My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple [Archive]

Ron_Tomkins

4th November 2009, 10:05 AM

JoeTheJuggler

4th November 2009, 10:18 AM

I'm not sure how Quantum Mechanics would help with the study of consciousness.

The best research is in the field of neuroscience. We really do have measures that correlate very reliably with self-reports of consciousness. (And dualists have nothing to support the idea that consciousness can exist without a normally functioning human mind or vice versa--that is there's zero evidence of P-zombies and disembodied consciousness.)

I mentioned a pretty cool experiment done at the California Neuroscience Institute that I saw described on PBS' Science Frontiers with Alan Alda. The subject is put in a chair such that his entire visual field is a monitor. The monitor displays an alternating pattern of two images: horizontal red stripes and vertical blue stripes. In normal vision, the subjective experience is a sort of purple plaid pattern (that is you see them both at the same time). If you put filters that make the red only visible to one visual field and blue only visible to the other, the subjective experience is that you only see one or the other at a time, and they switch every once in a while.
(Nothing in the objective world is changing, just the subjective experience, much like optical illusions where there is an ambiguity--you only see the silhouette spinning clockwise or counterclockwise, but not both at the same time.) Meanwhile, the subject is attach to a sophisticated sort of EEG. The EEG is attached to a computer program that can be taught to recognize the brain scans that match the experience of seeing one or the other of the two patterns. That is, before long the computer can tell by the brains can what the subject is experiencing.

I think we will continue to learn which structures and functions in the brain are "the seats of consciousness". I don't understand how quantum mechanics will have anything to do with this.

Hux

4th November 2009, 03:08 PM

I tried to read Penrose' book years ago. Not a frikkin' clue. Totally baffled. So I put it to one side.

You might get somewhere by reading some books by Stephen Pinker and Daniel Dennett. They are more approachable and do not suggest unsupported processes. I wonder how we could ever get to the bottom of consciousness by utilising a process we understand so poorly? Consciousness is not unusual. Our level of consciousness is. Its still however a natural biological process and I'm sure will be explained from that standpoint.

Maia

4th November 2009, 03:39 PM

drkitten

4th November 2009, 03:44 PM

JoeTheJuggler

4th November 2009, 04:07 PM

I don't know, but it always seems to me that some other variety of argument is always lurking behind the scenes when these kinds of concepts are brought out. All right, so if quantum mechanics actually provided a model for the process of consciousness somehow in some way not yet fully understood, then I guess... it would. What's really the point here?

But what exactly is being referred to by the usage of the phrase "apparent mystery"? If this "mystery" was resolved, what would that mean? If it wasn't resolved, what would that mean? Again, what exactly is the point?
I guess I have no problem with the overall point (understanding consciousness is fascinating).

I just don't understand how QM could possibly prove a model for consciousness.
And consciousness emerges at the level brain structure (if not the entire organ). It certainly isn't a property of tissue, cell, molecule or atom, much less anything that QM tells us about.

I would say the interesting stuff starts at the level of cell function. QM really doesn't have anything to say even about regular chemistry.

Given the responses of those familiar with Penrose (I'm not), it sounds like it's just a typical invocation of "quantum" to explain some New Age idea (like The Secret or What the Bleep or The Tao of Physics or some such). "Aha! QM tells us that observation has an effect on the thing being measured, so that must tell us something about consciousness!" As drkitten says, it's more a lack of understanding of the physics than it is anything actually about consciousness.

I also think it's like using terms that have real meaning (energy, vibration, resonance, etc.) to refer to fuzzy, possibly supernatural ideas.

What bugs me most is that there are pretty exciting advances in neuroscience, and invoking QM seems to say that physics (or a misunderstanding of physics) will tell us more about consciousness than the science that actually has told us a great deal about it.

rocketdodger

4th November 2009, 04:39 PM

Don't bother "investigating" Penrose. It's wrong, his theories are drivel, and the popularity of The Emperor's New Mind has arguably set cognitive science back by five years.

Basically, his entire argument can be summed up as follows:

1) I am a brilliant mathematician.
2) I don't understand consciousness at all.
3) I don't understand quantum mechanics at all
4) Therefore, quantum mechanics must explain consciousness.

It can't. Ask any practicing physicist whether or not Penrose actually gets the physics correct. You will almost certainly learn that, no, he doesn't.

Similarly, any cognitive scientist will tell you that he gets the fundamentals of cognitive science completely wrong. Indeed, any neurologist will tell you that he can't get neuroanatomy correct.

It's one huge tower of ignorance. A very well-written tower, but fundamentally wrong.

And if you want more information about why it is fundamentally wrong, go ahead and google "lucas penrose argument".

Note that the vast majority of hits have to do with explaining why it is invalid. That is why it is also known as the lucas penrose fallacy.

Maia

4th November 2009, 04:52 PM

I guess I have no problem with the overall point (understanding consciousness is fascinating).

I just don't understand how QM could possibly prove a model for consciousness.
And consciousness emerges at the level brain structure (if not the entire organ). It certainly isn't a property of tissue, cell, molecule or atom, much less anything that QM tells us about.

I would say the interesting stuff starts at the level of cell function. QM really doesn't have anything to say even about regular chemistry.

I have no idea how QM could really do that either, but I do have to say that I'd love to read Gustav Bernroider. :) (I haven't yet. Has anybody else?) The reason is that his theories are based on what happens in the ion channels of neurons; now, that I do know a bit about because of the relationship to the actions of psychopharmacological drugs. Most of the newer classes of anticonvulsants work on the ionic channels in some way, and he specifically studied the potassium (K+) ion channel. (Retigabine is one that modulates activity there.)

It might be worth reading what other scientists have done who aren't primarily mathematicians-- Bernroider definitely does not seem to have any New-Agey ax to grind. But...

The Secret or What the Bleep or The Tao of Physics or some such).

No! NO! Horrible memories of being trapped at friends' houses and forced to watch unspeakably bad movies while served tofu... :eek:

Zalbik

4th November 2009, 05:20 PM

3) I don't understand quantum mechanics at all

So you're saying the guy who has won the Wolfe prize for mathematical physics and the Dirac prize for theoretical physics doesn't understand quantum mechanics at all?

Any evidence for this remarkable remark?

I can't find any references / quotes from physicists who disparage his opinions on quantum mechanics.

That being said, I will agree that is cognitive science arguments are very weak in Emperor's New Mind. I have no idea if any of his subsequent works did any better...

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

4th November 2009, 05:24 PM

I believe that Penrose and Hameroff proposed 20 experiments to test Orch-OR, their "theory" behind their QM proposals. If you can find a single paper about any of these experiments, please let me know.

Also, try searching on <Orch-OR> at Pubmed. You'll get about seven hits, four of which are irrelevant, two by Penrose and Hameroff, and one titled "Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective-reduction proposal for human consciousness is not biologically feasible."

~~ Paul

JoeTheJuggler

4th November 2009, 05:30 PM

I have no idea how QM could really do that either, but I do have to say that I'd love to read Gustav Bernroider. :) (I haven't yet. Has anybody else?) The reason is that his theories are based on what happens in the ion channels of neurons; now, that I do know a bit about because of the relationship to the actions of psychopharmacological drugs. Most of the newer classes of anticonvulsants work on the ionic channels in some way, and he specifically studied the potassium (K+) ion channel. (Retigabine is one that modulates activity there.)
Yup. As I said, the interesting stuff starts at the level of cell functions. Ion channels, synapses, neurotransmitters, etc. That's pretty much the lowest level of organization that has to do with consciousness.

No! NO! Horrible memories of being trapped at friends' houses and forced to watch unspeakably bad movies while served tofu... :eek:
Hey, now! There's nothing wrong with tofu! :)

blobru

4th November 2009, 06:29 PM

... I mentioned a pretty cool experiment done at the California Neuroscience Institute that I saw described on PBS' Science Frontiers with Alan Alda. The subject is put in a chair such that his entire visual field is a monitor. The monitor displays an alternating pattern of two images: horizontal red stripes and vertical blue stripes. In normal vision, the subjective experience is a sort of purple plaid pattern (that is you see them both at the same time). If you put filters that make the red only visible to one visual field and blue only visible to the other, the subjective experience is that you only see one or the other at a time, and they switch every once in a while.
(Nothing in the objective world is changing, just the subjective experience, much like optical illusions where there is an ambiguity--you only see the silhouette spinning clockwise or counterclockwise, but not both at the same time.) Meanwhile, the subject is attach to a sophisticated sort of EEG. The EEG is attached to a computer program that can be taught to recognize the brain scans that match the experience of seeing one or the other of the two patterns. That is, before long the computer can tell by the brains can what the subject is experiencing.

Here's a 60 minutes report (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8jc8URRxPIg) from about a year ago where researchers are able to identify subjects' thoughts such as "screwdriver", "hammer", "igloo", "castle", "addition" or "subtraction", solely from brainscan pattern (the first half is relevant; the second is mostly ethical considerations and Lesley Stahl wetting her pants that her brain is "just molecules").

I think we will continue to learn which structures and functions in the brain are "the seats of consciousness". I don't understand how quantum mechanics will have anything to do with this.

I agree. I'm not sure where the pessimism comes from among some philosophers / researchers, that consciousness may be an insoluble paradox. The computational model for the mind is so suggestive -- all knowledge based on nets of comparison functions (x is A, y is not-A), consciousness the highest-level comparison function, likely recursive (I was I, now I'm not) -- that even if it's not the whole story, the gaps that remain should only offer even more knowledge about the nature of the brain and body and their relation to consciousness, not insuperable barriers to understanding.

Until we're sure those gaps even exist, like you, I don't see the point of invoking QM to explain them.

fuelair

4th November 2009, 08:07 PM

Ron_Tomkins

4th November 2009, 08:18 PM

Dancing David

4th November 2009, 08:43 PM

Um, here is the deal neurotansmitters are above the QM level, as are neurons.

Wowbagger

4th November 2009, 09:15 PM

QM might not provide the answer, but perhaps something else, that we know nothing about (yet) will. I can't tell you what that something else is (yet), but no matter what that thing is: Consciousness won't ever be simple until we find out what it is (eventually).

That's my take, as nebulous and uhelpful though it may be (for now).

Apathia

4th November 2009, 10:57 PM

Ah! This thread reminds me of one I started back when.
DrKitten intervened and so became one of my favorite JREF people.

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=59996

!Kaggen

4th November 2009, 11:52 PM

Consciousness is self referential.
It creates itself.
It therefore can only be recognized by itself.
The question for me is not how does consciousness arise, which is answered above, but why does consciousness create itself?

Consciousness creation by matter assumes that matter is conscious.
Clearly a form of dualism in the light of the above.
Penrose's honest mistake is making this dualism explicit by hypothesizing that consciousness is created by matter through QM.

To avoid this dualism I believe the why of consciousness can only be explained within its borders using its substance, thought.

Robin

5th November 2009, 12:44 AM

Consciousness is self referential.
It creates itself.

And you know this - how?

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 03:56 AM

And you know this - how?

I think

Wudang

5th November 2009, 04:15 AM

Consciousness is self referential.
It creates itself.

Unsupported assertion.

It therefore can only be recognized by itself.

Unsupported assertion and non sequitur

The question for me is not how does consciousness arise, which is answered above, but why does consciousness create itself?

House of cards is getting a little wobbly now

Consciousness creation by matter assumes that matter is conscious.

Only if we allow your unsupported assertion above

Clearly a form of dualism in the light of the above.

Since you have assumed a non-materialist axiom, duh!

Penrose's honest mistake is making this dualism explicit by hypothesizing that consciousness is created by matter through QM.

To avoid this dualism I believe the why of consciousness can only be explained within its borders using its substance, thought.
But this is still dualism. If there is matter and there is thought then that is dualism and we're back at the old "Which great opponent of Cartesian dualism resists the reduction of psychological phenomena to a physical state and insists there is no point of contact between the extended and the unextended?"

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 04:39 AM

Consciousness is self referential.
It creates itself.

Unsupported assertion.
Yes, the only one we can make "I think"

Consciousness creation by matter assumes that matter is conscious.

Only if we allow your unsupported assertion above

So you agree then.

Clearly a form of dualism in the light of the above.

Since you have assumed a non-materialist axiom, duh!
What gives you reason to believe it is a non-materialist axiom?

Penrose's honest mistake is making this dualism explicit by hypothesizing that consciousness is created by matter through QM.
To avoid this dualism I believe the why of consciousness can only be explained within its borders using its substance, thought.

But this is still dualism. If there is matter and there is thought then that is dualism and we're back at the old "Which great opponent of Cartesian dualism resists the reduction of psychological phenomena to a physical state and insists there is no point of contact between the extended and the unextended?" I do not assume a thought, only thought. Perhaps I should have used the word thinking instead. I am not differentiating between the matter and thoughts/ideas as this differentiation results from consciousness. I am saying we will only understand consciousness by examining that which we cannot avoid, thinking.

Hux

5th November 2009, 04:49 AM

It is a biological expression. It will be explained in terms of biology. It will and does take some explaining but since it arose naturally, there is no reason to suppose we cannot come upon a satisfying explanation. After all, its not really a question of consciousness; it is the level that requires explanation. We look at the animal Kingdom and see varying levels of consciousness and we do not seem to have a problem understanding animal response - but we know it is limited, often instinctual - so if we work from that we should get close to the real answers. So what if it turns out we are creatures running millions if not billions of algorithms per sec? So what if it gives us the impression that we are something apart from nature, if all we are doing is reacting to it with infinitesimally large options? There appears to be no inner self. What will be bruised other than our ego's?

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 05:00 AM

Hux

5th November 2009, 05:02 AM

You cant guess what I'm thinking right now. Thanks also for your input.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 05:11 AM

You cant guess what I'm thinking right now.
No, but if I could guess why you are thinking then I would understand consciousness.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 05:36 AM

I think

Which then begs the question, how do you know that?

Now phenomenology is a part of philosophy now, but nweuroscience has come a long way.

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 05:37 AM

I've been investigating Roger Penrose and I found out that he wrote a book about consciousness entitled "The Emperor's New Mind". In it, he argues that classical mechanics are insufficient to study and understand the process of human consciousness, and that quantum mechanics is closer to becoming a tool to understanding it.

Since the issue of Artificial Intelligence has been argued here before, and dualists have argued that you can't explain the "magical" process of consciousness through science and math; it occurs to me that maybe we haven't been fair to the process and appeared too simplistic with our explanations, and we have not fully reviewed in what way is it that consciousness can be approached (And the way Penrose suggest is Quantum Mechanics).

(And considering that things behave very different at the Quantum Level, it looks like this could be a clue to the apparent "mystery" to the behavior and nature of consciousness)

This is why I invite anyone who can contribute their thoughts and knowledge about how consciousness can better be understood from the Quantum Mechanics point of view.

And that includes people who have read Penrose's book and can give their layman version of what's more or less addressed in such book (Trying not to spoil us the surprises too much:D )

You wanted a reasonable, balanced response to that question? You posted your question on the wrong board. You might just as well have asked a bunch of Christians for their opinions on evolution.

The bottom line is that most of the people who post on this board (a) don't understand the deep philosophical problems and issues raised by questions about consciousness, (b) don't understand the deep philosophical problems and issues raised by questions about quantum mechanics, (c) aren't actually interested in understanding (a) or (b) because (d) they have an agenda which involves the denial that there could be anything about either subject which could possibly challenge that dogmatic, anti-religious, anti-"woo" agenda.

Ask proper scientists, ask philosophers, but don't bother asking a bunch of knee-jerk-responding, ignorant, arrogant "skeptics", because you should already know in advance what sort of response you will get. If there is a deep connection between the problems concerning QM and consciousness, this board is home to about the last people on Earth which would be willing to admit it. In short, most people here already believe they understand enough about these issues to be reasonably certain that any talk connecting consciousness and QM is woo-woo nonsense, but, if past experience is anything to go by, very few of them actually do understand those issues. It's their gut instinct which drives their opinions on this subject, not reason or scientific knowledge. Woo-woos talk about "quantum consciousness", therefore it must be nonsense.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 05:40 AM

Yes, the only one we can make "I think"

I observe and experience something I call thought.

That does not say what the experiece actaully is.

...

I do not assume a thought, only thought. Perhaps I should have used the word thinking instead. I am not differentiating between the matter and thoughts/ideas as this differentiation results from consciousness. I am saying we will only understand consciousness by examining that which we cannot avoid, thinking.

Well, the differentiation comes about because of the use of language, which is an idiomatic and self refential system of communication that takes place between communicants with the appearnce of existance.

that does not give validity to the actual label usage of the underlying phenomena.

We can also understand more about consciousness through biology than phenomenology.

:)

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 05:44 AM

You wanted a reasonable, balanced response to that question? You posted your question on the wrong board. You might just as well have asked a bunch of Christians for their opinions on evolution.

The bottom line is that most of the people who post on this board (a) don't understand the deep philosophical problems and issues raised by questions about consciousness, (b) don't understand the deep philosophical problems and issues raised by questions about quantum mechanics, (c) aren't actually interested in understanding (a) or (b) because (d) they have an agenda which involves the denial that there could be anything about either subject which could possibly challenge that dogmatic, anti-religious, anti-"woo" agenda.

Ask proper scientists, ask philosophers, but don't bother asking a bunch of knee-jerk-responding, ignorant, arrogant "skeptics", because you should already know in advance what sort of response you will get. If there is a deep connection between the problems concerning QM and consciousness, this board is home to about the last people on Earth which would be willing to admit it.

Ah, that is nice, and a great spin.

You can't present your ideas in a defensible fashion, so you blame everyone else.

Bravo UCE!

Some of us do care, we just don't agree with you. :p

So what 'problems' concerning QM ?
Maybe you could also say what problems there are with 'consciousness' ?

Please be sure to use some rigor in the defintions.

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 05:52 AM

Ah, that is nice, and a great spin.

You can't present your ideas in a defensible fashion, so you blame everyone else.

Bravo UCE!

