wanted at the remote spot about 160 km (100 miles) south of Tehran.
Wouldn't want to say anything bad, so just refuse comment...

[MikeMangum]

IAEA seeks explanation from Iran on nuclear weapon implosion device (http://www.examiner.com/x-27431-World-News-Examiner~y2009m11d6-IAEA-seeks-explanation-from-Iran-on-nuclear-weapon-implosion-device)
The Guardian newspaper reported on Thursday that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has requested a response from Iran in regard to evidence that the country has experimented with the creation of advanced implosion devices designed for use in nuclear weapons.

The report, which was compiled by using the data of numerous intelligence agencies over an extended period charges that Iranian scientists have been working on creating the components in a “two-point implosion” device. Such a device is used to bring about the chain reaction in a nuclear fission warhead. Furthermore, the device would be smaller than other nuclear implosion devices, which would in turn give Iran the ability to create much smaller warheads and therefore require a smaller missile system to deliver it to its target.

IAEA Director General IAEA Mohamed ElBaradei stated that the information obtained is regarded as reliable because it "appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran."

Since the United States’ faulty intelligence on Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s nuclear ambitions prior to the Iraq war, the IAEA has been more thorough in its evaluation of intelligence gained from the international community.

Iran claims that the development of such implosion devices is for civilian applications; however, according the Guardian they have thus far not supplied any information on such uses. No civilian uses are known to the international community.

ETA: I'm curious if anyone can think of ANY other use for a 2 point implosion device other than a hydrogen bomb.

[Pardalis]

And it looks like the deal about sending uranium out of the country is not gonna happen.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/07/iran.uranium.shipment/index.html

Anyone surprised?

[WildCat]

IAEA seeks explanation from Iran on nuclear weapon implosion device (http://www.examiner.com/x-27431-World-News-Examiner%7Ey2009m11d6-IAEA-seeks-explanation-from-Iran-on-nuclear-weapon-implosion-device)


ETA: I'm curious if anyone can think of ANY other use for a 2 point implosion device other than a hydrogen bomb.
And you think that's suspicious? They probably figured out a way to make kittens with it.

Why do you hate kittens Mike?

[GreNME]

And it looks like the deal about sending uranium out of the country is not gonna happen.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/07/iran.uranium.shipment/index.html

Anyone surprised?

I'm surprised that you mistook an unofficial statement for an answer by Iran on the deal. The report may very well be predictive, and the Iranian side of the negotiations might decide to keep playing at unfeasible alternatives, but a "semiofficial" media statement in Iran is not the Iranian government.

-----

IAEA seeks explanation from Iran on nuclear weapon implosion device (http://www.examiner.com/x-27431-World-News-Examiner~y2009m11d6-IAEA-seeks-explanation-from-Iran-on-nuclear-weapon-implosion-device)


ETA: I'm curious if anyone can think of ANY other use for a 2 point implosion device other than a hydrogen bomb.

And you think that's suspicious? They probably figured out a way to make kittens with it.

Why do you hate kittens Mike?

http://i7.photobucket.com/albums/y277/nethermouse/lold.jpg

[Skeptic]

Try this: just rearming the poor oppressed Hozebaggah's to defend them against Israeli aggression.

DR

The "g" isn't even CLOSE to the "l" on the keyboard, Darth...

[WildCat]

The "g" isn't even CLOSE to the "l" on the keyboard, Darth...
It's spelled correctly.

[Skeptic]

Ooops. Missed it. Don't drink and post, I guess...

[FireGarden]

And it looks like the deal about sending uranium out of the country is not gonna happen.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/07/iran.uranium.shipment/index.html

Anyone surprised?

Not once I read:

The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency said under the deal, Iran would get the converted fuel back by the end of 2010.

Iran would have to be very naive to pay everything in advance and then wait a year to receive goods from parties that have not kept previous agreements.

Would it really take a year to manufacture the required fuel? I'd like some actual data rather than "It could be true" responses. Of course it could be true, but is it?

