My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple [Archive] - Page 14

Third Eye Open

16th December 2009, 11:46 PM

And you and I are aware of many more things and in much more detail than Hellen Keller ever could be. Does that mean she was "less conscious"? :rolleyes:

If you define consciousness as being aware of ones self, then yes, she was less aware of herself than I am. If you define conscious as simply being aware that you exist, then no.

How many things is a supecomputer aware of when computing a weather forecast (if we're assuming computers are aware at all)? Trillions of pieces of data? Does that make the computer "more conscious"?

It would be much more aware of many more things than I, yes. If it is aware of its self, then it is aware of its self.

You tell me, it was your point. I simply claimed that we care about and confer certain rights to complex conscious things. This is undeniably true. You brought in the whole pain argument.

I brought up pain because it was the only example of a right we give to non humans, the right to not suffer.

And consciousness arises from neurons, so you want to abandon all this talk of conscious thermostats, right? :D

Well, thats fun. Consciousness arises from neurons. Neurons specifically? What is it exactly about neurons that makes them so special?

And what do we call it when we feel something with a very high temperature, say a hot stove? :) Think about how it reacts. If the temperature rises above its preset limits, it attempts to lower the temperature, correct? In other words, it tries to avoid extremes of temperature. Where else do we see this avoidance behavior?

From what I understand, a thermostat has two states, on and off. No room there for a 'move away from the heat' instruction that could be defined as a pain of some sort.

And things with neurons are conscious. Oh wait. Digital watches and smoke detectors are conscious. Once you go down the rabbit hole of conscious toasters and watches, you can't start harping on the uniqueness of nervous systems. You realize that, right?

There are people who do not feel pain also... is it OK to punch them?

What we describe as pain only applies to nervous systems. Something without a nervous system could experience a 'you are being damaged' message, but it would not 'feel' like we feel pain. We can't know what it would 'feel' like.

You are trying to project the version of consciousness that you know onto other things, because it is the only one you know. Things that are not human, are not conscious like humans. Because of this, you may choose not to think of them as conscious at all. That is fine. But when objects or creatures behave as if they are aware of their surroundings and themselves, I will consider them to be aware of themselves and their surroundings. I will not, however, conclude that because they are aware that they must be aware in the same exact way that I am and experience things in the same way that I do.

PixyMisa

17th December 2009, 12:08 AM

From what I understand, a thermostat has two states, on and off. No room there for a 'move away from the heat' instruction that could be defined as a pain of some sort.
I'll have to disagree with you there slightly. A thermostat has two output states, but it also has an internal representation of an external condition. That's why it's aware. It has no internal representation of itself, though - that's why it's not conscious.

tsig

17th December 2009, 12:41 AM

Dipping my head in here again.

Isn't what some people here are doing just Loki's Wager? It seems like people want to attempt to make consciousness deliberately impossible to define in order to keep it "ok" to hold wacky beliefs?

It seems to me like the entire HPC is just a big Loki's Wager?

Yes

tsig

17th December 2009, 12:47 AM

We may think that our conscious minds are directing events, but for all we know consciousness is a passive passenger, unable to do anything but monitor a deterministic process.

Then you have to post here as a passive passenger?

westprog

17th December 2009, 02:38 AM

If you re read the sentence you quoted very carefully, you may notice that I said 'act as if they are aware of' their surroundings, not simply 'react to'. Of course, you know there is a large difference, but you couldn't make your silly point over and over if you acknowledged it.

If there were a large difference, I'd expect it to be precisely explained, instead of simply alluded to as something we should just know.

This failure to be precise and systematic is something that's consistent across the board. "You should know what I mean" "Of course it's different", and so on.

If there's a difference between "reacting to surrounding" and "acting as if they were aware of the surroundings" you need to show exactly what the difference is, because when you pick away at it, you start to see that there is no difference. A physical object interacts with its surroundings, and exchanges information with its surroundings, and changes its state as a result of those exchanges. Any physical object.

I've noticed this pattern over and over again. An inability to define what is meant, followed by annoyance that it's not just obvious.

westprog

17th December 2009, 02:41 AM

Then you have to post here as a passive passenger?

I don't feel like a passive passenger. I think I'm in control. However, I should acknowledge the possibility.

westprog

17th December 2009, 02:45 AM

If a thermostat is conscious, then whose to say it doesn't feel pain? Perhaps when the temperature goes above its preset limit for too long the thermostat feels something analagous to pain? Remember, it was not me that opened the door to all this. I don't believe in conscious thermostats. But if you do, then it's a short hop from conscious thermostats to suffering thermostats.

I'm pretty sure that it was suggested, a few thousand posts ago, that a thermostat "wants" the room to be at a particular temperature, in exactly the same sense as a human being wants a bike for Christmas. Presumably it would be unhappy if someone leaves a window open or turns the furnace off.

The Brave Little Toaster view of inanimate objects is quite common, though it tends to wear off about six or seven years old.

Darat

17th December 2009, 02:57 AM

Actually, most of us do.

...snip...

Really? So when you decide to throw your vegetable peelings onto the compost heap you think "Is this concious or not?"

westprog

17th December 2009, 03:06 AM

Really? So when you decide to throw your vegetable peelings onto the compost heap you think "Is this concious or not?"

I don't agonise about it because I made my mind up a long time ago. Potato peelings - not conscious. Compost bin - not conscious. Slugs, ants and worms in compost - not sure if conscious, or to what degree. Television, not conscious. Microwave, not conscious. Computer, not conscious. Me, conscious. Family, conscious. It becomes automatic after a while - that is to say, after the age of about six or seven.

I don't think I deal with this any differently to most people. I rather think that the people who think the microwave is conscious are the outliers.

Darat

17th December 2009, 03:11 AM

I don't agonise about it because I made my mind up a long time ago. Potato peelings - not conscious. Compost bin - not conscious. Slugs, ants and worms in compost - not sure if conscious, or to what degree. Television, not conscious. Microwave, not conscious. Computer, not conscious. Me, conscious. Family, conscious. It becomes automatic after a while - that is to say, after the age of about six or seven.

I don't think I deal with this any differently to most people. I rather think that the people who think the microwave is conscious are the outliers.

I am actually astonished - I have never heard of anyone else that has has your educational process.

cyborg

17th December 2009, 03:37 AM

I happen to think there's a clear difference in the possibilities between "if - then - else" behaviour and, "stimulus -> simulcra -> analysis -> reaction," but that's clearly crazy when I can just make up ad hoc reasons based on whatever I happen to think at any one time with respect to any object.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 03:50 AM

Okay, then what role do you think consciousness plays in all of this?

The pieces share information with each other, producing consciousness.

How would one translate sensations that seem specific to the composition of a living neural substrate to that of, say, a switch board? Does the mode of information transfer, or the physical properties of the modules count, in your opinion?

I ask this because we've many cell types other than neural tissue and they all continually share information with one another yet, in humans atleast, they don't appear to produce consciousness. What do you think is the reason for this?

Does our subjective experience play some causal role in how we interract with the world, or do you suspect that consciousness is an irrelevant epiphenomenon with no functional value IAOI?

You mean, for example, can our subjective experience perchance cause you to ask questions about subjective experiences? Apparently so!

Aren't you in the least bit curious as to what subjective experiences are or their relation to observed reality?

Belz...

17th December 2009, 03:52 AM

Is that a plausible view? It's certainly logically possible, but is it likely?

I don't know. I don't see why not. Again, since we can only tell through behaviour, maybe it's just that.

Evidence?

You reject the claim that some computers exhibit a certain level of consciousness, and you want me to provide evidence that you do ?

Belz...

17th December 2009, 03:53 AM

Even assuming consciousness is a "side-effect" I wouldn't consider it annoying. Its what allows us to actually live and experience the world.

That's nice, but it doesn't answer what I said. If consciousness is just a side-effect of the brain's complexity it wouldn't be selected for or against. The associated behaviours, however, would.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 03:53 AM

Oh, I agree and I'm glad to hear you say this. I was under the impression you thought things like washing machines and microwave ovens are conscious because you've specifically said washing machines and microwave ovens are conscious.

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=158352&page=82

If you of all people can drop the idiotic notion that car engines are conscious, there's hope for us all!

You have changed your mind, right? It's more than just catching you in a blatant contradiction, I hope.

Don't bother, Mal. Hes as thoroughly self-deluded as any religious fundamentalist you'll have the misfortune to meet. Let him be.

Belz...

17th December 2009, 04:10 AM

Computation is required for all of our biological functions -- every living cell in our body computes. The point is that computation itself is not consciousness.

Which doesn't imply that consciousness isn't computation.

I'm still not seeing how you can argue that our perceptions are evidence of reality, but then question the reality of our perception.

:rolleyes: I'm not. I'm countering solipsist statements by bringing them to their logical conclusion.

When we're unconscious our knowledge and memories are still there, but there is no subjective experience of our sensory input or mental content.

You don't dream ? Really ? And when you do, you have absolutely no subjective experience ????

I told you the conditions I'd require to accept such a proposition. So far, none of them have been met.

As I said.

Belz...

17th December 2009, 04:11 AM

Unfortunately, it's a consequence of the belief thermostats are conscious. We tend to confer certain rights on complex conscious things.

You mean, like rats ?

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 04:13 AM

That's nice, but it doesn't answer what I said. If consciousness is just a side-effect of the brain's complexity it wouldn't be selected for or against. The associated behaviours, however, would.

"A side effect of the brain's complexity", you say? Do you mean that subjective experience is a physical byproduct like heat? If thats true, don't you think there would be physical consequences beyond "pure computation"?

In any case, it still requires energy to sustain brains that can produce subjective experiences. Other tissues are arguably as complex as the brain and require much less energy to maintain. If subjective experience IAOI has no adaptive value then why would species evolve an energy guzzling tissue type that produces it when all other tissues don't? Even more importantly, what is it about the "complexity" of brain tissue specifically that produces qualia?

PS: [Sorry. I know the word "qualia" seems to make many here squeamish for some reason, but its a lot quicker to type than "subjective experiences". If I use the word just assume that I mean "subjective experiences"]

Belz...

17th December 2009, 04:15 AM

Aren't you in the last bit curious as to what subjective experiences are or their relation to observed reality?

I am. But I suspect the answer will be less than satisfying for most people.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 04:58 AM

Computation is required for all of our biological functions -- every living cell in our body computes. The point is that computation itself is not consciousness.

Which doesn't imply that consciousness isn't computation.

I've already said that conscious experience is a -kind of- information processing. While all tissue types process information only one specific type appears conducive to conscious experience.

Has it ever occurred to you that maybe -- just maybe -- the physical properties of neural activity have something to do with producing consciousness or the quality of a subject's conscious experience? Wouldn't such a thing be technically relevant to anyone who wishes to reproduce it artificially? Or do you think that just throwing together a really really complicated assembly of switches will suffice?

I'm still not seeing how you can argue that our perceptions are evidence of reality, but then question the reality of our perception.

:rolleyes: I'm not. I'm countering solipsist statements by bringing them to their logical conclusion.

First of all, no one here is arguing for solipsism. Second, even if they were your rebuttal of "how do you know you're really having experiences?" doesn't even logically counter solipsism. Give it a rest already.

When we're unconscious our knowledge and memories are still there, but there is no subjective experience of our sensory input or mental content.

You don't dream ? Really ?

What the f--?!?

We've just been over this, Belz. I've already said:

"Keep in mind that when I say "consciousness" I'm referring to lucid and semi-lucid states of mind, which includes waking and lucid dreaming states. In a coma or deep sleep there is no subjective component." (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5419516&postcount=3214)

And when you do, you have absolutely no subjective experience ????

When I'm in a dreamless deep sleep I have no subjective experience.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 05:06 AM

Aren't you in the least bit curious as to what subjective experiences are or their relation to observed reality?

I am. But I suspect the answer will be less than satisfying for most people.

If you're curious then you must be aware that the "explanation" being put forward by some here doesn't even address the question.

yy2bggggs

17th December 2009, 05:59 AM

westprog

17th December 2009, 06:31 AM

I happen to think

Well, that should settle the matter then. It would be ungracious not to take your word for it.

westprog

17th December 2009, 06:36 AM

Don't bother, Mal. Hes as thoroughly self-deluded as any religious fundamentalist you'll have the misfortune to meet. Let him be.

Someone wandered into the room an hour or so ago and asked what I was doing. I admitted that I was arguing with people who thought that microwave ovens were conscious. Hilarity ensued.

This is just in case we confuse the consensus on JREF with what people think out in the real world.

I told the microwave but got no reaction.

Frank Newgent

17th December 2009, 06:49 AM

The majority of car engines manufactured in the last decade are conscious.

What year was it that a car engine first became conscious, Pixy?

Please tell me it was a Ford.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 06:56 AM

How would one translate sensations that seem specific to the composition of a living neural substrate to that of, say, a switch board? Does the mode of information transfer, or the physical properties of the modules count, in your opinion?

I'm not quite sure what you're asking... what do you mean by "mode of information transfer" and "physical properties" exactly?

"Information" is just an abstraction, and being an abstraction, can be instantiated by any physical medium. You can have the exact same information embodied by a handwritten ink message on paper, a morse code signal on a telegraph line, a wireless computer network, or the neural network of a human brain. At the same time, each of those mediums are physically different -- they have different physical properties.

Basically, I'm asking if you think subjective experience is a substrate dependent phenomenon, or if it's just an abstraction that can be instantiated by any ol' thing.

I ask this because we've many cell types other than neural tissue and they all continually share information with one another yet, in humans atleast, they don't appear to produce consciousness. What do you think is the reason for this?

Because information sharing per se isn't sufficient to produce what you're referring to as consciousness. And it's not a matter of degree--it's a matter of particular capabilities being met.

What capabilities do you suspect are met my neural cells that are not met by others? And do you think these requirements are met by contemporary artificial computers?

Aren't you in the least bit curious as to what subjective experiences are or their relation to observed reality?

Sure. But the way you phrased the question is odd--it's as if you're suggesting that what I've stated throws away the value of subjective experiences.

Why do you seem so surprised? To be honest, what you've stated clearly does throw away the value of subjective experience -- atleast functionally. Your initial explanation of intent implicitly assumed conscious experience is an epiphenomenon of brain processing. When I suggested a causal role of consciousness in brain processing, you explicit denied it (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5419855&postcount=3221).

Do you think what I said does not apply to subjective experiences? Think of the color red. Consider not merely all of the things you can do with the color red, but all of the types of things you can do with the color red. Each of those is a component of your psyche. Those are pieces of you, all having particular specialties, none of which alone are what you're considering conscious. You have to put all of these capabilities together and integrate them in order to have you. (I've made lists of things such as these before--I won't go over them again, unless you want me to).

The thing that subjectively experiences red is composed of those pieces talking to each other--if you take all of those things away, there would be nothing left to experience red.

I agree that the machinery of the brain is required to generate qualia [i.e. our subjective experiences] an integrate them. However, for all of that machinery to expend so much energy in order to produce them strongly suggests that they must play some causal/functional role. Why should brains even produce something like the perception of "red" to begin with?

Belz...

17th December 2009, 07:05 AM

In any case, it still requires energy to sustain brains that can produce subjective experiences. Other tissues are arguably as complex as the brain and require much less energy to maintain. If subjective experience IAOI has no adaptive value then why would species evolve an energy guzzling tissue type that produces it when all other tissues don't?

It has evolutionary advantages, maybe ?

Even more importantly, what is it about the "complexity" of brain tissue specifically that produces qualia?

Does it ?

Belz...

17th December 2009, 07:09 AM

First of all, no one here is arguing for solipsism.

When someone says that "experience" is pretty much the only thing you can be absolutely certain of, they flirt with solipsism.

Second, even if they were your rebuttal of "how do you know you're really having experiences?" doesn't even logically counter solipsism.

It does if the central tenet of solipsism is wrong.

When I'm in a dreamless deep sleep I have no subjective experience.

Okay. So what kind of activity goes on in your brain during that period ?

If you're curious then you must be aware that the "explanation" being put forward by some here doesn't even address the question.

I don't see why it doesn't, unless one assigns to "qualia" some magical property, which you don't.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 07:28 AM

"A side effect of the brain's complexity", you say? Do you mean that subjective experience is a physical byproduct like heat? If thats true, don't you think there would be physical consequences beyond "pure computation"?

In any case, it still requires energy to sustain brains that can produce subjective experiences. Other tissues are arguably as complex as the brain and require much less energy to maintain. If subjective experience IAOI has no adaptive value then why would species evolve an energy guzzling tissue type that produces it when all other tissues don't? Even more importantly, what is it about the "complexity" of brain tissue specifically that produces qualia?

It has evolutionary advantages, maybe ?

Okay, so your line of argument has been that consciousness is "pure computation", to "just a side-effect" of the brain's computational complexity that maybe confers an evolutionary advantage.

If consciousness is a "side-effect" of the brain's computation, then it is not "pure computation". If it confers some evolutionary value IAOI then it's more than just an epiphenomenon -- its has causal consequences for the organism. Ergo, consciousness requires explanation beyond beyond the glib "oh, its just computation" response.

cyborg

17th December 2009, 07:39 AM

Well, that should settle the matter then. It would be ungracious not to take your word for it.

