The absurdity of free will or the lack thereof

[RandFan]

Yes, I should have my head examined for bringing this up. Fools rush in...

Ok, here's the thing. While I think the concept of free will vs the lack thereof has some degree of value from a philosophical perspective in the end it's the equivalent of a dog chasing it's tail. Nothing can or will ever come of the pursuit of it beyond rudimentary understanding of whether or not we have free will and what it even means to say we do or do not have free will.

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to answer one of the following two questions (given that you care of course).

Assuming that humans are endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were not?
Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.

[Twiler]

Yes, I should have my head examined for bringing this up. Fools rush in...

Ok, here's the thing. While I think the concept of free will vs the lack thereof has some degree of value from a philosophical perspective in the end it's the equivalent of a dog chasing it's tail. Nothing can or will ever come of the pursuit of it beyond rudimentary understanding of whether or not we have free will and what it even means to say we do or do not have free will.

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to answer one of the following two questions (given that you care of course).

Assuming that humans are endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were not?
Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.


1. Mu.
2. Mu.

[Gord_in_Toronto]

1. Mu.
2. Mu.

Moo. Moo? :scared:

[RandFan]

1. Mu.
2. Mu.Could you elaborate? Are you saying that there would be no difference in behavior?

[HansMustermann]

I'd say we're way too early in our understanding of the brain, to answer such questions. Honestly, it's like asking a bunch of tribesmen whether heliocentrism or geocentrism are right.

Sure, we could go into philosophy based purely on guesses, postulates and axioms pulled out of the rear end. But then that's the kind of thing which got Aristotle to arrive with perfectly good logic to conclusions like that a cannonball twice as heavy falls twice as fast, or that flies have 4 legs, or that women have less teeth than men, or that the planets are made of fire and aether (if they were made of earth or water they'd fall down, because those elements are heavy, see?), and so on.

I think that the sane thing to do is to wait until we have a falsifiable theory, and then work from there.

[Lex Luthor]

I'm no physicist, but whenever I read an explanation of quantum physics for the layman and they speak of the uncertainty of how sub-atomic particles will react, I wonder if that uncertainty is the source of human free will.

If we had a completely deterministic universe in which all outcomes could be predicted, it seems to me that everything would be predestined and that free will would not exist. The unpredictability of the universe as described by quantum physics explains (at least in my mind) how free will could exist.

Does this make sense to anybody else?

[RandFan]

But then that's the kind of thing which got Aristotle to arrive with perfectly good logic to conclusions like that a cannonball twice as heavy falls twice as fast...The means for Aristotle to falsify his conclusions were at his disposal. Perhaps if someone had asked questions...

[RandFan]

I'm no physicist, but whenever I read an explanation of quantum physics for the layman and they speak of the uncertainty of how sub-atomic particles will react, I wonder if that uncertainty is the source of human free will.

If we had a completely deterministic universe in which all outcomes could be predicted, it seems to me that everything would be predestined and that free will would not exist. The unpredictability of the universe as described by quantum physics explains (at least in my mind) how free will could exist.

Does this make sense to anybody else?Yes, but this seems to be along the line of god of the gaps. On one hand we don't know if humans have free will on the other we have uncertainty at the quantum level. So we latch on to something that feels right. You need a mechanism to explain how one has anything to do with the other. And we also need to take into account chaos theory. The degree of uncertainty about weather patterns has nothing to do with quantum theory.

[Toke]

I sometimes get the rather depressing thought that what I think of as me is just a collection of braincells set up over lengthy evolution to propagate themselves.

In theory not much different than a virus or prion that happen to fit an enzyme or cell wall, they spread because they can.

Then I think of something else.

[HansMustermann]

Well, predestination it sure isn't, because those quantum effects throw very provable deltas into that chaos. E.g., there's nothing predestined about the haemophilia mutation in Queen Victoria, and that caused a whole bunch of far reaching effects, including arguably the October revolution.

Whether what remains is free will or just a degree of randomness, as I was saying, I don't think we know enough to make that kind of pronouncements.

[Twiler]

Could you elaborate? Are you saying that there would be no difference in behavior?

I mean that the idea of humans having or not having free will is an absurdity. Anything that thinks and acts is free. Humans cannot be humans without thinking and acting.

[RandFan]

Anything that thinks and acts is free. You only assert this. Can you demonstrate that it is true or are you simply, and arrogantly, declaring that it is true by fiat?

[RandFan]

...there's nothing predestined about the haemophilia mutation in Queen Victoria...Assertion is neither argument nor evidence.

[Twiler]

You only assert this. Can you demonstrate that it is true or are you simply, and arrogantly, declaring that it is true by fiat?

I consider that the concept of freedom has no objective basis, and thus must have a subjective basis. We generally consider that humans are free if they can act upon their thoughts, so this seems to be the best definition to use.

[HansMustermann]

Do you know something we don't about mutations? Because if you could present reasonable evidence that you can predict, say, C14 decay or the interactions of ionizing radiation with matter, there might be a Nobel Prize to be won.

Basically if you want to believe in some sort of predestination, fine by me, but quantum stuff being random is very much accepted fact by now. Just because you don't like it, doesn't make it an assertion ;)

[Seismosaurus]

I'm very unclear on exactly what "free will" means. I should say that I think of myself as reasonably smart, but I'm not versed in philosophy at all so this may be old news and basic stuff to everyone.

Anyway, I had a discussion with somebody on this a while back, and he claimed that all natural laws operate on either a causal basis for Newtonian/Einsteinian law, or on randomness for quantum law. He said that neither can give rise to free will, and so some supernatural component must be involved to allow free will.

But... when I think about that, the implication is that free will involves the ability to violate the laws of physics?

And if there is a supernatural component - call it the soul - how does THAT work? I mean, if souls do something to cause us to have free will, then isn't the soul just another causal system as well, like the laws of physics? I don't see how "souls do X and that results in free will" is any different in kind from the laws of physics causing things. And if the soul is not causing you to have free will... then how come having it makes you have free will?

So the only answer I can see to that is, either you define free will this way in which there's no such thing as free will even if there is some supernatural thing going on... or you redefine free will in such a way that it's possible even though we operate in a clockwork/random universe.

Related to your question, my friend claimed that if he found out there was no such thing as free will he would go out raping and killing, since he's not responsible for his actions. But even that is expressing things as if free will DID exist; I told him that if he did find out he had no free will then he would do whatever he was predetermined to do. He didn't quite seem to get that, though.

To me, this kind of thing renders the whole free will thing as a pretty academic exercise. It FEELS like we have free will... our consciousness seems to guide our actions. Really that's all that matters, because if we ever prove otherwise then what difference could it make, really?

[RandFan]

We generally consider that humans are free if they can act upon their thoughts... Who is this "we"? FWIW: There is a lot of evidence to suppose that this is not true.

Voluntary action and the sense of free will (http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/psych01.htm)

So - which came first? The decision to move, or activity in motor cortex? The answer was more dramatic than anyone expected. The brain activity began about 500 milliseconds, or half a second, before the person was aware of deciding to act. It seems that the conscious decision came far too late to be the cause of the action; as though consciousness is a mere afterthought. Odd though this might seem, it fits with previous experiments on exposed brains, in which Libet demonstrated that about half a second of continuous activity in sensory cortex is needed for a person to become aware of a sensory stimulus (Libet 1981). This implies the odd conclusion that consciousness lags behind the events of the world. But, Libet argued, once events reach neuronal adequacy (i.e. half a second of activity) they are subjectively referred back to the time of the initial evoked potential. So even though consciousness takes half a second to build up, events still seem to happen in real time.

[RandFan]

Do you know something we don't about mutations? Because if you could present reasonable evidence that you can predict, say, C14 decay or the interactions of ionizing radiation with matter, there might be a Nobel Prize to be won. What does this have to do with the question at hand? Uncertainty, BTW, doesn't translate into free will and you are the one that used the word "predestined". That's not the subject of the OP.

Basically if you want to believe in some sort of predestination, fine by me, but quantum stuff being random is very much accepted fact by now. Just because you don't like it, doesn't make it an assertion And this isn't argument. You need to establish a link between A and B and not simply assert that one exists. In the very least you need to explain the link.

[Twiler]

Who is this "we"? FWIW: There is a lot of evidence to suppose that this is not true.

Okay, where does the appearance of decisions come from if the decisions are not being made?

[Toke]

To me, this kind of thing renders the whole free will thing as a pretty academic exercise. It FEELS like we have free will... our consciousness seems to guide our actions. Really that's all that matters, because if we ever prove otherwise then what difference could it make, really?
Exactly, whether it is true or not we have to assume free will to function.
So, try think of something else.:)

[HansMustermann]

However, the very next paragraph spells it out that there still is an unresolved controversy about the validity of Libet's conclusions. Sorry, you don't get to cherrypick as definitive proof whate even the proponents of no free will note as still debatable.

[RandFan]

Okay, where does the appearance of decisions come from if the decisions are not being made? The "appearance"? We (humans) make decisions. Is it subconscious and it only appears that we consciously make decisions? I don't know that for a fact but the evidence as demonstrated in my link seems to suggest that it does. The "appearance" isn't in question. It's the facts that are in question. It "appears" that the magician cuts the women in half but not everything is as it appears.

[RandFan]

However, the very next paragraph spells it out that there still is an unresolved controversy about the validity of Libet's conclusions. Sorry, you don't get to cherrypick as definitive proof whate even the proponents of no free will note as still debatable.???

I never said that it was resolved. I never said that anything was definitive. Please skip the straw men.

[Twiler]

The "appearance"? We (humans) make decisions. Is it subconscious and it only appears that we consciously make decisions? I don't know that for a fact but the evidence as demonstrated in my link seems to suggest that it does. The "appearance" isn't in question. It's the facts that are in question. It "appears" that the magician cuts the women in half but not everything is as it appears.

Why does it matter (within the context of this debate) whether the decisions are subconscious or conscious? In either case, the decision comes from our mind.

[RandFan]

BTW: To disabuse those of you who are engaging in straw men, if I had to choose a horse to back it would be Dan Dennet's version of free will (http://www.human-nature.com/nibbs/03/dcdennett.html).

Please see the title and re-read the OP.

[Eyeron]

Which came first the move or the thought? And can people move without thinking consciously and subconsciously?

[RandFan]

Why does it matter (within the context of this debate) whether the decisions are subconscious or conscious? In either case, the decision comes from our mind.Oy vey. I'm just not that masochistic. Conscious decision making is the halmark of free will.

[RandFan]

Which came first the move or the thought? And can people move without thinking consciously and subconsciously? Well it depends on what you mean by "move" and "subconscious". Heart and other muscle tissue will continue to beat or twitch after it has been separated from the nervous system.

[Twiler]

Oy vey. I'm just not that masochistic. Conscious decision making is the halmark of free will.

I don't see that there's a clear distinction between consciousness and subconsciousness.

[HansMustermann]

To it, Libet's experiment:

A) asked people to just wait until they feel an urge to move the hand, which is anything else than a conscious decision. They were not asked to do a conscious decision when to move the hand. So at best what he measured is basically that a subconscious decision happens before the conscious becomes aware of it.

Yes, subconscious urges and actions may well start before they reach the threshold where you're aware of them. And sometimes don't even reach the conscious level at all. (See the ideomotor effect that Randi keeps mentioning.) What relevance does that have on free will?

B) for that matter, it seems to me pretty disingenuous to claim to have proof that actions aren't initiated consciously... when the test subjects were explicitly asked to not initiate those actions consciously.

That the conscious acts as just a possible override, isn't what he proves, it's the very setup of the experiment. That's what he asked those people to do. Generalizing from that to the whole topic of free will as a whole, is like asking a group to do the Moonwalk and then concluding that humans are naturally wired to walk backwards.

C) to arrive to that negative delta, Libet handwaves as instantaneous something which has no reason to be so. From the moment the brain is aware of that urge to move, it has to start all the processing related to finding out and committing to memory the position of the dot. Even just processing the "am I going to move yet" when trying to gauge a subconscious urge, is something which takes time. The brain is really that slow a machine.

D) even the antedating seems to be, well, let's just say that pretty much only Libet reads the data that way. There are at least half a dozen other explanations that have been proposed.

[HansMustermann]

???

I never said that it was resolved. I never said that anything was definitive. Please skip the straw men.

So, something prefixed with the words, "Who is this "we"? FWIW: There is a lot of evidence to suppose that this is not true." is not supposed to be evidence? And it seems to me like that evidence is weak enough, if even the lack-of-free-will apologists present it with a disclaimer.

[RandFan]

I don't see that there's a clear distinction between consciousness and subconsciousness.We might not be that far apart. I'm really not sure. I'm not certain if your posts have been inconsistent or simply not clear as to your understanding. I'm going to have to beg off for the moment.

[RandFan]

So, something prefixed with the words, "Who is this "we"? FWIW: There is a lot of evidence to suppose that this is not true." is not supposed to be evidence? And it seems to me like that evidence is weak enough, if even the lack-of-free-will apologists present it with a disclaimer.I don't understand your post other than you think the evidence is weak enough. I don't think anything is conclusive. I don't dismiss the evidence out of hand either.

[RandFan]

To it, Libet's experiment:

A) asked people to just wait until they feel an urge to move the hand, which is anything else than a conscious decision. They were not asked to do a conscious decision when to move the hand. So at best what he measured is basically that a subconscious decision happens before the conscious becomes aware of it.

Yes, subconscious urges and actions may well start before they reach the threshold where you're aware of them. And sometimes don't even reach the conscious level at all. (See the ideomotor effect that Randi keeps mentioning.) What relevance does that have on free will?

B) for that matter, it seems to me pretty disingenuous to claim to have proof that actions aren't initiated consciously... when the test subjects were explicitly asked to not initiate those actions consciously.

That the conscious acts as just a possible override, isn't what he proves, it's the very setup of the experiment. That's what he asked those people to do. Generalizing from that to the whole topic of free will as a whole, is like asking a group to do the Moonwalk and then concluding that humans are naturally wired to walk backwards.

C) to arrive to that negative delta, Libet handwaves as instantaneous something which has no reason to be so. From the moment the brain is aware of that urge to move, it has to start all the processing related to finding out and committing to memory the position of the dot. Even just processing the "am I going to move yet" when trying to gauge a subconscious urge, is something which takes time. The brain is really that slow a machine.

D) even the antedating seems to be, well, let's just say that pretty much only Libet reads the data that way. There are at least half a dozen other explanations that have been proposed.Libet's experiment, like many if not most experiments, is rightly questioned. However it has not in the least been regulated to the dust bin. I don't claim that Libet has conclusively proven anything but then conclusive proof isn't the raison d'être of science.

[HansMustermann]

I'm not aware of any such controversy around, say, the double slit experiment. Please correct me if I'm wrong ;)

[RandFan]

I'm not aware of any such controversy around, say, the double slit experiment. Please correct me if I'm wrong ;)It's not my claim that all theories are equaly controversial or questioned. That said there is controversy and there are competing explanations. See Schrödinger's cat and multiverse theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation).

[Maia]

1. Mu.
2. Mu.

Now, personally, I think that this is the best possible answer. :)

There's a link to this (from Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, but because of the current uncooperativeness of the computer, I will type it out from the book:


A monk asked Joshu, a Chinese Zen master: "Has a dog Buddha-nature or not?" Joshu answered, "Mu."

(Mu is the negative symbol in Chinese, meaning "Nothing." However, as explained in Mumou's thirteenth century commentary, it also does not mean "no." Nor does it mean "yes." )

[RandFan]

Now, personally, I think that this is the best possible answer. :)

There's a link to this (from Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, but because of the current uncooperativeness of the computer, I will type it out from the book: I guess I'm just not sophisticated enough and I see a naked emperor. It sounds to me like what Dennet terms as a "deepity" (see The Evolution of Confusion (http://richarddawkins.net/article,4547,n,n)).

Why not simply state that both would look the same? Why be opaque?

BTW: This reminds me of Dawkins example.


We explain the old geocentric model of the universe by saying that "it looks as if the Sun goes around the Earth". But as soon as you ask the relevant contrast question this supposed 'explanation by appearances' collapses: What would it look like if the Sun didn't go around the Earth?

[porch]

Yes, I should have my head examined for bringing this up. Fools rush in...

Ok, here's the thing. While I think the concept of free will vs the lack thereof has some degree of value from a philosophical perspective in the end it's the equivalent of a dog chasing it's tail. Nothing can or will ever come of the pursuit of it beyond rudimentary understanding of whether or not we have free will and what it even means to say we do or do not have free will.

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to answer one of the following two questions (given that you care of course).

Assuming that humans are endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were not?
Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.

When it comes to god/s (bear with me, here) I tend to be pragmatic. I'm ignostic because we need a meaningful definition before we can say anything meaningful about a subject. I'm atheist because, of the definitions I've heard so far, the more possible/probable a god is, the less relevant it is, to the point of practical non-existence.

I look at Free Will in much the same way. What are we even talking about here? Any coherent definition of it I've heard so far just ends up being compatibilist free will. To me this is like saying, "Maybe god exists, and god is nature." Well, I'm pretty sure nature exists, so if that's how you want to play it, I'll agree that god exists, even if I find the language a little baggage-heavy.

If we're talking about compatibilist free will, then here's my answer to question 1:

Humans would not experience themselves making choices, ie, receiving information from the environment, processing it, and reacting to that interplay.

That's a definition for compatibilist fw that I tentatively plucked out just at this moment, so feel free to pick apart, delete, add to, or rearrange as best you see fit, however . . . I think that is all there is left to do, to find a suitable definition for it. Or maybe, as with nature-as-god, we could scrap nature-as-free will, and just try to understand nature better. I suspect that would be both the most fruitful and the most interesting route in the end.

[Autumnman]

Just a thought:

At what age would “free will” become an active component of the human psyche—months? Years? how many years?
If an infant’s brain is somehow damaged, when if ever will such a brain-damaged human being realize “free will” as an active component of its psyche?
Does an adult with Alzheimer’s disease loose his/her psyche’s “free will” component as the Alzheimer’s disease progresses?

The English term “soul” is defined
The principle of life, feeling, thought and action in humans

Since “feeling, thought, and action” are dependent upon the healthy functioning of the human brain, are they not also essential mental functions for the alleged exercise of “free will”?

Is an individual with advanced Alzheimer’s disease soulless?
Is a brain-damaged human being soulless?

Perhaps our modern definition of “soul” is not fully accurate or adequate?
Perhaps if the definition of “soul” only applied to “the breath” of a breathing being the concept of “free will” would no longer be viable?

Autumnman

[yy2bggggs]

Not that it will stop anyone from trying to debate it, but the question in the OP is too vague, specifically because the concept of "free will" requires defining.

The general term "free will" is a confused mish mash. You can't even start asking the question without refining it into something technical enough to discuss.

[Maia]

I guess I'm just not sophisticated enough and I see a naked emperor. It sounds to me like what Dennet terms as a "deepity" (see The Evolution of Confusion (http://richarddawkins.net/article,4547,n,n)).

Why not simply state that both would look the same? Why be opaque?

BTW: This reminds me of Dawkins example.

Well, in this particular example, it's actually kind of a joke-- I just think that the discussions about free will around here go around and around and AROUND and AROUND. The problem isn't that they don't reach a conclusion, because that's definitely not a requirement of any kind for a speculative thread (and that's what all of these are in Religion and Philosophy). But I'm not so sure that they ever even end up going anywhere very interesting. (Joshu's full koan and Mumou's commentary are actually more complicated than this, and it might be fun to discuss, or maybe not. I don't know.) What interests me in a discussion is the way in which it relates to real-world situations, and it just seems that these threads about free will spend lots of time in a very over-intellectualized, unreal space. While everyone can certainly discuss exactly what they like in the way they like, this is a subject that I feel is firmly grounded in the real world, and it would be interesting to include some more discussion which acknowledges this.

However, I do have to say that the comment on that page which relates specifically to koans (posted by prolibertas) really does make a strawman out of the entire idea from beginning to end. I'm never sure if we're supposed to quote entire posts from another forum, so I won't do it here, but following the link makes it easy to find. I do think there are plenty of skeptical criticisms that can be undoubtedly made of this aspect of Zen Buddhism, but they have just got to be formulated better than this.

Ah... now, about Alzheimer's! I work with older adults who have various degrees and types of dementias. Alzheimer's disease is one of them, although there's no way to definitively diagnose it except by autopsy. So that's a subject which could be discussed as it relates to the real world.

[RandFan]

Well, in this particular example, it's actually kind of a joke-- I just think that the discussions about free will around here go around and around and AROUND and AROUND. The problem isn't that they don't reach a conclusion, because that's definitely not a requirement of any kind for a speculative thread (and that's what all of these are in Religion and Philosophy). But I'm not so sure that they ever even end up going anywhere very interesting. (Joshu's full koan and Mumou's commentary are actually more complicated than this, and it might be fun to discuss, or maybe not. I don't know.) What interests me in a discussion is the way in which it relates to real-world situations, and it just seems that these threads about free will spend lots of time in a very over-intellectualized, unreal space. While everyone can certainly discuss exactly what they like in the way they like, this is a subject that I feel is firmly grounded in the real world, and it would be interesting to include some more discussion which acknowledges this.

However, I do have to say that the comment on that page which relates specifically to koans (posted by prolibertas) really does make a strawman out of the entire idea from beginning to end. I'm never sure if we're supposed to quote entire posts from another forum, so I won't do it here, but following the link makes it easy to find. I do think there are plenty of skeptical criticisms that can be undoubtedly made of this aspect of Zen Buddhism, but they have just got to be formulated better than this.

Ah... now, about Alzheimer's! I work with older adults who have various degrees and types of dementias. Alzheimer's disease is one of them, although there's no way to definitively diagnose it except by autopsy. So that's a subject which could be discussed as it relates to the real world.Cool. I've no complaint with your post.

[Ethnikos]

Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
That's kind of like asking, if a crack-head was not an addict, would he smoke crack.
If the answer is, no, then how did he ever become an addict, in the first place.
What we need to do is to be recovering sinners, like a former user is a recovering addict.

[RandFan]

That's kind of like asking, if a crack-head was not an addict, would he smoke crack.No, it's not like that at all.

There is a simple point that is being made. Free will or the lack thereof has no bearing on how we percive our actions. Free will or the lack thereof has no bearing on how we behave. We know that it is so because you cannot demonstrate a difference between having free will or not having free will.

What we need to do is to be recovering sinners, like a former user is a recovering addict.This isn't a preaching thread. You will need to start your another.

[RandFan]

Not that it will stop anyone from trying to debate it, but the question in the OP is too vague, specifically because the concept of "free will" requires defining.

The general term "free will" is a confused mish mash. You can't even start asking the question without refining it into something technical enough to discuss. Meh~ Nothing in the OP precludes you from providing a definition or clarification. If such a definition would allow you to demonstrate a difference then have at it. Until then the point stands.