If there really is an intention to provide the goods once payment is made, then maybe some kind of security could be provided. Let America transfer 100billion in gold* to Iran, to be returned when the fuel is delivered on time. Just a suggestion. :D



*number chosen to tweak noses, but principle is a serious suggestion.

[WildCat]

Let America transfer 100billion in gold* to Iran, to be returned when the fuel is delivered on time. Just a suggestion. :D
Would they take Ron Paul instead?

[Skeptic]

Take Ron Paul?

They might be crazy, but they're not THAT crazy.

[GreNME]

Let America transfer 100billion in gold* to Iran, to be returned when the fuel is delivered on time. Just a suggestion. :D

Would they take Ron Paul instead?

Why not send more than just Ron Paul? There are plenty of Tea Party folks out there we can use as currency. At least 70 thousand of them. ;)

[Darth Rotor]

Let America transfer 100billion in gold* to Iran, to be returned when the fuel is delivered on time. Just a suggestion. :D

*number chosen to tweak noses, but principle is a serious suggestion.
It isn't America's problem, it is "the international community's" problem.

Thus, a better proposal would be to transfer 1/3 of the gold in Belgian banks, Brussels Belgium being where EU HQ resides, to Iran, all or most of it to be returned when the fuel is delivered on time.

Just a suggestion, to accomodate the internationalists who are tired of America throwing it's weight around. :p

In other words, put up or shut up.

DR

[Praktik]

And it looks like the deal about sending uranium out of the country is not gonna happen.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/07/iran.uranium.shipment/index.html

Anyone surprised?

Interesting look from the WaPo yesterday (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/06/AR2009110603072.html?hpid=opinionsbox1) at the hardliners in Iran:

The prospect of a deal with the Great Satan produced a political frisson in Tehran. . . . Critics chided Ahmadinejad for giving away the nuclear store. . . . Khamenei joined in the attacks last week, warning that negotiating with America would be "naive and perverted." The leader was implicitly criticizing Ahmadinejad, who had characterized the Geneva deal as an Iranian victory. . . .

But reading the Iranian press, you get the sense that for Iran's ruling elite, engagement with America remains a bridge too far. "America is still the Great Satan. Negotiations are meaningless," thundered the hard-line weekly Ya-Lesarat.Swap out a few names and replace "great satan" with "Persian Hitlers" and you have a pretty accurate portrayal of American hardliners urging against the deal stateside..;)

[FireGarden]

Just a suggestion, to accomodate the internationalists who are tired of America throwing it's weight around. :p

Keep your weight to yourself, but when have we ever complained of America throwing its money around? :p

[GreNME]

Interesting look from the WaPo yesterday (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/06/AR2009110603072.html?hpid=opinionsbox1) at the hardliners in Iran:

The prospect of a deal with the Great Satan produced a political frisson in Tehran. . . . Critics chided Ahmadinejad for giving away the nuclear store. . . . Khamenei joined in the attacks last week, warning that negotiating with America would be "naive and perverted." The leader was implicitly criticizing Ahmadinejad, who had characterized the Geneva deal as an Iranian victory. . . .

But reading the Iranian press, you get the sense that for Iran's ruling elite, engagement with America remains a bridge too far. "America is still the Great Satan. Negotiations are meaningless," thundered the hard-line weekly Ya-Lesarat.Swap out a few names and replace "great satan" with "Persian Hitlers" and you have a pretty accurate portrayal of American hardliners urging against the deal stateside..;)

I agree, but the cool thing is how that is precisely the type of response that is going to prove beneficial for the reformers and opposition in Iran.

Keep in mind, turning up the burners and turning off the communication from the outside tends to unite Iran in radicalism, turning down the burners and turning up the communication enables the hardliners to dig their own graves.