Taking word for it is irrelevant. The word is used in the Greek sense - it doesn't require a particular epiphenomenal effect to be valid.

PixyMisa

17th December 2009, 08:03 AM

I don't agonise about it because I made my mind up a long time ago.
We noticed.

I don't think I deal with this any differently to most people. I rather think that the people who think the microwave is conscious are the outliers.
Argumentum ad populum.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 08:22 AM

When someone says that "experience" is pretty much the only thing you can be absolutely certain of, they flirt with solipsism.

I think the original point in bring that up was to say that even if each of us were just traped in a deluded dream we can atleast know that the experience of the dream is real. If someone where to hook you up to a completely immersive VR simulation you could still do science :)

It does if the central tenet of solipsism is wrong.

The central tenet of solipsism is that the mind of the solipsist is the only thing that exists. Its basically just an egocentric version of idealism :p

When I'm in a dreamless deep sleep I have no subjective experience.

Okay. So what kind of activity goes on in your brain during that period ?

Deep sleep.

If you're curious then you must be aware that the "explanation" being put forward by some here doesn't even address the question.

I don't see why it doesn't, unless one assigns to "qualia" some magical property, which you don't.

Like I said before what I wanna know is:

"What is it about particular neural processes that causes some sensory input to be felt as a particular sensation or experience? What physical property differentiates the quality of these experiences? How is this process expressed thru the biochemistry of neurons? What part of the system actually has the experience(s) and what are the relevant physical properties of this portion of the system that causes it to be subjectively sensible?

These are things I would like to see answered in my textbook." (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5398299&postcount=2737)

The above are my basic requirements for accepting any theory of consciousness. If someone claims to me that they know what consciousness is and how to produce it and they can't even explain to me something as basic as what determines the quality of a subject's experience I know they're full of it.

Theres a huge gap in our scientific understanding of consciousness/subjective experience/qualia -- or whatever the hell one wants to call it -- and I personally find it extremely bothersome. I've no ideological commitments either way. I don't care if the actual explanation is banal or if it implies something "magical" about the universe. I just want the truth, or as near to it as humanly possible.

PixyMisa

17th December 2009, 08:26 AM

Like I said before what I wanna know is:

"What is it about particular neural processes that causes some sensory input to be felt as a particular sensation or experience? What physical property differentiates the quality of these experiences? How is this process expressed thru the biochemistry of neurons? What part of the system actually has the experience(s) and what are the relevant physical properties of this portion of the system that causes it to be subjectively sensible?

These are things I would like to see answered in my textbook." (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5398299&postcount=2737)

Self-referential information processing.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 08:36 AM

Self-referential information processing.

/yawn

PixyMisa

17th December 2009, 08:51 AM

"Information" is just an abstraction, and being an abstraction, can be instantiated by any physical medium.
Information is a physical property. It can be instantiated in any physical medium because it is a physical property.

You can have the exact same information embodied by a handwritten ink message on paper, a morse code signal on a telegraph line, a wireless computer network, or the neural network of a human brain.Yes.

At the same time, each of those mediums are physically different -- they have different physical properties.Well, yes and no. Yes, certainly, in the sense that an elephant has greater length and mass than an ant. Not in the sense that an elephant has a qualitatively different set of properties. It's all the same things in different quantities and arrangements - length, mass, time, charge and so on.

Basically, I'm asking if you think subjective experience is a substrate dependent phenomenon, or if it's just an abstraction that can be instantiated by any ol' thing.Neither. It's a physical process that can be instantiated in any suitable physical system. However, its defining properties are how it responds to information. Since information can (again by definition) pass the reality/simulation barrier, so too can consciousness. A simulated computer is a computer; a simulated mind is a mind.

What capabilities do you suspect are met my neural cells that are not met by others?They are switches arranged in a network. That's what distinguishes nerves from all our other cells. Muscle cells switch - they contract when a signal is received, and then relax again afterwards. But they are arranged for simple bulk additive properties, not in any sort of network.

And do you think these requirements are met by contemporary artificial computers?Yes.

Why do you seem so surprised? To be honest, what you've stated clearly does throw away the value of subjective experience -- atleast functionally. Your initial explanation of intent implicitly assumed conscious experience is an epiphenomenon of brain processing. When I suggested a causal role of consciousness in brain processing, you explicit denied it (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5419855&postcount=3221).The causal efficacy of consciousness is a subtle question, and not one that can be tackled without first agreeing on a definition. We're a long way from that, it seems.

I agree that the machinery of the brain is required to generate qualiaThere's no such thing as qualia.

[i.e. our subjective experiences]That's the same as saying I agree that grass is a suitable food for unicorns [i.e horses]. If you mean horses, just say horses. And if you mean unicorns, well, there's no such thing as unicorns.

an integrate them. However, for all of that machinery to expend so much energy in order to produce them strongly suggests that they must play some causal/functional role.Not necessarily. Experiences are not the only effect of consciousness. At the same time it provides an entire new class of behaviours - introspective behaviours - that are not otherwise possible.

We are likely as much evolved to have experiences as we are to dance or play the guitar. Upright posture and manual dexterity have much simpler explanations.

Why should brains even produce something like the perception of "red" to begin with?Because once you have self-referential information processing (and colour vision) you can't not have a perception of red. And self-referential information processing is an enormous evolutionary advantage, because it reduces the time for many types of adaptations to form from generations to seconds.

PixyMisa

17th December 2009, 08:54 AM

/yawn
While not responsive, you at least avoided your usual factual and logical errors. Whether that's actually an improvement is another question.

Belz...

17th December 2009, 09:08 AM

Okay, so your line of argument has been that consciousness is "pure computation", to "just a side-effect" of the brain's computational complexity that maybe confers an evolutionary advantage.

No. I don't claim to know. I'm saying those are possibilities.

If consciousness is a "side-effect" of the brain's computation, then it is not "pure computation".

Maybe, maybe not.

If it confers some evolutionary value IAOI then it's more than just an epiphenomenon -- its has causal consequences for the organism. Ergo, consciousness requires explanation beyond beyond the glib "oh, its just computation" response.

As I said, unless it has no bearing whatsoever on survival but is just a by-product of a process which has.

I think the original point in bring that up was to say that even if each of us were just traped in a deluded dream we can atleast know that the experience of the dream is real. If someone where to hook you up to a completely subversive VR simulation you could still do science

Well, we can agree to that.

"What is it about particular neural processes that causes some sensory input to be felt as a particular sensation or experience? What physical property differentiates the quality of these experiences? How is this process expressed thru the biochemistry of neurons? What part of the system actually has the experience(s) and what are the relevant physical properties of this portion of the system that causes it to be subjectively sensible?

All good questions. As I said, maybe the answer will be more complicated than Pixy thinks, or maybe it'll be just as boring. :D Maybe what we interpret as "qualia" or whatever you choose to call them, isn't what we think they are, and I expect that in the end it won't be quite as interesting as idealists would like.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 09:14 AM

While not responsive, you at least avoided your usual factual and logical errors. Whether that's actually an improvement is another question.

You seem to be under the mistaken impression that I take you and your opinions seriously. You've long expended your store of credibility as far as I'm concerned.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 09:23 AM

All good questions. As I said, maybe the answer will be more complicated than Pixy thinks, or maybe it'll be just as boring. :D Maybe what we interpret as "qualia" or whatever you choose to call them, isn't what we think they are, and I expect that in the end it won't be quite as interesting as idealists would like.

Yea, we really will just have to wait and see. I agree that the answers probably wont be that complicated but, as far as I can see, my questions are for biophysicists to work out -- not software engineers.

Third Eye Open

17th December 2009, 10:01 AM

If there were a large difference, I'd expect it to be precisely explained, instead of simply alluded to as something we should just know.

This failure to be precise and systematic is something that's consistent across the board. "You should know what I mean" "Of course it's different", and so on.

If there's a difference between "reacting to surrounding" and "acting as if they were aware of the surroundings" you need to show exactly what the difference is, because when you pick away at it, you start to see that there is no difference. A physical object interacts with its surroundings, and exchanges information with its surroundings, and changes its state as a result of those exchanges. Any physical object.

I've noticed this pattern over and over again. An inability to define what is meant, followed by annoyance that it's not just obvious.

I find it entertaining that the difference between how a rock reacts to the world around it and how a computer reacts to the world around it is something that eludes you. And you laugh at us for seeing something different in how they behave.

A computer stores and uses and processes information. A rock reacts to physical laws.

If you can't see a difference here, then I don't understand how you can see a difference between how a human reacts to the world and how a rock does. They are both just obeying physical laws, right?

Well, apparently those physical laws lead to awareness.

yy2bggggs

17th December 2009, 10:10 AM

Why do you seem so surprised? To be honest, what you've stated clearly does throw away the value of subjective experience -- atleast functionally.
Really? Let's get smaller. Your brain consist of neurons that exchange information.

Does that clearly throw away subjective experience, at least functionally?
Your initial explanation of intent implicitly assumed conscious experience is an epiphenomenon of brain processing. When I suggested a causal role of consciousness in brain processing, you explicit denied it (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5419855&postcount=3221).
If I denied it, it must be implicit, because I explicitly stated that consciousness does play a causal role. It is a cause-in-fact of your actions. I even explicitly told you that your very ability to describe subjective experience tautologically demonstrates that they play a causal role (how can they not play a causal role if you can describe it at all?)

If you're going to claim that I explicitly denied this, you're going to have to do better than vaguely linking to my own post. Quote the specific explicit phrasing. If you're going to claim that I implicitly said this, you're going to have to grasp what I just told you.

I believe the closest you'll find is that I claimed it was misleading. And I stand by that claim.

In that post that you linked to, I basically explained that when you crack open the shell of your conscious mind, it's made of nothing but subconscious modules. And the subconscious modules are what are producing each of those things. What you're calling consciousness is when enough of the "right" ones communicate--I can't say what the precise requirements are both because I don't know, and because what you're calling consciousness isn't defined well enough to say, but I do know that the entirety of our conscious mind need not be involved for a particular task, and it's playing a bigger role than merely carrying the task out, even by being aware. But in order to simply do something, only some of them have to communicate--a subset of them that you wouldn't consider conscious in itself. To get the full experience, you need the entire set of participants--many of which could potentially contribute to the task, but don't bother, because that's not you're working on. Some of them do contribute, but if they alone were involved, you wouldn't consider it conscious.

This is a matter of the parts doing the work that you're attributing to the whole.
I agree that the machinery of the brain is required to generate qualia [i.e. our subjective experiences] an integrate them. However, for all of that machinery to expend so much energy in order to produce them strongly suggests that they must play some causal/functional role. Why should brains even produce something like the perception of "red" to begin with?
The first example I gave was the internet and the forum. Does the internet play a causal role in my reply to your post?

Absolutely! Without the internet, there would not only be no reply, there would be no post to reply to. There wouldn't be a forum to begin with even. The internet most certainly plays a role in my response to your post. But it does not generate the response. It is a cause-in-fact, but not a proximate cause. And that is what I explicitly told you.

Going to things like subjective experience is different. I didn't address it directly. But if you'd like my opinion, subjective experiences of the sort that "red" is are extremely useful from a functional perspective. If I have a percept of red, I have that percept, regardless of how it got there. That's a starting point, and depending on the percept, there's a degree of "certainty" that at least I'm seeing red. It's a very solid groundwork to start with to formulate memories, theories, etc--without such a groundwork, it'd be much harder to function.

Now that I'm running with this essentially "undeniable" fact that I'm seeing red, and that it's definitely a color, etc, I can then go on to say, oh, but I'm just dreaming. Or, wow, that Benham's disk sure does make a convincing illusion. Or, hey, this apple must be ripe.
"Information" is just an abstraction, and being an abstraction, can be instantiated by any physical medium. You can have the exact same information embodied by a handwritten ink message on paper, a morse code signal on a telegraph line, a wireless computer network, or the neural network of a human brain. At the same time, each of those mediums are physically different -- they have different physical properties.
Remember... I'm not talking about the information per se, but the exchange of information between parts of yourself. Given this, the handwriting example of the above is misleading, because you have a transmitter--the person who wrote symbols on a sheet of paper--and a receiver--the person who reads the information. And the receiver in this case is a brain--a brain is necessary (nominally--we can count OCR if you really want to) to identify the individual symbols, in order to complete the exchange. Morse code is somewhat similar, though it's a lot easier to construct a device to decode it, since you basically need a timer and something capable of detecting open and closed circuits. The wireless computer example is apt.
Basically, I'm asking if you think subjective experience is a substrate dependent phenomenon, or if it's just an abstraction that can be instantiated by any ol' thing.I don't think subjective experience maps directly to particular symbols being exchanged. I think you have a fundamental misconception that it does. I believe subjective experience requires the same information being communicated between a number of component pieces, each of which does its own thing to the information.
What capabilities do you suspect are met my neural cells that are not met by others? And do you think these requirements are met by contemporary artificial computers?The particular neural cells are arranged in neural modules that have specialties. Generally speaking, contemporary artificial computers do not have such modules.

westprog

17th December 2009, 10:19 AM

I find it entertaining that the difference between how a rock reacts to the world around it and how a computer reacts to the world around it is something that eludes you. And you laugh at us for seeing something different in how they behave.

I laugh at the insistence that there's a vast, obvious difference which you are unable to specify.

A computer stores and uses and processes information. A rock reacts to physical laws.

And a rock stores and uses and processes information, and a computer reacts to physical laws.

The only fundamental difference is the use that human beings make of the computer and the rock.

If you can't see a difference here, then I don't understand how you can see a difference between how a human reacts to the world and how a rock does. They are both just obeying physical laws, right?

Well, apparently those physical laws lead to awareness.

And you've decided to arbitrarily assign awareness to the computer and not to the rock, and you are annoyed that I don't just say "Oh yes, it's obvious". Well, if it were obvious, you would be able to specify in what way the computer processes information that the rock doesn't.

Third Eye Open

17th December 2009, 10:54 AM

And a rock stores and uses and processes information,

Now I remember why I wasn't involved in this thread in the first place.

Well, if it were obvious, you would be able to specify in what way the computer processes information that the rock doesn't.

A rock doesn't. Maybe you could give me an example of how it does?

Maia

17th December 2009, 10:59 AM

Hey, y'all... (pops in briefly) Head on over to the "consciousness and awareness" thread to check out my devastating criticism of eliminative materialism. I worked on it very very hard! :) Do I get a cookie? Or at least a golden qualia cake with creamy filling? Mmm... (goes off in search of a qualia bakery)

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 11:38 AM

Why do you seem so surprised? To be honest, what you've stated clearly does throw away the value of subjective experience -- atleast functionally.

Really? Let's get smaller. Your brain consist of neurons that exchange information.

Does that clearly throw away subjective experience, at least functionally?

No, not at all.

If I denied it, it must be implicit, because I explicitly stated that consciousness does play a causal role. It is a cause-in-fact of your actions. I even explicitly told you that your very ability to describe subjective experience tautologically demonstrates that they play a causal role (how can they not play a causal role if you can describe it at all?)

If thats the case then wouldn't my decision to describe my subjective experiences be initiated from my conscious thought process?

If you're going to claim that I explicitly denied this, you're going to have to do better than vaguely linking to my own post. Quote the specific explicit phrasing. If you're going to claim that I implicitly said this, you're going to have to grasp what I just told you.

Okay, I'm going to quote the part I was referring to and explain how I'd interpreted it. Correct me if you feel I misread you:

"Nope. It's a complete mismatch. The picture I'm painting is entirely different than the picture you're painting.

You have this "conscious part" that gets basic raw drives, and works on them like it's a factory, grinding it, refining it, cooking it, baking it, slicing it, etc... and eventually that conscious factory took these "raw good goals" and consciously produced a conscious goal. You're calling the raw goods being brought into the factory the "basic building blocks".

I'm pointing out that the factory as a whole doesn't grind--just this one part. It doesn't refine--just this one part. Doesn't cook--just that part. Doesn't bake, just that part. Doesn't slice--just that part. The entirety--every single last drop of goal making--is done only by a tiny part of the factory working in its own corner passing things to another tiny part of the factory working in its corner." (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5419855&postcount=3221)

So what I took this to mean is that conscious mental processes don't perform any specialized functional role in the goal/intent making process. Each individual part of the brain -- individual neurons, groups of neurons, neural modules -- create the goal/intent and our conscious minds experience the end result is something it formed.

In that post that you linked to, I basically explained that when you crack open the shell of your conscious mind, it's made of nothing but subconscious modules. And the subconscious modules are what are producing each of those things. What you're calling consciousness is when enough of the "right" ones communicate--I can't say what the precise requirements are both because I don't know, and because what you're calling consciousness isn't defined well enough to say, but I do know that the entirety of our conscious mind need not be involved for a particular task, and it's playing a bigger role than merely carrying the task out, even by being aware. But in order to simply do something, only some of them have to communicate--a subset of them that you wouldn't consider conscious in itself. To get the full experience, you need the entire set of participants--many of which could potentially contribute to the task, but don't bother, because that's not you're working on. Some of them do contribute, but if they alone were involved, you wouldn't consider it conscious.

This is a matter of the parts doing the work that you're attributing to the whole.

