My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[RandFan]

Philosophical attempts to define consciousness aren't doing a thing to show that it is or isn't empirical. Can it be demonstrated? Can we correlate consciousness to awake states? Can we measure brain activity and test a subjects ability to perform tasks? Can we descriptively define consciousness?

Yes.And they are?

More to the point, though, I think that someone like Dennett really would begin to come across as silly in his basic arguments if he weren't debating opponents who sound even sillier. The way that the basic research is used is the bigger waste of time.So things you disagree with are silly?

[Ron_Tomkins]

Hey, the guy who recommended me the Penrose book, suggested one he thinks it's even better (Not for understanding consciousness but for understanding science in layman terms). The book is called "The Shape of Space" by Jeffrey Weeks.

Anyone heard of it?
Thoughts? Opinions?....... rants? ;)

[RandFan]

Philosophical attempts to define consciousness aren't doing a thing to show that it is or isn't empirical. BTW: Youe argument would suggest that flight was not empirical before we understood aerodynamics. There was a time when we didn't know what flight was. We only knew that it was.

Consciousness is without doubt empirical. You can take a 1,000 people. Have them all take take an equivalent of the Turing test. Then give them general anesthesia and have them retake the test.

[westprog]

Hey, the guy who recommended me the Penrose book, suggested one he thinks it's even better (Not for understanding consciousness but for understanding science in layman terms). The book is called "The Shape of Space" by Jeffrey Weeks.

Anyone heard of it?
Thoughts? Opinions?....... rants? ;)

Penrose is not really for a layman - it has some very deep maths - in all three books.

[James in New York]

What does Dan Dennett say that is silly, Maia?

[drkitten]

Penrose is not really for a layman - it has some very deep maths - in all three books.

.... which he gets wrong. So it's not really for a specialist, either.

Basically, it's for poseurs who don't know that the math is wrong.

[rocketdodger]

I'm sorry but we don't know enough to make such a statement at this time, IMO. We don't know if there isn't something intrinsic to biological systems. The examples of weather systems are apt. Weather isn't dualism because it can't be reproduced in a computer model. It's not dualism at all. It's just that weather is the result of physical properties not replicable in a computer simulation. I don't want to debate it. We can agree to disagree.

Westprog still has his work cut out for him. He still has to tell us what that missing thing is (he has said he does't believe in a ghost in the machine).

If you think that Weather cannot be reproduced in a simulation then you are a Weather dualist.

If you think that the Weather in our frame cannot be reproduced in a simulation -- a simulation by definition being some other frame -- then you are correct.

If you think that the Weather in our frame is real, and the Weather in all other frames is not real but simulated, and that if we are already in a simulation taking place in some other frame then our own Weather is no longer real ??? then you are westprog.

[RandFan]

If you think that Weather cannot be reproduced in a simulation then you are a Weather dualist.Honestly I have no idea what this even means. I didn't say "simulation". Of course it can be reproduced in a simulation. Water doesn't seep out of my computer when I simulate weather on my computer.

If you think that the Weather in our frame cannot be reproduced in a simulation -- a simulation by definition being some other frame -- then you are correct.

If you think that the Weather in our frame is real, and the Weather in all other frames is not real but simulated, and that if we are already in a simulation taking place in some other frame then our own Weather is no longer real ??? then you are westprog. Not a clue dude. "Frame"? What the hell is a frame? Do you mean frame of reference? Are you saying that because we can't disprove idealism then we must accept that a model of a tree growing fruit in my computer grows real fruit that would provide nourishment to some virtual person in cyberspace ala Tron/Matrix/The thirteenth floor?

If so, interesting but just navel gazing. I've no time for it. I can't disprove Idealism. I see no point to engage in speculation as though it were real. I'm happy to concede that it is possible.

[AkuManiMani]

Thats pretty interesting. I wonder how much of human physiology can be replaced with prosthetics without them losing the capacity for sensation. O.o

All of it.

Well of course -you- would say that. You firmly believe that household appliances are conscious :rolleyes:

[AkuManiMani]

Philosophical attempts to define consciousness aren't doing a thing to show that it is or isn't empirical.

Without consciousness there is no empiricism. I think we can agree that there must be an observer in order to have observations, right?

[Robin]

Yes. From Wikipedia: "A function F: N ? N of natural numbers is a computable function if and only if there exists a lambda expression f such that for every pair of x, y in N, F(x)=y if and only if f x =? y, where x and y are the Church numerals corresponding to x and y, respectively and =? meaning equivalence with beta reduction."

Of course, that's the definition using the lambda calculus; an equivalent formulation using Turing machines is simply that a function N ? N is computable iff there is a Turing machine that will effect that calculates that function.
But neither of these definitions will get you across the mathematical/physical divide (as earlier definitions had suggested).

You would have a pretty hard time convincing me that a brain is a function of natural numbers.

And the second definition seems to be the very thing PixyMisa claims it proves.

[Robin]

Without consciousness there is no empiricism. I think we can agree that there must be an observer in order to have observations, right?
But why does the observer have to be conscious?

[rocketdodger]

Honestly I have no idea what this even means. I didn't say "simulation". Of course it can be reproduced in a simulation. Water doesn't seep out of my computer when I simulate weather on my computer.

Not a clue dude. "Frame"? What the hell is a frame? Do you mean frame of reference? Are you saying that because we can't disprove idealism then we must accept that a model of a tree growing fruit in my computer grows real fruit that would provide nourishment to some virtual person in cyberspace ala Tron/Matrix/The thirteenth floor?

If so, interesting but just navel gazing. I've no time for it. I can't disprove Idealism. I see no point to engage in speculation as though it were real. I'm happy to concede that it is possible.

I am not talking about Idealism.

I am saying that because there is no way to prove we are not already in a simulation, it is a fallacy to speak of "reality" in anything other than relative terms.

In other words, the weather that drops rain on your head is only more "real" than the weather in your computer because it is in the same frame of reference as you -- period.

And it is not navel gazing, it is an argument that directly challenges the notions of those that think there is something special about the neurons in this frame, as opposed to all others, that makes consciousness like our's somehow unique to this frame.

Why? Because there are only two possibilities;

1) We are in the zero level frame I.E. we are not in any kind of simulation and true consciousness like our's is dependent upon the only truly primary primary properties -- those of the zero level frame.

2) We are in some other frame I.E. already in a simulation and consciousness like our's is unique to this frame for an arbitrary reason OR it is independent of the truly primary primary properties and thus can arise in any other frame as well.

And for reasons that should be clear, the people that want consciousness to be magical and restricted to humans don't like option #2.

The problem is, there is no way to tell which frame we are in. So such people have to make outrageous concessions -- which is exactly what westprog has done -- and say "well, if it turns out we are not in the zero level frame, then our consciousness isn't real either."

WTF? What kind of an argument allows for our own consciousness to be real under some conditions and not real under other conditions?

[RandFan]

I am not talking about Idealism.?

I am saying that because there is no way to prove we are not already in a simulation... AKA idealism.

What kind of an argument allows for our own consciousness to be real under some conditions and not real under other conditions?None whatsoever. I only have evidence of THIS reality.

And yeah, it's navel gazing.

[AkuManiMani]

But why does the observer have to be conscious?

To get to the other side? :confused:

[Robin]

To get to the other side? :confused:
But seriously folks...

Can't a robot be an observer?

[RandFan]

Consciousness is without doubt empirical. You can take a 1,000 people. Have them all take take an equivalent of the Turing test. Then give them [those that pass the test] general anesthesia and have them [those that pass the test] retake the test.Anyone venture a guess as to the outcome?

[Frank Newgent]

We are in some other frame I.E. already in a simulation and consciousness like our's is unique to this frame for an arbitrary reason OR it is independent of the truly primary primary properties and thus can arise in any other frame as well.

The words quoted are arbitrarily located.

[Robin]

Why? Because there are only two possibilities;

1) We are in the zero level frame I.E. we are not in any kind of simulation and true consciousness like our's is dependent upon the only truly primary primary properties -- those of the zero level frame.

2) We are in some other frame I.E. already in a simulation and consciousness like our's is unique to this frame for an arbitrary reason OR it is independent of the truly primary primary properties and thus can arise in any other frame as well.

And for reasons that should be clear, the people that want consciousness to be magical and restricted to humans don't like option #2.

The problem is, there is no way to tell which frame we are in.
But there is. We are always at zero level. If we are in a simulation we are deceived about what zero level is, but we are still at zero level.

Whatever mechanism is producing our consciousness is producing our consciousness, be it neurons or something else.

[Belz...]

It's just that weather is the result of physical properties not replicable in a computer simulation.

Not that I want to derail the thread but: such as ?

[RandFan]

Not that I want to derail the thread but: such as ? To be fair, I'm talking about conventional computers not holodecks. If you can get your computer to provide you oranges without any input of water, sucrose, proteins and all other constituent properties of oranges then I would be very impressed.

If your argument is idealism then I will concede the argument. It's theoretically possible to create The Thirteenth Floor. It's possible that our virtual hero could get stuck in a rainstorm and catch a cold, be miserable and have to run to the store for lozenges. Orange flavored ones.

[drkitten]

But neither of these definitions will get you across the mathematical/physical divide (as earlier definitions had suggested).

You would have a pretty hard time convincing me that a brain is a function of natural numbers.

That's because the mathematical/physical "divide," as you so quaintly put it, is not something that needs to be gotten across. Consciousness is described functionally, not physically. Any physical object that processes information behaves as the mathematics of information processing describes -- by definition.

[Robin]

Oh, sigh. Every once in a while, I just have to pop in here. The consciousness-related discussion over on the "human spirit" forum is interesting, so I recommend checking it out. :) But really now... "qualia" from electronics?
That is mild.

The claim being made here is that there can be a unified quale across millions of people and billions of years produced by nothing more than doing some mental arithmetic and jotting down the answers on a pieces of paper.

I imagine that if someone applied for the million dollar challenge with that claim and provided the Church-Turing thesis as proof then they would be mocked mercilessly in this forum.

[Robin]

That's because the mathematical/physical "divide," as you so quaintly put it, is not something that needs to be gotten across.
So you mean that I can arbitrarily substitute a physical object like a parsnip or a penwiper into a mathematical expression and the expression will prove something about the physical object?

And here we are wasting all this time on the experimental method.
Consciousness is described functionally, not physically.
Which means what exactly?

And in any case, the claim being made is about how consciousness is produced, not described.
Any physical object that processes information behaves as the mathematics of information processing describes -- by definition.
You mean computers never emit loud bangs and emit smoke in the middle of an important piece of work?

[Robin]

Not that I want to derail the thread but: such as ?
OK, here is a great business opportunity.

Write a simulation of a dynamo and get it to provide the electricity for the computer running the simulation.

Global warming solved in a flash.

[drkitten]

So you mean that I can arbitrarily substitute a physical object like a parsnip or a penwiper into a mathematical expression and the expression will prove something about the physical object?

Not arbitrarily, no. You need to make sure that the mathematics is being used appropriately.

But if I were to collect 7580 parsnips and 20420 penwipes together, you wouldn't need to count them to determine there were 28000 objects in all.


And here we are wasting all this time on the experimental method.

See above. To the best of my knowledge, the experiment described in the previous paragraph has never actually been done. Nevertheless, I feel confident enough of its result that I submit that to actually do the physical experiment would be the waste of time. Using the mathematics actually saves time over driving to every grocery store in town gathering thousands of parsnips, yes?

[RandFan]

The claim being made here is that there can be a unified quale across millions of people and billions of years produced by nothing more than doing some mental arithmetic and jotting down the answers on a pieces of paper.

I imagine that if someone applied for the million dollar challenge with that claim and provided the Church-Turing thesis as proof then they would be mocked mercilessly in this forum.Perhaps by those who think that an appeal to intuition is proof of something.

[Robin]

Anyone venture a guess as to the outcome?
Based on polls I have taken here, most people on this forum at least would outright deny that the result said anything whatsoever about consciousness.

[RandFan]

Based on polls I have taken here, most people on this forum at least would outright deny that the result said anything whatsoever about consciousness.It was an appeal to the crowd so I deserve your counter argument ad numerum. Touché.

[rocketdodger]

The words quoted are arbitrarily located.

And are the words important because of their arbitrary location, or because of something else, such as the very non-arbitrary relationship they have with other words, or even the location of other words?

[Robin]

Not arbitrarily, no. You need to make sure that the mathematics is being used appropriately.
How do you make sure that the mathematics is being used appropriately when you substitute the human brain into the Church-Turing thesis?

How exactly do you substitute the brain into the Church-Turing thesis?
But if I were to collect 7580 parsnips and 20420 penwipes together, you wouldn't need to count them to determine there were 2800 objects in all.
For example here, your brain is an information processing device but does not appear to have worked as the mathematics of information processing describe.

[drkitten]

How do you make sure that the mathematics is being used appropriately when you substitute the human brain into the Church-Turing thesis?

How exactly do you substitute the brain into the Church-Turing thesis?

By knowing what I'm talking about. Most of the groundwork was laid by Turing himself, when he pointed out that only finitely many physical object are distinguishable at any physical scale, and therefore the TM need represent only finitely many tape symbols.



For example here, your brain is an information processing device but does not appear to have worked as the mathematics says it should.

Apparently the forum software deleted the extra zero....

[rocketdodger]

That is mild.

The claim being made here is that there can be a unified quale across millions of people and billions of years produced by nothing more than doing some mental arithmetic and jotting down the answers on a pieces of paper.

I imagine that if someone applied for the million dollar challenge with that claim and provided the Church-Turing thesis as proof then they would be mocked mercilessly in this forum.

So time diliation shouldn't apply to consciousness, then?

Because that is really what you are saying -- that there is some absolute reference frame and consciousness will only arise if the rates of the underlying process match some (probably arbitrary) range in this absolute reference frame.

Which flies in the face of relativity.

[Robin]

Perhaps by those who think that an appeal to intuition is proof of something.
But I don't somehow don't see the million dollars being handed over.

[Robin]

So time diliation shouldn't apply to consciousness, then?
I don't actually recall saying that, but please go ahead and say where I did.

[rocketdodger]

But there is. We are always at zero level. If we are in a simulation we are deceived about what zero level is, but we are still at zero level.

Whatever mechanism is producing our consciousness is producing our consciousness, be it neurons or something else.

You seem to have missed the point.

If we are wrong about what the zero level is, then there are negative levels. Six of one, half a dozen of the other.

Here is the question I would like you to answer -- if we are in a simulation, is there any mathematical reason that a property of an entity in our level could not be replicated at a lower level?

