Examples of how assumptions about consciousness are entirely wrong

[rocketdodger]

So I am trying to get some extra hours in over the weekend, and I have to pee.

On my way back from the restroom, I navigate to my cubicle. Everything sounds kosher, right?

Except, it was my old cubicle that I moved from over 4 months ago.

When things like this happen to me, I realize just how wrong the classical view of consciousness really is.

[UndercoverElephant]

So I am trying to get some extra hours in over the weekend, and I have to pee.

On my way back from the restroom, I navigate to my cubicle. Everything sounds kosher, right?

Except, it was my old cubicle that I moved from over 4 months ago.

When things like this happen to me, I realize just how wrong the classical view of consciousness really is.

Eh? So you temporarily forgot you'd changed cubicles. Happens all the time. Classic example is when you set out to go somewhere in the car but end up following your route to work by mistake, because your mind drifted and the navigational part was on "automatic". This tell you precisely what? What is "the classical view of consciousness"? I can't see any argument here. You've noticed that humans make errors of this sort therefore the classical view of consciousness is very wrong? I've got no idea what you are trying to say, or why.

This isn't telling us anything about consciousness. It tells us something about cognition, but it's not that earth-shattering. All it tells us is that we do certain familiar things without having to think very hard about them, and sometimes this leads to the sort of error you are talking about.

[jadey]

Funny. Exact same thing happened to me the other day. It occured to me just how wrong the classical view of time travel really is.:boggled:

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All it tells us is that we do certain familiar things without having to think very hard about them, and sometimes this leads to the sort of error you are talking about.
Absolutely. And other times we do certain familiar things without being conscious at all about them. Ever had an upper GI or similar procedure? I was given a mild sedative and then given commands while I was unconscious. I obeyed the commands.

Consciousness is over-rated. :D

~~ Paul

[Hux]

I walk into a room and cannot remember why I went in there. Its called old age.

[UndercoverElephant]

I walk into a room and cannot remember why I went in there. Its called old age.

Hey man, so do I. In my case it is called being stoned. :)

[plumjam]

The other day I went for a crap and singlehandedly disproved several classical theories on digestion, anatomy and the nature of space.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But were you conscious while taking the crap?

~~ Paul

[dv82matt]

And other times we do certain familiar things without being conscious at all about them. Ever had an upper GI or similar procedure? I was given a mild sedative and then given commands while I was unconscious. I obeyed the commands.

Consciousness is over-rated. :D


How can you be sure you were unconcious? If "you" obeyed commands then "you" were obviously, in some sense, conscious of the commands.

[plumjam]

But were you conscious while taking the crap?

~~ Paul

Till about half way through.

[SumDood]

I had a very similar experience a while back while delivering flowers. I had my route in my head how to get to the street the destination was on. But I pretty much 'zoned out' and after a while discovered i didn't know where i was. Turned out i was on the correct street, but had used a more direct route to get there. I was planning on going on Highway 'A' to Highway 'B' then exit to the correct street. But turns out there was an exit to the correct street on Highway 'A'. I had taken the exit without even knowing it. Very strange. I always blamed it on my subconscious taking over while i wasn't paying attention.

[dv82matt]

When things like this happen to me, I realize just how wrong the classical view of consciousness really is.

How does the conclusion follow from the example?

[Hux]

The other day I went for a crap and singlehandedly disproved several classical theories on digestion, anatomy and the nature of space.

My God, please tell me you don't have evidence?

[plumjam]

How does the conclusion follow from the example?
I think when he got back to the wrong cubicle there was a post-it note on the side of the monitor reading "Classical understanding of consciousness :thumbsdow :( "

My God, please tell me you don't have evidence?
There is evidence; it's just not entirely solid.

[JoeTheJuggler]

I think procedural memory is part of what we commonly call "consciousness". (I wouldn't say consciousness is over-rated so much as poorly defined.)

I'm also not sure what the classical view of consciousness is, but the anecdote in the OP fits in just fine with neuroscience.

[Hux]

There is evidence; it's just not entirely solid.

Entirely is a worrying word.

[rocketdodger]

Eh? So you temporarily forgot you'd changed cubicles. Happens all the time. Classic example is when you set out to go somewhere in the car but end up following your route to work by mistake, because your mind drifted and the navigational part was on "automatic". This tell you precisely what? What is "the classical view of consciousness"? I can't see any argument here. You've noticed that humans make errors of this sort therefore the classical view of consciousness is very wrong? I've got no idea what you are trying to say, or why.

This isn't telling us anything about consciousness. It tells us something about cognition, but it's not that earth-shattering. All it tells us is that we do certain familiar things without having to think very hard about them, and sometimes this leads to the sort of error you are talking about.

Well this "classical view" of which I speak is the idea that there is some decision making entity that has continuous awareness of what one is doing.

And in arguments in these very forums, a number of individuals have expressed the sentiment that something like pathfinding is a conscious activity because it can be a conscious activity. But what about when it isn't? How can a process switch back and forth from conscious to subconscious?

Sometimes I am consciously aware of my own pathfinding. But many other times -- as illustrated by my anecdote -- it occurs on a level lower than where I consider my focus to be directed. I was not consciously pathfinding, because if I had been I wouldn't have gone to my old cube.

What this suggests about consciousness -- contrary to your assertion that it tells us nothing -- is that it really is self referencing information processing.

Another anecdotal experience that convinces me is seeing code I wrote no more than 6 months ago and not recognizing it at all. If consciousness is something beyond information processing, why does memory fail?

[rocketdodger]

How does the conclusion follow from the example?

Because my body was doing something that is classically considered a conscious activity without any conscious input whatsoever.

[dv82matt]

Because my body was doing something that is classically considered a conscious activity without any conscious input whatsoever.
Meh, I suppose. Your "classical understading" seems like a strawman to me though. Also how did you identify this consciousness "thing" that you assert that you did not have so that you could verify that you lacked it?

Sometimes I am consciously aware of my own pathfinding. But many other times -- as illustrated by my anecdote -- it occurs on a level lower than where I consider my focus to be directed. I was not consciously pathfinding, because if I had been I wouldn't have gone to my old cube.

What this suggests about consciousness -- contrary to your assertion that it tells us nothing -- is that it really is self referencing information processing.
Can you explain how you arrived at this conclusion? I get the sense that you think it is obvious but it is not at all clear to me that self-reference is the key salient feature.

What about the idea that consciousness is a process for resolving strong conflicting impulses? How were you able to rule that hypothesis out?

[Dancing David]

How can you be sure you were unconcious? If "you" obeyed commands then "you" were obviously, in some sense, conscious of the commands.

Yup, that is the problem with the term and associated baggage. I was also partly aware during a 'twilight' procedure.

The term is something like 'rousable and responsive' but by the full defintion it is not 'conscious', it was a lot like a dream.

[Dancing David]

Meh, I suppose. Your "classical understading" seems like a strawman to me though. Also how did you identify this consciousness "thing" that you assert that you did not have so that you could verify that you lacked it?

Can you explain how you arrived at this conclusion? I get the sense that you think it is obvious but it is not at all clear to me that self-reference is the key salient feature.

What about the idea that consciousness is a process for resolving strong conflicting impulses? How were you able to rule that hypothesis out?


Now wait, you might want to ask and read around in some threads.

There are two plus camps here, the 'consciousness' is a physical process mostly occuring within organic brains camp. (Isay mostly because of the PNS)

Then there are a variety of other camps that define 'consciousness' in some sort of metaphysical mish mosh of vague defintions and allusions.

When RD makes reference to the 'classical' model he is reffering exactly to that sort of construction.

Read around the first three pages of this thread (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=158352) which is the most recent incarnation. You will see that two posters in different ways assign these 'classical' meanings to 'consciousness' and then there are others.

