View Full Version : What is Emergence of Mind?
joyrex
2nd January 2004, 04:38 PM
I'm somewhat aware of this metaphysical(?) position which states that mind emerges from the brain. I'm unsure if it's a totally materialistic view, in the way that all there is to reality is matter. Evidence for this view is perhaps, for example, that brain damage, if sufficient, can result in drastic changes in personality?
What other systems are there in nature that could be compared to the mind-brain issue, if any? Since we're sort of privileged to examine our own mind so closely compared to other systems that (seem to) exist outside our mind, doesn't this crate a barrier? Is the emergence of mind unique?
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
2nd January 2004, 05:05 PM
How about the emergence of weather? Just a bunch of molecules, some heat, and a little rotation.
~~ Paul
Interesting Ian
2nd January 2004, 05:10 PM
Originally posted by joyrex
I'm somewhat aware of this metaphysical(?) position which states that mind emerges from the brain. I'm unsure if it's a totally materialistic view, in the way that all there is to reality is matter. Evidence for this view is perhaps, for example, that brain damage, if sufficient, can result in drastic changes in personality?
What other systems are there in nature that could be compared to the mind-brain issue, if any? Since we're sort of privileged to examine our own mind so closely compared to other systems that (seem to) exist outside our mind, doesn't this crate a barrier? Is the emergence of mind unique?
If indeed the mind does emerge from the brain, then yes, it is absolutely unique. Nothing else is like it or could be like it.
wayrad
2nd January 2004, 05:20 PM
Isn't life an emergent property of certain arrangements of molecules?
Mercutio
2nd January 2004, 05:25 PM
One way of looking at the "emergent property" view of mind, in two steps:
1--(emergent properties in general) I can show you classrooms, students, profs, spreadsheets with financial plans, curricula, alumni, all sorts of things, but there is no one thing I can point to and say "this is the university." In this case, "university" is an emergent property of all those other things. It is useful to speak of it as a thing, when comparing different universities for instance, but it does not have an existence apart from its component parts. You could say it is greater than the sum of its parts, but it is probably more accurate to say it is different from the sum of its parts. If you took the parts away, there is no university left. Change any one of those things and you change the university. It "exists" really only in metaphorical terms, a trick of our language.
2--(what the body does) Others might call this "what the brain does", but we cannot talk about the brain in isolation from the body; all its inputs and outputs are mediated by the body. Anyway...our bodies are able to move, to eat, to digest, to sleep...certainly...but they are also able to think, to remember, to feel. These are all things (behaviors) that we do.
As an important aside, there is a category of these behaviors that we tend to treat as importantly different from others (I would argue that we should not, and that it is this differential treatment that leads to half the arguments on this particular forum.); this is the category some call "private behaviors" and others call "mental behaviors". Thinking, feeling, remembering, are all such behaviors; less obviously, some here include seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. as well. Since these behaviors are observable only to the person doing them, we have thought of them as special, and used special metaphors to speak of them. We say we see sights. We say we remember memories. We say we think thoughts. These sights, memories, and thoughts are merely metaphors for a behavior that we cannot observe in another. There is no "thought" apart from thinking. There is no "memory" apart from remembering. There is no "sight" apart from seeing. The idea of these things as qualia, or as irreducible qualia, is merely the byproduct of this metaphorical language. We speak of them as things; they must be things. (end of aside)
Anyway...the emergent property of "mind" is what emerges from these behaviors. We think, feel, remember, see, hear, smell...and from this we speak of a "mind" that emerges in the same sense that the "university" emerges from the buildings, students, faculty, and curricula. "Seeing", for instance, has been scientifically studied for over 100 years; we know an awful lot about it, from the perceptual effects of the cellular structure of the retina itself (giving rise to the perceptual phenomena of Mach bands and the Hermann Grid, for example), to visual pathways (explaining the phenomenon of "blindsight", for instance, when an individual is cortically blind--has no experience of vision at all--but still knows when an object is moving), to feature and motion detectors (Jerry Andrus's "tri-zonal space warper" is a very cool demonstration of a motion after-effect based on these). As I said, we know an awful lot about the mechanics of seeing. It is only when we allow ourselves to be misled by the metaphor of "sight" (as in "I saw a sight") or "qualia" that we delude ourselves into thinking that there is another part that we have not understood. We cannot point to "the university" because it does not exist independently of its parts. We cannot point to "qualia" because the process of seeing, with all those parts from retinal bleaching of photopigments transducing light energy into nerve energy to the fourier synthesis of image from feature detectors, does not exist without its component parts.
I chose seeing; a similar analysis can be made for any private behavior. We know much (certainly not all) about what the brain does in remembering, feeling, thinking...and we are learning more all the time. Thinking of these processes in mentalistic terms is, I think, a great hindrance to progress.
There are those who look at this view and say that I am denying that we think, or feel, or see, or whatever. I absolutely do not deny these things. I do deny that thoughts exist (apart from thinking). I do deny that memories exist (apart from remembering). I deny that qualia exist (apart from sensing).
A final stab at the metaphor thing...those of you who meet me at TAM2 will notice that I have an odd walk...rather stiff-legged, almost limping on both legs. Hey, it gets me from point A to point B. But anyway...we all understand what I mean when I say I have an odd "walk" But I do not possess this "walk" in the same sense that I "have a computer" or "have a new pair of jeans" or even "have green eyes". I "have a walk" in the sense that my behavior of walking is different from others'. That's all. I "have a mind" in exactly the same sense--I think, feel, remember, see...but that's it. Other than metaphorically, none of us has a mind. And...it doesn't matter.
Sheesh...I do ramble on, don't I?
joyrex
2nd January 2004, 05:36 PM
Very nicely explained, Mercutio. I'll try to get some sleep and think more later :)
Mercutio
2nd January 2004, 05:54 PM
Originally posted by joyrex
Very nicely explained, Mercutio. I'll try to get some sleep and think more later :) Thanks. Credit Interesting Ian as well...it is his disagreement that honed my argument.
Interesting Ian
2nd January 2004, 06:31 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
One way of looking at the "emergent property" view of mind, in two steps:
1--(emergent properties in general) I can show you classrooms, students, profs, spreadsheets with financial plans, curricula, alumni, all sorts of things, but there is no one thing I can point to and say "this is the university." In this case, "university" is an emergent property of all those other things.
No it isn't. The University incorporates all those things, and more. It certainly doesn't emerge from these things.
2--(what the body does) Others might call this "what the brain does", but we cannot talk about the brain in isolation from the body; all its inputs and outputs are mediated by the body. Anyway...our bodies are able to move, to eat, to digest, to sleep...certainly...but they are also able to think, to remember, to feel. These are all things (behaviors) that we do.
[list=a]
Thinking and remembering and feeling are most certainly not what the body does! How can matter, a mind independent reality, think, or remember, or feel? They are not what the body does.
Nor are they behaviours.
[/list=a]
As an important aside, there is a category of these behaviors that we tend to treat as importantly different from others (I would argue that we should not, and that it is this differential treatment that leads to half the arguments on this particular forum.); this is the category some call "private behaviors" and others call "mental behaviors".
These expressions, should they exist, are oxymorons. What on earth are they supposed to mean?
Thinking, feeling, remembering, are all such behaviors; less obviously, some here include seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. as well.
It seems to me you need to look up the word behaviour in a dictionary. These are not behaviours. Their essence is constituted by their phenomenologicality.
Since these behaviors are observable only to the person doing them,
They are not observable. If they are observable then what do they look like, or sound like, or taste like, or smell like? Well??
we have thought of them as special, and used special metaphors to speak of them. We say we see sights. We say we remember memories. We say we think thoughts.
Who precisely says these things? I certainly never have done. They are nonsensical. You're attacking strawmen again :rolleyes:
These sights, memories, and thoughts are merely metaphors for a behavior that we cannot observe in another.
No they're not. They're what they say they are, no more no less.
There is no "thought" apart from thinking.
Please give a reference to someone disputing this.
There is no "memory" apart from remembering.
Please give a reference to someone disputing this.
There is no "sight" apart from seeing.
Please give a reference to someone disputing this.
The idea of these things as qualia, or as irreducible qualia, is merely the byproduct of this metaphorical language. We speak of them as things; they must be things. (end of aside)
Huh?? Give you please give a list of philosophers who hold qualia are things??
Anyway...the emergent property of "mind" is what emerges from these behaviors.
Thanks for informing me. Now do you have a clue how it happens? Ummm . . silly question.
We think, feel, remember, see, hear, smell...and from this we speak of a "mind" that emerges in the same sense that the "university" emerges from the buildings, students, faculty, and curricula.
First of all you completely misunderstand what thinking, and seeing, and feeling etc mean if you think they are behaviours. And secondly, the mind has these mental states, it doesn't emerge from them.
"Seeing", for instance, has been scientifically studied for over 100 years;
The physical mechanisms which allow seeing you mean, not the phenomenological sensation itself.
It is only when we allow ourselves to be misled by the metaphor of "sight" (as in "I saw a sight") or "qualia" that we delude ourselves into thinking that there is another part that we have not understood.
You quite clearly understand nothing whatsoever.
Sheesh...I do ramble on, don't I?
Yes that's right. And you have said nothing of any relevance whatsoever. Difficult to ascertain what your position is, but it's either eliminitivism or reductive materialism, where as the original poster was talking about the mind emerging from the brain. Saying the mind emerges means that the mind actually exists as a real thing, and, by implication, it is not reducible to the brain. You haven't explained how the mind emerges. Talking about the University analogy is a non-emergentists view of the mind.
Interesting Ian
2nd January 2004, 06:32 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Thanks. Credit Interesting Ian as well...it is his disagreement that honed my argument.
Huh?? :eek: Seems I'm wasting my time if that is so.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
2nd January 2004, 06:37 PM
Ian said:
No it isn't. The University incorporates all those things, and more. It certainly doesn't emerge from these things.
Then show me a university without those things.
Yes that's right. And you have said nothing of any relevance whatsoever. Difficult to ascertain what your position is, but it's either eliminitivism or reductive materialism, where as the original poster was talking about the mind emerging from the brain. Saying the mind emerges means that it neither doesn't exist, nor is it reducible to the brain. You haven't explained how the mind emerges. Talking about the University analogy is a non-emergentists view of the mind.
Mercutio, see my second sig line below.
~~ Paul
Mercutio
2nd January 2004, 06:43 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Huh?? :eek: Seems I'm wasting my time if that is so. See what I mean, joyrex?
:D :D :D
Mercutio
2nd January 2004, 06:45 PM
Actually, Ian's objections are the perfect illustration of what I spoke about. Thanks again, Ian, for the example.
Iacchus
2nd January 2004, 06:46 PM
Originally posted by joyrex
I'm somewhat aware of this metaphysical(?) position which states that mind emerges from the brain. I'm unsure if it's a totally materialistic view, in the way that all there is to reality is matter. Evidence for this view is perhaps, for example, that brain damage, if sufficient, can result in drastic changes in personality
What other systems are there in nature that could be compared to the mind-brain issue, if any? Since we're sort of privileged to examine our own mind so closely compared to other systems that (seem to) exist outside our mind, doesn't this crate a barrier? Is the emergence of mind unique? You ever try smashing a radio to bits and see if you can get a clear signal out of that either?
Yes, I would say the mind is an emergent property of the brain.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
2nd January 2004, 06:51 PM
Iacchus said:
You ever try smashing a radio to bits and see if you can get a clear signal out of that either?
Granted, I cannot. However, I can place another radio in the same spot and pick up exactly the same music. This is evidence that a common signal was coming from somewhere else and the radio was merely a receiver.
Got similar evidence for mind?
~~ Paul
Mercutio
2nd January 2004, 06:53 PM
Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Mercutio, see my second sig line below.
~~ Paul I think I have said all I need to; coupled with Ian's post as people's exhibit A, I think we are already at the point of "you either get it, or you don't". So....let's start a poll with my post and Ian's....nah...
Interesting Ian
2nd January 2004, 06:56 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
You ever try smashing a radio to bits and see if you can get a clear signal out of that either?
Yes, I would say the mind is an emergent property of the brain.
No, when we say the mind emerges from the brain one means that the mind is a separate existent from the brain, but is generated and is ontologically dependent on the brain.
The existence of the radio merely allows us to hear the signal. But the signal would still exist even when the radio is destroyed. Of course this might well be analogically similar to brain/mind, but then we wouldn't describe the mind as being a property of the brain.
Iacchus
2nd January 2004, 06:56 PM
Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Granted, I cannot. However, I can place another radio in the same spot and pick up exactly the same music. This is evidence that a common signal was coming from somewhere else and the radio was merely a receiver.
Got similar evidence for mind?
~~ Paul What difference does it make? What if it was a CD player instead? ;)
Interesting Ian
2nd January 2004, 07:00 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Actually, Ian's objections are the perfect illustration of what I spoke about. Thanks again, Ian, for the example. [/B]
You must admit you were describing reductionist materialism rather than the emergentist view? The University doesn't emerge, it's just the summation of all its various parts. Yes? But the original poster is interested in the hypothesis that the mind emerges from the brain (such as in epiphenomenalism for example).
Dancing David
2nd January 2004, 07:07 PM
Thanks Ian, you are a breath of fresh air compared to Lifegazer and Iachuss, it is nice to read some one stating thier mind and not quibbling!
When you show me mind without brain, then I will agree with you!
Dancing David
2nd January 2004, 07:09 PM
Jorex:
In answer to your question:
there is no mind.
there is a group of different events that are lumped together under the rubric 'mind'. But there is no substantial body that is the mind.
For example. You watch a wonderful sunset.
What are you/your brain doing: sensing and percieivng, thinking, remebering and feeling. These are all seperate cognitive events.
There is no mind.
Iacchus
2nd January 2004, 07:10 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No, when we say the mind emerges from the brain one means that the mind is a separate existent from the brain, but is generated and is ontologically dependent on the brain.And how do you know it's not picking up "signals" from elsewhere?
The existence of the radio merely allows us to hear the signal. But the signal would still exist even when the radio is destroyed. Of course this might well be analogically similar to brain/mind, but then we wouldn't describe the mind as being a property of the brain. The existence of the brain is merely the vessel, of which the "medium" is consciousness. And who's to say the "signal" is no longer there, when the brain ceases to function?
Mercutio
2nd January 2004, 07:14 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You must admit you were describing reductionist materialism rather than the emergentist view? The University doesn't emerge, it's just the summation of all its various parts. Yes? But the original poster is interested in the hypothesis that the mind emerges from the brain (such as in epiphenomenalism for example). Honestly, Ian, you are much better at the labels than I am. I described what the behaviorists I learned it from termed "emergent property"...I honestly do not know if they used the term in the same way that you or anyone else does. I also honestly do not know if it would be termed "reductionist materialism" or "emergentist", for much the same reasons.
As an example, you clearly disagree with the view that "thinking" is a behavior, and yet behaviorists are united in this view. I know that both they and you are intelligent; the only conclusion I can draw is that we are using the terms as they are used in very different language communities.