[Robin]

By knowing what I'm talking about. Most of the groundwork was laid by Turing himself, when he pointed out that only finitely many physical object are distinguishable at any physical scale, and therefore the TM need represent only finitely many tape symbols.
But so what?

I am asking exactly how you construct a mathematical expression that demonstrates that the human brain, or any animal brain, is equivalent to a turing machine.

And remember that we have already established that we cannot rely on it to behave as the mathematics of information processing say it should.

[RandFan]

But I don't somehow don't see the million dollars being handed over.Simply because there is no way to verify it one way or the other. Besides, I'm not sure what it has to do with the challenge in the first place. You would need to address that rather important point before you would even be allowed to apply. Do you know what the challenge is?

At JREF, we offer a one-million-dollar prize to anyone who can show, under proper observing conditions, evidence of any paranormal, supernatural, or occult power or event.

[rocketdodger]

I don't actually recall saying that, but please go ahead and say where I did.

You specifically included the large time span "billions of years" in your mockery.

If you don't think the non-relative rate of the underlying process has anything to do with whether or not consciousness can arise, then you should not have included that -- it would be dishonest.

Since I do not consider you dishonest, I assume that you do indeed think the non-relative rate has something to do with whether or not consciousness can arise.

However, the notion that something can happen at only one non-relative rate, as opposed to any rate as long as the relative rate is the same, is contrary to relativity.

Understand? It is quite simple -- if you are on a starship traveling near lightspeed, a single picosecond of your thought will take billions of years from the perspective of someone back on Earth. Are you no longer conscious, because you took so long to think a thought?

[drkitten]

But so what?

I am asking exactly how you construct a mathematical expression that demonstrates that the human brain, or any animal brain, is equivalent to a turing machine.

By showing that a Turing-machine is a universal computational device.
Anything that is capable of computing -- of performing arithmetic, really -- is either equivalent to a Turing machine or is less powerful than a Turing machine.

Since humans are capable of performing arithmetic, they are either equivalent to or less powerful than a Turing machine.

[Robin]

You seem to have missed the point.

If we are wrong about what the zero level is, then there are negative levels
That does not follow. If there is a mechanism that produces our consciousness, why does it then follow that another mechanism capable of producing consciousness is at a lower lever?

I think you are missing the point. Whatever produces the consciousness produces the consciousness. Whatever is not producing our consciousness is not producing our consciousness.
Here is the question I would like you to answer -- if we are in a simulation, is there any mathematical reason that a property of an entity in our level could not be replicated at a lower level?
I don't accept that there is a lower level - what is producing our consciousness is producing our consciousness.

Are you asking that if we are in a simulation, is there any mathematical reason that a property or entity in that simulation could not be reproduced by a simulation created by some other method?

The answer is that I don't know.

[rocketdodger]

And remember that we have already established that we cannot rely on it to behave as the mathematics of information processing say it should.

Lol -- this is the same approach (albeit from the opposite side) that Lucas-Penrose tried to take.

Look, there is nothing about "the mathematics of information processing" that states that an algorithm will always do what you think it should do.

The "mathematics of information processing" tells us that an algorithm will always do what it will do. Nothing more, nothing less. What you think it will do is irrelevant.

So the fact that you think an algorithm should do arithmetic correctly, yet it does not, is only indicative of you not understanding the algorithm.

[rocketdodger]

Are you asking that if we are in a simulation, is there any mathematical reason that a property or entity in that simulation could not be reproduced by a simulation created by some other method?

The answer is that I don't know.

Yes, that is the question.

The relevance to this discussion being that if there is no mathematical reason why not, and if we are in a simulation, then we should be able (with sufficient technology) to replicate every single property of every physical substance in the universe within a simulation of our own.

I am not aware of any such mathematical reason either.

[Robin]

By showing that a Turing-machine is a universal computational device.
Anything that is capable of computing -- of performing arithmetic, really -- is either equivalent to a Turing machine or is less powerful than a Turing machine.

Since humans are capable of performing arithmetic, they are either equivalent to or less powerful than a Turing machine.
But, again, we have established that when humans do arithmetic they do not behave as th e mathematics of information processing describe.

It is not enough that we have a TM equivalent of when we get the maths right, we need at least a TM equivalent of when we get the maths wrong.

And you have to demonstrate that the human brain only operates in terms of natural numbers.

[Robin]

Lol -- this is the same approach (albeit from the opposite side) that Lucas-Penrose tried to take.

Look, there is nothing about "the mathematics of information processing" that states that an algorithm will always do what you think it should do.

The "mathematics of information processing" tells us that an algorithm will always do what it will do. Nothing more, nothing less. What you think it will do is irrelevant.

So the fact that you think an algorithm should do arithmetic correctly, yet it does not, is only indicative of you not understanding the algorithm.
Well I was saying that the Lucas-Penrose argument was nonsense in this forum years ago so I am not saying that.

But you appear to be saying that the brain does what it does and the mathematics of information processing says that an algorithm does what it does and therefore the brain is an algorithm.

But drkitten is saying that we can include the brain in the C-T thesis because it is a computing device and by definition should behave as the mathematics of information processing say it should.

And you are telling me that the mathematics of information processing say something should behave the way it behaves.

It is circular.

[Robin]

Yes, that is the question.

The relevance to this discussion being that if there is no mathematical reason why not, and if we are in a simulation, then we should be able (with sufficient technology) to replicate every single property of every physical substance in the universe within a simulation of our own.

I am not aware of any such mathematical reason either.
But I know of no mathematical reason that we should be able to either.

[Robin]

OK, back to the desk check experiment.

The guys rechecking the desk check also causes an instant of consciousness to happen because he is doing exactly the same as the guys who created the original sheets.

So is there still an instant of consciousness if these guy start at the end and work back to the beginning?

[rocketdodger]

OK, back to the desk check experiment.

The guys rechecking the desk check also causes an instant of consciousness to happen because he is doing exactly the same as the guys who created the original sheets.

So is there still an instant of consciousness if these guy start at the end and work back to the beginning?

Ah, a much more interesting question!

Not, there is not, because the algorithm would not be the same.

[rocketdodger]

Well I was saying that the Lucas-Penrose argument was nonsense in this forum years ago so I am not saying that.

But you appear to be saying that the brain does what it does and the mathematics of information processing says that an algorithm does what it does and therefore the brain is an algorithm.

But drkitten is saying that we can include the brain in the C-T thesis because it is a computing device and by definition should behave as the mathematics of information processing say it should.

And you are telling me that the mathematics of information processing say something should behave the way it behaves.

It is circular.

No, I am simply saying that an algorithm doesn't always give the output you expect it to give you -- because human knowledge is limited, of course.

The Lucas-Penrose fallacy involves the assumption that the algorithm of a perfect mathematician must give the output Lucas-Penrose expect it to -- the output of knowing something and being correct. But it has been shown, in many rebuttals, that the fact of a perfect mathematician thinking it knows something correctly, and it actually knowing something correctly, are not one and the same -- because the algorithm that constitutes the mathematician can simply be wrong (wrong, as in, the algorithm isn't what everyone thinks it is).

And here you are suggesting the same sort of thing -- that because drkitten makes arithmetic errors his mind not might be an algorithm. Well, that doesn't follow, because his mind could be an algorithm that simply calculates arithmetic incorrectly.

[RandFan]

And here you are suggesting the same sort of thing -- that because drkitten makes arithmetic errors his mind not might be an algorithm. Well, that doesn't follow, because his mind could be an algorithm that simply calculates arithmetic incorrectly.And we could write an algorithm that would calculate arithmetic incorrectly.

Why does algorithm sound like environmentally friendly birth control?

[Robin]

And another thing with this level business.

If I have Blue Brain running a simulation of a Sparc system running a simulation of a PA-RISC running a simulation of an Intel, running a simulation of a power-pc running a simulation of a DragonBall running a simulation of a Z80.

I duly run Pong on the Z80, then which processor is running Pong?

[Robin]

And here you are suggesting the same sort of thing -- that because drkitten makes arithmetic errors his mind not might be an algorithm.
I am saying nothing of the sort.

I did not even claim the mind is not an algorithm, simply questioning the claim that it can be proved to be an algorithm.

You are shifting the burden of proof.

PixyMisa and drkitten are saying that they can prove that the mind is an algorithm.

Part of drkitten's reasoning was that since we can do arithmetic then we are a system that behaves as the mathematics of information processing say it should.

I point out that when humans do arithmetic they do not behave as the MoIP say we should.

And then you say, "yes we do, because the mathematics of information processing say that whatever we do is how we should behave"

As I say, circular.

You cannot point to our ability to do arithmetic and say "therefore we are Turing equivalent". You must go a level further down and say "that system behaves as the MoIP say it should".

But your argument seems to still be MoTP says an algorithm does what it does and the brain does what it does therefore the brain is an algorithm.

[Robin]

And we could write an algorithm that would calculate arithmetic incorrectly.
So the proof that the mind is an algorithm is that we are a system that behaves the way the MoIP says it should and the MoIP says that a system should behave like it behaves.

The mind behaves like it behaves.

Therefore the mind is an algorithm?

[rocketdodger]

Part of drkitten's reasoning was that since we can do arithmetic then we are a system that behaves as the mathematics of information processing say it should.

I point out that when humans do arithmetic they do not behave as the MoIP say we should.


But you are wrong -- there is nothing in computation theory that states that an algorithm that does arithmetic needs to compute the correct results, only that an algorithm that does arithmetic correctly needs to compute the correct results.

drkitten's reasoning is simpler than you are making it out to be.

1) A Turing machine can compute arithmetic correctly only because of it's Turing equivalence (certain operations are required for generic arithmetic computation, and the Church-Turing thesis states that this set of operations is equivalent to a bunch of other stuff, etc).
2) A human brain can compute arithmetic correctly. The fact that we often do not is irrelevant -- we can on occaision.
4) Nothing is more powerful than a Turing machine.
5) Therefore the human brain is both at least as powerful as a Turing machine and no more powerful than a Turing machine. In other words, Turing equivalent.

[rocketdodger]

But your argument seems to still be MoTP says an algorithm does what it does and the brain does what it does therefore the brain is an algorithm.

No, I never made an argument. I was simply pointing out that your criticism of drkitten's argument was invalid, because nowhere does the mathematics state that an algorithm must compute arithmetic correctly.

[Maia]

Can it be demonstrated? Can we correlate consciousness to awake states? Can we measure brain activity and test a subjects ability to perform tasks? Can we descriptively define consciousness?


Of course we can along the lines you describe, if we use a certain, very tightly circumscribed definition of consciousness. Merriam-Webster has a good one: (find it here (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consciousness)

Main Entry: con·scious·ness
Pronunciation: \-nəs\
Function: noun
Date: 1629
1 a : the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself
b : the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact
c : awareness; especially : concern for some social or political cause
2 : the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought : mind
3 : the totality of conscious states of an individual
4 : the normal state of conscious life <regained consciousness>
5 : the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as contrasted with unconscious processes

We would be best off sticking to 3, 4, and 5 (and maybe 2). Next, we examine research into the neural correlates of consciousness. Just to take one example, we might look at neural correlates of the first-person perspective. We can see from relevant research that "the brain regions involved in assigning first-person perspective comprise medial prefrontal, medial parietal and lateral temporoparietal cortex. These empirical findings complement recent neurobiologically oriented theories of self-consciousness which focus on the relation between the subject and his/her environment by supplying a neural basis for its key components" (Vogeley, K., and Gereon, F., R. Neural correlates of the first-person perspective. (2003). Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(1), 38-42.) In other words, we can find information about which areas of the brain are activated in first person and third person perspectives when performing various kinds of tasks, and how this changes in various pathological brain states, such as lesions in specific areas.

The problem I'm talking about can be illustrated pretty easily by what we find when we do a Google search on "definition of consciousness." Dear Zeus, what a mess. Eighty zillion different philosophical dogmas about what some kind of grand, vague, sweeping definition of "consciousness" supposedly is. This is not at all the same definition of consciousness as what we just saw above in Merriam-Webster.


There are many philosophical stances on consciousness, including: behaviorism, dualism, idealism, functionalism, reflexive monism, phenomenalism, phenomenology and intentionality, physicalism, emergentism, mysticism, personal identity etc.


Per Wikipedia... well, that's not exactly Merriam-Webster, now is it. Philosophical stances on consciousness are, at best, opinions about what various theories, facts, and the results of research should mean. Philosophical positions by definition must beg the question, or they couldn't stake out their positions. Voegely and Gereon's research has nothing to say about which particular philosophical position should be taken in regards to the neurological information gleaned from it, so the research doesn't beg the question.
[/quote]

And they are?


A lot of NDE research provides the best examples possible. It's actually kind of depressing to see it all divided so firmly along the lines of researchers' belief systems, because it would be so valuable to study the neurobiology of NDE's rather than focusing on whether or not they represent anything about "consciousness", and so few people are doing this. There was a long discussion about this exact issue in the D'Souza book review thread.


So things you disagree with are silly?

Randfan, you know better than to make that kind of logical error in an argument, and you know you do. Now come on. ;)

[westprog]

Westprog still has his work cut out for him. He still has to tell us what that missing thing is (he has said he does't believe in a ghost in the machine).


I didn't quite say that. I'm saying that the job of science is to look for a physical explanation of phenomena, and to assume that such an explanation exists.

I don't get quite what is meant by a "missing thing". I'm assuming that the likely physical explanation for consciousness is that it is, like the weather, a result of physical processes. The way to find how it works is to look at the physical processes.

[Maia]

ETA... well, it'll have to be a new post... because Dennett is a scientist as well as a philosopher, my criticism about what I think that scientists should be doing with their time and energy does apply to him. Basically, I'm just not impressed by the fact that his debates have consisted so overwhelmingly of let's-go-shoot-fish-in-a-barrel expeditions. If you can make Dinesh D'Souza look like an idiot, what kind of accomplishment is that? How astonishing would he look if he were up against an opponent who said, "Oh, yes, you're right. Of course consciousness arises from the brain. Now what? Do you have anything else substantive to say?" For more detailed opinions on Dennett, see the "human spirit" thread. More updates as time allows, but that will probably have to wait for Monday-- three thirteen-hour days are coming up!! And speaking of consciousness, I'll be working with Alzheimer's patients the entire time... ;)

[RandFan]

So the proof that the mind is an algorithm is that we are a system that behaves the way the MoIP says it should and the MoIP says that a system should behave like it behaves.

The mind behaves like it behaves.

Therefore the mind is an algorithm?Not my argument. If I can write an algorithm that can replicate human error then any argument that posits that human error falsifies the mind as an algorithm is false.