Meh. I really don't see how this necessarily contradicts my general sketch of how we form intentions. I made a point of pointing out that our conscious decisions are based off of impulses that originate from unconscious mental processes. The portion of our minds that are conscious then sort them into some deliberate plan of action. I'm not denying that all other parts of the process aren't crucial -- heck, if one wants to get right down to it, the entire neuromuscular system is required. I'm just saying that deliberate action is initiated from conscious mental activity.

The first example I gave was the internet and the forum. Does the internet play a causal role in my reply to your post?

Absolutely! Without the internet, there would not only be no reply, there would be no post to reply to. There wouldn't be a forum to begin with even. The internet most certainly plays a role in my response to your post. But it does not generate the response. It is a cause-in-fact, but not a proximate cause. And that is what I explicitly told you.

But even in that example the question comes down to what agency initiated the decision to post. You consciously decided what your message would be and how to convey it.

"Information" is just an abstraction, and being an abstraction, can be instantiated by any physical medium. You can have the exact same information embodied by a handwritten ink message on paper, a morse code signal on a telegraph line, a wireless computer network, or the neural network of a human brain. At the same time, each of those mediums are physically different -- they have different physical properties.

Remember... I'm not talking about the information per se, but the exchange of information between parts of yourself. Given this, the handwriting example of the above is misleading, because you have a transmitter--the person who wrote symbols on a sheet of paper--and a receiver--the person who reads the information. And the receiver in this case is a brain--a brain is necessary (nominally--we can count OCR if you really want to) to identify the individual symbols, in order to complete the exchange. Morse code is somewhat similar, though it's a lot easier to construct a device to decode it, since you basically need a timer and something capable of detecting open and closed circuits. The wireless computer example is apt.

I wasn't really trying to draw direct parallels to the neural net of the brain so much as convey what I mean by "mode of information transfer".

Basically, I'm asking if you think subjective experience is a substrate dependent phenomenon, or if it's just an abstraction that can be instantiated by any ol' thing.

I don't think subjective experience maps directly to particular symbols being exchanged. I think you have a fundamental misconception that it does. I believe subjective experience requires the same information being communicated between a number of component pieces, each of which does its own thing to the information.

I don't think subjective experience is tied to specific "symbols" being exchanged within the brain. I was asking if you believed that the phenomena of subjective experience itself were dependent on the biochemistry of the brain or if it were just a matter of computational architecture that could be replicated with any hardware.

What capabilities do you suspect are met my neural cells that are not met by others? And do you think these requirements are met by contemporary artificial computers?

The particular neural cells are arranged in neural modules that have specialties. Generally speaking, contemporary artificial computers do not have such modules.

There are other tissues in our body that function as intercommunicating modules but, unlike brain cells, they don't produce consciousness. I was asking what you thought the reason for this difference is and if such a difference would have relevance to the technology we use in our computers today.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 11:41 AM

rocketdodger

17th December 2009, 11:50 AM

Now I remember why I wasn't involved in this thread in the first place.

The rock vs. computer shenanigans only breaks the surface.

Ask westprog about rocks vs. bacteria.

yy2bggggs

17th December 2009, 12:08 PM

No, not at all.Then either you believe that individual neurons are conscious, or you believe that the part of the brain that is conscious is made up of components that in themselves are not conscious.
If thats the case then wouldn't my decision to describe my subjective experiences be initiated from my conscious thought process?There's no such thing as a "conscious thought process" in this sense. There are just thought processes. They are "conscious thought processes" when you become conscious of them.

But yes, those processes that you become conscious of result in your description of subjective experiences.
Okay, I'm going to quote the part I was referring to and explain how I'd interpreted it. Correct me if you feel I misread you:
Yes, you're misreading me.

There are two versions. In your version, you said that we have base goals, which are not conscious, that enter into this arena called "consciousness". Then "consciousness" causes other goals to be made. That's your version, and you said that this was what I was saying.

It's not what I was saying. I'm not pointing to things originating outside of the arena. I'm describing what's going on inside of it. The final product itself is made from a module that you are not conscious of, in exactly the same sort of way that you're not conscious of your individual neurons. You become "conscious" of it when all of the various aspects of yourself are notified, directly or indirectly (we work theoretically about ourselves as well), about the goal.

Your version has goals being produced in full light of your view. Mine does not.

And mine matches intuitions. It also matches the entire fact that we're not completely aware of how we do it. We're not aware of how we do it because the process itself is not a conscious one. Those holes in our awareness are where the things get done.
So what I took this to mean is that conscious mental processes don't perform any specialized functional role in the goal/intent making process.Right. And that's a misinterpretation. What I'm saying is that conscious processes are made up of nothing but subconscious processes. I explicitly said that conscious processes play a role--it just doesn't happen in full view.
Each individual part of the brain -- individual neurons, groups of neurons, neural modules -- create the goal/intent and our conscious minds experience the end result is something it formed.Wrong. Our conscious mind is made up of those neurons. I'm already inside the factory. That's what you're missing.

More later perhaps... I'm running low on time.

!Kaggen

17th December 2009, 12:13 PM

DD I eventually found the time to work through this

We should be cautious, especially in a society with so much freedom and very little cultural boundary's. In the past whole societies functioned exclusively on unconscious figuration based on collective representations. Many still do, even in western societies re. religious fundamentalists.

Now as an aside I disagree with that, it is agreat surface impression to say that habits, social mores and cultural values deetrmine a lot of a human behavior. But there is always self interest as well, which tends to dominate.

I think that yes, our experiences and habits do influence us, but i am not sure theya re all powerfull.

I think you are using the term figuration to denote a wide variety of responses, and I do understand what you mean now. I just happen , as usual to have a different POV.

I was meaning its more of a scale in a general way where individualism in pre-scientific societies was/is much less common.
As we learnt to think more abstractly about our environment based on a scientific view we could stand back and reflect on our habits and change them as individuals.
This is what I mean by an evolution of consciousness which can be seen through history as a move from common motives to individual motives.
For instance it is commonly assumed that depth perspective is a innate part of human consciousness since the first human and even perhaps our pre-human ancestors, but history tells us otherwise.
The real problem with the heliocentric view of our solar system was a problem of depth perspective. When people looked at the sky they could not imagine the shiny things out there being at different depths.
They saw the sky as a veil with the shiny things all on the same surface.
The fact that when they mapped the movements of some of them (the planets) they appeared to move in rhythmic patterns other than in a straight line was not regarded as odd. In fact it explained how the movements of the planets were related to the rhythmic phenomena on earth. The appearance of hypotheses of how these planetary movements arose, in other words abstract descriptions of the appearances, was a direct consequence of the development of depth perspective which arose through the work of an individual Filippo Brunelleschi. Even Brunelleschi's experimental demonstration of depth perspective to others indicates the difficulties in comprehending depth perspective by the people of his time.

"Curiously, Brunelleschi intended that it only be observed by the viewer holding the unpainted back of the picture against his/her eye with one hand, and a mirror in the other hand facing and reflecting the painted side. In other words, Brunelleschi wanted his new perspective "realism" to be tested not by comparing the painted image to the actual Baptistery but to its reflection in a mirror according to the Euclidian laws of geometric optics."
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filippo_Brunelleschi

It was demonstrated abstractly as a mirror representation of the real thing so that people would actually recognize what they saw!!!

Of course once artists started to demonstrate the new found depth perspective it was a matter of time before astronomers looked at the heavens with this in mind and ay presto the possibility that the shiny things were no longer equidistant from the earth made it easier to hypothesis a heliocentric solar system. Whilst this was still an hypothesis to "save the appearances" the church was not concerned. It was only when Galileo made the empirical observations of the phase's of Venus which moved the hypothesis from the abstract into the realm of reality that the church objected.

We can free ourselves from unconscious figuration and can now consciously direct figuration using the scientific method.

I think I understand that now, the scientific method does allow for testing of validity in some very specific ways and it has stripped the cultural values in a lot of ways. I think that cultural anthropology has as much to do with it is as the scienitific method however, but as you have pointed out it is very challenging to many people to call them on their cultural biases. Here in the US there is a very strong reaction to what pundits want to refer to as relativism, or cultural relativism.

Sure our scientific study of other cultures has shown how other cultures viewed/view reality completely differently to each other. It appears they did not just have different frames of references (abstractions) to ours, they actually experienced/experience the world differently. From my POV it appears that the main difference between pre-scientific cultures and ours is that they took the world literally whilst we re-configure the world based on our abstractions and hence my reference to the word idolatry in previous posts.

I was not so much referring to ducking, but more to the fact that a fist is solid. I would not call realizing the solidity of a fist a habit.

Well, if you study human babies you will find that they lack an innate fear of most things, they do startle in response to loud noise, but they have no 'natural fear' of most things. So construct that are intuitive, or 'ingrained' are often and usually learned. Such as a fear of height or the response of ducking. These things are learned and conditioned.

So regardless of calling it a habit, conditioning, learned response, it is not innate to humans, and it is learned.

So again we have the triumvirate of personal experience, social conditioning and culture, we learn that 'things' have 'solidity', we are socially conditioned in talking and other's responses and then there is the cultural framework "solid=unchanging'. We are complex to say the least.

Absolutely and this experience of solid=unchanging informs our conception of the world, where we no longer need to check for solidity but assume this property of the physical world in our phenomenal experience. The reason why I brought up the common sense proof of solidity was a response to Randfan's post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5344401#post5344401). I wanted to point out that the assumption within materialism about the relationship of our perception to matter does not originate directly from our percepts but from out concepts which themselves are informed by this common sense proof of solidity. We have learnt from observing the details of matter that it is not solid=unchanging at all. However we still cling to this common sense concept of solidity, albeit unconsciously, when we try justify the metaphysics behind materialism.

Sure, being a forum for skeptics I would expect this to be the case. However implicit in the questioning of common sense is to come up with a more reliable common sense.
Of course solipsism is always the possible outcome for a sceptic, but could hardly be a philosophy embraced by a scientist.

the use of common sense probably has a language barrier, here in the US it often denotes any commonly held belief.

I personally try to avoid its usage, instead referring to the rationale behind it. Solipsism is unavoidable, but then it does not appear to be true.

Ok, then perhaps we could use figuration instead?

This is the case were consequences are merely reported. I tend to be more interested in the physical results of introspection, in which case they speak for themselves.

I can't say I follow you here, the physical impacts? certainly not the poorly researched one. So maybe an example?

TM that reduces blood pressure.(http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/171878.php)

Goethe who discovered the homology of plant structures using active perception. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metamorphosis_of_Plants ) also see (http://www.natureinstitute.org/txt/ch/hsmetamorph.htm)

That may be especially when it comes to verbal communication of the results of introspection. However we need not and in fact mostly do not communicate introspection solely by rational means. We mostly do it through artistic expression. The question then is how much of this expression conveys something meaningful. The best artists tend to convey a common meaning better.

certainly but often the meaning is subjective to the viewer and the responses to artistic expression will vary widely. Any discussion of art will lead you to different conclusions for different viewers. For example in Moby Dick there is a chapter devoted to Starbuck and his courage. I believe that he has courage and it is not a failure of courage that leads him to not challenge Ahab, this is hotly debated. Or in Wouk's Caine Mutiny there is a movie version and a made for TV version, in one Queeg is almost craven, in the other he is not.

Well controversial interpretations can have more to do with the interpreters motives than the artists motives. Of course interpretations can also have there own meaning, and we often benefit from them in reflecting on the artists meaning.

Then the question remains, without a common objective measure of colour experience, will Mary experience beauty the same way someone with color perception does?

Now that is a great question, I think that Mary can learn to appreciate the values ascribed to beauty, but she will not ascribe them for the same reasons.

And not the beauty ascribed to values?

Hmm, surely there are cases similar to Mary were we would have recorded a physiological response to a stimulus of which a person is unaware?

I am not sure I follow, are you agreeing that her brain receives the same signals as someone with colour vision or are you saying that her physiological response before the brain would be differently to colours than someone with colour vision?

This is the question that would be unethical to answer.

There are multiple layers to color perception, the photoreceptors, the nerves and network of the retina, the optic nerve, the processing by the visual cortex.

I do not know if her photoreceptors for the longer wave lengths will be active, they likely will be, but she will not have developed )very likely) the retinal structure associated with color vision for the loner wave lengths, especially those where they are contrasted to other photo receptors, will the optic nerves be developed to carry the new signals (unknown) and do they have the capacity to learn them (probably), but the visual cortex and developed and has not had the input from the long wave receptors, so it is likely she will never perceive the 'color red' the way that someone with full color vision would.

But she might, however there does seem to be the issue of developmental cut offs for so many things. She may not.

It seems unlikely to me that such fundamental traits of mammalian physiology would "switch off" within such a short time (one generation). I certainly cannot see any evolutionary advantage. I can understand that the mind would not recognise the colour red due to lack of conditioning , but I find it hard to believe that the physiology of colour vision would not be happening. Is there really no unlucky person that you know of who went through this type of experience from which we might have learnt something more definitive?

I am not so sure that it is not relevant. Mary's awareness of colour is not just a matter of her physiology, but also her ability to abstract one from the other. If she has no cultural references to the differences in colour, why would we expect her to abstract one colour from the other just because her physiology can?

That is unrelated to the complete knowledge issue, which is the fallacy of construction I was referring to.

Ok, I thought you were referring to our derail ;=)

Malerin

17th December 2009, 01:23 PM

Washing machines and microwave ovens are more complex than thermostats, Malerin.

Thermostats are aware, but they are not conscious.

Car engines, washing machines and microwave ovens are conscious. Thermostats are merely aware. I would tell you to salvage your credibility while you still can, but what credibility?

Third Eye Open

17th December 2009, 01:31 PM

Car engines, washing machines and microwave ovens are conscious. Thermostats are merely aware. I would tell you to salvage your credibility while you still can, but what credibility?

Why don't you define 'conscious' for us so that it does not include these things. Or keep hurling insults, whatever, I don't really care anymore.

westprog

17th December 2009, 03:27 PM

Now I remember why I wasn't involved in this thread in the first place.

A rock doesn't. Maybe you could give me an example of how it does?

When you don't define your terms how can I?

What is meant by "process" information? Information means something. Pixy, of all people, posted the link to the Wiki article.

Still, no need to worry about it. Just keep posting "Westprog can't tell the difference between rocks and computers". That keeps Rocketdodger going.

westprog

17th December 2009, 03:29 PM

Why don't you define 'conscious' for us so that it does not include these things.

How about "consciousness is a biological property exhibited by humans and some animals".

See how easy it is to make up a definition that says whatever you want?

Dancing David

17th December 2009, 03:35 PM

I was meaning its more of a scale in a general way where individualism in pre-scientific societies was/is much less common.
As we learnt to think more abstractly about our environment based on a scientific view we could stand back and reflect on our habits and change them as individuals.
This is what I mean by an evolution of consciousness which can be seen through history as a move from common motives to individual motives.
For instance it is commonly assumed that depth perspective is a innate part of human consciousness since the first human and even perhaps our pre-human ancestors, but history tells us otherwise.
The real problem with the heliocentric view of our solar system was a problem of depth perspective. When people looked at the sky they could not imagine the shiny things out there being at different depths.
They saw the sky as a veil with the shiny things all on the same surface.
The fact that when they mapped the movements of some of them (the planets) they appeared to move in rhythmic patterns other than in a straight line was not regarded as odd. In fact it explained how the movements of the planets were related to the rhythmic phenomena on earth. The appearance of hypotheses of how these planetary movements arose, in other words abstract descriptions of the appearances, was a direct consequence of the development of depth perspective which arose through the work of an individual Filippo Brunelleschi. Even Brunelleschi's experimental demonstration of depth perspective to others indicates the difficulties in comprehending depth perspective by the people of his time.

"Curiously, Brunelleschi intended that it only be observed by the viewer holding the unpainted back of the picture against his/her eye with one hand, and a mirror in the other hand facing and reflecting the painted side. In other words, Brunelleschi wanted his new perspective "realism" to be tested not by comparing the painted image to the actual Baptistery but to its reflection in a mirror according to the Euclidian laws of geometric optics."
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filippo_Brunelleschi

It was demonstrated abstractly as a mirror representation of the real thing so that people would actually recognize what they saw!!!

Of course once artists started to demonstrate the new found depth perspective it was a matter of time before astronomers looked at the heavens with this in mind and ay presto the possibility that the shiny things were no longer equidistant from the earth made it easier to hypothesis a heliocentric solar system. Whilst this was still an hypothesis to "save the appearances" the church was not concerned. It was only when Galileo made the empirical observations of the phase's of Venus which moved the hypothesis from the abstract into the realm of reality that the church objected.

Um, I hardly know what to say, I disagree with you and don't know what else to say. There are so many statement that I can't agree with above. But I would rather discuss than argue.

Onward.

Sure our scientific study of other cultures has shown how other cultures viewed/view reality completely differently to each other. It appears they did not just have different frames of references (abstractions) to ours, they actually experienced/experience the world differently.

I don't think that is demonstrated, we have to contend with the language and cultural filters, certainly the discussions vary widely.

From my POV it appears that the main difference between pre-scientific cultures and ours is that they took the world literally whilst we re-configure the world based on our abstractions and hence my reference to the word idolatry in previous posts.