If joyrex was asking the question as understood by my language community, I think I gave a pretty decent explanation. On the other hand, if the language assumptions match yours, my post could be wholly irrelevant. Since I cannot read minds (especially since I don't believe they exist :D ), I'll just wait and see if what I wrote was helpful in any way.
Mercutio
2nd January 2004, 07:15 PM
Originally posted by Dancing David
Thanks Ian, you are a breath of fresh air compared to Lifegazer and Iachuss, it is nice to read some one stating thier mind and not quibbling!
Agreed. Ian is the real deal...
Iacchus
2nd January 2004, 07:19 PM
What about the emergent properties of a car? It's just a bucket of bolts until it's properly assembled and taken out for a drive. ;)
RussDill
2nd January 2004, 10:01 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
What difference does it make? What if it was a CD player instead? ;)
Then your point would be completely lost....The whole point of your radio medaphor was that it wasn't the radio making the music, it was the incoming signal...
Yahweh
2nd January 2004, 10:55 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Thanks for informing me. Now do you have a clue how it happens? Ummm . . silly question.
Quick Demonstration:
Bob: Hey, Bill, how does a Nuclear Power Plant work?
Bill: There are 1000s of tiny hampsters who run around in wheels. Those hampsters generate enough electricity to power up to--
Bob: Hampsters?
Bill: Yes, hampsters.
Bob: I dont think Power Plants work on hampster power.
Bill: Well then why dont you tell me if you're so smart?
Bob: But I dont know how they work.
Bill: Well obviously, you cant explain it, so I must be right. And like I was saying, those hampsters generate enough power to send the pyramids off to the moon!
(*cough (http://www.sci-con.org/editorials/20030403.html) cough (http://www.disenchanted.com/dis/lookup.html?node=1852)*)
Iacchus
2nd January 2004, 11:25 PM
Originally posted by RussDill
Then your point would be completely lost....The whole point of your radio medaphor was that it wasn't the radio making the music, it was the incoming signal... Yes, "completely" of course ...
But still the "incoming signal" is derived from the CD disk and, like the radio, illustrates that the CD player is not making the music.
RussDill
2nd January 2004, 11:39 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Yes, "completely" of course ...
But still the "incoming signal" is derived from the CD disk and, like the radio, illustrates that the CD player is not making the music.
Well, once again, I can get another CD player, and put in the same CD and get exactly the same music, just as in the radio example. "This is evidence that a common signal was coming from somewhere else (the cd) and the cd player was merely a player.
Got similar evidence for mind?"
Changing the medaphor advances nothing.
RussDill
2nd January 2004, 11:46 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Yes, "completely" of course ...
But still the "incoming signal" is derived from the CD disk and, like the radio, illustrates that the CD player is not making the music.
But in the case of the CD player or radio, its really easy to find evidence of that by examining the structure, it becomes quickly odvious. There is NO such evidence for the mind, none, notta. You might look at the cough's of yahweh for evidence we do have about the mind that really points away from your radio perspective. Particularly interesting is the left eye being flashed "walked", the patient gets up and walks across the room, and when asked, answers, "to get a coke".
Iacchus
3rd January 2004, 12:05 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
Well, once again, I can get another CD player, and put in the same CD and get exactly the same music, just as in the radio example. "This is evidence that a common signal was coming from somewhere else (the cd) and the cd player was merely a player.
Got similar evidence for mind?"
Changing the medaphor advances nothing. And yet all I'm trying to do is extract the medium -- consciousness or "the mind" -- from the player itself -- "the brain."
So let me ask you this, is music the ermergent property of the radio?
Iacchus
3rd January 2004, 12:13 AM
Perhaps another way to put this is the mind is the software -- the operating system -- of which the brain is the hardware -- the computer itself.
RussDill
3rd January 2004, 12:41 AM
Originally posted by Iacchus
And yet all I'm trying to do is extract the medium -- consciousness or "the mind" -- from the player itself -- "the brain."
I just told you that there is no evidence for the brain being a player. And your response is based on the assumption that the brain is just a player...
So let me ask you this, is music the ermergent property of the radio?
No, music really has nothing to do with the radio. But, since there is no evidence for the brain being anything like a radio, or a cd player, its a pointless question.
RussDill
3rd January 2004, 12:43 AM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Perhaps another way to put this is the mind is the software -- the operating system -- of which the brain is the hardware -- the computer itself.
Thats assuming there is some mechanism for loading "software" onto the brain. Again, we're back to the radio, for which there is no evidence.
joyrex
3rd January 2004, 12:58 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
Jorex:
In answer to your question:
there is no mind.
there is a group of different events that are lumped together under the rubric 'mind'. But there is no substantial body that is the mind.
For example. You watch a wonderful sunset.
What are you/your brain doing: sensing and percieivng, thinking, remebering and feeling. These are all seperate cognitive events.
There is no mind.You answer is so simple, and yet I think I've never seen the issue this way before. It's pretty much like applying Occam to the problem, isn't it? I'm starting to feel that the fact we humans have such a direct experience to this thing called mind results in that it sometimes blurs our ability to reason about it; 'the mind is something so unique it cannot be a mere summation of its parts'. And this brings up arrogance, which perhaps misleads us from the correct conclusions..
epepke
3rd January 2004, 01:00 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
We cannot point to "qualia" because the process of seeing, with all those parts from retinal bleaching of photopigments transducing light energy into nerve energy to the fourier synthesis of image from feature detectors, does not exist without its component parts.
I know this is an old thread, but I just saw it. The best evidence is that the feature detectors work like Gabor filters, that is, a sinusoidal multiplied by a 2-D normal curve. Which is not quite Fourier synthesis, even if it's close.
Iacchus
3rd January 2004, 01:07 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
Thats assuming there is some mechanism for loading "software" onto the brain. Again, we're back to the radio, for which there is no evidence. Or, since it isn't man-made, the natural "receptivity" -- of the mind with the brain -- has already been included. So I really don't see what the big deal is?
joyrex
3rd January 2004, 01:08 AM
Originally posted by epepke
I know this is an old thread, but I just saw it.I wouldn't know about old.. but I started this thread today. Maybe you are implying that the matter at hand has been discussed in length before?
Iacchus
3rd January 2004, 01:32 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
No, music really has nothing to do with the radio. But, since there is no evidence for the brain being anything like a radio, or a cd player, its a pointless question. Except that the music is the emergent property of the speakers (and radio).
RussDill
3rd January 2004, 01:45 AM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Except that the music is the emergent property of the speakers (and radio).
You still fail to try to prove your point. But I suppose, since you think that its perfectly valid to lie to yourself, and hey, if you do it, why not everyone else, I suppose I shouldn't expect any more than that. Anyway, I don't think you know what an emergent property is:
An emergent property is a property which a collection or complex system has, but which the individual members do not have. In such a case, the whole system is sometimes said to have Gestalt. A failure to realize that a property is emergent, or supervenient, leads to the fallacy of division.
For example, the taste of saltiness is a property of salt, but that does not mean that it is also a property of sodium and chlorine, the two elements which make up salt. Thus, saltiness is an emergent or a supervenient property of salt. Claiming that chlorine must be salty because salt is salty would be an example of the fallacy of division.
taken from http://atheism.about.com/library/glossary/general/bldef_emergent.htm
Now, no matter how carefully we examine the radio, an emergent property is not music. The only emergent property it has is that it converts electromagnetic signals to sound (all though, its debatable if this is even emergent, since the process can easily be broken down).
RussDill
3rd January 2004, 01:49 AM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Or, since it isn't man-made, the natural "receptivity" -- of the mind with the brain -- has already been included. So I really don't see what the big deal is?
If you are claiming receptivity, then that would be a well defined process within the brain. No matter how you want to slice it, the brain would be receiving a signal, and with enough research, we should be able to determine what structures in the brain are responsible for that reception. With further research, we should be able to pin down the behavior of these signals and capture them on our own, and with even further research, we should be able to generate these signals, and beyond that, tell where the signals are coming from.
Now, there has been no evidence for reception in the brain. All evidence points to awareness rising out of the brain itself. If you have evidence otherwise (or any reason to believe otherwise, besides it making you happy), let us know.
Mercutio
3rd January 2004, 03:42 AM
Originally posted by epepke
I know this is an old thread, but I just saw it. The best evidence is that the feature detectors work like Gabor filters, that is, a sinusoidal multiplied by a 2-D normal curve. Which is not quite Fourier synthesis, even if it's close. Everything old is new again...like this thread.
Sorry...the Fourier synthesis bit is my attempt at understanding it. I am not a visual-perception researcher, although 3 close friends are. When I speak with them about it, the closest I can come is thinking of it as Fourier synthesis, what with the demonstrable effects of, say, saturating a detector with the presentation of a grid stimulus and seeing its effect on the later presentation of a more complex stimulus. To my thinking, it is similar to the idea of breaking down a complex wave-form into simpler components. To the extent that it is "close but no cigar", blame the failure of my metaphor rather than the state of the research.
edited to add...and of course, there are, if memory serves, many different types of feature detectors, too, so we may be talking about different sorts.
wraith
3rd January 2004, 05:22 AM
Originally posted by joyrex
I'm somewhat aware of this metaphysical(?) position which states that mind emerges from the brain. I'm unsure if it's a totally materialistic view, in the way that all there is to reality is matter. Evidence for this view is perhaps, for example, that brain damage, if sufficient, can result in drastic changes in personality?
Surely brain correlates don't imply matter creating mind?
What other systems are there in nature that could be compared to the mind-brain issue, if any? Since we're sort of privileged to examine our own mind so closely compared to other systems that (seem to) exist outside our mind, doesn't this crate a barrier? Is the emergence of mind unique?
If there was a computer program running beyond it's own code perhaps?
Mercutio
3rd January 2004, 05:50 AM
Originally posted by wraith
Surely brain correlates don't imply matter creating mind?
Mine may be a stupid question, here, but...doesn't your question presuppose a separate and distinct status for "mind"? Do you assume a cartesian sort of dualism of matter and mind (for purposes of your question, at least), or failing that, how is it that you define "mind" in the first place?
I don't mean for this to sound challenging and hostile--it isn't--I just am curious as to the assumptions behind your question...
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 07:48 AM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Perhaps another way to put this is the mind is the software -- the operating system -- of which the brain is the hardware -- the computer itself.
I wish you'd make up your mind what you actually believe in!
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 07:50 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
No, music really has nothing to do with the radio. But, since there is no evidence for the brain being anything like a radio, or a cd player, its a pointless question.
A lot of materialists would say that the brain is like a cd player although they would normally say like a computer ie materialist functionalism.
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 07:56 AM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Originally posted by RussDill
No, music really has nothing to do with the radio. But, since there is no evidence for the brain being anything like a radio, or a cd player, its a pointless question.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Except that the music is the emergent property of the speakers (and radio).
Are you talking about the actual experience of listening to music or its physical representation (ie contractions and rarefactions of air)? In the context of this thread the former begs the question, the latter does not emerge because the music (physical representation) can be derived from physical laws.
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 08:11 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
You still fail to try to prove your point. But I suppose, since you think that its perfectly valid to lie to yourself, and hey, if you do it, why not everyone else, I suppose I shouldn't expect any more than that. Anyway, I don't think you know what an emergent property is:
An emergent property is a property which a collection or complex system has, but which the individual members do not have. In such a case, the whole system is sometimes said to have Gestalt. A failure to realize that a property is emergent, or supervenient, leads to the fallacy of division.
For example, the taste of saltiness is a property of salt,
A property of salt? What do you mean? Can something non-physical (an actual phenomenological taste) be a property of a physical thing? In that case it would be emergent. Is that what you're saying?
Now, no matter how carefully we examine the radio, an emergent property is not music.
Not the physical representation of music. Music as experienced might be.
The only emergent property it has is that it converts electromagnetic signals to sound (all though, its debatable if this is even emergent, since the process can easily be broken down).
I don't think that is emergent. Or perhaps I don't understand what emergent means! :confused:
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 08:35 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
If you are claiming receptivity, then that would be a well defined process within the brain.
Why?
No matter how you want to slice it, the brain would be receiving a signal, and with enough research, we should be able to determine what structures in the brain are responsible for that reception.
So what would need to be discovered about the brain in order for us to conclude this? Or to put it another way, what would need to be discovered about the brain for us to definitely conclude that the brain definitely generates/creates consciousness?
With further research, we should be able to pin down the behavior of these signals and capture them on our own, and with even further research, we should be able to generate these signals, and beyond that, tell where the signals are coming from.
No, you're making the mistake of taking the analogy too far. Such "signals" would not be physical and therefore could not in principle be detected (because if you did detect them they would by definition be physical!).
Now, there has been no evidence for reception in the brain. All evidence points to awareness rising out of the brain itself.
I fail to see why any putative evidence would not equally support both hypotheses.
If you have evidence otherwise (or any reason to believe otherwise, besides it making you happy), let us know.
I know you were addressing Lachus (or whatever he's called), but allow me to give my reasons which I have posted on this board in the past.
The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail that "B" originates from "A", or indeed "A" from "B". It could be that both "A" and "B" both independently are generated by "C". Or it could be the case that although states of "B" are modified by states of "A", "B" ultimately originates from "C".
Now even if we were to describe the mind as being caused by the brain (although I believe the use of "cause" here is technically inappropriate), this needn't have any implications that the mind has its origin in the brain. The picture on a television set is caused by its internal components. This of course doesn't mean to say that the origin of the storylines of the TV programmes being shown have their origin in the TV sets internal components! Indeed it would be preposterous to suppose they do! I believe a partial analogy can be drawn here in that it is equally ludicrous, if not more so, that the richness of our mental lives is somehow mysterious created ex nihilo by physical processes.
Peoples state of consciousness or mind states would correspond to the picture quality. It is the essential self which corresponds to the storyline. By the essential self I mean the *I* That which remains unchanged from your 5 year old self, to your sober adult self, to when you're drunk etc. It is that which makes you you even though your apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically.
Picture quality = state of mind
storyline = self.
[list=1]
state of brain
state of mind
essential self
[/list=1]
is roughly analogical to
[list=1]
state of internal components of TV set
picture quality
storyline of programme
[/list=1]
Affect the processes in the brain (drinking alcohol or whatever) and it affects states of mind (picture quality). But it doesn't affect the essential self (storyline).
Thus when I get drunk, and despite that my mind might change and I become more gregarious or whatever, I nevertheless have the same self. It's just that this self feels differently. I mean we act as if it's the same self, otherwise why plan a night out drinking? :eek: If the self on the other hand is literally equated with your states of mind, then obviously, once you have consumed alcohol you are literally a different person. But this is certainly contrary to how we feel! :eek: Can you not understand that whether I am in a good mood or a bad mood, my self hasn't changed, it's just the way that self feels. Why is this so difficult to understand?