Some of us do care, we just don't agree with you. :p

Sorry, DD, but I've been posting on this board a long time too and I do not believe that this subject is approached by most people here with a sufficiently open mind.

So what 'problems' concerning QM ?
Maybe you could also say what problems there are with 'consciousness' ?

Please be sure to use some rigor in the defintions.

As I have explained on numerous occasions in the past, these two problematic areas are connected because both of them require us to consider the distinction between the physical world we are directly aware of and the physical world of the external realists or hard physicalists. The "hard problem" of consciousness and the conundrums posed by Schroedinger's cat thought-experiment both end up being curve-balls for materialistic scientists because in both cases, unlike any other areas that we would like mainstream science to tackle, we cannot ignore the conceptual, metaphysical distinction between the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself. The denialists on this board try to claim that in neither case is there any need for scientists to turn to metaphysics. They are wrong. Bottom line: both subjects cause serious problems for naive materialists, and most of the people here are naive materialists who are unwilling to admit there is any reason for them to question their unacknowledged metaphysical commitments. It is a threat to the foundation of a belief system which, in this case, most adherents aren't even willing to admit is a belief system at all, let alone that there might be a serious problem with it.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 05:53 AM

Which then begs the question, how do you know that?Like I said, consciousness is self-referential.

Now phenomenology is a part of philosophy now, but nweuroscience has come a long way.
Yes it it should be supported to go further as an exact empirical science.
However it does not exist in a vacuum and thus far still needs to be thought about and interpreted by humans.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 06:04 AM

I observe and experience something I call thought.

That does not say what the experiece actaully is.That is until you start thinking about your observations and experience of thought.

Well, the differentiation comes about because of the use of language, which is an idiomatic and self refential system of communication that takes place between communicants with the appearnce of existance.

that does not give validity to the actual label usage of the underlying phenomena. Sure, using language to describe thoughts about thinking is hard. That is why much of phenomenology is incomprehensible.

We can also understand more about consciousness through biology than phenomenology.

:) We will understand more from using both methods together.
I do not believe they are exclusive.
I am of the opinion that biologists in particular will only benefit if they were also trained in phenomenology.

Wudang

5th November 2009, 07:22 AM

Sorry, DD, but I've been posting on this board a long time too and I do not believe that this subject is approached by most people here with a sufficiently open mind.

Translation: nobody accepts my bluster as truth
As I have explained on numerous occasions in the past, these two problematic areas are connected because both of them require us to consider the distinction between the physical world we are directly aware of and the physical world of the external realists or hard physicalists. The "hard problem" of consciousness and the conundrums posed by Schroedinger's cat thought-experiment both end up being curve-balls for materialistic scientists because in both cases, unlike any other areas that we would like mainstream science to tackle, we cannot ignore the conceptual, metaphysical distinction between the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself. The denialists on this board try to claim that in neither case is there any need for scientists to turn to metaphysics. They are wrong. Bottom line: both subjects cause serious problems for naive materialists, and most of the people here are naive materialists who are unwilling to admit there is any reason for them to question their unacknowledged metaphysical commitments. It is a threat to the foundation of a belief system which, in this case, most adherents aren't even willing to admit is a belief system at all, let alone that there might be a serious problem with it.
Translation: the HPC sounds weird, QM sounds weird, anyone who watches Buffy knows that weird things go together.

"the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself" Classic misunderstanding - the QM world is part of the world as it is at a very small scale - a scale we find it hard to visualize. The macrocosmic world that we experience is not made any less real because the world acts counter to our intuition at a small scale.

By the way - when you can say "as I have demonstrated" instead of "I have explained" the debate can probably move on further.

Wudang

5th November 2009, 07:37 AM

Yes, the only one we can make "I think"

I'm not interested in discussing opinions.

So you agree then.

Hardly

I do not assume a thought, only thought. Perhaps I should have used the word thinking instead. I am not differentiating between the matter and thoughts/ideas as this differentiation results from consciousness. I am saying we will only understand consciousness by examining that which we cannot avoid, thinking.

But when you start by making unfounded assumptions about what consciousness is then you may already be excluding the correct answer. You may wish to consider the history of introspection in the development of psychology to understand some of the wrong paths you can go down. Freudianism anyone?

Aepervius

5th November 2009, 07:51 AM

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 09:12 AM

Sorry, DD, but I've been posting on this board a long time too and I do not believe that this subject is approached by most people here with a sufficiently open mind.

fair enough

As I have explained on numerous occasions in the past, these two problematic areas are connected because both of them require us to consider the distinction between the physical world we are directly aware of and the physical world of the external realists or hard physicalists.

Well, I can agree with that, because all assumptions are false.

the world acts as though it is real, regardless of what it is made of.

The "hard problem" of consciousness

I still don't agree with the HPC, there may be a lack of detail in current models, but that is what they are, models. What is the problem, that models are incomplete?

and the conundrums posed by Schroedinger's cat thought-experiment

The Copenhagen interpretation of QM is that, it one one possible interpretation of QM, the 'thing' exists as a waveform, before during and after any interaction. That is sort of a superposition if you want to conceptualise it that way.

But really superposition is a classical framework for interpreting QM. A wave exists in the possible space of the Scrodinger wave form.

So, also the cat is a macro object and therefore also does not have QM effects.

both end up being curve-balls for materialistic scientists because in both cases, unlike any other areas that we would like mainstream science to tackle, we cannot ignore the conceptual, metaphysical distinction between the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself.

Well I don't think we should ever ingnore that, models are models, and they are accurate but not reality. they are ways of describing reality. (Whatever that may be.)

The denialists on this board try to claim that in neither case is there any need for scientists to turn to metaphysics.

Um, why should they in the case of consciousness or QM?

I don't understand, i ask sincerely.

They are wrong. Bottom line: both subjects cause serious problems for naive materialists, and most of the people here are naive materialists who are unwilling to admit there is any reason for them to question their unacknowledged metaphysical commitments. It is a threat to the foundation of a belief system which, in this case, most adherents aren't even willing to admit is a belief system at all, let alone that there might be a serious problem with it.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 09:36 AM

I'm not interested in discussing opinions.

Hardly

But when you start by making unfounded assumptions about what consciousness is then you may already be excluding the correct answer. You may wish to consider the history of introspection in the development of psychology to understand some of the wrong paths you can go down. Freudianism anyone?

The question is are you able to make any of the above statements without thinking?

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 09:38 AM

Like I said, consciousness is self-referential.

that might be an assumption, how do you show it in phenomenology?

Yes it it should be supported to go further as an exact empirical science.
However it does not exist in a vacuum and thus far still needs to be thought about and interpreted by humans.

that is already part of science, what are you thinking? I don't understand.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 09:39 AM

That is until you start thinking about your observations and experience of thought.

Sure, using language to describe thoughts about thinking is hard. That is why much of phenomenology is incomprehensible.

We will understand more from using both methods together.
I do not believe they are exclusive.
I am of the opinion that biologists in particular will only benefit if they were also trained in phenomenology.

Well, there may be something you can demonstrate, what benefit is there to phenomenology? It seems to some of us to be dead end, that does not produce an effective/pragmatic model.

Unless you want to include cognitive behaviorism.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 09:41 AM

The question is are you able to make any of the above statements without thinking?

Gently i ask you, and how would you demonstrate your assumption that you think? How do you show that it is more than an opinion?

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 09:52 AM

Translation: nobody accepts my bluster as truth

This is the exact sort of nonsense I am talking about. I don't "bluster". I make clinical, logical arguments. I have already made such a clinical argument in this thread. I am not merely waving my arms about. There is a very specific conceptual/metaphysical problem which links the two issues being discussed and I have explained precisely what it is.

Translation: the HPC sounds weird, QM sounds weird, anyone who watches Buffy knows that weird things go together.

Another typical load of nonsense. Your "translation" is what is known as a "straw man". You put words into my mouth that I did not utter, then knock them down. Why are you doing this??? Answer: because you do not want to engage with the actual issues, almost certainly for reasons I have already specified.

"the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself" Classic misunderstanding - the QM world is part of the world as it is at a very small scale - a scale we find it hard to visualize. The macrocosmic world that we experience is not made any less real because the world acts counter to our intuition at a small scale.

No, this is not the problem I am talking about. You're right, the sub-molecular world is counter-intuitive and hard to imagine, but this problem runs much deeper than that.

There's two sorts of materialist at this point: those who admit there is a serious problem here and they don't have a clue what the solution is, and those who try to claim there is no serious problem. Which sort are you?

Wudang

5th November 2009, 09:53 AM

The question is are you able to make any of the above statements without thinking?

Why not? Most of them are reflex action after seeing the same "linguistic games as excuse for real thought" for quite some years.

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 10:05 AM

Um, why should they in the case of consciousness or QM?

I don't understand, i ask sincerely.

The history of what we now call modern science can be traced back to a strategic decision taken by Galileo and certain other trailblazers at the dawn of the scientific revolution. This decision involved ceasing to ask metaphysical/ontological questions and concentrating on the empirical investigation of the material world - the OBSERVABLE material world. Somewhere later in that history, science also became closely associated with a metaphysical claim of external realism, materialism, physicalism or whatever-else you want to call it. For >99% of all scientific issues, this metaphysical claim was of no consequence - it made no difference to the actual practice of science whether you were talking about a directly-observed physical world as accepted by idealists and phenomenalists or the unobservable external material reality of the physicalists. The difference between that >99% and the <1% that includes consciousness and QM is that in these rare cases, the metaphysical assumption matters...BIGTIME. If you try to approach them like normal science, taking no notice of the metaphysical problems raised, then you might as well just give up on being rational.

Bottom line: you can't even ask the difficult questions regarding interpretations of QM and the nature of consciousness without straying outside the model of science established at the start of the scientific revolution by people like Galileo and Newton. Science doesn't do metaphysics and these are metaphysical issues. This is unavoidable. It is not down to lack of technology or the current state of science. It is to do with what it is possible to know and how it is possible to know it, which is the domain of philosophy, not science.

Why consciousness and QM are similarly-problematic scientifically: you cannot observe Schroedinger's cat when it is in the box and you cannot observe the noumenal brain that supposedly "produces" (insert some other nonsense word if you like) consciousness, yet the questions science asks about QM and consciousness conceptually requires that we acknowledge these unobservable entities. Claiming science can answer these questions without refering to metaphysics is to fail to understand what the scientific revolution was all about in the first place and to fail to acknowledge the absolute limitations of empirical science.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 10:09 AM

that might be an assumption, how do you show it in phenomenology?

metaphorically "You can take a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink"

that is already part of science, what are you thinking? I don't understand.

What I was thinking is that it is an unexamined part of science.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 10:20 AM

Well, there may be something you can demonstrate, what benefit is there to phenomenology? It seems to some of us to be dead end, that does not produce an effective/pragmatic model.

Unless you want to include cognitive behaviorism.

I don't believe phenomenology is a model to explain, language/logic has this job, as much as a tool for the individual to sharpen observational skills. I do not want to replace the scientific method with a phenomenological method as much as sharpen the observational ability of the scientist.

I have found many naturalists who, without any formal training and relying on pure observation, have developed insights which have lead to further research using the scientific method in order to create a logical framework for there observations which then allows for effective communication thereof.

I am not fimiliar enough with behaviorism to comment.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 10:48 AM

Gently i ask you, and how would you demonstrate your assumption that you think? How do you show that it is more than an opinion?

"I think" certainly will not stand up to scrutiny by analytical philosophy and could be regarded as a metaphysical proposition resulting from poor syntax.

And this is a good thing because it keeps us interested in analytical work.
However at some stage I believe we need to start putting together that which we have torn asunder. I have not found any other way to do this other than
thinking.

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 12:04 PM

I do not see quantum de-coherence spoken of in the thread so i guess it was not mentioned. The problem with Penrose idea is that quantum de-coherence happens at the nanosecond or so level, whereas neuron function are in the millisecond level. So I hardly see how a quantum effect can explain anything at all in the neuron function or even of the emerging behavior called consciousness.

Yep. But that is only half of why he is wrong. Here is a dumbed down version of Penrose's argument:

1) A "perfect" mathematician is always able to generate Godel sentences for any formal system it can use.
2) Computation theory tells us that the halting problem is undecidable for Turing equivalent computation machines.
3) Somehow, being able to generate Godel sentences for every formal system is equivalent to a solution to the halting problem.
4) Therefore a "perfect" mathematician must be somehow beyond Turing equivalent.
5) There are somehow "perfect" mathematicians among the human race.
6) Therefore human consciousness is somehow beyond Turing equivalent.
7) Outside of the effects of QM, computation is limited to Turing equivalence.
8) Therefore human consciousness must somehow be linked to the effects of QM.

Now, you are saying that there is quite a big gap left after step 8), because there is no plausible way any QM effects could impact the behavior of a neuron, never mind somehow affect the behavior of a neural network in any determined way.

That is true.

But note also that every step after 2) is wrong as well -- and even first year philosophy students can see why. This is why nobody takes him seriously in this matter anymore.

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 12:17 PM

The "hard problem" of consciousness and the conundrums posed by Schroedinger's cat thought-experiment both end up being curve-balls for materialistic scientists because in both cases, unlike any other areas that we would like mainstream science to tackle, we cannot ignore the conceptual, metaphysical distinction between the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself.

Actually, you can. And actually, people do.

Do you have some kind of a reason for why that "conceptual, metaphysical distinction" is so important and cannot be ignored?

Bottom line: both subjects cause serious problems for naive materialists, and most of the people here are naive materialists who are unwilling to admit there is any reason for them to question their unacknowledged metaphysical commitments. It is a threat to the foundation of a belief system which, in this case, most adherents aren't even willing to admit is a belief system at all, let alone that there might be a serious problem with it.

I fail to see how the default model of the external environment that our neural networks eventually develop is a "belief system."

When you see a ball flying towards your head, you don't just "believe" there is a ball flying towards your yead. The "belief," if there is one, is just icing on the cake. I know this because even people like yourself flinch and duck.

The reason I am unwilling to question this "metaphysical commitment" is that every single other metaphysical commitment hurts quite a bit, and some can even get you killed.

cyborg

5th November 2009, 12:18 PM

Not this **** again.

Conciousness.

Definition.

Go.

Kevinking

5th November 2009, 12:22 PM

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 12:22 PM

There's two sorts of materialist at this point: those who admit there is a serious problem here and they don't have a clue what the solution is, and those who try to claim there is no serious problem. Which sort are you?

You forgot the third type -- those that know the problem appears hard but understand the solution is trivial and therefore the problem is not hard at all.

And it is funny, but I bet most of the materialists here are the third type. I wonder why you saw fit to not mention them?

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 12:25 PM

Interesting responses. I pretty much started this thread to read people's opinion on the matter, before I launch myself into Penrose's book. Now I'm having doubts as to wether or not I should make the investment.

It still might be worth it -- you might be able to learn alot from his errors, because I hear he does cover a ton of subject matter in that book.

But if you haven't read GEB I recommend that instead, since it is essentially the same subject matter, only correct.

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 12:26 PM

We think, so we are! This is not a physical concept, so it must be a metaphysical concept.

Why is it not a physical concept?

JihadJane

5th November 2009, 12:40 PM

How Ant Colonies Get Things Done

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R07_JFfnFnY

R07_JFfnFnY

epeos76

5th November 2009, 12:46 PM

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 01:42 PM

Here is a link (http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/%7Emmk/papers/05-KI.html) to a paper analyzing the misuse of Godel in Penrose's argument that is so clearly written it almost succeeded in creating the illusion that I understood it.

Good find! Thanks for the link, it is always nice to see a fresh proof of the invalidity of Lucas + Penrose.

Each new refuation has a different view of the relevant topics -- you could almost educate yourself in this stuff by only reading refutations of Lucas + Penrose.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 01:57 PM

metaphorically "You can take a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink"

Um, so you can't answer the question?
Okay. :)

What I was thinking is that it is an unexamined part of science.

Then demonstrate how it influences science, you can ask any question you want, that is a given.

Some things are replicable, so what are they?

(And yes the questions you ask do determine the answers you find. So what question would you ask)

ETA: A metaphor does nothing to explain your phenomenology of metaphor, it does not demonstrate your basic premise, you state you think, but how can you know that you think?

The subjective phenomenology runs into the exact same issue as the objective stance.

Robin

5th November 2009, 01:58 PM

The history of what we now call modern science can be traced back to a strategic decision taken by Galileo and certain other trailblazers at the dawn of the scientific revolution. This decision involved ceasing to ask metaphysical/ontological questions and concentrating on the empirical investigation of the material world - the OBSERVABLE material world.
Really? Have you ever heard of Robert Grosseteste? Roger Bacon? Both a good 300 years before Galileo.
Somewhere later in that history, science also became closely associated with a metaphysical claim of external realism, materialism, physicalism or whatever-else you want to call it.
Well no, in fact the truth is quite the opposite.

When Neurath coined the term "Physicalism" he explicitly divorced it from any claims about external realism, he made it a purely linguistic philosophy. Whenever someone in the Vienna Circle would say something with even the hint of of an assumption of an external reality he would roar "Metaphysics!"

Mach said that science would be the same even if the world was a dream, just so long as it was a consistent dream. Einstein said that to call something "real" was as meaningful as calling it "cock-a-doodle-do", Bohr was closely associated with Neurath, Hawking has said that it is meaningless to ask if a scientific hypothesis describes reality, only whether it matches the observations, Schrodinger was an Idealist, Schlick said that any statement about the existence of an external reality was meaningless.

So where is this alleged association between science and the metaphysical claim of an external reality?

Well a couple of celebrity writers have recently made this association, but that has nothing to do with the underlying philosophy of science.

So you are perpetuating a myth here.
For >99% of all scientific issues, this metaphysical claim was of no consequence - it made no difference to the actual practice of science whether you were talking about a directly-observed physical world as accepted by idealists and phenomenalists or the unobservable external material reality of the physicalists. The difference between that >99% and the <1% that includes consciousness and QM is that in these rare cases, the metaphysical assumption matters...BIGTIME.
And as I have pointed your claim that science has this assumption is in itself an assumption.
If you try to approach them like normal science, taking no notice of the metaphysical problems raised, then you might as well just give up on being rational.
You appear to be saying that science should avoid one metaphysical assumption and make another metaphysical assumption.