[Darth Rotor]

Keep your weight to yourself, but when have we ever complained of America throwing its money around? :p Indeed. They come as a packaged deal. There is NO FREE LUNCH. :D

[Puppycow]

Feds launch seizure of alleged Iranian assets (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111209731.html?hpid=topnews)

They were probably holding off on this until the deal fell through.
Good to see that we can actually do something other than just wring our hands when they dick us around.

[Skeptic]

Swap out a few names and replace "great satan" with "Persian Hitlers" and you have a pretty accurate portrayal of American hardliners urging against the deal stateside..

Yes, yes, yes, OF COURSE there is equivalency between those warning the POTUS not to trust the Iranians on a nuclear deal just because they're religious nuts who broke every agreement they signed before on the subject... and those who ask Ahmadejinad to not trust the Americans because Allah said that America is a the great Satan who must be destroyed by Jihad for opposing the will of Allah that the Shi'ites rule the world.

Just like there was an equivalency between people who told Chamberline not to trust Hitler's intentions in Munich because he is a liar who is sure to break any agreement... and those who advised Hitler to just use force immediately, since there is no point to a deal with the wily, perfidious Chamberline who opposes German greatness just because he is controlled by the evil Jewish bankers.

Just exchange a few lines and the criticism by both the Nazi and British hard-liners' in 1938 criticism looks the same!

It is one thing to be opposed to black-and-white thinking and notice shades of grey between countries. It is something else altogether to refuse to see any shades of grey, and consider all countries equally grey.

[Darth Rotor]

It is one thing to be opposed to black-and-white thinking and notice shades of grey between countries. It is something else altogether to refuse to see any shades of grey, and consider all countries equally grey.
At least the Union were savvy enough to be non conformist, and wear blue, rather than any shade of gray. :D
DR

[GreNME]

Yes, yes, yes, OF COURSE there is equivalency between those warning the POTUS not to trust the Iranians on a nuclear deal just because they're religious nuts who broke every agreement they signed before on the subject... and those who ask Ahmadejinad to not trust the Americans because Allah said that America is a the great Satan who must be destroyed by Jihad for opposing the will of Allah that the Shi'ites rule the world.

Just like there was an equivalency between people who told Chamberline not to trust Hitler's intentions in Munich because he is a liar who is sure to break any agreement... and those who advised Hitler to just use force immediately, since there is no point to a deal with the wily, perfidious Chamberline who opposes German greatness just because he is controlled by the evil Jewish bankers.

Just exchange a few lines and the criticism by both the Nazi and British hard-liners' in 1938 criticism looks the same!

It is one thing to be opposed to black-and-white thinking and notice shades of grey between countries. It is something else altogether to refuse to see any shades of grey, and consider all countries equally grey.

http://image.grenme.com/thread/StrawMan.jpg

The US has been playing the same non-starter game with Iran for 30 years. The rhetoric against Iran during that time has only been topped with two things: the Cold War rhetoric and the 9/11 rhetoric. That doesn't make the two countries the same, but the rhetoric tends to mirror each other quite often.

[Skeptic]

It doesn't make both countries the same, true. But the "sophisticated" folks always try to make the USA look as bad as possible, Iran & co. as good as possible, and to find as many similarities as possible between them.

This doesn't mean the two countries look the same even after all their efforts -- the difference in goodness (for lack of a better word) between the two countries seems to wide to be eliminated by such rhetorical tricks -- but if so, it's not for lack of trying.

[theprestige]

http://image.grenme.com/thread/StrawMan.jpg

The US has been playing the same non-starter game with Iran for 30 years. The rhetoric against Iran during that time has only been topped with two things: the Cold War rhetoric and the 9/11 rhetoric. That doesn't make the two countries the same, but the rhetoric tends to mirror each other quite often.
Three things, actually: You're forgetting that the US rhetoric against Iran has also been consistently topped by the Iranian rhetoric against the US.

There's also the small matter of Iran playing the same non-starter game with the rest of the world... but heaven forbid the US actually take that into consideration when making policy.

[WildCat]

I just fell off the turnip truck yesterday and I am shocked shocked shocked Iran is backing out of the deal!