[dv82matt]

Yup, that is the problem with the term and associated baggage. I was also partly aware during a 'twilight' procedure.

The term is something like 'rousable and responsive' but by the full defintion it is not 'conscious', it was a lot like a dream.
Consciousness is such a fuzzy term. It's probably better to refer to more discrete, better defined processes.


Now wait, you might want to ask and read around in some threads.

There are two plus camps here, the 'consciousness' is a physical process mostly occuring within organic brains camp. (Isay mostly because of the PNS)

Then there are a variety of other camps that define 'consciousness' in some sort of metaphysical mish mosh of vague defintions and allusions.

When RD makes reference to the 'classical' model he is reffering exactly to that sort of construction.I'm in the physical process camp but RD's example based on autonavigation struck me as exceptionally poor.

The main seriously proposed nonphysical argument that I have heard is the idea that experience is made up of units called qualia that are fundamental which leads to the so called "hard problem of consciousness". But I don't see how RD's point is relevant to it at all.

On an unrelated note, the idea that consciousness is self-referential information processing is not useful until "self-reference" is properly defined or described in this context.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How can you be sure you were unconcious? If "you" obeyed commands then "you" were obviously, in some sense, conscious of the commands.
In some sense, yes. But I was not conscious of the pain, nor did I remember any of the commands or the procedure. We typically associate obeying commands with conscious acts.


The main seriously proposed nonphysical argument that I have heard is the idea that experience is made up of units called qualia that are fundamental which leads to the so called "hard problem of consciousness". But I don't see how RD's point is relevant to it at all.
He had no qualia associated with finding his way. I had none associated with obeying commands.

~~ Paul

[dv82matt]

In some sense, yes. But I was not conscious of the pain, nor did I remember any of the commands or the procedure. We typically associate obeying commands with conscious acts.
Sure but because of the fuzziness of the term "consciousness" and/or because most processes that we associate with consciousness don't absolutely require it few processes fall neatly into the consciousness folder.

He had no qualia associated with finding his way. I had none associated with obeying commands.That is the assertion, the evidence seems weak to me. But even if true so what? Is there some rule in the nonphysical arguments that says qualia must be present in any given situation if you don't experience anything?

Don't get me wrong though, I don't think consciousness is a "hard" problem though I do think there is more to it than just self-referencing information processing.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sure but because of the fuzziness of the term "consciousness" and/or because most processes that we associate with consciousness don't absolutely require it few processes fall neatly into the consciousness folder.
Indeed, which is the point of the OP.


That is the assertion, the evidence seems weak to me. But even if true so what? Is there some rule in the nonphysical arguments that says qualia must be present in any given situation if you don't experience anything?
I don't understand your second sentence.

I think we may be arguing in agreement.

~~ Paul

[dv82matt]

Indeed, which is the point of the OP.
Maybe in part, but that point doesn't seem to take since the OP makes its main point as if consciousness is well defined.

I don't understand your second sentence.
Just that in order for the absence of a "thing" in a particular situation to count as evidence against a theory the theory in question must assert the presence of a "thing" in that particular situation.

I think we may be arguing in agreement.I wouldn't be surprised.

[Dancing David]

Consciousness is such a fuzzy term. It's probably better to refer to more discrete, better defined processes.

That is exactly my point in most of the threads.


I'm in the physical process camp but RD's example based on autonavigation struck me as exceptionally poor.

The main seriously proposed nonphysical argument that I have heard is the idea that experience is made up of units called qualia that are fundamental which leads to the so called "hard problem of consciousness". But I don't see how RD's point is relevant to it at all.

On an unrelated note, the idea that consciousness is self-referential information processing is not useful until "self-reference" is properly defined or described in this context.

Of course.

[Dancing David]

Well, to navigate does require some level of 'awarenss' of stimuli/perceptions, and so there was awareness of the inputs that determined not bumping into things and maintaining balance.

So most likely also 'conscious' in terms of arousal and interaction, but not 'paying attention'.

[Wowbagger]

There are lots of examples in the field of vision. Most optical illusions will demonstrate just how wrong many old ideas about consciousness are.

And, then there are folks with brain damage who exhibit only certain aspects of conscious awareness, but not others.

[Pure Argent]

The other day I went for a crap and singlehandedly disproved several classical theories on digestion, anatomy and the nature of space.

But were you conscious while taking the crap?

~~ Paul

Till about half way through.

:D

Nominated.

[Beerina]

Absolutely. And other times we do certain familiar things without being conscious at all about them. Ever had an upper GI or similar procedure? I was given a mild sedative and then given commands while I was unconscious. I obeyed the commands.

Consciousness is over-rated. :D

~~ Paul

It may very well be. It could be an impersonal, so to speak, feature dependent on the hardware (brain) and the associated stored memories. Like a candle flame, when you are unconscious, it is "off", and when lit, it sucks up melted wax from below to burn and keep the flame "running".

As disturbing that is to think about, in a sense you "die" every time you fall asleep (note that dreams are actually conscious experiences, but are only part of the sleep cycle) only to come back to life when your brain kickstarts the high-oxygen-using conscious brain activity and flickers the candle back to life.

Thus there may very well be no "you" to kill when you copy your brain's contents elsewhere, in the old atom-copy-reassemble thought experiment. The sense of continuity is based on memories being restored to the newly-flickering candle that is your current, continuous instance of consciousness since you awoke this morning.

Of course, evolutionarily, both our conscious and unconscious brain are oriented about keeping this particular set of memories, i.e. brain, intact and re-awakening each morning, and not some clone :)


For this reason, as humanity moves into the future, I would like to place an emphasis on the importance of the original brain and memories in being the important part, and not the store of unconscious data that could, in theory, be cloned into any number of brains, mechanical or otherwise, that happen to give rise to the physical phenomenon of actual consciousness.

I would expect derivative constructions, i.e. the copies, to downplay this importance, and thus build up a meme that the "originals" can be done away with.

Sorry, no.

[rocketdodger]

I'm in the physical process camp but RD's example based on autonavigation struck me as exceptionally poor.

The main seriously proposed nonphysical argument that I have heard is the idea that experience is made up of units called qualia that are fundamental which leads to the so called "hard problem of consciousness". But I don't see how RD's point is relevant to it at all.

My point is relevant because if there is such a thing as qualia, a given state of my mind + body + environment would produce the same qualia.

Thus, I should experience the same qualia from pathfinding anytime I pathfind. That includes the qualia of awareness of making pathfinding decisions.

Except, I can pathfind and not be conscious of any of the pathfinding decisions -- turn left here, turn right there, etc.

So either qualia can be subconscious, or else the same mind + body + environment state can lead to qualia sometimes but not always. Either of those options pollutes the classical viewpoint.

Furthermore, it implies that the definitive ingredient for consciousness is not qualia at all but rather something above qualia. And given any thought it is trivially obvious that this ingredient is simply "attention" -- you are conscious of something because you are thinking about it. And once that is established, you don't even need qualia anymore.

On an unrelated note, the idea that consciousness is self-referential information processing is not useful until "self-reference" is properly defined or described in this context.

"Self-reference" means referencing the self, plain and simple.

[westprog]

Funny. Exact same thing happened to me the other day. It occured to me just how wrong the classical view of time travel really is.:boggled:

I think the thread title should really be


Examples of how other people's assumptions about consciousness are entirely wrong.

[westprog]

My point is relevant because if there is such a thing as qualia, a given state of my mind + body + environment would produce the same qualia.

Thus, I should experience the same qualia from pathfinding anytime I pathfind. That includes the qualia of awareness of making pathfinding decisions.


I'll give you the credit of assuming this is a joke.

[TheAnachronism]

So I am trying to get some extra hours in over the weekend, and I have to pee.