What precisely is the metaphysical problem raised by interpretations of QM and the nature of consciousness?

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 01:59 PM

We think, so we are! This is not a physical concept, so it must be a metaphysical concept. This has to be a starting point in all dialogue about consciousness.
Consciousness seems subjective, while science seems objective. Do you think you can have a scientific experiment to create consciousness?:rolleyes:

Psst, that is really off topic, we can discuss objectivism, but it is off topic. (The phenomenology/ontology of consciousness is going to be observable either way.)

How can you demonstrate that consciousness is not an observable phenomena?

Robin

5th November 2009, 02:00 PM

I think
You think, therefore consciousness creates itself.

Hmmm...

Perhaps you should be a little more explicit about this step.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 02:06 PM

I don't believe phenomenology is a model to explain, language/logic has this job, as much as a tool for the individual to sharpen observational skills. I do not want to replace the scientific method with a phenomenological method as much as sharpen the observational ability of the scientist.

I have found many naturalists who, without any formal training and relying on pure observation, have developed insights which have lead to further research using the scientific method in order to create a logical framework for there observations which then allows for effective communication thereof.

I am not fimiliar enough with behaviorism to comment.

Now the issue is that phenomenology is not sufficient in and of itself, but it is also subject to the scientific method. All things are.

here is the intro to cognitive behavior therapy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_Behavioural_Therapy), a good place to start on cognitive behaviorism. You will note it combines an objective phenomenology.

PixyMisa

5th November 2009, 02:10 PM

So you're saying the guy who has won the Wolfe prize for mathematical physics and the Dirac prize for theoretical physics doesn't understand quantum mechanics at all?

Any evidence for this remarkable remark?

I can't find any references / quotes from physicists who disparage his opinions on quantum mechanics.
Here you go then. (http://www.sustainedaction.org/Explorations/problem_with_quantum_mind_theory.htm)

Penrose is out by between 10 and 17 orders of magnitude. Quantum consciousness is drivel.

Robin

5th November 2009, 02:12 PM

Why consciousness and QM are similarly-problematic scientifically: you cannot observe Schroedinger's cat when it is in the box and you cannot observe the noumenal brain that supposedly "produces" (insert some other nonsense word if you like) consciousness,...
Calling "produces" a nonsense word you are implicitly making the claim that you know that consciousness is not a product. Can you back up that claim?

If consciousness is not a product then it is a metaphysical primitive - so are you claiming that the observably complex process of consciousness is metaphysically primitive? If so can you back up the claim?

If not then your claim of "nonsense" is an unsupported assertion.
yet the questions science asks about QM and consciousness conceptually requires that we acknowledge these unobservable entities.
Why?
Claiming science can answer these questions without refering to metaphysics is to fail to understand what the scientific revolution was all about in the first place and to fail to acknowledge the absolute limitations of empirical science.
So what is it, precisely, that you think metaphysics can tell us that traditional science cannot?

PixyMisa

5th November 2009, 02:12 PM

Do you think you can have a scientific experiment to create consciousness?:rolleyes:
Sure.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 02:12 PM

The history of what we now call modern science can be traced back to a strategic decision taken by Galileo and certain other trailblazers at the dawn of the scientific revolution. This decision involved ceasing to ask metaphysical/ontological questions and concentrating on the empirical investigation of the material world - the OBSERVABLE material world.

So remove the word material and just say observable world.
That is what i do.

Somewhere later in that history, science also became closely associated with a metaphysical claim of external realism, materialism, physicalism or whatever-else you want to call it.

But it doesn't matter, if the univserse is consistent, that is all science requires, regardless.

For >99% of all scientific issues, this metaphysical claim was of no consequence - it made no difference to the actual practice of science whether you were talking about a directly-observed physical world as accepted by idealists and phenomenalists or the unobservable external material reality of the physicalists. The difference between that >99% and the <1% that includes consciousness and QM is that in these rare cases, the metaphysical assumption matters...BIGTIME.

And again I ask you,

How so, I don't understand?

If you try to approach them like normal science, taking no notice of the metaphysical problems raised, then you might as well just give up on being rational.

But you haven't stated the problem yet, the cat in the box is not a problem, the cat is a macro scopic object , the wave forms are stable and not in a 'superposition'.

Bottom line: you can't even ask the difficult questions regarding interpretations of QM and the nature of consciousness without straying outside the model of science established at the start of the scientific revolution by people like Galileo and Newton. Science doesn't do metaphysics and these are metaphysical issues. This is unavoidable. It is not down to lack of technology or the current state of science. It is to do with what it is possible to know and how it is possible to know it, which is the domain of philosophy, not science.

Why consciousness and QM are similarly-problematic scientifically: you cannot observe Schroedinger's cat when it is in the box and you cannot observe the noumenal brain that supposedly "produces" (insert some other nonsense word if you like) consciousness, yet the questions science asks about QM and consciousness conceptually requires that we acknowledge these unobservable entities. Claiming science can answer these questions without refering to metaphysics is to fail to understand what the scientific revolution was all about in the first place and to fail to acknowledge the absolute limitations of empirical science.

I respectfully disagree, one can apply observation and replication to metaphysics, people often don't like to. But it can be done.

But you have not answered the question, why would I need to worry about the metaphysics of QM?

Robin

5th November 2009, 02:26 PM

"I think" certainly will not stand up to scrutiny by analytical philosophy and could be regarded as a metaphysical proposition resulting from poor syntax.

And this is a good thing because it keeps us interested in analytical work.
However at some stage I believe we need to start putting together that which we have torn asunder. I have not found any other way to do this other than
thinking.
But if time is only an illusion then process would be an illusion and the word "thinking" implies process - so we cannot have any more metaphysical confidence in the concept of "thinking" than we can in any other.

So we quickly find that everything is torn asunder again.

Maybe we should just cheerfully admit that we may never have any perfect knowledge.

Robin

5th November 2009, 02:36 PM

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 03:24 PM

Not this **** again.

Just won't go away, will it? ;)

Conciousness.

Definition.

Go.

Who are you asking? :D

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 03:28 PM

You forgot the third type -- those that know the problem appears hard but understand the solution is trivial and therefore the problem is not hard at all.

That'll be the second type then.

And it is funny, but I bet most of the materialists here are the third type. I wonder why you saw fit to not mention them?

I didn't mention them because they are identical to the ones who don't acknowledge a serious problem, which I'd already mentioned... :rolleyes:

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 03:35 PM

Robin,

I'm not going to respond to the majority of your post about Neurath and the Vienna Circle because most people who will read this won't be able to understand the context of the discussion.

You appear to be saying that science should avoid one metaphysical assumption and make another metaphysical assumption.

What precisely is the metaphysical problem raised by interpretations of QM and the nature of consciousness?

The same one that was raised by Kant. What is the relationship between the the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself, how can we know the answer to this question and what does it have to do with things like time and causality?

OK, so that's more than one problem, but it's all interlinked.

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 03:39 PM

Calling "produces" a nonsense word you are implicitly making the claim that you know that consciousness is not a product. Can you back up that claim?

I know that the claim that consciousness is a product is itself incompatible with materialistic monism. It becomes dualistic epiphenomenalism.

If consciousness is not a product then it is a metaphysical primitive - so are you claiming that the observably complex process of consciousness is metaphysically primitive? If so can you back up the claim?

I don't know what "observably complex process of consciousness" means. I know what complex neural activity is. I know how complex my own consciousness experiences are. But I don't know what your phrase means.

So what is it, precisely, that you think metaphysics can tell us that traditional science cannot?

It is the bridge between naive materialism and post-modernism. It's how you get from John Locke to Friederich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 03:42 PM

That'll be the second type then.

I didn't mention them because they are identical to the ones who don't acknowledge a serious problem, which I'd already mentioned... :rolleyes:

Oh, I see your point.

Yes, when one's lack of education and/or intelligence leaves them unable to distinguish between two very different positions, false dichotomies appear all over the place.

UndercoverElephant

5th November 2009, 03:44 PM

But you have not answered the question, why would I need to worry about the metaphysics of QM?

David,

I think I have answered that question.

If you are treating assuming "material world" means "the material world which I observe" then you aren't a materialist. Your position is compatible with idealism.

Geoff

rocketdodger

5th November 2009, 04:03 PM

David,

I think I have answered that question.

If you are treating assuming "material world" means "the material world which I observe" then you aren't a materialist. Your position is compatible with idealism.

Geoff

That's kinda funny, since "the material world" and "the material world which I observe" are one and the same.

So what was your point, again?

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 04:20 PM

The same one that was raised by Kant. What is the relationship between the the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself, how can we know the answer to this question and what does it have to do with things like time and causality?

OK, so that's more than one problem, but it's all interlinked.

Well, it was it is and we can observe what we can observe. That is all.

When you show me something interesting with theories of time and a chain of causality then we can talk.

Dancing David

5th November 2009, 04:23 PM

David,

I think I have answered that question.

If you are treating assuming "material world" means "the material world which I observe" then you aren't a materialist. Your position is compatible with idealism.

Geoff

Now that is funny because that isn't what i said at all, now is it.

I did not say material world at all. I said remove the 'material'.

Funny after your statement about straw arguments.

So what is the interesting issue about QM again? That is the point, what is it. there is no smeared out cat in the box, it is macro-scopic.

PS I am the one of the ones who has stated that materialism and idealism are idistinguishable.

gentlehorse

5th November 2009, 06:26 PM

Ask proper scientists, ask philosophers, but don't bother asking a bunch of knee-jerk-responding, ignorant, arrogant "skeptics", because you should already know in advance what sort of response you will get. If there is a deep connection between the problems concerning QM and consciousness, this board is home to about the last people on Earth which would be willing to admit it. In short, most people here already believe they understand enough about these issues to be reasonably certain that any talk connecting consciousness and QM is woo-woo nonsense, but, if past experience is anything to go by, very few of them actually do understand those issues. It's their gut instinct which drives their opinions on this subject, not reason or scientific knowledge. Woo-woos talk about "quantum consciousness", therefore it must be nonsense.

For my part, my old friend, I simply haven't run across any arguments connecting consciousness and QM that have any explanatory power. This isn't to say that I haven't been moved and impressed by the use of language from time to time...

PixyMisa

5th November 2009, 06:52 PM

The same one that was raised by Kant. What is the relationship between the the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself
The question is not meaningful. It is only possible to examine the world as it appears. Therefore it is only meaningful to discuss the world as it appears. There is no possible meaningful distinction between "the world as it is in itself" and "the world as it appears to us".

how can we know the answer to this question
We can't. The question is not meaningul.

and what does it have to do with things like time and causality?
Absolutely nothing.

PixyMisa

5th November 2009, 06:54 PM

PS I am the one of the ones who has stated that materialism and idealism are idistinguishable.
This is true for those forms of idealism that are logically coherent. But some of the things labeled as "idealism" are really dualism in a funny hat.

Robin

5th November 2009, 07:35 PM

Robin,

I'm not going to respond to the majority of your post about Neurath and the Vienna Circle because most people who will read this won't be able to understand the context of the discussion.
If you expected people to understand your original claim about the association between science and metaphysical assumptions, why do you think those same people would fail to understand the counter claim that scientists have for well over a century, carefully examined these assumptions and largely disavowed them?
The same one that was raised by Kant. What is the relationship between the the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself, how can we know the answer to this question and what does it have to do with things like time and causality?

OK, so that's more than one problem, but it's all interlinked.
Kant did not raise that problem, he said that "the world as it is in itself" could only be meaningful in the negative sense as something that was unknowable.

Kant only raised the concept of the noumenon in order to all but dismiss it and Mach got rid of it altogether. It is an irrelevant meaningless concept.

Time and causality simple (metaphysically speaking) - we have mathematical models and we check them against observations. No need for the "thing in itself" whatever that means.

Robin

5th November 2009, 07:44 PM

I know that the claim that consciousness is a product is itself incompatible with materialistic monism. It becomes dualistic epiphenomenalism.
Now your new claim is

X produces Y implies that X is a different substance from Y

Nonsense.

and your secondary assumption is that consciousness is a substance at all
I don't know what "observably complex process of consciousness" means. I know what complex neural activity is. I know how complex my own consciousness experiences are. But I don't know what your phrase means.
I don't get what you don't get.

You say your consciousness experiences are complex but you don't think your consciousness is complex.

What is the distinction you are making between your consciousness experiences and your consciousness?

Is there some consciousness you have that is not experience and is not complex? Tell me about it.
It is the bridge between naive materialism and post-modernism. It's how you get from John Locke to Friederich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Locke was neither naive nor a materialist but maybe you weren't suggesting that. I don't know why you would even want to get to Nietzsche and the ability to get to post-modernism is hardly a recommendation.

But your claim seems to be that the thing metaphysics can do that science can't is to get from one philosopher to another.

I think science can operate quite effectively without having to do that.

fuelair

5th November 2009, 08:08 PM

I think

Therefore you is!!!:)

soylent

5th November 2009, 08:23 PM

Why is it not a physical concept?

It's not a physical concept because it is so much more useful to define it as a metaphysical property. That way you can continually claim that materialism is bankrupt because it can't even in principle explain conciousness; who cares whether consciousness as so defined even exists?

Robin

5th November 2009, 08:53 PM

Robin

5th November 2009, 08:59 PM

It's not a physical concept because it is so much more useful to define it as a metaphysical property. That way you can continually claim that materialism is bankrupt because it can't even in principle explain conciousness; who cares whether consciousness as so defined even exists?
Or that there is not any metaphysical position that is capable of explaining consciousness.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 10:37 PM

Um, so you can't answer the question?
Okay. :)

Then demonstrate how it influences science, you can ask any question you want, that is a given.

Some things are replicable, so what are they?

(And yes the questions you ask do determine the answers you find. So what question would you ask)

ETA: A metaphor does nothing to explain your phenomenology of metaphor, it does not demonstrate your basic premise, you state you think, but how can you know that you think?

The subjective phenomenology runs into the exact same issue as the objective stance.

We "understand" a work of art not because we know the mind of the artist, but because we know our own.

You think, therefore consciousness creates itself.

Hmmm...

Perhaps you should be a little more explicit about this step.

Think defined as "to have a conscious mind".
Conscious defined as "aware of ones thoughts"

Asking me, how do you know "you think" is not equivalent to me asking myself how do I know "I think".
In the first instance you are addressing an object not of your creation in the 2nd I am addressing an object I created. This is the unique quality of thinking. It is self-referential. In order to answer the first question I refer to the 2nd and I am stuck, as I cannot transcend my own thinking in order to observe it as an independent object not of my creation. All I can say about it is, I think I think. We can transfer thinking to the brain/matter/atoms and then claim the "I" is an illusion which prevents us from studying thinking as an independent objective entity and this may prove useful in conceptualization, but it is not justified as it still assumes thinking and only transfers thinking elsewhere. We might then be further inclined to deny thinking as well, which is also unjustified as we would use thinking to do this.

!Kaggen

5th November 2009, 10:40 PM

But if time is only an illusion then process would be an illusion and the word "thinking" implies process - so we cannot have any more metaphysical confidence in the concept of "thinking" than we can in any other.

So we quickly find that everything is torn asunder again.

Maybe we should just cheerfully admit that we may never have any perfect knowledge.

Yes, except that is it justified to use thinking to deny thinking.

cyborg

6th November 2009, 12:12 AM

Who are you asking? :D

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 12:30 AM

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

Well before we can define something which stands up to the rigors of logic we need to experience it or alternatively not it.
I suggest starting here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychotropic)

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 12:41 AM

Now the issue is that phenomenology is not sufficient in and of itself, but it is also subject to the scientific method. All things are.

here is the intro to cognitive behavior therapy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_Behavioural_Therapy), a good place to start on cognitive behaviorism. You will note it combines an objective phenomenology.

Thanks for the link

Another example of the use of phenomenology in science is cognitive archaelogy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_archaeology) as used by Prof. Lewis-Williams archaelogy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis-Williams) described in his books The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art (http://www.amazon.com/Mind-Cave-Consciousness-Origins-Art/dp/0500051178) and Inside the Neolithic Mind: Consciousness, Cosmos and the Realm of the Gods (http://www.amazon.com/Inside-Neolithic-Mind-Consciousness-Cosmos/dp/0500288275/ref=pd_sim_b_1)

Aepervius

6th November 2009, 12:43 AM

But note also that every step after 2) is wrong as well -- and even first year philosophy students can see why. This is why nobody takes him seriously in this matter anymore.

I got a 2 out of 20 in first year of philo (extremly poor note), did not take a second year. I continued off to QM. So you can udnerstand that I only commented on the argument I could understand ;).

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 01:05 AM

Now the issue is that phenomenology is not sufficient in and of itself, but it is also subject to the scientific method. All things are.

Yes I agree and would not say otherwise. For me the main purpose of the scientific method is to develop a language through which consistent and repeatable information can be shared. However we cannot avoid being ourselves and this implies self-examination if we are to understand ourselves, especially something such as consciousness. For this task I believe phenomenology is indispensable.

Perhaps a better way of understanding consciousness is indirectly by examining its effects on the objective world around us.

Have humans interacted with the world differently through history? I believe there is plenty of evidence to suggest so.

Does this imply we had a different awareness of ourselves in relationship to the world through history? I believe there is evidence to support this.

Is there reason to believe that currently humans from different backgrounds and upbringings interact with the world differently and therefore have different types/degrees of self-awareness? I believe there is evidence to support this.

Then perhaps consciousness cannot be defined as an atomic fact available for logical scrutiny and it is rather a complex term encompassing many types of self-awareness through time and space. The best we can do is find correlations between consciousness and its effects on the objective world.