Imagine 2 people from the 17th century travelling to the 21st century and encountering a TV set showing some movie or other. After being suitably amazed, and after tinkering around with its internal components, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the movie must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person however will rightly point out that, although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions etc, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation of a storyline.
Peskanov
3rd January 2004, 09:25 AM
Ian,
Imagine 2 people from the 17th century travelling to the 21st century and encountering a TV set showing some movie or other. After being suitably amazed, and after tinkering around with its internal components, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the movie must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so.
Really? If this person would know the function of a big part of the pieces (resistors, transistors, etc...) I don't think this would be the case. He would be puzzled and that's all.
However we know the inner workings of neurons, and we still we think all the functions of the mind are performed by them.
Iacchus
3rd January 2004, 09:31 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I wish you'd make up your mind what you actually believe in! Is there a difference between the device itself, "the brain," and the effect it produces, "the mind?"
Even so, the brain doesn't produce so much as it "interprets" and then "channels" the information.
The idea
3rd January 2004, 09:32 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
I can show you classrooms, students, profs, spreadsheets with financial plans, curricula, alumni, all sorts of things, but there is no one thing I can point to and say "this is the university."
If there were no minds on campus, then would it be a university?
wraith
3rd January 2004, 09:33 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Mine may be a stupid question, here, but...
There is no such thing as a stupid question. Just stupid people.
Just kiding! South Park joke...couldn't resist it ;)
doesn't your question presuppose a separate and distinct status for "mind"? Do you assume a cartesian sort of dualism of matter and mind (for purposes of your question, at least), or failing that, how is it that you define "mind" in the first place?
The way I see it, it comes downs to what is creating what. Or perhaps, what is the emergent of what.
Matter creating mind (mind emerging from matter) or mind creating matter (matter emerging from mind)....and perhaps identity theories (matter is mind and mind is matter).
I would classify myself as an Idealist. I take the position that mind creates matter (matter emerges from mind).
I would define mind as having a sense of self. To perceive/reason.
I don't mean for this to sound challenging and hostile--it isn't--I just am curious as to the assumptions behind your question...
Copy that :cool:
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 09:42 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Ian,
Really? If this person would know the function of a big part of the pieces (resistors, transistors, etc...) I don't think this would be the case. He would be puzzled and that's all.
However we know the inner workings of neurons, and we still we think all the functions of the mind are performed by them.
You might think this, but can you give any reasons for thinking this? That is the question.
How do the inner workings of neurons lead to consciousness?
The idea
3rd January 2004, 09:43 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Such "signals" would not be physical and therefore could not in principle be detected (because if you did detect them they would by definition be physical!).
A sneaky person sees ultimate salvation in escape from detection via escape from the physical. Would a sneaky person use nonphysical components to build a functioning, nonphysical system?
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 09:49 AM
Originally posted by The idea
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Such "signals" would not be physical and therefore could not in principle be detected (because if you did detect them they would by definition be physical!).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A sneaky person sees ultimate salvation in escape from detection via escape from the physical. Would a sneaky person use nonphysical components to build a functioning, nonphysical system?
I see little purpose in presupposing materialism in arguing against materialism.
If I cannot assume the self is not physical you need to give some damn good reasons for supposing the self is physical, and also what on earth this actually means.
Mercutio
3rd January 2004, 09:49 AM
Originally posted by wraith
The way I see it, it comes downs to what is creating what. Or perhaps, what is the emergent of what.
Matter creating mind (mind emerging from matter) or mind creating matter (matter emerging from mind)....and perhaps identity theories (matter is mind and mind is matter).
I would classify myself as an Idealist. I take the position that mind creates matter (matter emerges from mind).
I would define mind as having a sense of self. To perceive/reason.
Fair enough. You (and Ian) both make your assumptions clear. I assume a physical world, and from it can explain a mental one. How does your mental world explain a consistent (-appearing) physical world? I trust that either you or Ian can answer that, and I am honestly looking forward to being enlightened.
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 09:53 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
[B]
Fair enough. You (and Ian) both make your assumptions clear. I assume a physical world, and from it can explain a mental one.
OK, if you can then do so.
How does your mental world explain a consistent (-appearing) physical world? I trust that either you or Ian can answer that, and I am honestly looking forward to being enlightened.
Why does it need to? Why can't the consistency in the "physical" world be a brute fact?
Peskanov
3rd January 2004, 10:30 AM
Ian,
You might think this, but can you give any reasons for thinking this? That is the question.
How do the inner workings of neurons lead to consciousness?
The abstract model of neurons has shown the following capabilities:
- Can store information
- Can match information
- Can learn, it's adaptative.
That covers the functions of memory and decision perfectly.
Also, neural nets don't sit waiting input, they remain active as far as energy is avalaible. We could say they have his own volition.
Now, a materialist maps this model with the "experience" concept, as they match so much in these two areas, memory and volition/control.
c4ts
3rd January 2004, 10:35 AM
The mind is a quality of the brain.
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 11:04 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Ian,
The abstract model of neurons has shown the following capabilities:
- Can store information
- Can match information
- Can learn, it's adaptative.
That covers the functions of memory and decision perfectly.
Also, neural nets don't sit waiting input, they remain active as far as energy is avalaible. We could say they have his own volition.
Now, a materialist maps this model with the "experience" concept, as they match so much in these two areas, memory and volition/control.
You're not saying anything relevant.
Mercutio
3rd January 2004, 11:16 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You're not saying anything relevant. well, no, not to an idealist. But from my perspective, Peskanov's info is highly relevant. I am a little surprised, Ian--although I would not expect you to agree with this materialist view, I honestly thought that you would understand it.
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 11:20 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
well, no, not to an idealist. But from my perspective, Peskanov's info is highly relevant. I am a little surprised, Ian--although I would not expect you to agree with this materialist view, I honestly thought that you would understand it.
No, I find it devoid of meaning.
Mercutio
3rd January 2004, 11:29 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No, I find it devoid of meaning. Yes, I see that. I just wonder why? I mean, my views must be as different from yours as yours are from mine, and yet I can see your perspective. I do not agree with it, of course :D , but I find that it makes sense when you start from your starting point.
And yet you are consistent in finding my view "devoid of meaning", and I am at a loss as to why. I hesitate so suggest any inability to see things from my view, because you occasionally will state a conclusion "from the materialist view" with great detail and accuracy. So, I am flummoxed. I really would like to understand better, but I wouldn't know where to begin.
So I ask "why is it devoid of meaning?", knowing that the question itself is probably impossible to answer as posed. So feel free to re-tool the question into something that you can answer, and give it a go. No hurry...we've been here before, we'll likely be here again...;)
Peskanov
3rd January 2004, 12:31 PM
Ian, I said materialists think all the functions of the mind are performed by neurons, and you asked reasons for thinking this. My reply was relevant I think.
If we agree that "remenbering" and "taking decisions" are functions of the mind, then mapping these functions in the brain is evidence for this hypothesis.
Interesting Ian
3rd January 2004, 01:06 PM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Ian, I said materialists think all the functions of the mind are performed by neurons, and you asked reasons for thinking this. My reply was relevant I think.
If we agree that "remenbering" and "taking decisions" are functions of the mind, then mapping these functions in the brain is evidence for this hypothesis.
This is what was said:
Pesk
However we know the inner workings of neurons, and we still we think all the functions of the mind are performed by them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II
You might think this, but can you give any reasons for thinking this? That is the question.
[/quote]
Note you said functions of the mind rather than functions of the brain. Now you give examples of remembering and taking decisions as examples of such functions. With what reason could such "functions of the mind" be understood by the inner workings of neurons? Neurons, like all other things, can only explain other physical things. So how can neurons (ie physical processes) explain something which is non-physical; namely the mind?
The idea
3rd January 2004, 01:27 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[...]how can neurons (ie physical processes) explain something which is non-physical; namely the mind?
If ideas are nonphysical, then how can a (physical) book give somebody an idea?
lifegazer
3rd January 2004, 01:33 PM
Originally posted by joyrex
Evidence for this view is perhaps, for example, that brain damage, if sufficient, can result in drastic changes in personality?
Classing the mind as a focal-point of awareness within perceived existence is the reason why this flawed idea is continually presented as evidence against Idealism. In truth, the mind should be regarded as encompassing the whole of its perceptions. But most importantly, the mind should be regarded as the creator of those sensations [upon awareness] in the first instance. Exactly the same principal as dreams.
That conscious-awareness is intrinsically linked and affected by the sensations it perceives is not in question. Equally, it can be argued that conscious attitude affects the yield of those sensations (affects perceived reality). The important thing to remember, imo, is that the mind is more than a focal-point within perceived reality. So this "evidence" has no real merit.
c4ts
3rd January 2004, 01:38 PM
Ian and Lifegazer are an insult to Plato, so you might not want to have them answer that question. Instead, look at it this way. Ideas are not things, and things are made of material. However ideas can be apparent in things. Because of this, ideas are qualities.
Iacchus
3rd January 2004, 01:43 PM
Originally posted by c4ts
Ian and Lifegazer are an insult to Plato, so you might not want to have them answer that question. Instead, look at it this way. Ideas are not things, and things are made of material. However ideas can be apparent in things. Because of this, ideas are qualities. So, the mind is the "transcendent" quality of the brain? Yes, this is how I see it. ;)
c4ts
3rd January 2004, 01:48 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
So, the mind is the "transcendent" quality of the brain? Yes, this is how I see it. ;)
Only if you say transcendence is a property of qualities, but that's about where Plato and I disagree.
The idea
3rd January 2004, 01:51 PM
Originally posted by The idea
If ideas are nonphysical, then how can a (physical) book give somebody an idea?
People can explain how they got some (nonphysical) ideas by identifying the (physical) books that they have been reading. So something physical can explain the origin of something nonphysical.
lifegazer
3rd January 2004, 01:54 PM
Originally posted by c4ts
Instead, look at it this way. Ideas are not things,
Actually, things are reasoned from amongst the sensations. So essentially, all things are ideas - fact.
and things are made of material.
Actually, things are made of sensations. They appear to be material. But as everyone here now knows, it takes a leap of faith to assert that these things exist beyond your awareness and that they are made of a substance distinct from your mind (matter).
Dancing David
3rd January 2004, 01:56 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Yes, "completely" of course ...
But still the "incoming signal" is derived from the CD disk and, like the radio, illustrates that the CD player is not making the music.
The metaphor breaks down though:
are you saying that we are conrolled at a distance?
are you saying that our eyes do not see but just recieve distant signals?
are you saying that human life is a prerecorded events.
Analogies and metaphors are nice but they tend to break down.
What evidence do you have for consiousness apart from an organic brain.
I would say I prefer the metaphor of ship and wake, the brain is the ship and the mind is the wake.
Peskanov
3rd January 2004, 01:59 PM
Ian,
Note you said functions of the mind rather than functions of the brain. Now you give examples of remembering and taking decisions as examples of such functions. With what reason could such "functions of the mind" be understood by the inner workings of neurons?
A person takes a decission with a clearly physical result. If you can know all causes which produced that final result, you can say you understood this action (the decision), isn't it?
The neuronal model offers a mechanism which can potentially produce all the complexity of a person's behaviour.
Neurons, like all other things, can only explain other physical things. So how can neurons (ie physical processes) explain something which is non-physical; namely the mind?
If the neuron model is correct, a good model of a person's brain should be able to predict his future mind states (supossing future inputs of that brain are also known). Yes, I said mind states and not brain states, because these succesful predictions would show evidence of both being the same.
Would be this model an explanation of the mind? You tell me, I don't know what do you accept for an explanation.
Does a simulation of fluids explain a waterfall? If you say yes, explain me why this not applies to the mind.
Dancing David
3rd January 2004, 02:03 PM
Originally posted by joyrex
You answer is so simple, and yet I think I've never seen the issue this way before. It's pretty much like applying Occam to the problem, isn't it? I'm starting to feel that the fact we humans have such a direct experience to this thing called mind results in that it sometimes blurs our ability to reason about it; 'the mind is something so unique it cannot be a mere summation of its parts'. And this brings up arrogance, which perhaps misleads us from the correct conclusions..
I have to credit Mecrutio for saying it first, although it reinforces the teachings of the buddha nicely.
Go Mecrutio!
c4ts
3rd January 2004, 02:04 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Actually, things are reasoned from amongst the sensations. So essentially, all things are ideas - fact.
Actually, things are made of sensations. They appear to be material. But as everyone here now knows, it takes a leap of faith to assert that these things exist beyond your awareness and that they are made of a substance distinct from your mind (matter).
I should have said "objects" instead of "things."
Dancing David
3rd January 2004, 02:07 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Except that the music is the emergent property of the speakers (and radio).
I will bring this up too!
Music doesn't exist it is a series of learned patterns that we place upon 'ordered' sounds, so music is an emergent property of a brain learning pattern recognition. It is a purely human value.
Dancing David
3rd January 2004, 02:10 PM
Originally posted by Iacchus
Is there a difference between the device itself, "the brain," and the effect it produces, "the mind?"
Even so, the brain doesn't produce so much as it "interprets" and then "channels" the information.
Uh, where do you think the qualia come from, the TV station?
The idea
3rd January 2004, 02:14 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Actually, things are made of sensations. They appear to be material. But as everyone here now knows, it takes a leap of faith to assert that these things exist beyond your awareness and that they are made of a substance distinct from your mind (matter).
So your account of human consciousness can be the same as the materialist account except that the materialist stops at matter, but you keep going and explain the matter as actually composed of sensations.
Dancing David
3rd January 2004, 02:16 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Note you said functions of the mind rather than functions of the brain. Now you give examples of remembering and taking decisions as examples of such functions. With what reason could such "functions of the mind" be understood by the inner workings of neurons? Neurons, like all other things, can only explain other physical things. So how can neurons (ie physical processes) explain something which is non-physical; namely the mind? [/QUOTE]
Glad to see you calling out meaningless again/
Why is consiousness any different from digestion?
We asked this before or at least Mecrutio did, and I think it deserves answering.
What is it about consiousness that makes it special other than anthropomorhism and egocentricism?
What makes consiousness different than digestion?
Dancing David
3rd January 2004, 02:21 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Classing the mind as a focal-point of awareness within perceived existence is the reason why this flawed idea is continually presented as evidence against Idealism. In truth, the mind should be regarded as encompassing the whole of its perceptions. But most importantly, the mind should be regarded as the creator of those sensations [upon awareness] in the first instance. Exactly the same principal as dreams.
That conscious-awareness is intrinsically linked and affected by the sensations it perceives is not in question
OHMI Lifegazer, thzt is the largest sentence stating [I]Goddidit[/] that i have seen, cut your optic nerve and tell me that sensation derives from the brain.
Silly.
It comes from photons enetering the eye.
Say can you see in the dark?
The sun is the center of the solar system, but wait the solar system supercedes the sun, so we can ignore the sun.
Thanks for the laugh!
c4ts
3rd January 2004, 02:24 PM
Is "classing" even a word?