On my way back from the restroom, I navigate to my cubicle. Everything sounds kosher, right?

Except, it was my old cubicle that I moved from over 4 months ago.

When things like this happen to me, I realize just how wrong the classical view of consciousness really is.

I wrote about a similar example in this post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=156231):

"I love looking at books in foreign language like Russian and Chinese. When I do this, I can look at the words and letters like they are pictures; I can observe the curves and lines of the letters without recognizing that they mean anything. But it's not the same for my native language (English) nor my second language (German). Whenever I see a word in these languages, I recognize it as meaning something. I can't look at the printed words "mistake" or "Aufhebung" and admire its form; my mind almost instantly decodes its meaning. Even if I try to force myself not to recognize the word, I read it and understand it."

[westprog]

My point is relevant because if there is such a thing as qualia, a given state of my mind + body + environment would produce the same qualia.

Thus, I should experience the same qualia from pathfinding anytime I pathfind. That includes the qualia of awareness of making pathfinding decisions.


The only way I can make sense of this is to assume Rocketdodger has taken some proof of the non-computational nature of consciousness and substituted "qualia" for "deterministic computational process". I think he must know that qualia have nothing to do with decision making. The experience of the decision has no causal relationship with how it is produced.

[drkitten]

The only way I can make sense of this is to assume Rocketdodger has taken some proof of the non-computational nature of consciousness and substituted "qualia" for "deterministic computational process".

That would be quite a trick, as no such proof exists.

Why not assume he took unicorn dust instead?

[rocketdodger]

I'll give you the credit of assuming this is a joke.

Nope.

I know what redness feels like. I experience the quale (singular?) of "redness" whenever I look at anything red.

I know what being in control and making a decision feels like. I experience the quale of "decision making" whenever I am making a decision.

What don't you understand about that?

Yet, there are times when I am looking at a red object, or (in the case of the OP) making decisions and I don't experience the associated qualia.

Why not?

[rocketdodger]

I think he must know that qualia have nothing to do with decision making. The experience of the decision has no causal relationship with how it is produced.

I think you must know that qualia have nothing to do with the perception of color. The experience of the perception of color has no causal relationship with how it is produced.

[drkitten]

I think you must know that qualia have nothing to do with the perception of color. The experience of the perception of color has no causal relationship with how it is produced.

That's actually true-ish. If I shine a red light and a green light into your eye, you will perceive a yellow quale.

[westprog]

That would be quite a trick, as no such proof exists.


Of course not, the post was gibberish whatever words were substituted in.

Why not assume he took unicorn dust instead?

You said it, not me.

[westprog]

Nope.

I know what redness feels like. I experience the quale (singular?) of "redness" whenever I look at anything red.

I know what being in control and making a decision feels like. I experience the quale of "decision making" whenever I am making a decision.

What don't you understand about that?

Yet, there are times when I am looking at a red object, or (in the case of the OP) making decisions and I don't experience the associated qualia.

Why not?

Maybe we don't understand how the process actually works?

[rocketdodger]

Maybe we don't understand how the process actually works?

Yes, that is possible.

It is also possible that the notion of qualia is rubbish and that there is no such thing as "how the process actually works" because it is rubbish.

[dv82matt]

My point is relevant because if there is such a thing as qualia, a given state of my mind + body + environment would produce the same qualia.

Thus, I should experience the same qualia from pathfinding anytime I pathfind. That includes the qualia of awareness of making pathfinding decisions.The state of mind is different so there's no reason to suppose that the qualia should be the same.

I don't take issue with the conclusion that qualia are unneccessary but your reasoning here doesn't work.

"Self-reference" means referencing the self, plain and simple.
What is a reference? What is a self? I think you may be borrowing your understanding of self-reference from computer programming but self-reference in any language is just shorthand to make it easier to process and refer to concepts. Self-reference originates in the language and is not actually inherent in the thing being studied.

Is a perturbed spring engaging in self-reference? A thermostat? A computer running a program that displays its own hardware specs? A dog failing to recognize itself in a mirror? A person contemplating consciousness?

[Maia]

.02 cents worth... (well, it all seems to make sense after a 12-hour day of working with Alzheimer's patients, anyway...)

I think I'll start a thread on how completely unscientific almost all theories of mind are, and how reductive materialism is just as bad as any other. ;)

[Robin]

So I am trying to get some extra hours in over the weekend, and I have to pee.

On my way back from the restroom, I navigate to my cubicle. Everything sounds kosher, right?

Except, it was my old cubicle that I moved from over 4 months ago.

When things like this happen to me, I realize just how wrong the classical view of consciousness really is.
I went for a cup of coffee and went back to my desk from 2 years ago once.

[Robin]

.02 cents worth... (well, it all seems to make sense after a 12-hour day of working with Alzheimer's patients, anyway...)

I think I'll start a thread on how completely unscientific almost all theories of mind are, and how reductive materialism is just as bad as any other. ;)
And Eliminative Materialist eh?

[Robin]

The other day I went for a crap and singlehandedly disproved several classical theories on digestion, anatomy and the nature of space.
On the other hand you must be an eliminative immaterialist

[Soapy Sam]

Here is my theory of consciousness and it is mine.
Ahem!
It's an install routine.
When we load a new program into the brain, we use the conscious installer. We call this "learning".
Once the new software is correctly installed (which can take many attempts and corrections) it runs as a compiled program, making calls to system subroutines. (Walk / swallow / print)- other times the interpreted version is run, where consciousness provides feedback and decision making ability.
This theory is very, very thin at one end, potentially very thick in the middle and I expect to get several books and a Ph.D out of it.

[westprog]

Yes, that is possible.

It is also possible that the notion of qualia is rubbish and that there is no such thing as "how the process actually works" because it is rubbish.

Well, maybe. But there is more to debunking a concept than throwing some random words together to produce a load of nonsense.

If you'd actually tried to debunk some claim that somebody made about qualia, that had something to do with the concept, it might have been relevant. Instead you made the obviously wrong assumption that qualia should have a direct functional connection with sensory input which nobody is claiming happens.

If the OP demonstrated anything (which it doesn't) it would be that since the same brain state produces different outcomes, the brain cannot work in a deterministic fashion, and hence cannot be a Turing machine. This would at least be wrong in only one or two ways.

[westprog]

Is a perturbed spring engaging in self-reference? A thermostat? A computer running a program that displays its own hardware specs? A dog failing to recognize itself in a mirror? A person contemplating consciousness?

There was an excellent program on the BBC's Horizon last night dealing with the measurement of a piece of string. It dealt with fractals, quantum theory, atomic structure and many deep concepts. It became clear that there was no easy answer to the actual length of a piece of string, and that well-defined mathematical concepts don't always translate easily into the real world.

Self-reference is a concept that might be easy to define for a computer program, but for a real-world object it's very difficult to define.

[Darat]

...snip...

Self-reference is a concept that might be easy to define for a computer program, but for a real-world object it's very difficult to define.

So a computer program is not a real-world object? What is it then, a soul?

[Darat]

Here is my theory of consciousness and it is mine.
Ahem!
It's an install routine.
When we load a new program into the brain, we use the conscious installer. We call this "learning".
Once the new software is correctly installed (which can take many attempts and corrections) it runs as a compiled program, making calls to system subroutines. (Walk / swallow / print)- other times the interpreted version is run, where consciousness provides feedback and decision making ability.
This theory is very, very thin at one end, potentially very thick in the middle and I expect to get several books and a Ph.D out of it.

Nah - conciousness is clearly a bug, one that nature is hoping to have fixed very soon... how else do you explain reality TV and Facebook?

[Soapy Sam]

Nah - conciousness is clearly a bug, one that nature is hoping to have fixed very soon... how else do you explain reality TV and Facebook?

Both are figments of your fevered imagination.