PixyMisa

6th November 2009, 01:34 AM

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".
Self-referential information processing. :)

quixotecoyote

6th November 2009, 01:46 AM

Self-referential information processing. :)

I seem to have heard that somewhere before...

http://i49.photobucket.com/albums/f253/quixotecoyote/smilies/ohnoes.gif

And I remember what that thread was like.

Robin

6th November 2009, 04:22 AM

Yes, except that is it justified to use thinking to deny thinking.
That is merely an assumption of your conclusion to say that I am using thinking to deny thinking.

If there is no such thing as process or change I am not thinking at all and neither are you.

Robin

6th November 2009, 04:30 AM

Think defined as "to have a conscious mind".
Conscious defined as "aware of ones thoughts"

Circular - if I substitute like terms you have defined conscious as aware of one's having a conscious mind and you have defined think as to have an awareness of one's thoughts
Asking me, how do you know "you think" is not equivalent to me asking myself how do I know "I think".
In the first instance you are addressing an object not of your creation in the 2nd I am addressing an object I created. This is the unique quality of thinking. It is self-referential. In order to answer the first question I refer to the 2nd and I am stuck, as I cannot transcend my own thinking in order to observe it as an independent object not of my creation. All I can say about it is, I think I think. We can transfer thinking to the brain/matter/atoms and then claim the "I" is an illusion which prevents us from studying thinking as an independent objective entity and this may prove useful in conceptualization, but it is not justified as it still assumes thinking and only transfers thinking elsewhere. We might then be further inclined to deny thinking as well, which is also unjustified as we would use thinking to do this.
Again - circular. In any case I don't deny thinking - I just cannot prove the concept.

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter".

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 05:09 AM

That is merely an assumption of your conclusion to say that I am using thinking to deny thinking.

If there is no such thing as process or change I am not thinking at all and neither are you.

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?

Circular - if I substitute like terms you have defined conscious as aware of one's having a conscious mind and you have defined think as to have an awareness of one's thoughts

Again - circular. In any case I don't deny thinking - I just cannot prove the concept. Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter". Except it would be nonsensical to claim to create matter but not thoughts. However both depend on thinking before we can have knowledge of either. "Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.

Robin

6th November 2009, 05:18 AM

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?
If there is no process and no change then we neither decide nor think - so the question is redundant.
Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.
This has precisely nothing to do with what I said. Providing a circular definition of "think" and "conscious" does not prove that consciousness creates itself.

It only proves your definition is meaningless. If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?

But if you create thinking please feel free to go ahead and explain how you create it.
Except it would be nonsensical to claim to create matter but not thoughts.
Nobody has claimed this and so the point is meaningless
However both depend on thinking before we can have knowledge of either.
Just so long as there is such a thing as thinking.
"Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.
So what? Did I suggest that thinking was a metaphysical proposition?

I can't even prove there is such a thing as thinking and neither, apparently, can you.

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 05:18 AM

Thanks for the link

Another example of the use of phenomenology in science is cognitive archaelogy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_archaeology) as used by Prof. Lewis-Williams archaelogy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis-Williams) described in his books The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art (http://www.amazon.com/Mind-Cave-Consciousness-Origins-Art/dp/0500051178) and Inside the Neolithic Mind: Consciousness, Cosmos and the Realm of the Gods (http://www.amazon.com/Inside-Neolithic-Mind-Consciousness-Cosmos/dp/0500288275/ref=pd_sim_b_1)

Sorry that looks wildly speculative to me, I will take the time to read through it, but it goes against my childhood training at the feet of my father. (A famous mezo american archaeologist.) Structural analysis of living culture is very difficult to do, economic and game theory provides some metrics for theory, but speculation about un-measurable metrics is fraught with danger.

For example the common Victorian assertions about egyptian culture, which is not montheistic.

More later.

Elaedith

6th November 2009, 05:20 AM

'My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple'

Don't understand the title. Has somebody claimed the study of consciousness is simple?

Hux

6th November 2009, 05:30 AM

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 05:36 AM

We "understand" a work of art not because we know the mind of the artist, but because we know our own.

Yes, but you are still taking an experinece, which is 'thing in an of itself' and ascribing to it a value.

We may have experiences that we label as 'Ithink' but that is what they are , experiences, they are no more a valid reference point than any other.

To assert '*I think*' is as much of an assumption as '*matter exists*', it is a face value, an appearance. There is no more validity to *I think* than there is to *matter exists*, the error is the same either way, one can not assume either materialsim or idealism, one can only judge appearnces.

I am trying to get back to not 'what is thought' but the basis of the idea "I think", because that is what we ahce to start at before we can get into the other stuff.

Now it appeared to me that you stated

http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5278679&postcount=18

Consciousness is self referential.
It creates itself.
It therefore can only be recognized by itself.
The question for me is not how does consciousness arise, which is answered above, but why does consciousness create itself?

Which is a huge assertion, that requires a discussion of the basis of many sperate parts.

In that you have not demonstrated premise 2 'It creates itself.' but merely asserted it.

these are really profound speculations to make, and I think we need to discuss them before going on to things such as

Consciousness creation by matter assumes that matter is conscious.

And no way we can even resolve the tautology of

To avoid this dualism I believe the why of consciousness can only be explained within its borders using its substance, thought.

it matters not, the tools we have are the same regardless.

This is not meant to be snarky or mean or judgmental, I apologise if my post appears that way.

Robin

6th November 2009, 05:49 AM

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 05:51 AM

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?
If there is no process and no change then we neither decide nor think - so the question is redundant.

And you decided all of this without thinking I suppose :rolleyes:

Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.
This has precisely nothing to do with what I said. Providing a circular definition of "think" and "conscious" does not prove that consciousness creates itself.It only proves your definition is meaningless.
Not my definitions dictionary.com definitions and the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that these concepts are not atomic facts which can be scrutinized by logic. They 'are' self referential, no matter how much you want to analyze them further they won't give. Get over it or lets change the subject to bricks.

If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself? Please try, it would be most interesting to see.

But if you create thinking please feel free to go ahead and explain how you create it. You obviously did not read this reply http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5282531#post5282531

"Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.
So what? Did I suggest that thinking was a metaphysical proposition?
That is my reading of this

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter".

I can't even prove there is such a thing as thinking and neither, apparently, can you. I never suggested that thinking required proof as I assume it. Feel free not to assume your own thinking. But then again feel free to reply with some further thoughts.

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 06:07 AM

Yes, but you are still taking an experinece, which is 'thing in an of itself' and ascribing to it a value.

We may have experiences that we label as 'Ithink' but that is what they are , experiences, they are no more a valid reference point than any other.

To assert '*I think*' is as much of an assumption as '*matter exists*', it is a face value, an appearance. There is no more validity to *I think* than there is to *matter exists*, the error is the same either way, one can not assume either materialsim or idealism, one can only judge appearnces.

I am trying to get back to not 'what is thought' but the basis of the idea "I think", because that is what we ahce to start at before we can get into the other stuff.

Now it appeared to me that you stated

http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=5278679&postcount=18

Which is a huge assertion, that requires a discussion of the basis of many sperate parts.

In that you have not demonstrated premise 2 'It creates itself.' but merely asserted it.

these are really profound speculations to make, and I think we need to discuss them before going on to things such as

And no way we can even resolve the tautology of

it matters not, the tools we have are the same regardless.

This is not meant to be snarky or mean or judgmental, I apologise if my post appears that way.

All good David, I am happy for post.

Just to be very clear. I am not referring to the finished product of thinking ideas, thoughts, concepts and assuming them. I am only assuming thinking. Also not your thinking or somebody else's thinking, but my thinking.

As far as "matter" is concerned I differentiate between matter and thinking in that matter is "given" and I play no role in its appearance, whereas thinking is what I must be active in for it to happen. Furthermore thinking cannot be grasped whilst it happens only thereafter. I can only reflect on my thinking. Whereas I can interact with matter as it appears before me.

I will try to address the rest of your concerns later.

Robin

6th November 2009, 06:33 AM

And you decided all of this without thinking I suppose :rolleyes:
If there is no such thing as thinking I didn't decide it.
Not my definitions dictionary.com definitions and the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that these concepts are not atomic facts which can be scrutinized by logic. They 'are' self referential, no matter how much you want to analyze them further they won't give.
What - based on a couple of circular definitions from dictionary.com and your own unsupported assertions?
Please try, it would be most interesting to see.
OK, from dictionary.com also:
Matter: the substance or substances of which any physical object consists or is composed
Physical: noting or pertaining to the properties of matter and energy

So there you are - a circular definition of matter. Therefore by your logic matter is self-referential and creates itself - right?

You obviously did not read this reply http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5282531#post5282531
I did. It does not even remotely answer the question I asked.
That is my reading of this
I said the very opposite. It is not a metaphysical starting point.
I never suggested that thinking required proof as I assume it.
You seem to be very intent upon defending the concept
Feel free not to assume your own thinking. But then again feel free to reply with some further thoughts.
Assuming of course that there were ever any in the first place.

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 06:40 AM

Sorry that looks wildly speculative to me, I will take the time to read through it, but it goes against my childhood training at the feet of my father. (A famous mezo american archaeologist.) Structural analysis of living culture is very difficult to do, economic and game theory provides some metrics for theory, but speculation about un-measurable metrics is fraught with danger.

For example the common Victorian assertions about egyptian culture, which is not montheistic.

More later.

On first impressions I would tend to agree. However the unique documentation by the linguist Wilhelm Bleek (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Bleek) and his assistant Lucy Lloyd in the 19th century of Bushman ethnology provides a hugely important resource for understanding ancient rock art directly from the creators thereof. In a way this documentation has allowed archaeologists to look back at the archaeological record of abstract representations using a "dictionary" to translate what they observe.

If you want to read some journal publications on the work of Lewis-Williams look here
http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Science/Geography/RockArt/Home.htm

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 09:44 AM

All good David, I am happy for post.

Just to be very clear. I am not referring to the finished product of thinking ideas, thoughts, concepts and assuming them. I am only assuming thinking. Also not your thinking or somebody else's thinking, but my thinking.

well, I take it all to a neutral stance
: The appearance of thinking, the appearance of matter
.

As far as "matter" is concerned I differentiate between matter and thinking in that matter is "given" and I play no role in its appearance, whereas thinking is what I must be active in for it to happen.

then that discusses why one given and not the other.

Matter is a label for an experience, thinking is another. We have sensation and perceptions that lead to an appearance of matter, we have othere xperiences that lead to an appearnce of thought.
They are both appearances. (IMNSHO)

Furthermore thinking cannot be grasped whilst it happens only thereafter.

Well that is an even more interesting question.

I can only reflect on my thinking. Whereas I can interact with matter as it appears before me.

Are you sure?

That again is an appearance. It appears you can interacts with thoughts as well. generic you and generic thought. (Place holders for the moment.)

I will try to address the rest of your concerns later.

These kinds of discussions take alot of time.

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 09:52 AM

On first impressions I would tend to agree. However the unique documentation by the linguist Wilhelm Bleek (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Bleek) and his assistant Lucy Lloyd in the 19th century of Bushman ethnology provides a hugely important resource for understanding ancient rock art directly from the creators thereof.

Well by training I am cautious. theer are the personal filters of the people involved and then the cultural filters of the people involved. And all the other confirmation bias, and sampling error.

So I would not draw general conclusions from a sample, perhaps speculative indicative factors.

But to translate from the !Kung or Khoi San experience to another would be fraught with peril.

:)

In a way this documentation has allowed archaeologists to look back at the archaeological record of abstract representations using a "dictionary" to translate what they observe.

A specific and limited dictionary filtered through two cultures.

:)

If you want to read some journal publications on the work of Lewis-Williams look here
http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Science/Geography/RockArt/Home.htm

I am sure it is great stuff, I am just trained as I am trained (informally).

One of the huge problems is:

.... artifacts of preservation...

So the sudden appearance of 'art', 'technology' and similar signs of intelligence may just be an artifact of preservation. (Read Magdelian explosion)

The window of preservation is about 40,000 years for anything that is not a carved or chipped rock. This also is when the material tends to show up in the record.

So we can not say what neanderthal art, soft technology might have been. The instances of preservation would be too low to give a sample. It may be that they had a very advanced wood and fiber technology, but due to the artifacts of preservation, we would be very unlikely to find any traces of it.

So the only thing we have are stone tools and carving, not traditionally considered art.

westprog

6th November 2009, 10:24 AM

I've been investigating Roger Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) and I found out that he wrote a book about consciousness entitled "The Emperor's New Mind". In it, he argues that classical mechanics are insufficient to study and understand the process of human consciousness, and that quantum mechanics is closer to becoming a tool to understanding it.

Since the issue of Artificial Intelligence has been argued here before, and dualists have argued that you can't explain the "magical" process of consciousness through science and math; it occurs to me that maybe we haven't been fair to the process and appeared too simplistic with our explanations, and we have not fully reviewed in what way is it that consciousness can be approached (And the way Penrose suggest is Quantum Mechanics).

(And considering that things behave very different at the Quantum Level, it looks like this could be a clue to the apparent "mystery" to the behavior and nature of consciousness)

This is why I invite anyone who can contribute their thoughts and knowledge about how consciousness can better be understood from the Quantum Mechanics point of view.

And that includes people who have read Penrose's book and can give their layman version of what's more or less addressed in such book (Trying not to spoil us the surprises too much:D )

Whether or not you want to read the book should not be determined by any of the summaries put forward so far in this thread. They've all been wildly inaccurate. One might assume that Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) was some kind of new-Age mystic instead of on of the leading living Mathematical Physicists.

Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) might well be wrong on some specific issues, but he has one thing going for him - he's the only Physicist who's addressed the issue of consciousness, AFAIAA. If you accept that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then you have to assume that it will be explained in physical terms, by physicists.

An advantage of the book is that because Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) is a physicist, he feels the need to explain exactly what he means by just about everything. So there's some quite deep physics right from the start. It is possible to skip the very difficult maths if you want to.

If, when you've finished TENM, and Shadows Of The Mind, you might want to read some of the rebuttals, to be found on line. Also some of the rebuttals of the rebuttals.

drkitten

6th November 2009, 10:29 AM

Whether or not you want to read the book should not be determined by any of the summaries put forward so far in this thread. They've all been wildly inaccurate. One might assume that Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) was some kind of new-Age mystic instead of on of the leading living Mathematical Physicists.

No, he's not a new-Age mystic. He's simply wrong.

Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) might well be wrong on some specific issues, but he has one thing going for him - he's the only Physicist who's addressed the issue of consciousness, AFAIAA.

Big deal. My cat may well be the only Cat who's addressed the issue of consciousness. That doesn't mean that "Meow" is a useful or correct contribution.

If you accept that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then you have to assume that it will be explained in physical terms, by physicists.

Not at all. Broken bones are physical phenomena, but they're explained and addressed by physicians, not by physicists.

An advantage of the book is that because Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) is a physicist, he feels the need to explain exactly what he means by just about everything.

Yes, but that's overridden by the disadvantage that it's wrong beyond repair from day one. He gets the physics wrong, he gets the cognitive science wrong, he gets the neuroanatomy wrong, and he even gets the math (Goedel's theorem) wrong.

(And, no, Penrose is NOT a physicist. He's a mathematician. Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at the Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford, with a Ph.D. in mathematics (algebra, specifically) from Cambridge. One of the top mathematicians in the world, but NOT a physicist.)

So there's some quite deep physics right from the start.

And it's all incorrect.

Which makes "deep" rather less than useful.

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 10:39 AM

fraught with peril.

who says some discovery's aren't ;)

westprog

6th November 2009, 10:46 AM

No, he's not a new-Age mystic. He's simply wrong.

He might be wrong, but he's certainly not simply wrong, as any perusal of the discussions will show.

Big deal. My cat may well be the only Cat who's addressed the issue of consciousness. That doesn't mean that "Meow" is a useful or correct contribution.

However, cats have not made any noteworthy contributions to understanding physical phenomena.

Not at all. Broken bones are physical phenomena, but they're explained and addressed by physicians, not by physicists.

Yes, but that's overridden by the disadvantage that it's wrong beyond repair from day one. He gets the physics wrong, he gets the cognitive science wrong, he gets the neuroanatomy wrong, and he even gets the math (Goedel's theorem) wrong.

(And, no, Penrose is NOT a physicist. He's a mathematician. Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at the Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford, with a Ph.D. in mathematics (algebra, specifically) from Cambridge. One of the top mathematicians in the world, but NOT a physicist.)

Well, that's simply wrong. He might be a mathematician, but he's undoubtedly a physicist as well, as a brief read of The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Road_to_Reality:_A_Complete_Guide_to_the_Laws_ of_the_Universe) will show. He's made major contributions to mathematics and physics. He's won major physics prizes. I gave the link to the Wiki page, so really there's no excuse for that one.

Along with Stephen Hawking, he was awarded the prestigious Wolf Foundation Prize for Physics in 1988. In 1989 he was awarded the Dirac Medal and Prize of the British Institute of Physics. In 1990 Penrose was awarded the Albert Einstein Medal for outstanding work related to the work of Albert Einstein by the Albert Einstein Society. ... From 1992 to 1995 he served as President of the International Society on General Relativity and Gravitation

You see, in order to carry out certain types of physics, it's actually helpful to start out as a mathematician. Would the fact that someone was Lucasian professor of Mathematics at Cambridge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucasian_Professor_of_Mathematics) mean that they could not be considered as an expert on physics?

And it's all incorrect.

Which makes "deep" rather less than useful.

I'll leave it to the OP to judge whether "Penrose is not a physicist" has any implications as to the truth of the statement "Penrose gets the physics wrong".

drkitten

6th November 2009, 11:28 AM

He might be wrong, but he's certainly not simply wrong, as any perusal of the discussions will show.

No, he's simply wrong.

There's a reason it's called the Lucas-Penrose fallacy.

I'll leave it to the OP to judge whether "Penrose is not a physicist" has any implications as to the truth of the statement "Penrose gets the physics wrong".