Absolutely and this experience of solid=unchanging informs our conception of the world, where we no longer need to check for solidity but assume this property of the physical world in our phenomenal experience. The reason why I brought up the common sense proof of solidity was a response to Randfan's post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5344401#post5344401). I wanted to point out that the assumption within materialism about the relationship of our perception to matter does not originate directly from our percepts but from out concepts which themselves are informed by this common sense proof of solidity. We have learnt from observing the details of matter that it is not solid=unchanging at all. However we still cling to this common sense concept of solidity, albeit unconsciously, when we try justify the metaphysics behind materialism.

And that is the point that just about all the people who style themselves as materialists will disagree with, that is the old notion of materialism and a number of people who do not style themselves materialists on this forum keep referencing it.

It is false, most materialists on the JREF will tell you flat out that the 'matter' is energy that expresses itself as wave form and that the 'solidity' only comes about through the interaction of the EM force.

So it is rather a straw argument and discussion. You may cling to solidity all you want however. (I do in a pragmatic sense for sure.)

It is a learned perception.

Ok, then perhaps we could use figuration instead?

I am not going to, you are welcome to.

TM that reduces blood pressure.(http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/171878.php)

I will have to look at that and then discuss.

Goethe who discovered the homology of plant structures using active perception. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metamorphosis_of_Plants ) also see (http://www.natureinstitute.org/txt/ch/hsmetamorph.htm)

Well controversial interpretations can have more to do with the interpreters motives than the artists motives. Of course interpretations can also have there own meaning, and we often benefit from them in reflecting on the artists meaning.

I am not saying controversy, I am saying that impressions of art vary widely, is Moby Dick really an allegory for Ireland? Some thing so, but I agree with Dave Barry, the work whale appears frequently in the book and the word Ireland in a very limited fashion at best.

And not the beauty ascribed to values?

She will have her own values of beauty not associated with the perception of the color red.

It seems unlikely to me that such fundamental traits of mammalian physiology would "switch off" within such a short time (one generation).

maybe you should study development more, the cutoffs are quite real, it is almost impossible for someone not exposed to language to develop it after a certain point. they can learn a very rudimentary language but not fluency, there are many such developmental thresholds that once passed make skill acquisition very difficult.

the structure of the retina and visual cortex will be very set for the retina and not so set for the visual cortex. She may not have the daisy ring patterns of retinal contrast.

Most of human skills require exposure to stimuli and interaction during development to develop.

that is the way it is, she will have some structures but others she will not.

I certainly cannot see any evolutionary advantage. I can understand that the mind would not recognise the colour red due to lack of conditioning , but I find it hard to believe that the physiology of colour vision would not be happening.

Again there is a whole lot to color vision and it occurs at many levels, the photoreceptors may or may not respond, the retinal contrast patterns will not be there, and may develop but never for full acuity, and so on. there are many neural patterns that develop through use, she will not have those.

It is not like a car, it is a structure that grows in place and responds to the environment.

Is there really no unlucky person that you know of who went through this type of experience from which we might have learnt something more definitive?

the Mary room is so contrived, I doubt it.

Ok, I thought you were referring to our derail ;=)

Third Eye Open

17th December 2009, 04:01 PM

How about "consciousness is a biological property exhibited by humans and some animals".

Have fun making up a whole new list of terms for the exact same properties in non biological things.

Third Eye Open

17th December 2009, 04:13 PM

What is meant by "process" information? Information means something.

I guess a rock could be said to store information, in as much as a rock is information. But a rock doesn't do anything with the information.

AkuManiMani

17th December 2009, 05:57 PM

Then either you believe that individual neurons are conscious, or you believe that the part of the brain that is conscious is made up of components that in themselves are not conscious.

I think the latter is closer to the truth than the former. I would stipulate that consciousness may not be necessarily made up of the neural components but generated by them. I'll leave it at that.

If thats the case then wouldn't my decision to describe my subjective experiences be initiated from my conscious thought process?

There's no such thing as a "conscious thought process" in this sense. There are just thought processes. They are "conscious thought processes" when you become conscious of them.

But yes, those processes that you become conscious of result in your description of subjective experiences.

It seems that even with your conception of the decision making process, it's hard to avoid viewing consciousness as in some way initiating actions =/

Yes, you're misreading me.

There are two versions. In your version, you said that we have base goals, which are not conscious, that enter into this arena called "consciousness". Then "consciousness" causes other goals to be made. That's your version, and you said that this was what I was saying.

It's not what I was saying. I'm not pointing to things originating outside of the arena. I'm describing what's going on inside of it. The final product itself is made from a module that you are not conscious of, in exactly the same sort of way that you're not conscious of your individual neurons. You become "conscious" of it when all of the various aspects of yourself are notified, directly or indirectly (we work theoretically about ourselves as well), about the goal.

So you're saying that what we experience as consciousness is the sum result of global processing in the brain, but if one were to consider the process at a lower reductive level [of say, the level of individual neurons] there is no consciousness, per se. In this picture, conscious experiences are the processed bits of information filtered/aggregated together from all the individual modules that make up the brain.

Is that a more accurate description of what you're proposing? :o

Your version has goals being produced in full light of your view. Mine does not.

And mine matches intuitions. It also matches the entire fact that we're not completely aware of how we do it. We're not aware of how we do it because the process itself is not a conscious one. Those holes in our awareness are where the things get done.

I don't think that our two conceptions of the process are completely at odds. I agree that we're definitely not conscious of the nuts-&-bolts operations that work behind the scenes to filter our experiences. But, at the same time, I still maintain that there's goal formation at the meta-level of consciousness.

We both agree that most of what goes on in the brain is not conscious, and that we don't even need to be directly conscious of it for it to be essential for producing consciousness itself.

But those basic unconscious functions do work together to filter some relevant information into the conscious format as qualia. Its at this level that we have subjective experiences, conscious thoughts, and form conclusions. For all intents and purposes, this level of processing is the subject.

So what I took this to mean is that conscious mental processes don't perform any specialized functional role in the goal/intent making process.

Right. And that's a misinterpretation. What I'm saying is that conscious processes are made up of nothing but subconscious processes. I explicitly said that conscious processes play a role--it just doesn't happen in full view.

Just to clarify, could you explain what role you think consciousness does play in these processes? :confused:

PixyMisa

17th December 2009, 07:40 PM

All good questions. As I said, maybe the answer will be more complicated than Pixy thinks, or maybe it'll be just as boring. :D Maybe what we interpret as "qualia" or whatever you choose to call them, isn't what we think they are, and I expect that in the end it won't be quite as interesting as idealists would like.
I don't suggest that human perception is at all simple, it's not. What I point out is that the mechanism that allows for consciousness is simple - and commonplace. (And of course, the idea does not originate with me; I borrowed it from Hofstadter and Dennett, and they build on earlier work.)

PixyMisa

17th December 2009, 07:47 PM

I laugh at the insistence that there's a vast, obvious difference which you are unable to specify.
Switching, westprog, switching.

Rocks don't.

And a rock stores and uses and processes information
No and no.

and a computer reacts to physical laws.
Yes and so?

Rocks are defined by their bulk statistical properties. Computers behave completely unlike their bulk statistical properties. Your comparison is one of the silliest things I have ever seen anyone post on these forums.

The only fundamental difference is the use that human beings make of the computer and the rock.
No. Not even close.

In their physical properties and behaviours, rocks and computers are different in every way imaginable.

And you've decided to arbitrarily assign awareness to the computer and not to the rock, and you are annoyed that I don't just say "Oh yes, it's obvious". Well, if it were obvious, you would be able to specify in what way the computer processes information that the rock doesn't.
Did you post this drivel from a rock? No, you used a computer. Why did you do that? Because computers behave completely differently from rocks.

You know this. You know perfectly well that the behaviours are not remotely equivalent. Yet you are arguing for this in the abstract because it is required to support your position. It seems not to matter to you that it is not only false, but absurd.

yy2bggggs

17th December 2009, 09:43 PM

I think the latter is closer to the truth than the former.
Then we're in synch. I'm talking about subsets of your conscious mind that are bigger than neurons, but still not quite conscious on their own. Those are the pieces.
It seems that even with your conception of the decision making process, it's hard to avoid viewing consciousness as in some way initiating actions =/Right, and I'm not avoiding it at all! My accusation is only that it's misleading. In particular, using the word conscious as an adverb is severely misleading--that conveys that consciousness is the means by which the thing is done, which strongly suggests proximate cause.

But consciousness is more the catalyst than the reactant.
So you're saying that what we experience as consciousness is the sum result of global processing in the brain, but if one were to consider the process at a lower reductive level [of say, the level of individual neurons] there is no consciousness, per se. In this picture, conscious experiences are the processed bits of information filtered/aggregated together from all the individual modules that make up the brain.
Close, but not quite. Knock out "global". There's no holistic aspect here--there are just the pieces. What makes them all "consciousness" is that the pieces communicate, creating this very real, yet virtual, entity. Consciousness isn't so much top down as it's side to side.
I don't think that our two conceptions of the process are completely at odds. I agree that we're definitely not conscious of the nuts-&-bolts operations that work behind the scenes to filter our experiences.I'm not arguing that your conception is at odds with mine... at least not yet (I reserve all rights to do so). Currently I'm just arguing that what you described doesn't match the picture I was painting. It seems you're starting to catch on though (and for that reason I don't think I'll finish the last reply... taking up from here seems like it'd work just fine).
But, at the same time, I still maintain that there's goal formation at the meta-level of consciousness.Only in a meta-level sense. It's still just a bunch of specialized pieces talking to each other.
We both agree that most of what goes on in the brain is not conscious, and that we don't even need to be directly conscious of it for it to be essential for producing consciousness itself.

But those basic unconscious functions do work together to filter some relevant information into the conscious format as qualia. Its at this level that we have subjective experiences, conscious thoughts, and form conclusions. For all intents and purposes, this level of processing is the subject.
I disagree. What you're calling consciousness is only the information exchanges that gets tossed around between these modules. I don't equate that with the self. In fact, I draw a much bigger circle around the thing I call the self. And I do this for a specific reason--because that's how we actually talk about ourselves as a subject and an agency.

For example, I believe I have preferences. Ultimately, the preferences aren't things I'm aware of at any particular moment; they are more like theories about what I would choose in certain situations. Furthermore, I don't know exactly why I have the preferences that I do, but I still consider the preferences to be a part of who I am. So if by "subject" I'm to refer to the thing that has preferences, I should be including the thing that actually does the preferring that I know would happen (because my memory recalls "sensing" the preference), as well as the thing that predicts that it would tend to choose those preferences in certain situations. That's a bit bigger than just the pieces of information being currently tossed around--it includes theoretical aspects of modules that I'm never really directly aware of. Yet I consider it to be part of my psyche.
Just to clarify, could you explain what role you think consciousness does play in these processes? :confused:
The information gets tossed between particular modules, depending on what you're doing, and a subset of those modules start working on particular tasks, while some of the other modules simply sit there having the potential to act, to redirect the flow (grab your attention, so to speak, should something interesting or alarming arise), or to do something else with the information (note interesting patterns to commit to memory, for example).

The sum of what you are aware of is what I'd imagine you're calling conscious, but not quite in a holistic sense. Rather, it's the sum working as collaborative pieces--the collaboration is more of a choreography than it is a special sort of "top down" connectivity principle (I know this, because although it's a wonderful dance expertly performed, on occasion, the dancers bump into each other and they have to work around it). The modules that perform said communication, or that potentially could, collectively form a very real, yet virtual (and somewhat fuzzy), singular entity, which is your self.

Frank Newgent

17th December 2009, 09:44 PM

delete

Belz...

18th December 2009, 03:47 AM

How about "consciousness is a biological property exhibited by humans and some animals".

See how easy it is to make up a definition that says whatever you want?

Then perhaps our first task would be to find a definition we can all agree on ?

AkuManiMani

18th December 2009, 07:27 AM

Then we're in synch. I'm talking about subsets of your conscious mind that are bigger than neurons, but still not quite conscious on their own. Those are the pieces.

So the general idea is that there is some threshold of neural activity that constitutes what we call consciousness.

Right, and I'm not avoiding it at all! My accusation is only that it's misleading. In particular, using the word conscious as an adverb is severely misleading--that conveys that consciousness is the means by which the thing is done, which strongly suggests proximate cause.

But consciousness is more the catalyst than the reactant.

Hmm. I don't think this view is necessarily wrong but I've worked out a somewhat different conception of consciousness. I'm not sure if the difference is just a matter of labeling but I guess I'll just spell out what I've had in mind:

[The following description is just a very rough sketch and I'm sure there are a lot of technical details are left out. Also, its pretty heavy in analogy and metaphor so please don't take my comparisons too literally]

From how I've been conceiving of it, the mind is basically a kind of virtual space generated by the "wetware" of the brain which contains all the elements of one's psyche, like memories, memes, etc. -- kind of like a biological database.

Consciousness would be a kind of active brain state during which the "lights" of the mind are "turned on", in some sense. Its during this state that the subject can subjectively experience mental elements as qualia. One's conscious mental activity is more energy intensive and, I suspect, is denoted by the metabolically more active areas of the brain seen in PET scans and the like.

Lucidity would be the degree of vividness of one's conscious experience; how "brightly" the dimmer switch of one's mind is turned. High lucidity would be the period's when the subject is fully awake, or when they're experiencing a highly vivid hallucination/dream. Periods of low lucidity would be mental states like delirium or when the subject is "fading" into sleep. Zero lucidity would be mental states of complete unconsciousness, like comas and deep sleep.

One's awareness is the mental extent of their short-term memory which -- to stick with the computer analogy -- would be equivalent to one's RAM. One's awareness would be a rough measure of how many different mental elements one can be conscious of . Stimuli and mental elements that a subject is not conscious of at all would be completely outside of their awareness.

Feel free to point out which portions you agree with and which differ from your own understanding of consciousness :)

The [i]sum of what you are aware of is what I'd imagine you're calling conscious, but not quite in a holistic sense. Rather, it's the sum working as collaborative pieces--the collaboration is more of a choreography than it is a special sort of "top down" connectivity principle (I know this, because although it's a wonderful dance expertly performed, on occasion, the dancers bump into each other and they have to work around it). The modules that perform said communication, or that potentially could, collectively form a very real, yet virtual (and somewhat fuzzy), singular entity, which is your self.

I agree. Our conscious minds can be viewed as virtual entities in a sense. Minds aren't the neural modules but the cascade of activity produced by them.

westprog

18th December 2009, 07:40 AM

I guess a rock could be said to store information, in as much as a rock is information. But a rock doesn't do anything with the information.

Of course it does. Everything receives and transmits information, all the time. Unless you want to restrict the definition of information to meaningful information, which implies someone conscious - which instantly gives a circular definition.

I know that it's intuitive that a computer is doing something meaningful with its information, and that the rock isn't, but that's solely because there's a human being involved making use of the computer. Take away the human being and the meaning disappears.

This is naturally a problem for the people who really, really don't want human beings to be anything special. But I can't help that.

westprog

18th December 2009, 07:42 AM

Then perhaps our first task would be to find a definition we can all agree on ?

There's a thread devoted to exactly that. I've already posted as to why it might be impossible in principle to do any such thing.

yy2bggggs

18th December 2009, 08:20 AM

Frank Newgent

18th December 2009, 08:40 AM

The majority of car engines manufactured in the last decade are conscious.

I have a 6.0 liter Ford diesel and I know what you mean.

Yesterday on the Ohio Turnpike my 2004 Ford E-350 began to question the posted price of diesel fuel as 'text' while subjecting the $2.59/gallon signs to a strenuous critical reevaluation as 'constructs' supplying myriad self-opposed 'meanings' derived from cultural signifiers drawing out assumptions from within the context of our media environment.

On the other hand my '96 Saturn is a Green Bay Packer fan.

Belz...

18th December 2009, 09:02 AM

I have a 6.0 liter Ford diesel and I know what you mean.

Yesterday on the Ohio Turnpike my 2004 Ford E-350 began to question the posted price of diesel fuel as 'text' while subjecting the $2.59/gallon signs to a strenuous critical reevaluation as 'constructs' supplying myriad self-opposed 'meanings' derived from cultural signifiers drawing out assumptions from within the context of our media environment.

On the other hand my '96 Saturn is a Green Bay Packer fan.

Thanks for proving my point about needing a common definition of "consciousness".

Frank Newgent

18th December 2009, 09:15 AM

Thanks for proving my point about needing a common definition of "consciousness".

Huh? My Saturn wasn't manufactured in the last decade :D

I bought it used. Its previous owner may have run it into a monolith though.

AkuManiMani

18th December 2009, 11:54 AM

So the general idea is that there is some threshold of neural activity that constitutes what we call consciousness.

Not exactly. Some requirement, not some threshold. What you're considering consciousness isn't a matter of degree, but structure--it's a matter of which pieces are participating, how, and what they're doing. And a lot of it is potential.

In other words, consciousness is a matter of having the right -kind- of system in place, right?

But our differences are in how you treat the subject, and subjectively experiencing. You seem to essentially have the same exact scenario you start with--a brain thrust into an environment with sense organs--but you simply bump the scale down. Now it's a sub-brain, and that sub-brain is self. And it has sense organs that are other pieces of the brain. I'm guessing from your description that the way you imagine this to work is that the vast majority of the brain's job is to do some thing "somehow" to generate the experience and feed it into the self.