Iacchus
3rd January 2004, 02:30 PM
Originally posted by Dancing David
The metaphor breaks down though:
are you saying that we are conrolled at a distance?
are you saying that our eyes do not see but just recieve distant signals?
are you saying that human life is a prerecorded events.
Analogies and metaphors are nice but they tend to break down.I'm suggesting that the mind picks up signals locally and remotely.
What evidence do you have for consiousness apart from an organic brain.That would be contingent upon whether we had a soul or not which, I'm not going to discuss at this time. Sorry.
I would say I prefer the metaphor of ship and wake, the brain is the ship and the mind is the wake.
That doesn't give much significance to the mind though does it?
lifegazer
3rd January 2004, 03:58 PM
Originally posted by Dancing David
OHMI Lifegazer, thzt is the largest sentence stating [I]Goddidit[/] that i have seen, cut your optic nerve and tell me that sensation derives from the brain.
Silly.
Which optic nerve would you like me to cut? The one we perceive within our sensations, or the one people like you think exists beyond our awareness?
P.s., how can I find the latter?
It comes from photons enetering the eye.
Would that be the inner-sensation of photons entering your inner-sensation of eyes, or the assumed existence of external photons entering the assumed existence of your outer eyes?
Say can you see in the dark?
In my dreams and imagination, yes.
Light is an abstract inner-sensation. It's created by the mind itself - not by external reality. Just as any abstract-sensation is.
As I have said on several occasions: no man has seen beyond himself. Even those distant stars we ponder on clear nights are not a single measure beyond our own awareness.
lifegazer
3rd January 2004, 04:06 PM
Originally posted by The idea
So your account of human consciousness can be the same as the materialist account except that the materialist stops at matter, but you keep going and explain the matter as actually composed of sensations.
All knowledge is derived from inner-sensation. Every thing exists amongst inner-awareness. You embrace your own universe. You are bigger than the whole shebang within you. The universe is within you. Your mind embraces existence. Your mind is existence, seeing things within it.
All you need to do now is find out who 'you' are.
hammegk
3rd January 2004, 04:55 PM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Does a simulation of fluids explain a waterfall? If you say yes, explain me why this not applies to the mind.
ROFL. You have seen a "thinking" waterfall? Did you also have a conversation with it?
Originally posted by The idea
So your account of human consciousness can be the same as the materialist account except that the materialist stops at matter, but you keep going and explain the matter as actually composed of sensations.
Except you have it backwards. Materialists extrapolate from the fact of "thought" to supposing the existence of a physical, objective world. Who needs Occam did you say?
- Can store information
- Can match information
- Can learn, it's adaptative.
Are irrelevant until operating system code source can be specified.
Hey, I know. Emergent Property = scientific jargon for goddidit.
RussDill
3rd January 2004, 10:52 PM
Originally posted by The idea
So your account of human consciousness can be the same as the materialist account except that the materialist stops at matter, but you keep going and explain the matter as actually composed of sensations.
look idea, don't even try. Its true, lifegazer's philosophy does assume that perceived reality is not in fact reality, but instead a vast illusion created by a superior intelligence. However, due to whatever reason, possibly mental illness, he refuses to question this belief. He blindly believes that he has found the truth, so he sees no point in questioning it. Any argument is only a pointless afterthought in his mind, anyone who also does not see the truth is odviously just stupid. He even claims that through his misunderstanding of science that he has proved and deduced all of his assumptions and beliefs. Your post has merit, but, he will just claim that your are ignorant, hopeless, brainwashed, etc, and then repeat his assumptions.
Peskanov
4th January 2004, 01:47 AM
Hammegk,
ROFL. You have seen a "thinking" waterfall? Did you also have a conversation with it?
Sorry, but I am not sure if you are being ironic, or what's the irony.
The question I was making: in case whe can build an implementation of an abstract model of the brain which shows the external signs of the mind (like having a conversation)...Does this model counts as an explanation of the mind or not?
Are irrelevant until operating system code source can be specified.
We can also trace back the path of the information to learn if a system is causally closed. In a TV set everything ends in the antenna; in a computer, the information just moves inside or is synthesized.
The brain show all the attributes of the later and none of the former.
We have good reasons to believe the brain is causally closed. Identifying what you call "the OS" is not as important as knowing that. Identifying possible function of the mind in the brain is just growing evidence of the mind as a function of the brain, like it or not.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 03:07 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
Its true, lifegazer's philosophy does assume that perceived reality is not in fact reality, but instead a vast illusion created by a superior intelligence. However, due to whatever reason, possibly mental illness, he refuses to question this belief.
Actually, it was with an open mind and a willingness to enquire without assumption which yielded my conclusions. I used to have the same beliefs as you, more or less, until relatively recently.
Stick to the issues Russ.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 03:26 AM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Actually, it was with an open mind and a willingness to enquire without assumption which yielded my conclusions. I used to have the same beliefs as you, more or less, until relatively recently.
Stick to the issues Russ.
You mean you, like me, used to inquire without assumptions? But now, your mind is airtight. Too bad. You even attempt to reason your philosophy with your misunderstanding of science.
spejic
4th January 2004, 03:28 AM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Which optic nerve would you like me to cut? The one we perceive within our sensations, or the one people like you think exists beyond our awareness?Whichever is the one that is affected by taking a big knife and sticking it in your eye sockets.Say can you see in the dark?
In my dreams and imagination, yes.Then is it ok to blindfold you and ask you to carry out your daily activities? This can finally be a way to experimentally find out if your "discoveries" of the true nature of the universe has an effect we can measure. But as the blindfolding would have an effect on your carrying out your daily activities (as I hope you would admit even without actually testing it) then clearly the waking world has differences to the dream world.As I have said on several occasions: no man has seen beyond himself. Even those distant stars we ponder on clear nights are not a single measure beyond our own awareness. But there must be something beyond our own awareness - otherwise how can those stars be seen by you and me both?
To answer the original question, "emergence of mind" is what happend to that guy in the movie "The Cube" after his face was sprayed with fast-acting acid.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 03:49 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
You mean you, like me, used to inquire without assumptions? But now, your mind is airtight. Too bad. You even attempt to reason your philosophy with your misunderstanding of science.
Russ, stating that the mind emerged just from random material events is definitely an assumption. As is the assertion that anything exists externally to awareness. But as you lack the sincerity to admit this to yourself, you are denied the same avenue of enquiry I embarked upon.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 04:08 AM
Originally posted by spejic
[B]Whichever is the one that is affected by taking a big knife and sticking it in your eye sockets.[B]
Ah, then that would be the inner-perception of an optic nerve.
Hit me on my perceived head with a perceived hammer and I shall perceive pain as a response. All happens within perception.
But I was more interested in getting beyond my inner-perception of things. Care to take me there?
"In my dreams and imagination, yes."
Then is it ok to blindfold you and ask you to carry out your daily activities?
You could ask me the same question in a dream. I'd give the same answer: No.
then clearly the waking world has differences to the dream world.
Correct. We share this dream and are set free to have our own when we sleep from it.
But there must be something beyond our own awareness - otherwise how can those stars be seen by you and me both?
That ~thing~ is what I call The Mind of God. Embraces a singular absolute blueprint of this ordered realm within that mind, but countless relative perceptions within it.
Again, dreams work by the same principal: The Mind embraces and creates the whole dream for its own awareness (you), but also plays the part of other entities and things within those dreams. It is the whole and the parts.
Interesting Ian
4th January 2004, 05:34 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Sorry, but I am not sure if you are being ironic, or what's the irony.
The question I was making: in case whe can build an implementation of an abstract model of the brain which shows the external signs of the mind (like having a conversation)...Does this model counts as an explanation of the mind or not? [/B]
It would only do so if we are functionalists. Otherwise no.
Interesting Ian
4th January 2004, 05:39 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
We can also trace back the path of the information to learn if a system is causally closed. In a TV set everything ends in the antenna; in a computer, the information just moves inside or is synthesized.
The brain show all the attributes of the later and none of the former.
So you're saying that there is overwhelming evidence that the brain is the actual creator of consciousness rather than a mere modifyer of consciousness? Is this what you're saying? Could you tell me what the evidence is?
We have good reasons to believe the brain is causally closed.
OK, could you tell me what these reasons are??
wraith
4th January 2004, 06:38 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Fair enough. You (and Ian) both make your assumptions clear.
What assumptions?
I assume a physical world, and from it can explain a mental one. How does your mental world explain a consistent (-appearing) physical world?
Well the assumption that matter exists independently of observation is fairly "huge" isn't it? What would your backyard look like if there was no one around to perceive it? Does a radio produce "sound" independently, before a mind can interpret a pattern of energy/information as being "sound"?
Does matter create the very sensations that we feel?
That's wacko talk.
wraith
4th January 2004, 06:41 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Ian,
The abstract model of neurons has shown the following capabilities:
- Can store information
- Can match information
- Can learn, it's adaptative.
That covers the functions of memory and decision perfectly.
Also, neural nets don't sit waiting input, they remain active as far as energy is avalaible. We could say they have his own volition.
Now, a materialist maps this model with the "experience" concept, as they match so much in these two areas, memory and volition/control.
Correlations don't imply cause.
wraith
4th January 2004, 06:52 AM
Originally posted by c4ts
The mind is a quality of the brain.
So Cats, how does matter send the sensations that you feel exactly?
Say that you touch a hot object. Is your line of reasoning as follows:
matter sends sensations of "hot and pain" to non-conscious brain > non-conscious brain sends the sensations of "hot and pain" to conscious mind?
If the sensations of "hot and pain" is a concept of mind and mind is a quality of non-conscious matter (ie the brain in this case) then how does matter create and send the sensations of "hot and pain" to mind?
wraith
4th January 2004, 07:01 AM
Originally posted by The idea
People can explain how they got some (nonphysical) ideas by identifying the (physical) books that they have been reading. So something physical can explain the origin of something nonphysical.
The problem is that you're assuming that the book is indeed physical.
Whether the book is actually physical or an idea of mind (non-physical) is the very thing that you're trying to find out.
wraith
4th January 2004, 07:15 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
[B]A person takes a decission with a clearly physical result. If you can know all causes which produced that final result, you can say you understood this action (the decision), isn't it?
The neuronal model offers a mechanism which can potentially produce all the complexity of a person's behaviour.
If the neuron model is correct, a good model of a person's brain should be able to predict his future mind states (supossing future inputs of that brain are also known). Yes, I said mind states and not brain states, because these succesful predictions would show evidence of both being the same.
Though, it doesn't explain how the matter itself creates consciousness.
You can see all the correlations that you want between a computer program and it's code, but correlations do not show cause.
Does a simulation of fluids explain a waterfall? If you say yes, explain me why this not applies to the mind.
The waterfall is a simulation of fluid in itself.
wraith
4th January 2004, 07:18 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
Except that the music is the emergent property of the speakers (and radio).
Don't be insane! Speakers are not a sufficient condition for music.
wraith
4th January 2004, 07:21 AM
Originally posted by The idea
So your account of human consciousness can be the same as the materialist account except that the materialist stops at matter, but you keep going and explain the matter as actually composed of sensations.
Hold the phone there charlie, that's what the materialist would have you believe.
wraith
4th January 2004, 07:26 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
What makes consiousness different than digestion?
The processes of digestion doesn't make digestion "conscious" for starters.
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 07:31 AM
Originally posted by wraith
What assumptions?
Actually, the assumption that mental entities exist. Certainly, our language treats mental entities as things, but our language also says the sun "rises".
You see evidence for mind with every thought you have and every image you see...but think about it: Suppose you had been told from birth that rain was the angels peeing...if everybody spoke this way, why would you question it? And every time it rained you would see evidence of angels. Only when you challenge the assumptions you did not even realize were assumptions, can you start to learn.
(in Ian's primary and secondary qualities thread, someone--I forget who, sorry--gave the example of the French and the concept of something "disagreeing with one's liver"...we do not think this way in our language community, but they do.)
Well the assumption that matter exists independently of observation is fairly "huge" isn't it? What would your backyard look like if there was no one around to perceive it? A huge assumption? It is an assumption, just like your assumption of mental entities. The difference is that I recognise it as such. You are so accustomed to thinking in terms of "thoughts", "memories", and other mentalisms, that you do not realize that they are not "self-evident" as some here have claimed. They arise from our language. I look in the back yard, I see a tree. I do not see the perception of a tree. I can trace the physics of this from the distal stimulus (the tree itself) to the proximal stimulus (its projection on my retina) to the transduction of specific wavelengths of light by bleaching alpha, beta, and gamma photopigments and producing a nerve signal, sodium and potassium ions coursing through the semi-permeable membrane of my neurons...long story short, we can explain seeing through the actions of my visual system. Nowhere in this explanation is there a need to use the term "qualia". Nowhere is there an "image" that must be "processed by the mind". That view was Descartes's, and we have learned a bit since then.
Does a radio produce "sound" independently, before a mind can interpret a pattern of energy/information as being "sound"?
You mean, before our ear transduces the pressure wave into nerve signal through the action of the hair cells on the basilar membrane? Before that signal is sent through the auditory nerve to the hearing centers of the brain? Now....please tell me where in the process the "mind" is doing anything. Without making use of anything that we know the brain does.
Does matter create the very sensations that we feel?
You are assuming "sensations" exist apart from our sensing.
That's wacko talk. You could have saved words by just admitting that you did not understand my first post in this thread. It is nothing to be ashamed of; you have spent your entire speaking life with the assumptions you do not realize are assumptions.
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 07:34 AM
Originally posted by wraith
The processes of digestion doesn't make digestion "conscious" for starters. Oh, good, someone who knows what "consciousness" is! Could you please tell me what it is that Ian's p-zombies don't have that you do? I really, really think I may be one...
What is consciousness, apart from seeing, hearing...thinking, remembering, feeling...all the things that we know the body can do without a "mind"...please tell me what is left for "consciousness"?
Interesting Ian
4th January 2004, 08:02 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Oh, good, someone who knows what "consciousness" is! Could you please tell me what it is that Ian's p-zombies don't have that you do? I really, really think I may be one...
What is consciousness, apart from seeing, hearing...thinking, remembering, feeling...all the things that we know the body can do without a "mind"...please tell me what is left for "consciousness"?
The body can't do any of those things without a mind. You're merely referring to the functional correlates.
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 08:09 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
The body can't do any of those things without a mind. You're merely referring to the functional correlates. To quote...well, you, Ian...could you give me the reasons for this claim of yours? Or is it merely an assertion?
wraith
4th January 2004, 08:10 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Actually, the assumption that mental entities exist. Certainly, our language treats mental entities as things, but our language also says the sun "rises".
You see evidence for mind with every thought you have and every image you see...but think about it: Suppose you had been told from birth that rain was the angels peeing...if everybody spoke this way, why would you question it?
Do you still believe in Santa?
And every time it rained you would see evidence of angels. Only when you challenge the assumptions you did not even realize were assumptions, can you start to learn.