It does not, since the fact that he gets the physics wrong (Tegmark's 17 orders of magnitude) is independently documented.

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 11:38 AM

Let's take one concrete example. Part of the collection of mental processes that fall under the label "consciousness" is proprioception. Neuroscience has localized proprioception functions to the basal ganglia, and can make successful predictions based on the knowledge gained from this study. They can stimulate specific brain regions to induce OBEs.

People who invoke QM for the study of something like proprioception makes claims that the consciousness can leave the body (astral projection or OBE). Of course, their "work" hasn't led to any better understanding of the phenomenon, and they can't even reproduce the phenomenon under controlled conditions.

Again, neuroscience has done a great deal to explain consciousness. I expect it will be the field that gives us more insight into the phenomenon in the future. Invoking QM has not led to any greater understanding, and I doubt very much it ever will.

drkitten

6th November 2009, 11:40 AM

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 11:44 AM

An even better example is how we explain the conscious perception of pain. The neuroscience model tells us that some mechanical force is translated via a nociceptor into an action potential that travels along afferent nerves to the CNS. Connections that go to the primary sensory cortex for that area of the body seem to correlate highly with the subjective experience of the pain.

Using that model we can predict that it should be possible to block that afferent nerve at any number of places, or just sedate the cortex entirely. We can do all those things with great precision. (Ask a woman who's had an epidural during labor. From what I'm told, the subjective experience of pain goes away like magic.)

Has invoking QM led to any such practical applications?

westprog

6th November 2009, 11:53 AM

No, he's simply wrong.

There's a reason it's called the Lucas-Penrose fallacy.

It's called that by people who disagree with it. People who are neutral call it the Lucas-Penrose thesis. There are of course a number of versions - inherent in the fact that it's Lucas-Penrose, not just Lucas.

I suggest a reading of the actual discussions which are far more subtle than is likely to be found here.

It does not, since the fact that he gets the physics wrong (Tegmark's 17 orders of magnitude) is independently documented.

Are you prepared to concede that he is, in fact, a physicist? Indeed, a very eminent physicist?

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 12:03 PM

.... And, contra westprog, these neuroscientists are by and large not physicists. Suggesting that the idea that the best people to work on explanations of consciousness are not physicists.

Yup. I'd accept that we can get advances from fields like psychiatry, neuroscience, even psychology before I would expect any insight into consciousness coming from physics.

Somewhat of a derail. . .I understand the TV show NUMB3RS is pretty entertaining, but the first episode I watched turned me off completely because it made the same mistake people here are making. The hero was using some mathematical model of the criminal's behavior to predict what he would do next. At one point, the prediction was dead wrong. Aha! he says, I forgot to consider the observer effect. He then invokes the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and claims that any time you observe something you alter it. He then leaps to the conclusion that since the bad guy knows the cops are after him, he has to change the mathematical model to take that into account. . .

Bleah!

What applies to subatomic particles does not necessarily apply to human brains (at that level of organization). The characteristics that emerge from such higher levels of organization that give rise to consciousness are NOT the characteristics of subatomic particles--especially the "weirdness" which is pretty much defined as the characteristics of subatomic particles that are NOT observed in the macro world.

From a logic point of view, it is the composition fallacy (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/composit.html) to think that if an object is composed of smaller objects with a given property that the larger object must also have that property.

As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy.

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 12:27 PM

As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy.

How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges?

drkitten

6th November 2009, 12:56 PM

Are you prepared to concede that he is, in fact, a physicist? Indeed, a very eminent physicist?

Not in the slightest, no.

His work as an algebraist and geometer has been of tremendous use to physics, just as Kahneman's work (and Simon's) work in psychology has been of tremendous use to economists. This does not make Penrose a physicist any more than it makes Kahneman or Simon economists.

And I hold to this statement despite the fact that Kahneman and Simon have received Nobel prizes in economics. Because -- as they would be the first to admit -- their work is psychological, not economic.

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 02:20 PM

who says some discovery's aren't ;)

Now I did not mean that. I meant that translating the idiomatic meaning of pictorial art that is filetered through personal and cultural filters and then trying to interpret symbolms across time and culture is not wise.

You are safe in saying 'flying people can be interpreted as shamans','flying people can be interpreted as angels','flying people can be interpreted as being launched from a catapult' but you can only speculate as to the meaning of pictorial art unless you have a good contemporary understanding of the symbology. And even then it can be questionable.

:)

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 02:22 PM

It's called that by people who disagree with it. People who are neutral call it the Lucas-Penrose thesis. There are of course a number of versions - inherent in the fact that it's Lucas-Penrose, not just Lucas.

Do you mean the impossible QM effects? I will check.

Nope something else

The probably most prominent and most articulate argument why the whole field of AI would be doomed to failure is expressed in the so-called Lucas-Penrose argument, which can be summarized as follows: Since Gödel proved that in each sound formal system - which is strong enough to formulate arithmetic - there exists a formula which cannot be proved by the system (assumed the system is consistent), and since we (human beings) can see that such a formula must be true, human and machine reasoning must inevitably be different in nature, even in the restricted area of mathematical logic. This attributes to human mathematical reasoning a very particular role, which seems to go beyond rational thought. Note that it is not about general human behaviour, and not even about the process of how to find mathematical proofs (which is still only little understood), but just about the checking of (finite) mathematical arguments.

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html

What if the brain is analog and fuzzy?

drkitten

6th November 2009, 02:36 PM

Do you mean the impossible QM effects? I will check.

Nope something else

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html

What if the brain is analog and fuzzy?

Hell, what if the brain is "unsound"?

Who would think that humans were capable of making mistakes in reasoning? Certainly not Penrose, which is one reason that he is "simply" wrong.

westprog

6th November 2009, 03:04 PM

Yup. I'd accept that we can get advances from fields like psychiatry, neuroscience, even psychology before I would expect any insight into consciousness coming from physics.

Of course. There's so little known about consciousness that there's nothing much for physicists to work with.

The fact remains - for something to be completely understood, there needs to be a physical explanation. Go deep enough and it's all physics.

Somewhat of a derail. . .I understand the TV show NUMB3RS is pretty entertaining, but the first episode I watched turned me off completely because it made the same mistake people here are making. The hero was using some mathematical model of the criminal's behavior to predict what he would do next. At one point, the prediction was dead wrong. Aha! he says, I forgot to consider the observer effect. He then invokes the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and claims that any time you observe something you alter it. He then leaps to the conclusion that since the bad guy knows the cops are after him, he has to change the mathematical model to take that into account. . .

Bleah!

What applies to subatomic particles does not necessarily apply to human brains (at that level of organization). The characteristics that emerge from such higher levels of organization that give rise to consciousness are NOT the characteristics of subatomic particles--especially the "weirdness" which is pretty much defined as the characteristics of subatomic particles that are NOT observed in the macro world.

From a logic point of view, it is the composition fallacy (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/composit.html) to think that if an object is composed of smaller objects with a given property that the larger object must also have that property.

As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy.

Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales. If consciousness is something that emerges on a large scale, it emerges as a result of small scale processes combined in some way not yet known.

westprog

6th November 2009, 03:05 PM

What if the brain is analog and fuzzy?

Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise.

drkitten

6th November 2009, 03:07 PM

Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise.

No, it assumes that the necessary fuzzy aspects of the brain can be modelled by something digital and precise.

Since we've had precise formulations of fuzzy logic for decades, that's not a particularly controversial assumption.

westprog

6th November 2009, 03:22 PM

Not in the slightest, no.

His work as an algebraist and geometer has been of tremendous use to physics,

Has it? That's beside the point. Penrose has not been working as a mathemetician solely. There are plenty of pure and applied mathematicians whose work has been used by physicists. They don't win physics prizes.

just as Kahneman's work (and Simon's) work in psychology has been of tremendous use to economists. This does not make Penrose a physicist any more than it makes Kahneman or Simon economists.

And I hold to this statement despite the fact that Kahneman and Simon have received Nobel prizes in economics. Because -- as they would be the first to admit -- their work is psychological, not economic.

Let's stick to science, shall we?

In 1965 at Cambridge, Penrose proved that singularities (such as black holes) could be formed from the gravitational collapse of immense, dying stars

That sounds sort of physics-ish to me. Or how about

In 1969 he conjectured the cosmic censorship hypothesis. This proposes (rather informally) that the universe protects us from the inherent unpredictability of singularities (such as the one in the centre of a black hole) by hiding them from our view behind an event horizon. This form is now known as the "weak censorship hypothesis"; in 1979, Penrose formulated a stronger version called the "strong censorship hypothesis". Together with the BKL conjecture and issues of nonlinear stability, settling the censorship conjectures is one of the most important outstanding problems in general relativity. Also from 1979 dates Penrose's influential Weyl curvature hypothesis on the initial conditions of the observable part of the Universe and the origin of the second law of thermodynamics.[7] Penrose wrote a paper on the Terrell rotation.

Sort of kind of like physics, isn't it?

And what about

In 2004 Penrose released The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe, a 1,099-page book aimed at giving a comprehensive guide to the laws of physics. He has proposed a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics.[9] Penrose is the Francis and Helen Pentz Distinguished (visiting) Professor of Physics and Mathematics at Pennsylvania State University.

So, he's made discoveries in physics. He's got physical theories published in Physics journals. He's written a big book all about physics. (And it's a very big book, I can assure you, and it's not at all easy reading). And he's a professor of Physics. He is not a mathematician whose ideas have been seized on by physicists. He's a mathematician who's used his mathematical knowledge to do physics. Precisely what else could he possibly do to qualify as a physicist?

Here's a suggestion:
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/80/260218048_f4761ae659.jpg

Stop digging.

westprog

6th November 2009, 03:24 PM

No, it assumes that the necessary fuzzy aspects of the brain can be modelled by something digital and precise.

Any device that exists in the real world will necessarily be fuzzy and analogue, whether it's a brain, an abacus, or a digital computer. The Strong AI hypothesis assumes that the essential element is the emulation of digital processing.

Since we've had precise formulations of fuzzy logic for decades, that's not a particularly controversial assumption.

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 04:04 PM

Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise.

Really, the fuzzy logic people would disagree.

Sounds like a true Scotsman argument to me, is there something that supports your position?
ETA
It may have been defined that way in the past, but that may not be true for all people into AI.

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 04:06 PM

Any device that exists in the real world will necessarily be fuzzy and analogue, whether it's a brain, an abacus, or a digital computer. The Strong AI hypothesis assumes that the essential element is the emulation of digital processing.

Um digital by defintition is not analog, you can emulate analog on digital.

What are you trying to say?

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 04:13 PM

How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges?
I don't think any number of disorganized brain cells will result in consciousness emerging. (Nor will any number of aggregated atoms or molecules. Nor will a collection of amygdalas or a collection of nerve fibers.)

However, the question as to what specific structures give rise to what specific components of "consciousness" (again stuff like memory, proprioception, language, empathy, etc. are all components of consciousness) and how they do it are questions that I predict will be answered by neuroscience (or related fields) and not by physics.

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 04:19 PM

Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales.
No. That's not true. That is the composition fallacy.

Consider a structure like a house. It has emergent properties, such as the ability to keep a person protected from the weather.

A brick, which is a component of that house, does NOT have that property. You can analyze a brick all you want, and it will not exhibit the properties that emerge at higher levels.

Similarly, you can analyze a hydrogen atom all you want and you will not find in it the properties of water.

It is as silly to consider the human brain to be a collection of atoms as it would be for your auto mechanic to try to diagnose a problem with your car's engine by considering it to be a collection of atoms.

QM will no more explain consciousness than it will explain why your car won't start (or, for that matter, why it does start when it's working). That's why a competent automotive mechanic doesn't have to learn QM.

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 04:24 PM

westprog

6th November 2009, 04:44 PM

No. That's not true. That is the composition fallacy.

Consider a structure like a house. It has emergent properties, such as the ability to keep a person protected from the weather.

A brick, which is a component of that house, does NOT have that property. You can analyze a brick all you want, and it will not exhibit the properties that emerge at higher levels.

Similarly, you can analyze a hydrogen atom all you want and you will not find in it the properties of water.

It is as silly to consider the human brain to be a collection of atoms as it would be for your auto mechanic to try to diagnose a problem with your car's engine by considering it to be a collection of atoms.

QM will no more explain consciousness than it will explain why your car won't start (or, for that matter, why it does start when it's working). That's why a competent automotive mechanic doesn't have to learn QM.

Of course a mechanic doesn't need to know physics in order to understand how a car works up to a point. But if he wants to know how chemical energy is converted into motion, it is necessary to understand the workings of the car on an atomic level. And we do understand it on an atomic level. We can actually see how the chemical energy contained in the fuel and oxygen produce heat, which produces pressure, which involves molecules moving faster and striking the piston head, which produces force on the crankshaft which turns the wheel. If we don't know how all this happens on an atomic scale, we don't know how a car works. Saying that a car moves because it's an emergent property of fuel air and steel is just saying we don't actually know how the car works.

Until we can trace the effects of consciousness from the micro level, tracking the forces involved, then we don't have a physical process.

westprog

6th November 2009, 04:54 PM

Um digital by defintition is not analog, you can emulate analog on digital.

What are you trying to say?

I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature.

It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet.

westprog

6th November 2009, 05:01 PM

I still see no answer to the question I asked at the end of post #118. I'll ask it again,
has trying to understand consciousness by invoking QM led to any practical applications (as examining it with neuroscience has)?

How's that "quantum anaesthesia" for surgery coming along? (Again, the sensation of pain is a part of consciousness.)

It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far.

There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value.

RandFan

6th November 2009, 05:13 PM

How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges?How many atoms are needed in the wing of a plane before flight emerges?

RandFan

6th November 2009, 05:21 PM

Robin

6th November 2009, 05:45 PM

Robin

6th November 2009, 05:48 PM

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 08:12 PM

I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature.

It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet.

I don't think I understand enough to agree with you or disagree with you. The bytes in memory of the machine I am typing this on are stored eight bits, 01010101 being 85 if I remember correctly, I think the 1 bit is last.

So that is processed as 8510 or 5516 and it is not an analog value it is not gated at 'around 85', if the byte is a command in the processor, 5516 it is going to be a separate function in the list of the processor than 5616.

So I don't really understand your point, could you elaborate with examples. The amplification of radio waves in a non-digital system is a good example of analog.

What do you have in mind?

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 08:15 PM

It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far.

There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value.

And again, you place this meta value on an undefined term that you wish to place at some arbitrary value.

Perception is part of consciousness, as is sensation, as is memory and while they are not all perfectly understood processes, they are processes that do have a strong data basis and theory to go with the data.

Dancing David

6th November 2009, 08:17 PM

RandFan

6th November 2009, 08:31 PM

And i am fairly certain that the internal architechture of the processor is digital. I could be totaly wrong.Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch.

PixyMisa

6th November 2009, 08:43 PM

Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) might well be wrong on some specific issues
He's wrong on all the specific issues.

but he has one thing going for him - he's the only Physicist who's addressed the issue of consciousness, AFAIAA.
And that's why he's wrong. He knows nothhing about consciousness or neuroscience.

If you accept that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then you have to assume that it will be explained in physical terms, by physicists.
No. Complete rubbish.

Rock formations are physical phenomena. They are studied by geologists.
Living creatures are physical phenomena. They are studied by biologists.
Chemical compounds are physical phenomena. They are studied by chemists.
Fossils are physical phenomena. They are studied by paleontologists.

An advantage of the book is that because Penrose (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_penrose) is a physicist, he feels the need to explain exactly what he means by just about everything. So there's some quite deep physics right from the start. It is possible to skip the very difficult maths if you want to.
There remains the problem that he's completely wrong.

If, when you've finished TENM, and Shadows Of The Mind, you might want to read some of the rebuttals, to be found on line. Also some of the rebuttals of the rebuttals.
He's still completely wrong.

rocketdodger

6th November 2009, 09:08 PM

Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch.

Oh, God, please don't bring up switching...

rocketdodger

6th November 2009, 09:19 PM

Until we can trace the effects of consciousness from the micro level, tracking the forces involved, then we don't have a physical process.

I agree -- the fact that our brains are entirely physical doesn't imply anything about whether consciousness is a physical process.

RandFan

6th November 2009, 09:36 PM

I agree -- the fact that our brains are entirely physical doesn't imply anything about whether consciousness is a physical process.As a former and ardent duaalist I have to ask. Pray tell what process could it be then?

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 10:02 PM

And you decided all of this without thinking I suppose :rolleyes:
If there is no such thing as thinking I didn't decide it. hmm.. I refer to you sig for clarification, please.

Not my definitions dictionary.com definitions and the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that these concepts are not atomic facts which can be scrutinized by logic. They 'are' self referential, no matter how much you want to analyze them further they won't give.
What - based on a couple of circular definitions from dictionary.com and your own unsupported assertions? once again I refer you to your sig for clarification, please.

Please try, it would be most interesting to see.
OK, from dictionary.com also:
Matter: the substance or substances of which any physical object consists or is composed
Physical: noting or pertaining to the properties of matter and energy

So there you are - a circular definition of matter. Therefore by your logic matter is self-referential and creates itself - right?
I am not convinced of your proof. In any case I was not suggesting that matter or thinking would create themselves if they were defined self-referentially. You suggested this and I suggested you try prove it. What I did say was that what I myself create, is self-referential. I gave you a dictionary definition of think and conscious as a guide and proceeded to explain why you saying you think and me saying I think is not equivalent. The point being to show you how only I can create and address my consciousness.

You obviously did not read this reply http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5282531#post5282531
I did. It does not even remotely answer the question I asked.
I did not pretend to answer the question in the above post only point out that it is unjustified to transfer thinking outside of its activity so as to explain its creation.

That is my reading of this
I said the very opposite. It is not a metaphysical starting point. Hmm.. not and no better are not equivalent. This is shifting the goalposts.

I never suggested that thinking required proof as I assume it.
You seem to be very intent upon defending the concept
Thinking is the only concept to defend. Failure thereof would make any other concept indefensible.