Kinda. I see the brain as taking in raw somatic/environmental data, parsing it into a suitable "mental" format, which is then fed into the "self". The outputs of proprioception and somatosensory processing are the inputs of the "self".

If this is the case, then all of these non-self modules of the brain may as well be mounted on the outside of your head. Whatever this "self" does to be a "self" remains unexplained, as does what these modules could possibly do to information to make them "experiences".

Very true. The explanation of "self" and "experience" is definitely whats lacking. However, what I'm doing here is providing a general description and framing the problem that needs explaining.

Well, I too allow this general sort of thing to happen in the brain. There may be pieces that are the neural sense organs. And they might do something to the data, and pass it to this nougat that is the self. But where I start with the picture is that I take these neural sense organs and throw them away--as far as I care, whatever information they feed to the self are fed via other means. Furthermore, I think I have a bigger piece of the brain devoted to the self.

If one wants to get right down to it, the "self" doesn't just map onto a specific region of the brain. Like you pointed out earlier, all of the brain's processing is involved in creating consciousness. However, we only become directly aware of a small portion of the information being processed at any given time.

What I'm suggesting has strong parallels with the Global Workspace Theory Nick227 was touting some months back. The virtual space of the mind isn't so much a physical module in some specific part of the brain, but software encoded by the collective activity of brain cells.

And I don't have these sense organs producing the experiences. Rather, I have this self nougat producing them. Mine is an inside out version of yours.

But I think mine makes a lot more sense. There are requirements that need to be met to coherently formulate the "redness" of the red, and simply translating it from one language to the other doesn't meet these requirements (making "red" say "vermelho" doesn't do the trick). It is the self that satisfies these requirements, so it should be the self that generates the experience--not the neural sense organs.

Just to clarify, in the description I'm drawing of it, the sense organs and brain modules parse data; once the processed data enters one's awareness its translated into experience. Errors in the parsing process can lead to conditions like synesthesia.

Also, I don't think that the transition from unconscious mental data to conscious experience is merely syntactic/symbolic. I think that the event of experience itself is a kind of excitatory state produced by brain cells. In my conception of it, consciousness is as much an energetic process as it is a computational one.

westprog

18th December 2009, 02:10 PM

Kinda. I see the brain as taking in raw somatic/environmental data, parsing it into a suitable "mental" format, which is then fed into the "self". The outputs of proprioception and somatosensory processing are the inputs of the "self".

It's a sign of the way that we've come to think about consciousness is that we find it difficult to talk about it without using the language of computing. There's a reason for that. We understand computing very well. In the course of less than a human lifetime, we've come to understand ways that computers work better than we understand how brains work. We've developed a language - "parsing into a suitable format", "fed into", "outputs", "inputs", "processing" - all of which have come to have very precise connotations, and which may lead us entirely in the wrong direction.

Because we can abstract some of the behaviour of the brain in terms that we use for data processing, we can easily come to think that this is evidence that the brain is somehow working in a computational way - evidence that is thin on the ground otherwise.

It's very difficult to break away from this, but maybe if we thought of the brain as the bodily organ which it is, instead of the mechanical device which it is not, we might not settle so easily for the simplest explanation.

Kinda. I see the brain as eating raw somatic/environmental energy, digesting it into a suitable "mental" chemical state, which is then absorbed into the "self". The excreta of proprioception and somatosensory processing are the food of the "self".

That's a more biological view, which is every bit as valid.

cyborg

18th December 2009, 03:07 PM

It's very difficult to break away from this, but maybe if we thought of the brain as the bodily organ which it is, instead of the mechanical device which it is not, we might not settle so easily for the simplest explanation.

So is it invalid to think of the bodily organ of the heart in terms of its pumping mechanics?

westprog

18th December 2009, 04:09 PM

So is it invalid to think of the bodily organ of the heart in terms of its pumping mechanics?

The heart is the perfect example of an organ whose function was fundamentally misunderstood. Even now the language is full of references to the heart which are based on a total misapprehension of its essential function. Luckily these are now taken to be figurative.

Malerin

18th December 2009, 05:19 PM

So is it invalid to think of the bodily organ of the heart in terms of its pumping mechanics?

Hearts aren't conscious, don't have subjective experiences, and aren't aware of anything.

Wait a minute, you don't think hearts (and livers and kidnesys) are conscious, do you? Normally, I wouldn't bother to ask, but with talk of concsious car enginges, washing machines, and aware thermostats being taken seriously (by a small but vocal minority, tis true), the question has to be put out there.

PixyMisa

18th December 2009, 07:22 PM

PixyMisa

18th December 2009, 07:28 PM

Of course it does. Everything receives and transmits information, all the time.
Irrelevant. We're talking about processing information.

Unless you want to restrict the definition of information to meaningful information, which implies someone conscious - which instantly gives a circular definition.
Nope. Not talking about meaning at all.

I know that it's intuitive that a computer is doing something meaningful with its information, and that the rock isn't, but that's solely because there's a human being involved making use of the computer. Take away the human being and the meaning disappears.
Not talking about meaning at all. I'm talking about behaviours.

You can't post to this forum with a rock. You know this, and you ignore it, because it destroys your so-called argument.

This is naturally a problem for people with unsupported and unsupportable arguments. But I can't help that.

yy2bggggs

19th December 2009, 12:32 AM

In other words, consciousness is a matter of having the right -kind- of system in place, right?
Consciousness as you define it, yes. Whatever kinds of things you want to throw in have requirements for certain kinds of things being in place.
Kinda. I see the brain as [1A] taking in raw somatic/environmental data, [1B] parsing it into a suitable "mental" format, which is then[1R] fed[1C] into the "self". The outputs of proprioception and somatosensory processing are the inputs of the "self".
...
Just to clarify, in the description I'm drawing of it, the sense organs and brain modules parse data; once [2A] the processed data [2B] enters one's awareness its [2C] translated into experience.
I'm confused. The picture you paint in the 1 series is first environmental data (1A), next (1R) parsing into mental format (1B), and then (1R) feeding into self (1C). (labeling 1R for a sequence "relation"). In the second account, you have data being processed (2A), then entering into awareness (2B), then translated into experience (2C).

It's not that I see a conflict, but I can't relate these pieces as you formulate them. The characters in play (not necessarily distinct) are processed data, suitable mental format data, awareness, experience, self. Can you relate the two for me? (Including which are the same entities, how you believe this flows, etc)
Very true. The explanation of "self" and "experience" is definitely whats lacking. However, what I'm doing here is providing a general description and framing the problem that needs explaining.
But it also appears that you have constructed some form of soft architecture about it.
If one wants to get right down to it, the "self" doesn't just map onto a specific region of the brain. Like you pointed out earlier, all of the brain's processing is involved in creating consciousness. However, we only become directly aware of a small portion of the information being processed at any given time.
A question for you... which do you consider describing the experience of red... when you aware of something being red, or when you are aware that you are aware of something being red? Which of these two do you mean when you say "directly aware"?

cyborg

19th December 2009, 02:59 AM

Hearts aren't conscious, don't have subjective experiences, and aren't aware of anything.

And you know this how?

How do you people who argue that subjective experience is the be-all and end-all get to be so damn good at knowing exactly what the subjective experiences of all other pieces of the universe are exactly?

Wait a minute, you don't think hearts (and livers and kidnesys) are conscious, do you? Normally, I wouldn't bother to ask, but with talk of concsious car enginges, washing machines, and aware thermostats being taken seriously (by a small but vocal minority, tis true), the question has to be put out there.

The behaviour of the heart doesn't lead to anything looking like "consciousness".

cyborg

19th December 2009, 03:01 AM

The heart is the perfect example of an organ whose function was fundamentally misunderstood. Even now the language is full of references to the heart which are based on a total misapprehension of its essential function. Luckily these are now taken to be figurative.

And maybe one day you'll understand why that applies to your brain as well.

Darat

19th December 2009, 03:17 AM

...snip...

The behaviour of the heart doesn't lead to anything looking like "consciousness".

Well as long as you don't include "reacts to external stimulus by changing its outputs" in your definition of conciousness... ;)

westprog

19th December 2009, 05:16 AM

And maybe one day you'll understand why that applies to your brain as well.

I understand that all the different ways to describe the brain are metaphors. The people who use computational terms are fooling themselves into thinking that they are describing the underlying reality.

Yes, the heart is a pump - but that's a metaphor which is of no use if,say, trying to cure a coronary tumour.

Frank Newgent

19th December 2009, 05:19 AM

cyborg

19th December 2009, 05:29 AM

The people who use computational terms are fooling themselves into thinking that they are describing the underlying reality.

Nope.

Yes, the heart is a pump - but that's a metaphor which is of no use if,say, trying to cure a coronary tumour.

No it isn't.

Dancing David

19th December 2009, 05:42 AM

Hearts aren't conscious, don't have subjective experiences, and aren't aware of anything.

Wait a minute, you don't think hearts (and livers and kidnesys) are conscious, do you? Normally, I wouldn't bother to ask, but with talk of concsious car enginges, washing machines, and aware thermostats being taken seriously (by a small but vocal minority, tis true), the question has to be put out there.

Hearts aren't aware, now they can generate pain, but they do not recognise it. So they have sensation but not awareness?

Except for the ways that they do, like the pulse that generates the synchronized beat. Different cells are aware of other cell's behavior. In that they note sense changes and react to it.

westprog

19th December 2009, 07:39 AM

Nope.

No it isn't.

Now there's two of them at it. This could cause confusion, you know.

AkuManiMani

19th December 2009, 07:07 PM

AkuManiMani

19th December 2009, 08:24 PM

Kinda. I see the brain as [1A] taking in raw somatic/environmental data, [1B] parsing it into a suitable "mental" format, which is then[1R] fed[1C] into the "self". The outputs of proprioception and somatosensory processing are the inputs of the "self".

[...]

Just to clarify, in the description I'm drawing of it, the sense organs and brain modules parse data; once [2A] the processed data [2B] enters one's awareness its [2C] translated into experience.

I'm confused. The picture you paint in the 1 series is first environmental data (1A), next (1R) parsing into mental format (1B), and then (1R) feeding into self (1C). (labeling 1R for a sequence "relation"). In the second account, you have data being processed (2A), then entering into awareness (2B), then translated into experience (2C).

It's not that I see a conflict, but I can't relate these pieces as you formulate them. The characters in play (not necessarily distinct) are processed data, suitable mental format data, awareness, experience, self. Can you relate the two for me? (Including which are the same entities, how you believe this flows, etc)

Hm...Steps [1A]->[1R], and [2A]->[2B] are equivalent. They represent the unconscious work our brain does to process information into a "finished" product. During step [1R] the information is part of one's consciously accessible mind. Steps [1C] and [2C] represent the point where the refined information is "illuminated" in the awareness (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5426663&postcount=3318) of a conscious subject.

I suppose the "self", as I've been using it, is synonymous with the 'light' of one's awareness. 'Experience', in this context, is all the mental information in one's awareness. The elements that make up an individual's experience are what we refer to as qualia. They're basically the subjective palette one's consciousness draws from.

ATM, I don't think that mental information in our awareness at any given time is necessarily in a different format than information sitting in our longterm memory. It seems more likely that the excitation of mental information under the 'illumination' of awareness constitutes conscious experience.

[And, just to be clear, I don't conceive of awareness as being a static module; IMO, is more like a kind of dynamic focus of activity that moves about one's conscious mind like a spotlight.]

Very true. The explanation of "self" and "experience" is definitely whats lacking. However, what I'm doing here is providing a general description and framing the problem that needs explaining.

But it also appears that you have constructed some form of soft architecture about it.

What does 'soft architecture' mean? I don't think I've heard this term before :o

If one wants to get right down to it, the "self" doesn't just map onto a specific region of the brain. Like you pointed out earlier, all of the brain's processing is involved in creating consciousness. However, we only become directly aware of a small portion of the information being processed at any given time.

A question for you... which do you consider describing the experience of red... when you aware of something being red, or when you are aware that you are aware of something being red? Which of these two do you mean when you say "directly aware"?

Direct experience of red would be being aware of a red stimulus. Being aware about the red stimulus [as in applying the label "red' to what you're seeing, or knowledge concerning the wavelength that we see as red, etc.] would be something we intellectually do with that direct experience.

ETA: Hmm...Actually, giving it summore thought, it seems that there are atleast two major aspects of one's conscious mental experience:

'Suchness' - The 'ineffable' qualities of our qualia -- the -raw feel- of our experiences. This is the essence of meaning and it underpins mental faculties like semantics and volition.

and...

'Aboutness' - How one mentally shapes and arranges their experiences -- the architecture of their mental space. This is the structural form of thought that underpins mental faculties like syntax and intellect.

[BTW, thanks very much for the organized feedback. Its really helping me sharpen the picture in my mind :) ]

AkuManiMani

19th December 2009, 08:46 PM

Ask your Ford dealer today.

Teehehe!

I troll IM chat bots like this all the time. Its fun to see the mindless responses they give :p

AkuManiMani

19th December 2009, 08:48 PM

Well as long as you don't include "reacts to external stimulus by changing its outputs" in your definition of conciousness... ;)

You mean like adrenaline? ;)

yy2bggggs

19th December 2009, 11:57 PM

Hm...Steps [1A]->[1R], and [2A]->[2B] are equivalent. ... Note, by the way, that 1R is meant to label a relation, not a step, and I repeat it in my summary. It's meant to emphasize that 1A, 1B, and 1C are ordered this way in time. This made it a bit hard to thread through your response.

Here is what I have so far:

1. External data processed by senses
2. Data is parsed into "mental information".
3. Mental information is fed into self.
4. Something about awareness happens. (Still not clear about this)
5. Experience is the mental information in awareness.

Any corrections are welcome. I'm still missing what you mean by awareness. You only explain it by analogy, and I don't think analogy is going to cut it here. I would suggest example.

Let's take, for example, blindsight. Suppose I'm suffering from a form of this. So someone shows me a paper, and it has a symbol on it, and I have no idea what the symbol is. If forced to guess, I would say it's probably an X. It turns out that it is, in fact, an X. They repeat this experiment (let's say, with X's and O's), and I do significantly better than average at guessing what the symbol is, but I swear that I cannot see the symbol.

So I am able to willfully act in response to this symbol, and describe what the symbol is. But to me it seems like I'm just guessing. I'm not really even sure how the correct symbol goes out of my mouth when I'm forced to guess what it is--it just does somehow. But it does this only when I initiate a guess.

Here's how I would describe this scenario. I would say that I'm aware of the X. But I'm not aware that I'm aware of the X. I see the X, but I don't see myself seeing it. I have blindsight because I cannot report on the fact that I recognize the X. But I can report the fact that I recognize the X. Does that make sense?
Direct experience of red would be being aware of a red stimulus. Being aware about the red stimulus [as in applying the label "red' to what you're seeing, or knowledge concerning the wavelength that we see as red, etc.] would be something we intellectually do with that direct experience.I think to have what you're calling qualia, you need to be able to "see yourself seeing red". That's a necessary, though not sufficient, condition. It's not just the fact that you can react to red, but also the fact that you know that the thing you are looking at is red.
What does 'soft architecture' mean? I don't think I've heard this term before :oSame as architecture, only I'm trying to contrast it to physical architecture. You're not dealing with a description of how the brain itself is physically arranged--like which modules are where. Rather, you're talking about some sort of aspect of how things flow through the brain.

It's an analogy to software architecture! (I make no apologies for using computer terms as analogies, and without naming names or specific accusations, anyone with a problem with this can just bite me.)

Regardless, do you think of the self as the thing that is aware, or the thing that is aware that it is aware?

westprog

20th December 2009, 06:40 AM

Hehe.

Yea, thats definitely another way to put it. I do realize that the computer analogy can only go so far. But, considering that most people here are most familiar with the technical language of computing, I figured its the most effective means of communicating what I've got in mind. I've taken dlorde's advice (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=4784818#post4784818) about effective communication to heart :D

It's not that the computer metaphor isn't valid - it's that it carries too much weight. From being a way to think about how the brain works, it's taken to be self-evidently the only important thing about how the brain works. When debating with people who think that there is no significant difference between the brain and a computer, it's important to avoid giving up in the terms used.

AkuManiMani

20th December 2009, 06:43 AM

Note, by the way, that 1R is meant to label a relation, not a step, and I repeat it in my summary. It's meant to emphasize that 1A, 1B, and 1C are ordered this way in time. This made it a bit hard to thread through your response.

Oh, sorry >_<

Here is what I have so far:

1. External data processed by senses

Right. I think this roughly corresponds to what the peripheral nervous system does.

2. Data is parsed into "mental information".

Yep. This part most likely occurs in the central nervous system and the more 'primitive' structures of the brain.

3. Mental information is fed into self.

This point of the game I think is equivalent to the ''workspace' of GWT (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Workspace_Theory) -- what I've been referring to as the consciously accessible mind (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5426663&postcount=3318) . The CAM is not consciousness but the virtual space one's conscious activity is confined to.

4. Something about awareness happens. (Still not clear about this)

When our CAMs reach some degree of lucidity (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5426663&postcount=3318) we are conscious. Awareness would be the 'lit' portions of the CAM when its in a state of consciousness.

