Thought experiment refutes immaterialism!

[ceptimus]

Assume that in 100 years time, scientists have built a robot with a computer brain. The robot is able to function like a normal intelligent human. It can read, talk, argue, drive a car, play sport, appreciate art and literature, fall in love and so on.

Almost everyone agrees that the robot is conscious. It claims that it is 'just as conscious as everyone else' when you ask it, and is able to engage in the same sort of arguments and discussion that we do in these forums.

Does this thought experiment refute immaterialism?

[espritch]

Since immaterialism assumes that the immaterial world somehow interacts with the material to allow a conscious to reside in our brains, there is no good reason why it could not also interact in the same fashion with this conscious computer. So, no, I don't think it refutes immaterialism.

It is pretty much impossible to refute an idea that is based on no evidence to begin with. :p

[Pahansiri]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Assume that in 100 years time, scientists have built a robot with a computer brain. The robot is able to function like a normal intelligent human. It can read, talk, argue, drive a car, play sport, appreciate art and literature, fall in love and so on.

Almost everyone agrees that the robot is conscious. It claims that it is 'just as conscious as everyone else' when you ask it, and is able to engage in the same sort of arguments and discussion that we do in these forums.

Does this thought experiment refute immaterialism?

The problem is the base of your statement “ assume and that this assumption contains so many possibilities of variables.


I.e. things that are a mechanical response as in read, talk drive a car, play sport or even to a point appreciate art and literature 9 these 2 perhaps along with argue can be a programmed response.


But then you add the things that would indicate a sense of “self” or self awareness these being fall in love and so on. Emotions.

Almost everyone agrees that the robot is conscious. It claims that it is 'just as conscious as everyone else'

For me I could not agree something that may be is anything but “may be” and in such a case as to just my belief too many variables. I.e. programming could be the controlling and driving “force” data in data out.

Would “it” be arguing or would it be the arguing of the programmer?


when you ask it, and is able to engage in the same sort of arguments and discussion that we do in these forums.


Would “it” be arguing or would it be the arguing of the programmer?

Just what I believe.

[El Greco]

Originally posted by ceptimus
It claims that it is 'just as conscious as everyone else' when you ask it, and is able to engage in the same sort of arguments and discussion that we do in these forums.

I hope you are not talking about me again. It will be hard for me to vindicate my humanity.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Assume that in 100 years time, scientists have built a robot with a computer brain. The robot is able to function like a normal intelligent human. It can read, talk, argue, drive a car, play sport, appreciate art and literature, fall in love and so on.

Almost everyone agrees that the robot is conscious. It claims that it is 'just as conscious as everyone else' when you ask it, and is able to engage in the same sort of arguments and discussion that we do in these forums.

Does this thought experiment refute immaterialism?

No, how would you know the robot isn't effectively a p-zombie? You see you beg the question by equating function with consciousness ;)

[ceptimus]

Ian, are you saying that there is (even in principle) no test that will allow us to determine whether or not something is conscious?

Do you think I am conscious? How can you tell?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Ian, are you saying that there is (even in principle) no test that will allow us to determine whether or not something is conscious?

Do you think I am conscious? How can you tell?

I think anomalous cognition (ESP) plays a role in addition to the totality of ones behaviour.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Pahansiri
The problem is the base of your statement “ assume and that this assumption contains so many possibilities of variables.I know. I really started the thread as a sort of wry comment on Ian's thread (http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=32961), where he suggests that the 'Newcomb's paradox' thought experiment might 'prove' something about dualism and souls. Personally, I don't see how thought experiments can show anything fresh about religious/philosophical questions of this type.

But this thread might be interesting in its own right. We'll see.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I think anomalous cognition (ESP) plays a role in addition to the totality of ones behaviour. So lets add the assumption that you can meet and talk to this robot, and you get the 'feeling' that it is conscious. What would this mean?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And let's also say that some psion comes along and claims to have a telepathic communication with the robot.

~~Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
So lets add the assumption that you can meet and talk to this robot, and you get the 'feeling' that it is conscious. What would this mean?

It would mean that there doesn't seem any good reason to suppose people are conscious but robots aren't. But since robots are purely mechanical, and we know how they work, then its consciousness must be equated to its functional states. We should then note that it would be peculiar for the origin of the robot's consciousness to be different from our own (given that the robot's and our consciousnesses are "similar"). Hence our consciousnesses also should be equated to our functional states. This then implies functionalist materialism is the correct position in the mind/body problem.