Feel free not to assume your own thinking. But then again feel free to reply with some further thoughts.
Assuming of course that there were ever any in the first place. I would rather be polite at this stage.

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 10:17 PM

well, I take it all to a neutral stance
: The appearance of thinking, the appearance of matter

If you like. The difference for me is that for thinking I cannot see how I can experience its appearance without producing it myself.

then that discusses why one given and not the other.

Matter is a label for an experience, thinking is another. We have sensation and perceptions that lead to an appearance of matter, we have othere xperiences that lead to an appearnce of thought.
They are both appearances. (IMNSHO)
What are these other experiences, if I may ask?

I can only reflect on my thinking. Whereas I can interact with matter as it appears before me.

Are you sure? No, but that's the only experience I have had (consistent and repeatable ;))

That again is an appearance. It appears you can interacts with thoughts as well. generic you and generic thought. (Place holders for the moment.)Thoughts yes, not thinking.

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 10:36 PM

Well by training I am cautious. theer are the personal filters of the people involved and then the cultural filters of the people involved. And all the other confirmation bias, and sampling error.

So I would not draw general conclusions from a sample, perhaps speculative indicative factors.

But to translate from the !Kung or Khoi San experience to another would be fraught with peril.

:)

A specific and limited dictionary filtered through two cultures.

:)

I am sure it is great stuff, I am just trained as I am trained (informally).

Now I did not mean that. I meant that translating the idiomatic meaning of pictorial art that is filetered through personal and cultural filters and then trying to interpret symbolms across time and culture is not wise.

You are safe in saying 'flying people can be interpreted as shamans','flying people can be interpreted as angels','flying people can be interpreted as being launched from a catapult' but you can only speculate as to the meaning of pictorial art unless you have a good contemporary understanding of the symbology. And even then it can be questionable.

:)

Of course you may be right David, then again you may be wrong.
Like our other discussion on thinking and consciousness, perhaps studying the evolution of consciousness starts with the self examination of our own thinking. It is after all the one artifact, the experience thereof, we share with our ancestor H. sapiens.

The other important thing I forgot to mention about the thesis of Lewis-Williams is the insight he has drawn from neuroscience and specifically the work on entoptic phenomena entoptic phenomena (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entoptic) arising during ASC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altered_state_of_consciousness).

I would be most interest to know what you think after an in depth study of the work of Lewis-Williams and the Rock Art Institute as you seem to be knowledgeable in both archaeology, cognitive science and neuroscience. I realize this is asking a lot, but to be honest I have yet to find someone who understands the background and the thesis of Lewis-Williams well enough to have a serious discussion about it.

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 10:45 PM

One of the huge problems is:

.... artifacts of preservation...

So the sudden appearance of 'art', 'technology' and similar signs of intelligence may just be an artifact of preservation. (Read Magdelian explosion)

The window of preservation is about 40,000 years for anything that is not a carved or chipped rock. This also is when the material tends to show up in the record.

So we can not say what neanderthal art, soft technology might have been. The instances of preservation would be too low to give a sample. It may be that they had a very advanced wood and fiber technology, but due to the artifacts of preservation, we would be very unlikely to find any traces of it.

So the only thing we have are stone tools and carving, not traditionally considered art.

An important point. However you appear to have left out rock art from the Magdelian explosion? Do you think it justified that "intelligence" as a term used today should be applied to people 40 000 years ago or even 500 years ago for that matter?

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 11:07 PM

But if he wants to know how chemical energy is converted into motion, it is necessary to understand the workings of the car on an atomic level.
No. There is no such thing as the understanding of a car on an atomic level.

You can learn about atoms by studying things at the atomic level, but not cars.

The properties of a car (something you can sit in, the ability to transport you and other loads from place to place, etc.) do not emerge at the atomic level.

Again, this statement:

Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales.
Is not true. In the car analogy, consciousness is a higher level emergent property (or rather a collection of properties) like the ability of a car to transport you from one place to another. You can't analyze either of these properties at the atomic level.

If we don't know how all this happens on an atomic scale, we don't know how a car works.
That's not true. Again, most auto engineers, designers and mechanics do not know QM, and yet we do actually know how a car works. The properties that we're concerned with in higher levels are not the properties of subatomic particles.
Saying that a car moves because it's an emergent property of fuel air and steel is just saying we don't actually know how the car works.
Not it's not. It's saying that we can understand these properties without worrying about individual atoms much less subatomic particles. In fact, it says that atomic theory and subatomic particles doesn't tell us anything about how cars work.
_________

It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far.
I've already given you several examples of this. In neuroscience, specific components of consciousness (memory, proprioception, systems of arousal, etc.) have been studied in some detail and have led to practical applications, especially in medicine.

There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value.
I'm not arguing about the difference between experimental vs theoretical work. I'm arguing that neuroscience (which is both theory and experiment) has led us to theories of consciousness that have led to very practical applications. QM (which is also theoretical and experimental) has not. Applying QM to consciousness has only resulted in the publication of New Agey books that compare subatomic particles to the mind.

JoeTheJuggler

6th November 2009, 11:12 PM

Of course. There's so little known about consciousness that there's nothing much for physicists to work with.
No. Again, we know quite a lot about consciousness (memory, arousal, proprioception, etc.) and it's all based on the neuroscience model. The field is advancing pretty quickly these days. . . in neuroscience, not in physics, and certainly not from QM.

I'm not dissing physics. It's just that the collection of properties or functions we call consciousness is not the subject of physics. (No more than auto repair and house construction are!)

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 11:41 PM

I don't think any number of disorganized brain cells will result in consciousness emerging. (Nor will any number of aggregated atoms or molecules. Nor will a collection of amygdalas or a collection of nerve fibers.)

However, the question as to what specific structures give rise to what specific components of "consciousness" (again stuff like memory, proprioception, language, empathy, etc. are all components of consciousness) and how they do it are questions that I predict will be answered by neuroscience (or related fields) and not by physics.

How many organized brain cells till consciousness emerges?

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 11:46 PM

How many atoms are needed in the wing of a plane before flight emerges?

flight will never "emerge" if it is a plastic model plane.
I do not see how flight will "emerge" on any wing regardless.
Why is a wing even necessary for flight?

!Kaggen

6th November 2009, 11:49 PM

It's just that the collection of properties or functions we call consciousness is not the subject of physics. (No more than auto repair and house construction are!)

I see so if physics explains gravity we can safely ignore this and build houses as high as we want to?

RandFan

7th November 2009, 12:09 AM

flight will never "emerge" if it is a plastic model plane.That's not an answer to the question. It's a straw man for you to attack.

I do not see how flight will "emerge" on any wing regardless. What you "see" is neither here nor there. To achieve flight there needs be a number of variables. If and only if all of the variables are met can flight happen (aka emerge).

Why is a wing even necessary for flight?Another straw man.

You have left the question unanswered. I assume you are withdrawing your silly question about brain cells. Even if your semantical argument was valid it still wouldn't answer the question as to how many atoms are necassary for flight.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 12:50 AM

I assume you are withdrawing your silly question about brain cells.

I will only note that you cannot answer the question.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 12:53 AM

To achieve flight there needs be a number of variables. If and only if all of the variables are met can flight happen (aka emerge).

Lets move onto the next question then.

How many variables are needed for flight to 'emerge'?

Wudang

7th November 2009, 01:55 AM

http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Aeronautics-and-Astronautics/16-333Fall-2004/LectureNotes/index.htm

Fill your boots. Note btw the absence of QM

Robin

7th November 2009, 03:21 AM

I am not convinced of your proof.
It was your own reasoning, with "matter" and "physical" swapped for "consciousness" and "think". You seemed to think you had made some point because you had a circular definition.

I was pointing out that circular definitions are easy to come by.

You said you would like to see me find a circular definition for matter. I did. That is all.
In any case I was not suggesting that matter or thinking would create themselves if they were defined self-referentially. You suggested this and I suggested you try prove it.
I don't recall asking anything of the sort. I think you will have to quote that part.
What I did say was that what I myself create, is self-referential.
Your original claim was that consciousness creates consciousness as I seem to recall.
I gave you a dictionary definition of think and conscious as a guide and proceeded to explain why you saying you think and me saying I think is not equivalent. The point being to show you how only I can create and address my consciousness.
Only you can address your consciousness - but you cannot create it.

Recall when I asked you how you created your consciousness you were unable to answer.
I would rather be polite at this stage.
Glass houses.

westprog

7th November 2009, 03:26 AM

A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not.

The only meaning "digital" has in the real world is in terms of the interpretation we place on the information received. The electrical processes on an analogue telephone line are exactly the same as when converted to ADSL. It's just a matter of decoding at each end.

And the quality of reproduction of either analogue or digital is entirely dependent on the precision of the equipment. In any case, we see and hear the information in an entirely analogue way, because our senses don't work on digital.

Robin

7th November 2009, 03:28 AM

Hmm.. not and no better are not equivalent. This is shifting the goalposts.
You were drawing metaphysical conclusions on the basis of "thinking"

I said thinking was no better a metaphysical starting point than matter.

I thought you understood that matter was not a metaphysical starting point at all, so it was a genuine misunderstanding.

But at least we can now agree that thinking is no basis for drawing metaphysical conclusions.

westprog

7th November 2009, 03:31 AM

Assuming of course that nature is not in fact digital.

Feynman once conjectured that nature might be fundamentally discrete. If that was the case then digital devices would be an emulation of digital on an emulation of analog.

That might well be the case - but it doesn't change how the digital devices actually work. The digital nature of the computer is still not the same as the digital nature of the universe.

westprog

7th November 2009, 03:33 AM

This is true too and more to the point. A digital system is no less a digital system because it is built on an analog system.

All real-world digital devices are built on an analogue system. When we call something a digital device, that's the unspoken assumption.

westprog

7th November 2009, 03:36 AM

As a former and ardent duaalist I have to ask. Pray tell what process could it be then?

Now we come to the mysticism at the heart of Strong AI.

westprog

7th November 2009, 03:42 AM

No. Again, we know quite a lot about consciousness (memory, arousal, proprioception, etc.) and it's all based on the neuroscience model. The field is advancing pretty quickly these days. . . in neuroscience, not in physics, and certainly not from QM.

I'm not dissing physics. It's just that the collection of properties or functions we call consciousness is not the subject of physics. (No more than auto repair and house construction are!)

When you say that something is not the subject of physics, then you are saying that you don't understand what is going on. Auto repair and house construction are understood in physical terms, and indeed the people who design houses and cars, and the materials used to make houses and cars, have to be very familiar with the physical principles involved. There are no mysterious, mystical "emergent properties" when it comes to houses and cars. We can follow what is going on from top to bottom. A brick or a brake has its engineering properties because of its physical characteristics.

When someone says that something is not in the purview of physics, that's the same as saying that it is not a matter of science. Neurological investigation is an important first step in the understanding of consciousness, but if there is no physical theory, there is no real understanding.

westprog

7th November 2009, 04:08 AM

No. There is no such thing as the understanding of a car on an atomic level.

You can learn about atoms by studying things at the atomic level, but not cars.

The properties of a car (something you can sit in, the ability to transport you and other loads from place to place, etc.) do not emerge at the atomic level.

However, they emerge because of the behaviour of the components of the car at an atomic level, and the connection between the behaviour of the atoms and the macro-scale behaviour of the car is well understood. When we say that we understand how a car works - how the ability to transport you from place to place emerges - we mean that we understand how the atomic level processes produce the large-scale processes. That is what physical understanding means.

Again, this statement:

Is not true. In the car analogy, consciousness is a higher level emergent property (or rather a collection of properties) like the ability of a car to transport you from one place to another. You can't analyze either of these properties at the atomic level.

We both know that's not the case. We don't know how the atoms in the brain produce consciousness, which is in any case poorly defined. We know exactly how the atoms in the car produce motion, comfy seats, well balanced MP3 sound systems and a pleasant interior temperature. There's a direct link between the micro and the macro level, every stage of which is understood.

It's because we have such a strong understanding of the physical processes involved that we can, if we wish, produce electric cars, hybrid cars, electronic engine management systems, kinetic energy recovery braking systems and so on. It is because we don't have any understanding of how the atoms of the brain produce consciousness that we are totally unable to produce anything apart from a human brain that has the consciousness property.

That's not true. Again, most auto engineers, designers and mechanics do not know QM, and yet we do actually know how a car works. The properties that we're concerned with in higher levels are not the properties of subatomic particles.

Not it's not. It's saying that we can understand these properties without worrying about individual atoms much less subatomic particles. In fact, it says that atomic theory and subatomic particles doesn't tell us anything about how cars work.

You don't think that the theory of combustion tells us anything about how cars work? What a superficial level of understanding that would be. Put in the petrol, switch on and go. Why does burning fuel make the wheels go round? Gee, who cares?

In fact, if you don't understand how cars work on a physical level, you might be able to drive 'em, repair 'em and maybe even build 'em, but you won't be able to design 'em.

I've already given you several examples of this. In neuroscience, specific components of consciousness (memory, proprioception, systems of arousal, etc.) have been studied in some detail and have led to practical applications, especially in medicine.

I'm not arguing about the difference between experimental vs theoretical work. I'm arguing that neuroscience (which is both theory and experiment) has led us to theories of consciousness that have led to very practical applications.

Those "theories" are at the same level as the mechanic who knows how to set the timing or tighten up the brakes. There is no deep insight to be found in a purely neurological approach. It's a necessary first step, but it won't tell us "how the brain works".

QM (which is also theoretical and experimental) has not. Applying QM to consciousness has only resulted in the publication of New Agey books that compare subatomic particles to the mind.

That's obviously because we don't have a decent theory yet. In fact, we have no physical theory of consciousness. We do have a complete physical theory of how cars work.

Robin

7th November 2009, 04:29 AM

That might well be the case - but it doesn't change how the digital devices actually work. The digital nature of the computer is still not the same as the digital nature of the universe.
Nor does the analog basis of digital devices change how they work.

Robin

7th November 2009, 04:31 AM

All real-world digital devices are built on an analogue system.
Where did I say otherwise???

I said the fact did not make them any less digital.

westprog

7th November 2009, 05:01 AM

Nor does the analog basis of digital devices change how they work.

Where did I say otherwise???

I said the fact did not make them any less digital.

In fact it does. There is no physical distinction between a digital and an analogue device. The difference is purely operational. A computer is a digital device because we choose to use it as such.

The reason this is an important distinction is because there's an apparent belief that digital devices are distinct in some sense from analogue devices. They aren't. We can treat digital devices as analogue, or analogue as digital, depending on our requirements.

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 05:20 AM

Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch.

Sure, that I know, the voltage potential gate is analog, but the effect is digital as far as bit switching. The gate is open or closed, the bit is on/off. The bit is not 53%.

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 05:23 AM

Oh, God, please don't bring up switching...

Sorry, is this like the 'evolution is random' thing?

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 05:32 AM

If you like. The difference for me is that for thinking I cannot see how I can experience its appearance without producing it myself.

Now taht is the appearance, it could be a Brain In Vat situation, it could be that thoughts are partly determined or mostly determined causaly and that they are an appearance of interactive free will, when in fact they are not.

My point is that 'there appear to be the experiences we labels as thought', but the usage of the word 'myself' is yet undefined.

Now if you use 'meslef' to denote the 'apparently organic body which I reference as mine' then I can agree to that.

But the appearnce is that we are organice beings and that the brains of those being have neural nets which generate patterns of interaction we call thought.

That requires a lot more than phenomenolgy, in phenomenology we could be BIVs.

What are these other experiences, if I may ask?

They are myriad and multiple, i would list auditory cognition and visual cognition. then there are a host of other processes. there is nothing as pure as the concept "I had a thought."

No, but that's the only experience I have had (consistent and repeatable ;))

Thoughts yes, not thinking.

Yes but that is the point, we have to couch it carefully, especially in these discussions, there is an appearance of *I think*.

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 05:38 AM

In fact it does. There is no physical distinction between a digital and an analogue device. The difference is purely operational.

Sorry, I don't get that either.

The usage is what determines the nature of the computation. Justa s in defintions of analog and digital.

There are no absolutes, the usage of the machine is digital, that is the part that matters, the parts are use digitally whatever the ultimate construction.

Why would it matter? (Most importantly)

A computer is a digital device because we choose to use it as such.

And a screw driver or cal phone can be used as a hammer.

Your point being?

The reason this is an important distinction is because there's an apparent belief that digital devices are distinct in some sense from analogue devices.

Nope, that is your straw man, they are digital because taht is the way they process the 'material' we give them. You are imposing these absolutes where none exist.

I could sue my desktop computer as a hammer, that does not mean that it becomes a hammaer.

They aren't. We can treat digital devices as analogue, or analogue as digital, depending on our requirements.

Excuse me, the process is digital, there is no meaning in the usage of the term otherwise.

You can use analog processes as well to generate analog computing algorithims, we don't.

You are making a distinction based upon some absolute, the process is digital.

That is physical process. It does not happen in some Kantian metaspace.

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 05:40 AM

Nor does the analog basis of digital devices change how they work.

Where did I say otherwise???

I said the fact did not make them any less digital.

Exactly.

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 05:41 AM

That's obviously because we don't have a decent theory yet. In fact, we have no physical theory of consciousness. We do have a complete physical theory of how cars work.

Argument of the gaps, we do not have a complete understanding of QM at all, it is still a useful theory, as are the theories of neurons and neural nets.

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 05:43 AM

That might well be the case - but it doesn't change how the digital devices actually work. The digital nature of the computer is still not the same as the digital nature of the universe.

Now that is just silly, there is no 'digital nature of the universe', that and all of it is semantic labeling.

cyborg

7th November 2009, 06:08 AM

The reason this is an important distinction is because there's an apparent belief that digital devices are distinct in some sense from analogue devices. They aren't. We can treat digital devices as analogue, or analogue as digital, depending on our requirements.

Yes. I can treat my computer as a large paperweight if I want to.

Now - how is this at all relevant to anything again?