[Doctor Evil]

A new report is out following the last inspection of the site at Qum. I have found this bit (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/world/middleeast/17nuke.html?_r=1&hp) to be interesting:
They confirmed American and European intelligence reports that the site was built to house about 3,000 centrifuges, enough to produce enough material for one or two nuclear weapons (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier) a year. But that is too small to be useful in the production of fuel for civilian nuclear power, which is what Iran insists was the intended purpose of the site.

[MikeMangum]

http://image.grenme.com/thread/StrawMan.jpg

The US has been playing the same non-starter game with Iran for 30 years. The rhetoric against Iran during that time has only been topped with two things: the Cold War rhetoric and the 9/11 rhetoric. That doesn't make the two countries the same, but the rhetoric tends to mirror each other quite often.

That's a nice picture of a straw man, but unfortunately, it is not a propo.

Swap out a few names and replace "great satan" with "Persian Hitlers" and you have a pretty accurate portrayal of American hardliners urging against the deal stateside..;)
Yes, yes, yes, OF COURSE there is equivalency between those warning the POTUS not to trust the Iranians on a nuclear deal just because they're religious nuts who broke every agreement they signed before on the subject... and those who ask Ahmadejinad to not trust the Americans because Allah said that America is a the great Satan who must be destroyed by Jihad for opposing the will of Allah that the Shi'ites rule the world.

I'm not sure where you see the scarecrow, frankly. Praktik clearly made an equivalency that Skeptic disagreed with. I'm not sure how else you can describe a statement such as "swap out a few names...and you have a pretty accurate portrayal..." as anything other than an equivalency.

Yes, the US has been playing the same "non-starter game" with Iran for 30 years. It might possibly be related to the fact that 30 years ago Iran committed an act that was a clear and brazen violation of international law and also happened to be a clear cassus belli. It also might be related to the fact that the official position of the government of Iran towards the United States of America throughout those 30 years can be reduced to their oft spouted (at least weekly) phrase "Death to America". And yet you claim that the rhetoric of the two sides "tend to mirror each other".

In the immortal words of Ice T: "what world do you live in"?


Iran's Ahmadinejad issues new threats against Israel, U.S (http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2007/09/23/2007-09-23_irans_ahmadinejad_issues_new_threats_aga.html)

On the eve of his trip to New York City, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stood before a banner blaring "Death to America," showed off his military might and declared his extremist regime will not bow to Western pressure.

'Death to America' Day: How Iran Trained Its Young to Protest (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1934584,00.html)

On Wednesday, Iran officially celebrated the 30th anniversary of the taking of the U.S. Embassy in central Tehran, a day formally designated as "Students' Day" in honor of the several university students killed during the course of the 1979 Revolution.

From FARS (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8708251506) (state run) news:
“Our people’s slogan of hatred, which is death to America, will continue to be heard,” added Khatami, a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts that selects and supervises the supreme leader’s activities.

Radio Free Europe (http://www.rferl.org/content/A_Call_To_End_Death_To_America_Chants_In_Iran/1380717.html):
The slogan "Death To America" was chanted in Iran during the revolution in 1979 and it became a part of all state-organized demonstration, where sometimes U.S. flags are also burned.

That definitely mirros harsh rhetoric like this (http://allthatnatters.com/2009/03/20/transcript-president-obama-video-message-to-iranian-people-nowruz/):
THE PRESIDENT: Today I want to extend my very best wishes to all who are celebrating Nowruz around the world.

This holiday is both an ancient ritual and a moment of renewal, and I hope that you enjoy this special time of year with friends and family.

In particular, I would like to speak directly to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nowruz is just one part of your great and celebrated culture. Over many centuries your art, your music, literature and innovation have made the world a better and more beautiful place.

Here in the United States our own communities have been enhanced by the contributions of Iranian Americans. We know that you are a great civilization, and your accomplishments have earned the respect of the United States and the world.

...

You, too, have a choice. The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right — but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.