Well then, it looks as if we are challenging each other's assumptions? ;)
A huge assumption? It is an assumption, just like your assumption of mental entities. The difference is that I recognise it as such. You are so accustomed to thinking in terms of "thoughts", "memories", and other mentalisms, that you do not realize that they are not "self-evident" as some here have claimed. They arise from our language.
Well at least one of us is closer to describing the Truth.
However, even if there were no other mental entities (I take it that you mean other minds?), and I was living in world of solipsism, materialism would still be False.
I look in the back yard, I see a tree. I do not see the perception of a tree.
You see a difference between seeing a tree and perceiving a tree?
Are you saying that you can see something without perceiving it?
I can trace the physics of this from the distal stimulus (the tree itself) to the proximal stimulus (its projection on my retina) to the transduction of specific wavelengths of light by bleaching alpha, beta, and gamma photopigments and producing a nerve signal, sodium and potassium ions coursing through the semi-permeable membrane of my neurons...long story short, we can explain seeing through the actions of my visual system. Nowhere in this explanation is there a need to use the term "qualia". Nowhere is there an "image" that must be "processed by the mind". That view was Descartes's, and we have learned a bit since then.
Firstly, all that you have described are the mechanics of seeing. The mechanics itself do not explain the actual sensation of seeing that tree. The features that make up a tree such as colour, shape, smell etc are sensations of mind. Matter can not produce these senations before being perceived by mind.
You mean, before our ear transduces the pressure wave into nerve signal through the action of the hair cells on the basilar membrane? Before that signal is sent through the auditory nerve to the hearing centers of the brain? Now....please tell me where in the process the "mind" is doing anything. Without making use of anything that we know the brain does.
My reply to your previous quote would apply this one. The correlations don't show a cause between matter and mind. Also, I am not saying that correlations don't exist by necessity. Also, I am not saying that mind can disobey the laws of physics. ie there is always a mind and brain correlation (at least in this Universe).
From your point of view, matter creates the sound before the sound is perceived by the mind. How is this possible if sound is produced in the mind?
You are assuming "sensations" exist apart from our sensing.
That's your stance!?
You could have saved words by just admitting that you did not understand my first post in this thread. It is nothing to be ashamed of; you have spent your entire speaking life with the assumptions you do not realize are assumptions.
LOL!
Don't flatter yourself.
wraith
4th January 2004, 08:14 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Oh, good, someone who knows what "consciousness" is! Could you please tell me what it is that Ian's p-zombies don't have that you do? I really, really think I may be one...
I'm pretty sure that I exist :eek:
apart from seeing, hearing...thinking, remembering, feeling...all the things that we know the body can do without a "mind"...please tell me what is left for "consciousness"?
Are you sure about this?
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 08:30 AM
Originally posted by wraith
Well then, it looks as if we are challenging each other's assumptions? ;)
As long as they are recognised as assumptions, this is fine by me.
Well at least one of us is closer to describing the Truth.
However, even if there were no other mental entities (I take it that you mean other minds?), and I was living in world of solipsism, materialism would still be False.
No, I do not mean other minds. I mean the very things that you take as evidence for your own mind--thoughts, memories, feelings (as opposed to thinking, remembering, and feeling, as physical processes.)
You see a difference between seeing a tree and perceiving a tree?
Are you saying that you can see something without perceiving it?
Not only do you not understand me, you don't understand that you don't understand :D. Do you not see a difference between "seeing a tree" and "seeing a perception of a tree"? (I could have used the term "qualia" or "image" as well). You add an additional layer that is superfluous.
Firstly, all that you have described are the mechanics of seeing. The mechanics itself do not explain the actual sensation of seeing that tree. The features that make up a tree such as colour, shape, smell etc are sensations of mind. Matter can not produce these senations before being perceived by mind.
Ok...please tell me what additional process is needed for the "mind"? Why are these "sensations of the mind", apart from the physical processes we know? You assert that matter cannot produce these sensations, but I do not see any reason for that assertion. Please explain it in more detail or something--all I see is an additional and un-needed hypothetical step.
My reply to your previous quote would apply this one. The correlations don't show a cause between matter and mind. Also, I am not saying that correlations don't exist by necessity. Also, I am not saying that mind can disobey the laws of physics. ie there is always a mind and brain correlation (at least in this Universe).
What exactly, then, are you saying that the mind does? It seems to me that there is precious little left of our experience for it to explain, and absolutely no mechanism by which it could explain it.
From your point of view, matter creates the sound before the sound is perceived by the mind. How is this possible if sound is produced in the mind?
Matter creates a pressure wave, which is interpreted by our sensory system as sound. It is interpreted and perceived by our body--every part of the sensory system that we know of is, after all, part of our body-- and not by our "mind", until such time as you can give me evidence that a "mind" adds one iota to the explanation. Oh, and as a direct answer, I suppose that it is not possible if sound is produced in the mind...good thing it isn't.
That's your stance!? This question implies clearly that you do not understand my stance.
LOL!
Don't flatter yourself. Then, please, demonstrate that you do understand.
Interesting Ian
4th January 2004, 08:42 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
To quote...well, you, Ian...could you give me the reasons for this claim of yours? Or is it merely an assertion?
It is true by definition of what these words mean eg to see something means to have a certain phenomenological experience. Nothing to do with the body.
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 08:54 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It is true by definition of what these words mean eg to see something means to have a certain phenomenological experience. Nothing to do with the body. So, by assertion, then. :D Ok, then, what is the evidence that a phenomenological experience has nothing to do with the body? I only ask because I have never, personally, experienced the one without the other. That I know of, anyway.
Peskanov
4th January 2004, 09:07 AM
Ian, I replied to you in the previous page; I still would like to see your reply.
It would only do so if we are functionalists. Otherwise no.
How does a "non functionalist" explain any natural phenomena, like for example a lighting?
I still say that if I can create a good formal model of a phenomena and predict it's development using it, I am explaining it at some level...
However any known phenomena can be explained at several levels of detail and using several criterions.
So you're saying that there is overwhelming evidence that the brain is the actual creator of consciousness rather than a mere modifyer of consciousness? Is this what you're saying? Could you tell me what the evidence is?
I say there is overwhelming evidence about the brain processing, creating and modifying information. On a higer level, there is also overwhelming evidence of processes about learning, memorising, or making decissions.
I don't know about consciousness because I can't even define it properly.
We have good reasons to believe the brain is causally closed
OK, could you tell me what these reasons are??
Mainly 2:
-The studies about the neuron. If the brick's of the brain are perfectly known at low level, what more functions do you expect them to carry on? Neurons are connected to electronic circuit, and it's behaviour is formalized and predicted.
- The success of the use of the theory elaborated from the study of the neurons. High level functions (like a net which learns to reckon a sound) are synthetised easily using the neuron model.
To believe there is "something more" in this mechanism, you must postulate absurd theories like the penrose-hameroff ones...Good luck.
Peskanov
4th January 2004, 09:18 AM
Wraith,
Correlations don't imply cause.
No, the implication comes from the deterministic nature of the neuron.
Though, it doesn't explain how the matter itself creates consciousness.
You can see all the correlations that you want between a computer program and it's code, but correlations do not show cause.
When do you substitute "correlation" for "identity"? What proof do you need to accept that a set magnetic charges inisde a chip are really the program you are seeing through your screen?
For me, seeing that I can model the chip and reproduce it's exact output is proof enough about identity, not correlation. Same about the brain.
The waterfall is a simulation of fluid in itself.
Yes? Let's guess we live in a idealist's universe. My mind creates the waterfall. So what? The waterfall still follows his own logic, although maybe only for the few time I am looking at it.
If I build a model which tells me how the waterfall runs and will run, I am explaining the waterfall.
The origin of the waterfall does not matter, I am trying to explain the waterfall, not the whole universe.
If I can successfully model the brain and use this model to reproduce all the external signs of the mind, I say I am explaining it.
Interesting Ian
4th January 2004, 09:41 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
So, by assertion, then. :D Ok, then, what is the evidence that a phenomenological experience has nothing to do with the body? I only ask because I have never, personally, experienced the one without the other. That I know of, anyway.
It's irrelevant whether you always experience one with the other. A phenomenological experience, by virtue of what it means, has nothing to do with the body. If you don't realise this, you haven't understood what it means.
Interesting Ian
4th January 2004, 09:42 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
[B]Ian, I replied to you in the previous page; I still would like to see your reply.
You haven't said anything which is worth responding to.
Interesting Ian
4th January 2004, 09:45 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
So you're saying that there is overwhelming evidence that the brain is the actual creator of consciousness rather than a mere modifyer of consciousness? Is this what you're saying? Could you tell me what the evidence is?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I say there is overwhelming evidence about the brain processing, creating and modifying information. On a higer level, there is also overwhelming evidence of processes about learning, memorising, or making decissions.
I don't know about consciousness because I can't even define it properly
Then there is no further point in me discussing this with you. I knew you didn't have any answers. No-one has. No materialist can explain consciousness, not ever, not even in principle. Stop pretending otherwise.
wraith
4th January 2004, 10:09 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
As long as they are recognised as assumptions, this is fine by me.
Why don't you assume what I assume if logic doesn't separate us?
No, I do not mean other minds. I mean the very things that you take as evidence for your own mind--thoughts, memories, feelings (as opposed to thinking, remembering, and feeling, as physical processes.)
So you're saying that thinking, remembering, and feeling can exist without mind?
Not only do you not understand me, you don't understand that you don't understand :D. Do you not see a difference between "seeing a tree" and "seeing a perception of a tree"? (I could have used the term "qualia" or "image" as well). You add an additional layer that is superfluous.
Well that's not what I asked. I said:
Do you see a difference between seeing a tree and perceiving a tree?
Are you saying that you can see something without perceiving it?
Ok...please tell me what additional process is needed for the "mind"?
None, because there is only mind. I see this Universe as a manisfestation of information, interpreted by mind, via our senses.
Why are these "sensations of the mind", apart from the physical processes we know?
Because you can't send sensations because it's produced by mind.
You assert that matter cannot produce these sensations, but I do not see any reason for that assertion.
You can't send the sensation of sound to mind, because it's the mind that produces that sensation of sound.
Please explain it in more detail or something--all I see is an additional and un-needed hypothetical step.
It's the materialist point of view that requires the extra steps.
My view takes the point of information being sent from mind to mind.
You're saying that it's being sent from matter to mind to matter to mind.
What exactly, then, are you saying that the mind does? It seems to me that there is precious little left of our experience for it to explain, and absolutely no mechanism by which it could explain it.
The mind interprets and expresses information. The origin of mind itself is still a mystery to me. But if logic holds up, it certainly isn't produced by the way that mainstream materialism describes it, for the reasons given above.
Matter creates a pressure wave, which is interpreted by our sensory system as sound. It is interpreted and perceived by our body--every part of the sensory system that we know of is, after all, part of our body-- and not by our "mind", until such time as you can give me evidence that a "mind" adds one iota to the explanation.
How does the body interpret energy as being sound? Would you hear sound if you didn't have a mind?
This question implies clearly that you do not understand my stance.
No, I know your stance pretty well ;)
Then, please, demonstrate that you do understand.
I'll do what I can :cool:
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 10:44 AM
Originally posted by wraith
Why don't you assume what I assume if logic doesn't separate us?
A very good question. I like my assumptions, because they are part of a scientific worldview that has made tremendous progress (depending, of course, on how you define progress) in understanding the workings of the world. I don't know why you assume what you do; you appear to deny that it is merely the unquestioning acceptance of "the way things are" being defined by "the way we talk about them".
So you're saying that thinking, remembering, and feeling can exist without mind?
Absolutely. And the more we understand of Neurobiology and Neuropsychology, the more clear this is.
Well that's not what I asked. I said:
Do you see a difference between seeing a tree and perceiving a tree?
Are you saying that you can see something without perceiving it?
Sorry...I thought that your question above was a mis-statement of my prior statement "I look in the back yard, I see a tree. I do not see the perception of a tree."
Let me answer the question you did ask, then. No. Seeing is one form of perceiving (seeing is just more specific, as opposed to smelling or tasting the tree). Seeing, or perceiving the tree is a physical activity. The distinction I tried to make was between perceiving the tree, and having a perception of the tree. The two are equivalent, I would think, in your world view. Not in mine. "Having a perception" gives a special status of some form of object to something which is not an object at all. It is not a mental entity, it is a physical activity.
None, because there is only mind. I see this Universe as a manisfestation of information, interpreted by mind, via our senses.
...
Because you can't send sensations because it's produced by mind.
...
You can't send the sensation of sound to mind, because it's the mind that produces that sensation of sound.
Note that these comments are all assertions. They each are the functional equivalent of "because I said so." Do you, as Ian does, deny that any evidence is needed to support your view?
Now...if we can't "send sensations" (I really don't understand that--I think perhaps you are treating me as if I am a dualist; I am not), do you deny the physical sensory systems altogether? The pressure waves, the basilar membrane, the neural signals--is all this illusory?
It's the materialist point of view that requires the extra steps.
My view takes the point of information being sent from mind to mind.
You're saying that it's being sent from matter to mind to matter to mind.
No, I am not saying that at all... The "mind" has absolutely no place in my explanation. The mind seems to be a convenient thing to point to to say "I don't have a mechanism, and I don't need one." I have no extra steps at all.
The mind interprets and expresses information. The origin of mind itself is still a mystery to me. But if logic holds up, it certainly isn't produced by the way that mainstream materialism describes it, for the reasons given above.
So how does it work?
How does the body interpret energy as being sound? Would you hear sound if you didn't have a mind?
Of course. We do, not just we would. If you don't think the body can, with its sense organs, sensory association brain areas, etc., how can the mind, which has none of this? What does the mind add to the explanation at all, other than an excuse for ignorance?
No, I know your stance pretty well ;)
Quite obviously not, as yet. You are getting closer, though. Your explanations of "my view" or of "what I'm saying" are, quite simply, not my view and not what I am saying.
I'll do what I can :cool: I really do appreciate the effort. I do enjoy exploring this. :D
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
4th January 2004, 11:04 AM
Ian said:
Then there is no further point in me discussing this with you. I knew you didn't have any answers. No-one has. No materialist can explain consciousness, not ever, not even in principle. Stop pretending otherwise.
And there you have it, my friends.
Except for one thing . . . why does he keep bringing up the subject?
~~ Paul
hammegk
4th January 2004, 11:12 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
.... It is not a mental entity, it is a physical activity. ...
Hmm, and I thought we were discussing that very point.
Let's see:
You start from your 1 known data point, "thought exists";
You deny solipsism;
You postulate the existence of the "physical, objective, world";
You note that science does a great job (mathematically)explaining macroscopic non-life, and postulate the same must be true for "life" in every aspect;
Ergo: thought is a function of the physical objective world.
Do I have it right?
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 11:27 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
I like my assumptions, because they are part of a scientific worldview that has made tremendous progress (depending, of course, on how you define progress) in understanding the workings of the world.