5. Experience is the mental information in awareness.

Yep.

Any corrections are welcome. I'm still missing what you mean by awareness. You only explain it by analogy, and I don't think analogy is going to cut it here. I would suggest example.

Let's take, for example, blindsight. Suppose I'm suffering from a form of this. So someone shows me a paper, and it has a symbol on it, and I have no idea what the symbol is. If forced to guess, I would say it's probably an X. It turns out that it is, in fact, an X. They repeat this experiment (let's say, with X's and O's), and I do significantly better than average at guessing what the symbol is, but I swear that I cannot see the symbol.

So I am able to [i]willfully act in response to this symbol, and describe what the symbol is. But to me it seems like I'm just guessing. I'm not really even sure how the correct symbol goes out of my mouth when I'm forced to guess what it is--it just does somehow. But it does this only when I initiate a guess.

Here's how I would describe this scenario. I would say that I'm aware of the X. But I'm not aware that I'm aware of the X. I see the X, but I don't see myself seeing it. I have blindsight because I cannot report on the fact that I recognize the X. But I can report the fact that I recognize the X. Does that make sense?

Yea, that makes perfect sense. I've actually been giving scenarios like this some thought and I think the descriptive model I'm proposing can explain it roughly.

Blindsight is similar to synesthesia except that, instead of sensory channels being crossed or scrambled, portions of visual data simply don't reach the CAM for some reason. The subject may experience some motion and/or positional qualia but the more salient aspects of the visual experience [like color qualia] are inaccessible to the subject's awareness.

I think to have what you're calling qualia, you need to be able to "see yourself seeing red". That's a necessary, though not sufficient, condition. It's not just the fact that you can react to red, but also the fact that you know that the thing you are looking at is red.

For a while that was pretty much the same understanding I had of perception. But, giving it some thought, that particular line of reasoning just leads to the regression problem that many critics of the "Cartesian Theater" object to.

The regression problem is avoided if the buck simply stops at awareness. A subject can experience the color qualia we call "red" [a 'suchness'] without knowing that what they're experiencing is called "red" ['aboutness']. Blindsightedness isn't the same as not knowing you're seeing red; you simply don't see it because the sensory data necessary to produce certain visual qualia are not accessible to your awareness.

What does 'soft architecture' mean? I don't think I've heard this term before :o

Same as architecture, only I'm trying to contrast it to physical architecture. You're not dealing with a description of how the brain itself is physically arranged--like which modules are where. Rather, you're talking about some sort of aspect of how things flow through the brain.

Pretty much. I think this scheme allows us to understand the mind as something distinct from the brain/body without having to invoke metaphysical dualism :)

Regardless, do you think of the self as the thing that is aware, or the thing that is aware that it is aware?

Both. Awareness -of- a thing [Suchness] and awareness -that- a thing [Aboutness] are just two complementary aspects of our conscious experience.

AkuManiMani

20th December 2009, 07:39 AM

It's not that the computer metaphor isn't valid - it's that it carries too much weight. From being a way to think about how the brain works, it's taken to be self-evidently the only important thing about how the brain works. When debating with people who think that there is no significant difference between the brain and a computer, it's important to avoid giving up in the terms used.

Oki. I'll try and keep that in mind.

westprog

20th December 2009, 10:06 AM

Oki. I'll try and keep that in mind.

I do it myself all the time. I just noticed one day that I was arguing against the computational model using the language of the computational model. I'll probably do it again.

FedUpWithFaith

29th December 2009, 02:44 PM

I have a 6.0 liter Ford diesel and I know what you mean.

Yesterday on the Ohio Turnpike my 2004 Ford E-350 began to question the posted price of diesel fuel as 'text' while subjecting the $2.59/gallon signs to a strenuous critical reevaluation as 'constructs' supplying myriad self-opposed 'meanings' derived from cultural signifiers drawing out assumptions from within the context of our media environment.

On the other hand my '96 Saturn is a Green Bay Packer fan.

That was f'in funny man.

By the way, my Suzuki SX4 told me she thinks Saturns are adorable. Be forewarned before you let yours nearby though. She's a bit promiscuous and loves to take it up the tailpipe. I'm always finding her missing from the garage, no telling where she's been

FedUpWithFaith

29th December 2009, 04:21 PM

Aku,

I sort of took your post in the other thread as an invitation to check out what you're up to here and put in my two cents. I apologize ahead of time that i didn;t have time to review deeply into this thread and I apologize if I derail your discussion like a dilletante.

I suppose the "self", as I've been using it, is synonymous with the 'light' of one's awareness. 'Experience', in this context, is all the mental information in one's awareness. The elements that make up an individual's experience are what we refer to as qualia. They're basically the subjective palette one's consciousness draws from.

I'd argue that qualia and the awareness of same is all consciousness really is. It is the subjective experience of red, sound, taste, touch, and even our own thoughts, our mind's eye, and that voice in you might hear in your mind reading this. Our actual thinking, memory, and cognition isn't conscious although it sort of feels that way. It's already mostly been calculated subconsciously before you even "feel" it. As I type these words I can already tell most of the thinking has been done. In fact, I sometimes find I've written or said stuff before I consciousnessly recognize what I've written or said.

I don't think we have to postulate any separate conscious processes though there may be some. Rather, I view it as a self-referential "by-product" (though likely a necessary one) of subconscious thought and sensory mental processing - all highly parallel processes.

[And, just to be clear, I don't conceive of awareness as being a static module; IMO, is more like a kind of dynamic focus of activity that moves about one's conscious mind like a spotlight.]

Even most or all of attention could be subconscious - perhaps you just feel the qualia of attention. And you'll be interested to know that neuroscientists call it "the spotlight of attention" and several distinct brain areas have been identified as potential primary loci for it.

'Suchness' - The 'ineffable' qualities of our qualia -- the -raw feel- of our experiences. This is the essence of meaning and it underpins mental faculties like semantics and volition.

I'd argue "qualia" is all you need here.

'Aboutness' - How one mentally shapes and arranges their experiences -- the architecture of their mental space. This is the structural form of thought that underpins mental faculties like syntax and intellect.

Sounds like "cognition" to me. Do we really need new terms? Language is the biggest barrier we have in philosophy as it is.

AkuManiMani

29th December 2009, 05:34 PM

I suppose the "self", as I've been using it, is synonymous with the 'light' of one's awareness. 'Experience', in this context, is all the mental information in one's awareness. The elements that make up an individual's experience are what we refer to as qualia. They're basically the subjective palette one's consciousness draws from.

I'd argue that qualia and the awareness of same is all consciousness really is. It is the subjective experience of red, sound, taste, touch, and even our own thoughts, our mind's eye, and that voice in you might hear in your mind reading this. Our actual thinking, memory, and cognition isn't conscious although it sort of feels that way. It's already mostly been calculated subconsciously before you even "feel" it. As I type these words I can already tell most of the thinking has been done. In fact, I sometimes find I've written or said stuff before I consciousnessly recognize what I've written or said.

I conceive of qualia as a kind of subjective complement to quanta. When the conscious activity of our minds is focused on some mental element(s) it produces a spectrum of qualities. For all intents and purposes, the subject is the medium of those spectral patterns.

If you haven't noticed already, I find its best to try to view the mind/consciousness as some kind of energetic phenomenon instead of abstracted computational functions. If we're ever going to fit the mind properly into the ontological frame of science it almost certainly will have to be in terms of physics. As to whether consciousness is just an unaccounted feature of known physical fields, or if its something completely beyond the pale, I dunno.

I don't think we have to postulate any separate conscious processes though there may be some. Rather, I view it as a self-referential "by-product" (though likely a necessary one) of subconscious thought and sensory mental processing - all highly parallel processes.

Thats roughly as I conceive it. I'd add the caveat that I distinguish conscious thought, from unconscious processing. The former is volitional and deliberate while the latter is habitual and automatic. The conscious portion initiates willful actions and is, I would argue, indeterminate but conditioned by unconscious processing. The stronger one's conscious will is, the more easily they can override/modify their unconscious impulses.

Even most or all of attention could be subconscious - perhaps you just feel the qualia of attention.

The way I'm using the terms, attention [i.e. awareness] is what we're consciously focused on.

And you'll be interested to know that neuroscientists call it "the spotlight of attention" and several distinct brain areas have been identified as potential primary loci for it.

Cool! Any working hypotheses as to how the activities of those areas are 'pooled' together to form our unified experiences?

'Suchness' - The 'ineffable' qualities of our qualia -- the [I]-raw feel- of our experiences. This is the essence of meaning and it underpins mental faculties like semantics and volition.

I'd argue "qualia" is all you need here.

Aboutness' - How one mentally shapes and arranges their experiences -- the architecture of their mental space. This is the structural form of thought that underpins mental faculties like syntax and intellect.

Sounds like "cognition" to me. Do we really need new terms? Language is the biggest barrier we have in philosophy as it is.

Meh...I guess it really isn't necessary to introduce new vocabulary. I'm kinda just building an introspective picture from scratch and naming features I "see" as I go along. If the terminology I'm using corresponds to terms already in use then at least I know I'm on the right track :D

FedUpWithFaith

29th December 2009, 07:18 PM

Hey Aku,

First, can you tell me how to conveniently do nested quotes like you just did without having to cut and paste?

I conceive of qualia as a kind of subjective complement to quanta. When the conscious activity of our minds [i.e. our awareness] is focused on some mental element(s) it produces a spectrum of qualities. For all intents and purposes, the subject is the medium of those spectral patterns.

You saw "Fantastic Voyage" as a kid didn't you? Besides Raquel Welch's sweet bobbing breasticles the thing I best remember about that movie was the way neuron dendrites and axons lit up when they fired in the brain.

I don't think your quanta analogy is meaningful or necessary. In some of your posts I also sense a bias towards the sequential processing of digital computers opposed to the massively parallel processing of neural networks. You could be right though in your main conclusions. But you might want to challenge your ideas by reframing the perspective. Could your qualia of attention be a result, perhaps a sort of virtual illusion, yielded by a subconscious and massively parallel relaxation process occuring in the weights of many synapses (e.g., like annealing - investigate the Boltzmann Machine if interested in exploring this aspect of ANNs further)?

My suggestions here are not simply speculative. Are you aware of Libet's brainscan research that shows that the neural signals associated with subject-chosen decisions precede their conscious reporting of "choosing"?

If you haven't noticed already, I find its best to try to view the mind/consciousness as some kind of energetic phenomenon instead of abstracted computational functions. If we're ever going to fit the mind properly into the ontological frame of science it almost certainly will have to be in terms of physics.

I disagree, but here you are more mainstream than I. If you read all my posts in that other thread you would have seen that I am among one of those small but growing numbers of fringe scientists (not just nutty ones - includes Nobel Prize winners) who believes the essence of everything, including matter and energy, is actually information, math and computation. So my bias is the reverse of yours. But even before I believed that fringe stuff I still would have disageed with you because for the materialist, math and computation are supervenient on the material anyway, rather than the other way around, as I now believe. If it helps you to think in physical analogies and metaphors i still think you can reach the right answer, but I don't agree it's necessary. In fact, if consciousness results from a self-referential "strange loop" as per Hofstadter as I also believe, you'll have to do a lot more mental gymnastics to understand consciousness if you rely on physical analogies as opposed to computation itself.

Thats roughly as I conceive it. I'd add the caveat that I distinguish conscious thought, from unconscious processing. The former is volitional and deliberate while the latter is habitual and automatic. The conscious portion initiates willful actions and is, I would argue, indeterminate but conditioned by unconscious processing. The stronger one's conscious will is, the more easily they can override/modify their unconscious impulses.

I'd go further and state that much of what you think is conscious is really unconscious but, paradoxically, not necessarily any less volitional. You're just not really aware of all the causes of your volition. I know this sounds counterintuitive but it becomes clearer, at least to me when I view studies like Libet's and consider the nature and evolutionary purpose of thinking itself.

What is the purpose of thinking? I will never forget my thesis advisor's answer to that question 27 years ago, "the purpose of thinking is to abolish thinking". When we train ourselves to play tennis, do a card trick, or solve complex math problems we know we've really learned it when we're not thinking about it anymore. What required conscious attention now is subconsciously autonomic. Our ancestors couldn't waste time thinking what to do each time they saw a lion. They needed to act fast or die.

In your conception of neural processing, it sounds like you'd might conclude that as actions requiring thinking are learned they are then shuffled from some "thinking" part of the brain to a subconscious autonomic action part. Is there evidence that such a transfer might occur? Yes, in some cases but usually not. You'd probably be amazed to see that most of the same neural pathways are maintained from the thinking phase to the autonomic phase. The exceptions to this are very revealing too, but they would require more effort here than I'm willing to make.

I haven't proven my case to you I'm sure. And I wouldn't bet my house on it (maybe my car). But its something for you to ponder perhaps.

AkuManiMani

29th December 2009, 08:40 PM

Hey Aku,

First, can you tell me how to conveniently do nested quotes like you just did without having to cut and paste?

I actually use copy-paste to do my nested qoutes.

Inside the first quote bubble type in (without spaces): [ QUOTE= Username ] ...qoutation... [ / QUOTE ]

If there is a more efficient way to go about it I would be glad if someone lurking would chime in :)

You saw "Fantastic Voyage" as a kid didn't you?

Nope :-X

Besides Raquel Welch's sweet bobbing breasticles the thing I best remember about that movie was the way neuron dendrites and axons lit up when they fired in the brain.

I don't think your quanta analogy is meaningful or necessary. In some of your posts I also sense a bias towards the sequential processing of digital computers opposed to the massively parallel processing of neural networks. You could be right though in your main conclusions. But you might want to challenge your ideas by reframing the perspective.

To be perfectly honest, I tailored my analogies to what most of the posters here are familiar with. I don't think our minds are sequential digital computers but I do believe some of the gross features are analogous. For instance, our short-term memory [what I've been calling awareness] is directly analogous to RAM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volatile_memory).

My qualia/quanta analogy was to emphasize that just as quanta are basic units of physical entities, qualia are basic elements of conscious experience.

Could your qualia of attention be a result, perhaps a sort of virtual illusion, yielded by a subconscious and massively parallel relaxation process occuring in the weights of many synapses (e.g., like annealing - investigate the Boltzmann Machine if interested in exploring this aspect of ANNs further)?

I'm not really sure what is meant when people refer to conscious experiences as 'illusions'. An illusion is a misleading perception; perception itself is undeniably real, tho -- else there couldn't be any illusions.

Also, I would like to re-emphasize that I didn't intend to down play the parallel nature of brain processing.

My suggestions here are not simply speculative. Are you aware of Libet's brainscan research that shows that the neural signals associated with subject-chosen decisions precede their conscious reporting of "choosing"?

Yea, I'm familiar with that experiment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet) and it's been brought up in previous discussions here. To be quite honest, I don't think that it establishes that our decisions are unconscious. The subjects had already decided -that- they would act, it was just a matter of choosing -when-. IMO, all the experiment shows is that we must first build up initiative in the form of readiness potentials before we enact a choice.

I disagree, but here you are more mainstream than I. If you read all my posts in that other thread you would have seen that I am among one of those small but growing numbers of fringe scientists (not just nutty ones - includes Nobel Prize winners) who believes the essence of everything, including matter and energy, is actually information, math and computation. So my bias is the reverse of yours. But even before I believed that fringe stuff I still would have disageed with you because for the materialist, math and computation are supervenient on the material anyway, rather than the other way around, as I now believe. If it helps you to think in physical analogies and metaphors i still think you can reach the right answer, but I don't agree it's necessary. In fact, if consciousness results from a self-referential "strange loop" as per Hofstadter as I also believe, you'll have to do a lot more mental gymnastics to understand consciousness if you rely on physical analogies as opposed to computation itself.

I don't think that information supervenes on matter, or vis versa. I think that energy/potential is the essential 'stuff' of the universe and information is just the discernible form that energy takes over a given time/place. When energy is in the vacuum state is inheres no information.

If someone wants to generate electrical power, they must physically produce it. A computer simulation of a generator will not do. Likewise, if one wants to produce consciousness, a computer simulation of a brain will not do. One would need to understand the physical principles that underlie the brain's production of conscious experience before they could instantiate it synthetically.

I'd go further and state that much of what you think is conscious is really unconscious but, paradoxically, not necessarily any less volitional. You're just not really aware of all the causes of your volition. I know this sounds counterintuitive but it becomes clearer, at least to me when I view studies like Libet's and consider the nature and evolutionary purpose of thinking itself.

What is the purpose of thinking? I will never forget my thesis advisor's answer to that question 27 years ago, "the purpose of thinking is to abolish thinking". When we train ourselves to play tennis, do a card trick, or solve complex math problems we know we've really learned it when we're not thinking about it anymore. What required conscious attention now is subconsciously autonomic. Our ancestors couldn't waste time thinking what to do each time they saw a lion. They needed to act fast or die.

In your conception of neural processing, it sounds like you'd might conclude that as actions requiring thinking are learned they are then shuffled from some "thinking" part of the brain to a subconscious autonomic action part. Is there evidence that such a transfer might occur? Yes, in some cases but usually not. You'd probably be amazed to see that most of the same neural pathways are maintained from the thinking phase to the autonomic phase. The exceptions to this are very revealing too, but they would require more effort here than I'm willing to make.