[rocketdodger]

Yes, I should have my head examined for bringing this up. Fools rush in...

Ok, here's the thing. While I think the concept of free will vs the lack thereof has some degree of value from a philosophical perspective in the end it's the equivalent of a dog chasing it's tail. Nothing can or will ever come of the pursuit of it beyond rudimentary understanding of whether or not we have free will and what it even means to say we do or do not have free will.

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to answer one of the following two questions (given that you care of course).

Assuming that humans are endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were not?
Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.

I will chime in with my usual contribution -- what, exactly, do you want your decisions to be like?

This is my answer: I want my decisions to be the result of 1) my history, which includes all the contributions to my "self" that the environment has made, up until the time of the decision, 2) the current environment, and 3) randomness to break ties.

Where is "free will" in there? Nowhere. But what else could you ask for, really?

You are deciding what to have for breakfast. You think about what you had the last few days, and what your preferences are. You also think about what you actually have on the shelf. And then you might just choose something at random. You don't want to choose Cheerios when you hate Cheerios, you don't want to choose Cheerios when you have none in your pantry, etc.

Interpolate to the case of crossing a busy highway, or helping an injured person you encounter. What do you do? How do you make the decision? Where does "free will" come into play?

"Free will" is useless and frankly I am glad I have none. I make decisions exactly how I would want to make them in a perfect world. The funny thing is everyone else feels the same way. It just so happens that very few people are intelligent enough to realize that their physical cognitive process is capable of doing what they want it to do, so they whip up this "free will" to make up for what they don't even know they aren't missing.

[rocketdodger]

Meh~ Nothing in the OP precludes you from providing a definition or clarification. If such a definition would allow you to demonstrate a difference then have at it. Until then the point stands.

I think yy2bggggs is taking the strategy of educating people by forcing them to realize that they themselves don't even know what they are asking.

It is actually the best way to teach people, if you ask me.

[yy2bggggs]

Meh~ Nothing in the OP precludes you from providing a definition or clarification.
Generally, in the vulgar, free will implies two things, which are meant to be equivalent. It implies that a person with the property can control his actions, and it implies that a person with the property is not compelled to act.

Given the assumption that control is only possible if you aren't compelled to action, then the one implies the other.

The assumption is false though. The only way for you to be in control over your action would be for you to compel the action, and since you're part of the universe, this is equivalent to the universe compelling it. Once you realize the assumption is wrong, you see that these two "equivalent" phrasings of free will are not only not equivalent, but contradictory.

But because the populace drives language through usage, and due to the popularity of the term in discourse, this contradictory assumption appears to be bound to the term.

Asking whether or not we have free will without refining the definition from this confused mish mash is like asking whether square circles have corners. It's fine to resolve the term free will privately for discussion in such a matter that it can be discussed, but how you do so is arbitrary, and can lead to different discussions.

ETA: Given the topic, I'm not entirely sure, but I'm guessing this is the sort of thing you'd want to discuss in the thread in the first place?

[yy2bggggs]

I think yy2bggggs is taking the strategy of educating people by forcing them to realize that they themselves don't even know what they are asking.
Wow... never quite thought of it exactly this way, but I do indeed tend to proceed that way. I think people take it for granted that if they can ask a question, they have formulated a real problem, and should proceed to answer or find a way to answer it. But questions can be meaningless, and can also have implied "statements" in them (sometimes wrong statements), and it's not always obvious when questions are wrong or meaningless--especially questions like this in philosophy.

The first thing you should do when addressing questions like this, in my opinion, is to figure out if the question is valid and legitimate in the first place.

[RandFan]

I will chime in with my usual contribution -- what, exactly, do you want your decisions to be like?

This is my answer: I want my decisions to be the result of 1) my history, which includes all the contributions to my "self" that the environment has made, up until the time of the decision, 2) the current environment, and 3) randomness to break ties.

Where is "free will" in there? Nowhere. But what else could you ask for, really?

You are deciding what to have for breakfast. You think about what you had the last few days, and what your preferences are. You also think about what you actually have on the shelf. And then you might just choose something at random. You don't want to choose Cheerios when you hate Cheerios, you don't want to choose Cheerios when you have none in your pantry, etc.

Interpolate to the case of crossing a busy highway, or helping an injured person you encounter. What do you do? How do you make the decision? Where does "free will" come into play?

"Free will" is useless and frankly I am glad I have none. I make decisions exactly how I would want to make them in a perfect world. The funny thing is everyone else feels the same way. It just so happens that very few people are intelligent enough to realize that their physical cognitive process is capable of doing what they want it to do, so they whip up this "free will" to make up for what they don't even know they aren't missing. Interesting but I'm not sure if you are not simply post rationalizing your desire that there be no "fee will". Of course you don't need to do that because you have no choice in the matter. What you "want" and what everyone "feels" is entirely irrelevant. That's just emotion.

It seems to me that you would agree that there is no way to deferentiate between free will behavior and non-free will behavior, right? In the end both are the same.

I don't know if you are right or Dan Dennet is right. I think Dennet makes the better argument but in the end I don't personaly care. But then I've no choice in the matter. :)

[RandFan]

I think yy2bggggs is taking the strategy of educating people by forcing them to realize that they themselves don't even know what they are asking.

It is actually the best way to teach people, if you ask me.My point is that either position is ultimatly absurd so assuming that folks don't know what they are asking about doesn't detract from my point.

[RandFan]

Asking whether or not we have free will without refining the definition... Here's a hint. I've not asked if we have free will.

[RandFan]

I think people take it for granted that if they can ask a question, they have formulated a real problem...What question do you think has been asked? I don't think there is a problem. I think that ultimately any position is absurd (see thread title).

I think we can formulate arguments to justify any position we want but given that we don't have free will then our positions don't need justification. If we have free will there is no way to distinguish any free will behavior from non-free will behavior. The absurdity easily manifests itself.

[Scyldemort]

As far as I can see, there is no way whatever given current technology and understanding of the brain to empirically demonstrate whether free will does or does not exist. All attempts to do so immediately fall under the category of 'philosophy.'

Which isn't to say it that it's not an important question. It's up there with, 'Why is there something and not nothing?' and 'Is there a purpose to any of this?' But the answer, whatever it may be, while doubtless interesting, is likely to be of little practical use.

[yy2bggggs]

What question do you think has been asked?
They are numbered 1 and 2. I think you're misinterpreting something along the way.
I don't think there is a problem. I think that ultimately any position is absurd (see thread title).
Right. But the questions you numbered 1 and 2 in the OP are ill-formed without a refined definition of free will, and I don't believe I have a legitimate means of refining it, in such a way that I can say "my refined definition is what free will means". Put it this way. Which of those two questions would you answer?

[RandFan]

They are numbered 1 and 2.I think you should re-read them. And perhaps re-read the OP.

I think you're misinterpreting something along the way.No.

Right. But the questions you numbered 1 and 2 in the OP are ill-formed without a refined definition of free will...You are entitled to an opinion but, no.

Which of those two questions would you answer?Are you kidding? You don't know? Really?

Drum roll please.......

Neither (see thread title and re-read the OP).

But please, define and refine to your heart's content. When you are finished the questions will remain.

[RandFan]

As far as I can see, there is no way whatever given current technology and understanding of the brain to empirically demonstrate whether free will does or does not exist. All attempts to do so immediately fall under the category of 'philosophy.'

Which isn't to say it that it's not an important question. It's up there with, 'Why is there something and not nothing?' and 'Is there a purpose to any of this?' But the answer, whatever it may be, while doubtless interesting, is likely to be of little practical use.:) Welcome to the party pal. I'm with ya 100%.

ETA: Well, not 100%. I'm not sure how important the question is but it sure seems to be important to some.

[PlayingDeaf]

I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.

Wasn't quick enough.

[yy2bggggs]

Are you kidding? You don't know? Really?
Quite the opposite, RandFan. I'm not kidding, and I did know. That is why my question is qualified: "Put it this way".
Neither (see thread title and re-read the OP).
Why not? Do you yourself not think those questions are well formed? If that's the case, why do you think you're disagreeing with me?

The only space I see for a potential disagreement between us is whether or not you think these questions are ill formed for a reason different than the one I have.

[RandFan]

Wasn't quick enough.So true. :)

[RandFan]

The only space I see for a potential disagreement between us is whether or not you think these questions are ill formed for a reason different than the one I have.They are perfectly formed.

I think the point that you are missing is that I've created a logical disjunction.


Given X (X = free will, whatever that means) what is the behavior of not X?
Given not X what is the behavior of X?
That said, you are more than free to choose to define X anyway you like to justify your decision and explanation for the difference in behavior.

[litewave]

Free will is a logical nonsense. There are 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action then the action is the result of those reasons.

2) When you don't have reasons for your action then the action is unintentional.

3) Your action can be the result of a combination of 1) and 2).

None of those possibilities allow for free will because you are always compelled to your action and never in control of your action. :)

[RandFan]

...why do you think you're disagreeing with me?Better defining "free will" won't resolve the problem. In the end any definition will lead to absurdity. X = Not X.

[RandFan]

Free will is a logical nonsense. There are 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action then the action is the result of those reasons. So, by this logic, humans are then incapable of acting irrationally? Right? One could not choose to tell the boss to take the job and shove it thereby causing future regret.

[litewave]

So, by this logic, humans are then incapable of acting irrationally? Right?
They can act without reasons too. See possibilities 2) and 3).

[yy2bggggs]

Given X (X = free will, whatever that means) what is the behavior of not X?
Given not X what is the behavior of X?
That said, you are more than free to choose to define X anyway you like to justify your decision and explanation for the difference in behavior.
Okay, I'll play this game. Free will means that I'm able to act causally based on my thoughts. So I'm going to say we have free will. Given not X, we either would not have thoughts, or would not be able to behave based on those thoughts.

As an example of a test for this form of free will, I can write a computer program that shows me two three digit numbers. Once those are shown, I can try to multiply the numbers in my head, and type out the product. I can also try to see if I can type out the product without having those thoughts.
Better defining "free will" won't resolve the problem. In the end any definition will lead to absurdity. X = Not X
Okay. Point out the absurdity that the definition I gave leads to.

[RandFan]

They can act without reasons too. See possibilities 2) and 3). Hold on. #2 states that the action is unintentional. Telling my boss to go to hell is an intentional act unless I'm mentally incapable of forming intent.

let's take this further.

I want to keep my job.
I want to tell my boss to go to hell.
In the current job market loss of income is a scary thing.
I hate my boss and he is an idiot.
I can't take his attitude.
I don't think I can find another job.
These are competing reasons to act. Do I have no means to consciously weigh the reasons?

[RandFan]

Okay, I'll play this game. Free will means that I'm able to act causally based on my thoughts. So I'm going to say we have free will. Given not X, we either would not have thoughts, or would not be able to behave based on those thoughts. On the other hand it's possible that we don't know if we are acting on our thoughts or if we only observe the process and perceive that we are acting on our thoughts.

As an example of a test for this form of free will, I can write a computer program that shows me two three digit numbers. Once those are shown, I can try to multiply the numbers in my head, and type out the product. I can also try to see if I can type out the product without having those thoughts.

Okay. Point out the absurdity that the definition I gave leads to.You've not shown how behavior would be different if we didn't have free will. The behavior is the same regardless. I can argue that it is the subconscious that is making the decision not to process the product and if there is no process therefore you can't have those thoughts. You've resolved nothing. Your reasoning is circular. You are declaring that your free will proves your free will.

[litewave]

Hold on. #2 states that the action is unintentional. Telling my boss to go to hell is an intentional act unless I'm mentally incapable of forming intent.

let's take this further.

I want to keep my job.
I want to tell my boss to go to hell.
In the current job market loss of income is a scary thing.
I hate my boss and he is an idiot.
I can't take his attitude.
I don't think I can find another job.
These are competing reasons to act. Do I have no means to consciously weigh the reasons?
Some reasons may affect you more than others. You will do that which appeals to you most in the situation.

[yy2bggggs]

On the other hand it's possible that we don't know if we are acting on our thoughts or if we only observe the process and perceive that we are acting on our thoughts.On the other hand, it's possible that we don't know if the theory of relativity is true.
You've not shown how behavior would be different if we didn't have free will.If I cannot type the correct answer, despite seeming to have thoughts about the correct answer, that would be one demonstration. Another would be if I could consistently type the correct answer even without bothering to go through with the thoughts.
The behavior is the same regardless.The same as what?
I can argue that it is the subconscious that is making the decision to process the product and therefore you can't have those thoughts.And I can argue that they are all thoughts, and they all arrive from the same causal network, and the only thing that makes it a "conscious thought" or a "subconscious thought" is whether or not it is broadcast into the global network, which is of secondary concern, not primary concern.

As I defined free will, it is the ability to act on our thoughts.
You've resolved nothing. Your reasoning is circular.No, it's referential.
You are declaring that your free will proves your free will.Nope. The fact that my thoughts correlate to particular classes of behavior demonstrates free will.

Asking for proof is inappropriate from the start. Sure we can't prove free will. We also can't prove relativity. Honestly, any time anyone, you or otherwise, tries to demand proof of a phenomenon, that should properly set off big alarm bells in your head. Proofs are mainly for mathematics. For the rest, we induce.

[RandFan]

Some reasons may affect you more than others. You will do that which appeals to you most in the situation.Yes, yes, yes. Of course. You are stating the obvious. But do I consciously make a choice or does my brain weigh the options and I perceive to make a choice?

[RandFan]

If I cannot type the correct answer, despite seeming to have thoughts about the correct answer, that would be one demonstration.Where is this in your original post?

Another would be if I could consistently type the correct answer even without bothering to go through with the thoughts.But both X and Not X models predicts that you can't.

The same as what? Given X or Not X.

I can argue that the subconscious is responsible for bending starlight around the sun.You are being glib. There is an accepted model of not X whereby we percieve that we are making decisions consciously when we are not.

No, it's referential.Still the same given X or not X.

Nope. The fact that my thoughts correlate to particular classes of behavior demonstrates free will.Asserting something doesn't make it so. The thoughts only happen if the there is a process whether that process is conscious or sub conscious and we only percive it as conscious.

Asking for proof is inappropriate from the start.I did not ask you for proof.

[RandFan]

BTW: I didn't invent this stuff 3 minutes ago. I honestly thought you knew the material. I think you do and you are being obtuse. I'm not interested in that.

If you have taken my claim of absurdity to heart and you find that offensive then fine. Ignore it. I'm a huge fan of Dennet's and Blackmore and I think both make very reasoned arguments for opposing sides. If your heart is set on one then fine. I didn't mean to offend you.

But don't be obnoxious. Unless you really don't understand how it's possible to subconsciously process information and percieve that you are making a conscious decision (see The Myth of Free Will (http://www.amazon.com/Myth-Free-Will-Revised-Expanded/dp/0970818181)) It's not really something that I need defend.

I'll forgo the claim of absurdity but I stand by the questions. I don't really think that Dennet or Blackmore are being absurd. I think any dogmatic adherence to either is absurd and that is my point. IMO the search for X or not X is a fools erand and anyone who declares that he or she knows that one or the other is a fact is lying or ignorant. Of course I stand ready to be shown wrong. It won't be today though.

[yy2bggggs]

Where is this in your original post?
Once those are shown, I can (A) try to multiply the numbers in my head, and type out the product. I can also (B) try to see if I can type out the product without having those thoughts.
(A), and (B). (A) is a means of correlating an action with a thought. (B) is seeing if the action can occur without the presence of the thought.
You are being glib. There is an accepted model of not X whereby we percieve that we are making decisions consciously when we are not.Ah, a passive tense statement. "There is an accepted model..."

I think that accepted model is flawed in a fundamental sense. What is the basis of this accepted model?
The thoughts only happen if the there is a process whether that process is conscious or sub conscious and we only percive it as conscious.
The above implies that you think that there are two different kinds of processes of interest--those being conscious processes and subconscious processes.

I disagree. I offer, for example, that there's no such thing as a "conscious process" in this context. As proof, I offer the obvious fact that we have tremendous difficulty telling how their conscious process goes about doing what it does. Obviously a major part of the process underlying what you label as conscious thought is subconscious anyway.

I offer a suggestion, instead, that there is one type of process--one of interest anyway (in particular, processes of interest are teleological--that is, goal based processes working with high level information--the thing that has to be going on if I write out the correct answer to the product of two three digit numbers). What makes things conscious or subconscious isn't whether or not it's the right "type" of process to begin with, but instead, is whether or not we sense the process. And, furthermore, we never sense the whole process anyway. Yet we are here, and we do sense thoughts.

It's out of this arena that you need to carve out a meaningful concept of free will. Perhaps I disagree with both X and not X. Nevertheless, in the end, I've given you a contrived definition of free will that I believe matches this stuff.

[Robin]

FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.
A vain hope I think - free will threads have a will of their own.

[HansMustermann]

Hmm... By now I'd add my vote to the need for a clear definition of free will. Because it just means that many things.

E.g., in the beginning it was basically whether or not we're allowed to decide what to do, as opposed to some deity making us do thing. E.g., when God "hardened the pharaoh's heart" so he wouldn't let the Jews go, that's an example of lacking free will. The Pharaoh did what God made him do. That's the kind of Free Will that, say, St Augustine was concerned with, and it still plays a major role in theological apology.

E.g., then there's Free Will vs Determinism or even Predestination. Basically could you theoretically predict ten years ago that I'll post this today? This is basically the kind of thing that Spinoza concerned himself with.

E.g., now we're apparently down to simply "Conscious decision making is the halmark of free will." in which case, yes, we do. You can distinguish on an MRI or even EEG between conscious and subconscious brain activity, and in fact that's what Libet's claim is _based_ on: that he can see something happening there before the conscious is even aware of it.

But that's not a very useful definition of Free Will.

E.g., then there's the "but it has a cause" approach, e.g., Dennett's, since you say you're backing that one.

Which for a start doesn't impress me much, because it's based on _postulating_ a kind of causality in the universe, that we know to be actually false. There are plenty of things which are genuinely and purely random. E.g., mutations due to C14 decay in your body. (You get about 2000 DNA breaks a year due to random C14 decay, IIRC.) There is no cause you can assign to that decay, in the sense of "event X is the cause of event Y." The only "cause" is an instability of that nucleus, which can result in a decay at any given time without any other event being involved as a cause. You can't go say that it happened only as a result of some other event X.

Or there's brownian motion, which again, is truly and genuinely random. The mollecules involved aren't pool balls, they're particles subject to a fundamental non-determinism. To predict that mollecule X in your body will end up hitting receptor X instead of receptor Y, you wouldn't just theoretically need to know what every mollecule in your body is doing, you would need to do so with a degree of accuracy that the Universe fundamentally doesn't _have_. What happens there isn't a cause of "it ended up messing synapse X instead of synapse Y, because of event Z as a cause", but again a fundamental non-determinism.

Hence I'll have trouble taking any philosophy seriously if they need to postulate a causality that just doesn't work that way outside of a very narrow domain. Doubly so when he needs to postulate it about things he really has no data about. He doesn't know exactly how deterministic are the neurons, much less the whole circuit. And just pulling a postulate out of the arse just doesn't cut it for me.

Yes, our actions have some cause, but we don't know what happens in between that cause and the brain reaching a conclusion. We don't know if there isn't some random number generator involved too, for example.

In fact, in some cases we actually do. In Delirium Tremens synapses can get to the point where they trigger pretty much truly randomly.

[six7s]

Hmm... By now I'd add my vote to the need for a clear definition of free will. Because it just means that many things.Ditto

I can imagine that free will is the complement to premium will, which has 24/7 support via a $9.99/minute hotline to a bunch of gurus who have ALL the answers encrypted in a secret vault under Hank's house

[Maia]

Cool. I've no complaint with your post.

It's all good. :)

Back to the Alzheimer's patients, because that's a perfect real-world example when it comes to discussions about the nature of consciousness and free will. Alzheimer's is a progressive disease, and its causes are unknown. Old age is the biggest risk factor; however, it is not a natural and inevitable consequence of aging by any means (nor are other types of dementia.) While staying socially active and engaging in intellectually stimulating activities are protective factors, the long-term care facility where I work really has nothing but people who've worked challenging and high-profile jobs, run large households, etc (we have one of the best-known physicians in the recent history of the city as a resident.) So you just never know.

In the early to middle stages of Alzheimer's, people feel and express tremendous amounts of anger and terror, because they know that they're losing their previous mental abilities. Sweet, refined, genteel, courtly Southern ladies and gentlemen will swear and scream and yell for hours on end and try to attack people, cry that they just want to go home, accuse everybody of stealing their belongings or moving them around, constantly ask where everything is, get lost while walking down the hall, etc. In the more advanced stages, even basic communication becomes impossible, patients can't walk or feed themselves, it's impossible to tell if they consistently recognize family members, and so forth. And... well, let's just say that there are some major cleanup jobs on a daily basis... if you picture what two-year-olds sometimes do if you don't catch them in time, and nobody changed their diaper... I'm not sure why they don't just give these patients big jars of Play-Dough.

But the truth is that there's no way to ever really know where an Alzheimer's patient is in terms of their mental faculties, because they go in and out all the time, and it's impossible to keep track of their brain functioning in the way that you could with a comatose patient. Even the most confused patients will have times when they respond appropriately to others. Even patients in the most advanced stages will have many moments throughout the day when they do interact with their environment (making purposeful movements, reaching out for things, suddenly making eye contact and then an appropriate verbal response of a few words.)

So I would say that meaningful consciousness seems to sort of phase in and out, even with people at the most extreme ends of the example. When it does, these people can choose to do or to not do something (eat or refuse to eat, communicate meaningfully, interact with their environment, etc.) When it doesn't, they can't. Could it be that free will and consciousness are actually the same thing?

[rocketdodger]

Interesting but I'm not sure if you are not simply post rationalizing your desire that there be no "fee will". Of course you don't need to do that because you have no choice in the matter. What you "want" and what everyone "feels" is entirely irrelevant. That's just emotion.

It seems to me that you would agree that there is no way to deferentiate between free will behavior and non-free will behavior, right? In the end both are the same.

I don't know if you are right or Dan Dennet is right. I think Dennet makes the better argument but in the end I don't personaly care. But then I've no choice in the matter. :)

Erm, I don't really have such a desire, the drama in my post was simply drama.

This is quite an easy exercise, you should try it yourself.

1) Think of a decision you have made, or might make. It can be anything at all in the world.

2) Think of what factors you want to contribute to that decision, and how they should contribute.

3) Ask yourself where free-will comes in.

Now, I have never found a case where free-will affects the decision. So yes, I agree that it would be impossible to differentiate between free will behavior and non free will behavior.

But my point -- and this is important since you want to discuss this with others -- is that everyone has an idea of what they want their decisions to be like, and "free-will" actually has nothing to do with it.