[jadey]

Here is my theory of consciousness and it is mine.
Ahem!
It's an install routine.
When we load a new program into the brain, we use the conscious installer. We call this "learning".
Once the new software is correctly installed (which can take many attempts and corrections) it runs as a compiled program, making calls to system subroutines. (Walk / swallow / print)- other times the interpreted version is run, where consciousness provides feedback and decision making ability.
This theory is very, very thin at one end, potentially very thick in the middle and I expect to get several books and a Ph.D out of it.

True story: We saw a man fall off of a ladder a couple of years ago. My neighbor ran over while I ran to call 911. The guy was unconcious when my neighbor arrived. My neighbor likes to describe the man regaining conciousness as a re-booting process. Its actually quite humorous when he tells the story. You are welcome to use this story to support your excellent theory. ;) (The man broke his wrist and has since fully recovered).

[RandFan]

True story: We saw a man fall off of a ladder a couple of years ago. My neighbor ran over while I ran to call 911. The guy was unconcious when my neighbor arrived. My neighbor likes to describe the man regaining conciousness as a re-booting process. Its actually quite humorous when he tells the story. You are welcome to use this story to support your excellent theory. ;) (The man broke his wrist and has since fully recovered). Flash bang grenades have been explained to work as flooding the brain with stimulus and forcing it to reboot.

[jadey]

Flash bang grenades have been explained to work as flooding the brain with stimulus and forcing it to reboot.

Seriously? That would be an interesting read. I'll do some google "research". but if you have a link, I'll take it.

[Maia]

And Eliminative Materialist eh?

Actually, no, because eliminative materialism is even worse. That's a theory of mind which doesn't even try to really prove its hypothesis, which misrepresents the origin of its opponents' theories, and which piggybacks on reductive materialism to dress itself up in "scientific" trappings. In other words, eliminative materialism is supposed to represent the opposite of "folk" or "common-sense" psychology, by which our beliefs determine our behavior. The idea is that we'll eventually discard that model of human behavior and see it as just as outdated as the medieval ideas that demons, angels, spirits, etc., controlled human behavior. The problem (well, one out of many problems here) is that this isn't "folk" or "common-sense" anything, but rather the basis of cognitive-behavioral theory, and eliminative materialism, if anything, is straight behaviorism whose proponents (such as Paul and Patricia Churchland) aren't being honest about the real origins of their own theories. Straight behaviorism has its place, but cognitive-behavioral theory, as pioneered by Dr. Aaron Beck, is the one which has been overwhelmingly validated by the empirical method and which is standard evidence-based treatment for depression, anxiety, panic disorder, substance abuse, borderline personality disorder, and a long list of others. For mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar and schizoaffective disorder, as well as major depressive disorder, CBT is used in conjunction with medication-based treatment.

So cognitive-behavioral theory is a theory of mind which proposes a basic hypothesis (our beliefs about the world, our future, and ourselves determine our behavior), tests that hypothesis through controlled studies involving control groups and experimental groups, and validates that hypothesis. That being said, CBT does have its limitations, and that's another post!

[rocketdodger]

The state of mind is different so there's no reason to suppose that the qualia should be the same.

I don't take issue with the conclusion that qualia are unneccessary but your reasoning here doesn't work.

No, my reasoning does work, because you just admitted what I was trying to show -- that qualia (whatever they are) are dependent upon state of mind.

But this is no good for people who are into qualia because if qualia are dependent upon state of mind, what good are they? They become nothing more than another word for stuff we already have words for. Of course, this is what people like myself have been saying all along...


What is a reference? What is a self? I think you may be borrowing your understanding of self-reference from computer programming but self-reference in any language is just shorthand to make it easier to process and refer to concepts. Self-reference originates in the language and is not actually inherent in the thing being studied.

I find this to be a moot point since the "understanding of self-reference from computer programming" is the only pertinent form of self-reference. That is why I said self-referential information processing.

Is a perturbed spring engaging in self-reference? A thermostat? A computer running a program that displays its own hardware specs? A dog failing to recognize itself in a mirror? A person contemplating consciousness?

Yes to all.

But note that only a few of those are self-referential information processing.

[rocketdodger]

If you'd actually tried to debunk some claim that somebody made about qualia, that had something to do with the concept, it might have been relevant. Instead you made the obviously wrong assumption that qualia should have a direct functional connection with sensory input which nobody is claiming happens.

You don't consider the claim that qualia must be explained by any theory of the mechanism of consciousness is a claim that can be debunked?

I don't understand why you consider it an invalid approach to show that qualia aren't what people think they are, they are something else that we already have strong theories about, and thus are already sufficiently explained.

Oh, wait, I know why -- because you want consciousness to be magical and if it can be explained then it isn't magical anymore.

And I know you are going to reply with "of course I don't think consciousness is magical..." but you know what? I don't buy it. So why don't you state for the record whether you think consciousness is an entirely physical phenomenon that, when we understand it fully, will be explainable in terms of science we already know at this time OR you think consciousness requires some fundamental ingredient that we haven't discovered yet.

If the OP demonstrated anything (which it doesn't) it would be that since the same brain state produces different outcomes, the brain cannot work in a deterministic fashion, and hence cannot be a Turing machine. This would at least be wrong in only one or two ways.

It wasn't the same brain state, that was the point.

[westprog]

So a computer program is not a real-world object? What is it then, a soul?

An instantiation of a computer program might be a physical object, but a computer program is a mathematical object, like 1+1=2.

[rocketdodger]

An instantiation of a computer program might be a physical object, but a computer program is a mathematical object, like 1+1=2.

If there were no intelligent entities in the universe capable of understanding mathematics, would mathematics still exist?

If so ... where? In the magical netherworld void?

It is clear to me that you believe in some non-physical stuff, whatever it might be. You are clearly a dualist and I have always pegged you as such.

[westprog]

You don't consider the claim that qualia must be explained by any theory of the mechanism of consciousness is a claim that can be debunked?

I don't understand why you consider it an invalid approach to show that qualia aren't what people think they are, they are something else that we already have strong theories about, and thus are already sufficiently explained.


Qualia aren't "what people think they are". What people? What do they think? What theories are these that contradict what people think?

Of course it would be a valid approach to answer some of these questions.


Oh, wait, I know why -- because you want consciousness to be magical and if it can be explained then it isn't magical anymore.

And I know you are going to reply with "of course I don't think consciousness is magical..." but you know what? I don't buy it. So why don't you state for the record whether you think consciousness is an entirely physical phenomenon that, when we understand it fully, will be explainable in terms of science we already know at this time OR you think consciousness requires some fundamental ingredient that we haven't discovered yet.



Yes, all that matters is what people think. Never mind what we can prove, or what we claim to be true. It's beliefs that matter.

It's part of the ongoing Rocketdodger logical fallacy. It's the same as the argument with UE. Never mind what he's claiming, never mind the evidence - guess what he believes and then concentrate on that.

It's a bad, flawed way to argue, and I have no intention of dealing with it. You can guess all you want what I believe. It has nothing to do with my arguments.

It wasn't the same brain state, that was the point.

Well of course it wasn't the same brain state. Which makes the whole exercise meaningless, whether you're talking about turing machines or qualia. You will never have exactly the same brain state at any two seperate times.

[westprog]

If there were no intelligent entities in the universe capable of understanding mathematics, would mathematics still exist?


Do you think that the inverse square law applied to gravity before human beings were around? Do you think it applied before it was discovered?


If so ... where? In the magical netherworld void?

It is clear to me that you believe in some non-physical stuff, whatever it might be. You are clearly a dualist and I have always pegged you as such.

[westprog]

They become nothing more than another word for stuff we already have words for.

Debunking by synonym.

[quarky]

Is it possible that cubicles suck?