I haven't proven my case to you I'm sure. And I wouldn't bet my house on it (maybe my car). But its something for you to ponder perhaps.

If what you're saying it true, and our conscious experiences/choices are just epiphenomena, then natural selection would have weeded it out long ago. Biologically speaking, its pretty expensive to produce consciousness. For an organ of its size, the brain is a huge energy guzzler. I find it hard to believe that we evolved such an energy intensive process just for glitz & show -- it must hold some cause survival value of it's own.

I've kinda covered this in other lengthy discussions but, as far as I can tell, a major function of consciousness is to spontaneously produce novel behaviors. In humans, and some other animals, this is expressed as creativity and it's what distinguishes 'intelligent' design from 'natural' design.

Frank Newgent

29th December 2009, 09:21 PM

If you read all my posts in that other thread you would have seen that I am among one of those small but growing numbers of fringe scientists (not just nutty ones - includes Nobel Prize winners) who believes the essence of everything, including matter and energy, is actually information, math and computation. So my bias is the reverse of yours. But even before I believed that fringe stuff I still would have disageed with you because for the materialist, math and computation are supervenient on the material anyway, rather than the other way around, as I now believe.

My Econoline E-350 wants to know: how does "the essence of everything, including matter and energy, is actually information, math and computation" differ from solipsism?

Both lack external reference.

"Essence of everything" is difficult to define and so I'll just replace it with "my '96 Saturn" and observe: because my '96 Saturn is ideally constructed rather than built of empirical data it seems impossible to know the degree to which its windshield reflects an ontological reality :D

yy2bggggs

29th December 2009, 10:40 PM

Hey Aku,

First, can you tell me how to conveniently do nested quotes like you just did without having to cut and paste?
...
If there is a more efficient way to go about it I would be glad if someone lurking would chime in :)

Click the icon to reply with a private message... the envelope looking thing. That gets everything nested. Copy that, go back, and click reply, and paste in the edit box.
I'd go further and state that much of what you think is conscious is really unconscious but, paradoxically, not necessarily any less volitional. You're just not really aware of all the causes of your volition. I know this sounds counterintuitive but it becomes clearer, at least to me when I view studies like Libet's and consider the nature and evolutionary purpose of thinking itself.
...
In your conception of neural processing, it sounds like you'd might conclude that as actions requiring thinking are learned they are then shuffled from some "thinking" part of the brain to a subconscious autonomic action part. Is there evidence that such a transfer might occur? Yes, in some cases but usually not. You'd probably be amazed to see that most of the same neural pathways are maintained from the thinking phase to the autonomic phase. The exceptions to this are very revealing too, but they would require more effort here than I'm willing to make. ...
If what you're saying it true, and our conscious experiences/choices are just epiphenomena, then natural selection would have weeded it out long ago.
He didn't say they were epiphenomena. The model FedUpWithFaith is using is fairly similar to mine. "You" is a virtual projection. When "you" are aware that you are doing something, that means that there are various aspects of you glued in, watching it happen. The "you" that does the thing, however, is the same "you", whether you are aware of the thing, or doing it on autopilot. So from a psychic point of view, it's not epiphenomenal. It's just a matter of how much of which part of you is watching this piece of you doing it.

Furthermore, I'm pretty sure he said that this is the complete opposite of epiphenomenal. He's placed emphasis on two different states--one where you "think" about things, and the other where they happen on autopilot, because you learned it. Which means that if you haven't learned it, you must go to the "thinking" state, which strongly suggests that this state has a purpose.

rocketdodger

29th December 2009, 10:46 PM

If what you're saying it true, and our conscious experiences/choices are just epiphenomena, then natural selection would have weeded it out long ago. Biologically speaking, its pretty expensive to produce consciousness. For an organ of its size, the brain is a huge energy guzzler. I find it hard to believe that we evolved such an energy intensive process just for glitz & show -- it must hold some cause survival value of it's own.

Not if it comes free with some other function that holds survival value.

For example, if our brains evolved to do a whole bunch of reasoning about the world -- something of great survival value -- then reasoning about self is an automatic inclusion. No extra cost at all.

westprog

30th December 2009, 03:39 AM

I apologize if I derail your discussion like a dilletante.

That would be like spitting at a train wreck. No one person can do any more damage.

The same people have been making the same arguments for a long time now. Any new voices would be welcome. Please don't bother going back over the thread(s) - it wouldn't help anyway.

FedUpWithFaith

30th December 2009, 10:05 AM

Click the icon to reply with a private message... the envelope looking thing. That gets everything nested. Copy that, go back, and click reply, and paste in the edit box.

He didn't say they were epiphenomena. The model FedUpWithFaith is using is fairly similar to mine. "You" is a virtual projection. When "you" are aware that you are doing something, that means that there are various aspects of you glued in, watching it happen. The "you" that does the thing, however, is the same "you", whether you are aware of the thing, or doing it on autopilot. So from a psychic point of view, it's not epiphenomenal. It's just a matter of how much of which part of you is watching this piece of you doing it.

Furthermore, I'm pretty sure he said that this is the complete opposite of epiphenomenal. He's placed emphasis on two different states--one where you "think" about things, and the other where they happen on autopilot, because you learned it. Which means that if you haven't learned it, you must go to the "thinking" state, which strongly suggests that this state has a purpose.

Yes! Absolutely agree. I also agree with Aku that evolution wouldn't waste time or energy generating anything that wasn't necessary. I made this exact argument to somebody else. Whatever is responsible for generating qualia I'm confident has an irreducibly critical purpose - though it might not be for generating qualia per se. Elsewhere I've argued it may be a form of data compression , i.e., that qualia are the most efficient mental representation of all the data we perceive. We take for granted that everything we see and feel could only be felt that way and that this is the only natural way to experience because we have no other avenues of experience by which to judge.

I think a good analogy can be found in The Matrix where you see them looking at screens of flowing green symbols. The movie leads you to believe that people who learn how to read these symbols garner more info faster about the totality of the immediate Matrix environment then they would by their own experiential immersion in The Matrix themselves or by viewing what their compatriots are doing in it like a regular TV show.

I'd argue that if mankind had evolved to somehow access dual realities like that we would have developed new senses and new qualia to data-compress the info from both environments so we wouldn't have to learn any symbolic representations. But it is very hard to imagine this because we're trapped by our own veil of perception. We can't imagine more colors than we can see, more sounds than we can hear, or more thoughts than we can think.

rocketdodger

30th December 2009, 10:12 AM

Elsewhere I've argued it may be a form of data compression , i.e., that qualia are the most efficient mental representation of all the data we perceive.

That is what I think as well. You really need to read my thread in the other section.

FedUpWithFaith

30th December 2009, 10:43 AM

To be perfectly honest, I tailored my analogies to what most of the posters here are familiar with. I don't think our minds are sequential digital computers but I do believe some of the gross features are analogous. For instance, our short-term memory [what I've been calling awareness] is directly analogous to RAM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volatile_memory).

Well, there are certain levels of interpretation and functional explanations when the RAM analogy is OK. But I ultimately don't like it because it still distracts one from thinking in parallel connectionist terms. Though you can create parallel pipelines RAM is still pretty much sequential and loci specific. If you destroy the locus of storage you destroy the memory and the surrounding memories are fine. You can't really find a locus of a particular short-term memory in the hippocampus but you can find loci. But if you destroy them you would usually take out or damage a lot of other memories too. In fact, it can also amaze one to find out how much one can destroy without completely obliterating a memory. The brain is very fault tolerant in many respects unless you happen to disrupt a major pipeline between brain regions responsible for different forms of processing.

If you like QM analogies then maybe you could consider thinking of memory as parallel distributed processing under superposition of states with lots of associated memories traveling together as one wave function. This analogy also tends to help see how our minds can tie very disparate forms of information, knowledge and thoughts together in milliseconds to enable us to do very creative and cool stuff. by essentailly collapsing the wave function. But again, this is an analogy, I'm not arguing for QM-based mind and this analogy breaks down in many places.

The subjects had already decided -that- they would act, it was just a matter of choosing -when-. Although I haven't been able to get my fingers on them yet, there have been other related studies by Libet and others that appear to show the subjects were unaware of making the conscious decision at the time of selection.

I don't think that information supervenes on matter, or vis versa. I think that energy/potential is the essential 'stuff' of the universe and information is just the discernible form that energy takes over a given time/place. When energy is in the vacuum state is inheres no information.

What I meant was matter or energy - both are interchangeable anyway.

If someone wants to generate electrical power, they must physically produce it. A computer simulation of a generator will not do. Likewise, if one wants to produce consciousness, a computer simulation of a brain will not do. One would need to understand the physical principles that underlie the brain's production of conscious experience before they could instantiate it synthetically.

I agree, but you missed my point. Your definition of reality is your reference frame. In the Matrix their generators really do generate the power that runs their cities and if your were there it would appear tgo be completely physical Yet, obviously, they wouldn't generate any power outside the Matrix.

I think we will come to understand how the mind might generate sentience and consciousness by computer simulation before we somehow figure out sufficient brain physics. Both means of study will, of course, continue to go hand-in-hand for sometime to come. Also realize I am referring to ANN simulation in a digital computer. In principle, it is possible to simulate any analog computer (like NNs) with a digital one. When AI/neuroscientists like me study ANN's on digital computers we don't concern ourselves with all the digitial metaprogramming needed to generate the ANNs in the first place. Only the models of the neurons, their connections, and their weight change paradigms matter. We often add graphics to even make them look like a little brain.

FedUpWithFaith

30th December 2009, 10:49 AM

That is what I think as well. You really need to read my thread in the other section.

I will and promise I'll get back to you if I don't get banned first for my agitation in another thread in this forum.

AkuManiMani

30th December 2009, 02:53 PM

AkuManiMani

30th December 2009, 04:28 PM

He didn't say they were epiphenomena. The model FedUpWithFaith is using is fairly similar to mine. "You" is a virtual projection. When "you" are aware that you are doing something, that means that there are various aspects of you glued in, watching it happen. The "you" that does the thing, however, is the same "you", whether you are aware of the thing, or doing it on autopilot. So from a psychic point of view, it's not epiphenomenal. It's just a matter of how much of which part of you is watching this piece of you doing it.

Furthermore, I'm pretty sure he said that this is the complete opposite of epiphenomenal. He's placed emphasis on two different states--one where you "think" about things, and the other where they happen on autopilot, because you learned it. Which means that if you haven't learned it, you must go to the "thinking" state, which strongly suggests that this state has a purpose.

This is why I make the distinction between the conscious volitional layer [what you called the "thinking" state], which is deliberate and creative, and the layer of unconscious impulse which is automatic and habit based. When we're learning a new skill its as if our awareness [the "I" of consciousness] is using a deeply intuitive interface to condition a behavioral program. Once fully integrated into our minds, the program can be triggered by sensory cues or be brought up via conscious will.

I'm gonna go out on a limb here and propose that the conscious "I" -- the "light" of awareness -- is the user, the mind is it's interface, and the brain is the wetware by which the "I" remains in feedback with the rest of the body and, by extension, the outside world. I suspect that one reason why the brain is so metabolically expensive is that it not only has to maintain the CAM (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5432224&postcount=3347), but it must also must generate the "I" energy construct during lucid/semi-lucid periods. Sleep may be an opportunity for the brain/body to divert energy away from generating the "I" to perform maintenance functions.

Just to recap and re-clarify:

Mind is the virtual space of psychic activity .

Consciousness is the active "I" of one's mind; it is the self.

Awareness is the extent of the "I"'s focus in the mind.

Lucidity is the level of the "I"'s intensity.

CAM is the consciously accessible mind.

Yes! Absolutely agree. I also agree with Aku that evolution wouldn't waste time or energy generating anything that wasn't necessary. I made this exact argument to somebody else. Whatever is responsible for generating qualia I'm confident has an irreducibly critical purpose - though it might not be for generating qualia [I]per se. Elsewhere I've argued it may be a form of data compression , i.e., that qualia are the most efficient mental representation of all the data we perceive. We take for granted that everything we see and feel could only be felt that way and that this is the only natural way to experience because we have no other avenues of experience by which to judge.

I think a good analogy can be found in The Matrix where you see them looking at screens of flowing green symbols. The movie leads you to believe that people who learn how to read these symbols garner more info faster about the totality of the immediate Matrix environment then they would by their own experiential immersion in The Matrix themselves or by viewing what their compatriots are doing in it like a regular TV show.

I'd argue that if mankind had evolved to somehow access dual realities like that we would have developed new senses and new qualia to data-compress the info from both environments so we wouldn't have to learn any symbolic representations. But it is very hard to imagine this because we're trapped by our own veil of perception. We can't imagine more colors than we can see, more sounds than we can hear, or more thoughts than we can think.

I'm not sure that qualia are necessarily compressed representations. I think that qualia are the spectrum of our subjective responses to mental elements our awareness passes thru. Nears I can understand, we don't simply -have- qualia; in some sense, we -are- qualia. Qualia are emanations of the self.

yy2bggggs

30th December 2009, 05:35 PM

This is why I make the distinction between the conscious volitional layer [what you called the "thinking" state], which is deliberate and creative, and the layer of unconscious impulse which is automatic and habit based. When we're learning a new skill its as if our awareness [the "I" of consciousness] is using a deeply intuitive interface to condition a behavioral program. Once fully integrated into our minds, the program can be triggered by sensory cues or be brought up via conscious will.
So again, what is the difference, neurally speaking, between the two states? You seemed earlier to agree with me that there's no single "I-spot" in the brain. Given this, the difference can't be that the "I" is hooked in, unless you're proposing that there are multiple I-spot's, still distinct from what eventually becomes the automated system, that just happen to be distributed throughout the brain. Instead, the difference should be that many of the pieces are hooked together, which all contribute to this virtual "you", right?
I'm gonna go out on a limb here and propose that the conscious "I" -- the "light" of awareness -- is the user, the mind is it's interface, and the brain is the wetware by which the "I" remains in feedback with the rest of the body and, by extension, the outside world.
And I'm going to say that what you describe neurally should match what you describe psychically. The "I" isn't an entity that "becomes real" once things are hooked in, per se, but rather, is in itself a divisible, interactive set of psychic modules that are connected. You're getting an inside look at the same exact coin, and "I" legitimately do drive and choose things when I drive when I'm doing so on autopilot--I'm just less aware of all of the individual steps (translation in psychic terms: other pieces of "me" aren't taken up with the task of having to pay attention/process the information; in neural terms, the pieces don't have to talk to each other, and can do other things instead).

When the psychic difference in degree is that I don't pay as much attention to it, the neural difference in degree corresponds directly to it, and is that not as many of the pieces talk to each other.

The difference isn't that "I" am not involved, but rather, that only smaller parts of "me" are involved. Since no single part of this interconnected "I" is entirely me, yet I'm there when it's interconnected; it follows that the parts are all partially me. Again, this is just following the rule that the psychic perspective should match the neural one--and it really does seem to match what intuitively goes on.

And this fits FedUpWithFaith's description quite well.

AkuManiMani

30th December 2009, 07:15 PM

This is why I make the distinction between the conscious volitional layer [what you called the "thinking" state], which is deliberate and creative, and the layer of unconscious impulse which is automatic and habit based. When we're learning a new skill its as if our awareness [the "I" of consciousness] is using a deeply intuitive interface to condition a behavioral program. Once fully integrated into our minds, the program can be triggered by sensory cues or be brought up via conscious will.
So again, what is the difference, neurally speaking, between the two states? You seemed earlier to agree with me that there's no single "I-spot" in the brain. Given this, the difference can't be that the "I" is hooked in, unless you're proposing that there are multiple I-spot's, still distinct from what eventually becomes the automated system, that just happen to be distributed throughout the brain. Instead, the difference should be that many of the pieces are hooked together, which all contribute to this virtual "you", right?

I think that the "I" is distributed in some sense, and that certain areas of metabolic activity in the brain denote cognitive functions the the "I" is drawing upon. The more heavy the activity in particular areas, the more the "I" is focusing on faculties specific to those modules.

I'm gonna go out on a limb here and propose that the conscious "I" -- the "light" of awareness -- is the user, the mind is it's interface, and the brain is the wetware by which the "I" remains in feedback with the rest of the body and, by extension, the outside world.
And I'm going to say that what you describe neurally should match what you describe psychically. The "I" isn't an entity that "becomes real" once things are hooked in, per se, but rather, is in itself a divisible, interactive set of psychic modules that are connected. You're getting an inside look at the same exact coin, and "I" legitimately do drive and choose things when I drive when I'm doing so on autopilot--I'm just less aware of all of the individual steps (translation in psychic terms: other pieces of "me" aren't taken up with the task of having to pay attention/process the information; in neural terms, the pieces don't have to talk to each other, and can do other things instead).

When the psychic difference in degree is that I don't pay as much attention to it, the neural difference in degree corresponds directly to it, and is that not as many of the pieces talk to each other.

I think the goal should be to identify what brain activity denotes the relegated steps that we are only peripherally aware of [or not at all], those that indicate the center of our awareness, and use that to infer the nature of "I". I'm hoping that this is the part where FUWF will chime in.