[Robin]

But you are wrong -- there is nothing in computation theory that states that an algorithm that does arithmetic needs to compute the correct results, only that an algorithm that does arithmetic correctly needs to compute the correct results.

drkitten's reasoning is simpler than you are making it out to be.
I was using his/her own words and the version you present is more complex that the way I presented it, so "simpler"?

So here is his/her own words:
Any physical object that processes information behaves as the mathematics of information processing describes -- by definition.

So where does that fit in in your rendition of the argument?

[Robin]

Not my argument. If I can write an algorithm that can replicate human error then any argument that posits that human error falsifies the mind as an algorithm is false.
But since nobody ever said that human error falisified the mind as an algorithm then the point is irrelevant isn't it?

Straw man and shifting burden of proof at the same time.

Remember it is drkitten and PixyMisa who claim that there is mathematical proof that the mind is an algorithm.

And it was drkitten who advanced as part of this proof that any system that processes information behaves in the way the MoIP say it should.

Now you are saying that any way a system behaves is how the MoIP says it should.

If that is the case then the point is trivially true and proves nothing.

And it says that everything is an algorithm.

In which case why not go ahead and say that everything is an algorithm and save time?

[RandFan]

Of course we can along the lines you describe, if we use a certain, very tightly circumscribed definition of consciousness. Merriam-Webster has a good one: (find it here (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consciousness)

Main Entry: con·scious·ness
Pronunciation: \-nəs\
Function: noun
Date: 1629
1 a : the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself
b : the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact
c : awareness; especially : concern for some social or political cause
2 : the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought : mind
3 : the totality of conscious states of an individual
4 : the normal state of conscious life <regained consciousness>
5 : the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as contrasted with unconscious processes

We would be best off sticking to 3, 4, and 5 (and maybe 2). Sounds good to me. That should do it.

The problem I'm talking about can be illustrated pretty easily by what we find when we do a Google search on "definition of consciousness." Dear Zeus, what a mess. Eighty zillion different philosophical dogmas about what some kind of grand, vague, sweeping definition of "consciousness" supposedly is. This is not at all the same definition of consciousness as what we just saw above in Merriam-Webster. I don't really care about all that. Consciousness is emperical. We might need another 100 years to figure out all of the details but until then the philosophers and the various cognitive scientists can thrash it all out.

I don't want to limit anyone. Most scientists weren't too keen on Marconi, Red Shift or Solar Wind to name just a few concepts. New paradigms often come from personal drive, inspiration surprising directions. Quantum mechanics and reltivity where both counter intuitive. Who am I to say where the dead ends are? I'm just not that arrogant.

JMO

Randfan, you know better than to make that kind of logical error in an argument, and you know you do. Now come on. ;)I called it the way I honestly saw it. :)

[RandFan]

No, I am simply saying that an algorithm doesn't always give the output you expect it to give you -- because human knowledge is limited, of course.

The Lucas-Penrose fallacy involves the assumption that the algorithm of a perfect mathematician must give the output Lucas-Penrose expect it to -- the output of knowing something and being correct. But it has been shown, in many rebuttals, that the fact of a perfect mathematician thinking it knows something correctly, and it actually knowing something correctly, are not one and the same -- because the algorithm that constitutes the mathematician can simply be wrong (wrong, as in, the algorithm isn't what everyone thinks it is).

And here you are suggesting the same sort of thing -- that because drkitten makes arithmetic errors his mind not might be an algorithm. Well, that doesn't follow, because his mind could be an algorithm that simply calculates arithmetic incorrectly.

But since nobody ever said that human error falisified the mind as an algorithm then the point is irrelevant isn't it?I'm simply supporting RocketDodgers argument.

[Robin]

No, I never made an argument. I was simply pointing out that your criticism of drkitten's argument was invalid, because nowhere does the mathematics state that an algorithm must compute arithmetic correctly.
And I never suggested there was. Not once.

But drkitten suggested that any system that processes information the way the MoIP says it should.

But if way the MoIP says it should means any behaviour of which the system is capable then his point is only trivially true.

I am not sure why you don't understand that point.

By the way, do you think that in general, it is possible for an algorithm to run on a non-algorithmic system?

[RandFan]

I don't get quite what is meant by a "missing thing".You made the argument that a model of respiration and weather won't result in respiration or weather (or something like that).

It won't because the computer model is incomplete. There are many physical elements missing. It's a fairly simple inference. Perhaps you simply picked a bad analogy. Could you give us another?

I'm assuming that the likely physical explanation for consciousness is that it is, like the weather, a result of physical processes. The way to find how it works is to look at the physical processes.Based on this I see no problem for AI.

[Robin]

I'm simply supporting RocketDodgers argument.
Well perhaps you should think twice before supporting a straw man/shifting burden of proof attack.

[RandFan]

By the way, do you think that in general, it is possible for an algorithm to run on a non-algorithmic system?I don't think so but perhaps it's just my ignorance. Could you provide an example of a non-algorithmic system for the purpose of this question?

[RandFan]

Well perhaps you should think twice before supporting a straw man/shifting burden of proof attack.Oh hell no, if you make an argument and I think your point worth supporting I'll support it.

[Robin]

Simply because there is no way to verify it one way or the other.
On the contrary, PixyMisa and drkitten say it can be mathematically proved.
Besides, I'm not sure what it has to do with the challenge in the first place. You would need to address that rather important point before you would even be allowed to apply. Do you know what the challenge is?
A consciousness that was independent of any physical brain would not qualify as a paranormal or supernatural thing?

What about the Global Consciousness Project, I am pretty sure that I have heard it said that they would qualify if they had proof and they are saying more or less the same thing.

So if GCP qualifies, why not this? What is the difference?

[PixyMisa]

The claim being made here is that there can be a unified quale across millions of people and billions of years produced by nothing more than doing some mental arithmetic and jotting down the answers on a pieces of paper.
No. The concept of qualia is incoherent. Unified consciousness, sure. What actual objection do you have to this?

I imagine that if someone applied for the million dollar challenge with that claim and provided the Church-Turing thesis as proof then they would be mocked mercilessly in this forum.
No. Sorry.

[PixyMisa]

But I don't somehow don't see the million dollars being handed over.
The million dollars is for proof of a supernatural ability. This qualifies just fine on the proof part, but fails completely on the supernatural part. That's just how the Universe works, Robin. If you isolate the computations, it doesn't matter how fast or how slowly you do them, you still get the same answer.

[RandFan]

On the contrary, PixyMisa and drkitten say it can be mathematically proved.I don't think either PixyMisa or drkitten speak on behalf of James Randi and the Million Dollar challenge.

A consciousness that was independent of any physical brain would not qualify as a paranormal or supernatural thing?Hell no. How would something that is the product of physical process and predicted by cognitive theory be supernatural?

...I am pretty sure that I have heard it said...I Don't believe everything I hear. Do you have a reference from someone who is qualified to speak on behalf of the JREF?

[PixyMisa]

Ah, a much more interesting question!

Not, there is not, because the algorithm would not be the same.
I'm not sure that such a reverse algorithm is necessarily possible.

But if you divided up the process into millisecond slices, and calculated slice 2000, then 1999, then 1998... Then you would get a moment of consciousness, which would experience everything in the usual order, but be reversed in time with respect to us.

Indeed, you can run the slices in any order at all and get the same result.

[RandFan]

Simply because there is no way to verify it one way or the other. Besides,
On the contrary, PixyMisa and drkitten say it can be mathematically proved.
This qualifies just fine on the proof part. I'm skeptical. I think the proof will be in the pudding but it's not really a point I care to debate.

[PixyMisa]

And another thing with this level business.

If I have Blue Brain running a simulation of a Sparc system running a simulation of a PA-RISC running a simulation of an Intel, running a simulation of a power-pc running a simulation of a DragonBall running a simulation of a Z80.

I duly run Pong on the Z80, then which processor is running Pong?
Pick one. The Z80 makes sense from some perspectives, but you can choose any of them.

[Robin]

You specifically included the large time span "billions of years" in your mockery.
What mockery? I was only stating the proposition that you are making in plain terms. Why is that mockery?
If you don't think the non-relative rate of the underlying process has anything to do with whether or not consciousness can arise, then you should not have included that -- it would be dishonest.
Did you think that conclusion through? Or did you just grab the first two daft options you thought of and decided there weren't any more?
Since I do not consider you dishonest, I assume that you do indeed think the non-relative rate has something to do with whether or not consciousness can arise.
And then tried to make it sound like the second daft option was a noble act on your part.
However, the notion that something can happen at only one non-relative rate, as opposed to any rate as long as the relative rate is the same, is contrary to relativity.

Understand? It is quite simple -- if you are on a starship traveling near lightspeed, a single picosecond of your thought will take billions of years from the perspective of someone back on Earth. Are you no longer conscious, because you took so long to think a thought?
It has nothing to do with relativity whatsoever, perceived time is not tied to physical time, you don't have to go running to Einstein to find why the time seems to pass more slowly in a dentists office, or seems to pass more quickly as you grow older. Perceived time is an illusion, even in normal consciousness.

So I have no problems whatsoever that a conscious state lasting a billion years might seem like a half a second and I never said I did.

But it has nothing to do with relativity.

[PixyMisa]

But since nobody ever said that human error falisified the mind as an algorithm then the point is irrelevant isn't it?

Straw man and shifting burden of proof at the same time.

Remember it is drkitten and PixyMisa who claim that there is mathematical proof that the mind is an algorithm.
No. That the mind can be reproduced by an algorithm. Subtle but significant difference.

And it says that everything is an algorithm.
Everything can be reproduced by an algorithm.

[biomorph]

I didn't quite say that. I'm saying that the job of science is to look for a physical an explanation of phenomena. , and to assume that such an explanation exists.
Occam strikes.......IMO



I don't get quite what is meant by a "missing thing". I'm assuming that the likely physical explanation for consciousness is that it is, like the weather, a result of physical processes. The way to find how it works is to look at the physical processes.

I'm not sure there is a "result of physical processes". just physical processes.

Care to elaborate?

[Frank Newgent]

And are the words important because of their arbitrary location, or because of something else, such as the very non-arbitrary relationship they have with other words, or even the location of other words?

I don't necessarily find your words to be important.

Don't see how you can either when you can't even tell if this is a simulation or not.

[drkitten]

Remember it is drkitten and PixyMisa who claim that there is mathematical proof that the mind is an algorithm.

Wrong. I claimed that anything that can execute an algorithm is (at most) a Turing machine.


And it was drkitten who advanced as part of this proof that any system that processes information behaves in the way the MoIP say it should.

Now you are saying that any way a system behaves is how the MoIP says it should.[/QUOTE]

Yes. That's because the mathematics of information processing define the limits of how (information processing) objects are capable of behaving.

That's like saying "any physical object obeys the laws of physics." Yes, that is equivalent to saying "the way any physical object behaves is how the laws of physics say that it should." If you could find an object that did not follow the laws of physics, that would be pretty revolutionary.


If that is the case then the point is trivially true and proves nothing.

Wrong. Because, among other things, there are things that the mathematics of information processing say are not possible do to.


And it says that everything is an algorithm.

At least you got that one more or less right. Certainly anything that can process information involves an algorithm. And since everything is an algorithm, and there are things that algorithms can't do, there are things that can't be done.

That's hardly "trivial."


In which case why not go ahead and say that everything is an algorithm and save time?

I did. You asked me to unpack it, so I did.

[drkitten]

But drkitten suggested that any system that processes information the way the MoIP says it should.

But if way the MoIP says it should means any behaviour of which the system is capable then his point is only trivially true.

Not when the "MoIP" limits the capabilities of the system.

[Robin]

The million dollars is for proof of a supernatural ability. This qualifies just fine on the proof part, but fails completely on the supernatural part.
Does PEAR qualify? Rupert Sheldrake's claims? Homeopathic cures?
That's just how the Universe works, Robin.
That is your claim.
If you isolate the computations, it doesn't matter how fast or how slowly you do them, you still get the same answer.
That is the trivial part of the claim, all that means is that the natural number output by the last step if it halts is always the same.

And all that means is that the last deck checker filling in the last box will write down the same number as was in the last updated register or memory location of the super computer and that all the numbers in between will be the same.

It does not imply that every single property of the system being modelled will be reproduced.

[Robin]

Not when the "MoIP" limits the capabilities of the system.
Rocketdodger says that it doesn't. How does the MoIP limit the capabilities of a system?

[biomorph]

And another thing with this level business.

If I have Blue Brain running a simulation of a Sparc system running a simulation of a PA-RISC running a simulation of an Intel, running a simulation of a power-pc running a simulation of a DragonBall running a simulation of a Z80.

I duly run Pong on the Z80, then which processor is running Pong?


The Blue Brain is the only physical processor here. yes?

The simulations in the example you have used are all software yes.?

All the simulations run on the physical processor (hardware). Thats the only real processor there is, yes?

Thats the one for me.

how about you?

[Dancing David]

But seriously folks...

Can't a robot be an observer?

Or someone undergoing twilight anesthesia?

[Robin]

Yes. That's because the mathematics of information processing define the limits of how (information processing) objects are capable of behaving.
So we are back to having limits
That's like saying "any physical object obeys the laws of physics." Yes, that is equivalent to saying "the way any physical object behaves is how the laws of physics say that it should." If you could find an object that did not follow the laws of physics, that would be pretty revolutionary.
But that would only be a valid point if everything is a algorithm.

If that is now your point then the claim that the mind is an algorithm is pointless.

I did. You asked me to unpack it, so I did.
Thanks. Everything is an algorithm.

Why didn't you say so in the first place?

[Robin]

The Blue Brain is the only physical processor here. yes?

The simulations in the example you have used are all software yes.?

All the simulations run on the physical processor (hardware). Thats the only real processor there is, yes?

Thats the one for me.

how about you?
Me too.

[Robin]

Everything can be reproduced by an algorithm.
No, drkitten says everything is an algorithm.

[PixyMisa]

No, drkitten says everything is an algorithm.
Where?

Edit: Sorry, I see the post you're referring to. I suggest you read it again, more carefully.

[biomorph]

Rocketdodger says that it doesn't. How does the MoIP limit the capabilities of a system?

forgive me for being simplistic, but probably in the way that 2+2 is limited to the result of 4, I would guess..

[Robin]

Certainly anything that can process information involves an algorithm. And since everything is an algorithm, and there are things that algorithms can't do, there are things that can't be done.
Although it is not quite clear to me:

anything that can process information involves an algorithm

and

everything is an algorithm

The second claim seems to make the first superfluous.

[PixyMisa]

Does PEAR qualify? Rupert Sheldrake's claims? Homeopathic cures?
Yes, yes, and yes. Of course, none of them are true, so they fail in the proof section of the requirements.