If one wanted to escape such a conclusion one could of course adopt solipsism. One wouldn't necessarily need to deny the existence of an external world, or even physical world, but there would be no consciousnesses in such a world (apart from, of course, your own).

[WinAce]

The split-brain experiment alone refutes immaterialism.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by WinAce
The split-brain experiment alone refutes immaterialism.

Just to clarify. It refutes the notion that there is no material world at all? That's what immaterialism means although no-one on this board seems to understand this ;) Or do you mean it refutes any non-materialist position?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No, how would you know the robot isn't effectively a p-zombie? You see you beg the question by equating function with consciousness ;)
Well, if it acts like a person, walks like a person, quacks like a person, and is indistinguishable from a person, then it is a person.

If the "zombie" exhibits all the symptoms of consciousness, then the "zombie" is not a zombie; for to exhibit all the symptoms of consciousness is to have consciousness, which the zombie is denied by definition


Random Inquery: I step into a futuristic machine. It scans all the atoms in my body (position, spin, etc.). As if by a miracle of Quantum Mechanics, the machine zaps into place all the atoms in the proper place with spin. My material body is recreated exactly, will the Yahweh Copy be conscious?

[RussDill]

All you would need to do is let the robots on their own (maybe just in a computer, why all the parts) and let them come up with the notion of conciousness on their own rather than telling them about it.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by RussDill
All you would need to do is let the robots on their own (maybe just in a computer, why all the parts) and let them come up with the notion of conciousness on their own rather than telling them about it.
If for any reason those robots invent a religion, I'm putting the blame square on your shoulders :p

[metacristi]

ceptimus

Does this thought experiment refute immaterialism?


Thought experiments never qualifies as proofs,there is no necessity that logical conclusions,even correctly derived from a set of premises considered true,experimetally derived,must also hold experimentally.Not even in the case when is proved that the conclusion is unique.Only if immaterialism were proved inconsistent internally or incompatible with observed facts would we have a more solid base,inductively derived,to consider it as refuted.Not the case I'm afraid.

But it would certainly represent a sufficient reason to consider that consciousness is entirely material and that relations between physical 'entities' (known or not) are enough to give rise to the consciousness based on observed facts if such a robot will be built in practice.Moreover if the architecture of the brain is macroscopic and computational (using switches and logic gates,not depending on quantum effects) the argument would represent a sufficient reason to consider that the computational emergentist theory of consciousness is much more than a simple open conjecture.

Indeed since the observed facts are the basis of all 'objective knowledge' [not some possible 'hidden reality' acting behind the scene,potentially unknowable-even if it existed ontologically the burden of proof is upon those who make the positive claim that it exist] and given the lack of any serious scientific alternative this is the only rational conclusion which can be derived from the current variant of the scientific method.

Of course this does not imply certitudes since all we can do is to make the constatation that the external behaviour of the robot is indistinguishable from that of a human being,a fact exploited by the 'zombies' argument.Even if we constructed a perfect clone (experimentally indistinguishable at the level of 'architecture') of a human being from raw material.

Anyway even if such a robot will ever be built,giving us a high degree of confidence that consciousness is entirely physical certified by the best method of establishing the truth,it is far from giving sufficient arguments that we and our reality are not in the 'mind of God' as simple 'information'.Depends therefore of what you mean by 'immaterialism'.If immaterialism merely means that consciousness is,at least,not entirely physical (stuff we can potentially probe) then yes the construction of a robot whose behaviour is indistiguishable from that of a human being does represent a sufficient reason against (Berkeleyan type or matrix type, where minds belong to a higher-up level different from the world we observe around,included).If immaterialism is extended to mean the existence of transcedental entities such a Creator (we and our reality being mere information or existing in the 'mind of God') or the existence of 'substances' which cannot interact with the physical then the construction of such a robot cannot qualify as a sufficient reason against.

[metacristi]

Overlook it.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh

Well, if it acts like a person, walks like a person, quacks like a person, and is indistinguishable from a person, then it is a person.