The difference isn't that "I" am not involved, but rather, that only smaller parts of "me" are involved. Since no single part of this interconnected "I" is entirely me, yet I'm there when it's interconnected; it follows that the parts are all partially me. Again, this is just following the rule that the psychic perspective should match the neural one--and it really does seem to match what intuitively goes on.

And this fits FedUpWithFaith's description quite well.

You've a different way of describing it but, yea, thats pretty close to what I have in mind. The "brightest" point of conscious focus is the center of the "I" with decreasing gradations of consciousness farther into the periphery of one's awareness.

Neurologically speaking, the center point of awareness isn't a single locus of brain activity. It may be indicated by scattered areas of increased activity. The "I" is not the brain or any specific structure(s); I see it as something generated by the brain which, in turn, can spontaneously act upon it.

!Kaggen

4th January 2010, 11:16 AM

I was meaning its more of a scale in a general way where individualism in pre-scientific societies was/is much less common.
As we learnt to think more abstractly about our environment based on a scientific view we could stand back and reflect on our habits and change them as individuals.
This is what I mean by an evolution of consciousness which can be seen through history as a move from common motives to individual motives.
For instance it is commonly assumed that depth perspective is a innate part of human consciousness since the first human and even perhaps our pre-human ancestors, but history tells us otherwise.
The real problem with the heliocentric view of our solar system was a problem of depth perspective. When people looked at the sky they could not imagine the shiny things out there being at different depths.
They saw the sky as a veil with the shiny things all on the same surface.
The fact that when they mapped the movements of some of them (the planets) they appeared to move in rhythmic patterns other than in a straight line was not regarded as odd. In fact it explained how the movements of the planets were related to the rhythmic phenomena on earth. The appearance of hypotheses of how these planetary movements arose, in other words abstract descriptions of the appearances, was a direct consequence of the development of depth perspective which arose through the work of an individual Filippo Brunelleschi. Even Brunelleschi's experimental demonstration of depth perspective to others indicates the difficulties in comprehending depth perspective by the people of his time.

"Curiously, Brunelleschi intended that it only be observed by the viewer holding the unpainted back of the picture against his/her eye with one hand, and a mirror in the other hand facing and reflecting the painted side. In other words, Brunelleschi wanted his new perspective "realism" to be tested not by comparing the painted image to the actual Baptistery but to its reflection in a mirror according to the Euclidian laws of geometric optics."
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filippo_Brunelleschi

It was demonstrated abstractly as a mirror representation of the real thing so that people would actually recognize what they saw!!!

Of course once artists started to demonstrate the new found depth perspective it was a matter of time before astronomers looked at the heavens with this in mind and ay presto the possibility that the shiny things were no longer equidistant from the earth made it easier to hypothesis a heliocentric solar system. Whilst this was still an hypothesis to "save the appearances" the church was not concerned. It was only when Galileo made the empirical observations of the phase's of Venus which moved the hypothesis from the abstract into the realm of reality that the church objected.

Um, I hardly know what to say, I disagree with you and don't know what else to say. There are so many statement that I can't agree with above. But I would rather discuss than argue.

Onward.

It's a pity, I would like your input on the above.

Sure our scientific study of other cultures has shown how other cultures viewed/view reality completely differently to each other. It appears they did not just have different frames of references (abstractions) to ours, they actually experienced/experience the world differently.

I don't think that is demonstrated, we have to contend with the language and cultural filters, certainly the discussions vary widely.

It is exactly these filters which make our experiences different. If we can see this in behavioral studies today, why can we not use these phenomena to interpret the past?

From my POV it appears that the main difference between pre-scientific cultures and ours is that they took the world literally whilst we re-configure the world based on our abstractions and hence my reference to the word idolatry in previous posts.

Absolutely and this experience of solid=unchanging informs our conception of the world, where we no longer need to check for solidity but assume this property of the physical world in our phenomenal experience. The reason why I brought up the common sense proof of solidity was a response to Randfan's post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5344401#post5344401). I wanted to point out that the assumption within materialism about the relationship of our perception to matter does not originate directly from our percepts but from out concepts which themselves are informed by this common sense proof of solidity. We have learnt from observing the details of matter that it is not solid=unchanging at all. However we still cling to this common sense concept of solidity, albeit unconsciously, when we try justify the metaphysics behind materialism.

And that is the point that just about all the people who style themselves as materialists will disagree with, that is the old notion of materialism and a number of people who do not style themselves materialists on this forum keep referencing it.

It is false, most materialists on the JREF will tell you flat out that the 'matter' is energy that expresses itself as wave form and that the 'solidity' only comes about through the interaction of the EM force.

So it is rather a straw argument and discussion. You may cling to solidity all you want however. (I do in a pragmatic sense for sure.)

It is a learned perception.

I would now be curious to see what FUWF and UCE have to say about the learned perception of solidity influencing the metaphysical basis of materialism apparent on the JREF.

Ok, then perhaps we could use figuration instead?

I am not going to, you are welcome to.

Hume referred to figurations as "impressions", perhaps this is a better word for you?

TM that reduces blood pressure.(http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/171878.php)

I will have to look at that and then discuss.

Any thoughts on the above yet?

Goethe who discovered the homology of plant structures using active perception. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metamorphosis_of_Plants ) also see (http://www.natureinstitute.org/txt/ch/hsmetamorph.htm)

Well controversial interpretations can have more to do with the interpreters motives than the artists motives. Of course interpretations can also have there own meaning, and we often benefit from them in reflecting on the artists meaning.

I am not saying controversy, I am saying that impressions of art vary widely, is Moby Dick really an allegory for Ireland? Some thing so, but I agree with Dave Barry, the work whale appears frequently in the book and the word Ireland in a very limited fashion at best.

Ah so you use the word "impressions" for art interpretation. Now why would impressions not apply to all our other behavior?

And not the beauty ascribed to values?

She will have her own values of beauty not associated with the perception of the color red.

That does not address a whole cascade of experience which humans share about beauty.
I don't see how Mary can ascribe to common values about beauty without red being more than a colour perception then.

It seems unlikely to me that such fundamental traits of mammalian physiology would "switch off" within such a short time (one generation).

maybe you should study development more, the cutoffs are quite real, it is almost impossible for someone not exposed to language to develop it after a certain point. they can learn a very rudimentary language but not fluency, there are many such developmental thresholds that once passed make skill acquisition very difficult.

the structure of the retina and visual cortex will be very set for the retina and not so set for the visual cortex. She may not have the daisy ring patterns of retinal contrast.

Most of human skills require exposure to stimuli and interaction during development to develop.

that is the way it is, she will have some structures but others she will not.

Hmm interesting and thanks, it makes sense. I know this about plants, but the only animal behavior I did in 3 years of University Zoology was behavior as prescribed by the selfish gene:rolleyes:. This puts into context the BS that geneticist tell us when they say they just need the genetic information to make a fully functional creature. Of course its all just sales talk as I have always claimed :mad:

I certainly cannot see any evolutionary advantage. I can understand that the mind would not recognise the colour red due to lack of conditioning , but I find it hard to believe that the physiology of colour vision would not be happening.

Again there is a whole lot to color vision and it occurs at many levels, the photoreceptors may or may not respond, the retinal contrast patterns will not be there, and may develop but never for full acuity, and so on. there are many neural patterns that develop through use, she will not have those.

It is not like a car, it is a structure that grows in place and responds to the environment.

Tell that to the GMO pundits....

Is there really no unlucky person that you know of who went through this type of experience from which we might have learnt something more definitive?

the Mary room is so contrived, I doubt it.

You'll let me know if you find something, please?

Dancing David

4th January 2010, 01:03 PM

Yes! Absolutely agree. I also agree with Aku that evolution wouldn't waste time or energy generating anything that wasn't necessary.

Um , that is not really the way evolution works, it often contains all sorts of worthless stuff.

Dancing David

4th January 2010, 01:07 PM

It's a pity, I would like your input on the above.

It is exactly these filters which make our experiences different. If we can see this in behavioral studies today, why can we not use these phenomena to interpret the past?

I would now be curious to see what FUWF and UCE have to say about the learned perception of solidity influencing the metaphysical basis of materialism apparent on the JREF.

Hume referred to figurations as "impressions", perhaps this is a better word for you?

Any thoughts on the above yet?

Ah so you use the word "impressions" for art interpretation. Now why would impressions not apply to all our other behavior?

That does not address a whole cascade of experience which humans share about beauty.
I don't see how Mary can ascribe to common values about beauty without red being more than a colour perception then.

Hmm interesting and thanks, it makes sense. I know this about plants, but the only animal behavior I did in 3 years of University Zoology was behavior as prescribed by the selfish gene:rolleyes:. This puts into context the BS that geneticist tell us when they say they just need the genetic information to make a fully functional creature. Of course its all just sales talk as I have always claimed :mad:

Tell that to the GMO pundits....

You'll let me know if you find something, please?

Hi !Kaggen, more later.

FedUpWithFaith

4th January 2010, 01:54 PM

Um , that is not really the way evolution works, it often contains all sorts of worthless stuff.

I don't disagree with that but it doesn't really contradict my point given the complexity of the stuff we're talking about.

I see no evidence that evolution will evolve anything of significant complexity unless it has a purpose to aid survival. Once that purpose ceases to be of importance, then you could view evolutions products as worthless or vestigial although they often evolve to fit some other purpose as new environmental challenges present themselves.

The fact that our genome does get cluttered with benign random mutations or can incorporate benign viral DNA is not germane to my point.

Dancing David

6th January 2010, 02:50 AM

Dancing David

6th January 2010, 02:53 AM

I don't disagree with that but it doesn't really contradict my point given the complexity of the stuff we're talking about.

I see no evidence that evolution will evolve anything of significant complexity unless it has a purpose to aid survival. Once that purpose ceases to be of importance, then you could view evolutions products as worthless or vestigial although they often evolve to fit some other purpose as new environmental challenges present themselves.

The fact that our genome does get cluttered with benign random mutations or can incorporate benign viral DNA is not germane to my point.

Now I making a more general statement about the disucussion of evolution in general, it is blind to the future and the 'worth' of something is never known in advance. Now significant complexity can come about for many reasons, some will be associated with survival, some will not.

AkuManiMani

6th January 2010, 05:15 AM

Now I making a more general statement about the disucussion of evolution in general, it is blind to the future and the 'worth' of something is never known in advance. Now significant complexity can come about for many reasons, some will be associated with survival, some will not.

The fact still remains that any biological feature which costs and organism an appreciable amount of energy with no survival benefit will tend to be selected against. The fact that conscious brains are so metabolically expensive and haven't been weeded out by natural selection demonstrates that consciousness has a survival benefit.

Dancing David

6th January 2010, 10:08 AM

Not really, it all hinges on reproductive success, if you breed you succede. Now it does seem likely that the brain leads to survival to reproduce and succesful reproduction.

But it is false to state "any biological feature which costs and organism an appreciable amount of energy with no survival benefit will tend to be selected against", the factor that matters is "Is it beneficial, neutral or deterimental to reproduction." Traits that are detrimental to reproductive success will be selected against.

AkuManiMani

7th January 2010, 12:45 AM

Dancing David

7th January 2010, 07:22 AM

Nope, that is contrary to the theory of natural selection through reproductive success, your comfort with it is not germane.

Why does cholera usually kill the host?
Why is cancer not selected out in the gene pool?

There are a host of others, unless something impacts reproduction it does not matter.

Your concept of 'evolutionary liability' applies only to reproductive success, there are many traits that benefit reproductive success that are detrimental to the personal success of the organsim, pregnancy for example.

(I said the large brain probably benefits reproductive success.)

AkuManiMani

7th January 2010, 10:13 AM

Nope, that is contrary to the theory of natural selection through reproductive success, your comfort with it is not germane.

Why does cholera usually kill the host?
Why is cancer not selected out in the gene pool?

So now we should think of consciousness as being pathogenic? :rolleyes:

There are a host of others, unless something impacts reproduction it does not matter.

Again, consciousness is a biological trait that costs an organism energy to produce and maintain. If consciousness confers no reproductive advantage then it will be selected against in much the same way that traits which make organisms prone to pathogenic conditions are selected against.

(I said the large brain probably benefits reproductive success.)

No kidding?

!Kaggen

7th January 2010, 01:06 PM

It's a pity, I would like your input on the above.

It is a language issue again !Kaggen, to say that humans did not have depth perception prior to x-point in time is a mis-statement.

Threading needles, chasing animals, playing catch, there are literally thousands of examples of things that humans and animals did that display the use of depth perception.

Then you made another bizarre statement about the helio centric system and depth perception, and I hardly want to point out the errors in that.

You have taken something of an abstracted usage of language which applies to certain behaviors (which have to be defined) and made a wild conclusion based upon it, so people walked around with their arms out to not walk into things?

:D

Ahh.... no wonder you wanted to avoid a comment since you completely misunderstood what I said.
I was referring to the ability to form an abstract concept of depth perception and use this in abstract representation, not the ability to behave in a 3-D world.
You don't need to master the former to perform the later.
However you do need the former to imagine abstractly the depth of space.
Assuming that people look up from earth into space and "see" its depth is false because its physically impossible.

It is exactly these filters which make our experiences different. If we can see this in behavioral studies today, why can we not use these phenomena to interpret the past?

Because you have to be careful about interpreting what the data actually say.

Many people knew that the earth was not flat and discussed certain aspects in fact of the roundness of the earth.

But people still say things like, "They thought the earth was flat.", you have to be very careful and not extrapolate from the data.

Just because Aristotle said something about geese living at the bottom of lakes over the winter (alleged, I do not know if he actually did) does not meant that other people did not watch the birds fly to other places.

Sure mistakes are possible when using imaginative thinking to interpret the past.
Mistakes are good, they help us learn

I would now be curious to see what FUWF and UCE have to say about the learned perception of solidity influencing the metaphysical basis of materialism apparent on the JREF.
You mean the conflation by some people here, mostly those who do not call themselves materialists of 'materialism' and the EM repulsion leading to the effect of solidity. I am not sure what you mean by materialist of "materialism" .

This statement 'learned perception of solidity influencing the metaphysical basis of materialism apparent on the JREF' , in and of itself could be a straw man, it could be overbroad, a mis-characterization, semantics, etc... and probably could make its own thread. Yes, I suppose it would be an interesting thread and might turn out to be a strawman. Although the more time I spend here the more true it seems.

But then I have found that while I call myself a materialist, I am most correctly a methodological physicalist. Ok

Hume referred to figurations as "impressions", perhaps this is a better word for you?

No I will choose my own language as the situation calls for it personal history, personal bias, social constructs and reinforcement and cultural filters are very broad and can not be categorized so easily. :)

Why is consciousness any different?

Any thoughts on the above yet?

Sure people may be able to influence their blood pressure, however the causal relationship would require considerable parsing. And does not make any general pattern of response to meditation.

I take medicine to control mine. No amount of calming practice seemed to lower mine. Something about sodium sensitivity and the way my body works. Probably sleep apnea as well.

I also was on medication for my Ankylosing spondolytis for 2 years, but found that avoiding stress worked just as well and was better for my gut.

Ah so you use the word "impressions" for art interpretation. Now why would impressions not apply to all our other behavior?

I never said they did not, please ask and clarify where you want that statement to go.
:)
Then behaviorists must be using the same technique that I am suggesting for assessing how "impressions" effect behavior and how becoming conscious of and changing "impressions" change behavior. This is a phenomenological approach which seems to me to contradict strict physicalism?

That does not address a whole cascade of experience which humans share about beauty.
I don't see how Mary can ascribe to common values about beauty without red being more than a colour perception then.

I don't understand where you are going here, she will develop her own thoughts, impressions about beauty, and they will not include the perception red. How can we know these thought and impressions she is having are about beauty ? What evidence do we have?
What I am getting at is that you cannot reduce beauty to the perception of a wavelength of red light or whatever colour Mary is experiencing. If you want to talk about beauty as a physicalist then you probably need re-define beauty into a workable/reducible definition. I am keen to know what this might be.

So maybe you want to say some more and then ask. Beauty cuts across the three domains of person, social and culture. I am not going to agree to any platonic notions of beauty. Why should you? However as a physicalist you will need to explain it in physical terms if beauty is not to go the same route as qualia.

Hmm interesting and thanks, it makes sense. I know this about plants, but the only animal behavior I did in 3 years of University Zoology was behavior as prescribed by the selfish gene:rolleyes:. This puts into context the BS that geneticist tell us when they say they just need the genetic information to make a fully functional creature. Of course its all just sales talk as I have always claimed :mad:

So some people are silly, you can make a 'functional' creature in terms of biology and depending upon the neotany of the creature some will be more functional in other terms. Unfortunately these silly people are not some...they are many.

So it depends, you can create a creature that functions in terms of 'being a biological entity' but a clone of Adolph Hitler will be an 'identical twin' it will not have had the life experience. I was wondering about clones and consciousness recently and thinking that this puts a twist on the SRIP definition of consciousness. If one accepted this definition then a replicate of a computer designed to be conscious, being equivalent to a biological clone, would not be conscious until it had a history. So there you go Pixy, that is what else is necessary over and above computation.

You'll let me know if you find something, please?

Again it is a contrived philosophical situation.

Not so sure, I think Mary's room brings up important questions, such as what is beauty for a physicalist.
I would also be interested in a Mary's room equivalent question about ethics.