That is your claim.
Yes. In what way is it supernatural?

That is the trivial part of the claim, all that means is that the natural number output by the last step if it halts is always the same.
Correct.

And all that means is that the last deck checker filling in the last box will write down the same number as was in the last updated register or memory location of the super computer and that all the numbers in between will be the same.
Correct.

It does not imply that every single property of the system being modelled will be reproduced.
Well, that depends entirely on what calculations you were doing, doesn't it?

[drkitten]

Rocketdodger says that it doesn't. How does the MoIP limit the capabilities of a system?

Well, the mathematics of information processing says that no algorithm can infallibly determine whether or not a given computer program is capable of generating output. Since "everything is an algorithm," this means that this particular problem is literally unsolvable, by any system.

And this isn't just abstract theorizing without practical import. The same mathematics say that a perfect antivirus scanner is impossible, a fact of which both Norton and the FBI are well aware.

[Robin]

Where?

Edit: Sorry, I see the post you're referring to. I suggest you read it again, more carefully.
Here
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5374161#post5374161

And it says that everything is an algorithm.
At least you got that one more or less right. Certainly anything that can process information involves an algorithm. And since everything is an algorithm, and there are things that algorithms can't do, there are things that can't be done.

That's hardly "trivial."
In which case why not go ahead and say that everything is an algorithm and save time?
I did. You asked me to unpack it, so I did
Did you want to draw my attention to something in particular?

The claim is made twice although the wording is, as I pointed out, a little unclear.

Can you clarify drkitten? Is everything an algorithm or is it not?

[PixyMisa]

The Blue Brain is the only physical processor here. yes?
You have a screen and a keyboard and CP/M. You've never heard of "Blue Brain". What CPU are you running on?

The simulations in the example you have used are all software yes.?

All the simulations run on the physical processor (hardware). Thats the only real processor there is, yes?

Thats the one for me.

how about you?
No. One of the most important properties of system virtualisation is that programs running under the virtual system have no way of telling that the system is virtual. To the programmer and to the program, you're on a Z80.

[Robin]

Well, the mathematics of information processing says that no algorithm can infallibly determine whether or not a given computer program is capable of generating output. Since "everything is an algorithm," this means that this particular problem is literally unsolvable, by any system.

And this isn't just abstract theorizing without practical import. The same mathematics say that a perfect antivirus scanner is impossible, a fact of which both Norton and the FBI are well aware.
But PixyMisa says that I have not read your post properly if I think you are claiming that everything is an algorithm.

Can you clarify?

[Robin]

You have a screen and a keyboard and CP/M. You've never heard of "Blue Brain". What CPU are you running on?
If you don't know about it then it isn't there?

[Robin]

Yes, yes, and yes. Of course, none of them are true, so they fail in the proof section of the requirements.
They certainly do. But do they, themselves say that their claims are supernatural?

[biomorph]

Me too.

ok, and perhaps without me having to trawl through pages of discussion, your reason for asking is?

[drkitten]

But PixyMisa says that I have not read your post properly if I think you are claiming that everything is an algorithm.

Can you clarify?

Well, anything that processes information does so via an algorithm.
Anything that makes decisions (or categorizes things) processes information.
And anything that can decide whether or not a computer program can generate output makes decisions.

So anything that is even presumptively capable of solving that particular problem is an algorithm (and therefore can't solve that problem, by the mathematical finding above).

Now, if you want to claim that a brick that is just sitting there is not an algorithm, I'm cool with that. But a brick is also not capable of making decisions. If you can find a way in which a brick makes decisions, it will do so in an algorithmic way.

You could also claim that a computer that is just sitting there (powered down)_ is not an algorithm -- which is fair, since most algorithms are software. But, again, an unpowered computer is not making decisions, any more than a brick is.

But the human mind is something that makes decisions. And it's therefore algorithmic.

[Robin]

ok, and perhaps without me having to trawl through pages of discussion, your reason for asking is?
Fair enough question, but I will have to get back later.

[biomorph]

You have a screen and a keyboard and CP/M. You've never heard of "Blue Brain". What CPU are you running on?

Still the "Blue Brain", I guess, because the reality of the actual hardware is not changed by the user's perception, and in this case the perception appears limited in understanding what really is processing those typos....lol.

that is, it matters not, except to the personal experience of the user, who only is accessing the CP/M virtualisation of the "Blue Brain"....maybe?

And how did you guess, I've never heard of a Blue Brain either, perhaps I'm needing to get out more.....lol;)


No. One of the most important properties of system virtualisation is that programs running under the virtual system have no way of telling that the system is virtual. To the programmer and to the program, you're on a Z80.

I agree with you, that seems right.

I do, however draw perhaps an old fashioned, but i think valid, distinction between hardware and software.

to entirely see the point you make, I have to make some compromises that perhaps are valid, but to me , limit the physical reality that exists regardless.

Like, there's no actual z80 in fact, just the BB acting like one.

Though why it would beats me...........lol

am i close, or no cigar...?

[biomorph]

Fair enough question, but I will have to get back later.

no worries, and thats fine, tnx

[AkuManiMani]

To get to the other side? :confused:


But seriously folks...

Can't a robot be an observer?

Sure...If said hypothetical robot has the capacity to observe. /cough

[PixyMisa]

They certainly do. But do they, themselves say that their claims are supernatural?
Depends on who makes the claim; some will claim that PEAR's findings are scientific, others that they are supernatural.

The point is that PEAR, Sheldrake, and homeopathy all contradict established scientific fact at so many levels without any evidence that they actually work. So we classify them as supernatural even if their adherents do not, and they qualify for the million dollar challenge.

That doesn't apply to what DrKitten and I are talking about. This is established scientific fact.

[PixyMisa]

I agree with you, that seems right.

I do, however draw perhaps an old fashioned, but i think valid, distinction between hardware and software.
Yep, it's valid. My point is not that it's wrong to say that it's Blue Brain running Pong, but rather that it's a matter of perspective, and depending on your perspective there is more than one right answer.

For example, if all we have access to is the Z80 simulation, we can easily see that it is running Pong. If we're looking at Blue Brain itself, we can see that it's running a simulation of another computer architecture, but there's no way to tell that it's running Pong without traversing the stack of simulations. From that pespective, also valid, Blue Brain isn't running Pong.

[drkitten]

Yep, it's valid. My point is not that it's wrong to say that it's Blue Brain running Pong, but rather that it's a matter of perspective, and depending on your perspective there is more than one right answer.

For example, if all we have access to is the Z80 simulation, we can easily see that it is running Pong. If we're looking at Blue Brain itself, we can see that it's running a simulation of another computer architecture, but there's no way to tell that it's running Pong without traversing the stack of simulations. From that pespective, also valid, Blue Brain isn't running Pong.

And from a third perspective, I notice that the monitor attached to Blue Brain shows a Pong game, and conclude that Blue Brain is running Pong.

All three perspectives are correct.

[PixyMisa]

If you don't know about it then it isn't there?
No, but if you don't know about it you don't know about it.

You can't look at a the screen of a CP/M system and say whether it's running on a physical Z80 or an eZ80 in compatibility mode or a hardware emulator or a virtualised Z80 on a hardware Z80 or a register-level simulated Z80 or a JIT Z80 to VLIW compiler. Z80-ness is defined functionally.

(That is, in principle. In practice, abstractions leak. If your Z80 performs at the the equivalent of 1GHz then you can safely assume that some sort of recompilation is in effect.)

[Robin]

Depends on who makes the claim; some will claim that PEAR's findings are scientific, others that they are supernatural.
Yep.
The point is that PEAR, Sheldrake, and homeopathy all contradict established scientific fact at so many levels without any evidence that they actually work. So we classify them as supernatural even if their adherents do not, and they qualify for the million dollar challenge.

That doesn't apply to what DrKitten and I are talking about. This is established scientific fact.
That a desk checked algorithm will create a real human consciousness, just as you are experiencing right now?

You are claiming that this is scientific fact?

Drkitten is currently trying to pretend that you are saying something else, so I would like to get you to confirm that this is exactly what you are saying.

[Robin]

no worries, and thats fine, tnx

Hi,

Haven't forgotten, I am collecting posts.

[drkitten]

Drkitten is currently trying to pretend that you are saying something else, so I would like to get you to confirm that this is exactly what you are saying.

Yes, that's right. I'm cunningly pretending I'm saying something else by using words with well-defined meanings that you don't even try to understand. Egad, what a cunning debater I am.

Next up, Robin will explain why a person is fat because the treadmill in his house is cunningly pretending to be a sofa.

[PixyMisa]

Yep.

That a desk checked algorithm will create a real human consciousness, just as you are experiencing right now?

You are claiming that this is scientific fact?
Are you claiming that it isn't?

It's not experimentally proven, for obvious reasons; it's derived from the laws of physics and mathematics, and verified in principle by countless simpler simulations.

If you have something more than the argument from personal incredulity to dispute this, by all means present it.

[AkuManiMani]

That doesn't apply to what DrKitten and I are talking about. This is established scientific fact.

That a desk checked algorithm will create a real human consciousness, just as you are experiencing right now?

You are claiming that this is scientific fact?

Don't look astounded. This is something that Pixy genuinely believes. And hes absolutely right...provided you're using his own personal definition of conciousness :rolleyes:

[biomorph]

Yep, it's valid. My point is not that it's wrong to say that it's Blue Brain running Pong, but rather that it's a matter of perspective, and depending on your perspective there is more than one right answer.
i'm not sure there is more than one right answer, just that from the z80 perspective, there is an answer, however due to shall we say, a restriction of all the answer in full, the z80 perpsective is not entire.

At that point the programmer is not misled, just uninformed.


For example, if all we have access to is the Z80 simulation, we can easily see that it is running Pong. If we're looking at Blue Brain itself, we can see that it's running a simulation of another computer architecture, but there's no way to tell that it's running Pong without traversing the stack of simulations. From that pespective, also valid, Blue Brain isn't running Pong.

true, via this thing you call perspective, or perhaps perception, which has not all the facts, as you rightly pointed out in your vitrualisation bit earlier..

however it assumes it matters, I'm not sure it does.

what i'm getting at is it isn't either/or, but a question that regardless of the limit of the z80 user's ability to "percieve" the BB, reality eventually hands you the whole package, given a little more info is available to the programmer..

In real life of course, the rest of the answer is available, and the z80 is seen for what it is.

that is not to say I'm saying there are no limits, I don't know..... but we see the BB perhaps, or at least some of the emulators......?

[drkitten]

Don't look astounded. This is something that Pixy genuinely believes. And hes absolutely right...provided you're using his own personal definition of conciousness :rolleyes:

Well, if you've got a better definition of consciousness that you would prefer to use, you're welcome to present it. I bet Pixy will take fewer than ten lines to shred your definition beyond repair.

[biomorph]

Don't look astounded. This is something that Pixy genuinely believes. And hes absolutely right...provided you're using his own personal definition of conciousness :rolleyes:

Um, and that is?

[biomorph]

Hi,

Haven't forgotten, I am collecting posts.

<derail> ah, grasshopper, so I see.......lol</derail>

[AkuManiMani]

Um, and that is?

Self-referential information processing.

[biomorph]

<-snip->
(That is, in principle. In practice, abstractions leak. If your Z80 performs at the the equivalent of 1GHz then you can safely assume that some sort of recompilation is in effect.)

I should say so....:p

[biomorph]

Self-referential information processing.

Is that right?

gosh.

thats awkward, i cant find (my)self to refer any information to.

I might not have one:boggled:

Just them damn neurons and chemicals and all that gear.

I guess a good dose of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/mirror neuron s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron) is in order.....

[AkuManiMani]

Don't look astounded. This is something that Pixy genuinely believes. And hes absolutely right...provided you're using his own personal definition of conciousness :rolleyes:

Well, if you've got a better definition of consciousness that you would prefer to use, you're welcome to present it. I bet Pixy will take fewer than ten lines to shred your definition beyond repair.

I'm going by the common definition of the word, as can be found in the english dictionary:

con⋅scious⋅ness (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/consciousness) [kon-shuhs-nis]
–noun

[...]

7. Philosophy. the mind or the mental faculties as characterized by thought, feelings, and volition.

[Robin]

Are you claiming that it isn't?
Personally I think that all that will happen is that some numbers will be written down on bits of paper that will be the same as the numbers a computer produces.

I see not even a scintilla of evidence, argument or proof or whatever for the claim and drkitten pretending that this claim was never made and that I am trying to claim that Strong AI is magic.

And you and drkitten getting tied in knots about what the basis of this proof will entail and whether everything is an algorithm, or algorithmic or whatever you finally decide it is.
If you have something more than the argument from personal incredulity to dispute this, by all means present it.
I am not making the claim you are. I don't have to prove you are wrong you have to prove that you are right.

All I know is that numbers will be written down on paper that will be the same as if they had been produced by a computer.

That is all. No real human consciousness. Just numbers on paper.

[rocketdodger]

I don't necessarily find your words to be important.

Don't see how you can either when you can't even tell if this is a simulation or not.

So according to you, if we are in a simulation, then nothing is important anymore? Might as well throw in the towel, eh, since nothing is "real?"

[RandFan]

All I know is that numbers will be written down on paper that will be the same as if they had been produced by a computer.

That is all. No real human consciousness. Just numbers on paper.

System and virtual mind replies: finding the mind (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room#System_and_virtual_mind_replies:_find ing_the_mind)
Systems reply. The "systems reply" argues that it is the whole system that understands Chinese experiences consciousness, consisting of the room, the book, the man, the paper, the pencil and the filing cabinets.

[rocketdodger]

So I have no problems whatsoever that a conscious state lasting a billion years might seem like a half a second and I never said I did.

Well, you made a post in the form of

1) <assertion that sounds absurd at face value>

2) <query about who believes the assertion>

and included the "billions of years" in the <assertion that sounds absurd at face value>.

If you do not think there is anything strange about a billion year conscious state that seems like half a second to the consciousness, then why did you include the notion in that statement?

But it has nothing to do with relativity.

It doesn't need to, but it can.

[RandFan]

All I know is that numbers will be written down on paper that will be the same as if they had been produced by a computer.

That is all. No real human consciousness. Just numbers on paper.

Speed, complexity and other minds: appeals to intuition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room#Speed.2C_complexity_and_other_minds:_ appeals_to_intuition)
Speed and complexity replies. The speed at which our brains process information is (by some estimates) 100,000,000,000 operations per second. Several critics point out that the man in the room would probably take millions of years to respond to a simple question, and would require "filing cabinets" of astronomical proportions write down all of the numbers. This brings the clarity of Searle's [Robin's] intuition into doubt.