If the "zombie" exhibits all the symptoms of consciousness, then the "zombie" is not a zombie; for to exhibit all the symptoms of consciousness is to have consciousness, which the zombie is denied by definition



I'm not sure you understand what Dennet is saying when he says this. He's not just simply saying that if it walks like a person etc that it is extremely likely it is conscious. Rather if it walks, talks, behaves like a person, then it is a person by definition. But then he's defining our mentality exclusively in terms of behaviour. Basically then he is saying consciousness doesn't exist. And if were ever to build an android, then it would be conscious by definition.




Random Inquery: I step into a futuristic machine. It scans all the atoms in my body (position, spin, etc.). As if by a miracle of Quantum Mechanics, the machine zaps into place all the atoms in the proper place with spin. My material body is recreated exactly, will the Yahweh Copy be conscious?

You'd get a corpse.

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

Whose the chick?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I'm not sure you understand what Dennet is saying when he says this. He's not just simply saying that if it walks like a person etc that it is extremely likely it is conscious. Rather if it walks, talks, behaves like a person, then it is a person by definition. But then he's defining our mentality exclusively in terms of behaviour. Basically then he is saying consciousness doesn't exist. And if were ever to build an android, then it would be conscious by definition. And I thought you were never going to read Dennett?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You'd get a corpse. Yes, we've done this one to death haven't we? :D

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
[B]Ian,

Whose the chick?



Huh? :confused: What chick?

[whitefork]

He speaks of what I suspect is the photo of a younger Ian you're using as your avatar. A comment on the hair, perhaps.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Huh? :confused: What chick? Either that or you've grown your hair long!


edit: oops, sorry, I didn't see your post, Kullervo

[Dorian Gray]

If for any reason those robots invent a religion, I'm putting the blame square on your shoulders No, Dave.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You'd get a corpse.
Well isnt that depressing...

Was there something wrong with the Yahweh Copy, the process of copying, or my presumptions on the origins of consciousness?

(I'm going to take a leap of faith and assume you will choose option #3...)

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Yes, we've done this one to death haven't we? :D
Around and around and around and around like a carousel...

Woohee!

[billydkid]

My problem with immaterialism is that it adds nothing to the equation. You don't need it to come up with the reality of the universe. There is nothing in our experience of the world that can not be accounted for materially. Immaterialism brings nothing to the party.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Immaterialism brings consciousness to the party, if you believe that consciousness cannot be material by definition.

Seems to me it's easier just to change the definition, but then I'm not an immaterialist.

~~ Paul

[Yahweh]

I wouldnt be an Immaterialist because I dont see consciousness any more spectacular than other functions of the body such as digestion...

(And I also dont see the concept of consciousness as a substance or a "something" in any sense...)

[BillyJoe]

Yahweh,

Originally posted by Yahweh
I wouldnt be an Immaterialist because I dont see consciousness any more spectacular than other functions of the body such as digestion...I hope you have other reasons to be an immaterialist because, quite frankly and very clearly, consciousness is far more spectacular than digestion. For one thing, digestion we have down to a tee but with consciousness we are just scratching the surface.

BillyJoe

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Yahweh,

I hope you have other reasons to be an immaterialist because, quite frankly and very clearly, consciousness is far more spectacular than digestion. For one thing, digestion we have down to a tee but with consciousness we are just scratching the surface.
Maybe I could adopt Immaterialism until we figure Consciousness out, then maybe I'll pick a religion (any religion which offers eternal life is better than no religion), then I could deny that the external world exists...

Or I could go the other way, I could say digestion couldnt logically be explained as a set of Materialistic functions...

(Yeah! First quasi-sarcastic post of 2004!)

[wraith]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Assume that in 100 years time, scientists have built a robot with a computer brain. The robot is able to function like a normal intelligent human. It can read, talk, argue, drive a car, play sport, appreciate art and literature, fall in love and so on.

Almost everyone agrees that the robot is conscious. It claims that it is 'just as conscious as everyone else' when you ask it, and is able to engage in the same sort of arguments and discussion that we do in these forums.

Does this thought experiment refute immaterialism?

It depends on what the criteria is for something to be regarded as being conscious.

[wraith]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Random Inquery: I step into a futuristic machine. It scans all the atoms in my body (position, spin, etc.). As if by a miracle of Quantum Mechanics, the machine zaps into place all the atoms in the proper place with spin. My material body is recreated exactly, will the Yahweh Copy be conscious?