"Free-will" is merely a placeholder for all the stuff laypeople don't know about how the brain works, and they don't even know it. Until you ask them "what more would you want out of a decision besides determinism and randomness?" Every single time that question is asked, the only answer is "I dunno." And in this case, that really means they don't know -- they have just been told about "free-will" and they want a piece of the pie.

[RandFan]

Ah, a passive tense statement. "There is an accepted model..."Poor wording on my part. Blackmore, Libet, Evatt and others are proponents of a mental model that accounts for the appearance of free will. The model has explanatory power and makes testable predictions.

The above implies that you think that there are two different kinds of processes of interest--those being conscious processes and subconscious processes. Again the fault in communication lies with me. There are NOT two different kinds of processeses. There are only brain processeses. However, there are processeses of the brain that we are aware of and there are those that we are not aware of (see Ramachandran's A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness).

According to the proponents of consciousness as an illusion including Blackmore, Lebet, Evatt, et all we don't consciously make decisions. We only observe the process and perceive that we are making a decision. If the model is true then your proposal cannot falsify the theory. You would have to engage in circular reasoning to do so. Your proposition assumes your premise. Again, I didn't invent the theory.

It's out of this arena that you need to carve out a meaningful concept of free will. Perhaps I disagree with both X and not X. Nevertheless, in the end, I've given you a contrived definition of free will that I believe matches this stuff. I need do no such thing. If you want to clarify or define then as I've said you are welcome to it.

Otherwise I concede my poor communication skills and apologize. If you need citations please don't hesitate to ask.

Thanks

[RandFan]

Hmm... By now I'd add my vote to the need for a clear definition of free will. Because it just means that many things.No one has precluded you from doing so.

E.g., in the beginning it was basically whether or not we're allowed to decide what to do, as opposed to some deity making us do thing. E.g., when God "hardened the pharaoh's heart" so he wouldn't let the Jews go, that's an example of lacking free will. The Pharaoh did what God made him do. That's the kind of Free Will that, say, St Augustine was concerned with, and it still plays a major role in theological apology.

E.g., then there's Free Will vs Determinism or even Predestination. Basically could you theoretically predict ten years ago that I'll post this today? This is basically the kind of thing that Spinoza concerned himself with.

E.g., now we're apparently down to simply "Conscious decision making is the halmark of free will." in which case, yes, we do. You can distinguish on an MRI or even EEG between conscious and subconscious brain activity, and in fact that's what Libet's claim is _based_ on: that he can see something happening there before the conscious is even aware of it.

But that's not a very useful definition of Free Will.

E.g., then there's the "but it has a cause" approach, e.g., Dennett's, since you say you're backing that one.

Which for a start doesn't impress me much, because it's based on _postulating_ a kind of causality in the universe, that we know to be actually false. There are plenty of things which are genuinely and purely random. E.g., mutations due to C14 decay in your body. (You get about 2000 DNA breaks a year due to random C14 decay, IIRC.) There is no cause you can assign to that decay, in the sense of "event X is the cause of event Y." The only "cause" is an instability of that nucleus, which can result in a decay at any given time without any other event being involved as a cause. You can't go say that it happened only as a result of some other event X.

Or there's brownian motion, which again, is truly and genuinely random. The mollecules involved aren't pool balls, they're particles subject to a fundamental non-determinism. To predict that mollecule X in your body will end up hitting receptor X instead of receptor Y, you wouldn't just theoretically need to know what every mollecule in your body is doing, you would need to do so with a degree of accuracy that the Universe fundamentally doesn't _have_. What happens there isn't a cause of "it ended up messing synapse X instead of synapse Y, because of event Z as a cause", but again a fundamental non-determinism.

Hence I'll have trouble taking any philosophy seriously if they need to postulate a causality that just doesn't work that way outside of a very narrow domain. Doubly so when he needs to postulate it about things he really has no data about. He doesn't know exactly how deterministic are the neurons, much less the whole circuit. And just pulling a postulate out of the arse just doesn't cut it for me.

Yes, our actions have some cause, but we don't know what happens in between that cause and the brain reaching a conclusion. We don't know if there isn't some random number generator involved too, for example.

In fact, in some cases we actually do. In Delirium Tremens synapses can get to the point where they trigger pretty much truly randomly. It would seem that you agree with me.

[RandFan]

Erm, I don't really have such a desire, the drama in my post was simply drama.

This is quite an easy exercise, you should try it yourself.

1) Think of a decision you have made, or might make. It can be anything at all in the world.

2) Think of what factors you want to contribute to that decision, and how they should contribute.

3) Ask yourself where free-will comes in.

Now, I have never found a case where free-will affects the decision. So yes, I agree that it would be impossible to differentiate between free will behavior and non free will behavior.

But my point -- and this is important since you want to discuss this with others -- is that everyone has an idea of what they want their decisions to be like, and "free-will" actually has nothing to do with it.

"Free-will" is merely a placeholder for all the stuff laypeople don't know about how the brain works, and they don't even know it. Until you ask them "what more would you want out of a decision besides determinism and randomness?" Every single time that question is asked, the only answer is "I dunno." And in this case, that really means they don't know -- they have just been told about "free-will" and they want a piece of the pie. I'm not sure I want to discuss anything. :) It's arguable that I simply started a thread because of an inumerable set of variables.

The question, where does free will come in is interesting but it doesn't advance the discussion nor does it resolve anything. I don't disagree with your post but it doesn't address the OP. Not that the OP needs addressing BTW. I'm just waiting for someone to answer the questions. FWIW, I don't think there is an answer to either question. We'll see.

[RandFan]

A vain hope I think - free will threads have a will of their own.:)

[HansMustermann]

According to the proponents of consciousness as an illusion including Blackmore, Lebet, Evatt, et all we don't consciously make decisions. We only observe the process and perceive that we are making a decision. If the model is true then your proposal cannot falsify the theory. You would have to engage in circular reasoning to do so. Your proposition assumes your premise. Again, I didn't invent the theory.

Yes, but to those I'd oppose teleofunctionalism. If you're not familiar with that, let's just say it's kinda what happens when you start with "darwinism, the brain, and philosophy walk into a bar..." ;)

Why would a layer dedicated to providing that illusion would have evolved? Why would you need the brake of pretending to put into words, some decisions which the subconscious can take much faster? (Assuming that the subconscious could process the same kind of complex problems.)

Just about any decision which can be taken subconsciously and not be subject to that "illusion" at all, is a heck of a lot faster. E.g., you can lift your foot a bit on the gas pedal a lot faster when you see a 30 in a circle on the highway, than if you were to reason it consciously in words.

The saving grace would be that at conscious level we can explore more complex things, but now a bunch of people are trying to tell me that even that's just an illusion to mask the actual decision-making done by subconscious. Basically that a chunk of my brain has nothing better to do that to put on a little decision-making play for its own benefit, while a whole other chunk actually solves the problem.

And my question is: why would something like that evolve?

The human brain is a _major_ consumer of proteins, glucose _and_ oxygen. It's also why babies are defenseless for so long, etc. If we could save even 10% by ditching that chunk which does nothing more than the illusion of conscious reasoning, it would be a major survival advantages for our ancestors. So why would evolution produce and then keep something that useless?

[yy2bggggs]

According to the proponents of consciousness as an illusion including Blackmore, Lebet, Evatt, et all we don't consciously make decisions. We only observe the process and perceive that we are making a decision.
And this assumes that "we" are only the conscious part. When I say "I" like cheese, what am I being conscious of exactly (at the time I say it)? You might say that I'm perceiving my desire for cheese, but that doesn't actually match what subjectively goes on. Rather, I have a belief that if there is cheese in front of me, I will tend to formulate a goal-based behavior of eating the cheese in certain circumstances due to the fact that I believe as a result that I'll have a positive experience.

And there's a process that goes on when I formulate the theory that I like cheese. And that's the same kind of process as all of the other processes.

If you want to involve "us" being involved in the cause, you need to come up with a more acceptable model of "us" than "that which we are conscious of".

I do unapologetically make the claim that conscious versus subconscious isn't the line between "us" versus "not us" in our heads, as demonstrated by the fact that "I like cheese".

In other words, if you want to involve the "I" and say that it's false that the "I" is the thing that causes actions, and there is a propensity to eat cheese, then you should have to show that it's false that the "I" is the thing that likes the cheese, not that it's false that the selection of the cheese is sensed at some specified time.
If the model is true then your proposal cannot falsify the theory.Sure I can falsify the theory. As I stated before, if I can type the product correctly both with and without the presence of those thoughts, I can demonstrate that the thoughts are passive.

Why do refuse to acknowledge that as a falsification?
You would have to engage in circular reasoning to do so.No I wouldn't. Look at my definition again. If the thoughts cause the actions, I'm arbitrarily calling it free will. I have a test that can be falsified--if I can demonstrate that the actions don't actually need the thoughts, it's falsified.

Rather, I would say it's absurd to suggest that the actions don't need the thoughts.
Your proposition assumes your premise. Again, I didn't invent the theory.I don't have a premise. I have a contrived definition.

The fact that you're coming up with these objections suggests that you think you're asking a specific question. What I'm trying to show is that you aren't. It's the same thing I thought you were trying to argue in the first place.
I need do no such thing.You do if you want to show that given any arbitrary definition of free will, it should lead to absurdity. That's a tremendous pill to swallow. I think you're claiming more than you can support.

Your accusations of non-specific definitions being circular make absolutely no sense. The fact that you have to read into my definition and expand more into it than I gave demonstrates that you're making some sort of error somewhere. What appears to be going on is that if someone offers a definition, you're showing that it's possible to argue that they are wrong.

And that is an inappropriate burden. As I stated, it's also possible to argue that relativity is wrong. So what?

Now if you want to argue against specific definitions of free will, that'd be a bit more meaningful. But even in your refutations, you're not arguing against my contrived specific definition of free will. So what are you arguing against exactly?
If you want to clarify or define then as I've said you are welcome to it.I don't. It would be pathetic to do so. There's nothing with my hypothetical definition that needs clarification. You haven't shown anything circular about it, unless by "circular" you mean "I defined it such that it's true". Sure did! I could define it such that it's false too. But that's not what circular reasoning is.

[babbits]

Now, personally, I think that this is the best possible answer. :)


Quote:
A monk asked Joshu, a Chinese Zen master: "Has a dog Buddha-nature or not?" Joshu answered, "Mu."

(Mu is the negative symbol in Chinese, meaning "Nothing." However, as explained in Mumou's thirteenth century commentary, it also does not mean "no." Nor does it mean "yes." )
:
So does "mu" mean "undetermined"?

If I had 'free will' I'd be nineteen, 5 feet ten inches tall, and weigh 135. I'm not and I don't.
On the other hand, I can decide if I want cereal or toast and cheese for breakfast.

So I do have choice, albeit very limited choice. But the vast majority of my experience is pre-determined by genetics, geography, socialization, peer pressure, etc.

[Robin]

So does "mu" mean "undetermined"?
Variously it is "the question has no meaning", or "unask the question"

[Robin]

A monk asked Joshu, a Chinese Zen master: "Has a dog Buddha-nature or not?" Joshu answered, "Mu."
"No,not cow, dog" said the monk

"Sorry, in that case 'woof'"

[six7s]

"No,not cow, dog" said the monk

"Sorry, in that case 'woof 42 pounds of flax'"ftfy :)

[Maia]

Another ko-an from Joshu, which may be more to the point:


A student once asked Joshu: "If I haven't anything in my mind, what shall I do?"
Joshu replied, "Throw it out."
"But if I haven't anything, how can I throw it out?" continued the questioner.
"Well," said Joshu, "then carry it out."


"But what about free will?" the pesky student persisted. "Am I using free will when I cart out all those neurons out of my head, or not? Is it an arbitrary non-specific definition of free will, or a ubiquitously perscipacious one? And should I use a handbasket, a shovel, or a--"

Joshu pulled a large fan out of his sleeve and started hitting the student over the head with it.

"What is that your business? Fifty hungry monks in this temple, lunch in half an hour, the fire has gone cold, and you keep yapping away about free will!" he yelled. "OUT, OUT, OUT! Make the rice porridge, stupid head!"

With those words, the student was enlightened. :)


(Mandatory Disclaimer: All portions of this koan are not guaranteed to have originated from sixth century China.)


;)

[Robin]

As I see it there are three flavours of free will:

Def 1: A conscious intention can be the major proximate cause of the intended action and a conscious state can be the major proximate cause of the intention.

Def 2: A conscious intention can be the original cause of the intended action.

Def 3: When a person performs an action at time t the possibility existed before but close to t that he/she would choose to do otherwise.

The first is compatibilism and IMO the most likely to be true.

I am not sure of the name of the second, but it would seem to entail that time and causality are independent in the human mind.

The third - libertarianism - entails (as has been long discussed at JREF) that there can be an event that is neither random nor determined.

[Robin]

I'm no physicist, but whenever I read an explanation of quantum physics for the layman and they speak of the uncertainty of how sub-atomic particles will react, I wonder if that uncertainty is the source of human free will.

If we had a completely deterministic universe in which all outcomes could be predicted, it seems to me that everything would be predestined and that free will would not exist. The unpredictability of the universe as described by quantum physics explains (at least in my mind) how free will could exist.

Does this make sense to anybody else?
Not to me, because I don't see how a random event could be free will any more than a determined event.

[Robin]

As I see it there are three flavours of free will:

Def 1: A conscious intention can be the major proximate cause of the intended action and a conscious state can be the major proximate cause of the intention.


So I think I can answer the question in the OP, using the first definition:

If we had no free will then we would find that our actions were never or rarely the result of an intention

In other words we would never or rarely be able to answer the question "why did you do that?" with a statement about an intention.

If you truthfully answered the question "did you intend to do that" the answer would normally be "no".

[RandFan]

Why would a layer dedicated to providing that illusion would have evolved?I don't believe that is the conventional wisdom. Like the illusion of self and consciousness, the ability for birds to fly is an emergent property of an evolved dynamic system. Consciousness then is simply an emergent property of brain functions. No layer dedicated to flight or consciousness is needed. This is just a straw man and does not exist in the mental models that preclude free will.

And my question is: why would something like that evolve? Why did moths evolve to fly into candle flames? As Dawkins says you are asking the wrong question? Our consciousness is simply a bi-product, an emergent property and I'm not saying that there is no value to a perception of reality. I have some ideas as to the evolutionary advantage but I would refer you to Blackmore, Dawkins and others who provide more info on this.

The human brain is a _major_ consumer of proteins, glucose _and_ oxygen. It's also why babies are defenseless for so long, etc. If we could save even 10% by ditching that chunk which does nothing more than the illusion of conscious reasoning, it would be a major survival advantages for our ancestors. So why would evolution produce and then keep something that useless?I can't think of anything more "useless" than suicide yet moths evolved to commit suicide.

[RandFan]

Sure I can falsify the theory. As I stated before, if I can type the product correctly both with and without the presence of those thoughts, I can demonstrate that the thoughts are passive.You beg the question. If the model is correct then it is the subconscious that chooses not to process information and you simply percieve that you are consciously directing to think or not to think. You only perceive that the lack of activity is due to the absence of your conscious thoughts.

No I wouldn't. Look at my definition again. If the thoughts cause the actions...Here you beg the question. The thoughts are posterior. You want to move them to the front but that hasn't been established. Libet argues that the activity in the brain that you are unaware of precede the thoughts and it is that activity that causes the action. You only perceive that the thoughts cause the actions.

It would be pathetic to do so. There's nothing with my hypothetical definition that needs clarification. You haven't shown anything circular about it, unless by "circular" you mean "I defined it such that it's true". Sure did! I could define it such that it's false too. But that's not what circular reasoning is. Forgive me but you are droning on and on unnecessarily so. It's a simple point. If your thoughts are posterior as Libet and others suggest then your little experiment is false from the get go. Your subconscious generates thoughts and you perceive that you are doing so of your own free will. According to Libet You are not.

You don't need to accept the theory but claiming to have falsified it by demanding that your free will proves free will is silly and absurd.

[RandFan]

So I think I can answer the question in the OP, using the first definition:

If we had no free will then we would find that our actions were never or rarely the result of an intention

In other words we would never or rarely be able to answer the question "why did you do that?" with a statement about an intention.

If you truthfully answered the question "did you intend to do that" the answer would normally be "no".A mental model of free will (see Dennet) and one of no free (see Libet) both predict the same outcome. You have created a straw man.

[HansMustermann]

I don't believe that is the conventional wisdom. Like the illusion of self and consciousness, the ability for birds to fly is an emergent property of an evolved dynamic system. Consciousness then is simply an emergent property of brain functions. No layer dedicated to flight or consciousness is needed. This is just a straw man and does not exist in the mental models that preclude free will.

Why did moths evolve to fly into candle flames? As Dawkins says you are asking the wrong question? Our consciousness is simply a bi-product, an emergent property and I'm not saying that there is no value to a perception of reality. I have some ideas as to the evolutionary advantage but I would refer you to Blackmore, Dawkins and others who provide more info on this.

I can't think of anything more "useless" than suicide yet moths evolved to commit suicide.

Actually, those are some of the poorest analogies IMHO.

Flight may have emerged out of other mutations, but was selected for in subsequent generations because it was a useful thing. The very fact that it evolved independently in several species, and in several different ways, would pretty much rule out its being just an accidental by-product.

Furthermore, it didn't even emerge like that, it seems to have gone through intermediate steps which were just situationally useful, and was a gradual evolution from there. Again, which happened because it was a useful trait, not a by-product.

The "evolution of moths to fly into flames", no offense, but is such a monumental stupidity that I'd have expected it from fundies not from you. I'll have to chalk that as "probably was an accidental bad analogy".

There is no such evolution to fly into candles. There's a navigational system which worked well for millions of years, and candles are a bare blip at that scale. It just didn't have the time (yet) to be changed by evolution into something else.

That sudden environment changes can change a positive trait into a handicap, isn't new. And it's nothing like evolving a way to commit suicide.

But how the heck that applies to consciousness in any form or shape, now that's a better question.

So basically that you'd refer me to Dawkins and the gang over a non-sequitur based on a misunderstanding... well, I think I'll pass.

[RandFan]

Actually, those are some of the poorest analogies IMHO.Take it up with Dawkins et al. I know, authority and all that. However, IMHO, they are excellent.


Flight may have emerged out of other mutations, but was selected for in subsequent generations because it was a useful thing. The very fact that it evolved independently in several species, and in several different ways, would pretty much rule out its being just an accidental by-product.
No one has said that consciousness is an accidental by-product.

Furthermore, it didn't even emerge like that, it seems to have gone through intermediate steps which were just situationally useful, and was a gradual evolution from there. Again, which happened because it was a useful trait, not a by-product.None of this obviates anything I have said.


The "evolution of moths to fly into flames", no offense, but is such a
monumental stupidity that I'd have expected it from fundies not from you.
I got it from Dawkins. (http://www.environmentfoundation.net/reports/richard-dawkins-questions.htm) What do you mean "fundies"? What the hell are you talking about? Are you poisoning the well?

But how the heck that applies to consciousness in any form or shape, now that's a better question.

So basically that you'd refer me to Dawkins and the gang over a non-sequitur based on a misunderstanding... well, I think I'll pass.In other words you would prefer to engage in ad hominem and then to stick your finger in your ears.

Got it.

[Autumnman]

I am not as sharp as many or most of those who post on this forum. I look to the dictionary definition of “free will” to aid me in figuring out what RandFan is driving at.

It has been my experience that the terminology, “free will”, is generally used by Christians as they attempt to explain why “we are all sinners” and why “we all need Jesus Christ” due to the “Original Sin” that was committed by “Adam & Eve” in the Garden of Eden.

According to Webster’s 2003 Unabridged Dictionary the terminology free will is defined:
“philos. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.”

I cannot find a Webster’s definition for “free choice”. However, choice is defined:
“2. the right, power, or opportunity to choose; option.”

It has been my experience that if one does not know the “options” a personal choice (“free will”) cannot be exercised. The English verb know denotes understanding that is based in facts or truth: “to apprehend (i.e. to understand) clearly and with certainty.”

“Divine forces” must be taken on faith since they cannot be understood clearly or with certainty.
“Physical forces”, on the other hand, would in fact be the only way that the five physical senses could be informed of one’s options (alternatives, choices, etc.).

To suggest that a personal choice (a.k.a. an individual’s free will) is somehow influenced by an innate, unqualified, unquantified knowledge of one’s physical (corporeal) options is indeed faith based nonsense and quite absurd.

Therefore, the doctrine (Christian Doctrine) of free will can only be regarded as faith based nonsense and quite absurd.

Autumnman

[RandFan]

Therefore, the doctrine (Christian Doctrine) of free will can only be regarded as faith based nonsense and quite absurd.

Autumnman:) Agreed.

[Robin]

A mental model of free will (see Dennet) and one of no free (see Libet) both predict the same outcome. You have created a straw man.
How can I have created a straw man when I am stating my own opinion?

Are you saying I don't really think that?

Can you state Dennet's definition and Libet's definition to ensure that they are even talking about the same thing when they say "free will"? That is one of the greatest bugbears of this type of discussion, but apparently that is nothing new, see my sig line.

In any case as far as I know Libet is talking about very short term volition - under a second from stimulus to response. You will notice in my definition I did not say "always", I said "can be".

I would have thought that by a free will event we would include those cases where we have formed an intention over time and thought it out.

[Autumnman]

I would have thought that by a free will event we would include those cases where we have formed an intention over time and thought it out.

Robin: Having "formed an intention over time and [thinking] it out" is incongruent with the definition of "free will":
“philos. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.”

There must be something more than "physical forces" contributing to the choice being made.

As I state above:
“Divine forces” must be taken on faith since they cannot be understood clearly or with certainty.
“Physical forces”, on the other hand, would in fact be the only way that the five physical senses could be informed of one’s options (alternatives, choices, etc.).

To suggest that a personal choice (a.k.a. an individual’s free will) is somehow influenced by an innate, unqualified, unquantified knowledge of one’s physical (corporeal) options is indeed faith based nonsense and quite absurd.

Autumnman

[HansMustermann]

Take it up with Dawkins et al. I know, authority and all that. However, IMHO, they are excellent.

No one has said that consciousness is an accidental by-product.

None of this obviates anything I have said.

I got it from Dawkins. (http://www.environmentfoundation.net/reports/richard-dawkins-questions.htm) What do you mean "fundies"? What the hell are you talking about? Are you poisoning the well?

In other words you would prefer to engage in ad hominem and then to stick your finger in your ears.

Got it.

No, I'd prefer that you actually understood what you're talking about. And "sticking fingers in ears"? Please.

For a start Dawkins doesn't actually make the point that moths evolved a way to commit suicide. That's your own misunderstanding.