[RandFan]

and included the "billions of years" in the <assertion that sounds absurd at face value>. See my last post.

[rocketdodger]

I was using his/her own words and the version you present is more complex that the way I presented it, so "simpler"?

My version has more statements than the verbatim one, but clearly it gives you less leeway in interpretation. And that makes it simpler because for some reason your interpretation of drkitten's words is confusing you.

I mean I hate to appeal to authority but everyone with an education in computation theory on this thread understands exactly what drkitten and pixy are saying here -- this really is an instance of you misunderstanding what they are writing.

So where does that fit in in your rendition of the argument?

It fits in perfectly?

[rocketdodger]

See my last post.

Aye

[rocketdodger]

And I never suggested there was. Not once.

But drkitten suggested that any system that processes information the way the MoIP says it should.

But if way the MoIP says it should means any behaviour of which the system is capable then his point is only trivially true.

I am not sure why you don't understand that point.

I do understand it. Perfectly. But then there is what drkitten has responded with -- that the MoIP actually tells us quite a bit.

What you don't understand is my point, which is that even though the MoIP explains everything about an algorithm, it does not follow that we will know everything about an algorithm. We can be wrong!

By the way, do you think that in general, it is possible for an algorithm to run on a non-algorithmic system?

I am not sure what you are asking, can you clarify?

[rocketdodger]

Rocketdodger says that it doesn't. How does the MoIP limit the capabilities of a system?

Err, that is not quite true -- I didn't say that it doesn't. I said that MoIP states that an algorithm will do what an algorithm will do.

[Frank Newgent]

So according to you, if we are in a simulation, then nothing is important anymore? Might as well throw in the towel, eh, since nothing is "real?"

You claim that an arbitrary "what is real/what isn't real (a simulation)" distinction to be the only "what is real/what isn't real" distinction that is a true (or non-arbitrary) "what is real/what isn't real" distinction.

I just don't understand how this can be true (or non-arbitrary) when the distinction between what is real and what isn't real, after all... is arbitrary.

[PixyMisa]

Personally I think that all that will happen is that some numbers will be written down on bits of paper that will be the same as the numbers a computer produces.
And since all methods of computation are equivalent, consciousness will necessarily result.

I see not even a scintilla of evidence, argument or proof or whatever for the claim and drkitten pretending that this claim was never made and that I am trying to claim that Strong AI is magic.
So what do you claim is the third option?

It's either working via the laws of physics, and a computational simulation will result in the same effects, or it's magic, and it won't.

Where is the third alternative? And don't bring up the simulated oranges nonsense; that's a category error and we've been over it a hundred times.

And you and drkitten getting tied in knots about what the basis of this proof will entail and whether everything is an algorithm, or algorithmic or whatever you finally decide it is.
No, that's just you.

I am not making the claim you are. I don't have to prove you are wrong you have to prove that you are right.
It's already established that either we're right or the Universe is logically inconsistent.

All I know is that numbers will be written down on paper that will be the same as if they had been produced by a computer.
And since those numbers represent the operations of a human brain, the results will necessarily be the same as the operations of a human brain.

This is unavoidable.

That is all. No real human consciousness. Just numbers on paper.
Sorry, no. If the numbers represent a model of the human brain, then when you run the model, you get a human mind.

That you find this somehow improbable changes facts not in the least. We run models of this sort all the time. Human consciousness is no different except in scale than a rat neocortex, and we've done that.

Either we can simulated it with a computer, and get the same effects, or it's magic. Which?

[PixyMisa]

I'm going by the common definition of the word, as can be found in the english dictionary:
I notice that you chose the seventh of eight definitions, when the very first definition corresponds directly to mine (though mine is more precise).

Why did you do that?

[PixyMisa]

Err, that is not quite true -- I didn't say that it doesn't. I said that MoIP states that an algorithm will do what an algorithm will do.
Indeed. The halting problem raises its scaly head again.

Robin, you cannot, in general, know what an algorithm will do without running the algorithm.

[yy2bggggs]

I don't understand exactly what is being claimed in the reverse-order desk check case.

Let's take this scenario. Suppose I wrote a program, call it N, that iterates constantly from (00) to (01) to (10) to (11) and back to (00). At each step, this program calculates the NAND of the arguments--that is, (00)->1, (01)->1, (10)->1, (11)->0 (I know everyone knows what NAND is, but here I'm just trying to lay down notation).

Given that I can build a machine A' using NAND gates equivalent to any machine A you build; that out of order desk check styled operations are allowed; and that every NAND gate in A' can be mapped, out of order, directly to a calculation in N that yields the same results; then would N be producing experiences, in an "out of order" conscious entity? (e.g., is it possible that the last 15 seconds of my conscious experience was really out of order calculations produced by such an N machine in some "scrambled" order?)

If so, why?

If not, why not? (What would be the significant requisite factor that makes N different from A'?)

[PixyMisa]

what i'm getting at is it isn't either/or, but a question that regardless of the limit of the z80 user's ability to "percieve" the BB, reality eventually hands you the whole package, given a little more info is available to the programmer.
Or not. There are some things that we simply cannot know - Godel's Incompleteness Theorem being the perfect example.

In real life of course, the rest of the answer is available, and the z80 is seen for what it is.
Not always, no.

that is not to say I'm saying there are no limits, I don't know..... but we see the BB perhaps, or at least some of the emulators......?
Again, you might, or you might not. If you just have a screen and a keyboard that runs CP/M commands, that's all you know. That's how Real Computers(TM) work, in fact. You are presented with a virtualised slice of the computer's resources, and you can't see anything beyond that; you can't even know if there is anything beyond that.

[PixyMisa]

I don't understand exactly what is being claimed in the reverse-order desk check case.
Yeah, it's not very clearly defined.

Assuming that the neurons in your brain make a certain sequence of state transition in computing two seconds of your conscious mind, if we run the same set of transitions backwards what happens?

Well, we start with all your memories of those two seconds in place, and we end up with them all gone. At any point in the process, the paper-you remembers things in the original chronological order. Since the calculations and hence the results are the same but reversed, you have to be unaware of the external order of processing, the time taken, the mechanism involved, and so in.

So if you run the simulation backwards, the simulated-you will experience those two seconds forwards - as far as it is concerned. Forwards, backwards, or in compeltely random order, it doesn't matter, as long as you don't change the results.

[PixyMisa]

Is that right?

gosh.

thats awkward, i cant find (my)self to refer any information to.

I might not have one:boggled:

Just them damn neurons and chemicals and all that gear.
Yep. Which are doing the self-referential information processing.

I guess a good dose of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/mirror neuron s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron) is in order.....
Mirror neurons are a good example of this.

[yy2bggggs]

So if you run the simulation backwards, the simulated-you will experience those two seconds forwards - as far as it is concerned. Forwards, backwards, or in compeltely random order, it doesn't matter, as long as you don't change the results.
Well I understand that part, but there's something missing still in going down to N--either an explicit claim that N would produce my consciousness, or an explanation of something left out.

Assume that A is your simulation of a neuron's calculations--include whatever inputs happen to come in whenever/wherever they occur (just picking this for discussion--we could easily aggregate these... consider it a functional decomposition style analysis).

Now I build A', which is an equivalent simulation, using only clocked NAND's. So I want to use A' to define the "random" ordering, as follows. I have t NAND gates total. I will label all of them uniquely with integer numbers, from 1 to t. What is significant here is that I defined an ordering (let's further assume they have labeled inputs, and we always represent them in a certain order, so that we know 01 from 10, in case that matters).

During each clock cycle in A', p of my t NAND gates are computing 00, q are computing 01, r are computing 10, and s are computing 01. So let P1 through Pp be the NAND gates calculating 00, in order, Q1 through Qq be the ones calculating 01, in order, and so forth. For the next clock cycle, we do the same thing, but start with Pp+1, Qq+1, etc.

When we're done, I want to calculate the NAND gates in A', in this arbitrary order:
P1, Q1, R1, S1, P2, Q2, R2, S2, etc.

Once I hit the end of one of the P, Q, R, and S sequences, while I still have the other three to calculate, I'm just going to start running some other "program" in the background in a random order (effectively I want to just fill it in, so that I keep iterating).

Now I wind up with N, which is a program that's just calculating, in this order, (00)->1, (01)->1, (10)->1, (11)->0, and going back to start. So are you claiming that this program implements an out of order equivalent A? If we keep running it, will it produce a conscious mind--albeit an out of order one?

[rocketdodger]

You claim that an arbitrary "what is real/what isn't real (a simulation)" distinction to be the only "what is real/what isn't real" distinction that is a true (or non-arbitrary) "what is real/what isn't real" distinction.

I just don't understand how this can be true (or non-arbitrary) when the distinction between what is real and what isn't real, after all... is arbitrary.

Well that is your problem -- you think "true" and "non-arbitrary" are the same thing.

Why? Those terms don't have anything to do with each other...

[rocketdodger]

Yeah, it's not very clearly defined.

Assuming that the neurons in your brain make a certain sequence of state transition in computing two seconds of your conscious mind, if we run the same set of transitions backwards what happens?

Well, we start with all your memories of those two seconds in place, and we end up with them all gone. At any point in the process, the paper-you remembers things in the original chronological order. Since the calculations and hence the results are the same but reversed, you have to be unaware of the external order of processing, the time taken, the mechanism involved, and so in.

So if you run the simulation backwards, the simulated-you will experience those two seconds forwards - as far as it is concerned. Forwards, backwards, or in compeltely random order, it doesn't matter, as long as you don't change the results.

I do not agree with this -- if the state transitions are determined by non-invertible functions then the sequence cannot be run backwards.

So the only way to do it would be to have the entire results of the simulation and then "play" it backwards. But in that case it is no longer information processing, it becomes merely information. The only time it is processing is when it is run forward as intended.

[rocketdodger]

Well I understand that part, but there's something missing still in going down to N--either an explicit claim that N would produce my consciousness, or an explanation of something left out.

Assume that A is your simulation of a neuron's calculations--include whatever inputs happen to come in whenever/wherever they occur (just picking this for discussion--we could easily aggregate these... consider it a functional decomposition style analysis).

Now I build A', which is an equivalent simulation, using only clocked NAND's. So I want to use A' to define the "random" ordering, as follows. I have t NAND gates total. I will label all of them uniquely with integer numbers, from 1 to t. What is significant here is that I defined an ordering (let's further assume they have labeled inputs, and we always represent them in a certain order, so that we know 01 from 10, in case that matters).

During each clock cycle in A', p of my t NAND gates are computing 00, q are computing 01, r are computing 10, and s are computing 01. So let P1 through Pp be the NAND gates calculating 00, in order, Q1 through Qq be the ones calculating 01, in order, and so forth. For the next clock cycle, we do the same thing, but start with Pp+1, Qq+1, etc.

When we're done, I want to calculate the NAND gates in A', in this arbitrary order:
P1, Q1, R1, S1, P2, Q2, R2, S2, etc.

Once I hit the end of one of the P, Q, R, and S sequences, while I still have the other three to calculate, I'm just going to start running some other "program" in the background in a random order (effectively I want to just fill it in, so that I keep iterating).

Now I wind up with N, which is a program that's just calculating, in this order, (00)->1, (01)->1, (10)->1, (11)->0, and going back to start. So are you claiming that this program implements an out of order equivalent A? If we keep running it, will it produce a conscious mind--albeit an out of order one?

This is a good question. I will have to meditate on it.

[Robin]

Either we can simulated it with a computer, and get the same effects, or it's magic. Which?
So either a simulated dynamo can power the computer it is running on or it's magic eh?

[Robin]

I make a calculation and write down the answer an paper.

Result? A number on the paper.

I make another calculation based on that and write it down.

Result? Another number on a piece of paper.

No matter how long you do this you will end up with numbers on paper.

No consciousness, no time dilation.

Just numbers on paper.

I mean, what is the mechanism being proposed here?

[Robin]

Delete to reword

[Robin]

Indeed. The halting problem raises its scaly head again.

Robin, you cannot, in general, know what an algorithm will do without running the algorithm.
But you will know what the algorithm will do the second time you run it.

At least in theory.

[Belz...]

To be fair, I'm talking about conventional computers not holodecks. If you can get your computer to provide you oranges without any input of water, sucrose, proteins and all other constituent properties of oranges then I would be very impressed.

If your argument is idealism then I will concede the argument. It's theoretically possible to create The Thirteenth Floor. It's possible that our virtual hero could get stuck in a rainstorm and catch a cold, be miserable and have to run to the store for lozenges. Orange flavored ones.

I was certainly not arguing for idealism, as such a "theory" is unprovable and irrelevant to anything. I was simply curious as to what properties or processes you thought could not be simulated.

[Belz...]

OK, here is a great business opportunity.

Write a simulation of a dynamo and get it to provide the electricity for the computer running the simulation.

Global warming solved in a flash.

Ok, fair enough. But inside the simulation the dynamo CAN work. Of course, the argument works both ways. Putting water in my computer won't make the virtual flowers grow.

[Belz...]

I notice that you chose the seventh of eight definitions, when the very first definition corresponds directly to mine (though mine is more precise).

Why did you do that?

A typical human behaviour, I'd guess. Our annoying ability to cherry-pick. Usually not even intentionally.

[AkuManiMani]

I notice that you chose the seventh of eight definitions, when the very first definition corresponds directly to mine (though mine is more precise).

Why did you do that?


First of all, I chose definition 7 since the first several were redundant. Definition 7 sums up all the previous senses rather concisely; as in thoughts, feelings, and volition. I'll simply post them all, since you apparently think I'm trying to avoid some devastating point:

con⋅scious⋅ness  [kon-shuhs-nis]
–noun
1. the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc.
2. the thoughts and feelings, collectively, of an individual or of an aggregate of people: the moral consciousness of a nation.
3. full activity of the mind and senses, as in waking life: to regain consciousness after fainting.
4. awareness of something for what it is; internal knowledge: consciousness of wrongdoing.
5. concern, interest, or acute awareness: class consciousness.
6. the mental activity of which a person is aware as contrasted with unconscious mental processes.
7. Philosophy. the mind or the mental faculties as characterized by thought, feelings, and volition.
—Idiom
8. raise one's consciousness, to increase one's awareness and understanding of one's own needs, behavior, attitudes, etc., esp. as a member of a particular social or political group.

As can be seen, each of those 8 senses of the word either refer to consciousness -of- particular object(s) or -attributes- of consciousness itself. They are not mutually exclusive, or separate concepts.

Second point: There is a difference between simply -processing- information and -awareness- of information. As I've already emphasized to you numerous times, our own physiology processes information [self-referential or otherwise] even when we are unconscious. Your definition of consciousness is not "more precise"; you've simply co-opted the label "consciousness" for another concept.