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 06:18 AM

If you expected people to understand your original claim about the association between science and metaphysical assumptions, why do you think those same people would fail to understand the counter claim that scientists have for well over a century, carefully examined these assumptions and largely disavowed them?

The arguments I make tend to be neo-Kantian. They are addressed to people who are still engaged in pre-Kantian debates about ontology and epistemology (not that most of them realise this). You are talking about philosophical arguments that occured after the period of philosophical history which Kant triggered. In other words, people have to understand the issues raised by Kant and the people who immediately followed him before they can understand the relevance of Wittgenstein, Neurath and logical positivism.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 06:23 AM

I don't know why you would even want to get to Nietzsche and the ability to get to post-modernism is hardly a recommendation.

One doesn't end up at Nietzsche or post-modernism because one wants to. One just ends up there because there is nowhere-else left to go.

But your claim seems to be that the thing metaphysics can do that science can't is to get from one philosopher to another.

I think science can operate quite effectively without having to do that.

Sure it can, provided we understand what "science" means and what its limitations are. Quite a lot of people here do not understand this. They think that understanding science - as in understanding things Darwinism or Newtonian mechanics - means that they automatically have a good grasp of how science fits into a broader spectrum of knowledge and enquiry. This is not the case. Some of the most scientifically-literate people have the biggest blind spots when it comes to acknowledging what science can't do.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 06:27 AM

Exactly. It was and is never going to be simple. It might be one of those things we never qute get a handle on but Im not one of those who advocate there are some things beyond the realm of human understanding.

All I have seen above is a bunch of people trying to score points off one another, pedantic and unhelpful. This is probably why no one has got to the bottom of the question yet.

No-one has got to the bottom of the question because nobody has worked out what question they are actually trying to ask. I'm afraid it really does come down to how you define the word "consciousness". If it is not possible to come to an agreement about exactly what is meant by that word and exactly what question we are trying to ask about the thing to which it refers then we stand zero chance of reaching a sensible answer.

Garbage in, garbage out.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 06:29 AM

A semantical argument.

What, precisely, do you think is not a "semantical argument"?

"Just a semantic argument" should only be used to refer to an argument where the only serious point of contention is what a specific word means. For example, if a person disagrees that sex with a consenting pre-teen should be refered to as "rape" but accepts that it should still be illegal then it really is a merely semantic argument. You, on the other hand, continually try to claim "it's just semantics", even when there is a very real argument going on underneath the semantics. You use it as a means of avoiding the real underlying argument.

Arguments about consciousness end up being arguments about the definition of words NOT because there is a genuine disagreement about what the relevant words mean but because it is impossible to resolve the dispute simply by agreeing to a new and clearer set of definitions. It is not possible to come to agreement precisely because there is a genuine underlying logical problem (or set of logical problems) which certain people try to hide by providing definitions of words which are designed to avoid acknowledging a real, non-semantical problem. In this specific case, they try to avoid being forced to acknowledge a genuine difficulty in studying consciousness by attempting to define the word "consciousness" to mean something which can concievably be tacked by science rather than defining it to mean what most people mean when they raise the problem in the first place. This is a classic example of putting cart before horse. It's a bit like trying to define "evolution" to mean "God's method of creating life on Earth" and then wondering why people refuse to accept the definition. Is that a merely semantic argument? No, it is an abuse of language resulting from an attempt to hide from an unwanted problem and the attempted mis-definition has no power to solve the actual problem. What it does do is allow the person trying misdefine the word to avoid having to think too hard about the unwanted problem.

Can I suggest a test? If you can re-arrange the meanings of the words so that the point of contention/disagreement disappears, then it is merely a semantic argument. If you can't, then it isn't.

cyborg

7th November 2009, 06:45 AM

No-one has got to the bottom of the question because nobody has worked out what question they are actually trying to ask. I'm afraid it really does come down to how you define the word "consciousness".

Right - there is a reason why that was my first post here.

So fire away.

rocketdodger

7th November 2009, 08:20 AM

As a former and ardent duaalist I have to ask. Pray tell what process could it be then?

I was being sarcastic.

rocketdodger

7th November 2009, 08:25 AM

Now we come to the mysticism at the heart of Strong AI.

I don't find it surprising that when I use sarcasm to regurgitate westprog's argument, westprog realizes the absurdity of it and calls it mysticism.

Fail.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 08:31 AM

Right - there is a reason why that was my first post here.

So fire away.

It wasn't me who mentioned the word "consciousness". Ask the person who asked the original question. You should already know my answer to this: I think we depend on a subjective definition of this word - we have to define it privately in terms of our own experience of reality. The next question is: can we use a privately-defined word in a public discussion?

westprog

7th November 2009, 08:47 AM

Sure, that I know, the voltage potential gate is analog, but the effect is digital as far as bit switching. The gate is open or closed, the bit is on/off. The bit is not 53%.

But the bit is just an idea that we have. The physics of it is not digital.

rocketdodger

7th November 2009, 08:48 AM

Sorry, is this like the 'evolution is random' thing?

Pretty much. Here is a summary of about 1000 pages of posts:

Westprog thinks that consciousness can't be a physical process because all physical processes are equivalent and thus everything would be conscious -- an absurdity, according to westprog.

Westprog's proof of this is that he/she thinks the behavior necessary for computation -- switching -- is constantly exhibited by all existing physical entities, from the smallest particle to the entire universe. To show this, westprog is more than happy to come up with elaborate scenarios where any entity might indeed act as a switch (and he/she considers the fact that all these scenarios are entirely independent of each other to be beside the point, because after all its not like the switches involved in computing have to work together or anything). Thus, according to westprog, everything computes: there is no distinction between a pile of rocks, a pile of computer parts (or a bowl of soup -- yes, we actually argued about this) and a working computer.

And when anyone points out the obvious distinctions, westprog claims that those only exist in the minds of humans, and anyway computers are built by humans so somehow they can't be used in arguments about human consciousness because to do so would be circular, or something. Furthermore westprog thinks that all the stuff that exhibits such obvious distinctions that we could use in arguments that would not be circular, or something, -- such as all other life on the planet Earth -- is irrelevant (his/her repeated dodging of questions along those lines is equivalent to an admission of as much). Finally, when a clever observer points out that a rock doesn't compute when it is sitting in the sun, westprog intelligently replies that it is only not computing according to a human observer (then we are back to the whole "human centric" thing) and in fact we can come up with some definition of "computing" that such a rock sitting in the sun will satisfy. Again, the fact that definitions are completely changed to suit the specific case in question is irrelevant to westprog, because things like consistency should not get in the way of a good argument.

EDIT: Oh, and westprog also claims that a glass of pure water contains a virtual machine + software, equivalent to the central dogma of molecular biology (DNA + transcription, etc). He/she has yet to explain that one, since the thread died before yy2bggggs could get anything resembling an argument from him/her.

JoeTheJuggler

7th November 2009, 08:56 AM

How many organized brain cells till consciousness emerges?

I don't think it's a function purely of number.

For example, you might ask how many bricks make a house (and the emergent properties of a house)? It's not a matter of number (though it does take more than "some") as much as it is how they're organized to do certain functions.

(ETA: It also depends on how you define "consciousness". As I've been saying that's a term that refers to many different properties/functions.)

But again, back to the point of this thread, do you suppose QM or neuroscience will answer this question?

cyborg

7th November 2009, 09:06 AM

we have to define it privately in terms of our own experience of reality.

That's just a cop out.

The next question is: can we use a privately-defined word in a public discussion?

We do so all the time.

cyborg

7th November 2009, 09:08 AM

But the bit is just an idea that we have. The physics of it is not digital.

It's irrelevant - the system behaves as if it is digital because that is how system is setup.

Water can pass through the dam or it cannot. The individual motion of the water molecules doesn't really matter.

JoeTheJuggler

7th November 2009, 09:14 AM

When you say that something is not the subject of physics, then you are saying that you don't understand what is going on.
That's not true.

When I say consciousness is not the subject of physics I mean exactly what I said: consciousness is not the subject of physics.

Go to any reputable university and there is not one single physics department class on consciousness (or any of the collection of properties/functions that comprise consciousness like memory, proprioception, etc.)

westprog

7th November 2009, 09:15 AM

Pretty much. Here is a summary of about 1000 pages of posts:

Westprog thinks that consciousness can't be a physical process because all physical processes are equivalent and thus everything would be conscious -- an absurdity, according to westprog.

Could you be any more confused about what I'm saying? You've managed to miss an astonishing number of points in a single sentence. Good lord.
It's not as if I haven't explained this point at great length.

I have always insisted that any scientific investigation of consciousness has to start with a physical theory. "All physical processes are equivalent"? Where do you get this? It's the proponents of Strong AI that insist that consciousness is independent of any given physical process, and that it can be produced by electricity, mechanics or punched cards. I've made the point that one cannot assume that an entirely different physical process cannot be simply assumed to produce the same result.

The context is the Strong AI claim that computing is something that produces consciousness, or can produce it, independently of the physical medium, but at the same time the insistence that computing only happens either in the brain or in human-made computers, but never in any way in natural phenomena.

Westprog's proof of this is that he/she thinks the behavior necessary for computation -- switching

Note the switch between "consciousness" and "computation" as if they were the same thing, when this is precisely the issue at dispute.

This kind of hamfisted switching around, using an argument about one thing as evidence for another, is all too typical of the discussions on this subject.

-- is constantly exhibited by all existing physical entities, from the smallest particle to the entire universe. To show this, westprog is more than happy to come up with elaborate scenarios where any entity might indeed act as a switch (and he/she considers the fact that all these scenarios are entirely independent of each other to be beside the point, because after all its not like the switches involved in computing have to work together or anything). Thus, according to westprog, everything computes: there is no distinction between a pile of rocks, a pile of computer parts (or a bowl of soup -- yes, we actually argued about this) and a working computer.

And when anyone points out the obvious distinctions,

FSV of "point out", as in claim "well, it's obvious".

westprog claims that those only exist in the minds of humans, and anyway computers are built by humans so somehow they can't be used in arguments about human consciousness because to do so would be circular, or something.

Yeah, "or something".

Furthermore westprog thinks that all the stuff that exhibits such obvious distinctions that we could use in arguments that would not be circular, or something, -- such as all other life on the planet Earth -- is irrelevant (his/her repeated dodging of questions along those lines is equivalent to an admission of as much). Finally, when a clever observer points out that a rock doesn't compute when it is sitting in the sun, westprog intelligently replies that it is only not computing according to a human observer (then we are back to the whole "human centric" thing) and in fact we can come up with some definition of "computing" that such a rock sitting in the sun will satisfy. Again, the fact that definitions are completely changed to suit the specific case in question is irrelevant to westprog, because things like consistency should not get in the way of a good argument.

EDIT: Oh, and westprog also claims that a glass of pure water contains a virtual machine + software, equivalent to the central dogma of molecular biology (DNA + transcription, etc). He/she has yet to explain that one, since the thread died before yy2bggggs could get anything resembling an argument from him/her.

The thread died waiting for anyone to come up with a physical description of computing. There was a fair split between people who said it wasn't necessary, while not actually accepting that this implied that computing could not therefore be considered a physical process, and people who made some attempts to define computing in a physical sense but were unable to do so. Either there was a perfectly good physical theory, or it was a total irrelevance.

I had no particular wish to revisit this, but the alternative seems to be to have Rocketdodger give his misunderstood version.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 09:18 AM

That's just a cop out.

No it isn't. It's one of the central questions discussed by Wittgenstein in what is widely considered to be the most important philosophical book of the 20th century.

We do so all the time.

Can you provide some examples?

westprog

7th November 2009, 09:19 AM

That's not true.

When I say consciousness is not the subject of physics I mean exactly what I said: consciousness is not the subject of physics.

Go to any reputable university and there is not one single physics department class on consciousness

Which is what I already said. I'm also insisting that this necessarily implies that consciousness is not scientifically understood.

True, there are no physics classes on auto engineering, but there are classes on all the processes that scientifically describe auto engineering.

(or any of the collection of properties/functions that comprise consciousness like memory, proprioception, etc.)

Already by stating that consciousness is comprised of a number of listed properties the question is being massively begged.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 09:20 AM

I will only note that you cannot answer the question.Then you are being dishonest. You asked a question about how many brain cells are needed for consciousness to emerge. I asked how many atoms are needed for flight to emerge.

Neuroscience does not hold that the only thing necessary for consciousness is brain cells.
Likewise, I do not hold that the only thing necessary for flight are wings.

So the question still stands.

Ron_Tomkins

7th November 2009, 09:21 AM

*Looks at radical growth of thread since the last time he posted*

..... I think I have created a monster :boxedin:

JoeTheJuggler

7th November 2009, 09:22 AM

Lets move onto the next question then.

How many variables are needed for flight to 'emerge'?

It's the same question. You seem to want to learn about the concept of emergent properties.

Actually, you seem to be scoffing at the idea of emergent properties by asking reductionist questions.

Emergent properties is not about quantity. It's much more about levels of organization.

Organ systems have properties that you won't find at the level of tissue; tissue has properties that you won't find at the level of cells; cells have properties that you won't find at the level of molecules; molecules have properties that you won't find at the level of atoms.

The central problem with the "QM" approach to consciousness is that it acts as if you can find and examine properties of consciousness at the atomic level, when those properties don't emerge at that level. They're not there at all. (Similarly, the quantum "weirdness" is weird because it does not describe the way things act in the macro level.)

I suspect that part of the reason they do this is that a sloppy understanding of QM uses the pathetic fallacy, which is sort of like the literary figure of speech of personification. For example, they'll ask how entangled particles can "know" the state of spin of each other. (They can't. "Knowing" is an aspect of consciousness and it doesn't emerge until you get to the level of organ.)

ETA: And, as I've mentioned, it is the composition fallacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition) to think that every property of a part must necessarily be a property of the whole. For example, human bodies are something like 80% water by weight. Water has the property that it can evaporate. Do we therefore expect human bodies to evaporate? Water can flow to conform to any shape container. Do we therefore expect the human body to be able to conform to any shape container?

Here's another example of the composition fallacy:
Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales.

This is not true. A property of the whole is not necessarily a property of any part and vice versa. If that were true objects would be sort of like those Mandelbrot set graphics that look the same at any scale. Humans would not be organized into organ systems, tissues, cells, molecules, etc.. . instead we would be composed of atoms that looked and behaved just like tiny little humans. Why would we expect subatomic particles to have consciousness but not for them to have other properties of humans?

RandFan

7th November 2009, 09:23 AM

Lets move onto the next question then.

How many variables are needed for flight to 'emerge'?You've gotten off track here. It's not my question to answer. It's yours. But given that a wing is a variable needed for flight and all other variables are met, how many atoms are needed before flight can emerge.

BTW: Brain cells, like the wings of a plane for flight, are not all that is requisite for consciousness.

So we are back to your silly question about brain cells.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 09:29 AM

"Just a semantic argument" should only be used to refer to an argument where the only serious point of contention is what a specific word means. Bingo. Words have meaning and their purpose is to convey ideas. The word Digital has a meaning and when used appropriately it correctly conveys ideas. I stand by my contention.

Can I suggest a test? If you can re-arrange the meanings of the words so that the point of contention/disagreement disappears, then it is merely a semantic argument. If you can't, then it isn't. "re-arrange the meanings of the words"?

There's simply no need. If the crux of the argument is the meaning of the words then it is a semantical argument.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 09:31 AM

I was being sarcastic.:) Leave it to me.

cyborg

7th November 2009, 09:32 AM

No it isn't.

Yes it is - for the reason below.

Can you provide some examples?

We literally do it all the time. Like, right now.

All I have when using any particular word is a private definition of it. Communication is possible when two private definitions agree sufficiently.

Either it's a general problem or it's not - I don't see why "consciousness" should be a particular problem.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 09:34 AM

Sure, that I know, the voltage potential gate is analog, but the effect is digital as far as bit switching. The gate is open or closed, the bit is on/off. The bit is not 53%.Then we are in agreement. I specificaly said "medium". A transistor composed of semiconducting material IS the medium.

westprog

7th November 2009, 09:38 AM

It's irrelevant - the system behaves as if it is digital because that is how system is setup.

Water can pass through the dam or it cannot. The individual motion of the water molecules doesn't really matter.

"Matter" is not a verb in physics. The behaviour of the individual water molecules is of exactly the same significance as the switching effect of the dam.

The reason that this matters is that if there's a contention that a physical process is happening with a switch, then that physical process needs to be unambiguously defined.

cyborg

7th November 2009, 09:41 AM

"Matter" is not a verb in physics. The behaviour of the individual water molecules is of exactly the same significance as the switching effect of the dam.

No, it isn't.

The reason that this matters is that if there's a contention that a physical process is happening with a switch, then that physical process needs to be unambiguously defined.

It's unambiguous as to whether or not water is passing through a dam.

It either is or it isn't.

JoeTheJuggler

7th November 2009, 09:41 AM

Organ systems have properties that you won't find at the level of tissue; tissue has properties that you won't find at the level of cells; cells have properties that you won't find at the level of molecules; molecules have properties that you won't find at the level of atoms.

A rather simple example: the cardio vascular system. As an organ system is has the property of being able to pump blood through the lungs to be oxygenated and then throughout the rest of the body to deliver that oxygen via the capillaries to cells and to return the unoxygenated blood to the heart.

We could look at any of the organs in the system, but let's take the heart. The heart does not in itself have the property of delivering oxygenated blood to the cells. (You need arteries, arterioles, capillaries, venules, veins, and lungs.) However it does have the ability to pump blood.

The heart is made of several different kinds of tissues. None of them has the ability to pump blood. Some tissue can contract, some is organized into valves, etc. These have various properties/functions that the cells which compose them don't have.

And so on.

Using QM to study consciousness is no different than trying to use QM to study cardiovascular function. What can QM tell us about blood pressure regulation?

westprog

7th November 2009, 10:42 AM

*Looks at radical growth of thread since the last time he posted*

..... I think I have created a monster :boxedin:

I think you poked a sleeping giant.