Insects evolved a navigational system which worked perfectly well for 99% of the moths that ever lived, at the expense that maybe 1% would end up flying into a fire. And even for those, a lot had reproduced already. There wasn't an overall disadvantage to that navigation system, and not much of a pressure to evolve a way to avoid fires.

Unless you want to tell me that maybe 1% of people ever experienced consciousness, I fail to see how that's an analogy at all.

Furthermore, introducing the _candle_ element is a very very late development. It's a very small and concentrated fire, the temperature gradient near the flame is very abrupt, so even mechanisms to avoid a bigger fire would fail. It's a change of environment, not something that evolved to fly into candles.

Even in the link you provide, Dawkins actually seems very aware of this: "But when somebody challenges you as a Darwinian to explain why people fight over shopping trolleys in Sainsbury’s or something, you don’t give them a naive answer at the wrong level. You say to yourself, "Moth in candle flame"." It seems clear to me that he's using that as an illustration of when darwinism doesn't apply and you shouldn't look for that kind of explanation.

At any rate, how does that apply to my question about the evolution of consciousness, is still a puzzle. Consciousness is not something that only happens to too few people to affect natural selection, and is not something that's a by-product of some change of environment causing stuff to happen in the brain that were never meant to happen.

[Robin]

Robin: Having "formed an intention over time and [thinking] it out" is incongruent with the definition of "free will":
The definition of free will? Some stone tablet somewhere I should know about?

All you are saying is that the definition I have used (which I clearly stated in my post) is different from another definition you have found.

See my sig line.

There are quite a number of ways in which free will is used in philosophy as I have already pointed out - there is no one "right" definition.

I stated clearly which of the definitions I was using.

BTW the theological usage of free will is quite compatible with determinism.
There must be something more than "physical forces" contributing to the choice being made.
I did not say anything about "physical forces" in my definition or post. In what sense is "physical" being used here? What is the precise reason that "choice" and "physical" must be mutually exclusive?

[Autumnman]

The definition of free will? Some stone tablet somewhere I should know about?

All you are saying is that the definition I have used (which I clearly stated in my post) is different from another definition you have found.

See my sig line.

There are quite a number of ways in which free will is used in philosophy as I have already pointed out - there is no one "right" definition.

I stated clearly which of the definitions I was using.

BTW the theological usage of free will is quite compatible with determinism.

I did not say anything about "physical forces" in my definition or post. In what sense is "physical" being used here? What is the precise reason that "choice" and "physical" must be mutually exclusive?

Robin: Apparently I am not as learned as yourself. In fact, I find it quite difficult to comprehend the philosophical definitions of free will that you provide in your post:
Def 1: A conscious intention can be the major proximate cause of the intended action and a conscious state can be the major proximate cause of the intention.

Def 2: A conscious intention can be the original cause of the intended action.

Def 3: When a person performs an action at time t the possibility existed before but close to t that he/she would choose to do otherwise.

Complexity is the mother of confusion! is what comes to my simple mind.

So, a [corporeal/physical] conscious state can cause the conscious intention & the conscious intention can be the cause of the intended action. And that is a philosophical definition of free will?

Is there such a thing as a non-corporeal/physical conscious state?
Can an unconscious state cause a conscious intention?

I really don’t grasp what you are driving at; unless you are confusing “free and independent choice” with “free will”.

Straighten me out, if you so desire.
Autumnman

[willhaven]

Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?Humans with free will wouldn't be bound by mental or physical addictions or dependencies.

You'd be able to will pain away. No one would be overweight. Everyone would be motivated.

I'm a determinist. I think we're a slave to our physical makeup, the laws of physics and the inputs that drive our five senses and thought process.

[yy2bggggs]

You beg the question. If the model is correct then it is the subconscious that chooses not to process information and you simply percieve that you are consciously directing to think or not to think.
You are repeating your error. When you say, "it is the subconscious that chooses", that is opposed to what--the conscious choosing? So you've carved the brain into two parts... the conscious part, and the subconscious part. And in formulating this objection, you (but not me, which makes your objection specifying what I'm doing a straw man) are equating me with the part of the brain that is conscious.

But there is no part of my brain that is conscious. That is the misnomer. Furthermore, nowhere in my definition did I refer to the things you're ascribing to me. When I say "thoughts", you're reading into it when you interpret it as "conscious thoughts". What I mean when I say "thoughts", rather, is more general--it's teleological processing of the same sort of information you generally work with (referring back to my example, "numbers", "multiply", etc--in other words, the concepts).

These thoughts do not become conscious by being generated by the "conscious part" of the brain, and they do not become conscious by having a "property" of consciousness. They become conscious by being broadcast over a shared network to truckloads of other modules, each of which has a specialty of analysis, and the general whole of which is you (each of them is a particular part of what makes up you).

So, keeping this in mind:
You only perceive that the lack of activity is due to the absence of your conscious thoughts.
...again, no such thing as "conscious thoughts" in this context. They are just thoughts, and I happen to be able to sample them, but only if I'm conscious of them.

What I'm doing here is inducing. My consciousness is merely a geiger counter. The counter clicks a lot, and out comes the correct answer. When it does not click, the correct answer doesn't get written. My conclusion is that there's some sort of correlation between the answer being written and that clicking sound.

So, please. Tell me what my error is.
Here you beg the question. The thoughts are posterior. You want to move them to the front but that hasn't been established.No, you want to say that I want to move them to the front. I'm claiming it doesn't matter what the order is. What is at the heart of this is whether or not I am causing the action.

The only reason I can imagine why you would emphasise that this has to do with the ordering in which consciousness occurs versus the things causing the action, is if you believe that somehow I only live on the side of my brain that's conscious--in which case, if that conscious side of the brain doesn't kick things off, then it must not be me doing it.

My objection to this is that there's no such thing as the conscious side the brain. The piece of interest is merely a bunch of connected subconscious modules. "Consciousness" is when they all talk to each other over the global workspace, so if you do want to call a part of the brain the "conscious" side, it should be the entire set of interconnected modules.

[yy2bggggs]

It has been my experience that the terminology, “free will”, is generally used by Christians as they attempt to explain why “we are all sinners” and why “we all need Jesus Christ” due to the “Original Sin” that was committed by “Adam & Eve” in the Garden of Eden.
You may be interested in this:
Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal? [pdf] (http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/cultural-universal.pdf)

[hamelekim]

If you hold a materialistic world view then quantum physics would dictate that on some level everything is random, which would include human behavior.

If you hold a Christian world view, our souls are not deterministic and we have a choice in regards to what actions we take in life.

We don't fully understand free will and responsibility in regards to the Bible except that God dictates everything that will ever happen in history, down to the smallest act, but we freely choose to do those acts and are therefore responsible. So God determines everything we will do, but we still freely act out the things God determines we will do.

[hamelekim]

Free will is a logical nonsense. There are 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action then the action is the result of those reasons.

2) When you don't have reasons for your action then the action is unintentional.

3) Your action can be the result of a combination of 1) and 2).

None of those possibilities allow for free will because you are always compelled to your action and never in control of your action. :)

You always have a choice to act or not act in a situation. If someone punches you, you have a free choice to punch them back or turn the other cheek. Both possibilities are open and it is up to the individual to decide what they want to do.

We don't not understand consciousness well enough to determine how those decisions come about to argue with any authority that one does not have free will in deciding.

Basing your decisions on some previous experience does not negate free choice. You have the ability to make another choice, even if you won't.

[hamelekim]

I am not as sharp as many or most of those who post on this forum. I look to the dictionary definition of “free will” to aid me in figuring out what RandFan is driving at.

It has been my experience that the terminology, “free will”, is generally used by Christians as they attempt to explain why “we are all sinners” and why “we all need Jesus Christ” due to the “Original Sin” that was committed by “Adam & Eve” in the Garden of Eden.

According to Webster’s 2003 Unabridged Dictionary the terminology free will is defined:
“philos. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.”

I cannot find a Webster’s definition for “free choice”. However, choice is defined:
“2. the right, power, or opportunity to choose; option.”

It has been my experience that if one does not know the “options” a personal choice (“free will”) cannot be exercised. The English verb know denotes understanding that is based in facts or truth: “to apprehend (i.e. to understand) clearly and with certainty.”

“Divine forces” must be taken on faith since they cannot be understood clearly or with certainty.
“Physical forces”, on the other hand, would in fact be the only way that the five physical senses could be informed of one’s options (alternatives, choices, etc.).

To suggest that a personal choice (a.k.a. an individual’s free will) is somehow influenced by an innate, unqualified, unquantified knowledge of one’s physical (corporeal) options is indeed faith based nonsense and quite absurd.

Therefore, the doctrine (Christian Doctrine) of free will can only be regarded as faith based nonsense and quite absurd.

Autumnman

Your problem is that you believe that science is the only valid way of discerning reality. This is not the case for most of humanity for most of human history. To assume that you somehow have more truth about reality than all those other people is rather arrogant, and has no basis in fact.

[westprog]

I tend to agree that it's difficult to think of a scientific test, even in principle, that would demonstrate the existence of free will. In principle, it could be possible to show that any given action is the result of deterministic processes, but that's not going to happen any time soon.

However, whatever the view on free will, it seems that people, once they get away from philosophising, almost always assume that it exists and that people are responsible for their actions.

[Twiler]

Your problem is that you believe that science is the only valid way of discerning reality. This is not the case for most of humanity for most of human history. To assume that you somehow have more truth about reality than all those other people is rather arrogant, and has no basis in fact.

So, you concede that your claim that YHVH exists is arrogant?

[Teapots Happen]

Who is this "we"? FWIW: There is a lot of evidence to suppose that this is not true.

Noticed a lot of citation of Libet in this thread - did you guys see this recent experiment?

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20327274.400-free-will-not-an-illusion-after-all.html

In 1983, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet asked volunteers wearing scalp electrodes to flex a finger or wrist. When they did, the movements were preceded by a dip in the signals being recorded, called the "readiness potential". Libet interpreted this RP as the brain preparing for movement.

Since then, others have quoted the experiment as evidence that free will is an illusion - a conclusion that was always controversial, particularly as there is no proof the RP represents a decision to move.

Long sceptical of Libet's interpretation, Jeff Miller and Judy Trevena of the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, attempted to tease apart what prompts the RP using a similar experiment, with a key twist.

They also used scalp electrodes, but instead of letting their volunteers decide when to move, Miller and Trevena asked them to wait for an audio tone before deciding whether to tap a key. If Libet's interpretation were correct, Miller reasoned, the RP should be greater after the tone when a person chose to tap the key.

While there was an RP before volunteers made their decision to move, the signal was the same whether or not they elected to tap. Miller concludes that the RP may merely be a sign that the brain is paying attention and does not indicate that a decision has been made.

[willhaven]

Your problem is that you believe that science is the only valid way of discerning reality. This is not the case for most of humanity for most of human history. To assume that you somehow have more truth about reality than all those other people is rather arrogant, and has no basis in fact.I that Greek mythology is a myth. I know that every other religion is a myth.

It arrogant to not believe in every other invisible man story yet cling to the one you like best.

All invisible man stories with no scientific evidence to support them have equal validity. I find them all equally untrue.

[gentlehorse]

We don't fully understand free will and responsibility in regards to the Bible except that God dictates everything that will ever happen in history, down to the smallest act, but we freely choose to do those acts and are therefore responsible. So God determines everything we will do, but we still freely act out the things God determines we will do.

Okay, god dictates everything that will ever happen. And free will comes into play exactly where? To what extent is your will free if everything you've ever done or ever will do is dictated by an omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omnivorous entity?

[Autumnman]

Your problem is that you believe that science is the only valid way of discerning reality. This is not the case for most of humanity for most of human history. To assume that you somehow have more truth about reality than all those other people is rather arrogant, and has no basis in fact.

Since science is based in facts and objective reality I do embrace science [as] the only valid way of discerning reality. That is not to say that I am ignorant of the fact (the reality) that there is a sublime mystery infused into every aspect of existence on planet earth and throughout the universe.

From the time when the human mammal’s brain evolved and the human imagination began to inform the human worldview, superstition and mythology have been employed by human beings in various attempts to psychologically cope with the fitful, harsh and brutal realities that mortal beings on planet earth must endure. There are superstitions and mythologies that are many thousands of years older than the Judeo-Christian superstition and mythology. Long before the Israelites and Judeans, the Canaanites and the Phoenicians, the Akkadians and the Ugarites, there was the Natufian culture (the earliest known agrarian & urbanized culture—apx.10,500 to 8,500 BCE) that thrived around Mt. Carmel and the Judean hills. There is a wealth of archaeological and anthropological information found at every Natufian site: settlement size, dwelling structures, graves, art objects, elaborate bone industry, pounding and grinding tools, etc. All of this information points to a highly evolved and imaginative Neolithic culture that evolved from the Paleolithic hunter-gatherer cultures that inhabited the caves of Mt. Carmel and that region of the ancient Mediterranean Coast of the Near East (a.k.a. The Holy Land).

It is science that provides us with this remarkable insight into the peoples and cultures of the ancient “Holy Land”. Modern (2,500 year old) superstitions, mythologies, and religious dogmas chain the human mind in darkness and ancient fears. It is irrational to state or imply that the truths and facts of our shared reality are less reasonable and convincing than the mythology and religious dogma of a two thousand year old superstition.

That I have learned more about the real and true state of our shared reality by studying the real, and true state of our shared reality than those who embrace only superstition, mythology, and religious dogma does not make me “arrogant”. Enlightened, would be a more appropriate term. The more I learn the more awestruck and humble I become before the sublime mystery I find thriving in every facet of the real, and true state of our shared reality.

Autumnman

[rocketdodger]

You always have a choice to act or not act in a situation. If someone punches you, you have a free choice to punch them back or turn the other cheek. Both possibilities are open and it is up to the individual to decide what they want to do.

You don't seem to understand.

Regardless of the choice the individual makes, there is a reason they make the choice.

And if there is a reason for the choice, there is nothing "free" about it -- the choice was entirely determined by the reasons.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And my question is: why would something like that evolve?
So that I have the feeling that I am the agent of my own actions. Then I will spend time planning for future events because I feel that I will have control over the results.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You always have a choice to act or not act in a situation. If someone punches you, you have a free choice to punch them back or turn the other cheek. Both possibilities are open and it is up to the individual to decide what they want to do.
How does the individual decide?


We don't not understand consciousness well enough to determine how those decisions come about to argue with any authority that one does not have free will in deciding.
Are you talking about compatibilist or libertarian free will?


I tend to agree that it's difficult to think of a scientific test, even in principle, that would demonstrate the existence of free will. In principle, it could be possible to show that any given action is the result of deterministic processes, but that's not going to happen any time soon.
Could you describe a process that is neither deterministic nor random, because that is what it would have to be to allow libertarian free will. I daresay you cannot describe such a process, because there is no logical room for it.

~~ Paul

[Beth]

So that I have the feeling that I am the agent of my own actions. Then I will spend time planning for future events because I feel that I will have control over the results.

~~ Paul


This is confusing to me. Why would it be advantageous to feel (or believe) that you are the agent of your own actions if, in fact, you are not? Why would such a belief be helpful in motivating you to plan for future events unless you are able to make different choices as a result of planning? But if you are able to make different choices as a result of choosing different thought processes, such as planning for future events, doesn't that mean that you are the agent of your own actions and have some control over what actions to take and their results?

Thanks for any explanation you can provide.

[Richard Masters]

I'm still making up my mind about the OP. However, here are some thoughts: when your brain is being biopsied, and a doctor stimulates the motor cortex and your hand jerks, did you choose to move your hand?

What about split-brain patients? One hand does one thing, and the other does another.

I think that thoughts and actions are predetermined, but the vast amount of information and physical entities interacting with each other and their sensory organs (in the case of biological entities) makes prediction very difficult. There are too many variables to consider.

However, my hypothesis doesn't rob us of our identities. Our histories, wants and needs do affect our choices, whether or not there is some form of materialist predetermination.

[maatorc]

Yes, I should have my head examined for bringing this up. Fools rush in...

Ok, here's the thing. While I think the concept of free will vs the lack thereof has some degree of value from a philosophical perspective in the end it's the equivalent of a dog chasing it's tail. Nothing can or will ever come of the pursuit of it beyond rudimentary understanding of whether or not we have free will and what it even means to say we do or do not have free will.

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to answer one of the following two questions (given that you care of course).

Assuming that humans are endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were not?
Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.

The question of free will is most simple: Will is mental desire, full stop!

[Robin]

Robin: Apparently I am not as learned as yourself. In fact, I find it quite difficult to comprehend the philosophical definitions of free will that you provide in your post:
And I can't comprehend the definition you give - so we are apparently even.
Complexity is the mother of confusion! is what comes to my simple mind.
No, misrepresenting somebody's words is the mother of confusion.
So, a [corporeal/physical] conscious state can cause the conscious intention & the conscious intention can be the cause of the intended action.
I don't recall using the terms "corporeal/physical" in my defintion, in fact I recall quite specifically disavowing the term "physical", but you ignored that part.

I also pointed out that as David Hume said, I cannot argue with people who change my definitions.

Deal with what I actually said and not with what you pretended I said.

Thank you.

[Robin]

Your problem is that you believe that science is the only valid way of discerning reality. This is not the case for most of humanity for most of human history. To assume that you somehow have more truth about reality than all those other people is rather arrogant, and has no basis in fact.
And another valid way of discerning reality is...? Remind me?

[!Kaggen]

So that I have the feeling that I am the agent of my own actions. Then I will spend time planning for future events because I feel that I will have control over the results.

~~ Paul

I always understood individual survival in evolutionary terms as getting as many as possible of ones progeny to a reproductive age?
In other words the reason above (no free will) for acting now for the future is hinged on the delusion of free will?
Sounds like a circular argument to me.

[Belz...]

Yes, I should have my head examined for bringing this up. Fools rush in...

Ok, here's the thing. While I think the concept of free will vs the lack thereof has some degree of value from a philosophical perspective in the end it's the equivalent of a dog chasing it's tail. Nothing can or will ever come of the pursuit of it beyond rudimentary understanding of whether or not we have free will and what it even means to say we do or do not have free will.

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to answer one of the following two questions (given that you care of course).

Assuming that humans are endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were not?
Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.

My opinion is that one cannot answer because "free will" is notoriously ill-defined... or undefined.

[Belz...]

Your problem is that you believe that science is the only valid way of discerning reality. This is not the case

Okay... what's an other way ?

[Asm]

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to answer one of the following two questions (given that you care of course).


Assuming that humans are endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were not?
Assuming that humans are not endowed with free will explain how humans would behave differently than they do now if they were?
FWIW: I'm happy for this thread to die a quick death.

I view free will as an illusion, a part of your conscious experience. You are your brain. And if your brain decides it wants to have a nap, you want to have a nap. I really don't see the problem.

Unless your conscious "I" is separate from your brain (which I think it is not), my answers would be

1. No difference
2. No difference.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This is confusing to me. Why would it be advantageous to feel (or believe) that you are the agent of your own actions if, in fact, you are not?
Because that might have the effect of causing me to plan ahead.


Why would such a belief be helpful in motivating you to plan for future events unless you are able to make different choices as a result of planning?
I am able to make different choices. I could run like hell from the next bear, or I could try to stand and fight.


But if you are able to make different choices as a result of choosing different thought processes, such as planning for future events, doesn't that mean that you are the agent of your own actions and have some control over what actions to take and their results?
I am the agent of my own actions. They just aren't libertarian actions.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I always understood individual survival in evolutionary terms as getting as many as possible of ones progeny to a reproductive age?
In other words the reason above (no free will) for acting now for the future is hinged on the delusion of free will?
Sounds like a circular argument to me.
There doesn't have to be any illusion of free will in the philosophical sense. There only has to be various impetuses for me to plan for the future. One of those impetuses could be the idea that I have control over my actions. It may simply have been an easy thing to evolve that resulted in better future planning due to feedback from the idea of control to the actual planning. It's better if I think I can do something practical about future events than if I'm simply a zombie regarding my own future.

~~ Paul

[Beth]

Because that might have the effect of causing me to plan ahead.


I am able to make different choices. I could run like hell from the next bear, or I could try to stand and fight.


I am the agent of my own actions. They just aren't libertarian actions.

~~ Paul

Ah, you were claiming it doesn't constitute (libertarian) free will. I was thinking that it did, but I was thinking of compatibilitistic free will. Thanks.

[!Kaggen]

There doesn't have to be any illusion of free will in the philosophical sense. There only has to be various impetuses for me to plan for the future. One of those impetuses could be the idea that I have control over my actions. It may simply have been an easy thing to evolve that resulted in better future planning due to feedback from the idea of control to the actual planning. It's better if I think I can do something practical about future events than if I'm simply a zombie regarding my own future.

~~ Paul

From an evolutionary point of view the only advantage to be gained from any current actions is future reproductive success. I still do not see how the idea of free will would be an advantage within this context. In fact it could be a disadvantage in that I could decide against procreation based on my idea of having control over my actions and be selected out of the genetic pool.

[yy2bggggs]

There only has to be various impetuses for me to plan for the future. One of those impetuses could be the idea that I have control over my actions.
The idea that you have control over your actions may not be something major to add in the first place. In order to accomplish a goal (drink some water out of a cup), you set about accomplishing a number of subgoals ("reach out", grab the cup, pick it up without spilling, pull it towards your mouth holding it moderately level, etc). You need mitigation plans in case something goes wrong, or something else significant happens to change the environment (e.g., while you're reaching out, someone next to you sticks their arm in your way--you need to be able to punch them). And that requires a feedback loop while you're accomplishing your goals.

Technically, the feedback loop is useful even if you don't have such things--minor adjustments in your reach, for example, means you don't have to be exactly accurate about how you reach--you merely need to start going in the right location and adjust as needed.

The feeling of control would simply come into play here. As you accomplish the subgoals, you feel as if you are, well, doing what you wanted to do. Which is what control is.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

From an evolutionary point of view the only advantage to be gained from any current actions is future reproductive success. I still do not see how the idea of free will would be an advantage within this context. In fact it could be a disadvantage in that I could decide against procreation based on my idea of having control over my actions and be selected out of the genetic pool.
First, it's not the idea of free will in the libertarian sense. It's only the idea of having control over my actions. Indeed, I can decide to select myself out of the gene pool. However, I'm guessing that more of our ancestors decided to escape from the tiger and procreate, and fewer decided to escape and skip procreation. If the whole "control over my destiny" thing hadn't worked, it would have been selected against.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The feeling of control would simply come into play here. As you accomplish the subgoals, you feel as if you are, well, doing what you wanted to do. Which is what control is.
And the feeling feeds forward to improve future actions. Just like the feeling of pain is apparently useful to get me to yank my hand away from the fire. What the hell did we need pain for? Apparently it's just a good way to get the yanking to work more efficiently.

~~ Paul

[Robin]

I never understand the debate at this point because I don't have the illusion of free will and people who claim they do have this illusion can never properly describe what this illusion is like.