[Darat]

An instantiation of a computer program might be a physical object, but a computer program is a mathematical object, like 1+1=2.

So you don't think a computer program is a real-world object, where does a computer program exist then if not in the real-world and how do we access this non-real-world to gain access to the computer program.

[Maia]

I don't see this entire argument being settled anytime soon. :rolleyes:

That being the case, I personally prefer to stick to theories about how the mind works, because they're actually falsifiable, and theories about consciousness itself are not.

[westprog]

So you don't think a computer program is a real-world object, where does a computer program exist then if not in the real-world and how do we access this non-real-world to gain access to the computer program.

A computer program exists in the same sense as any other mathematical statement. And I don't think the term "real-world" is appropriate. 1+1=2 is true in the real world, but 1+1=2 is clearly not a physical object.

How one deals with the concept of mathematical truth is quite a tricky thing. One can always say "dualism" and move on, I suppose.

[westprog]

I don't see this entire argument being settled anytime soon. :rolleyes:


Gee, I thought we'd have it all wrapped up with general agreement in about another three and a half days.


That being the case, I personally prefer to stick to theories about how the mind works, because they're actually falsifiable, and theories about consciousness itself are not.

I think you'll find that it's not as uncontroversial as you might hope.

[Maia]

Gee, I thought we'd have it all wrapped up with general agreement in about another three and a half days.



I think you'll find that it's not as uncontroversial as you might hope.

I think that there were just too many qualifiers and double negatives between those two paragraphs. What is it that will be found uncontroversial? (And wouldn't that be non-controversial?) Anyway, theories about how the mind works (rather than theories about what consciousness is) might be controversial in the sense that there is disagreement about them, but they do have the distinct advantage of being falsifiable.

Take cognitive-behavioral theory, for instance. Its basic hypothesis is that our beliefs about ourselves, the world around us, and our futures determine our behavior. This theory came from the treatment of depression, and was expanded from the more specific theory that the negative cognitive triad (negative beliefs about the self, the world, and the future) perpetuated and reinforced depression. This hypothesis is at least falsifiable to a degree (although this certainly isn't perfect) because if it weren't the case, then therapeutic interventions based on CBT wouldn't be successful in treating a wide variety of pathologies, such as depression, anxiety, panic disorder, personality disorders, adjustment disorders, and substance abuse. Empirical research using control groups (who didn't receive the CBT treatment) and study groups (who did receive it) have consistently shown that the study groups improve as measured by standardized scaling instruments such as the Beck Depression Inventory.

In fact, some theories of mind are based on better empirical evidence than CBT theory, largely because they bring in neurobiological evidence which differs between a control group and a study group. We can look at the one group which doesn't improve with CBT treatment and even gets worse (individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder, such as combat veterans), and see that there are distinct and measurable neurological differences in this group. Trauma theory predicts that for the PTSD group, beliefs may indeed not determine behavior in some circumstances. However, there are physical, neurological, historical, and statistical reasons for this in trauma theory (as opposed to eliminative materialism, which relies on bare assertion for the same hypothesis.)

Do you see why both of these theories of mind are scientific in a way that theories about consciousness can't be (although trauma theory is even more so)? Even reductionist materialism can't test its hypothesis (that consciousness occurs only through the physical brain) through research which uses a control group and a study group.

[dv82matt]

No, my reasoning does work, because you just admitted what I was trying to show -- that qualia (whatever they are) are dependent upon state of mind.No. That was your assumption.

You said: "My point is relevant because if there is such a thing as qualia, a given state of my mind + body + environment would produce the same qualia." emphasis mine

I just pointed out that the state of mind isn't the same in each instance so your reasoning fails.

But this is no good for people who are into qualia because if qualia are dependent upon state of mind, what good are they? They become nothing more than another word for stuff we already have words for. Of course, this is what people like myself have been saying all along...I agree that qualia (when considered to be fundamental) don't have potential to add to our understanding.

I find this to be a moot point since the "understanding of self-reference from computer programming" is the only pertinent form of self-reference. That is why I said self-referential information processing.
So define "information processing" then.

Yes to all.

But note that only a few of those are self-referential information processing.All processes can be thought of as information processing.

[rocketdodger]

Yes, all that matters is what people think. Never mind what we can prove, or what we claim to be true. It's beliefs that matter.

It's part of the ongoing Rocketdodger logical fallacy. It's the same as the argument with UE. Never mind what he's claiming, never mind the evidence - guess what he believes and then concentrate on that.

It's a bad, flawed way to argue, and I have no intention of dealing with it. You can guess all you want what I believe. It has nothing to do with my arguments.

There are two possibilities here.

First, you might have missed the part where I asked you a very easy question -- you can answer with a "yes" or "no" and be done with it. It isn't a trick question.

Second, you saw that question, and you realize that by answering it truthfully you will place yourself squarely in either the same camp as people like myself, where your arguments are simply wrong, or the opposite camp of dualists, where your arguments can't be wrong but they are also nonsense. And furthermore you realize that either option doesn't do your current position any good -- your current position being one of fuzzy fence sitting where you get to criticize anyone and everyone and when they try to respond you drop to the other side of the fence for immunity.

So which is it, westprog? Are you going to answer the question or are you going to hide forever?

[rocketdodger]

No. That was your assumption.

You said: "My point is relevant because if there is such a thing as qualia, a given state of my mind + body + environment would produce the same qualia." emphasis mine

I just pointed out that the state of mind isn't the same in each instance so your reasoning fails.

Ah, I see what you mean. Yes that was my error, and very bad wording.

What I mean is that for the notion of qualia to be useful for those that champion it, the qualia needs to remain somewhat constant. For instance, if every "redness" were different then the term "qualia" would be useless since there is nothing in common between each instance.

So by "state of mind" I was meaning something like the retina and low level visual pathway, and I should have used a different term for that.

So define "information processing" then.

All processes can be thought of as information processing.

Oh man... well, we have already been over this in other threads, but after work today I will write you a synopsis.

In short, not all processes can be thought of as information processing because that requires computation, a behavior that is not exhibited by all systems.

[westprog]

Do you see why both of these theories of mind are scientific in a way that theories about consciousness can't be (although trauma theory is even more so)? Even reductionist materialism can't test its hypothesis (that consciousness occurs only through the physical brain) through research which uses a control group and a study group.

I agree that scientific studies of consciousness are at the moment still at the stage of trying to define what consciousness is (something for which there is no consensus here). However, while I consider it The Hard Problem, many don't. I leave you to them.

[westprog]

There are two possibilities here.

First, you might have missed the part where I asked you a very easy question -- you can answer with a "yes" or "no" and be done with it. It isn't a trick question.


I've answered it, in detail. You of course won't like the answer because you will be left with the subject matter, not the person.


Second, you saw that question, and you realize that by answering it truthfully you will place yourself squarely in either the same camp as people like myself, where your arguments are simply wrong, or the opposite camp of dualists, where your arguments can't be wrong but they are also nonsense.

What you fail to realise is that beliefs have nothing to do with the arguments, which stand or fall on their own. Which is why I have no interest in discussing what people believe on this subject because it adds nothing to the evidence.

That you are desperate to find a shortcut to avoid dealing with the subject is your problem. I'm certainly not going along with it.

And furthermore you realize that either option doesn't do your current position any good -- your current position being one of fuzzy fence sitting where you get to criticize anyone and everyone and when they try to respond you drop to the other side of the fence for immunity.

So which is it, westprog? Are you going to answer the question or are you going to hide forever?

I have a very specific position on this matter. There is no convincing theory of consciousness and in particular, the Strong AI position is incoherent and not backed up by theory or experiment. That's what I've been claiming all along.