[Robin]

Err, that is not quite true -- I didn't say that it doesn't. I said that MoIP states that an algorithm will do what an algorithm will do.
Fair enough.

Now remember the original claim that a system capable of running an algorithm will behave as the MoIP says it will.

And the MoIP says that an algorithm will do what an algorithm will do.

So any system capable of running an algorithm should always do what an algorithm will do.

So the question is, can you design a system that is capable of running an algorithm, but which will do what an algorithm won't do?

And bear in mind that the Church-Turing thingy works both ways.

[AkuManiMani]

Ok, fair enough. But inside the simulation the dynamo CAN work. Of course, the argument works both ways. Putting water in my computer won't make the virtual flowers grow.

Thats pretty much the heart of the issue. Simulations are just models of a thing, they aren't ontologically identical to what they're intended to model.

[Robin]

Thats pretty much the heart of the issue. Simulations are just models of a thing, they aren't ontologically identical to what they're intended to model.
I agree that is the heart of the matter. You shouldn't confuse a model with the thing it is modelling.

[Robin]

ok, and perhaps without me having to trawl through pages of discussion, your reason for asking is?
OK, here is the original post from rocketdodger

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5372822#post5372822

My position was that we are alway at level zero because what produces our consciousness is what produces our consciousness.

Even if we do not know what that is.

[Robin]

Well, you made a post in the form of

1) <assertion that sounds absurd at face value>
But again, it is none of my doing that the assertion sounds absurd.
and included the "billions of years" in the <assertion that sounds absurd at face value>.
Which, as I pointed out before, was none of my doing
If you do not think there is anything strange about a billion year conscious state that seems like half a second to the consciousness, then why did you include the notion in that statement?
Because - and maybe you should read carefully this time - that was the proposition.

I was stating it. As plainly as I could. I don't think that is the absurd part.
It doesn't need to, but it can.
Well there is a chance that I might buy a disembodied conscious state produced by mental arithmetic and numbers on paper.

But you are asking me to buy that mental arithmetic and numbers on paper could produce time dilation? How?

[Belz...]

Thats pretty much the heart of the issue. Simulations are just models of a thing, they aren't ontologically identical to what they're intended to model.

I don't know. Though real water can't make virtual flowers grow, and vice-versa, are programs modeling consciousness conscious, by definition ? I mean, virtual characters running in a simulation are running as far as the simulation is concerned. The difference is that conscious programs COULD and WOULD interact with reality.

[Robin]

Speed, complexity and other minds: appeals to intuition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room#Speed.2C_complexity_and_other_minds:_ appeals_to_intuition)
Speed and complexity replies. The speed at which our brains process information is (by some estimates) 100,000,000,000 operations per second. Several critics point out that the man in the room would probably take millions of years to respond to a simple question, and would require "filing cabinets" of astronomical proportions write down all of the numbers. This brings the clarity of Searle's [Robin's] intuition into doubt.
That does not seem to be relevant.

I have already stipulated that it might take a billion years to desk check half a second of consciousness.

So now you seem to be implying that I had not considered the length of time.

Did you read my argument properly? If so then what is the point of what you quoted?

[drkitten]

So either a simulated dynamo can power the computer it is running on or it's magic eh?

Nope. That's the "simulated orange" category error Pixy mentioned.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Take a system that uses a true RNG, and for every instance of a random number generated, simply create a Turing machine that features it. That is, if the first use of the RNG is like "If RNG(0) is > B, branch" you can put "If A > B move left" in the Turing machine, where A = RNG(0) (zero meaning simply the first call).
But where does the machine get A? If it is from a true RNG, then it's an augmented Turing machine. If it's from a list of true random numbers on the tape, then how was that list initialized? It can't be an infinite list, because we can't initialize an infinite number of values.

~~ Paul

[Robin]

System and virtual mind replies: finding the mind (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room#System_and_virtual_mind_replies:_find ing_the_mind)
Systems reply. The "systems reply" argues that it is the whole system that understands Chinese experiences consciousness, consisting of the room, the book, the man, the paper, the pencil and the filing cabinets.
This was one of the objection I raised to the Chinese Room argument when you raised it initially, several pages back.

Why are you raising it now when you know that I am aware of this objection to the CR argument and had introduced it to this thread ages ago?

Or don't you read my posts?

So what is your point?

Here was my reply to your original Searle post:
I think Searle just made a blunder when he said that the Chinese Room does not understand Chinese because the people operating it did not understand Chinese.

That would not seem be be relevant since they are just part of the machinery in this case.

Also, as far as I recall, Searle did not provide a definition for understand.

Personally I have no trouble saying the Chinese Room understands Chinese, just so long as it is actually able to carry on a conversation in Chinese - even if in very slow motion.

Similarly I would have no problem saying that a desk checked program understands just so long as it is able to meet the behavioural criteria at whatever speed.

I would baulk, however, at any certainty about either being conscious.

[drkitten]

I don't know. Though real water can't make virtual flowers grow, and vice-versa, are programs modeling consciousness conscious, by definition ?

Well, is a simulated decision a real decision?

Obviously, the water in Second Life won't water my real garden.

But if I "program" a "computer" in Second Life to play chess, based on a sufficiently detailed simulation of an an actual chessboard (involving simulated pieces, simulated moves, and what not, that simulation can play chess in the real world.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Anything that is capable of computing -- of performing arithmetic, really -- is either equivalent to a Turing machine or is less powerful than a Turing machine.

Since humans are capable of performing arithmetic, they are either equivalent to or less powerful than a Turing machine.
What? Why can't humans be more powerful than a Turing machine? Anything more powerful can perform arithmetic.

~~ Paul

[drkitten]

So the question is, can you design a system that is capable of running an algorithm, but which will do what an algorithm won't do?

Isn't this like designing a physical system that won't obey the laws of physics?

[drkitten]

What? Why can't humans be more powerful than a Turing machine?

Because Turing machines are universal (in terms of capacity, not necessarily in performance).

More formally, because nothing not explicitly counterfactual can be more powerful than a Turing machine, and because humans are not counterfactual.

[westprog]

I don't know. Though real water can't make virtual flowers grow, and vice-versa, are programs modeling consciousness conscious, by definition ?

I think there should be a question mark at the end of that sentence.

[RandFan]

This was one of the objection I raised to the Chinese Room argument when you raised it initially, several pages back.I don't know what you mean by "you raised it"?

Why are you raising it now when you know that I am aware of this objection to the CR argument and had introduced it to this thread ages ago?It's apropos.

I would baulk, however, at any certainty about either being conscious. Utter nonsense. Searle is making the same appeal to intuition that you are. The turing test is a test for strong AI. Searle is trying to rebut strong AI.

BTW: Did you know that Searle wrote a book about consciousness? The Mystery of Consciousness (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0940322064/ref=cap_pdp_dp_0) by John R. Searle ?

Did you know that he references The Chinese Room in the book?

[westprog]

Isn't this like designing a physical system that won't obey the laws of physics?

No, it's like designing a car that can float.

[drkitten]

No, it's like designing a car that can float.

But no one claimed that cars couldn't float. The claim, however, is that all algorithms behave according to the mathematics of information processing.

So the question asks for someone to design something that is provably impossible to design.

[Robin]

Isn't this like designing a physical system that won't obey the laws of physics?
No, you sentence is not equivalent to mine, read more carefully.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

More formally, because nothing can be more powerful than a Turing machine, and because humans are not examples of "nothing."
But the Church-Turing thesis is only a thesis, not a proof. I guess we're assuming it's true.

~~ Paul

[westprog]

What? Why can't humans be more powerful than a Turing machine? Anything more powerful can perform arithmetic.

~~ Paul

Any human with a sledgehammer is more powerful than 99% of the computers in the world.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Thats pretty much the heart of the issue. Simulations are just models of a thing, they aren't ontologically identical to what they're intended to model.
Indeed, but sometimes the ontological difference is largely irrelevant. Adding 2 + 2 in a computer program is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to adding 2 + 2 on your fingers. The question is whether this equivalence holds for consciousness.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Similarly I would have no problem saying that a desk checked program understands just so long as it is able to meet the behavioural criteria at whatever speed.

I would baulk, however, at any certainty about either being conscious.
So what is there about consciousness that is over and above behavior?

~~ Paul

[Wudang]

No, you sentence is not equivalent to mine, read more carefully.

Is the clue in the words "is capable of"?

[RandFan]

That does not seem to be relevant.
Your argument is an appeal to intuition. NOTHING MORE.

You don't offer evdince or proof. You simply say that you don't see how that could work and you apeal to us why it wouldn't work.

This explains why your appeal to intuition is problematic.

You've not resolved the problem.

[RandFan]

Similarly I would have no problem saying that a desk checked program understands...BTW: What do you mean by it undertands?

[Robin]

I don't know what you mean by "you raised it"?
You were, as far as I know the first to bring up the Chinese Room argument.
It's apropos.
Well obviously you thought so, but I am asking you why you thought it a propos. Especially when I had already brought it up ages ago.
Utter nonsense. Searle is making the same appeal to intuition that you are.
No, Searle is making a specific argument with a specific structure. The person is the computer, the tiles and instructions are the program. He says the person does not understand and yet can converse in Chinese using the program. So therefore a computer conversing in Chinese would not understand. Pinker seems to have misunderstood this and I have read where Searle has corrected this misapprehension.

I, on the other hand, was making an appeal to intuition and explicitly so (I said so to Paul and I said so to you)
The turing test is a test for strong AI. Searle is trying to rebut strong AI.
Yes, I know. Every time you say this I say, yes, I know. Will you stop saying it so I can stop saying "yes I know"? It is getting a bit tedious.

Why are you repeating all this stuff, dragging it out?

[drkitten]

But the Church-Turing thesis is only a thesis, not a proof. I guess we're assuming it's true.

No more than the Theory of Evolution or the Theory of Relativity is "only a theory."

The Church-Turing thesis is a proof that all definitions of information processing so far proposed are equivalent. At this point, the list of actual definitions is quite lengthy. We don't even have a well-formed definition of anything more powerful than a Turing machine -- except for the explicitly counterfactual notion of "oracle computing," which rather blatantly assumes magic.

So Robin and Westprog are in the rather uncomfortable position of asking whether or not it's possible to exceed the speed of light. I have told them, several times, that relativity theory says that it isn't. They then ask if relativity theory applies to angelic unicorns that are defined to have the ability to exceed the speed of light at will.

Relativity theory says that no such creatures exist. Relativity theory even says that such creatures would violate the basic causal structure of the universe. If R&W want to take seriously the possibility of angelic unicorns, they first need to demonstrate that such creatures are even coherent.

Similarly, the mathematics says that no information processor more powerful than a Turing machine exists. At this point, the proponent of angelic unicorn accountants needs to step up with something more sophisticated than "could SO!"

[Robin]

BTW: What do you mean by it undertands?
Oh for crying out loud are we to go over all this stuff yet again?

By "understand" I mean the ability to take broad information and apply it to specific situations recognising significant deviations.

Thus if the Chinese room is able to pass the Turing test in Chinese, then by my definition it understands Chinese.

If a computer can pass a school comprehension in English then it understands English.

[Robin]

Is the clue in the words "is capable of"?
Yes.

[Robin]

So Robin and Westprog are in the rather uncomfortable position of asking whether or not it's possible to exceed the speed of light. I have told them, several times, that relativity theory says that it isn't. They then ask if relativity theory applies to angelic unicorns that are defined to have the ability to exceed the speed of light at will.
Drkitten, on the other hand, would rather fling around straw than try to read a sentence properly.

[Robin]

So what is there about consciousness that is over and above behavior?

~~ Paul
Take a hammer and hit your thumb (not really of course).

[Robin]

Indeed, but sometimes the ontological difference is largely irrelevant. Adding 2 + 2 in a computer program is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to adding 2 + 2 on your fingers. The question is whether this equivalence holds for consciousness.

~~ Paul
I accept that for most things, understanding, thinking, intelligence.

You will remember that I posted the desk check idea tentatively at first, an attempt to put into words the intuition that an algorithm that simulated consciousness was not conscious.

The more people argued in it's favour, the more straw they flung around, the more absurd it sounded to me.

If everybody is so comfortable with this idea why did I get attacked so hard? Especially when I had started out saying that it was only an intuition.

[RandFan]

Thus if the Chinese room is able to pass the Turing test in Chinese, then by my definition it understands Chinese.Not JUST understands Chinese.

Do you even know what the Turing Test is? We are not even talking Leobner.

We are talking about the ability for a computer to have a conversation to with a human being and the human being not able to discern whether or not it's a computer. So the computer needs to "understand" many things. It needs to be able to think like a human.

[Frank Newgent]

Well that is your problem -- you think "true" and "non-arbitrary" are the same thing.

Why? Those terms don't have anything to do with each other...


What is true can be determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle?

Arbitrary (http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/arbitrary)

[Robin]

But no one claimed that cars couldn't float. The claim, however, is that all algorithms behave according to the mathematics of information processing.
No, you changed the claim.

Your claim was that a system capable of running an algorithm behaved according to the mathematics of information processing.

There is a difference.

[Robin]

Not JUST understands Chinese.

Do you even know what the Turing Test is? We are not even talking Leobner.

We are talking about the ability for a computer to have a conversation to with a human being and the human being not able to discern whether or not it's a computer. So the computer needs to "understand" many things. It needs to be able to think like a human.
Yes I know what the Turing Test is. You are just quibbling. Yes of course it needs to know more stuff.

But it does not need to have identical conscious states to humans.

[RandFan]

He says the person does not understand and yet can converse in Chinese using the program. So therefore a computer conversing in Chinese would not understand. Would not understand what? It meets your definition of understand. Clearly Searle doesn't mean what you mean. He's appealing to our intuition. How can file cabinets, pencil and paper carry on a conversation, in Chinese no less.

I, on the other hand, was making an appeal to intuition and explicitly so (I said so to Paul and I said so to you) Searle appeals to our intuition. He has no other argument.

Why are you repeating all this stuff, dragging it out?It directly addresses your appeal to intuition.

[RandFan]

But it does not need to have identical conscious states to humans.Who said it did?

[Robin]

What? Why can't humans be more powerful than a Turing machine? Anything more powerful can perform arithmetic.

~~ Paul
This "more powerful" is a red herring. An algorithm needs to be equivalent to a function on natural numbers.

That seems to suggest there are a couple of things an algorithm doesn't do.

For example a process that was genuinely random could not, strictly speaking, be random since a function cannot map a point on it's domain to more than one point on it's range.