[rocketdodger]

There doesn't have to be any illusion of free will in the philosophical sense. There only has to be various impetuses for me to plan for the future. One of those impetuses could be the idea that I have control over my actions. It may simply have been an easy thing to evolve that resulted in better future planning due to feedback from the idea of control to the actual planning. It's better if I think I can do something practical about future events than if I'm simply a zombie regarding my own future.

~~ Paul

Curiously, it seems as if the understanding that we were nothing but zombies all along is part of human advancement.

I, for one, am very happy to be a zombie, and to know that I am a zombie.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I, for one, am very happy to be a zombie, and to know that I am a zombie.
Do you mean a philosophical zombie? Because if you are a physicalist, then there is no such thing.

~~ Paul

[rocketdodger]

Do you mean a philosophical zombie? Because if you are a physicalist, then there is no such thing.

~~ Paul

Not really, I mean a zombie whose decisions are either determined or random.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Not really, I mean a zombie whose decisions are either determined or random.
Okay, that's good. I like that, too. Otherwise there are all these free decisions to be made and no way to make them.

~~ Paul

[Autumnman]

As I understand the 2003, Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary philosophical definition of “free will”—
Philos. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces
—it sounds to me as if this philosophical doctrine dictates that “free will” is an innate, functioning mental faculty in human beings, (i.e. all human beings are born with the functioning mental faculty of “free will”). That would mean that at the moment of a human being’s birth the human brain within that infant would have a fully functional mental faculty of “personal choice.”
However, the human brain within an infant does not even have a concept of being a “person”, let alone the mental capacity to make “personal choices.” As far as I know, that is a biological fact. I have never heard of an infant, a one year old, a two year old, a five year old, or even a nine year old human being having a fully formed concept of being a “person”, let alone the mental capacity to make informed “personal choices”. I think that is why we call human beings of this age, “children” and not adults.

If, as the above defined philosophical doctrine of “free will” dictates, a child were endowed with the completely functional mental capacity to make fully informed “personal choices”, then such a child would have been born with a completely informed and functioning mental faculty of “reason”. The 2003, Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines the term “reason” used in this context as:
the mental powers concerned with forming conclusions, judgments, or inferences. sound judgment; good sense. the power of intelligent and dispassionate thought, or of conduct influenced by such thought.
Even the King James Bible does not associate the mental faculty of reason to children:
Moreover your little ones ... and your children, which in that day had no knowledge between good and evil ...

Even the King James Bible does not support the above defined philosophical doctrine of “free will”.

Autumnman

[Robin]

Do you mean a philosophical zombie? Because if you are a physicalist, then there is no such thing.

~~ Paul
If you are anybody there is no such thing.

But according to Chalmers if you are a physicalist then you ought not to think that they are conceivable.

He never quite says why the metaphysical possibility of should be a problem for physicalists, only that most people agree with him.

[Robin]

Oh and according to St Augustine free will is both the expression of personal choice and Divine forces. God's ominiscience let's him know exactly what a person with free will will do, so he does it all for us.

[Robin]

This is confusing to me. Why would it be advantageous to feel (or believe) that you are the agent of your own actions if, in fact, you are not? Why would such a belief be helpful in motivating you to plan for future events unless you are able to make different choices as a result of planning? But if you are able to make different choices as a result of choosing different thought processes, such as planning for future events, doesn't that mean that you are the agent of your own actions and have some control over what actions to take and their results?

Thanks for any explanation you can provide.

No-one could give a definite answer to that - we don't know enough about what consciousness is or how it works.

But we can provide plausible scenarios.

For example it seems reasonable for animals to have evolved a negative emotional reaction to being trapped - being trapped by a current in the water, being trapped by mud, tar, vegetation, other animals.

It follows then the we will have a positive emotional reaction to the opposite - moving under the impulse of our own limbs - in other words free.

So it could be that what we call free will is simply the feeling that is the opposite of being trapped or being controlled by external factors.

That seems perfectly reasonable to me.

[Robin]

My opinion is that one cannot answer because "free will" is notoriously ill-defined... or undefined.
The trouble is that there are a number of definitions around and people are arguing as though there was only one.

It is like listening to an Englishman and American man discussing whether or not they wear suspenders.

[!Kaggen]

First, it's not the idea of free will in the libertarian sense. It's only the idea of having control over my actions. Indeed, I can decide to select myself out of the gene pool. However, I'm guessing that more of our ancestors decided to escape from the tiger and procreate, and fewer decided to escape and skip procreation. If the whole "control over my destiny" thing hadn't worked, it would have been selected against.

~~ Paul

Is your hypothesis 'the idea of control over my actions/my destiny leads to fitness to survive?' I do not know of any evidence supporting this hypothesis. I cannot even see how you would test such a hypothesis.

[RandFan]

How can I have created a straw man when I am stating my own opinion?

Are you saying I don't really think that?I missunderstood you. I appologize.

Can you state Dennet's definition and Libet's definition to ensure that they are even talking about the same thing when they say "free will"? That is one of the greatest bugbears of this type of discussion, but apparently that is nothing new, see my sig line.I think you are making a controversy where there is none but in the end I don't care. Free will or the lack thereof isn't a decided point and it is unlikely that it will ever be much more than an opinion either way (regardless of your semantics). There are experts on both sides of the fence arguing in favor of and against free will. It's possible that there are differences of opinion as to what free will means and I've unfairly made Dennet and Libet opponents but it doesn't really change my point.

In any case as far as I know Libet is talking about very short term volition - under a second from stimulus to response. You will notice in my definition I did not say "always", I said "can be".

I would have thought that by a free will event we would include those cases where we have formed an intention over time and thought it out. I could argue that such an event is one that was formed by our subconcious and we only percieved to have "thought" it out. However our awareness of events could direct underlying brain processeses to alter long term decisions (IOW: consciousness contributes to decisions). Otherwise yes, you are correct about Libet's point being short term.

[RandFan]

For a start Dawkins doesn't actually make the point that moths evolved a way to commit suicide. That's your own misunderstanding.No misunderstanding. I stated it just as Dawkins did and I made CLEAR that it was a bi-product. Hell, that was the point you and I are arguing. Of course moths didn't actualy evolve to commit suicide. For crying in the dark. BI-PRODUCT!


At any rate, how does that apply to my question about the evolution of consciousness, is still a puzzle. Consciousness is not something that only happens to too few people to affect natural selection, and is not something that's a by-product of some change of environment causing stuff to happen in the brain that were never meant to happen.I've no idea how to reply to this. You are creating a straw man and then simply making a declaration by fiat.

The theory that I'm talking about doesn't make the prediction that it only happens to too few people (that's all in your head and you beg the question) nor does the explanatory power of the theory require it. One model is that like the moth consciousness is simply a bi-product. Another model is that consciousness has a long term feed back loop. That we are aware of posterior events has long term consequences (they effect the actual processes that make decisions).

BTW: A peackocks tail was never meant to happen. In fact, nothing was ever meant to happen. Oh, and BTW2, a peacocks tail uses a lot of resources with no evolutionary advantage. The tail is the result of sexual selection and there is a model that consciousness is the result of sexual selection (see consciousness effects processes for long term decision making).

[RandFan]

Humans with free will wouldn't be bound by mental or physical addictions or dependencies.Can you demonstrate this?

You'd be able to will pain away. No one would be overweight. Everyone would be motivated.Why do you think this? What is your basis for it?

I'm a determinist. I think we're a slave to our physical makeup, the laws of physics and the inputs that drive our five senses and thought process.Could be.

[RandFan]

When you say, "it is the subconscious that chooses", that is opposed to what--the conscious choosing? So you've carved the brain into two parts... the conscious part, and the subconscious part. And in formulating this objection, you (but not me, which makes your objection specifying what I'm doing a straw man) are equating me with the part of the brain that is conscious.It's a figure of speech. One I did not invent and not alone in using. It's purpose is to communicate an idea, like the use of cartesian theatre even though it doesn't exist it has explanatory purpose. Dan Dennett often uses the term. Some times he attacks it and sometimes he uses it to communicate an idea about consciousness.

These thoughts do not become conscious by being generated by the "conscious part" of the brain, and they do not become conscious by having a "property" of consciousness. They become conscious by being broadcast over a shared network to truckloads of other modules, each of which has a specialty of analysis, and the general whole of which is you (each of them is a particular part of what makes up you).I've no argument with this. Yes.

What I'm doing here is inducing.Not quite. I'd say begging the question.

My consciousness is merely a geiger counter. The counter clicks a lot, and out comes the correct answer. When it does not click, the correct answer doesn't get written. My conclusion is that there's some sort of correlation between the answer being written and that clicking sound. No argument here except that some times the geiger doesn't click and there is activity (see alien hand syndrome).

No, you want to say that I want to move them to the front. I'm claiming it doesn't matter what the order is. What is at the heart of this is whether or not I am causing the action. You could cause the action without being aware that you are causing the action.

I only live on the side of my brain that's conscious--in which case, if that conscious side of the brain doesn't kick things off, then it must not be me doing it. You've not read Ramachandran's book and you don't know about limbs that move indepentantly of consciousness (Alien Hand syndrome or Dr. Strangelove syndrome (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alien_hand_syndrome)). If what you are saying is true then these limbs can't possible behave in the way we know that they do.

We can answer this question because of pathology. We can see that perception isn't always the same as reality. We know that because of pathology that we may just very well only be aware of what is hapening after the fact. Just because you think you consciously cause something to happen doesn't mean that it does (if that were true then there would be no alien limbs). I strongly urge you to get Ramachandran's book (http://www.amazon.com/Brief-Tour-Human-Consciousness-Impostor/dp/0131486861). I'm really not pulling this out of my ass.

My objection to this is that there's no such thing as the conscious side the brain. The piece of interest is merely a bunch of connected subconscious modules. "Consciousness" is when they all talk to each other over the global workspace, so if you do want to call a part of the brain the "conscious" side, it should be the entire set of interconnected modules. I don't claim a "conscious" side of the brain. I'm using the term as Dawkins uses design in the Selfish Gene when there is no design.

Our brains process information, make decisions and cause us to act (among other things).
We can be aware (conscious) of some of these events.
It's not necassary for us to be conscious of these events (see alien hand syndrome).
If we percieve that we decide to forgo thoughts and then there is no activity we cannot then deduce that free will is the conclusion (otherwise pick up your nobel and tell those folks with alien hand syndrome to stop faking it). It could be that the brain makes the decision and THEN we percieve that we have made a conscioius decisions (you are still begging the question) Yes. Yes you are. Your little thought experiment proves absolutely nothing other than thinking is going on and action is going on (but you've only established corelation and not cause and effect). Given that involuntary action is demonstrable then it's possible that all action is involuntary and you are only aware of some of that activity and therefore ONLY think that you are directing it.
Now, you could argue that an alien hand never composes music or writes out the answer as you put it. Ok but clearly this is a pathological problem and we might not expect for there to be a functioning processes that you are not aware of that can write out answers. The only point is that it is not necassry for you to be aware of a brain process for there to be action (a limb with alien hand syndrome most certainly doesn't demonstrate free will the way you claim that it does).

[RandFan]

My opinion is that one cannot answer because "free will" is notoriously ill-defined... or undefined.:) So long as you don't demand that I define it. I actually think "free will" or the lack of "free will" is absurd but I'd settle for indefinable.

Let me hasten to add, if you think it's possible to define it then you don't get to use your get out of jail free card. Give us your definition and then plug that into the question.

[Aepervius]

I'm no physicist, but whenever I read an explanation of quantum physics for the layman and they speak of the uncertainty of how sub-atomic particles will react, I wonder if that uncertainty is the source of human free will.


Short answer : no. Long answer : all quantum phenomenon are by the time you get to the neuron level , de-cohered, or are by factor billion so low as to be negligible. Most if not all attempt to apply QM to explain free will are non sense. There is another thread on the forum about penrose for example.

You would probably have better chance with statistic coming from temperature distribution of materials in the brain than with any quantum effect.

[Aepervius]

:) So long as you don't demand that I define it. I actually think "free will" or the lack of "free will" is absurd but I'd settle for indefinable.

Let me hasten to add, if you think it's possible to define it then you don't get to use your get out of jail free card. Give us your definition and then plug that into the question.

It is an UFO UFW , or Unidentified Free Will

[Robin]

Is your hypothesis 'the idea of control over my actions/my destiny leads to fitness to survive?' I do not know of any evidence supporting this hypothesis. I cannot even see how you would test such a hypothesis.
Hmm... I detect a slight movement of the goal post - you orginally said:
I still do not see how the idea of free will would be an advantage within this context.
I don't think there is any hypothesis here that can be tested and nobody suggested there was. But it can be shown to be plausible.

[Robin]

I think you are making a controversy where there is none but in the end I don't care. Free will or the lack thereof isn't a decided point and it is unlikely that it will ever be much more than an opinion either way (regardless of your semantics). There are experts on both sides of the fence arguing in favor of and against free will. It's possible that there are differences of opinion as to what free will means and I've unfairly made Dennet and Libet opponents but it doesn't really change my point.
I wasn't trying to make controversy or suggest that there anything more than opinion or conjecture to be said about free will, only trying to suggest a possible answer to the question you posed in the OP.
I could argue that such an event is one that was formed by our subconcious and we only percieved to have "thought" it out.
I would also hold that as a strong possibility, certainly consciousness is only the very tip of our mental iceberg.

[yy2bggggs]

It's a figure of speech. One I did not invent and not alone in using.
You're missing the point. The term isn't the issue. It's your usage of the term. Thus, your defense of the term is irrelevant.

Here's what you wrote:
If the model is correct then it is the subconscious that chooses not to process information and you simply percieve that you are consciously directing to think or not to think.
...and in this response:
you are only aware of some of that activity and therefore ONLY think that you are directing it.
"And therefore" suggests an implication. This implication assumes a conscious side of the brain.

You want to argue that if a subconscious module is to blame for an action, then whatever this "I" is cannot lay claim to it. This assumes, however, that this very same "I" is something other than a bunch of subconscious modules.

It's not.
No argument here except that some times the geiger doesn't click and there is activity (see alien hand syndrome).
...
If what you are saying is true then these limbs can't possible behave in the way we know that they do.

Well let's see. Here is what I said:
My objection to this is that there's no such thing as the conscious side the brain. The piece of interest is merely a bunch of connected subconscious modules. "Consciousness" is when they all talk to each other over the global workspace, so if you do want to call a part of the brain the "conscious" side, it should be the entire set of interconnected modules.
...and from the wiki page you linked to:
AHS is best documented in cases where a person has had the two hemispheres of their brain surgically separated, ... It also occurs in some cases after other brain surgery, strokes, or infections.
So if what I say is true, then if this global workspace consisting of interconnected modules carrying out goal-based behaviors, is severed, it should produce two smaller sets of interconnected modules that carry out goal-based behaviors. Which is exactly what AHS is. So what's to explain?

You spent a significant amount of this post trying to hammer the AHS point home though, but it doesn't conflict at all with what I've presented.
You could cause the action without being aware that you are causing the action.Sure can, because awareness is a separate function from causation. But it still matches my contrived definition of free will, so long as the actions are carried out by thoughts.
Now, you could argue that an alien hand never composes music or writes out the answer as you put it.
I don't have to argue that at all. Sever the brain, or otherwise split the global workspace, and obviously this thing I'm calling "me" is going to also be split. It's like a netsplit on IRC... you used to be on efnet, and now you're just on a part of efnet. And there's another part on the other side.

It's very easy to explain. I don't see why you think it's impossible, unless you're still building straw men.

[!Kaggen]

Is your hypothesis 'the idea of control over my actions/my destiny leads to fitness to survive?' I do not know of any evidence supporting this hypothesis. I cannot even see how you would test such a hypothesis.
Hmm... I detect a slight movement of the goal post - you orginally said:
I still do not see how the idea of free will would be an advantage within this context.

The original post which started my exchange with Paul was this one.

Yes, but to those I'd oppose teleofunctionalism. If you're not familiar with that, let's just say it's kinda what happens when you start with "darwinism, the brain, and philosophy walk into a bar..." ;)

Why would a layer dedicated to providing that illusion would have evolved? Why would you need the brake of pretending to put into words, some decisions which the subconscious can take much faster? (Assuming that the subconscious could process the same kind of complex problems.)

Just about any decision which can be taken subconsciously and not be subject to that "illusion" at all, is a heck of a lot faster. E.g., you can lift your foot a bit on the gas pedal a lot faster when you see a 30 in a circle on the highway, than if you were to reason it consciously in words.

The saving grace would be that at conscious level we can explore more complex things, but now a bunch of people are trying to tell me that even that's just an illusion to mask the actual decision-making done by subconscious. Basically that a chunk of my brain has nothing better to do that to put on a little decision-making play for its own benefit, while a whole other chunk actually solves the problem.

And my question is: why would something like that evolve?

The human brain is a _major_ consumer of proteins, glucose _and_ oxygen. It's also why babies are defenseless for so long, etc. If we could save even 10% by ditching that chunk which does nothing more than the illusion of conscious reasoning, it would be a major survival advantages for our ancestors. So why would evolution produce and then keep something that useless?

Paul then suggested the above had been selected for due to its survival advantage. He clarified that he was not referring to the idea of libertarian free will but the idea of control over my actions/my destiny.

I am not moving any goal posts, I am questioning his assertion.


I don't think there is any hypothesis here that can be tested and nobody suggested there was. But it can be shown to be plausible.

Is it justified then to attach a non-verifiable assertion to the scientific Theory of Evolution because it is plausible? Does not sound like science to me, more like dogma.

[Robin]

The original post which started my exchange with Paul was this one.
Yes, in other words the question "why would something like that evolve", not "provide a falsifiable hypothesis with experimental confirmation of how something like that would evolve".
Paul then suggested the above had been selected for due to its survival advantage. He clarified that he was not referring to the idea of libertarian free will but the idea of control over my actions/my destiny.

I am not moving any goal posts, I am questioning his assertion.
My italics. Paul suggested, not asserted.
Is it justified then to attach a non-verifiable assertion to the scientific Theory of Evolution because it is plausible?
Quote me the part where anybody suggest that this should be attached to the Theory of Evolution.

Nevertheless I am taking this as a firm undertaking on your part that you are going to be consistent and provide experimental verification for every comment you make about a scientific subject.

You are going to do that, aren't you?

[Robin]

Is it justified then to attach a non-verifiable assertion to the scientific Theory of Evolution because it is plausible?
You are willing to live up to your own standards I presume?

So when you say:
In fact it could be a disadvantage in that I could decide against procreation based on my idea of having control over my actions and be selected out of the genetic pool.
How would you even test such a thing?

Or alternatively how do you justify adding this unverifiable assertion to the scientific Theory of Evolution?

Sounds more like dogma than science to me.

[!Kaggen]

Yes, in other words the question "why would something like that evolve", not "provide a falsifiable hypothesis with experimental confirmation of how something like that would evolve".

My italics. Paul suggested, not asserted.

Quote me the part where anybody suggest that this should be attached to the Theory of Evolution.

Nevertheless I am taking this as a firm undertaking on your part that you are going to be consistent and provide experimental verification for every comment you make about a scientific subject.

You are going to do that, aren't you?

Robin, I am not trying to be obstinate. I am trying to point out that 'suggesting' that their is an evolutionary advantage by having an 'idea' of control even if there is no scientific basis for this idea is circular, unobservable, inconsistent and unrepeatable and ultimately is avoiding the real issue. We cannot escape questions regarding thinking/consciousness by appealing to history (the time before thinking/consciousness).

[Belz...]

The trouble is that there are a number of definitions around and people are arguing as though there was only one.

It is like listening to an Englishman and American man discussing whether or not they wear suspenders.

The way I understand what most people mean by "free will" is something that is definitely NOT deterministic ("factors we don't control decide our actions ? Yuck!") and surely NOT random ("Random ? My decisions are NOT random, mister!"). But there's nothing that fits this definition, not even hypothetically under any metaphysics.

[Belz...]

:) So long as you don't demand that I define it. I actually think "free will" or the lack of "free will" is absurd but I'd settle for indefinable.

Let me hasten to add, if you think it's possible to define it then you don't get to use your get out of jail free card. Give us your definition and then plug that into the question.

Well, as I said in my previous post, it would be something that is neither deteministic nor random. As such it doesn't exist, and I couldn't even begin to imagine what difference it would make to my actions (specifically because I cannot logically conceive of such a thing).

However, if "free will" is used to mean something less... er... mystical, then it might be a more useful term. Either way I'm not sure it would make a visible difference.

[Robin]

Robin, I am not trying to be obstinate.
I never suggested you were. I suggested you were shifting the goalposts and applying an inconsistent standard.
I am trying to point out that 'suggesting' that their is an evolutionary advantage by having an 'idea' of control even if there is no scientific basis for this idea is circular, unobservable, inconsistent and unrepeatable and ultimately is avoiding the real issue.
But your suggestion that there would be no evolutionary advantage to this and even an evolutionary disadvantate is not "circular, unobservable, inconsistent and unrepeatable"???

You are allowed to make unsupported assertions about evolution, but others are not?

Quite a double standard.
We cannot escape questions regarding thinking/consciousness by appealing to history (the time before thinking/consciousness).
Nobody is trying to escape questions, only suggest possible answers.

Anyway, just what is the question you think people are trying to escape?

[Robin]

The way I understand what most people mean by "free will" is something that is definitely NOT deterministic ("factors we don't control decide our actions ? Yuck!") and surely NOT random ("Random ? My decisions are NOT random, mister!"). But there's nothing that fits this definition, not even hypothetically under any metaphysics.
I am not sure how the feeling that we control things is incompatible with determinism - doesn't control imply determination? What would be the difference between "I controlled the outcome" and "I determined the outcome"?

But I think the second definition I provided does fit this bill.

What about Broad's definition:


i. Some (and it may be all) voluntary actions have a causal ancestor which contains as a cause-factor the putting-forth of an effort which is not completely determined in direction and intensity by occurrent causation.
ii. In such cases the direction and the intensity of the effort are completely determined by non-occurrent causation, in which the self or agent, taken as a substance or continuant, is the non-occurrent total cause. Thus, Libertarianism, as defined by me, entails Indeterminism, as defined by me; but the converse does not hold.

From Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism (http://www.ditext.com/broad/dil.html)

[!Kaggen]

I never suggested you were. I suggested you were shifting the goalposts and applying an inconsistent standard.

But your suggestion that there would be no evolutionary advantage to this and even an evolutionary disadvantate is not "circular, unobservable, inconsistent and unrepeatable"???

You are allowed to make unsupported assertions about evolution, but others are not?

Quite a double standard.

Nobody is trying to escape questions, only suggest possible answers.

Anyway, just what is the question you think people are trying to escape?