Now it seems that in order to back up the claim that there is no valid theory of consciousness, I've to produce a theory which I "believe" to be true. Which Rocketdodger is convinced must be the case, because he can't just deal with the arguments.

[rocketdodger]

I've answered it, in detail. You of course won't like the answer because you will be left with the subject matter, not the person.



What you fail to realise is that beliefs have nothing to do with the arguments, which stand or fall on their own. Which is why I have no interest in discussing what people believe on this subject because it adds nothing to the evidence.

That you are desperate to find a shortcut to avoid dealing with the subject is your problem. I'm certainly not going along with it.



I have a very specific position on this matter. There is no convincing theory of consciousness and in particular, the Strong AI position is incoherent and not backed up by theory or experiment. That's what I've been claiming all along.

Now it seems that in order to back up the claim that there is no valid theory of consciousness, I've to produce a theory which I "believe" to be true. Which Rocketdodger is convinced must be the case, because he can't just deal with the arguments.

You have not answered the question.

I will repeat it for you:

Do you think consciousness is an entirely physical phenomenon that, when we understand it fully, will be explainable in terms of science we already know at this time OR do you think consciousness requires some fundamental ingredient that we haven't discovered yet?

[rocketdodger]

What you fail to realise is that beliefs have nothing to do with the arguments, which stand or fall on their own. Which is why I have no interest in discussing what people believe on this subject because it adds nothing to the evidence.

What you fail to realize is that for years people here have been giving you arguments they feel stand or fall on their own -- and you reject them for reasons you are still unable to make clear.

So perhaps we are all stupid, and banging our heads against the wall I.E. "discussing" this issue with you further really will shed light on something.

Or, perhaps you are a dualist and even if we provided the most logically sound and coherent argument possible you would still reject it out of principle.

I would just like to know which it is, because if it is the latter then I won't waste nearly as much time painstakingly formulating responses to your posts.

Do you think that is unreasonable?

[Robin]

Actually, no, because eliminative materialism is even worse.
I was being light hearted - I could tell that from the context.
So cognitive-behavioral theory is a theory of mind which proposes a basic hypothesis (our beliefs about the world, our future, and ourselves determine our behavior), tests that hypothesis through controlled studies involving control groups and experimental groups, and validates that hypothesis. That being said, CBT does have its limitations, and that's another post!
And for one for the science/technology section I think.

[Robin]

The whole "beliefs determine behaviour" thing seems to beg the question of what determines our beliefs.

I can't imagine how there could be a belief without the mechanism of the brain behind it, or at least some kind of complex mechanism behind it.

Also there seems to be the fact that some conditions defined in terms of behaviour (like Autism) are apparently heritable, which suggests that the behaviour is being conditioned by something other than belief.

[Maia]

The whole "beliefs determine behaviour" thing seems to beg the question of what determines our beliefs.

I can't imagine how there could be a belief without the mechanism of the brain behind it, or at least some kind of complex mechanism behind it.

Also there seems to be the fact that some conditions defined in terms of behaviour (like Autism) are apparently heritable, which suggests that the behaviour is being conditioned by something other than belief.

Well, here we have a fascinating question, and there's a lot of evidence in different directions. Theories about how the mind works (and doesn't work) in various pathological states could provide indirect evidence for how or why different theories about consciousness might operate, which is why I think that in this particular context, they really do have a place here rather than in the science/tech board.

For instance, I think that eliminative materialism ends up being too unsupported to take seriously as a theory of consciousness, which is exactly what it's presented as. But what makes it at least an interesting theory is the way in which it does suggest that beliefs don't always determine behavior. This is actually a clear, defined, testable, and falsifiable hypothesis.

[dv82matt]

Oh man... well, we have already been over this in other threads, but after work today I will write you a synopsis.I'd appreciate that.

In short, not all processes can be thought of as information processing because that requires computation, a behavior that is not exhibited by all systems.I had thought that "information processing" and "computation" were synonyms. I await your further explanation.

[westprog]

What you fail to realize is that for years people here have been giving you arguments they feel stand or fall on their own -- and you reject them for reasons you are still unable to make clear.


I think you mean "for reasons which I am unable to understand".

That's what this forum is for, you know. Making arguments and trying to convince people. It's not for guessing what people thing so their arguments can be ignored.


So perhaps we are all stupid,


Please don't offer me that kind of opportunity.


and banging our heads against the wall I.E. "discussing" this issue with you further really will shed light on something.

Or, perhaps you are a dualist and even if we provided the most logically sound and coherent argument possible you would still reject it out of principle.

I would just like to know which it is, because if it is the latter then I won't waste nearly as much time painstakingly formulating responses to your posts.

Do you think that is unreasonable?

Here's a suggestion - deal with the arguments. And if they aren't satisfactory, nobody's forcing you to read what I write, or to respond if you do read it.

And this particular rerun of the consciousness debate kicked off when you decided to post what you thought my position on the subject was, so that it was necessary for me to correct the misrepresentation.

[Darat]

A computer program exists in the same sense as any other mathematical statement. And I don't think the term "real-world" is appropriate. 1+1=2 is true in the real world, but 1+1=2 is clearly not a physical object.

...snip...



If you keep your terms straight it might help! Earlier you said it was not a "real world" object, now it is not a "physical object". But that is nothing more than a smoke screen and doesn't clarify your original claim which was that a computer program is not in the "real world".

So we are, still, trying to resolve your claim i.e.where does a computer program exist if not in the real-world and how do we access this non-real-world to gain access to the computer program?

[Robin]

For instance, I think that eliminative materialism ends up being too unsupported to take seriously as a theory of consciousness, which is exactly what it's presented as.
Yes I have to agree here. He does include a way in which is to be tested, but one which would probably not be remotely practical (if ever possible) until long after his death

[westprog]

If you keep your terms straight it might help! Earlier you said it was not a "real world" object, now it is not a "physical object". But that is nothing more than a smoke screen and doesn't clarify your original claim which was that a computer program is not in the "real world".


Are you saying that I shouldn't try to qualify my statements in order to make my thoughts clearer?


So we are, still, trying to resolve your claim i.e.where does a computer program exist if not in the real-world and how do we access this non-real-world to gain access to the computer program?

I used the term "physical world" in order that it's clear that I'm not claiming that mathematical objects aren't real.

Clearly, "1+1=2" does not have a physical existence, and does not have a location, mass nor energy. Whether you consider it something "real" or not is a matter for the individual. It's certainly the case that if you have one proton and one proton, then you have two protons. That's how mathematics interacts with the physical world.

[Darat]

Are you saying that I shouldn't try to qualify my statements in order to make my thoughts clearer?



Not at all, and I am hoping that at some point you will do so.



I used the term "physical world" in order that it's clear that I'm not claiming that mathematical objects aren't real.


Yet you are claiming that computer programs are not real - you clearly stated that: "Self-reference is a concept that might be easy to define for a computer program, but for a real-world object it's very difficult to define.[/quote]"

The conclusion from your claim is that you believe there is the "real world" and some other form/type/class of existence and some of the things you and I interact with do not exist in the real-world but in your "non-real world".

So, again, you have not answered the question that arises from your claim - "Where does a computer program exist if not in the real-world and how do we access this non-real-world to gain access to the computer program?"

[westprog]

Not at all, and I am hoping that at some point you will do so.




Yet you are claiming that computer programs are not real - you clearly stated that: "Self-reference is a concept that might be easy to define for a computer program, but for a real-world object it's very difficult to define."

The conclusion from your claim is that you believe there is the "real world" and some other form/type/class of existence and some of the things you and I interact with do not exist in the real-world but in your "non-real world".

So, again, you have not answered the question that arises from your claim - "Where does a computer program exist if not in the real-world and how do we access this non-real-world to gain access to the computer program?"[/QUOTE]

I already explained - I decided that the term "real-world" was ambiguous, and amended it to refer to the physical world. "Physical world" is much clearer. I don't see why you wish to persevere with the unclear term "real-world" and go down a blind alley of alternative definitions.