It's a myth that science has to be conducted from the viewpoint of observing an external reality. Science is merely concerned with existential behaviour/order, as it looks within the fishbowl of perceived existence. Science is shown to be the observation of internally perceived/sensed behaviour/order. This order - these laws between things - exists, even within our own awareness!!
Science is the study of the order amongst the inner-sensations, even though you and science fail to recognise this.
No assumption of an external realm is required!!. Indeed, such an assumption is shown to be incorrect: science ponders the internal realm of the mind's perceived order.
Dancing David
4th January 2004, 11:28 AM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Light is an abstract inner-sensation. It's created by the mind itself - not by external reality. Just as any abstract-sensation is.
As I have said on several occasions: no man has seen beyond himself. Even those distant stars we ponder on clear nights are not a single measure beyond our own awareness.
The experients that allow for a mind are the same experients that allow for the physical world. You say that there is an assumption of the material world, I say that is the same assumption that you make when you say that there is a mind.
The exact same logic that applies to your external experience applies to your internal experience. Why should you say that the experience of 'awareness' is any more true than the experience of a visual color.
They are the exact same experience, even in your philossophy Lifegazer.
In your philosphy Lifegazer, why is the experience of awareness any different that the exepience of a visual qualia? In your philosophy, all experience reduces to the singular source of the internal awareness.
Is that not true Life gazer: The word reduce may not be the correct phrase, but you maintain that all awareness is just an internal experient, that all experience comes the from the same source!
Is that not correct Lifegazer?
If I understand your theory all experients reduce to the single cause:
'The light of the mind', is that the phrasing you use, because I hope that I say this correctly.
1. The light of the mind is all that there is.
2. Things are percieved through the light of the mind.
3. Everything that is is percieved through the light of the mind.
4. Thoughts are percieved through the light of the mind.
5. Awareness is percieved through the light of the mind.
6. All events are percieved through the light of the mind.
7. All is light.
The external visualy produced qualia is percieved through the light of the mind. The 'awareness' of the mind is only know through the light of the mind. If all is light and all is mind, then all mind can only be percieved through the light of the mind.
Why then is the light of the mind that creates the sense of awareness any different than the light of the mind that creates the external visual qualia?
Both the 'physical world' and the 'mental' world are percieved through the light of the mind.
There is no difference between the light that creates the external world and the light that creates the monist world.
Would not it be an error then to say that there are two different kinds of light? In your philosophy is not the light of the mind the unifying force? Why then should the light that shines upon outer objects be any different than the light that shines on internal objects. They are both the light of the mind.
The same criteria are there in both cases.
There is no difference in validity for internal or external experients. They are both equally valid
I have read your posts Lifegazer and the one linking point is your philosophy is that the light of the mind is the unfing force that creates, holds and enforces the creations. The light of the mind is all creation. All creation is the light of mind.
Why should that light create two creations?
Should not all creations of the light be considered equaly true. Or is there a dichotomy of 'true' light and 'false' light. That would seem to indicate a lack of unity for the light.
So I put forth to you that your philsophy would then say
All light is equal.
The light that shines upon the world is the same light that shines upon the mind.
The external world is as light as the mind world. They are both true. They are both light of mind.
I make this post in all earnestness and hope that we can communicate upon it.
Why if the light of mind is all there is, is the light that shines upon the external world less valid than the light that shines upon the mind?
The mind is only known through the light of the mind, there can be no other solution. All that is, is the light of the mind. If all there is is the light of the mind, then all things in that light are the same, they are light of the mind. All things are the light of the mind.
The external world=the light of the mind.( All is the light of the mind)
Therefore the external world has the same meaning as the light of the mind there is no difference.
All is the light of the mind.
Am I correct?
Dancing David
4th January 2004, 11:35 AM
I have got it!
This is the tie maker!
I state that there could be the potential for the p-mind! The same potential that creates the p-zombie!
All that a mind is is experients!
I postulate the p-mind, it has all the experients of a mind but it does not require a consiousness.
A p-zomie is a human body devoid of consiosness but appearing consious.
A p-mind is a human experient devoid of consiousness but appearing consious.
How can you tell a p-mind from an actual mind!
All the same:same!
To accept one is to accept the other to deny one is to deny the other.
Yoickes and away!
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 11:36 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
Hmm, and I thought we were discussing that very point.
Let's see:
You start from your 1 known data point, "thought exists";
Actually, this is anything but a known data point. How do you define "thought" in your statement "thought exists"? I suspect that you define it quite differently from me, which suggests that this "1 known data point" is no such thing.
You deny solipsism;
ok
You postulate the existence of the "physical, objective, world";
ok
You note that science does a great job (mathematically)explaining macroscopic non-life, and postulate the same must be true for "life" in every aspect;
strawman noted. Just by the way, how does your view stack up in this department?
Ergo: thought is a function of the physical objective world.
Do I have it right? Some of it. Not nearly enough.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 12:02 PM
Originally posted by Dancing David
The experients that allow for a mind are the same experients that allow for the physical world. You say that there is an assumption of the material world, I say that is the same assumption that you make when you say that there is a mind.
I (the awareness central to all experience) am having abstract experiences (sensations, thoughts, feelings, desire, will, imagination) within myself (within the awareness that I am).
This is existence. Completely. Always has been. An abstract and intangible existence... an existence of mindful attributes... an existence of mind.
Now there is no leap of faith required here, since this is the direct experience of existence. Whereas I have no direct experience whatsoever of anything truly tangible existing beyond my awareness.
Things are defined from amidst the fog of my internal sensations. They exist within my awareness. I know of no-thing beyond internal things. The only other ~thing~ I might come to know is the truth of my own mind's identity.
The experience of existence absolutely is internal to the self/awareness. Whereas the notion that the self is internal to reality (meaning that there is an external reality), is assumed.
Those who say that idealism is no-more credible than materialism are kidding themselves. But they aren't fooling anyone with the capacity to reason with sincerity.
joyrex
4th January 2004, 12:30 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
I (the awareness central to all experience) am having abstract experiences (sensations, thoughts, feelings, desire, will, imagination) within myself (within the awareness that I am).
This is existence. Completely. Always has been. An abstract and intangible existence... an existence of mindful attributes... an existence of mind.There are also times when we lose awareness, such as when we are in dreamless sleep. What happens to existence, which according to you (if I understood correctly) is based on awareness, in this state? What happens to this 'I', when we can't think or say, "I am"?
hammegk
4th January 2004, 12:37 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Actually, this is anything but a known data point. How do you define "thought" in your statement "thought exists"? I suspect that you define it quite differently from me, which suggests that this "1 known data point" is no such thing.
Well, for example --
Originally posted by lifegazer
The experience of existence absolutely is internal to the self/awareness. Whereas the notion that the self is internal to reality (meaning that there is an external reality), is assumed.
Hmmm?
Some of it. Not nearly enough.
Oh. What salient bits did I overlook?
RussDill
4th January 2004, 12:51 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Russ, stating that the mind emerged just from random material events is definitely an assumption. As is the assertion that anything exists externally to awareness. But as you lack the sincerity to admit this to yourself, you are denied the same avenue of enquiry I embarked upon.
True, the events themselves were random, but whether or not the change was kept was random was not. Its similar to a little kid rolling a d+d characher, lets see...strength, 5...nope, lets roll again, 7, nope, lets roll again, etc. The progression of the nerveous system through evolution to what we have today is pretty clear. We even still have the structures from reptiles, fish, etc in our brain. The evidence is there in our brain, the evidence is there in the fossil record, the evidence is there in other animals.
However, since I cannot disprove that a god created the heavens and the earth in 6 days (and created the animals in such a way to fool people into thinking that they evolved, as well as created a fossil record, carbon dated stuff, eroded landscape, light from far away starts in mid transit, etc), you are right, I am assuming something.
Mercutio
4th January 2004, 12:58 PM
Originally posted by hammegk
Well, for example --
...
Hmmm?
Precisely. That would be an excellent example of how a simple statement like "thought exists" comes loaded with unwarranted assumptions.
Oh. What salient bits did I overlook? Wait a minute...in this very post, you address a "salient bit" that you overlooked, and now you are asking the question? The very point that you called the "1 known data point" is what I call into question, and you ask me what salient bit is missing? Come on...
Hey, I have a dumb question for you. Would you agree or disagree with the statement "a world external to us appears to exist"? I emphasize "appears" because I do not intend the sentence to mean that it does exist, only that, well, speaking for myself, it looks as if there is an actual computer I am typing on right now. I begin to wonder if perhaps my experience with the world and yours differ markedly.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 01:00 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Ah, then that would be the inner-perception of an optic nerve.
Hit me on my perceived head with a perceived hammer and I shall perceive pain as a response. All happens within perception.
But I was more interested in getting beyond my inner-perception of things. Care to take me there?
Actually, you keep calling it *your* inner perception, but its odviously more than that, it would have to be a shared perception, which would mean its not inner to you or me.
You could ask me the same question in a dream. I'd give the same answer: No.
In dreams, you don't always have conscious control over you actions, so you might well say banana apple monkey blender, or maybe yes. Also, in a dream, I can carry out actions perfectly fine with a blindfold. Hell, I'll be ok if I turn into a bicycle.
Correct. We share this dream and are set free to have our own when we sleep from it.
But you just said that this world *is* own own inner perceptions....but now you agree that we share it, and its own dreams that are our inner perceptions.
That ~thing~ is what I call The Mind of God. Embraces a singular absolute blueprint of this ordered realm within that mind, but countless relative perceptions within it.
Then this blueprint and the mind would be reality. Not our perception.
Again, dreams work by the same principal: The Mind embraces and creates the whole dream for its own awareness (you), but also plays the part of other entities and things within those dreams. It is the whole and the parts.
It certainly apears in no way that I create a blueprint when I dream. In fact, there are many facuets of my dreams that do not occur in reality, such as false memories that are part of the dream. Also, in a dream, if we were all part of the "Mind", it wouldn't make sense to involve the human brain in the dream, since its only there (according to you) to perceive the outside world, and to act within it. But instead, the human brain is very, very active in dream states.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
4th January 2004, 01:07 PM
Lifegazer said:
Now there is no leap of faith required here, since this is the direct experience of existence.
But you have to be very careful not to turn it into a leap of faith. For example, you cannot assume anything about the source of your mental attributes. Your mind might be beamed at you from an external source, for example. Just because it "feels like it's in your head" doesn't mean it is.
Those who say that idealism is no-more credible than materialism are kidding themselves. But they aren't fooling anyone with the capacity to reason with sincerity.
Speaking for myself, I think that if you carefully defined idealism and materialism, you would find that they are equivalent, and thus equally "credible." Both leave us with the same question: What is the source of my mind?
~~ Paul
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
4th January 2004, 01:16 PM
I have a question for idealists. I admit it's pompous of me.
You look outside your head and ask "Why should I assume there is any external world out there?" It's a reasonable question. But turn around and look in the opposite direction. It's just as reasonable to ask "Why should I assume there is any sort of universal mind in there?" Of course, if we're to reject solipsism, then we need one or the other of those things. Why is one more reasonable than the other, except because the description of the universal mind happens to match our inner feelings better than the description of the external world?
~~ Paul
RussDill
4th January 2004, 01:17 PM
lifegazer, jumping into random discussions and repeating your assumptions won't do you any good. All of your proof has been torn to shreads. Your philosophy has even been shown to be contridictory. And yet, you continue to state your assumptions as absolute fact.
Originally posted by lifegazer
It's a myth that science has to be conducted from the viewpoint of observing an external reality.
Its pretty clear that you, and I (and everyone else) share the same reality, yes, or no? So whether or not this reality is created by a superior conciousness (even with a blueprint feed to our perceptions) and our the essence of our consciousness supplied by that being, we are still studying a reality external to ourselves.
Science is merely concerned with existential behaviour/order, as it looks within the fishbowl of perceived existence. Science is shown to be the observation of internally perceived/sensed behaviour/order. This order - these laws between things - exists, even within our own awareness!!
Again, we all share a reality, regardless of the source for that reality. If it only existed within our own awareness (like dreams) we wouldn't agree on anything. Even in your philosophy, you say that its all feed from the mind by a huge blueprint. That's external to our perceptions blueprint->mind->perceptions->us
Science is the study of the order amongst the inner-sensations, even though you and science fail to recognise this.
No assumption of an external realm is required!!. Indeed, such an assumption is shown to be incorrect: science ponders the internal realm of the mind's perceived order.
If we assume that there is no external realm, then we would be assuming that no one else exists but ourselves. They may all seem to be like us, conscious, thinking, etc, but they are only illusions, who cares about them, etc, because they are just zombies.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 02:12 PM
Originally posted by RussDill
lifegazer, jumping into random discussions and repeating your assumptions won't do you any good. All of your proof has been torn to shreads. Your philosophy has even been shown to be contridictory. And yet, you continue to state your assumptions as absolute fact.
God is existence, cannot be torn to shreds. Not by any philosopher who has ever lived - which includes you.
Its pretty clear that you, and I (and everyone else) share the same reality, yes, or no? So whether or not this reality is created by a superior conciousness (even with a blueprint feed to our perceptions) and our the essence of our consciousness supplied by that being, we are still studying a reality external to ourselves.
There is only one reality - you admit this yourself. Then, at the end of your statement, you digress to (at least) two realities.
Be clear that a reality of God is one reality, even when that God has a multitude of diverse perceptions.
Again, we all share a reality, regardless of the source for that reality.
If we share the same reality, then ultimately, we are the same. It's simply obvious.
If it only existed within our own awareness (like dreams) we wouldn't agree on anything. Even in your philosophy, you say that its all feed from the mind by a huge blueprint. That's external to our perceptions blueprint->mind->perceptions->us
'we' are It having a specific dream. I.e., in my philosophy, me and you, for example, are It having a different dream, so to speak.
If we assume that there is no external realm, then we would be assuming that no one else exists but ourselves.
Get rid of the plurality.
They may all seem to be like us, conscious, thinking, etc, but they are only illusions, who cares about them, etc, because they are just zombies.
We care about "them" because they are God too. We are all One.
hammegk
4th January 2004, 02:27 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Hey, I have a dumb question for you. Would you agree or disagree with the statement "a world external to us appears to exist"? I emphasize "appears" because I do not intend the sentence to mean that it does exist, only that, well, speaking for myself, it looks as if there is an actual computer I am typing on right now.
Along with a denial of solipsism, is it not evident that an external reality -- something that is independent of *I*-- exists? I find it so.
I begin to wonder if perhaps my experience with the world and yours differ markedly.
Yeah, I've noticed you seem confused as to whether or not you might really be a p-zombie. Sorry; I can't assist *you* in that dilemma.
Originally posted by Pau C. A.
You look outside your head and ask "Why should I assume there is any external world out there?" It's a reasonable question.
Huh? Doesn't sound reasonable to me, anyway. And note the problem inherent in your words; what's that "you" you mention that "looks outside", and what is it "looking out of"?