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 11:12 AM

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 11:15 AM

No-one has got to the bottom of the question because nobody has worked out what question they are actually trying to ask.
Wrong. I know exactly what I am trying to ask, and that's why I have an answer.

You might not like my question. You might not like my answer. But that's your problem, not mine.

I'm afraid it really does come down to how you define the word "consciousness". If it is not possible to come to an agreement about exactly what is meant by that word and exactly what question we are trying to ask about the thing to which it refers then we stand zero chance of reaching a sensible answer.
This is all true. So, what's your definition?

Garbage in, garbage out.
We noticed.

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 11:17 AM

*Looks at radical growth of thread since the last time he posted*

..... I think I have created a monster :boxedin:
Yep.

Just mention consciousness and the people who can't even define the term come out in droves to argue - incoherently - with the people who can.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 11:20 AM

The only meaning "digital" has in the real world is in terms of the interpretation we place on the information received. The electrical processes on an analogue telephone line are exactly the same as when converted to ADSL. It's just a matter of decoding at each end.

And the quality of reproduction of either analogue or digital is entirely dependent on the precision of the equipment. In any case, we see and hear the information in an entirely analogue way, because our senses don't work on digital.I will take some exception with Pixy as this isn't entirely wrong. In any event. Using the same analogue telephone line we can send and receive a voice message in analouge and record it over and over and very quickly we will see degredation. Not so with digital. We can make millions if not billions of copies without degredation (that's not to say there will be no degredation of information in transit however we have digital error checking and can resend any data that is degraded). That's a fact jack.

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 11:23 AM

But our senses are digital.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 11:32 AM

But our senses are digital.I will agree with you that it could be argued that they are. The rods and cones in our eyes are in digital configuration. The data transmission, I think, is digital. As an aside, the four protein arrangement of our DNA is digital. It's not as clear cut as it may seem. It comes down to how you define digital. I'm going to alter my stance on this one a bit.

But please to tell me how our senses are digital other than the rods and cones in our eyes and the transmission of data from nerves to brain? FWIW: I'm not insisting that they are not. :)

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 12:12 PM

Bingo. Words have meaning and their purpose is to convey ideas. The word Digital has a meaning and when used appropriately it correctly conveys ideas. I stand by my contention.

"re-arrange the meanings of the words"?

There's simply no need. If the crux of the argument is the meaning of the words then it is a semantical argument.

Randfan, the trouble is that I have heard you cry "semantic argument" on numerous occasions when there was far more at stake than the mere meanings of words.

Anyone who thinks this dispute about consciousness is "merely semantic" simply because the debate can't go anywhere at all unless you first nail down the definition of the word "consciousness" is badly mistaken.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 12:14 PM

The data transmission, I think, is digital.

Not according to any concept of "digital" with which I am familiar.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 12:17 PM

Randfan, the trouble is that I have heard you cry "semantic argument" on numerous occasions when there was far more at stake than the mere meanings of words.This would be a fallacy. If there is an error in logic then what's at stake has no relevance as to the error in logic.

Anyone who thinks this dispute about consciousness is "merely semantic" simply because the debate can't go anywhere at all unless you first nail down the definition of the word "consciousness" is badly mistaken. And this would be a strawman.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 12:18 PM

Not according to any concept of "digital" with which I am familiar. According to the concept that I'm familiar with I think it very well could be argued.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 12:20 PM

I am not convinced of your proof.

I was pointing out that circular definitions are easy to come by.

You said you would like to see me find a circular definition for matter. I did. That is all.

This is what you asked

If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?.

and I said go ahead and try. I did not say that I agreed it was possible.

and thats not all since you have yet to show

If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?.

It was your own reasoning, with "matter" and "physical" swapped for "consciousness" and "think". You seemed to think you had made some point because you had a circular definition.

no

this is what I said

this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.

and repeated later

In any case I was not suggesting that matter or thinking would create themselves if they were defined self-referentially. You suggested this and I suggested you try prove it. What I did say was that what I myself create, is self-referential. I gave you a dictionary definition of think and conscious as a guide and proceeded to explain why you saying you think and me saying I think is not equivalent. The point being to show you how only I can create and address my consciousness.

I don't recall asking anything of the sort. I think you will have to quote that part.

the quote

If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself? Please try, it would be most interesting to see.

Recall now?

What I did say was that what I myself create, is self-referential.

Your original claim was that consciousness creates consciousness as I seem to recall.

This assertion as related to thinking was clarified in these posts immediately after my first post on this thread

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5278997#post5278997

And you know this - how?

I think

and

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5279089#post5279089

Consciousness is self referential.
It creates itself.

Unsupported assertion.
, the only one we can make "I think"

I then proceeded over the next few posts addressed mostly the David to justify my initial claims regarding consciousness in the light of thinking.

Then you then asked me

You think, therefore consciousness creates itself.

Hmmm...

Perhaps you should be a little more explicit about this step.

So I first defined what I meant by conscious and think to be clear and then re-iterated what I had been trying to say next.

Asking me, how do you know "you think" is not equivalent to me asking myself how do I know "I think".
In the first instance you are addressing an object not of your creation in the 2nd I am addressing an object I created. This is the unique quality of thinking. It is self-referential. In order to answer the first question I refer to the 2nd and I am stuck, as I cannot transcend my own thinking in order to observe it as an independent object not of my creation. All I can say about it is, I think I think. We can transfer thinking to the brain/matter/atoms and then claim the "I" is an illusion which prevents us from studying thinking as an independent objective entity and this may prove useful in conceptualization, but it is not justified as it still assumes thinking and only transfers thinking elsewhere. We might then be further inclined to deny thinking as well, which is also unjustified as we would use thinking to do this.

and I repeated this later

I gave you a dictionary definition of think and conscious as a guide and proceeded to explain why you saying you think and me saying I think is not equivalent. The point being to show you how only I can create and address my consciousness.

Only you can address your consciousness - but you cannot create it.

And what would I be addressing my consciousness with then?

Recall when I asked you how you created your consciousness you were unable to answer.

a reminder

And you know this - how?

I think That is my answer the first time and I have yet to change my mind.

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 12:24 PM

Not according to any concept of "digital" with which I am familiar.
Our nerves carry pulse-coded digital signals. I'm not sure what concepts of "digital" with which you are familiar, but whatever they are, they are incomplete at best.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 12:38 PM

I don't think it's a function purely of number.

For example, you might ask how many bricks make a house (and the emergent properties of a house)? It's not a matter of number (though it does take more than "some") as much as it is how they're organized to do certain functions.

(ETA: It also depends on how you define "consciousness". As I've been saying that's a term that refers to many different properties/functions.)

I think its problematic to refer to an emergent property without first defining this property and identifying at what stage it emerges.

But again, back to the point of this thread, do you suppose QM or neuroscience will answer this question?

The question of Penrose and his thesis on QM being capable of explaining consciousness ?
I do not believe it is consciousness that needs explaining, but thinking.
This can only be explained using thinking. We can confirm our thoughts on consciousness using the scientific method. In other words consciousness is a question for philosophy to unravel and science to communicate.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 12:45 PM

I think its problematic to refer to an emergent property without first defining this property and identifying at what stage it emerges. Nonsense. Prior to our understanding of aerodynamics we didn't have to pretend that flight wasn't a result of the constituent properties of birds, bats and other flying animals.

This is what you are asking us to do with consciousness. Since we don't know at what stage consciousness emerges we must presume that it doesn't emerge from physical processes.

Now, before our understanding of aerodynamics there were people who proposed that flight was metaphysical. Angels or special forces but it wasn't up to those who insisted that flight was simply the result of physical forces to prove the negative.

We only know of physical processes for consciousness.

End of story.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 12:46 PM

This would be a fallacy. If there is an error in logic then what's at stake has no relevance as to the error in logic.

The attempt is made to hide logical errors with absurd definitions like "consciousness is what the brain does." If I contest this sort of argument it is not a mere semantic argument.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 12:46 PM

Then you are being dishonest. You asked a question about how many brain cells are needed for consciousness to emerge. I asked how many atoms are needed for flight to emerge.

Neuroscience does not hold that the only thing necessary for consciousness is brain cells.
Likewise, I do not hold that the only thing necessary for flight are wings.

So the question still stands.

One long strawman.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 12:49 PM

Nonsense. Prior to our understanding of aerodynamics we didn't have to pretend that flight wasn't a result of the constituent properties of birds, bats and other flying animals.

This is what you are asking us to do with consciousness. Since we don't know at what stage consciousness emerges we must presume that it doesn't emerge from physical processes.

Now, there were people who proposed that flight was metaphysical. Angels or special forces but it wasn't up to those who insisted that flight was simply the resulto fo physical forces to prove the negative.

We only know of physical processes for consciousness.

End of story.

Another strawman

RandFan

7th November 2009, 12:50 PM

The attempt is made to hide logical errors with absurd definitions like "consciousness is what the brain does." If I contest this sort of argument it is not a mere semantic argument.You are veering off the course. Let's stick with the point that started this meta discussion. I noted that there was a semantical argument being made. Now, this is the case or it isn't. That claim must stand on it's own.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 12:52 PM

Another strawman Hardly. It goes directly to the heart of the matter. It illustrates clearly why you are making an error in logic.

However, I'll withdraw my use of the word "pretend" and substitute "presume" as that could be construed as a straw man.

Ron_Tomkins

7th November 2009, 12:53 PM

I think you poked a sleeping giant.

I think I opened a can of killer worms.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 01:01 PM

It's the same question. You seem to want to learn about the concept of emergent properties.

Actually, you seem to be scoffing at the idea of emergent properties by asking reductionist questions.

Emergent properties is not about quantity. It's much more about levels of organization.

Organ systems have properties that you won't find at the level of tissue; tissue has properties that you won't find at the level of cells; cells have properties that you won't find at the level of molecules; molecules have properties that you won't find at the level of atoms.

I am very much aware of the concept of emergence and have no issues with it.
I just do not see why we should not ask when does an emergent property emerge and therefore how much of "whatever" was required before a new property emerged. Otherwise stating that something complex is difficult to understand because "it is an emergent property" is just hand waving.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 01:05 PM

I just do not see why we should not ask when does an emergent property emerge and therefore how much of "whatever" was required before a new property emerged. There is nothing wrong with asking such questions. That we don't know the answer does not invite conclusions from our ignorance.

We don't know.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 01:09 PM

One long strawman. Why is it a straw man?

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 01:37 PM

Why is it a straw man?

The issue I brought up by asking the numbers question is that I do not see why the concept emergence should bypass empirical scrutiny.

You brought up something completely unrelated to point to your own thoughts on neuroscience about the emergence of consciousness being the result of more than one thing and the emergence of flight being the result of more than one thing.

I never said that consciousness was only the result of brain cells, I only asked how many brain cells would be necessary for consciousness.

!Kaggen

7th November 2009, 01:39 PM

There is nothing wrong with asking such questions. That we don't know the answer does not invite conclusions from our ignorance.

We don't know.

What prompted this response?

RandFan

7th November 2009, 01:47 PM

I never said that consciousness was only the result of brain cells, I only asked how many brain cells would be necessary for consciousness.The question is a silly and nonsensical one. To illustrate why it is both silly and nonsensical I asked "how many atoms in the wing of a plane would be necessary for flight?".

Both questions are equally silly and absurd. Neither question (or the inability to answer either question) will advance a debate or discussion.

So, no straw man.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 01:49 PM

What prompted this response?If you already knew the answer to your question (we don't know how many brain cells are necessary) then why ask the question in the first place? Are you not trying to make a point? No point, other than we are ignorant, can be made.

Bob: Flight is the result of all of the pysical processes of flying animals and air pressure.
Ted: How many atoms are needed in the wing before an animal can fly?
Bob: That is a silly and absurd questions.

JTJ: Consciousness is the result of physical processes in the brain.
Kag: How many brain cells are needed in the brain before consciousness emerges.
RF: That is a silly and absurd question.

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 01:58 PM

The attempt is made to hide logical errors with absurd definitions like "consciousness is what the brain does."
Of course, no-one ever said that, so the point is irrelevant.

RandFan

7th November 2009, 02:01 PM

The attempt is made to hide logical errors with absurd definitions like "consciousness is what the brain does." If I contest this sort of argument it is not a mere semantic argument.

Of course, no-one ever said that, so the point is irrelevant. As a definition of consciousness that would be a rather incomplete definition at best.

However consciousness is what the brain does as flight is what planes do.

Malerin

7th November 2009, 02:51 PM

The question is a silly and nonsensical one. To illustrate why it is both silly and nonsensical I asked "how many atoms in the wing of a plane would be necessary for flight?".

Both questions are equally silly and absurd. Neither question (or the inability to answer either question) will advance a debate or discussion.

So, no straw man.

Kaggen's not asking how many atoms it takes before consciousness can emerge (which would lead to your rebuttal question about atoms and wings).

Wouldn't the question be more like: How much lift does a wing have to generate before "flight" occurs?

RandFan

7th November 2009, 03:39 PM

Kaggen's not asking how many atoms it takes before consciousness can emerge....:facepalm: Sweet jesus.

He's asking about brain cells. Brain cells are the constituent parts that make up a brain. What are the constiuent parts that make up a wing (the primary means of flight in flying animals) Atoms are constituent units of wings. If you prefer molecules I could go for that. If you perfer feathers I could go for that. If you have any other constituent unit that would be an analog I would be happy to accept it.

Which constituent unit would you choose? Hint: Lift ISN'T a constiuent part.

Wouldn't the question be more like: How much lift does a wing have to generate before "flight" occurs?NO. Because lift ISN'T a constiuent part of a wing.

UndercoverElephant

7th November 2009, 03:40 PM

*Looks at radical growth of thread since the last time he posted*

..... I think I have created a monster :boxedin:

What did you expect mentioning the word "consciousness" in a thread title? :D

Malerin

7th November 2009, 05:14 PM

:facepalm: Sweet jesus.

He's asking about brain cells. Brain cells are the constituent parts that make up a brain. What are the constiuent parts that make up a wing (the primary means of flight in flying animals) Atoms are constituent units of wings. If you prefer molecules I could go for that. If you perfer feathers I could go for that. If you have any other constituent unit that would be an analog I would be happy to accept it.

Which constituent unit would you choose? Hint: Lift ISN'T a constiuent part.

NO. Because lift ISN'T a constiuent part of a wing.

Think more in terms of necessary conditions:

Lift is a necessary condition for a typical plane to get off the ground. So you can then ask, Well how much lift is necessary? In the same way, physicalists claim neural activity is a necesssary condition for consciousness. So the same question arises: how much neural activity is necessary?

RandFan

7th November 2009, 05:26 PM

In the same way, physicalists claim neural activity is a necesssary condition for consciousness.Atoms and molecules ARE a necessary condition.

So the same question arises: how much neural activity is necessary?How man feathers are necassary for flight?

If you can't tell me precisely how many feathers are needed for a bird to fly then how can you expect me to tell you how much neural activity is necassary for flight?

When does night become day? No, really. What is the precise moment? Such questions are absurd. We don't know. Consciousness isn't a binary question. There are different levels (actually gradations) of consciousness.

If there was an answer then we don't know what that answer is. I've said "we don't know". I've said it over and over. So what should we make of our ignorance?

Dancing David

7th November 2009, 06:27 PM

But the bit is just an idea that we have. The physics of it is not digital.

So?

The usage is digital not analog. It uses numbers to transmit the data in the processor, not a volatge state. the way music is encoded digitaly is very different from analog encoding. You are saying that there is no way to tell the DnA of a rabiit from the DnA of a dog because they are physically teh same.

The number 5516 is not a sliding scale from 1 to 256 represented by a volatge potential, it is low high low high low high low high. It is used to represent the digits in binary of 8510, 5516.

It is the usage that determines the defintion, not the underlying process.

You use the voltages to represent 0/1 and then numbers in binary, octal, digital or hexideci, which is what makes it digital. And yes you can tell the difference physically, if you send an analog video signal down an ethernet cable to an ethernet modem it will receive noise. You can distinguish the signal pattern difference.

So are you really saying that rabbits and dogs are the same because you can't tell their DnA apart.

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 07:06 PM

As a definition of consciousness that would be a rather incomplete definition at best.

However consciousness is what the brain does as flight is what planes do.
Indeed.

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 07:21 PM

Think more in terms of necessary conditions:

Lift is a necessary condition for a typical plane to get off the ground. So you can then ask, Well how much lift is necessary? In the same way, physicalists claim neural activity is a necesssary condition for consciousness. So the same question arises: how much neural activity is necessary?
The two questions are not only not equivalent, they are not even similar.

Lift is a vector. If you have more lift than weight, you go up. Very very simple.

Neural activity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness in neural networks. Obviously. No neural activity, no consciousness. But you can also have neural activity without consciousness.

Are you seriously disputing any of these facts? Are you seriously suggesting that those questions are equivalent?

PixyMisa

7th November 2009, 07:23 PM

It wasn't me who mentioned the word "consciousness". Ask the person who asked the original question. You should already know my answer to this: I think we depend on a subjective definition of this word - we have to define it privately in terms of our own experience of reality.
I absolutely deny this. My definition is objective and mathematically precise.

I know you don't like it. But that's your problem.

rocketdodger

7th November 2009, 09:48 PM

I had no particular wish to revisit this, but the alternative seems to be to have Rocketdodger give his misunderstood version.

Right. Lets just clear up my misunderstanding then, eh?

Do you or do you not consider consciousness to be a physical process?

Do you or do you not think a working computer is different from a pile of non-functional computer parts?

Do you or do you not think a thermostat is different from a rock?

Do you or do you not consider bacteria different from rocks?

Do you or do you not think that life would exist on Earth if humans didn't exist?

Do you or do you not think a glass of water contains a virtual machine and software to run on it?

Do you or do you not think that an adult human assembled cell by cell in an advanced laboratory would be human in the same way as the rest of us, if there were no way to tell the difference between us?