I did not shift goals posts, I followed the various ways of defining free will from the illusion of conscious reasoning to the idea of control of ones actions and then questioned the evolutionary advantage suggested by these definitions.

The evolutionary disadvantage to not procreating is clear. I do not pass my genes on to the next generation. What is it about this that you find difficult to accept?

Why is there consciousness?

[Belz...]

I am not sure how the feeling that we control things is incompatible with determinism - doesn't control imply determination?

I said nothing about the impression of free will.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Is your hypothesis 'the idea of control over my actions/my destiny leads to fitness to survive?' I do not know of any evidence supporting this hypothesis. I cannot even see how you would test such a hypothesis.
Yes, that is my hypothesis. I do not know how to test it, but I also do not know how to test the hypothesis that running faster is a good thing. Do you?

We'll see if biologists can come up with evidence over time. People are certainly thinking about it:

http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Why_did_consciousness_evolve

http://www.peterrussell.com/SCG/EoC.php

http://www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/awconlang.html


~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Robin, I am not trying to be obstinate. I am trying to point out that 'suggesting' that their is an evolutionary advantage by having an 'idea' of control even if there is no scientific basis for this idea is circular, unobservable, inconsistent and unrepeatable and ultimately is avoiding the real issue. We cannot escape questions regarding thinking/consciousness by appealing to history (the time before thinking/consciousness).
Hang on, who is trying to escape any questions? And what is the real issue?


Why is there consciousness?
Either because it has an evolutionary advantage, or simply by accident. But it seems awfully complex to have hung around by accident.

~~ Paul

[RandFan]

"And therefore" suggests an implication. This implication assumes a conscious side of the brain.And now I've made myself clear.

You want to argue that if a subconscious module is to blame for an action, then whatever this "I" is cannot lay claim to it. No. Only that awareness of our thoughts isn't proof of free will. I don't hold that there is a subconscious model. Only that there are processes in the brain that we are not conscious of.

So if what I say is true, then if this global workspace consisting of interconnected modules carrying out goal-based behaviors, is severed, it should produce two smaller sets of interconnected modules that carry out goal-based behaviors. Which is exactly what AHS is. So what's to explain?It's possible for us to act without our being aware of the action. This falsifies your proposition.


You spent a significant amount of this post trying to hammer the AHS point home though, but it doesn't conflict at all with what I've presented.
Yes it does. You assert that action can only happen if you direct your thoughts to cause it to happen. If true then there cannot be AHS.

Sure can, because awareness is a separate function from causation. But it still matches my contrived definition of free will, so long as the actions are carried out by thoughts. I've demonstrated, via AHS, that it's possible to have action without directing your thoughts. Your claim is false.

I don't have to argue that at all. Sever the brain, or otherwise split the global workspace, and obviously this thing I'm calling "me" is going to also be split. It's like a netsplit on IRC... you used to be on efnet, and now you're just on a part of efnet. And there's another part on the other side. Yet you are not aware of both sides and you are not likely to sit down and write poetry with one hand and music with the other. Action can happen without you consciously directing your thoughts.

It's very easy to explain. I don't see why you think it's impossible, unless you're still building straw men.You've explained nothing that contradicts anything I've said. We are in agreement that thoughts cause actions. The only dispute is whether or not you can consciously direct your thoughts to cause action. I argue that there is a mental model of consciousness (see Blackmore (http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/psych01.htm)) that holds that we are only aware of our thoughts and we cannot consciously direct them. Your argument is circular. You simply restate free will (I direct my thoughts to cause action) to prove free will. So, your argument becomes, my free will proves free will.

[RandFan]

Well, as I said in my previous post, it would be something that is neither deteministic nor random. As such it doesn't exist, and I couldn't even begin to imagine what difference it would make to my actions (specifically because I cannot logically conceive of such a thing).

However, if "free will" is used to mean something less... er... mystical, then it might be a more useful term. Either way I'm not sure it would make a visible difference.So, I say we F the ineffable.

[Belz...]

Not sure I understand you.

[RandFan]

Not sure I understand you.:) It's a joke. A play on words. "****** the ineffable" or, to restate, screw that which can't be expressed.

[Beth]

And now I've made myself clear.

You've explained nothing that contradicts anything I've said. We are in agreement that thoughts cause actions. The only dispute is whether or not you can consciously direct your thoughts to cause action. I argue that there is a mental model of consciousness (see Blackmore (http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/psych01.htm)) that holds that we are only aware of our thoughts and we cannot consciously direct them.


This was a very interesting article, but I don't think it goes so far as to explain something that might be termed a mental model of consciousness. It seems to me to mainly be arguing that if p-zombies could exist, the concept of free will can be considered an illusion.

On the other hand, for someone like me who doesn't accept that such a thing as a p-zombie could exist, it doesn't really add much to the argument and Blackmore doesn't really address that POV.

Futher, as she notes, there is a great deal of controversy over the interpretation of various experiments, such as Libet's that she is using to support her theory. They do not conclusively show that we cannot consciously direct our thoughts. Subjective experience indicates otherwise and the experimental evidence and theoretical models provided are interesting but they are not sufficient to dismiss that subjective experience as illusionary.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's clear that the experiences that we call consciousness have an effect on future thoughts. Otherwise we would not be having this conversation. So it's a question of how immediately consciousness can effect future thoughts. Does my consciousness of the beginning of this sentence affect the end of the sentance sentence?

~~ Paul

[RandFan]

This was a very interesting article, but I don't think it goes so far as to explain something that might be termed a mental model of consciousness.Meh~. Not really important enough to have a debate.

It seems to me to mainly be arguing that if p-zombies could exist, the concept of free will can be considered an illusion.

On the other hand, for someone like me who doesn't accept that such a thing as a p-zombie could exist, it doesn't really add much to the argument and Blackmore doesn't really address that POV. I won't bother commenting as it's neither here nor there.

Futher, as she notes, there is a great deal of controversy over the interpretation of various experiments, such as Libet's that she is using to support her theory. They do not conclusively show that we cannot consciously direct our thoughts. Subjective experience indicates otherwise and the experimental evidence and theoretical models provided are interesting but they are not sufficient to dismiss that subjective experience as illusionary.:) It sounds like you've summed up my possition perfectly.

[Beth]

Meh~. Not really important enough to have a debate.

I won't bother commenting as it's neither here nor there.

:) It sounds like you've summed up my possition perfectly.

How can we have a good satisfying argument when we're in agreement? :p

[RandFan]

:) Thanks Beth.

[willhaven]

Can you demonstrate this? No I can't. Because free will does not exist. If free will existed, addiction would not exist. If we were free to choose how we feel or react, you'd be able to walk away from heroin the same way you change the channel on a television program you don't like.

I think we're slaves to our past experiences and the inputs that drive us the same way we can be addicted to heroin. Our brain makes decisions and weighs possible outcomes, but all of those decisions we make are based on our physical needs and our past experiences. Given the same person with the same past experience with the same problem to solve, I think they'd make the same decision every single time.

We are the products of our environment. I see no reason why our emotions and decision making would be a less of a product of our environment than addiction or drowning would be.


Why do you think this? What is your basis for it? I think everything is physical. Obesity, addiction, feelings, every decision we make. It's just a really complicated kinetic ball sculpture. There is a process of decision that involves our brains, but I don't think there is any sort of magic involved. We have the illusion of free will, but we don't really have it. We have the experience of making a decision, and because we weigh the decision we make against the other decisions we could possibly make, it seems as though we had a number of possibilities to choose from, when we really didn't. Or, to be more specific, we will always choose the outcome that works for us given what we know at the time.

Imagine any decision you've ever made and think about why you made that decision. Are there ones you regret? Why do you regret them? Given what you know now, would you have made a different decision? Of course. Given what you knew then, could you have made any other decision?


Could be.I haven't explored this thinking into every facet of my life, but that kind of thinking can be applied to almost every situation imaginable and it seems to make sense.

It's only been kicking around in my head for the past few years.

[RandFan]

No I can't. Because free will does not exist. If free will existed, addiction would not exist. If we were free to choose how we feel or react, you'd be able to walk away from heroin the same way you change the channel on a television program you don't like.You beg the question. Your conclusion presumes the premise.

I think we're slaves to our past experiences and the inputs that drive us the same way we can be addicted to heroin. Our brain makes decisions and weighs possible outcomes, but all of those decisions we make are based on our physical needs and our past experiences. Given the same person with the same past experience with the same problem to solve, I think they'd make the same decision every single time. You are simply asserting something. The conclusions don't necassarily follow from your premises.

We are the products of our environment. I see no reason why our emotions and decision making would be a less of a product of our environment than addiction or drowning would be. A straw man. Free will models don't preclude evolutionary based decision making.

I think everything is physical. Obesity, addiction, feelings, every decision we make. It's just a really complicated kinetic ball sculpture. There is a process of decision that involves our brains, but I don't think there is any sort of magic involved. We have the illusion of free will, but we don't really have it.Here, to be sure, you've wanderd into the quandry posed by many of the other posters. You've not defined free will.

Imagine any decision you've ever made and think about why you made that decision. Are there ones you regret? Why do you regret them? Given what you know now, would you have made a different decision? Of course. Given what you knew then, could you have made any other decision? Post hoc reasoning.

I haven't explored this thinking into every facet of my life, but that kind of thinking can be applied to almost every situation imaginable and it seems to make sense.

It's only been kicking around in my head for the past few years.I think you need to do a bit more reading on the subject. I strongly recomend Freedom Evolves (http://www.amazon.com/Freedom-Evolves-Daniel-C-Dennett/dp/0670031860) By Daniel C. Dennett (a review of the book can be found here (http://www.human-nature.com/nibbs/03/dcdennett.html)). I also think you need to better understand your position of Determinism and also better understand argument and fallacy and the underlying premises to your conclusions.

Best of luck.

[BobG]

I'm no physicist, but whenever I read an explanation of quantum physics for the layman and they speak of the uncertainty of how sub-atomic particles will react, I wonder if that uncertainty is the source of human free will.



It is my understanding that at one time it was thought that the whole universe, including our brain, was just a set of interacting particles that were controlled by the laws of physics. Thus, although we think that we are thinking, we really aren't thinking. The particles were all interacting according to the laws of physics and the laws of physics were controlling our thoughts.

Then came quantum mechanics which somehow put to rest the thought of particles moving precisely in accordance with the laws of physics and because of this it is now accepted that we have free will.

However, Richard Feyman, one of the greatest minds in Physics that ever existed and who significantly contributed to quantum mechanics, said that "I do not understand quantum mechanics". To me, this means that Feynam felt that quantum mechanics was not understandable.

In light of this, is it still possible, despite quantum mechanics, that free will does not exist and that quantum mechanics may not be the final theory on the workings of the atom?

I may add that Albert Einstein never beleived in quantum mechanics!

Bob

[willhaven]

Post hoc reasoning.Which is what I feel free will is based on entirely. "In hindsight I could have made choice B but I still made choice A, therefore I have free will."

It depends what you consider free will to be. If it is the power to make your own choices, then we have that ability because the choices we make are a part of our physical makeup. A decision happening in our brain could be called free will to some.

But free will is often framed as something that transcends all known laws of science, which is an idea that I don't subscribe to in the slightest.

Testing what I consider free will to be is essentially impossible because you'd have to test the same subject in the same environment and observe different results in their thought process. That just isn't possible.

[RandFan]

Which is what I feel free will is based on entirely. "In hindsight I could have made choice B but I still made choice A, therefore I have free will."

It depends what you consider free will to be. If it is the power to make your own choices, then we have that ability because the choices we make are a part of our physical makeup. A decision happening in our brain could be called free will to some.

But free will is often framed as something that transcends all known laws of science, which is an idea that I don't subscribe to in the slightest.

Testing what I consider free will to be is essentially impossible because you'd have to test the same subject in the same environment and observe different results in their thought process. That just isn't possible.So, it seems that you are saying that once you strip away any metaphysical/supernatural basis for free will then there is nothing that you would consider free will. I've no basis to argue with that.

Still I think you should read Dennet's book.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Here's the problem with libertarian free will:

Libertarian free will cannot involve a mechanism, because a mechanism is necessarily deterministic and/or random. When you ask a libertarian for the mechanism, he will avoid the question or, like Interesting Ian, assert that there is no mechanism, no method, no procedure, no algorithm.

However, without a mechanism it is impossible to give a coherent description of how libertarian free will might work. We do not know how to describe something like decision making without reference to a mechanism.

So the only way to prove that libertarian free will exists is to formulate a logical argument why every other type of will cannot account for our decision making. I believe this is impossible.

~~ Paul

[Robin]

I said nothing about the impression of free will.
And on re-reading my post, neither did I.

[Robin]

I did not shift goals posts, I followed the various ways of defining free will from the illusion of conscious reasoning to the idea of control of ones actions and then questioned the evolutionary advantage suggested by these definitions.

The evolutionary disadvantage to not procreating is clear. I do not pass my genes on to the next generation. What is it about this that you find difficult to accept?
What has the evolutionary disadvantage of not procreating to do with the evolutionary advantage or otherwise of the feeling of free will?

Where is your reasoning to show that free will or the feeling of free will would lead to not procreating?

How do you propose to test your hypothesis?
Why is there consciousness?
Nobody knows. And nobody knows any good reason why there should not be consciousness. Our understanding of the subject is incomplete.

So what was your point?

[yy2bggggs]

And now I've made myself clear.
...and wrong.
No. Only that awareness of our thoughts isn't proof of free will.
This is the second time you introduced the word "proof" into our discussion. Furthermore, to willhaven, you said:
"The conclusions don't necassarily follow from your premises."

Once again, I'm telling you... the standards of proof and necessity are irrelevant.
I don't hold that there is a subconscious model. Only that there are processes in the brain that we are not conscious of.That's not the problem. The problem is that you think there are two different kinds of processes--those we aren't conscious of, and those we are.

Consciousness, though, is not a type of process in this sense. It's not an action. It's information about an action getting propagated.

Furthermore, you are not a ball of "conscious stuff". You are, instead, a bunch of different interconnected aspects. You are your memory. You are your beliefs, your desires, your sensations. Every different aspect of you is a different brain cell in a different place, and they have to communicate with each other in order for your "you-ness" to be coherent and integrated as you take for granted that it is.

Here's the absurdity laid out a certain way. I have a thought. But I'm presumably mistaken about it in that I think I am the one having the thought. In reality, though, the thought arises from the subconscious, and not me. Does that about sum it up?

Now here's a question. If the underlined phrase above is true, then where does this notion leave room for me to have a mistaken thought that I have the thought?

You are handwaving around this problem in formulating your objections.
It's possible for us to act without our being aware of the action.
Correct.
This falsifies your proposition.
Incorrect, on so many levels, some of which are very telling and very fundamental.

Here's what you're trying to defend:
Better defining "free will" won't resolve the problem. In the end any definition will lead to absurdity. X = Not X.
That's a big burden, RandFan. But you're slinging around words like "prove" and "necessarily" applying to your opponents, and for you, words like "it's possible for".

Add to that, here is what I'm proposing:
Okay, I'll play this game. Free will means that I'm able to act causally based on my thoughts. So I'm going to say we have free will. Given not X, we either would not have thoughts, or would not be able to behave based on those thoughts.

...so on the most major level, I'm not even proposing what you say in the first place. So really, you start out dead in the water--refuting something never claimed.

However, even if that were not the case, this is wrong because it meets an inappropriate burden. Its being possible for the action to occur without our awareness is the weakest of all rebuttals... anything is possibly a different way than we think.

And even if we grant that, it's wrong because it doesn't even demonstrate your point. I am wearing clothes if I have a shirt on and some shorts. That it's possible for there to be kinds of clothes I'm not wearing--example, socks--is a red herring. But your claim takes this form. Assuming I did rely on awareness as a critical component, then if there is anything that legitimately counts towards my "wearing free will", then I have it. Your claim to possibility of there being something I don't have free will about doesn't make me naked.
Yes it does. You assert that action can only happen if you direct your thoughts to cause it to happen.
I never asserted that. Nevertheless, it doesn't apply to AHS anyway.
Yet you are not aware of both sidesWrong way to phrase it.

The sides are not aware of each other. And even that's not true. They are aware of each other. They just simply aren't aware through a neural interconnection--they have to be indirectly aware, which simply doesn't count towards combined individuality (see again my description).

Take this example from the wiki article you linked to, which I'll just discuss for illustration:
For example, one patient was observed putting a cigarette into her mouth with her intact, 'controlled' hand (her right, dominant hand), following which her alien, non-dominant, left hand came up to grasp the cigarette, pull the cigarette out of her mouth, and toss it away before it could be lit by the controlled, dominant, right hand. The patient then surmised that "I guess 'he' doesn't want me to smoke that cigarette."
This patient's LH side carried out a very high level, purposeful action. Another thing I'd like you to note is that, in this example, it wasn't merely a high level action (tossing a cigarette out of the mouth), it was a reaction in real time to interfere with a completely separate high level goal being achieved by the RH side (the point of tossing the cigarette away, obviously, is to prevent the smoking of it from happening).

Now, add to this that this sort of behavior is a special case--it is not nominal behavior in a normally functioning human being. The constant variable behind AHS is a disconnection of modules within the brain--exactly the sort of thing that makes the case special in terms of what I had described. But more to the point, because this is the variable, and because it's a special case, one would be forgiven to suppose that had this patient's brain not been severed (assuming the common scenario for discussion), then the patient would not have exhibited this behavior.

Now think about that. With a disconnection in the brain, you have two halves, each of which comes up with and carries out high level goals. But connect the two sides, and there's a unity about the goals--either this patient would have smoked the cigarette, or would have not bothered. Assuming that the action were smoking a cigarette, her LH would probably have stayed quietly by her side, perfectly content with the idea of having a drag.

And what that suggests, my friend, is that in the nominal case, the two sides of a connected brain in a normal human being are communicating, and at the very least, one side is inhibiting the other's behavior, or vice versa, or they are collaborating and deciding on new goals, or something. Somehow, starting to light a cigarette doesn't result in tossing it aside.

Fascinating that, don't you think? It's as if the subconscious modules, when connected, are functioning as a single-minded coherent entity.
You've explained nothing that contradicts anything I've said. We are in agreement that thoughts cause actions.
Then we're in agreement.
The only dispute is whether or not you can consciously direct your thoughts to cause action.
Not really. You keep saying that I'm saying this, and I keep explaining why that barely even makes sense.

Your phrasing "consciously direct" is not only clumsy, it's something I never brought up in this discussion. You came up with it.

The reason it's clumsy is because the adjective "consciously" is a misnomer. Actions are initiated by these interconnected modules--and when an action winds up being initiated, it's very likely a module that's involved. So "direction" is something that a module does.

Now "consciously" means "in a manner that you're conscious of", and consciousness of an act is different from initiating an act. To be conscious of an act is to communicate a high level concept representing the act to all of the appropriate interconnected modules--that is a sensation. But to carry out an act is to trigger a different pathway that begins to translate such high level goals into actions. So "consciously directing" per se doesn't even make sense in the first place.

But what makes this worse is that there's a feedback loop involved in carrying out a high level operation. Even the alien hand in our subject had to reach towards and grab a cigarette, with appropriate timing--not a trivial task by far. Even in formulating its goal in the first place it had to be (indirectly) aware that the RHS was about to smoke the cigarette, and that this involved immediate action to prevent.
I argue that there is a mental model of consciousness (see Blackmore (http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/psych01.htm)) that holds that we are only aware of our thoughts and we cannot consciously direct them.
And I argue that said concept is a warped view of how we fit into the brain. You aren't excluding your role when you say you don't consciously direct things--not unless you assume, first, a model which I don't believe you can support with evidence.

There's no spot in the brain that is conscious. Yet we are conscious. That's because we're scattered throughout, into a bunch of subconscious modules. We're in pieces--they're just connected pieces. And AHS syndrome? No problem at all. That's what happens when the pieces aren't all connected to each other.

That should give you a few ideas of what the interconnection is doing there in the first place as well.

[RandFan]

The problem is that you think there are two different kinds of processes
You are either being willfuly ignorant or dishonest. I've said multiple times that I DON'T think that there are two differnt kinds of processes! There are processes that we are aware of and there are processes that we are not. That fact is demonstrable (see AHS). That doesn't mean that there are two different kinds. Sitting here in my office I know that there are thumtacks that I'm aware of and thumtacks that I'm not aware of. That doesn't render the thumtacks different kinds. (FWIW: There could be two different kinds. There could be a "subconscious model" but that's not important for my point and I'm not arguing it). MOVE ON!

BTW: The word "proven" I've used colloquially so your point is rhetorical nonsense at worst or overly pedantic at best. Substitute demonstrated for proven (words are not physical laws of the universe. They are means to convey information). "Proven" in a legal sense isn't the same as "proven" in a mathmatic sense. The word "proven" can be used in a philosophical or scientific sense in every day communication. Dawkins, Dennet and others have used it that way. Sometimes one or both correct themselves as that can lead to confusion but if you don't know what I mean by "proven" then just ask for crying in the dark.

{rest of post snipped}

I'm not going to read the rest. You either correct this and we will move on or I'm not going to waste my time with you. Go back a few posts (or see below) and you will see that you either are not reading what I write or you are lying.

I'll leave it to you to tell me which.

RandFan

ETA: I will hapily read the rest of your post and respond once and if we resolve this contention. However it is absurd to continue in light of such a profound misunderstanding.

There are NOT two different kinds of processeses. There are only brain processeses. However, there are processeses of the brain that we are aware of and there are those that we are not aware of (see Ramachandran's A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness).

I don't hold that there is a subconscious model. Only that there are processes in the brain that we are not conscious of.

BTW: another bit of dishonesty or willful ignorance on your part is to act as if the word "subconscious" has no meaning. AHS, which you have not disputed as being a real phenomenon, demonstrates that there ARE processes in the brain that we are not consciously aware of. Now, there is controversy as to what exactly is the "subconscious". Clearly Freud's model was wrong. Clearly there is no activty below the limon (subliminal). However, there is clearly a need for a word that describes brain processes that we are not aware of. And it is demonstrable that such processes exist (see AHS, Ramachandran's How the Mind Works, Pinker (http://www.shunya.net/Text/Blog/PinkerStoryteller.htm), Dennet(see below) Blackmore (http://books.google.com/books?id=S-YqymSqnUsC&pg=RA1-PA21&lpg=RA1-PA21&dq=susan+blackmore+subconscious&source=bl&ots=sv1qbS6yY3&sig=paYekDTMJberKEjYJjFgjAux_iI&hl=en&ei=c671SqbjKoX8tQOvtOy0CQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CAwQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=subconscious&f=false)).

From an article quoting Dennett. (http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/calvin/calvin_p2.html)
Consciousness is the tip of the iceberg, in the sense that many other things are going on in the brain at the same time, hidden from view. There are subconscious trains of thought that vie for "attention."