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, here we have a fascinating question, and there's a lot of evidence in different directions. Theories about how the mind works (and doesn't work) in various pathological states could provide indirect evidence for how or why different theories about consciousness might operate, which is why I think that in this particular context, they really do have a place here rather than in the science/tech board.

For instance, I think that eliminative materialism ends up being too unsupported to take seriously as a theory of consciousness, which is exactly what it's presented as. But what makes it at least an interesting theory is the way in which it does suggest that beliefs don't always determine behavior. This is actually a clear, defined, testable, and falsifiable hypothesis.

Eliminative materialism is no more a theory of consciousness than psychiatry is a theory of demonic possesion. Eliminative materialism is a philosophical claim that no "theory of consciousness" is needed. It is not supported by scientific evidence. It is driven by philosophical necessity on the part of the eliminativists.

[Darat]

I already explained - I decided that the term "real-world" was ambiguous, and amended it to refer to the physical world. "Physical world" is much clearer. I don't see why you wish to persevere with the unclear term "real-world" and go down a blind alley of alternative definitions.

Which as I said does not add to or support your claim, let me ask you again:

Where does a computer program exist if not in the physical-world and how do we access this non-physical-world to gain access to the computer program?

[Elaedith]

Because my body was doing something that is classically considered a conscious activity without any conscious input whatsoever.

Who considers this a 'classically conscious activity'? It is known that people with amnesia can perform tasks including navigation of environments, that they cannot consciously recollect learning. I can't see anything in your account that conflicts with what is generally known about consciousness. Activities are not classified as exclusively conscious or unconscious.

[westprog]

Which as I said does not add to or support your claim, let me ask you again:

Where does a computer program exist if not in the physical-world and how do we access this non-physical-world to gain access to the computer program?

It exists in the same realm as mathematical truths. If you don't accept that 1+1=2 exists outside of the physical world, then the same should hold for any other mathematical statement. A computer program is a mathematical statement. It has neither substance nor location.

An instance of a given computer program can be said to have a physical status. This could be on paper, on disc, in computer memory - each quite independent of each other.

It depends whether you consider "Microsoft Word 7.0" an actual object in itself, or a name which you give to all the different instances of the program.

[Darat]

It exists in the same realm as mathematical truths. If you don't accept that 1+1=2 exists outside of the physical world, then the same should hold for any other mathematical statement. A computer program is a mathematical statement. It has neither substance nor location.

An instance of a given computer program can be said to have a physical status. This could be on paper, on disc, in computer memory - each quite independent of each other.

It depends whether you consider "Microsoft Word 7.0" an actual object in itself, or a name which you give to all the different instances of the program.


You have made a claim that divides things into at least two distinct categories of "existence" - one is in the "real/physical-world" the other is somewhere/something else.

I am asking you how/where (obviously until you define your non-physical/real-world I do not know if how or where is the appropriate question) something that exists e.g. a computer program is and how (again until you define your terms it is hard to be sure that "how" is the appropriate question) do we access this non-real/physical-world to gain access to the computer program?

[jadey]

Darat and Westprog,

I'm interested in this discussion and would like to see it get past this sticking point, which appears to be an issue with terminology - specifically "existence".

Darat, do you perceive a distinction between an idea, and the implementation of that idea? If yes, what terms, categories, etc, would you use to distinguish them. For example: What terminology (if any) would you use to distinguish between 1) the concept of an umbrella, something that could keep you dry if it was raining, and 2) an umbrella, something that can/does keep you dry if it is raining (and properly deployed)?

[quarky]

I have an image in my mind of a new kind of umbrella that doesn't exist yet.
The image in my mind, or brain, might have some material associated with it, but not as much as the finished proto-type will have.

Before the blueprints is an idea. After the blueprints, a building.
What is a building made of?

[rocketdodger]

Darat and Westprog,

I'm interested in this discussion and would like to see it get past this sticking point, which appears to be an issue with terminology - specifically "existence".

Darat, do you perceive a distinction between an idea, and the implementation of that idea? If yes, what terms, categories, etc, would you use to distinguish them. For example: What terminology (if any) would you use to distinguish between 1) the concept of an umbrella, something that could keep you dry if it was raining, and 2) an umbrella, something that can/does keep you dry if it is raining (and properly deployed)?

This isn't a terminology issue, it is a metaphysical worldview issue.

One camp holds that mathematics is merely a description of reality and, as a human language, only exists to the extent that humans also exist (because human ideas are merely particles like everything else is particles). And in "discovering mathematics" we really are only noticing patterns in reality and using a special language -- mathematics -- to describe such patterns.

The other camp believes mathematics is something more fundamental than reality and reality merely follows it. And in "discovering mathematics" we are noticing patterns in reality that allow us to deduce the underlying fundamental truths of mathematics that exist even if the reality doesn't.

See the difference?

[rocketdodger]

I'd appreciate that.

I had thought that "information processing" and "computation" were synonyms. I await your further explanation.

Sorry, I have been bogged down both at work and at home (darn MW2). I will get to this as soon as I can.

[yy2bggggs]

This isn't a terminology issue, it is a metaphysical worldview issue.

...
See the difference?
No, I don't.

[rocketdodger]

No, I don't.

I don't think you understand.

I am saying some individuals think mathematics would exist if there was no reality to go with it.

[jadey]

This isn't a terminology issue, it is a metaphysical worldview issue.

One camp holds that mathematics is merely a description of reality and, as a human language, only exists to the extent that humans also exist (because human ideas are merely particles like everything else is particles). And in "discovering mathematics" we really are only noticing patterns in reality and using a special language -- mathematics -- to describe such patterns.

The other camp believes mathematics is something more fundamental than reality and reality merely follows it. And in "discovering mathematics" we are noticing patterns in reality that allow us to deduce the underlying fundamental truths of mathematics that exist even if the reality doesn't.

See the difference?

No, not entirely, but I'm mulling it over in my mind.

How would a person from camp 1 vs camp 2 answer the specific question I raised above?

[westprog]

This isn't a terminology issue, it is a metaphysical worldview issue.

One camp holds that mathematics is merely a description of reality and, as a human language, only exists to the extent that humans also exist (because human ideas are merely particles like everything else is particles). And in "discovering mathematics" we really are only noticing patterns in reality and using a special language -- mathematics -- to describe such patterns.

The other camp believes mathematics is something more fundamental than reality and reality merely follows it. And in "discovering mathematics" we are noticing patterns in reality that allow us to deduce the underlying fundamental truths of mathematics that exist even if the reality doesn't.

See the difference?

I'd broadly accept that definition, though I would use "physical" rather than "real". If mathematics has existence, then it's part of reality.

I suppose that one way of looking at it is whether one considers that the digits of pi remain to be discovered, or if they are an artifact in some way.

[yy2bggggs]

I am saying some individuals think mathematics would exist if there was no reality to go with it.
I don't understand what that means either.

I trip over a shoe on the floor. If the shoe wasn't there, I wouldn't have tripped. That's clear. But it only has meaning because there's a context to interpret a hypothetical world without the shoe, but otherwise just like this world.

If I were a girl, would my name be Sue? That particular hypothetical makes less sense, because the key characteristic that I'm changing isn't related to the name. There's no clear hypothetical world grounding the answer, like there is in the "if the shoe wasn't there".

But here, you're asking something like, if everything we can point to weren't there, would there be exactly one even prime number? I don't think this is anything like the first hypothetical. It sounds more like the second one.

[rocketdodger]

No, not entirely, but I'm mulling it over in my mind.

How would a person from camp 1 vs camp 2 answer the specific question I raised above?