The Response from Iran? Guess. It's not hard, because the response has only 3 words. I'll give you a hint: the first word is "death".

http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/03/iran_responds_death_to_america.asp
In a speech on Saturday, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded directly to Barack Obama's video mash note from late last week. According to the Associated Press: "Khamenei, wearing a black turban and dark robes, said America was hated around the world for its arrogance, as the crowd chanted 'Death to America.'"

[FireGarden]

A new report is out following the last inspection of the site at Qum. I have found this bit (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/world/middleeast/17nuke.html?_r=1&hp) to be interesting:
They confirmed American and European intelligence reports that the site was built to house about 3,000 centrifuges, enough to produce enough material for one or two nuclear weapons (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier) a year. But that is too small to be useful in the production of fuel for civilian nuclear power, which is what Iran insists was the intended purpose of the site.

It's worse than that! They're going to build 10 new enrichment plants, and each of them will too small for their civilian nuclear aims. What could this possibly mean?

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8385275.stm

Iran's government has approved plans to build 10 new uranium enrichment plants, according to state media.

[...] President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told his cabinet that parliament had ordered that Iran should produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear energy by 2020.

It therefore needed to make 250-300 tonnes of nuclear fuel a year, he said, which would require 500,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium.

Natanz has nearly 5,000 working centrifuges, with plans to build 54,000 in all.

[WildCat]

What could this possibly mean?
A target-rich environment?

[Sporanox]

Boy, this thread is a clear demonstration as any that reality is cold and often slaps you.

[aviolet4u]

A target-rich environment?

Death to America? I should take the hint and move to New Zealand already.

All I read in the news is how "Iran defies...defies...defied...." Are we sure its not a suicidal government? :covereyes

[Thunder]

Perhaps Iran hopes to be the new Mecca for buyers of weapons-grade uranium.

10 new plants huh? They have got to be *********** kidding me.

This has got to be a deathwish.

I really feel sorry for the Iranian people, cause they are gonna suffer the most from all of this.

[Darth Rotor]

My post #121:

That news leads me to believe that Iran will build another secret facility in case Qom site gets bombed ...
Originally Posted by BBC
Iran's government has approved plans to build 10 new uranium enrichment plants, according to state media. [...] President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told his cabinet that parliament had ordered that Iran should produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear energy by 2020. It therefore needed to make 250-300 tonnes of nuclear fuel a year, he said, which would require 500,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium. Natanz has nearly 5,000 working centrifuges, with plans to build 54,000 in all.
This was not hard to predict, no need for me to try to collect the MDC.

[Skeptic]

Drat! Just when negotiations were working out so well!

[FireGarden]

My post #121:



This was not hard to predict, no need for me to try to collect the MDC.

You predicted "secret".
These are rub your nose in it public.

(I need a "wag my finger at you" smiley!)

[Darth Rotor]

You predicted "secret".
These are rub your nose in it public.

(I need a "wag my finger at you" smiley!)
OK, but I was already not calling for the MDC. Close enough, got my B, passed the course, take the three hours of credit. ;)

DR

[FireGarden]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100102/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpoliticsexchange

Iran's foreign minister gave the West a one-month "ultimatum" on Saturday to accept a uranium swap, warning that it will produce its own nuclear fuel for a Tehran reactor if there is no deal.

"The international community has just one month left to decide whether or not it will accept Iran's conditions," Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was quoted by state television as saying.

"This is an ultimatum."

Iran, which rejected a December 31 deadline to accept a UN-brokered deal, said on Tuesday it was ready to swap abroad its low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel, while insisting that the exchange happen in stages.

[Skeptic]

And to think some racist and Islamophobic people think Iran wants a bomb, just because it constantly says so and broke every single "agreement" not to do so it every signed.

[FireGarden]

And to think some racist and Islamophobic people think Iran wants a bomb, just because it constantly says so and broke every single "agreement" not to do so it every signed.

How this follows from the news article I posted is a mystery to me.