The absurdity of free will or the lack thereof

[RandFan]

Case 1: Now if F conflicts with N, we have a problem. One or both F and N must be false. Light must either behave as a particle or it must behave as a wave. If P conflicts with W then one or both must be false. Perhaps the notion that light is a wave or a particle is absurd.

I'm not really trying to apply the duality of light or quantum mechanics to free will. I'm saying that the notion itself is incoherent and the idea that we either have free will or we don't is an absurdity. If it helps you to sleep at night to shelve it as a semantics problem then that's fine by me.

So in none of these cases do you have an absurdity that a definition cannot resolve.Asserted. Perhaps there exists such a definition but I've been telling you from the start that it is up to you to provide the definition and then demonstrate that behavior would be different for free will or non-free will based on that definition. I'm not convinced that such a definition exists. I think perhaps there are perspectives but none of them can conclusively tell us if free will exists or doesn't exist. One thing I know for sure, stating that the "meaning" of light is that it is a particle doesn't resolve the duality of light anymore than you declaring that brain processes prove free will.

[yy2bggggs]

One thing I know for sure, stating that the "meaning" of light is that it is a particle doesn't resolve the duality of light anymore than you declaring that brain processes prove free will.
Ah, this may explain your confusion. But I discussed this in post #56.

The two situations are not analogous. It's very clear what is meant by light. Even if Bob and Joe disagree about light's nature--if Bob thinks it's a particle and Joe a wave--they still know what they mean. Both Bob and Joe would be able to identify whether or not a flashlight is on, for example, based on the visible light being emitted from it. They don't agree on what that thing is, but they agree perfectly on what the "that" is.

"Free will" isn't like this at all. Bob and Joe not only disagree about free will's nature, but on whether or not we have it. And their concepts per se are loaded with various misconceptions they have. Bob and Joe don't even know if they are talking about the same thing when they use the term, and they don't really know if the thing they're talking about has meaning in the first place.

[RandFan]

The two situations are not analogous.I'm not saying they are analagous. I'm addressing your assumption and following your logic.

It's very clear what is meant by light. Even if Bob and Joe disagree about light's nature--if Bob thinks it's a particle and Joe a wave--they still know what they mean. Both Bob and Joe would be able to identify whether or not a flashlight is on, for example, based on the visible light being emitted from it. They don't agree on what that thing is, but they agree perfectly on what the "that" is.

"Free will" isn't like this at all. Bob and Joe not only disagree about free will's nature, but on whether or not we have it. And their concepts per se are loaded with various misconceptions they have. Bob and Joe don't even know if they are talking about the same thing when they use the term, and they don't really know if the thing they're talking about has meaning in the first place.A.) I think all roads lead to absurdity and you are complaigning that the evidence thus far agrees with me. B.) You have been free from the very first post to define free will and explain its nature. You have been free to provide meaning. And yet nothing has changed. Declaring that the meaning of free will is "thought directed action" only makes my point as both sides at least agree to that much.

[yy2bggggs]

Declaring that the meaning of free will is "thought directed action" only makes my point as both sides at least agree to that much.
And why is it a problem if both sides agree?

[RandFan]

And why is it a problem if both sides agree?Poor communication skills on my part. They don't both agree that "thought directed action" proves free will. What they agree on is that our thoughts (which you have defined simply as brain processes) direct our actions. The question becomes, can we consciously make choices?

When we are asleep our motor control is often disconnected so that our unconscious brain processes (please tell me that you are not going to argue that sleep isn't an unconscious state?) don't direct our actions. No one would argue, I don't think, that sleep walking is an action made of conscious free will. Yet the actions are directed by thoughts. Perhaps you will surprise me and argue that sleep walking or RLS is proof of free will. My wife has RLS. A condition that interferes with her sleep. The movements are involuntary. It is not her will that it happen. The movements are the result of brain processes and she takes Parkinson's medicine to control the movement. Perhaps she just needs to be convinced that it is her free will that is directing her leg actions and she only thinks otherwise...

[dlorde]

As I pointed out before, only in very short term decisions.
Yes, those decisions we are not consciously aware of at the time.

I don't really consider very short term decisions as examples of free will, I am thinking more of considered decisions.
It seems to me likely that the kinds of decisions that require some pondering are the kind of decisions where a larger proportion of the 'modules' of the brain are recruited or become involved, and the more are involved, the greater our conscious awareness of the processing becomes, and so the more we feel that we are 'consciously doing' it, when we are just consciously aware of doing it - this being Libet's illusion (that the self is not quite as it seems), that RandFan mentioned earlier, i.e. the illusion of consciousness having special agency.