I would say yes.

What does this show though?

[Abdul Alhazred]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Assume that in 100 years time, scientists have built a robot with a computer brain. The robot is able to function like a normal intelligent human. It can read, talk, argue, drive a car, play sport, appreciate art and literature, fall in love and so on.


I won't assume anything of the sort. I'm an atheist and a materialist, but I'm also a skeptic. I'll believe such a machine when it is produced, not before.


Almost everyone agrees that the robot is conscious.


Except me.


It claims that it is 'just as conscious as everyone else' when you ask it, and is able to engage in the same sort of arguments and discussion that we do in these forums.


Whoop-di-do! I can easily write a program that says "I am conscious".


10 PRINT "I am conscious"
20 GOTO 10


The same sort of arguments? What arguments? Prove you are conscious (and not a 'bot).


Does this thought experiment refute immaterialism?

Sorry, pal. I am a materialist like you, but you have to do better than this.

[!Xx+-Rational-+xX!]

I just posted this but I must post it again here!

We are no more conscious then robots or computers! Unlike most humans robots accept that there is nothing beyond physical matter and they don't look to far out fairy tales to add meaning to life where there is none! They act as they are materialistically programmed through natural laws!

[ceptimus]

Abdul,

It works best if you read a thread, before you post to it. But never mind. :)

[gentlehorse]

Originally posted by Pahansiri
For me I could not agree something that may be is anything but “may be” and in such a case as to just my belief too many variables. I.e. programming could be the controlling and driving “force” data in data out.


Hi Pahansiri,

Out of curiosity, do you agree that people other than yourself are conscious, or do you hold to the position that we "may be"?

[The idea]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Assume that in 100 years time, scientists have built a robot with a computer brain. The robot is able to function like a normal intelligent human. It can read, talk, argue, drive a car, play sports, appreciate art and literature, fall in love and so on.

Almost everyone agrees that the robot is conscious. [...]
Does this thought experiment refute immaterialism?
You've left out your reasoning.
Explain why it matters that the entity created by the scientists was built rather than grown.
You also didn't account for sensations. For example, in Milgram's experiment, the actor pretends to be experiencing physical pain. If his performance is persuasive, then do you conclude that he actually does experience physical pain?

Your overall approach seems to be:
(1) Here's a human being in a cage. This strange beast is thought to be partly immaterial. (We're not sure why anybody thinks that, but let's temporarily ignore that question.)
(2) Okay, here's a robot in a cage. Everybody agrees that robots are entirely material, but let's imagine that the robot is capable of acting just like a human being.
(3) If the robot can act that way without any immaterial component, then surely the human being can get along fine without an immaterial component.

[The idea]

Consider two cars. One is parked and the other one is speeding down the highway. Now, is the speed of the moving car a material entity that the moving car has? Is the speed of a moving car like the hood ornament of a car that has a hood ornament? Should speed be considered an immaterial component of the speeding car?

[c4ts]

Take drugs until you can't logic your way out of a paper bag. That's how Ian refuted materialism.

[ceptimus]

Ahem. For all those questioning my OP, here is a copy of my third post in this threadOriginally posted by ceptimus
I know. I really started the thread as a sort of wry comment on Ian's thread (http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=32961), where he suggests that the 'Newcomb's paradox' thought experiment might 'prove' something about dualism and souls. Personally, I don't see how thought experiments can show anything fresh about religious/philosophical questions of this type.

But this thread might be interesting in its own right. We'll see. Now. If and when such a robot is ever built, it will show that dualism and immaterialism are (almost certainly) wrong. But as a thought experiment, it's just a joke and can prove nothing.

[BillyJoe]

Yahweh,

Originally posted by Yahweh

Maybe I could adopt Immaterialism until we figure Consciousness out, then maybe I'll pick a religion (any religion which offers eternal life is better than no religion), then I could deny that the external world exists...

Or I could go the other way, I could say digestion couldnt logically be explained as a set of Materialistic functions...

(Yeah! First quasi-sarcastic post of 2004!) Goddamn. Sorry son, I forgot who I was talking to for a moment. Carry on.

BillyJoe

[!Xx+-Rational-+xX!]

This is not to be questioned!