So, can we dispense with this silly nonsense that there are not processes of the brain that we are not conscious of (AKA subconscious)?

[yy2bggggs]

Okay, I think I have this figured out. You're making two errors, and I think I have to start with the more fundamental one--and that is appropriate burden.

You're missing all of the qualifiers, so I'll highlight them:
...why do you think you're disagreeing with me?Better defining "free will" won't resolve the problem. In the end (A) any definition will lead to absurdity. X = Not X.
...and my response:
Okay, I'll play this game. Free will means that I'm (B) able to act causally based on my thoughts. So I'm going to say we have free will. Given not X, we (C) either (D) would not have thoughts, or would (E) not be able to behave based on those thoughts.

As (F) an example of a test for this form of free will, I can write a computer program that shows me two three digit numbers. Once those are shown, I can try to multiply the numbers in my head, and type out the product. I can also try to see if I can type out the product (G) without having those thoughts.

(A) is "any". That is a global qualifier, equivalent to $\forall X$. So you have a strong claim.

(B) is "able to". That is an existence qualifier, equivalent to $ \exists X$. So that's a weak claim. (C), (D), and (E) serve to clarify this. (F) is showing a particular case, in a particular individual.

Keep this in mind. Now let's go back over this:
It's possible for us to act without our being aware of the action.
That is an existence qualifier. $\exists X$ such that X is an action and that we are not aware of X. Agreed.
This falsifies your proposition.
...and this is incorrect. That $\exists X$ such that X is an action and that we are not aware of X does not falsify that $\exists X$ such that X is an action and that X results from my thoughts. Whether your proposition is true or not does not in any affect whether or not mine is. It's an inappropriate burden. The qualifiers are wrong.

Now onto your second error:
You are either being willfuly ignorant or dishonest. I've said multiple times that I DON'T think that there are two differnt kinds of processes!
Herein lies why I phrased my initial definition this way. I want you to pay careful attention to words I did not use in my definition, and the words that I did use. Keep in mind that I introduced this definition in particular to refute your strong claim (A) above:
Free will means that I'm able to act causally based on my thoughts. So I'm going to say we have free will. Given not X, we either would not have thoughts, or would not be able to behave based on those thoughts.
Note the absence of the words "aware", and "consciously". This was intentional... I wanted to try to point out here that the major issue is tied to what qualifies a thought as being "my thought" and an act that "I perform", and this is more arbitrary than you lend credit to.

Now, this is the closest you came to actually describing my position, corrected by removing the inappropriate burden.
You assert that action can only happen if you direct your thoughts to cause it to happen.
I draw your attention to the highlighted word. You're taking for granted that you means the same thing as what you are aware of. But in doing so, you're treating awareness as if it's a binary property--a thing that a thought either has, or doesn't have.

Awareness is not such a binary property. Awareness is relative to which modules have the information, and nominally, when "we" sense our thoughts, a truckload of said modules have the information, since they are all interconnected--in the much the same fashion that nominally, when we see a word on a computer screen, multiple modules have the information about what the word is (you can speak it, recall an instance of it, type it, etc).

In light of this fact, there's no such thing as an atomic point at which we "become aware" of thought. There's a point at which we can talk about it. There's a point at which we can store it in our short term memory. There's a point at which we can relate it to other thoughts. There's a point at which we can relate it to time and "simultaneously" press a button, read a number from a clock, etc. All of these are different things, and they are all different aspects of you, and different "pieces" of awareness.

In summary, your error is that you're gluing two completely different aspects of the self together in your mind and calling it "I". One aspect has to do with how many and which modules receives information--so it's a distributed aspect. The other has to do with what neurons kick off the action, which involves just one module (though that module's actions are subject to prior influences of other interconnected modules).

The fact that these modules tend to cooperate in a coherent way is what lends the general concept of "you"--you're a "single-minded" legion of modules. AHS, far from disproving my proposition, demonstrates that this is indeed the case, as I explained in the part of my post you didn't read.

{drama snipped, though I did read it}
BTW: another bit of dishonesty or willful ignorance on your part is to act as if the word "subconscious" has no meaning.
I never claimed it had no meaning. In fact, I'll go ahead and claim it has a meaning.

But you're not just asserting that the subconscious exists:
I argue that there is a mental model of consciousness that holds that we are only aware of our thoughts and we cannot consciously direct them.
...see? You're making negative claims about something, and are trying to connect your negative claims as if it follows from the fact that the subconscious is attributable.

What I'm claiming is that this is a muddled, confused picture. It starts getting muddled when you start attributing things that I am conscious of to the subconscious (as opposed to the conscious) because at some point I wasn't conscious of it. "Consciousness" is a matter of degree in this case. The subconscious isn't a different "place", and it's not a different "aspect"--it is the same place, same aspect, same thoughts. The only difference is that less of the modules are involved, and when you speak of particular implications of things you're conscious of (e.g., if you're conscious of it, you can press a button), then the difference is the involvement of particular modules.

You're asserting that I am not the cause of my actions because it comes from the subconscious (and furthermore, I didn't connect "I" to consciousness anyway, and furthermore, I don't do this--you did--but that's not relevant with respect to this rebuttal). And this implies that you're contrasting the subconscious to the conscious--as if, when I become conscious of a thing, suddenly it stops being subconscious. So if you demonstrate that something arises from the subconscious, it didn't arise from the conscious. This is indeed what you're doing, because you want to imply that if the subconscious is the cause, then the consciousness cannot be.

But that's as meaningful as claiming that if something arose from neuron, it didn't arise from the subconscious. If this subconscious module is a component of what makes up consciousness, just as the neuron is a component of what makes it a subconscious module, then the fact that it's subconscious doesn't mean it doesn't involve consciousness, just as the fact that it's neural doesn't mean it doesn't involve the subconscious.
AHS, which you have not disputed as being a real phenomenon,
...was discussed in the part of the post you didn't read.
demonstrates that there ARE processes in the brain that we are not consciously aware of.
...yet you're still not connecting that to my claim, except by reading into it.

So, can we dispense with this silly nonsense that there are not processes of the brain that we are not conscious of (AKA subconscious)?
As soon as you recognize that that is not my objection, sure.

Can I get you to realize that consciousness is nothing but a collection of the very same kinds of processes you're calling subconscious? And that, therefore, you're not in any meaningful sense refuting that a thing isn't conscious by demonstrating that it arises from subconscious?

[RandFan]

Can I get you to realize that consciousness is nothing but a collection of the very same kinds of processes you're calling subconscious? And that, therefore, you're not in any meaningful sense refuting that a thing isn't conscious by demonstrating that it arises from subconscious?:mad:

I think at this point you are intentionally lying.

[RandFan]

Can I get you to realize that consciousness is nothing but a collection of the very same kinds of processes you're calling subconscious? And that, therefore, you're not in any meaningful sense refuting that a thing isn't conscious by demonstrating that it arises from subconscious?

RandFan: There are only brain processes.
yy2bggggs: I'm saying that there are only brain processes.
RandFan: Yes, there are only brain processes.
yy2bggggs: What you don't understand is that there are only brain processes.
RandFan: There are only brain processes.
yy2bggggs: Can I get you to realize that there are only brain process.

[RandFan]

I'd like to think you are just yanking my chain. I'd like to think that you are not that cynical or think I'm that stupid.

If so then you got me. Very good. It was a bit over the top but ha ha. PM me and we'll toast a beer.

If not then go [explative removed] yourself.

[yy2bggggs]

RandFan: There are only brain processes.
yy2bggggs: I'm saying that there are only brain processes.
Alright. You've summed up agreements.

Now let's just admit there are only brain processes, and see where that leads.

Do you exist? If so, you must be a brain process, right?

[RandFan]

Do you exist? If so, you must be a brain process, right? So I guess we can skip that beer. The other offer still stands.

[yy2bggggs]

So I guess we can skip that beer. The other offer still stands.
The crux of our disagreement is twofold. First, you are making an insanely strong claim--that you can show any definition of free will invalid. Second, when I say "I direct my actions", you have very particular ideas about what this means.

I do not have those ideas.

FYI, I don't drink beer anyway.

[RandFan]

The crux of our disagreement is twofold. First, you are making an insanely strong claim--that you can show any definition of free will invalid.No. I'm stating that free will is ultimately an absurd concept as it can't be demonstrated (and it's just an opinion and I just wanted a discussion. The title and OP were constructed to elicit discussion and not to demonstrate any concept to the exclusion of all others). Which is why I have said repeatedly that I'm not opposed to either Blackwell's or Dennett's take on the subject. BTW: I've expressed that fre will or the lack thereof are equaly absurd so the claim that I can demonstrate that any definition of free will simply demonstrates that you are not paying attention.

Second, when I say "I direct my actions", you have very particular ideas about what this means.No. Only that you think that free will proves free will. It doesn't.

[yy2bggggs]

No. I'm stating that free will is ultimately an absurd concept as it can't be demonstrated.
Okay, and I can demonstrate the sort I'm proposing--by multiplying two three digit numbers in my head. We're back to where this started.
No. Only that you think that free will proves free will. It doesn't.
No, the fact that the correct answer coming out correlates to whether or not thoughts were in my head is the test.

Correlating two variables, both of which are observed, is a kind of thing you get to do in science. This is no different in principle--it's not epistemologically distinct--than correlating two variables for any other observed phenomenon.

[RandFan]

Okay, and I can demonstrate the sort I'm proposing--by multiplying two three digit numbers in my head. We're back to where this started.Yes, but not by any fault of mine. A number of posters understood my point just fine. We discussed the issue. It was no big deal.

No, the fact that the correct answer coming out correlates to whether or not thoughts were in my head is the test.There are two explanations for your conclusions. To eliminate one of those your conclusion must presume the premise.

[RandFan]

Yes, I realize that you are just trolling but I'm happy at the moment to post support of my position.

In the 1970s, Libet was involved in research into neural activity and sensation thresholds. His initial investigations involved determining how much activation at specific sites in the brain was required to trigger artificial somatic sensations, relying on routine psychophysical procedures. This work soon crossed into an investigation into human consciousness; his most famous experiment demonstrates that the unconscious electrical processes in the brain called Bereitschaftspotential (or readiness potential) discovered by Lüder Deecke and Hans Helmut Kornhuber in 1968 precede conscious decisions to perform volitional, spontaneous acts, implying that unconscious neuronal processes precede and potentially cause volitional acts which are retrospectively felt to be consciously motivated by the subject. If this is true (I said "IF" as I've not taken a position) then an unconscious process in your brain is what chooses. No free will can be assumed.

BTW: Libet's conclusions have been replicated and extended (http://bps-research-digest.blogspot.com/2008/04/libet-redux-free-will-takes-another.html). The criticisms of Libet's work are not as strong as they were because of more precise measuring of the brain.

"Thus a network of high-level control areas can begin to shape an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness," the researchers concluded.

But I know yy2bggggs, I know. The evidence doesn't matter. That experts in their field say the same thing as I do doesn't matter. You will drone on and on with equations and verbose arguments.

Researchers: Our evidence indicates that unconscious brain activity occurs prior to conscious decisions.
yy2bggggs: But I can direct my thoughts to cause activity.
Researchers: No, our evidence indicates otherwise.
yy2bggggs: But Y = thoughts and X = activity and if there is no Y then there is no X QED.
Researchers: :facepalm:

[RandFan]

yy2bggggs, why don't you try to have your little thought experiment that demonstrate that the experiments of Libet and Chun Siong Soon are wrong published? Maybe you could win an award or gain recognition.

It's amazing these people didn't realize that directing thoughts to cause actions demonstrates that people can direct their thoughts to cause action in spite of evidence to the contrary. The mind boggles as to why such folks would even bother to conduct their experiments.

[maatorc]

yy2bggggs, why don't you try to have your little thought experiment that demonstrate that the experiments of Libet and Chun Siong Soon are wrong published? Maybe you could win an award or gain recognition.

It's amazing these people didn't realize that directing thoughts to cause actions demonstrates that people can direct their thoughts to cause action in spite of evidence to the contrary. The mind boggles as to why such folks would even bother to conduct their experiments.

You are correct: Will is mental desire. We cannot swim like a whale or fly like an eagle, and while will is not free in the sense of being unlimited, the choices within the context of our psycho-somatic constitution are vast.

[yy2bggggs]

It's amazing these people didn't realize that directing thoughts to cause actions demonstrates that people can direct their thoughts to cause action in spite of evidence to the contrary.
What evidence to the contrary? You're making that up. You are arbitrarily equating "direct my thoughts" with "being aware of my thoughts" and "being conscious of the thoughts". You are the one doing that, not me.

Here... a picture might help. This is just a simplified model, but you're still missing something critical here:
http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_206134af66946b44d3.png (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=18128)

Top left shows a basic control loop--something that happens in a coordinated goal-based act.

On the right hand side, A is a model of awareness. Note that it's scattered--note also that these modules have specialties--they're not necessarily redundant. Awareness is aspect oriented, not a singular thing. I've colored modules that receive information in this module blue--those you should consider "causally dirtied" by awareness. And as for consciousness, I direct you to the bottom left corner. D1 may be what we consider information that we are conscious of. That could involve, say, the modules required to come up with words for the thoughts, answer questions about them, etc. D2 might be a temporary state of partial consciousness while you're waking up, say, and that part of the brain that comes up with words just isn't awake (I don't know if that's a real state, but this is an example--I do know we can't always find the words for things, and there are states where we're completely jumbled). D3, we may simply describe as subconscious. These are merely matters of degree. D3 could very well still be called subconscious, if a white and blue module's colors just got mixed--if some other module had the information but that particular blue module did not--in other words, there is no "you-spot".

Now if there's any meaning at all to the phrase consciously directing, it is that the state D1 results in the action. This isn't what I'm arguing now, but it's what I'm depicting, because I want to show you exactly how your description is muddling things. So accept this scenario hypothetically as you will--as something sufficient for the type of free will I prescribe, but that may not actually occur. What I'm going to argue about, rather, is the meaning and implication of your terms.

If the phrase consciously directing is to have any sort of meaning at all, it is that D1 results in an action. Back to the right side, this is how actions result from D1. There are modules "dirtied" by awareness, but they have specialties. A particular module participates in carrying out a particular sort of action. So that's B. But that still follows from D1, so we still leave things dirty. Colored purple are the modules involved in the action. C is what happens when we add in the control loop--again, not all modules that are aware are involved. But some are.

So if we're to answer the question, as it applies to this case: "Did consciousness direct the action?" ...then the only meaningful answer is, yes, it did. D1 is consciousness, and because of those modules being blue, which is what consciousness is, the action occurred. Not all of those blue modules contributed to the action, true, but if I shut down my computer, I can say that MS Windows turns it off, even though it's really just a program that is part of Windows turning it off. These express a cause-in-fact.

Now what if things happened in a slightly different order? B and C occurred, but not all of the modules were dirtied--those blue modules in the diagram aren't yet blue... but later become blue? Now can we say that consciousness directed the action? And the answer is, yes, we still can. Those blue modules in B and C are inconsequential aspects of consciousness, and the same exact aspects that were required for B and C caused the same actions, in the same way, and consciousness occurs.

But you're wanting to argue either that there's some significant difference between these two scenarios, despite the fact that the same causal dependencies exist, or you're wanting to argue a straw-man--that "consciously directing" must mean all modules are involved (why must it mean that?)

That's enough for now. I'll save reiterating (I did give it) my argument that "I directed X" doesn't equate to "consciously directing X" for later... one thing at a time.

[RandFan]

What evidence to the contrary? You're making that up. You are arbitrarily equating "direct my thoughts" with "being aware of my thoughts" and "being conscious of the thoughts". Opponents and proponents of free will BOTH predict the conclusion to your little experiment. BOTH believe that we can direct our thoughts.

[yy2bggggs]

Opponents and proponents of free will BOTH predict the conclusion to your little experiment. BOTH believe that we can direct our thoughts.

Do both use the same definition of free will? Now we're getting back even earlier... see #41.

ETA: If both predict the conclusions to my little experiment, then you failed to demonstrate my definition absurd.

...unless you go a different route, that is... and explain why my definition of "free will" shouldn't be the "correct" one (that is, that it's not what people mean by free will)... which, of course, requires you to at least partially define free will (partial is okay),

...which you're doing anyway in your objections. But you don't want to mention what this definition is.

[RandFan]

Do both use the same definition of free will? As it applies to your experiment, yes, of course. Thoughts direct actions. If by "thoughts" it is meant brain processes that we are aware of as opposed to brain processes that we are not aware of (see Libet) then the proponents of free will would predict a given conclusion of your thought experiment. If thoughts are the totality of brain processes then opponents of free will predict the self same conclusion (which is the basis of the OP).

Your argument is and has always been circular and that's not going to change.

[yy2bggggs]

As it applies to your experiment, yes, of course. Thoughts direct actions.
(Sigh)... This was in response to the question: "Do both use the same definition of free will?".

That's a direct contradiction. If both use the same definition of "free will", there's no disagreement. But if they are proponents and opponents to the existence of free will, there is a disagreement.

Either there is a disagreement, or there isn't one.

Are you just trying to avoid defining free will RandFan?
Your argument is and has always been circular and that's not going to change.
My argument follows from my definition. This is not what "circular" means.

This makes your argument circular. You're arguing that defining doesn't help--that any definition leads to absurdity. But if a definition is given that doesn't lead to an absurdity, you're going to call it circular. And you're not going to give your own definition.

What a safe argument you have!

[RandFan]

(Sigh)... This was in response to the question: "Do both use the same definition of free will?".

That's a direct contradiction. If both use the same definition of "free will", there's no disagreement. Nonsense. They could use the same definition and one side think it exists and the other doesn't.

But if they are proponents and opponents to the existence of free will, there is a disagreement.For the sake of this excercise they both could be in agreement as to the definition but disagree as to whether it exists.

Either there is a disagreement, or there isn't one.Only as to whether it exists. Person A can believe in unicorns and person B can not believe. BOTH can have the same definition of unicorns.

Are you just trying to avoid defining free will RandFan?I don't see any need to define it but I'm happy to let you define it. However, it's quite easy to acknowledge that as it applies to your experiment both are in agreement.

[RandFan]

yy2bggggs definition of unicorns.

Proponents believe that they exist.
Opponents believe that they don't exist.
What?

[Gate2501]

My whole problem with what most people like to think of as "free will" is as follows:

1. I do not hold "free will" to be axiomatic in nature.

2. All macro-scale systems appear to be deterministic, and do not violate causality.

3. My brain is a macro-scale system.

4. The functioning of my brain must therefore not violate causality, unless it behaves differently than all other macro-scale systems.

5. There is no evidence that my brain is different than any other macro-scale system(in the way mentioned in 5), other than my own subjective experience making me feel as if I control the outcome of my "choices".

6. What my subjective experience leads me to believe is incorrect, or my brain can violate causality(there is no known, coherent way that it could do this).

7. It is more likely that my subjective experience is incorrect, misleading, or an illusion of sorts.


I feel that a huge part of the illusion of free will is caused by our minds taking account of our own experiences(memories, including those just written instants ago) when processing the outcome to a given scenario. It makes me feel as if I am deciding, when really the outcome is entirely causal.

That last bit is just my own personal philosophy on the matter.

[yy2bggggs]

Nonsense. They could use the same definition and one side think it exists and the other doesn't.
Completely irrelevant. Are they using the same definition of free will?
For the sake of this excercise they both could be in agreement as to the definition but disagree as to whether it exists.
You apparently are missing the point of this exercise.

Might I remind you that this stems from your claim that any definition leads to an absurdity.

ETA: This would include mine, and the definition a proponent uses, and the definition an opponent uses--you already contended mine wasn't absurd but instead "circular", which I have to assume simply means it's not the "correct" one by some standard; now you're pitting together two hypothetical question-begging proponent/opponents that disagree but agree with definitions, and stating that the fact that they disagree but agrees on definitions means something--without even saying what they are disagreeing about so that we know at least what it means.

Suppose I contended that a hypothetical proponent and opponent of free will could disagree about whether or not there were free will, but agree on definitions.

Now what? What exactly does that imply? Without saying what they are disagreeing with, this doesn't mean anything.

yy2bggggs definition of unicorns.
* Proponents believe that they exist.
* Opponents believe that they don't exist.

False analogy. We know exactly what form a unicorn takes. When the proponent says unicorns exist, he's talking about a horse-like creature with a horn. When the opponents say unicorns don't exist, he's also talking about a horse-like creature with a horn.

This is not so with the term "free will". Proponents and opponents are all over the place. You're pretending these are the same thing.

They're not.

You're wiggling your way around defining things. In doing so, you're begging the question. Let me know when you're ready to make meaningful claims.

[Malerin]

yy2bggggs definition of unicorns.

Proponents believe that they exist.
Opponents believe that they don't exist.
What?

Let it go. Bigggs will be more than happy to go round and round the sophistry bush.

[RandFan]

Completely irrelevant. Are they using the same definition of free will?I've already answered you and no, it's not irrelevant.

False analogy.No because it's possible to agree on a definition and disagree as to the existence of that which is defined.

You're wiggling your way around defining things. I've said over and over you are free to define it.

[yy2bggggs]

I've said over and over you are free to define it.

But that's exactly what I did. And you said it was circular.

...but only after I showed it didn't contradict anything in your model.

(It's not true that defining things such that they fit observations is circular. It would be fallacy if I made further conclusions that opponents, who didn't mean the same thing, were wrong, but I never did that.)

A relevant objection would be that my definition doesn't match what these other people are talking about. That's the way this whole thing should have progressed in the first place.

I can argue that it's sufficiently close to common usage to qualify for a definition of free will, as real people use it (this is indeed a match to a compatibilist concept of free will). So that means if you think that free will is absurd, and you think this isn't, you have to either argue that you don't mean this by free will--and show what you do mean instead... or contend that you're not making a meaningful claim.

[RandFan]

But that's exactly what I did. And you said it was circular. Directing your thoughts to cause action is that which is not at issue. Both schools of thought accept this. Both schools of thought predict that your experiment will have the same result and will demonstrate nothing of significance. If you are saying that directing your thoughts to cause action is free will then your conclusion presumes the premise.

[Belz...]

And on re-reading my post, neither did I.

No... but you said the "feeling that we control things". This "feeling" is irrelevant. I spoke of the actual control.

And you claimed it isn't incompatible with determinism. I disagree. If determinism is true then there is no control.

[yy2bggggs]

Directing your thoughts to cause action is that which is not at issue.
Then what is at issue, exactly? You're also the one that stated this was perfectly formed. Prove it!
Both schools of thought accept this. Both schools of thought predict that your experiment will have the same result and will demonstrate nothing of significance. If you are saying that directing your thoughts to cause action is free will then your conclusion presumes the premise.
I'm not making a premise. I'm making a definition, and a conclusion of observations matching the definition, in that order.