RussDill
4th January 2004, 02:39 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
God is existence, cannot be torn to shreds. Not by any philosopher who has ever lived - which includes you.
Nor can "we are all minds in vats". However, you proof can be torn to shreads
There is only one reality - you admit this yourself. Then, at the end of your statement, you digress to (at least) two realities.
The plurality is there because that is what we have to resolve. We have the sense of self, and we have the reality we perceive. It is true, that in both materialism, and your philosophy they both boil down to being the same reality. However, it is still useful to talk in this way. My point was that there is more to reality than what is just in our own minds.
Be clear that a reality of God is one reality, even when that God has a multitude of diverse perceptions.
It would apear that in your reality, god is compartmentalized into multiple senses of self. The primary god sense of self provides preceptions to its lifegazer sense of self. In this, you are viewing a world beyond your perceptions, are you not?
If we share the same reality, then ultimately, we are the same. It's simply obvious.
You are going to have to define in what way we are the same, otherwise, thats a meaningless statement. I can name many ways in which we are not the same. I can name many ways in which we are the same.
'we' are It having a specific dream. I.e., in my philosophy, me and you, for example, are It having a different dream, so to speak.
But you already said that we are having the dream fed though us. The process you spoke of with the mind opening the blueprint to the page we are perceiving, and feeding us that perception. So even if our consciousness is part of the mind, our part of the consciousness and awareness is not generating the dream. So that would make it a reality external to our awareness.
Get rid of the plurality.
Again, there is no plurality, its simply the question at hand. What is perceived reality.
We care about "them" because they are God too. We are all One.
You said all of reality is just inner-sensations, its all contained within our mind. If so, the lifegazer I see walking down the street is not really lifegazer, its just the zombie lifegazer. The real lifegazer is off with his own reality within his own inner-sensations. So whatever I do to the zombie lifegazer, within my own reality of inner-sensations, won't effect the actual lifegazer, just as it would in any other dream of mine.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
4th January 2004, 02:39 PM
Hammegk said:
Huh? Doesn't sound reasonable to me, anyway. And note the problem inherent in your words; what's that "you" you mention that "looks outside", and what is it "looking out of"?
Well, you completely fooled me, Hammy. You said "... is it not evident that an external reality -- something that is independent of *I*-- exists?" I would have sworn that all these months you were arguing that we couldn't assume anything but *I*, that *I* is the only thing we know for sure.
I'm constantly surprised by the crappy job we all do conveying our ideas with words.
~~ Paul
Peskanov
4th January 2004, 02:41 PM
Hammegk,
You start from your 1 known data point, "thought exists";
You deny solipsism;
You postulate the existence of the "physical, objective, world";
You note that science does a great job (mathematically)explaining macroscopic non-life, and postulate the same must be true for "life" in every aspect;
Ergo: thought is a function of the physical objective world.
Do I have it right?
Well, is a bit twisted imo. If I remenber correctly I was interacting with world as if it was real before learning how to talk or even rationalize :D
Now, seriously, imo the biggest problems of idealism are:
- The consistency and complexity of the world seems to surpase our mind capabilities by far. When you start understanding a small part of it you are already forgeting about the previous one you studied. Supossing all this is created by your mind seems a bit presumptuous. And supossing a greater system, "a metamind" seems an admission of the existence of complexity and components in the mind which greatly resembles materialism.
- We want the rest of the people we see in that external world to exist, so we tend to choose a framework which allows it. Solipsism is as viable as idealism, however nobody wants to defend it; would you?
However all the signals we get of the existence of others are purely physical (unless you believe in all that telepathy mumbo jumbo).
BTW, your skepticism about the scientific study of life is quite curious. I wonder if further advances in the manipulation of life and in nanotechnology would modify your opinion of it.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 02:41 PM
Originally posted by joyrex
There are also times when we lose awareness, such as when we are in dreamless sleep. What happens to existence, which according to you (if I understood correctly) is based on awareness, in this state? What happens to this 'I', when we can't think or say, "I am"?
Relative awareness is a shifting state. In my philosophy, it originates from the absolute Self awareness that is the omni-God... and shifts through the relative (amongst things of the mind) awareness that is 'me' (or anyone), at the behest of the absolute awareness.
'we' are entities judged in relation to the things we see within our perception. That is, we judge our identity via the things in our mind, rather than through our unperceived origins.
Sleep is just a specific state of relative perception which can include non-awareness.
Dreams can happen because, significantly, awareness loses itself to this order it finds itself within and amongst (which we all share) and these dreams are largely influenced by emotional concerns. But have you ever had a lucid dream? I have... once... though I have no idea how I came to know I was dreaming whilst I was dreaming.
So there is an absolute self [awareness] and a multitude of shifting relative-awarenesses emanating from it. But these relative awarenesses are all from It. So any entity [relative to other perceived things], is in fact It.
Existence is all God.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 02:45 PM
Originally posted by hammegk
Hmm, and I thought we were discussing that very point.
Let's see:
Here's my line of thinking, I'm sure those who have participated in these types of threads for months will have a field day, but eh, critizism is always good.
There is a reality we can perceive
There are objects, etc in this reality
They appear to follow a set of laws I can study, they follow these laws very accurately, I can make predictions about future behavior, even behavior I have never seen.
There are also objects that apear to be like me, in fact, they all say they have a sense of self just like me. They seem to be constructed just like me.
Since they are made of the same stuff as all the other objects in the universe, and every thing else that I've studied that is made of the stuff in the universe follows these laws I've found, it would stand to reason that these "other people" also follow these same laws.
(and since I am made of the same stuff, same structure, these laws apply to me too)
Now, its not excactly a deduction, but a line of thinking. However, all the evidence I've seen thus far, with neural and behavioral research points in this direction.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 02:48 PM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Solipsism is as viable as idealism, however nobody wants to defend it; would you?
Solipsism is dandy when applied purely to God... who is the only living entity.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 02:50 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Sleep is just a specific state of relative perception which can include non-awareness.
Dreams can happen because, significantly, awareness loses itself to this order it finds itself within and amongst (which we all share) and these dreams are largely influenced by emotional concerns. But have you ever had a lucid dream? I have... once... though I have no idea how I came to know I was dreaming whilst I was dreaming.
lucid dreaming is in fact very common. There are even ways of improving the probability of lucid dreaming. Altered dream states, such as lucid dreaming, provide interesting insights into the nature of the mind. I suggest you study them further. (Also interesting is sleepwalking, and closely related to that, communicating verbally to someone who is in a dream)
[random thought, wonder if this means the right brain is dreaming, but the left is not, will have to look into that]
So there is an absolute self [awareness] and a multitude of shifting relative-awarenesses emanating from it. But these relative awarenesses are all from It. So any entity [relative to other perceived things], is in fact It.
Existence is all God.
Interesting philosophy, but it does not explain the origin, nature, or structure of god.
lifegazer
4th January 2004, 02:59 PM
Originally posted by RussDill
Interesting philosophy, but it does not explain the origin, nature, or structure of god.
Just have time to say that God has no origin or structure, existing at boundless singularity. And what do you mean by "nature"?
RussDill
4th January 2004, 03:10 PM
Originally posted by RussDill
[random thought, wonder if this means the right brain is dreaming, but the left is not, will have to look into that]
http://www.brain-mind.com/Dreaming.html
anyway, interesting start for further study.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 03:17 PM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Just have time to say that God has no origin or structure, existing at boundless singularity. And what do you mean by "nature"?
So then what was god's first thought? How long did it take him to decide to create this reality? How are memories stored in the mind? etc
Peskanov
4th January 2004, 03:30 PM
Ian,
Then there is no further point in me discussing this with you. I knew you didn't have any answers. No-one has. No materialist can explain consciousness, not ever, not even in principle. Stop pretending otherwise.
How nice, I thinked we were debating about the mind, not about consciousness. I don't recall having mentioned that word in this thread, did I?
It happens I feel consciousness is a part of the mind, and not the reverse. I wonder how and idealist separates those terms, but as you don't seem interested in answering any of my questions I guess I will have to learn it in other place.
hammegk
4th January 2004, 03:40 PM
Originally posted by RussDill
There is a reality we
I.E. Solipsism is denied ...
can perceive ...
There are objects, etc in this reality
I see. Could you tell me a bit more about "perception"? What is doing the perceiving? What is being perceived?
And yup, I agree, if we start the discussion assuming objective physical reality exists to the exclusion of all else, then non-living matter must be both perceived & perceiver.
Did I get it right this time?
Originally posted by Peskanov
If I remenber correctly I was interacting with world as if it was real before learning how to talk or even rationalize ...
And who/what is that *I* of which you speak? Again, what does human level consciousness -- at birth or at adulthood -- have to do with "what-is"?
Does a butterfly have an *I*? A bacterium? An "energy field"? How do you know?
Soapy Sam
4th January 2004, 03:59 PM
Iacchus asked about the emergent properties of a car. Again we are back to definitions .
Some would say the car itself was an emergent phenomenon. I would suggest that the ride quality, or the handling of the car would be better examples.
A car is much less than a university. A university has functions, faculty, furore, politics, reputation, personnel, property, on and on. The combinatorial properties emerge due to the interaction of the parts with each other and the interaction of the parts with the world they are in.
Easy to get bogged in argument about words. Other properties of a brain are nervous response, mass, thermal regulation, headaches. (Can a headache exist without a brain, I wonder? If not, then why assume a mind can)?
All that said, there is no doubt mind or consciousness is very different from the other properties, but is the difference one of order or of kind? I think it's just a function of complexity.
Thinking seems to correlate with neural activity as seen on scanners. When neuronal activity ceases, outward evidence of thought stops. This always happens. This may be coincidence of course.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 04:26 PM
Originally posted by hammegk
I.E. Solipsism is denied ...
I have not denied it, I simply started a thought process beyond it. I myself cannot come up with an experiment that would disprove it.
I see. Could you tell me a bit more about "perception"? What is doing the perceiving? What is being perceived?
self is doing the perceiving, what is being perceived is what is in question.
And yup, I agree, if we start the discussion assuming objective physical reality exists to the exclusion of all else, then non-living matter must be both perceived & perceiver.
Did I get it right this time?
My line of thinking follows from what we can perceive follows a set of rules. This does not necessarily means that it exists, nor does it assume that it is all exists.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
4th January 2004, 04:30 PM
Russ said:
I have not denied it, I simply started a thought process beyond it. I myself cannot come up with an experiment that would disprove it.
Tough to come up with an experiment to disprove any old ontological model.
And y'all know what I say next ...
~~ Paul
Suggestologist
4th January 2004, 05:10 PM
Originally posted by RussDill
But in the case of the CD player or radio, its really easy to find evidence of that by examining the structure, it becomes quickly odvious. There is NO such evidence for the mind, none, notta. You might look at the cough's of yahweh for evidence we do have about the mind that really points away from your radio perspective. Particularly interesting is the left eye being flashed "walked", the patient gets up and walks across the room, and when asked, answers, "to get a coke".
So subliminal messages do work? What about memes; they're transfered between minds; like the CD transfered between CD players.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 05:19 PM
Originally posted by Suggestologist
So subliminal messages do work? What about memes; they're transfered between minds; like the CD transfered between CD players.
Thats not a subliminal message, its not flashed for a 1/30th of a second, the right half of the brain is given time to see it, and carries out what is asked. The left has is confused, doesn't know why, so says, "I don't know" or makes up some bs.
Anyone interested in further info, google callosotomy
spejic
4th January 2004, 07:56 PM
Damn this thread goes by so fast.
Originally posted by lifegazer
But I was more interested in getting beyond my inner-perception of things. Care to take me there?What makes you think there is a "human" understanding there? It could be a structure too complex to understand. It could be a structure to alien too understand. It could be a structure too simple to understand. It almost certainly is not a structure with any sort of will or creativity as we understand it because the "dream of the Mind of God" is so incredibly predictable and tends to follow rules we have a pretty good grasp of. I do think we can get beyond the inner-perception of things, but that that is what the study of neurons and chemical interactions and molecules and atoms and subatomic particles is all about. It is my contention that you already found the structure you are looking for, and it upset you that it is so uncaring and unpurposeful that you reject it and went looking for another more to your liking.That ~thing~ is what I call The Mind of God. Embraces a singular absolute blueprint of this ordered realm within that mind, but countless relative perceptions within it.
Again, dreams work by the same principal: The Mind embraces and creates the whole dream for its own awareness (you), but also plays the part of other entities and things within those dreams. It is the whole and the parts. So what benefit do you get from knowing that the "so-called real world" is actually "the Mind of God"? Do you get to perceive any more than I do? Can you tell me what George W Bush is saying right now? Do you get special abilities to affect the "Mind of God" and cause new perceptions to spring from nowhere? Can you give me the perception of owning 100 bricks of gold, for example? Why do you want to convince others that we exist in a Mind universe? If it is important that we know that we exist in a Mind universe, why did it take millions of years until you were born before someone figured it out?
wraith
4th January 2004, 09:17 PM
Originally posted by Peskanov
No, the implication comes from the deterministic nature of the neuron.
How does this show that mind is created by matter?
When do you substitute "correlation" for "identity"? What proof do you need to accept that a set magnetic charges inisde a chip are really the program you are seeing through your screen?
For me, seeing that I can model the chip and reproduce it's exact output is proof enough about identity, not correlation. Same about the brain.
If my brain was in state A, which equates to me being happy at that time, then you must describe why/how brain state A = my happiness at that time. In other words, you're saying that happiness is not a concept of mind, but a physical thing. You could point to my brain in that state and say "that's happiness".
This line of reasoning on your behalf is like saying that sound exists before observation.
Yes? Let's guess we live in a idealist's universe. My mind creates the waterfall. So what? The waterfall still follows his own logic, although maybe only for the few time I am looking at it.
If I build a model which tells me how the waterfall runs and will run, I am explaining the waterfall.
The origin of the waterfall does not matter, I am trying to explain the waterfall, not the whole universe.
If I can successfully model the brain and use this model to reproduce all the external signs of the mind, I say I am explaining it.
Well actually, your mind is not creating the waterfall. The laws of physics created it. You're perceiving it.
RussDill
4th January 2004, 09:30 PM
Originally posted by wraith
If my brain was in state A, which equates to me being happy at that time, then you must describe why/how brain state A = my happiness at that time. In other words, you're saying that happiness is not a concept of mind, but a physical thing. You could point to my brain in that state and say "that's happiness".
This line of reasoning on your behalf is like saying that sound exists before observation.
Actually...that kind of stuff can be shown by both examining activity in the brain, and knowing what chemicals are present (afaik though, it would be difficult to know instantly what chemicals are present throught the brain)
wraith
4th January 2004, 09:50 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
A very good question. I like my assumptions, because they are part of a scientific worldview that has made tremendous progress (depending, of course, on how you define progress) in understanding the workings of the world. I don't know why you assume what you do; you appear to deny that it is merely the unquestioning acceptance of "the way things are" being defined by "the way we talk about them".