A process that involves non-discrete values cannot, by that definition, be an algorithm.

This thesis is really just about the equivalence of one way of doing arithmetic with another, people tend to get a bit over excited by it.

[RandFan]

If everybody is so comfortable with this idea why did I get attacked so hard? Especially when I had started out saying that it was only an intuition.I don't know if you got attacked hard. But to the extent that people took issue with your argument it was, IMO, because appealing to intuition can be problematic. QM and Relativity are counterintuitive. That they are isn't a valid argument against them.

[RandFan]

For example a process that was genuinely random could not, strictly speaking, be random...Can you clarify?

[Robin]

Who said it did?
Well since my entire point was whether or not the desk checked algorithm had identical conscious states to humans and you keep dragging up Searle and Strong AI as though it was relevant, so I guess you said it did.

I keep asking you for the relevance of this stuff.

[Robin]

Can you clarify?
I did, in the rest of the sentence you quoted.
For example a process that was genuinely random could not, strictly speaking, be random since a function cannot map a point on it's domain to more than one point on it's range.

[westprog]

By showing that a Turing-machine is a universal computational device.
Anything that is capable of computing -- of performing arithmetic, really -- is either equivalent to a Turing machine or is less powerful than a Turing machine.

Since humans are capable of performing arithmetic, they are either equivalent to or less powerful than a Turing machine.

A human being can go to the shops and buy beer, which makes a human being more powerful than a Turing machine.

A Turing machine - well, a certain type of Turing machine - can perform computable operations. To say that nothing is more powerful than a Turing machine is just to say that there is nothing possible except for computation. The statement is either wrong or trivial.

[Robin]

Would not understand what? It meets your definition of understand. Clearly Searle doesn't mean what you mean.
But why are you getting into this stuff again. Am I not allowed to have a different definition
He's appealing to our intuition. How can file cabinets, pencil and paper carry on a conversation, in Chinese no less.
But they are just the program and data in Searles argument. The person is the computer.
Searle appeals to our intuition. He has no other argument.
Do you understand Chinese? If not, is it just an intuition that you don't?

So, no, it is not an intuition. The man does not understand Chinese by any definition.
It directly addresses your appeal to intuition.
Even if he did, it is still not the same.

Please answer this question: is Searles objection to the Chinese Room that it does not have identical conscious states to humans?

You have this bee in your bonnet for some reason - you want Searle's argument to be what I am saying and it really is not. Can we get past this?

[RandFan]

Well since my entire point was whether or not the desk checked algorithm had identical conscious states to humans and you keep dragging up Searle and Strong AI as though it was relevant, so I guess you said it did. Identical conscious states? I'm sorry but I don't remember this. Sincerely. I would have told you from the start that the answer was no. Why would that even be a point for discussion? Who cares? So long as the algorithm is conscious. You and I don't even have identical conscious states. Not even identical twins have identical conscious states.

[RandFan]

Please answer this question: is Searles objection to the Chinese Room that it does not have identical conscious states to humans?I don't know why that would be anyone's objection. If you've made this clear to me then I sincerely apologize. I would never have been in such a discussion. I honestly don't know what the purpose of proving you and I don't have identical conscious states so it would be even less obvious to me why your thought experiment would advance any discussion about consciousness.

You have this bee in your bonnet for some reason - you want Searle's argument to be what I am saying and it really is not. Can we get past this?I won't bring it up again I assure you.

[Robin]

Identical conscious states? I'm sorry but I don't remember this. Sincerly. I would have told you from the start that the answer was no. Why would that even be a point for discussion? Who cares? So long as the algorithm is conscious. You and I don't have identical conscious states.
It was just the entire point I was making. Sheesh.

Do you really not recall me asking "Do you think it possible that this moment you are experiencing right now could be the result of a billion years of writing numbers on paper?"

I think I have said it over and over again. Without that I have no point. I am not making the Chinese Room argument.

[Robin]

Self-referential information processing.
Take a thermometer with a flexible probe. Put the probe against the battery compartment of the thermometer.

Self-referential information processing.

[Belz...]

Well, is a simulated decision a real decision?

Obviously, the water in Second Life won't water my real garden.

But if I "program" a "computer" in Second Life to play chess, based on a sufficiently detailed simulation of an an actual chessboard (involving simulated pieces, simulated moves, and what not, that simulation can play chess in the real world.

Yes, this is what I was saying.

[Robin]

Identical conscious states? I'm sorry but I don't remember this. Sincerely. I would have told you from the start that the answer was no. Why would that even be a point for discussion? Who cares? So long as the algorithm is conscious. You and I don't even have identical conscious states. Not even identical twins have identical conscious states.
But if the desk checked program was the moment you are experiencing right now, then clearly it would have identical conscious states to you.

Which is why I phrased it that way.

[Belz...]

I think there should be a question mark at the end of that sentence.

Isn't there ? :confused:

[RandFan]

Do you really not recall me asking "Do you think it possible that this moment you are experiencing right now could be the result of a billion years of writing numbers on paper?"Roughly yes. Exactly no. No sufficiently complex system can be modeled exactly. (see Chaos theory). I had no idea you were being so exacting in your language. But the puzzling things is that you don't need to appeal to intuition. Chaos theory rebuts it perfectly.

[RandFan]

But if the desk checked program was the moment you are experiencing right now, then clearly it would have identical conscious states to you.Your checking is itself a variable. The paper is a variable. The pencil is a variable. The temperature of the room is a variable. There are many variables that you can't model. There is no possible way for you to exactly model the moment I'm experiencing now (see chaos theory).

[rocketdodger]

Well I understand that part, but there's something missing still in going down to N--either an explicit claim that N would produce my consciousness, or an explanation of something left out.

Assume that A is your simulation of a neuron's calculations--include whatever inputs happen to come in whenever/wherever they occur (just picking this for discussion--we could easily aggregate these... consider it a functional decomposition style analysis).

Now I build A', which is an equivalent simulation, using only clocked NAND's. So I want to use A' to define the "random" ordering, as follows. I have t NAND gates total. I will label all of them uniquely with integer numbers, from 1 to t. What is significant here is that I defined an ordering (let's further assume they have labeled inputs, and we always represent them in a certain order, so that we know 01 from 10, in case that matters).

During each clock cycle in A', p of my t NAND gates are computing 00, q are computing 01, r are computing 10, and s are computing 01. So let P1 through Pp be the NAND gates calculating 00, in order, Q1 through Qq be the ones calculating 01, in order, and so forth. For the next clock cycle, we do the same thing, but start with Pp+1, Qq+1, etc.

When we're done, I want to calculate the NAND gates in A', in this arbitrary order:
P1, Q1, R1, S1, P2, Q2, R2, S2, etc.

Once I hit the end of one of the P, Q, R, and S sequences, while I still have the other three to calculate, I'm just going to start running some other "program" in the background in a random order (effectively I want to just fill it in, so that I keep iterating).

Now I wind up with N, which is a program that's just calculating, in this order, (00)->1, (01)->1, (10)->1, (11)->0, and going back to start. So are you claiming that this program implements an out of order equivalent A? If we keep running it, will it produce a conscious mind--albeit an out of order one?

Alright, I have my response -- yes, it will produce a conscious mind.

I say this because to the extent that you can run the operations out of order it will only be during concurrent operations of the algorithm anyway. For serial operations the system has no choice but to pause and wait for required results before proceeding.

So your example is a little misleading because there will be times when you simply can't run the calculations out of order without changing the results of the algorithm. Accepting this, it isn't as crazy as it sounded at first.

[Robin]

Yes, this is what I was saying.
It is more or less the proposition that AkuManiMani suggested earlier models can do the action but don't duplicate the ontology.

A chess program is not strictly speaking a model anyway - there is no "thing" that it is modelling.

But I never doubted for a moment that the desk check could model the function, I even stipulated that it might understand.

[AkuManiMani]

I don't know. Though real water can't make virtual flowers grow, and vice-versa, are programs modeling consciousness conscious, by definition ?

I remember in our previous discussions westprog and I were going on about how we need a physical understanding of what consciousness is before we can reproduce it in technology. PixyMisa, et al., have been arguing from 3 assumptions: [1] consciousness is capable of being modeled by a Turing machine, [2] we already have a sufficient model, and [3] that such a model is an -actual- reproduction of consciousness. Essentially, the whole debate so far has been whether consciousness is a physics issue or simply an IT problem.

If consciousness is a form of energy, like electricity or matter, simply modeling functions correlated with it in a program will not be enough. One would have to recreate the actual physical process that generates consciousness.

I mean, virtual characters running in a simulation are running as far as the simulation is concerned. The difference is that conscious programs COULD and WOULD interact with reality.

My guess is if we did create conscious programs we would have to create the appropriate physical medium. After that, it would be a matter of having them interface with some purely virtual environment and/or an interface with the external environment we operate in. For entities like that, interfacing with the "external" world via some robotic system might be akin to us using an avatar in a VR interface :D

[rocketdodger]

I make a calculation and write down the answer an paper.

Result? A number on the paper.

I make another calculation based on that and write it down.

Result? Another number on a piece of paper.

No matter how long you do this you will end up with numbers on paper.

No consciousness, no time dilation.

Just numbers on paper.

I mean, what is the mechanism being proposed here?

Well, keep in mind that entire worlds have been created that are nothing more than bits on silicon.

If you suggested such a thing to someone who hadn't seen it, they would say "but those are just bits on silicon..."

But then their jaw will drop when they see something like GTA4, which fits neatly on an Xbox360.

[Darat]

Take a hammer and hit your thumb (not really of course).

How is that anything other than behaviour?

[Robin]

Roughly yes. Exactly no. No sufficiently complex system can be modeled exactly. (see Chaos theory). I had no idea you were being so exacting in your language. But the puzzling things is that you don't need to appeal to intuition. Chaos theory rebuts it perfectly.
I think I mentioned a while back that the only perfect model of a physical system was the system itself.

There are quite a few things that rebut it perfectly. It is simply not true to say that a system capable of running an algorithm is itself algorithmic, if you think hard you can devise counter examples. So there is no reason in the first place to think that there must be an algorithm that is equivalent to the human brain.

But the point being pressed was the equivalency. But without that then it might not be conscious at all, or it might be conscious in a way we wouldn't recognise.

[rocketdodger]

Fair enough.

Now remember the original claim that a system capable of running an algorithm will behave as the MoIP says it will.

And the MoIP says that an algorithm will do what an algorithm will do.

So any system capable of running an algorithm should always do what an algorithm will do.

So the question is, can you design a system that is capable of running an algorithm, but which will do what an algorithm won't do?

And bear in mind that the Church-Turing thingy works both ways.

Well, an algorithm can't really do anything "physical." And if anyone says they can, what they mean is that a physical system behaving according to an algorithm can do something "physical."

So your question should be, can you design a physical system that is capable of behaving according to an algorithm yet can also behave in a way that isn't in accordance with any algorithm.

And I think the answer is "no," and I think that is what people like drkitten and pixy mean when they say "everything is an algorithm" or "everything is computable," etc. They mean that there is no behavior for which there is no possible algorithm. (please chime in if I am incorrect, drkitten or pixy).

Of course this doesn't take into account true randomness of QM and stuff like that, but I am not an expert in that area so I am not sure how it impacts the arguments.

[Robin]

How is that anything other than behaviour?
You define pain as behaviour?

[rocketdodger]

Which, as I pointed out before, was none of my doing

Well I guess I made an incorrect assumption about your intent when making that post. I apologize.

But you are asking me to buy that mental arithmetic and numbers on paper could produce time dilation? How?

LOL, no no no. I am saying that time diliation would affect a process that produces consciousness.

I.E. if you were in a starship.

I only brought it up to illustrate that the idea of a microsecond of consciousness taking billions of years to occur isn't absurd at all, since relativity theory has been saying it for 50+ years.

[AkuManiMani]

Take a thermometer with a flexible probe. Put the probe against the battery compartment of the thermometer.

Self-referential information processing.

It LIVES!!!

MUWAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!

[Robin]

Well, an algorithm can't really do anything "physical." And if anyone says they can, what they mean is that a physical system behaving according to an algorithm can do something "physical."

So your question should be, can you design a physical system that is capable of behaving according to an algorithm yet can also behave in a way that isn't in accordance with any algorithm.

And I think the answer is "no," and I think that is what people like drkitten and pixy mean when they say "everything is an algorithm" or "everything is computable," etc. They mean that there is no behavior for which there is no possible algorithm. (please chime in if I am incorrect, drkitten or pixy).

Of course this doesn't take into account true randomness of QM and stuff like that, but I am not an expert in that area so I am not sure how it impacts the arguments.
Since an algorithm must be equivalent to a function on natural numbers then a genuinely random event could not be an algorithm, nor could a process involving non discrete values.

So you only have to think of an implementation of an algorithm on a physical system that involved randomness or non-discrete values then you would have a system capable of running an algorithm that did not itself behave algorithmically.

[Robin]

Well I guess I made an incorrect assumption about your intent when making that post. I apologize.



LOL, no no no. I am saying that time diliation would affect a process that produces consciousness.

I.E. if you were in a starship.

I only brought it up to illustrate that the idea of a microsecond of consciousness taking billions of years to occur isn't absurd at all, since relativity theory has been saying it for 50+ years.
OK. But as I said I am ok with the billion year seeming like a half second in any case if the conscious state did in fact arise.

[Robin]

Your checking is itself a variable. The paper is a variable. The pencil is a variable. The temperature of the room is a variable. There are many variables that you can't model. There is no possible way for you to exactly model the moment I'm experiencing now (see chaos theory).
Although, thinking about it, if you were, in fact, the desk checked algorithm then what you are experiencing would be the result of the algorithm.

[rocketdodger]

What is true can be determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle?

Arbitrary (http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/arbitrary)

Ah I see what you are saying.

Well let me ask you this -- suppose someone selects a number arbtrarily. Let us call this number a. Furthermore, suppose there is another number constrained for some arbitrary reason to be exactly 5 greater than a, call it b.

Now -- is it true, or arbitrary, that b - a == 5 ?

[RandFan]

I think I mentioned a while back that the only perfect model of a physical system was the system itself.And by system we don't mean just the neural correlates. We are also talking about stimulus, chemicals, temperature, etc..

So not only the physical system but every variable, many that we might never be able to even conceive of. You can't step into the same river twice. No brain can ever have the exact same experience twice.

[RandFan]

Although, thinking about it, if you were, in fact, the desk checked algorithm then what you are experiencing would be the result of the algorithm.And each iteration of checking would result in a different experience. Roughly the same but not exactly identical.