When we sense we are in control of a voluntary action, it involves a feedback loop similar to what I have shown. This isn't sufficient now--the information has to make it to a D1 level. But according to the latest emerging models, as I see it, it's definitely:
The thing that is sensed
Something that involves a predictive element associated with the action
That predictive element influences the action
Something that we internally attribute to sensing that we did the action
Furthermore, it would be impossible for "us" to sense the act unless "we" are actually connected, at the very least, to the thing that does perform the act. And if there's no "you-spot"--if it's really distributed, there's a question of whether or not this connection actually extends who we are rather than merely being a thing "we" talk to over the "brain bus".

When you piece all of this together, we are sensing some things that are correct--we're sensing that something is controling the action. And there's one thing that's up for debate--whether or not that something really is "us".

And that's a lot more arbitrary than you're giving it credence for. But you need to argue that it's absurd to claim that this thing that does control is me. I (A) sense that it's me. I (B) say that it's me. So if I'm mistaken, by what context am I mistaken?

(A) and (B) are much more problematic than you might think. If I am not what I sense myself to be, what exactly am I? You need a meaningful context with which to say that I'm wrong. You're just taking for granted that you have one.

[Belz...]

No. I'm stating that free will is ultimately an absurd concept as it can't be demonstrated

I'd also like to point out that it also can't be defined in a non-contradictory way.

yy2bggggs, Randfan, there's lots of fun conversations to be had about free will and brain processes, but not when we're calling one another liars and idiots. Right ?

[yy2bggggs]

If determinism is true then there is no control.
If the system has a goal that it works to achieve, especially if it can adjust to changing environments in real time to continue to achieve that goal, would you not call that control?

Said systems can be entirely deterministic.

[RandFan]

Then what is at issue, exactly? That the notion of free will or the lack thereof are ultimatly absurd as there is no real way to distinguish them (see thread title).

I'm not making a premise. I'm making a definition, and a conclusion of observations matching the definition, in that order. The premise is that you direct your thoughts to cause an action (a premise that is suppose to be in support of the conclusion). This is also the conclusion. Namely that you can direct your thoughts to cause actions in a way that not having free will can't.

In truth both free will models and non-free will models hold that we can direct thoughts to cause action (or at least believe that we direct our thoughts to cause action). (see Libet)

[RandFan]

If the system has a goal that it works to achieve, especially if it can adjust to changing environments in real time to continue to achieve that goal, would you not call that control?

Said systems can be entirely deterministic.:rolleyes: Welcome to the party pal.

[yy2bggggs]

The premise is that you direct your thoughts to cause an action (a premise that is suppose to be in support of the conclusion).
No. That is not a premise. It's based on an observation. Two three digit numbers pop up on the screen. The correct product churns out if I have the thoughts. I correlate the answer coming out to the thoughts.

They're the kinds of thoughts that I measure directly--again, the AHS actually illustrates what this means. In the AHS patient, the LH tossing the cigarette was observed, but only indirectly. So that's what I mean by my thoughts.
This is also the conclusion. Namely that you can direct your thoughts to cause actions in a way that not having free will can't. Yep. Neither of my hands are alien hands.
In truth both free will models and non-free will models hold that we can direct thoughts to cause action (or at least believe that we direct our thoughts to cause action). (see Libet)
But that doesn't mean anything, unless you show that the involved models are using the same dictionary. You haven't shown that.

Besides, even if they are using the same dictionary, all you're showing is that people disagree. You aren't showing the concept is absurd. There's a bigger burden of proof to the claim that it's absurd no matter what the definition, than merely pointing to experts who disagree. I would hope... otherwise, let's discuss some absurd physics theories.

[RandFan]

The correct product churns out if I have the thoughts. True given a free will model or one that is not free will.

Yep. Neither of my hands are alien hands. But either or both could be and if they were it would demonstrate that there are brain processes that you are not aware of.

There's a bigger burden of proof to the claim that it's absurd no matter what the definition, than merely pointing to experts who disagree. I would hope... otherwise, let's discuss some absurd physics theories. "proof"?

Not my argument (yes you've created a straw man). I'm stating an opinion and inviting people to show how behavior for free will would be different than non-free will. I leave open the definition of free will to those who want to take me up on it.

[yy2bggggs]

True given a free will model or one that is not free will.
And if they are two different models, then nothing of value was demonstrated.

[RandFan]

And if they are two different models, then nothing of value was demonstrated.:) Thank you.

[RandFan]

Yep. Neither of my hands are alien hands. But either or both could be and if they were it would demonstrate that there are brain processes that you are not aware of.

There's a bigger burden of proof to the claim that it's absurd no matter what the definition, than merely pointing to experts who disagree. I would hope... otherwise, let's discuss some absurd physics theories. "proof"?

Not my argument (yes you've created a straw man). I'm stating an opinion and inviting people to show how behavior for free will would be different than non-free will. I leave open the definition of free will to those who want to take me up on it.

[yy2bggggs]

But either or both could be and if they were it would demonstrate that there are brain processes that you are not aware of.You're still battling a straw man yourself. Awareness is only of secondary concern in my model. Of primary concern is whether or not the thing is "you", which we can speak of, in a useful sense, in terms of interconnectedness.

The AHS girl we talked about from the wiki article demonstrates exactly what I mean by this. She had one alien hand--her left hand. Her right hand was categorically different.

If her brain was reconnected, as if no severing ever took place, she would have zero alien hands, and the resulting situation would be categorically different.

That difference is one of her controlling both hands. That there is a difference at all demonstrated in this scenario shows both that there's a real meaning I'm proposing, and that people who don't have alien hands are on the control their hands side.
"proof"?
No. "Burden of proof"--in this case, the standard by which you would demonstrate the claim.
Not my argument (yes you've created a straw man).I'm willing to accept this. But first, you have to explain post #64 to me, because that is where I get that it's your argument that any definition of free will leads to an absurdity. And that's what I've been objecting to all of this time.

For convenience, here it is:
...why do you think you're disagreeing with me?Better defining "free will" won't resolve the problem. In the end any definition will lead to absurdity. X = Not X.
I'm stating an opinion and inviting people to show how behavior for free will would be different than non-free will.In the OP, yes. But I didn't bother introducing my definition to discuss the OP. I introduced it to discuss your claims in post #64.

You haven't demonstrated an absurdity--not even that I have any alien hands. In fact, I think it absurd to make the claim that I have some sort of "whole-body AHS".

[RandFan]

Better defining "free will" won't resolve the problem. In the end any definition will lead to absurdity. X = Not X. Post # 64

I believe that it is true. It's a statement of opinion. One that I would happily be shown wrong about. To date I've not seen anything to suggest otherwise.

Perhaps I should have written it differently.

Given that X = Free Will and Y = Behavior

X = Y
Not X = Y

[RandFan]

That difference is one of her controlling both hands. That there is a difference at all demonstrated in this scenario shows both that there's a real meaning I'm proposing, and that people who don't have alien hands are on the control their hands side.In the example you cite of the litter girl, who is controling the other hand?

[RandFan]

No. "Burden of proof"--in this case, the standard by which you would demonstrate the claim.Oh come one. That's awfully weasely. You berate me for using the word "proof" and then you use the word "proof". I accept that "burden of proof" is but a figure of speech but that's how I used it.

At least be consistent.

[yy2bggggs]

In the example you cite of the litter girl, who is controling the other hand?
Another set of interconnected modules.
A "useful sense"?

You don't really get to use AHS to support your claim after demanding post after post that awareness wasn't at issue.
Yes I do, because awareness still measures what I'm talking about--in the same exact fashion that the same exact awareness measures other natural phenomenon.

And the girl is aware both of what her left-hand is doing and of what her right-hand is doing. But her being aware of what her left-hand is doing doesn't count, does it? You're still going to argue that she doesn't control her left hand.

Something is distinct between the two scenarios, and it's not awareness that illustrates the distinction. It's interconnectivity. The interconnectivity comes into play in defining a coherent, singular entity.

And that is the "I" that we're talking about.
You are moving the goal posts.Why do you persist, every time there's an imagined conflict, on assuming I'm at fault?
AHS demonstrates that it is possible for there to be processes that we are not aware of (and AHS isn't the only example).
And AHS also has a common theme--brain damage, split-brain, etc. It demonstrates that the "I" is divisible. The negative of AHS demonstrates this even more strongly.

Normal people go on autopilot constantly as well. They still don't tend to behave in the way that the AHS patient did, even while on autopilot.

[RandFan]

Another set of interconnected modules.But it is still her?

You're still going to argue that she doesn't control her left hand. I'm arguing that she isn't consciously controlling her left hand. Of course she (her brain) is controlling her left hand.

Something is distinct between the two scenarios, and it's not awareness that illustrates the distinction. It's interconnectivity. The interconnectivity comes into play in defining a coherent, singular entity. She is not consciously directing her actions. She is not aware of what her left hand will do, or, she does not perceive that she is aware of what her left hand will do. It comes as a surprise to her.

I know what my left hand will do (or I'm aware of what my left hand will do). Usually. Sometimes it twitches involuntarily and that is a surprise to me. Interconnectedness is important. I don't at all dismiss it. That interconnectedness is at the root of the problem doesn't obviate my point.

There are brain processes.
Some we are aware of (they don't surprise us when they happen).
Some are not.
Normal people go on autopilot constantly as well. They still don't tend to behave in the way that the AHS patient did, even while on autopilot. For the very reason you state. I don't believe that we fundamentally disagree as to the function of the human brain and awareness. Our only disagreement is as to whether or not we can direct our thoughts to cause action in a way that a model that precludes free will does not allow.

[yy2bggggs]

But it is still her?Assuming corpus callosotomy, it's probably pretty safe to assume that she was split into two different individuals.

It's really, really, simple RandFan. You're overcomplicating this. Where once there was a big set of interconnected modules, now there are two sets--one for each hemisphere.
I'm arguing that she isn't consciously controlling her left hand. Of course she (her brain) is controlling her left hand.The first "she" is a social entity. That's the one you can talk to. The second "she" is the other one--the one you can't talk to. But the second one doesn't want to smoke cigarettes.

The brain was split into two pieces. There are now essentially two brains in the head--each disconnected from each other. The one controlling her alien hand may very well be similar to this:
Jill Bolte Taylor's stroke of insight [TED] (http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/jill_bolte_taylor_s_powerful_stroke_of_insight.htm l)

Nevertheless, focusing on the social entity:
She is not consciously directing her actions. She is not aware of what her left hand will do, or, she does not perceive that she is aware of what her left hand will do. It comes as a surprise to her.
...then certainly. There's a meaningful difference between the left hand and the right hand.

Then again, there's a meaningful difference between the left hand and the right hand. If you're going to use that difference to define what it means to control a hand, wouldn't that box you into the position that she does control her right hand?
Our only disagreement is as to whether or not we can direct our thoughts to cause action in a way that a model that precludes free will does not allow.
...but either what you think is not happening is so fuzzy as to be meaningless, or it's meaningful. If you want to convince me that it's meaningful, you need to demonstrate a meaningful difference--such as what this girl can do with her right hand and not with her left hand.

I'm running with that as the meaningful difference. And since it really is meaningful, I'm all set. The only possible legitimate argument you can make is that this doesn't match other people's definitions of free will.

And if that's all the disagreement is about, then it's a disagreement over dictionaries.

[RandFan]

You're overcomplicating this.I'm really not.

Where once there was a big set of interconnected modules, now there are two sets--one for each hemisphere. Duh. None of anything you've said obviates my point.

"Meaningful difference"? You are the one that is overcomplicating this.

If you're going to use that difference to define what it means to control a hand, wouldn't that box you into the position that she does control her right hand? She controls both hands. She's aware of one and not the other one.

There's two possibilities.

1.) She directs both hands but only consciously directs her right hand (free will).
2.) She directs both hands but perceives that she directs her right hand (no free will).

We are not getting anywhere. I know you want it to be about definitions but it just isn't. Sorry.

[yy2bggggs]

There's two possibilities.

1.) She directs both hands but only consciously directs her right hand (free will).
2.) She directs both hands but perceives that she directs her right hand (no free will).
False dichotomy.

Try this:

3.) What used to be "she" was cut into two pieces, one of which directs her left hand, the other directs her right hand.

After all, her brain was cut into two. Is it impossible for you to imagine she was cut into two?
I know you want it to be about definitions but it just isn't.
Almost. It should be about meaning.

[RandFan]

After all, her brain was cut into two. Is it impossible for you to imagine she was cut into two? If by "she" you mean her sense of self or her personality, never thought otherwise. It's not necessary for there to be a physical separation by the way. You really need to read Ramachandran's book. Brain pathology is quite varied and it is the pathology that gives us insight into how brain processes lead to a sense of self and why past conventional view has been wrong. BTW, the symptom is also brought on by stroke and infection. No bifurcation of the brain is necessary.

I'll grant you the third option. It's still demonstrable that there are still brain processes that she isn't aware of. And given that bifurcation isn't necassary for the syndrome then the point is doubly moot.

[yy2bggggs]

I'll grant you the third option. It's still demonstrable that there are still brain processes that she isn't aware of.Of course, if by "she" you're referring to the set of interconnected processes that talks to you.
And given that bifurcation isn't necassary for the syndrome then the point is doubly moot.Well let's see... if the principle behind the third option is correct, "callosotomy" isn't the critical factor, but rather, a break in the interconnection of modules.

Per the wiki article you linked to, other causes are "other brain surgery, strokes, or infections". Since this list looks like it could also be responsible for a break in the interconnections between modules, then I've yet to be surprised.

So I'm not convinced it's moot.

[Belz...]

Ugh. I'm having trouble following both of your arguments, here. Maybe I'm a little slow or just tired... a short summary each, perhaps ?

[dlorde]

I'm no physicist, but whenever I read an explanation of quantum physics for the layman and they speak of the uncertainty of how sub-atomic particles will react, I wonder if that uncertainty is the source of human free will.
That uncertainty effect has been shown to be so far below the scale of the neurons that are generally believed to be responsible for maintaining consciousness that it cannot have any direct influence.

If we had a completely deterministic universe in which all outcomes could be predicted, it seems to me that everything would be predestined and that free will would not exist.
How could you tell the difference?

Can you tell here and now whether you really have free will, or whether every sensation, thought and action is pre-determined?

The unpredictability of the universe as described by quantum physics explains (at least in my mind) how free will could exist.

Does this make sense to anybody else?
No, not really. I can see why you may feel that, but (apart from the fact that quantum randomness is not relevant at the appropriate scale) you seem to be confusing unpredictability with randomness. The universe may be deterministic but unpredictable. Does that change your view of free will?

[dlorde]

If we had no free will then we would find that our actions were never or rarely the result of an intention

In other words we would never or rarely be able to answer the question "why did you do that?" with a statement about an intention.

If you truthfully answered the question "did you intend to do that" the answer would normally be "no".
Unless, of course, we generate a plausible explanation (confabulation) for our actions after the fact when our consciousness has not been fully aware of the deliberations leading to those actions. There is experimental evidence that this is often (usually?) what happens in those circumstances.

[dlorde]

It does seem awkward to talk about an undefined/multiply defined term like 'free will' in terms of another poorly defined term, 'consciousness'...

The problem is that you think there are two different kinds of processes--those we aren't conscious of, and those we are.

Consciousness, though, is not a type of process in this sense. It's not an action. It's information about an action getting propagated.

Furthermore, you are not a ball of "conscious stuff". You are, instead, a bunch of different interconnected aspects. You are your memory. You are your beliefs, your desires, your sensations. Every different aspect of you is a different brain cell in a different place, and they have to communicate with each other in order for your "you-ness" to be coherent and integrated as you take for granted that it is.

Here's the absurdity laid out a certain way. I have a thought. But I'm presumably mistaken about it in that I think I am the one having the thought. In reality, though, the thought arises from the subconscious, and not me. Does that about sum it up?

I pretty much agree with this sentiment. The mental 'I' that thinks and initiates actions is the sum of the processes in my brain. I am consciously aware of some of these processes for varying lengths of time and in varying amounts of detail (typically superficial). When I am consciously aware of a decision process, from the start of weighing up the options through to taking an action, it feels as if I consciously made the decision and acted. When I am not aware of this process, it feels as if it was subconscious - but in both cases the whole system is involved. In the first case, I think it more correct to say 'I was conscious of making the decision' rather than 'I consciously made the decision'. The latter mode of expression implies that consciousness has a special (unexplained) agency, and this erroneous emphasis is where the idea of 'free will' finds a foot-hold.

[RandFan]

Per the wiki article you linked to, other causes are "other brain surgery, strokes, or infections". Since this list looks like it could also be responsible for a break in the interconnections between modules, then I've yet to be surprised. "Could also be responsible"... Yeah, could be. Then it again it's possible that it coudn't be. Sheesh. Anything that could even remotely fit your world view including "possible". So just make the data fit.

[RandFan]

It does seem awkward to talk about an undefined/multiply defined term like 'free will' in terms of another poorly defined term, 'consciousness'... Which raises the question, why can't someone define better define it in order to remove ambiguity? My point is that improved definition isn't likely to solve anything. I suspect that at best we can find different points of perception to justify a position. Dennett and Libet need not be at odds and it's possible that we both have and don't have free will.

[RandFan]

I chose not to respond to this earlier but having noted it from diordes post I would like to say that yy2bgggs' post are so replete with straw men, non sequiturs and irrelevancies that I really need to point them out at least once.

Consciousness, though, is not a type of process in this sense.I never said otherwise.

It's not an action. I never said otherwise.

It's information about an action getting propagated.I never said otherwise.

Furthermore, you are not a ball of "conscious stuff".I never said otherwise.

You are, instead, a bunch of different interconnected aspects.I never said otherwise.


You are your memory. I never said otherwise.

You are your beliefs, your desires, your sensations.I never said otherwise.

Every different aspect of you is a different brain cell in a different place, and they have to communicate with each other in order for your "you-ness" to be coherent and integrated as you take for granted that it is.I never said otherwise.

Here's the absurdity laid out a certain way. I have a thought. But I'm presumably mistaken about it in that I think I am the one having the thought.A.) I don't hold this view. B.) I don't suggest that this is part of the model posited by Blackmore, Libet and others. It's a straw man of your invention and isn't supported by anything that I've said.

In reality, though, the thought arises from the subconscious, and not me. The subconscious IS you.

Does that about sum it up?No, no, no, no, no and no.

In all honesty you are so blinded by whatever it is you think I'm saying that I don't think you have even the slightest clue as to what it that I'm saying. Which is why it has been so frustrating to even attempt a discussion or debate with you. I'll concede that I've not made your job easy at times as I assumed that you had a rudimentary understanding of the non-free will side of the argument but I don't think the problem is entirely mine. I don't think you have made any serious effort to understand me as you have time and again falsely attributed things to me.

[RandFan]

My position. Our actions are the result of the totality of our brain processes. Some of our brain processes we are consciously aware of and some we are not aware of. There is a school of thought advanced by Libet and others that there are in a number of species, humans and others, an emergent property we call consciousness. Consciousness is an awareness of our thoughts and the effect that our thoughts have on our actions. According to Libet our sense of self is an illusion but not an illusion in the sense that it doesn't exist only an illusion in that it isn't exactly as it seems. As it applies to free will the illusison is to think what we we consciously weigh options and make a decision (should we have soup or salad) when in Libet's opinion we don't. However, this model holds that our ability to be aware of our thoughts effect long term decisions.

I make no categorical distinction between brain processes except to say that some we are consciously aware of and some we are not. I don't posit a conscious layer or module. If my choice of words have been misleading then I apologize but A.) I have apologized and corrected and B.) I've not really used words or figures of speech not used by Dennet, Pinker and others to communicate my ideas in a way that they have. I think you have gone out of your way to misunderstand me and I offer as "proof" of that your berating me for the use of the word proof even though I did so colloquialy and then you turn around and use the word "proof" yourself in a colloquial fashion.

I accused you of dishonesty, as I have done so in the past and invariably, I confess, I've had to apologize. I'm not sure such an apology is warranted in this instance. I can't read your mind so I don't know to what extent you've been obtuse but I can say I see no effort on your part to understand my intent. You clearly have an agenda because you think I've acted arrogantly and dismissively of your point about definition. I understand that but I don't really think this was at all necessary.

[RandFan]

I'd also like to point out that it also can't be defined in a non-contradictory way.

yy2bggggs, Randfan, there's lots of fun conversations to be had about free will and brain processes, but not when we're calling one another liars and idiots. Right ?I should have responded to you earlier. See my previous post. I just don't think yy2bggggs has endeavored to engage me in discussion but instead is playing ¿Quién es más macho?. I should have ingored him from the start.

Ego, aint it a bitch?

[Robin]

Unless, of course, we generate a plausible explanation (confabulation) for our actions after the fact when our consciousness has not been fully aware of the deliberations leading to those actions. There is experimental evidence that this is often (usually?) what happens in those circumstances.
As I pointed out before, only in very short term decisions.

I don't really consider very short term decisions as examples of free will, I am thinking more of considered decisions.

But I am happy to concede that even in these cases the conscious part is the very tip of the mental iceberg.

[yy2bggggs]

The subconscious IS you.
Okay, but that brings us back to post 67, where I defined free will as follows:
Free will means that I'm able to act causally based on my thoughts. So I'm going to say we have free will.
...and asked you to demonstrate that this was absurd.

[RandFan]

Free will means that I'm able to act causally based on my thoughts. So I'm going to say we have free will.
...and asked you to demonstrate that this was absurd.By the same meaning we don't have free will. If by thoughts you simply mean brain processes then all theories of mind (free will models and non-free will models) make this assumption.

[yy2bggggs]

I'm confused about both statements in your response.

Your claim in post 64 was that a definition wouldn't help--that "X is not X". But there are two sentences in your response:
By the same meaning we don't have free will.
...why would this not be helped by a refined definition? Especially since, earlier, you actually granted that thoughts led to action.
If by thoughts you simply mean brain processes then all theories of mind (free will models and non-free will models) make this assumption.
...and why is this even relevant to the criteria?

Let's take two of those models. F and N. Without loss of generality, F is any free will model you choose. N is any non-free will model you choose.

Case 1: Now if F conflicts with N, we have a problem. One or both F and N must be false. But if this is the case, one of them could be right, free will is meaningful with respect to the two models, and nothing is absurd--simply one of them is wrong.

Case 2: F and N are orthogonal--they don't really have anything to do with each other. Then both, or neither, could be true, or either one, and between the two, there's simply a disagreement of dictionaries.

Case 3: F and N are the same thing. Then both, or neither, could be false. Here, by definition of the case, both would have the same model, and they would still have a disagreement of dictionaries.

In Case 1, you didn't start out with an absurdity in the first place.

In Case 2, and Case 3, a refined definition would help clarify things.

So in none of these cases do you have an absurdity that a definition cannot resolve.

Am I missing something?