But I am happy to concede that even in these cases the conscious part is the very tip of the mental iceberg.
:)

[yy2bggggs]

The question becomes, can we consciously make choices?
But that's the thing. I disagree that this is the question.
No one would argue, I don't think, that sleep walking is an action made of conscious free will. Yet the actions are directed by thoughts.
So here, what's significant is whether or not the direction results from her consciousness...
It is not her will that it happen.
...but here, what's significant is whether or not the direction results from her will.

[I Ratant]

The means for Aristotle to falsify his conclusions were at his disposal. Perhaps if someone had asked questions...
.
Such as asking Mrs. Aristotle to open her mouth so he could count her teeth, rather than assuming that as a woman, she had fewer teeth than a man.
Amusing story on this in the July/August issue of "ANALOG "Questiones Super Caelo et Mundo", by Michael F. Flynn, in which a group of philosophers in Paris invent most of modern science in about a month, by beginning with testing the "truths" of Aristotle.

[I Ratant]

I mean that the idea of humans having or not having free will is an absurdity. Anything that thinks and acts is free. Humans cannot be humans without thinking and acting.
.
I've watched animals alter their behavior based on the circumstances, so they (coyotes in this case) are capable of altering their lives by choice.

[RandFan]

But that's the thing. I disagree that this is the question.I think it is but that's fine.

So here, what's significant is whether or not the direction results from her consciousness... I thought consciousness wasn't the question. If consciousness isn't the question why do you now say that consciousness is what's significant?

...but here, what's significant is whether or not the direction results from her will. Well, lack of sleep and a decrease in well being that results in trips to doctors and money spent on therapy and medication would seem to indicate that her will is for it not to happen. So it would seem that her suffering is not the result of her will and the relief of that suffering is.

[yy2bggggs]

I thought consciousness wasn't the question. If consciousness isn't the question why do you now say that consciousness is what's significant?You're reading it wrong. I'm comparing two things in your statement. "Significant" should read "significant to you", and "here" should read "within the context of this quote".
Well, lack of sleep and a decrease in well being that results in trips to doctors and money spent on therapy and medication would seem to indicate that her will is for it not to happen. So it would seem that her suffering is not the result of her will and the relief of that suffering is.
And here, you're applying a criteria of whether or not the actions are directed by her will.

This is a different criteria than whether or not the actions are directed by her consciousness.

[RandFan]

And here, you're applying a criteria of whether or not the actions are directed by her will.

This is a different criteria than whether or not the actions are directed by her consciousness. No. I'm pointing out that there are actions that result from brain processes that are counter to my wife's conscious will. You are the one that has given meaning to actions caused by any and all brain processes as free will.

Let me ask you this question, do you think medications like those that treat parkinson's disease redundant given that my wife need only direct her thoughts to stop her RLS?

If you want to exclude consciousness from the equation then I'm not opposed to that. It was never my intent to narrowly restrict the discussion. However, I think you've got to provide justification for excluding consciousness as being a subject of discussion as it applies to free will or the lack thereof. Or, you make my argument for me. By your logic my wife has bifurcated will. Will RLS and will Not RLS.

X = Not X. or X and Not X.

[yy2bggggs]

You are the one that has given meaning to actions caused by any and all brain processes as free will.
I am now even more convinced that you didn't understand post #56. I still don't think you're appreciating the tie I made in my definition of free will to "my thoughts", but at this point I'm chocking that up to irrelevance... I think the major disagreement you have with me is imagined.

When I say "refined definition" in post #56, I'm talking only of a more specific definition--one you can address. Such definitions don't necessarily suggest anything about the general term they are refining. Technical definitions are examples of this (e.g., "generic programming" isn't just any sort of programming).

But I think when you read it, in spite of the very next phrase, you read it as implying that I could give a definition of free will that would resolve the issue of whether or not we had it.

That's nowhere close to what I was saying. What I was claiming was that we could give a definition of free will that has enough arbitrarily introduced precision that we could, within the context of that definition, establish whether or not we have it.

The phrase:
and I don't believe I have a legitimate means of refining it, in such a way that I can say "my refined definition is what free will means"
...was meant to clarify this point. But you insisted you disagreed with me, which was what started this exercise.

This would explain why you're trying to match my definition to what proponents/opponents say.

So am I right?

[RandFan]

This would explain why you're trying to match my definition to what proponents/opponents say.