[rocketdodger]

Since an algorithm must be equivalent to a function on natural numbers then a genuinely random event could not be an algorithm, nor could a process involving non discrete values.

So you only have to think of an implementation of an algorithm on a physical system that involved randomness or non-discrete values then you would have a system capable of running an algorithm that did not itself behave algorithmically.

But you can always generate an algorithm after the fact. So just because there is randomness doesn't mean there isn't an algorithm -- it just means it would be impossible to determine which algorithm was being followed until after any relevant random events had occurred. But there would still be an algorithm that was followed.

And I am not sure the discrete thing is important.

[Frank Newgent]

Ah I see what you are saying.

Well let me ask you this -- suppose someone selects a number arbtrarily. Let us call this number a. Furthermore, suppose there is another number constrained for some arbitrary reason to be exactly 5 greater than a, call it b.

Now -- is it true, or arbitrary, that b - a == 5 ?

Necessity, reason, and principle say true.

Chance, whim, or impulse might say anything.

[rocketdodger]

A process that involves non-discrete values cannot, by that definition, be an algorithm.


Well, the catch 22 is that you can discretize the value in question to an arbitrary level of precision.

Meaning, if you wanted to see how far off a system was from what the algorithm stated it should be, you couldn't, because if you can, then you can discretize further.

[rocketdodger]

Necessity, reason, and principle say true.

Chance, whim, or impulse might say anything.

Well then you have answered your question.

The fact that we cannot tell if we are in a simulation or not has no more bearing on the consistency and truth values of our logical statements than the fact of a being arbitrary has on the relative difference between a and b.

[yy2bggggs]

I say this because to the extent that you can run the operations out of order it will only be during concurrent operations of the algorithm anyway. For serial operations the system has no choice but to pause and wait for required results before proceeding.
As I understand the concept of a desk check, I don't believe this reasoning applies. If we have gates A'1 and A'2 having inputs (11) and (01) respectively, that feed into gate A'3 in the next cycle, then A'3 is going to get inputs (01). We can calculate (01)->1 for A'2, then (01)->1 for A'3, then (11)->0 for A'1.

Suppose for some odd reason a mistake in the A' algorithm showed up, where the A'2 gate emitted 0, then it'd be a different thing we do is all--it may even change the order of our checks (in this case it would). We use N to compute A'3 first as (00)->1, and that would look right. Then A'2 as (01)->1, and that would look wrong, and then we'd be done with our desk check, and conclude that the A'2 gate's calculation messed up. This means that our A'3 calculation computed what it did, yet not what it was supposed to, but so what? We found the error--it failed the desk check. We go and fix A'2 and rerun it.

So no, we don't have to wait for A'2 to complete in order to run A'3 in a post hoc desk check. We simply assume the entire thing ran smoothly, and try to prove the assumption false.

If we were doing a test in the blind, however, we wouldn't have this information, so we have to run the whole thing in order. But we're not doing that, I don't think. I think all we're doing is figuring out if A' ran correctly, and I think we already know everything A' did. But the case to consider is the case in which it did happen to run correctly, and we're running N out of order.
So your example is a little misleading because there will be times when you simply can't run the calculations out of order without changing the results of the algorithm. Accepting this, it isn't as crazy as it sounded at first.
Don't you have the same problem computing entire time slices backwards? You have to know what the inputs were to slice 2000 in order to simulate that at all. That depends on what happened in 1999. I can't see a way to reasonably interpret doing a desk check backwards without having the same concerns about serial versus concurrent processing.

[AkuManiMani]

Well then you have answered your question.

The fact that we cannot tell if we are in a simulation or not has no more bearing on the consistency and truth values of our logical statements than the fact of a being arbitrary has on the relative difference between a and b.

This.

[westprog]

Isn't there ? :confused:

Yes, there is. It's an expression of doubts which not everybody posting on this topic has.

[westprog]

But no one claimed that cars couldn't float. The claim, however, is that all algorithms behave according to the mathematics of information processing.

So the question asks for someone to design something that is provably impossible to design.

The question asks for someone to design a system that is non-algorithmic.

An example of a non-algorithmic system has already been given - a Turing machine with a random number generator bolted on the side. There's been an objection that the coin-tosser I suggested is still deterministic. I don't necessarily accept that in this context, but it's possible to replace the coin-tosser with a device that uses quantum events such as radioactive decay.

Such a device can do things that the Turing machine can't. It can't carry out the computations that the Turing machine can carry out any better, but so what? If we restrict ourselves to discussing only things that we know that Turing machines can do, we'll come to the conclusion that nothing can do anything that a Turing machine can't do. It's not a productive way to proceed.

Since we've established that there are systems which have capabilities that Turing machines do not, then we have to consider whether the human mind is such a system, or if everything it does is capable of being performed by a Turing machine.

[westprog]

No brain can ever have the exact same experience twice.

That might be practically true, but I believe the argument is that the human brain could be simulated on a Turing machine and that this would produce identical experiences, in every way.

I don't think this is true, but I think that some people arguing here do believe that it's true. In fact, I think that Rocketdodger is arguing that it is a matter of provable mathematical fact that it's true.

[Frank Newgent]

The fact that we cannot tell if we are in a simulation or not has no more bearing on the consistency and truth values of our logical statements than the fact of a being arbitrary has on the relative difference between a and b.

In some ideal way perhaps.

But I think I prefer this... may I paraphrase you:

The fact that we cannot tell if we are experiencing a past life regression or not has no more bearing on the consistency and truth values of our logical statements than the fact of a being arbitrary has on the relative difference between a and b

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No more than the Theory of Evolution or the Theory of Relativity is "only a theory."
I don't think so.


The Church-Turing thesis is a proof that all definitions of information processing so far proposed are equivalent. At this point, the list of actual definitions is quite lengthy. We don't even have a well-formed definition of anything more powerful than a Turing machine -- except for the explicitly counterfactual notion of "oracle computing," which rather blatantly assumes magic.
But it is not a proof that all algorithms are Turing compatible. So the brain could employ an algorithm that is not Turing compatible.

I agree that this is a nit-pick, since surely the Church-Turing thesis is correct.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Take a hammer and hit your thumb (not really of course).
Who says behavior has to be overt? Think of consciousness as internal behavior. What problems arise that would make you think it is something more?

Edited to add: As Darat said.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You define pain as behaviour?
Yes. What else is it if not simply internal behavior?

~~ Paul

[drkitten]

But it is not a proof that all algorithms are Turing compatible.

Er,.... yes, it is. The definition of "algorithm" is "something that can be run on a Turing-machine." We've had that since 1930.

What we have also had since 1930 is the alternative notions of "something that can be computed in the lambda calculus," "something that can be computed via recursive functions," "something that can be computed by cellular automata," and other variant notions.

The Church-Turing thesis is simply a proof that these are all "algorithms."

[cyborg]

Er,.... yes, it is. The definition of "algorithm" is "something that can be run on a Turing-machine." We've had that since 1930.

Hmm - if an "algorithm" was defined that required a machine that was more powerful than a Turing-machine (but it was theoretically something that could be built unlike other hyper-Turing-machines) then I suspect that the new system would become the de facto definition for algorithm. The basic reason being that the term existed long before the theory of computation.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

An example of a non-algorithmic system has already been given - a Turing machine with a random number generator bolted on the side.
I don't think we understand the ramifications of this. At least I don't. Is this more powerful than a plain Turing machine? What about initializing the tape with an arbitrarily large number of random numbers?

In any event, this doesn't seem to have any ramifications on a physicalist model of the brain, since quantum noise is available to the brain if necessary.

~~ Paul

[cyborg]

I don't think we understand the ramifications of this. At least I don't. Is this more powerful than a plain Turing machine?

Well, there's the Non-Deterministic Turning Machine, which would be a bit similar but instead of having a random number generator you can have state transitions with multiple possible outcomes that can be selected arbitrarily. As I recall such a machine would allow some problems to be computed with a lower order of complexity (and hence more quickly) but it wouldn't allow you to compute anything you couldn't already compute with a DTM. I don't think this machine would do so either since you'd pretty much only be able to use the RNG for a similar use (or for the randomness itself if it was required).

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Er,.... yes, it is. The definition of "algorithm" is "something that can be run on a Turing-machine." We've had that since 1930.

What we have also had since 1930 is the alternative notions of "something that can be computed in the lambda calculus," "something that can be computed via recursive functions," "something that can be computed by cellular automata," and other variant notions.

The Church-Turing thesis is simply a proof that these are all "algorithms."
Hmm. I don't think that's the definition of an algorithm. I think the definition involves steps in an imperative-style task and the claim that they can be simulated with a Turing-complete system is just an assertion.

Now, just to contradict myself, here is a possible proof:

http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=70459

And here is a program for proving it:

http://www.math.ist.utl.pt/~ojakian/ojakianSlidesCT2008.pdf

~~ Paul

[rocketdodger]

As I understand the concept of a desk check, I don't believe this reasoning applies. If we have gates A'1 and A'2 having inputs (11) and (01) respectively, that feed into gate A'3 in the next cycle, then A'3 is going to get inputs (01). We can calculate (01)->1 for A'2, then (01)->1 for A'3, then (11)->0 for A'1.

Suppose for some odd reason a mistake in the A' algorithm showed up, where the A'2 gate emitted 0, then it'd be a different thing we do is all--it may even change the order of our checks (in this case it would). We use N to compute A'3 first as (00)->1, and that would look right. Then A'2 as (01)->1, and that would look wrong, and then we'd be done with our desk check, and conclude that the A'2 gate's calculation messed up. This means that our A'3 calculation computed what it did, yet not what it was supposed to, but so what? We found the error--it failed the desk check. We go and fix A'2 and rerun it.

So no, we don't have to wait for A'2 to complete in order to run A'3 in a post hoc desk check. We simply assume the entire thing ran smoothly, and try to prove the assumption false.

If we were doing a test in the blind, however, we wouldn't have this information, so we have to run the whole thing in order. But we're not doing that, I don't think. I think all we're doing is figuring out if A' ran correctly, and I think we already know everything A' did. But the case to consider is the case in which it did happen to run correctly, and we're running N out of order.

Don't you have the same problem computing entire time slices backwards? You have to know what the inputs were to slice 2000 in order to simulate that at all. That depends on what happened in 1999. I can't see a way to reasonably interpret doing a desk check backwards without having the same concerns about serial versus concurrent processing.

Yeah but I disagree with Pixy about the backwards thing too, so my argument still stands. See my post on that.

[rocketdodger]

In some ideal way perhaps.

But I think I prefer this... may I paraphrase you:

And?

I see no problem with that statement...

[Belz...]

It is more or less the proposition that AkuManiMani suggested earlier models can do the action but don't duplicate the ontology.

A chess program is not strictly speaking a model anyway - there is no "thing" that it is modelling.

No ? I was under the impression that it modeled a person playing chess.

[Belz...]

If consciousness is a form of energy, like electricity or matter, simply modeling functions correlated with it in a program will not be enough. One would have to recreate the actual physical process that generates consciousness.



My guess is if we did create conscious programs we would have to create the appropriate physical medium. After that, it would be a matter of having them interface with some purely virtual environment and/or an interface with the external environment we operate in. For entities like that, interfacing with the "external" world via some robotic system might be akin to us using an avatar in a VR interface :D

We have no reason to presume that consciousness is "a form of energy" or that it requires a particular "physical medium". As far as we know it's just a process of a certain type/complexity.

[Belz...]

You define pain as behaviour?

What else ?

[Belz...]

Yes, there is. It's an expression of doubts which not everybody posting on this topic has.

Not necessarily.

[Frank Newgent]

The fact that we cannot tell if we are experiencing a past life regression or not has no more bearing on the consistency and truth values of our logical statements than the fact of a being arbitrary has on the relative difference between a and b.

I see no problem with that statement...

Cool. Thanks. May I paraphrase further?


Here is the question I would like you to answer -- if we are in a past life regression, is there any mathematical reason that a property of an entity in our level could not be replicated at a lower level?
Are you asking that if we are in a past life regression, is there any mathematical reason that a property or entity in that past life regression could not be reproduced by a past life regressed by some other method?

The answer is that I don't know.

Yes, that is the question.

The relevance to this discussion being that if there is no mathematical reason why not, and if we are in a past life regression, then we should be able (with sufficient technology) to replicate every single property of every physical substance in the universe within a past life regression of our own.

I am not aware of any such mathematical reason either.

I am saying that because there is no way to prove we are not already in a past life regression, it is a fallacy to speak of "reality" in anything other than relative terms.

We are in some other frame I.E. already in a past life regression and consciousness like our's is unique to this frame for an arbitrary reason OR it is independent of the truly primary primary properties and thus can arise in any other frame as well.

You're a funny guy RD. :D

[AkuManiMani]

We have no reason to presume that consciousness is "a form of energy" or that it requires a particular "physical medium". As far as we know it's just a process of a certain type/complexity.

Well, what I'm arguing is that the process in question differs more along the lines of "type" than "complexity". After giving this discussion a lot of thought, I've come to the conclusion that whats at issue here isn't merely a matter of information being computed, but the energetic form of the "stuff" in question.

The simulated water in your example has many of the same operational properties as H20. But, physically speaking, the simulated water is completely different than drinkable water. It does not, and cannot, serve as a stand-in for a body of H20 because they do not have the same physical make-up, and therefore have completely different physical properties. The same goes for the simulated dynamo, mentioned earlier, for exactly the same reasons.

The same also goes for biological processes like consciousness. Asserting that producing consciousness is simply a matter of flipping a particular pattern of switches in a Turing machine is like claiming that and ad hoc simulation of solar panels is an efficacious instance of photosynthesis.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The simulated water in your example has many of the same operational properties as H20. But, physically speaking, the simulated water is completely different than drinkable water. It does not, and cannot, serve as a stand-in for a body of H20 because they do not have the same physical make-up, and therefore have completely different physical properties. The same goes for the simulated dynamo, mentioned earlier, for exactly the same reasons.
Agreed.


The same also goes for biological processes like consciousness. Asserting that producing consciousness is simply a matter of flipping a particular pattern of switches in a Turing machine is like claiming that and ad hoc simulation of solar panels is an efficacious instance of photosynthesis.
A mere assertion on your part. What is it about consciousness that escapes a simulation in any important way? We agree, of course, that a simulated human is not a human. But looking specifically at consciousness, what is it other than complex inner behavior?

~~ Paul

[westprog]

I don't think so.


But it is not a proof that all algorithms are Turing compatible. So the brain could employ an algorithm that is not Turing compatible.

I agree that this is a nit-pick, since surely the Church-Turing thesis is correct.

~~ Paul

It still doesn't follow that the operations of the brain are algorithmic.