Well camp 1 would say that although the idea of an umbrella can't keep you dry, it is a physical entity because that idea is merely a pattern in the particles of some human's brain (or in a book, or video, or whatever).

I think camp 2 would say that an idea isn't physical because it hasn't been instantiated.

[rocketdodger]

I don't understand what that means either.

I trip over a shoe on the floor. If the shoe wasn't there, I wouldn't have tripped. That's clear. But it only has meaning because there's a context to interpret a hypothetical world without the shoe, but otherwise just like this world.

If I were a girl, would my name be Sue? That particular hypothetical makes less sense, because the key characteristic that I'm changing isn't related to the name. There's no clear hypothetical world grounding the answer, like there is in the "if the shoe wasn't there".

But here, you're asking something like, if everything we can point to weren't there, would there be exactly one even prime number? I don't think this is anything like the first hypothetical. It sounds more like the second one.

Yeah I know it makes less sense. In fact it makes no sense to me. That is why I am a member of the first camp -- I believe mathematics is merely a language that humans use to describe the behavior of our reality.

If the reality were different, mathematics would be different. Pi could be different. I have no idea what else it could be, though, because our reality is our reality.

[rocketdodger]

I suppose that one way of looking at it is whether one considers that the digits of pi remain to be discovered, or if they are an artifact in some way.

Yep.

I myself consider them to be merely an artifact of our mathematics. The digits don't even exist until someone expands pi that far.

[JoeTheJuggler]

That's actually true-ish. If I shine a red light and a green light into your eye, you will perceive a yellow quale.

For that matter, if someone stimulates the right part of your sensory cortex just the right way, you'll experience some colored light even though there is no light at all.

Action potentials are just action potentials.

[JoeTheJuggler]

For instance, I think that eliminative materialism ends up being too unsupported to take seriously as a theory of consciousness, which is exactly what it's presented as. But what makes it at least an interesting theory is the way in which it does suggest that beliefs don't always determine behavior. This is actually a clear, defined, testable, and falsifiable hypothesis.

I'm not sure what you mean by "eliminative materialism" (I confess ignorance if this is a conventional philosophical term that I've not run into), but it sounds like a position that most modern materialists don't espouse. Being a materialist doesn't demand the denial of properties and functions that emerge at different levels of organization of matter.

In other words, I can't deconstruct a house looking for a bit of matter that is "shelter from weather". I can't deconstruct my legs (or entire body) and find "running". But I can use the bits to understand why these properties emerge.

On the Penrose thread I mentioned that looking for a characteristic of the whole in individual parts is the division fallacy (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/division.html) (or composition fallacy (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/composit.html) taken the other way around).

But maybe that's not what you're talking about at all--

I think the idea of learning what functions occur where by seeing those functions disappear coincident with damage to specific brain structures is very useful. Though that's not an "explanation of consciousness" in itself. It can certainly tell us what parts are necessary to get the specific functions.

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm interested in this discussion and would like to see it get past this sticking point, which appears to be an issue with terminology - specifically "existence".


:D

That's more than an issue with terminology. It's what philosophy has been talking about for the past three millenia. The Beginning and the End.


Darat, do you perceive a distinction between an idea, and the implementation of that idea? If yes, what terms, categories, etc, would you use to distinguish them. For example: What terminology (if any) would you use to distinguish between 1) the concept of an umbrella, something that could keep you dry if it was raining, and 2) an umbrella, something that can/does keep you dry if it is raining (and properly deployed)?

(2) refers to the present tense - an umbrella that is actually in your presence and (sometimes) currently keeping you dry. (1) is just a concept.

[jadey]

I think I'll just wade on back to shore. These waters are a bit murky for me. :confused:

[westprog]

Yep.

I myself consider them to be merely an artifact of our mathematics. The digits don't even exist until someone expands pi that far.

Then it becomes a matter of distinguishing between things we discover and things we construct.

[dv82matt]

My take on dualism vs monism (which seems to be the undercurrent of the debate in this thread) is that humans are constructed as dualists (or with a dualistic kernel) because given the limited computational power available dualism is/was better at generating useful beliefs than monism is/was. Dualism allows a fundamental distinction between thinker and thought that is difficult to achieve with monism. That said I am a monist (specifically a reductionist) even though I am stuck running a dualist OS.

Another way of thinking about it would be that, due to our specific method and definition of "knowing", consciousness is epistemologically fundamental (fundamental to knowledge) but not ontologically fundamental (not fundamental to reality).

[quarky]

My take on dualism vs monism (which seems to be the undercurrent of the debate in this thread) is that humans are constructed as dualists (or with a dualistic kernel) because given the limited computational power available dualism is/was better at generating useful beliefs than monism is/was. Dualism allows a fundamental distinction between thinker and thought that is difficult to achieve with monism. That said I am a monist (specifically a reductionist) even though I am stuck running a dualist OS.

Another way of thinking about it would be that, due to our specific method and definition of "knowing", consciousness is epistemologically fundamental (fundamental to knowledge) but not ontologically fundamental (not fundamental to reality).



That was pretty smooth.

Mind if I use it as a pick-up line in a high end bar?

[yy2bggggs]

If the reality were different, mathematics would be different. Pi could be different. I have no idea what else it could be, though, because our reality is our reality.
I think you're talking about a different thing not making sense than what I'm talking about.

You're comparing one pi to another, and it's different. However, you're also attributing the difference to a difference in mathematics in this other reality.

But if it's different mathematics, can you meaningfully say that "pi" is different, as opposed to simply that you're talking about two different numbers?

In other words... is there a real metaphysical difference in "the" thing, or are you just describing two different things?

[Maia]

I'm not sure what you mean by "eliminative materialism" (I confess ignorance if this is a conventional philosophical term that I've not run into), but it sounds like a position that most modern materialists don't espouse. Being a materialist doesn't demand the denial of properties and functions that emerge at different levels of organization of matter.

In other words, I can't deconstruct a house looking for a bit of matter that is "shelter from weather". I can't deconstruct my legs (or entire body) and find "running". But I can use the bits to understand why these properties emerge.

On the Penrose thread I mentioned that looking for a characteristic of the whole in individual parts is the division fallacy (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/division.html) (or composition fallacy (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/composit.html) taken the other way around).

But maybe that's not what you're talking about at all--

.

Quickly popping in after a 13 hour day working with Alzheimer's patients. :)

Here's some info about eliminative materialism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/), and here's the Wikipedia entry. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism) It's a very odd theory of mind, and it has very little to do with what most people would think of as materialist theories, IMHO.


I think the idea of learning what functions occur where by seeing those functions disappear coincident with damage to specific brain structures is very useful. Though that's not an "explanation of consciousness" in itself. It can certainly tell us what parts are necessary to get the specific functions.


Well, THAT certainly reminded me of today...

Mr. Croker, who is in very late-stage Alzheimer's: (kick, kick, kick under the table)

Me: Mr. Croker, you're kicking me again.

Mr. Croker: Mnhymnnnn. (Completely covers head with sweatshirt yet again. He's very fond of doing this for some reason which nobody has been able to discover.)

Me: Mr. Croker, I really need you to keep your hands where we can see them. (removes hands from inside pants. You don't want to know what can happen when we don't keep his hands where we can see them. Let's just say that it's quite the cleanup job.) How about if you stop eating your bib. (Mr. Croker doesn't want to stop eating his bib.) Wouldn't you like to try this nice pie instead? Why don't you let your nurse feed you this nice piece of pie? (unsuccessful attempt to take away bib)

Mr. Croker: Mm! Mhnhgymn.

Me: Nice pecan pie... just one bite... (finally maneuvering in the fork)

Mr. Croker: (thoughtfully) It's really excellent.

Everyone has their moments. :)