So am I right?I'm not trying to match anything. I've simply contrasted your thought experiment with with what the proponents/opponents say. Given your definition of thoughts as simply being brain processes it fits nicely into any and every model I know of and therefore it doesn't tell us anything.

And so here we are. Back to my wife who is aware that her legs twitch and keep her up at night and she relies on medication to control the involuntary movements of her legs.

So could you address this real life example? My wife claims that she is not aware of directing her thoughts to cause the RLS. Clearly there are brain processes behind the actions of the RLS but she is only aware of the results and not the thoughts. Further, directing her thoughts to stop the actions doesn't seem to have any effect. This would seem to be problematic for your thought experiment.

Given the expense of Mirapex (there is no generic form) and given that it is the only drug that has ever worked for her I have to say I wish you were right. I mean that sincerely.

[yy2bggggs]

No. I'm pointing out that there are actions that result from brain processes that are counter to my wife's conscious will.
Her conscious will as opposed to her regular will?

The word "conscious" here is just as misleading as when you said "consciously direct", for the same reason. You're obviously binding the term "conscious" to the concept of "I", and so long as you do this, you're only going to mislead yourself.

Let me give you a scenario. You're driving down the road, along a route you've driven a thousand times before. Typically, your mind wouldn't be highly engaged in driving--you're on autopilot. You are likely, rather, paying attention to something else, either externally driven (the radio) or internally (mind wandering--perhaps you're going over a shopping list, or problem at work, or something).

All of a sudden, your left arm starts twitching. It's serious enough to grab your attention. At this point you're probably focused on your arm, why it's twitching, how it affects driving--should you pull over? Slow down? Change arms? Change your route to the hospital? Drive a different safer route to the destination?

The arm twitching, I would assume you would agree, would not be a normal sort of thing. The driving, however, is. I would also assume you would agree that your driving was voluntary, yet your arm twitching was involuntary.

In this scenario, things are completely backwards. You are controlling the car, but you're not conscious of it. You are not, however, controlling your arm, but you're extremely conscious of that. It's not whether the action is directed by your conscious will that is at issue--it is whether the direction is directed by your will that is at issue.
You are the one that has given meaning to actions caused by any and all brain processes as free will.
No I'm not. Reread post #188.
Let me ask you this question, do you think medications like those that treat parkinson's disease redundant given that my wife need only direct her thoughts to stop her RLS?
Leading question.
If you want to exclude consciousness from the equation then I'm not opposed to that.
I'm not excluding consciousness from the equation in the first place. I'm only pointing out, correctly, that consciousness isn't relevant in the way you think it is to the decision making process. Consciousness isn't a prerequisite for will, and is optional to even carry out will (see car driving scenario above).

That does not make everything your brain does your will. There's still a difference. It's just that the difference isn't what you think it is.
It fits nicely into any and every model I know of and therefore it doesn't tell us anything.
Why should it have to tell you anything? I'm defining a term. It may, or may not, apply to a situation. What are you expecting the definition of the term to tell you?
Back to my wife who is aware that her legs twitch and keep her up at night and she relies on medication to control the involuntary movements of her legs.If they are involuntary, it's not correct to say she originates them.

You seem to be setting up a false dichotomy. Consciousness is the only criteria you can think of that ties an action to you, so if I claim that consciousness isn't significant, you think I'm telling you that nothing is.

Please reread my posts. I talk about the "I", the interconnected modules (even called them "the piece of interest", singularity of purpose, etc, and I've even drawn you a diagram.
My wife claims that she is not aware of directing her thoughts to cause the RLS.My guess would be she isn't directing them.

[RandFan]

Her conscious will as opposed to her regular will? You are complicating something that doesn't need to be complicated. The example of my wife's RLS obviates the need to ask this question. Some brain processes my wife is consciously aware of and some she is not. Some she can direct (or she percieves that she directs). And some she cannot direct or she percieves that she cannot direct.

The word "conscious" here is just as misleading as when you said "consciously direct", for the same reason. You're obviously binding the term "conscious" to the concept of "I", and so long as you do this, you're only going to mislead yourself.No. On the contrary. I've kept it very simple for you. My wife is able to direct her thoughts (or she percieves that she is able to direct her thoughts) to cause actions when it comes to driving (see below) but she is unable to direct her thoughts to cause action (or percieves that she is unable to direct her thoughts to cause action) when it comes to RLS.

Let me give you a scenario. You're driving down the road, along a route you've driven a thousand times before. Typically, your mind wouldn't be highly engaged in driving--you're on autopilot. You are likely, rather, paying attention to something else, either externally driven (the radio) or internally (mind wandering--perhaps you're going over a shopping list, or problem at work, or something).

All of a sudden, your left arm starts twitching. It's serious enough to grab your attention. At this point you're probably focused on your arm, why it's twitching, how it affects driving--should you pull over? Slow down? Change arms? Change your route to the hospital? Drive a different safer route to the destination?

The arm twitching, I would assume you would agree, would not be a normal sort of thing. The driving, however, is. I would also assume you would agree that your driving was voluntary, yet your arm twitching was involuntary.

In this scenario, things are completely backwards. You are controlling the car, but you're not conscious of it. You are not, however, controlling your arm, but you're extremely conscious of that. It's not whether the action is directed by your conscious will that is at issue--it is whether the direction is directed by your will that is at issue. In the example of my wife, she can direct her thoughts to cause action (or she percieves that she can direct ther thoughts to cause action) to stop driving the car. She can't direct her thoughts (or she doesn't percieve that she can direct her thoughts) to stop her RLS

Leading question.Nonesense and disapointly evasive. You've stated plainly that a person can direct his or her thoughts to control actions.

My point: Driving a car and RLS are both the result of brain processes.
My wife is able to direct her thoughts (or percieve that she directs her thoughts) to drive the car.
My wife is unable to direct her thoughts to control (or percieve that she is unable to direct her thoughts to control) her RLS.
Which is why my wife relies on medication to control her RLS but doesn't need medication to drive a car.

That's it. We don't need all of the other baggage and nonsense.

I'll make it real simple for you.


Can my wife direct her thoughts to stop driving?
Can my wife direct her thoughts to sop her RLS?

[yy2bggggs]

You are complicating something that doesn't need to be complicated.
Yes it does need to be, as you say, "complicated", because you're still misrepresenting my position, and it's quite possibly because you're still mixing the "I" with consciousness.

I do get to correct your misrepresentations of my position, do I not?
My wife is able to direct her thoughts (or she percieves that she is able to direct her thoughts) to cause actions when it comes to driving (see below) but she is unable to direct her thoughts to cause action (or percieves that she is unable to direct her thoughts to cause action) when it comes to RLS.
Sure. What has that got to do with whether she consciously directs her driving?
Let me ask you this question, do you think medications like those that treat parkinson's disease redundant given that my wife need only direct her thoughts to stop her RLS?
Leading question.
Nonesense and disapointly evasive.
Highlighted is the statement you're putting in my mouth. That's a textbook leading question.
You've stated plainly that a person can direct his or her thoughts to control actions.
Yes. I've also stated that I'm wearing clothes. You're going to disprove that I'm wearing clothes by showing me I'm not wearing socks.

That a person can do X does not imply there does not exist a Y such that person can not do Y. You're treating this as if it does. Either this, or you're making up something that I'm claiming. It's one or the other, because I never actually did claim that we get to control everything.

[RandFan]

Yes it does need to be, as you say, "complicated", because you're still misrepresenting my position, and it's quite possibly because you're still mixing the "I" with consciousness.No. I've made every effort possible to avoid the "I". I wouldn't know how to define it other than the totality of my brain processes.

I do get to correct your misrepresentations of my position, do I not?If I've misrepresented your position sure.

Highlighted is the statement you're putting in my mouth. That's a textbook leading question. (see below)

Let's back up.

Free will means that I'm able to act causally based on my thoughts. You define thoughts as brain processes thus rendering your statement vacuous since all models/theories of human behavior hold that brain processes cause actions.

In the example of my wife she is not able to direct her thoughts (nor does she perceive to direct her thoughts) at it applies to RLS.

She is able to direct her thoughts (or she perceives to direct her thoughts) as it apples to driving a car.

The point of the example is that A.) There exist actions that we don't consciously direct (or that we don't perceive to consciously direct). B.) If this is true that such actions exist it is also possible that all actions are unconsciously directed and we only perceive that they are consciously directed.

1If I cannot type the correct answer, despite seeming to have thoughts about the correct answer, that would be one demonstration. 2Another would be if I could consistently type the correct answer even without bothering to go through with the thoughts.

Ramachandran demonstrates this in his book (http://www.amazon.com/Brief-Tour-Human-Consciousness-Impostor/dp/0131486861).
You would seem to demonstrate this with your example of driving the car because it is possible to arrive at the correct answer (correct destination) without bothering to go through with the thoughts.

[RandFan]

Highlighted is the statement you're putting in my mouth. That's a textbook leading question.The statement is the result of a lot of statements by you. It's a long thread of ideas that I don't care to reconstruct. I'll withdraw the statement and appologize.