Surely your arguments don't stem from a fundamental assumption?! Let alone assume a belief that's ultimately unbeneficial.
Absolutely. And the more we understand of Neurobiology and Neuropsychology, the more clear this is.
Can you show me what thinking, remembering, and feeling is without referring to a mind?
Sorry...I thought that your question above was a mis-statement of my prior statement "I look in the back yard, I see a tree. I do not see the perception of a tree."
Let me answer the question you did ask, then. No. Seeing is one form of perceiving (seeing is just more specific, as opposed to smelling or tasting the tree). Seeing, or perceiving the tree is a physical activity. The distinction I tried to make was between perceiving the tree, and having a perception of the tree. The two are equivalent, I would think, in your world view. Not in mine. "Having a perception" gives a special status of some form of object to something which is not an object at all. It is not a mental entity, it is a physical activity.
Sure you may not see the tree, but your other senses can still sense the tree. But they are still perceptions. Can you see, taste, touch, smell or hear the tree without perceiving it?
Note that these comments are all assertions. They each are the functional equivalent of "because I said so." Do you, as Ian does, deny that any evidence is needed to support your view?
Sure you need evidence. However, the reasons to support your beliefs are very weak.
Saying that sound, for example, can exist without mind is not logical. Sure that there can be a disturbance in the air, but if there is no observer to pick that disturbance, then what is "sound"?
Now...if we can't "send sensations" (I really don't understand that--I think perhaps you are treating me as if I am a dualist; I am not), do you deny the physical sensory systems altogether? The pressure waves, the basilar membrane, the neural signals--is all this illusory?
I'm under the impression that you're a materialist?
I do not deny the mechanics of our senses.
No, I am not saying that at all... The "mind" has absolutely no place in my explanation. The mind seems to be a convenient thing to point to to say "I don't have a mechanism, and I don't need one." I have no extra steps at all.
Well, I'm saying that all there is, is mind. Matter is there by necessity.
The view point of matter creates mind needs every step under the sun.
So how does it work?
Different mind's send and express information. Exactly what we're doing now.
Of course. We do, not just we would. If you don't think the body can, with its sense organs, sensory association brain areas, etc., how can the mind, which has none of this? What does the mind add to the explanation at all, other than an excuse for ignorance?
The mind is interpreting that information. How can a certain disturbance in air be called "sound" before it reaches an observer?
If you assume that sound exists independently of observation, then this disucssion will go no where.
Quite obviously not, as yet. You are getting closer, though. Your explanations of "my view" or of "what I'm saying" are, quite simply, not my view and not what I am saying.
Really? naaar!
wraith
4th January 2004, 09:57 PM
Originally posted by RussDill
Actually...that kind of stuff can be shown by both examining activity in the brain, and knowing what chemicals are present (afaik though, it would be difficult to know instantly what chemicals are present throught the brain)
ie. you're saying that neurons in a certain structure is happiness?
In other words, happiness is not a concept of mind, but a physical thing? How does "happiness" exist without mind?
RussDill
5th January 2004, 12:52 AM
Originally posted by wraith
ie. you're saying that neurons in a certain structure is happiness?
In other words, happiness is not a concept of mind, but a physical thing? How does "happiness" exist without mind?
Its a purely physical process. Certainly to us, it seems to have a special meaning, but thats the way happiness works, otherwise, we wouldn't really care about being happy.
Peskanov
5th January 2004, 02:30 AM
Hammegk,
And who/what is that *I* of which you speak? Again, what does human level consciousness -- at birth or at adulthood -- have to do with "what-is"?
I would really like any idealist to tell me if "mind" and "consciousness" are synonims in his framework. For me they are not and this idea has implications.
Does a butterfly have an *I*? A bacterium? An "energy field"? How do you know?
I know they lack the physical support that performs several operations probably related to the mind.
Again, we are talking about the mind, not about consciousness.
Do you agree that the concept of mind is more wide than the concept of consciousness?
Do you believe that you are aware about all that happens in your mind?
Are you aware of what is the next knowledge you are going to forget, for example? Are you aware of any inconscient decision, like using one hand or the other to get an object?
Interesting Ian
5th January 2004, 05:03 AM
Originally posted by Peskanov
Hammegk,
I would really like any idealist to tell me if "mind" and "consciousness" are synonims in his framework. For me they are not and this idea has implications.
Why do people people on this board always do their damned best to try to confuse the issues?? No, mind is certainly not a synonym for consciousness! Mind is somewhat of a more obscure concept than consciousness! And yes, that is certainly saying something. Basically, why do you wish to discuss mind when we have absolutely ZERO agreement about what consciousness is??? I mean what is the bloody point???
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
5th January 2004, 05:14 AM
Ian said:
Why do people people on this board always do their damned best to try to confuse the issues??
Welcome to the club.
Care to define consciousness? Distinguish it from mind. How about free will while you're at it?
~~ Paul
Mercutio
5th January 2004, 06:40 AM
Originally posted by wraith
Can you show me what thinking, remembering, and feeling is without referring to a mind?
I don't believe I have referred to a "mind" at all in any of my examples, except to comment on the mentalistic view which I do not hold. So, feel free to look at any post of mine, from my first on, and I am showing you thinking, remembering, and feeling without referring to mind. more on this below.
Sure you may not see the tree, but your other senses can still sense the tree. But they are still perceptions. Can you see, taste, touch, smell or hear the tree without perceiving it?
You really and truly have not understood what I have said. Each of these actions--seeing, tasting, touching, smelling, hearing--are perceiving, but none involve "perceptions" as mental entities separate and distinct from a process of perceiving.
The problem here is one of language. If I "have a pen", we understand (solipsism aside) that the pen exists separately from my "having" it. But "having a memory", which sounds similar, and which thus implies that memories exist separately from my having them, is only a metaphor. I do remember. We have studied remembering for roughly 100 years, only recently with the tools that allow us to see the actions of specific neural pathways. (aside--Our entire understanding of the process of remembering is changing. The old model of storage and retrieval is being supplanted by a model of "reconstruction" and re-experiencing, such that many of the same brain structures activated in the original perceiving are activated in the re-experiencing. This model much more closely fits the data on memory distortions and perceptual biases.--/aside)
So, while to your view, "remembering" and "having a memory" are synonymous (and, admittedly, our language treats them that way), they do have very different implications for our assumptions about what is really going on. Same with "perceiving" and "having a perception", which was the crux of your objection.
Sure you need evidence. However, the reasons to support your beliefs are very weak. Your ignorance of the evidence does not mean it does not exist. My view is quite consistent with modern cognitive neuroscience. Moreover, much of what I claim is falsifiable...but has not as yet been disproven. That is not the same as proof, but it is still a good thing.
Saying that sound, for example, can exist without mind is not logical. Sure that there can be a disturbance in the air, but if there is no observer to pick that disturbance, then what is "sound"?
When did I say there was no observer? You or I are the observers, of course, or any number of other people. I went into great detail about the mechanics of the auditory perceptual system in a prior post--did you think those things were not part of an observer? What is missing from my picture, of course, is a "mind". It is missing because when we put the puzzle together, there is not an open hole left to fill in with "mind". We can trace the path from pressure wave to basilar membrane to auditory primary projection areas, to secondary, to association areas, to secondary motor, to primary motor areas, to a motor response (either verbal or some other behavior). Where is a "mind" needed? You say that "saying that a sound can exist without mind is not logical"...tell me then, logically, where does the mind figure in? What characteristic of "mind" allows it to interpret pressure waves? These waves are physical in nature--how does the mind interact with them? I can demonstrate the way my physical observer interacts with these waves...logically, it is the mind that has problems.
I'm under the impression that you're a materialist?
I do not deny the mechanics of our senses.
Then again, tell me how the mind interacts with them? At what point does it connect with this physical mechanism that you do not deny?
Well, I'm saying that all there is, is mind. Matter is there by necessity.
I do not understand what you are saying here. If all that there is is mind, how is matter there by necessity?
The view point of matter creates mind needs every step under the sun.
Perhaps....I wouldn't know, I don't say mind is created. I say there is no mind. We speak of one, certainly, but we also speak of sunrises and gods, and the four corners of the earth. It is a convenient verbal shorthand, that's all.
Different mind's send and express information. Exactly what we're doing now.
Funny...I am physically typing on a keyboard. I suspect you are doing the same. Once again, we can trace the neural pathways to our behavior...where does the mind come in? The pineal gland?
The mind is interpreting that information. How can a certain disturbance in air be called "sound" before it reaches an observer?
I never said it does not reach an observer. It does not reach a "mind". Also...you say the mind is interpreting that information. How? If you say "that's just what it does", why can you not say that of the body? The advantage of saying that about the body is...well, we can see the body. We can trace the pathways. Can we do this with mind? Not at all. We cannot even demonstrate that there is a mind. Even you, in this post, are merely claiming one by assertion.
If you assume that sound exists independently of observation, then this disucssion will go no where.
I hope by now you realize I am not claiming sound independently of observation...that was your misinterpretation. It is just that my observer differs from yours. First, my observer is physical. Second...my observer actually exists.:D
!Xx+-Rational-+xX!
5th January 2004, 06:49 AM
Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Care to define consciousness? Distinguish it from mind. How about free will while you're at it?
~~ Paul
Materialism! This scientific fact is all that needs to be said here and unless if you have a grudge against intelligence it shall not be questioned!
We can benefit our lives with materialism because we know that consciousness and senses are illusions so when can do crazy sh*t without worrying about pain! The pain is just a frickin illusion so it doesn't matter! Not even the wishful thinking of woo-woo beliefs can compare to this!
Science makes it no secret that everything in existence is reducible to matter and the paranormal is reducible to people’s delusions and wishful thinking! - !Xx+-Rational-+xX!
:crazy:
WTF!?
Interesting Ian
5th January 2004, 07:01 AM
Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Welcome to the club.
Care to define consciousness? Distinguish it from mind. How about free will while you're at it?
~~ Paul
It is impossible to define consciousness. All we can say positively say about consciousness is that it is phenomenological experiences. We can also negatively define it by saying it is non-physical. You see, one can only define things either by ostensive definition (pointing at the object of interest), by stipulation, or by the role it plays in some scientific theory. Unfortunately consciousness doesn't fit into any of those. Consciousness is something we are all implicitly acquainted with, but cannot define. And no, pointing at brain processes doesn't constitute a definition! I mean how can visual qualia of some brain processes actually literally be, for example, the feeling elicited by a warm summers day and a feeling that all is right with the world?? You're all crazy in thinking this!
As for minds. Well, conscious experiences don't just happen haphazardly. They tend to exist in groups or families so that each family seems to be had by an individual (although I recognise most materialists think this is an illusion). So I have certain experiences, but I don't experience your experiences, and vice versa, etc. Now each family of conscious experiences constitute the conscious mind. Of course a mind is more involved than that, because there's also the unconscious mind. But let's not go there.
As for free will, I've already defined it. It means mental causation so that at least some of our behaviour is influenced by the conscious will. A conscious will which has the power to choose between alternative courses of action, and even if it chooses a particular course of action, it could have chosen an alternative course of action. So it's also a denial of determinism.
Dancing David
5th January 2004, 07:33 AM
Originally posted by lifegazer
I (the awareness central to all experience) am having abstract experiences (sensations, thoughts, feelings, desire, will, imagination) within myself (within the awareness that I am).
This is existence. Completely. Always has been. An abstract and intangible existence... an existence of mindful attributes... an existence of mind.
I know but what is the difference, there is an experient that you call 'awareness', that is an experient. As it were, an experient is the raw sense of qualia. This is then just the qualia of awareness. How is the qualia of awareness any different from any other qualia? This is the step that Titus Rivas maintains, that the experient of awareness ie 'consiousness' is qualatatively different from any other sort of qualia.
I think that is a dualistic philosphy:
0. There is awareness.
1. There is awareness of mind.
2. There is awareness of the physical world.
There is either Awareness or there are things that are not Awareness and Awareness.
That is why it is a duality.
Now there is no leap of faith required here, since this is the direct experience of existence. Whereas I have no direct experience whatsoever of anything truly tangible existing beyond my awareness.
That is because your are seperating the materialist from the idealist.
What makes you think that there are two different kinds of awareness. that is assuming the materialist model to be true, is it not. HMMMM.
That is saying that there are two lights of the mind, the light of the mind that shines upon true Ideal objects and the light of the mind that shines upon material objects.
Same:Same.
Things are defined from amidst the fog of my internal sensations. They exist within my awareness. I know of no-thing beyond internal things. The only other ~thing~ I might come to know is the truth of my own mind's identity.
Which is the same as the material body, seen within the light of the mind.
The light of the mind infuses the physical body or we would not have awareness of it.
Animist that I am.
The experience of existence [b]absolutely is internal to the self/awareness. Whereas the notion that the self is internal to reality (meaning that there is an external reality), is assumed.
Woah, don't charge off so fast there LG.
Please answer me this. what is the awareness of awareness?
same:same.
Those who say that idealism is no-more credible than materialism are kidding themselves. But they aren't fooling anyone with the capacity to reason with sincerity.
I am not at the point where I assign any value to either experience.
I have not myself said that the two are seperable.
Monism says that all things are. This is the same message behind your philosophy , you say that all things are equal in the Mind. There is only mind and the experience of the Mind.
That is dualism.
Buddhism, nihilism are the same as monism.
All is Mind.
If the physical world is Not-Mind, then it is a dualism.
But they aren't fooling anyone with the capacity to reason with sincerity.
I am sincere.
Dancing David
5th January 2004, 07:42 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
Along with a denial of solipsism, is it not evident that an external reality -- something that is independent of *I*-- exists? I find it so.
Yeah, I've noticed you seem confused as to whether or not you might really be a p-zombie. Sorry; I can't assist *you* in that dilemma.
Huh? Doesn't sound reasonable to me, anyway. And note the problem inherent in your words; what's that "you" you mention that "looks outside", and what is it "looking out of"?
But hammegk, I had thought that they were the same.
Monism is monism, what you are saying is dualism, not monism.
It is aaall mind or it isn't all mind.
Now I am confused, help me please?
Dancing David
5th January 2004, 07:53 AM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Relative awareness is a shifting state. In my philosophy, it originates from the absolute Self awareness that is the omni-God... and shifts through the relative (amongst things of the mind) awareness that is 'me' (or anyone), at the behest of the absolute awareness.
'we' are entities judged in relation to the things we see within our perception. That is, we judge our identity via the things in our mind, rather than through our unperceived origins.
Sleep is just a specific state of relative perception which can include non-awareness.
Dreams can happen because, significantly, awareness loses itself to this order it finds itself within and amongst (which we all share) and these dreams are largely influenced by emotional concerns. But have you ever had a lucid dream? I have... once... though I have no idea how I came to know I was dreaming whilst I was dreaming.
So there is an absolute self [awareness] and a multitude of shifting relative-awarenesses emanating from it. But these relative awarenesses are all from It. So any entity [relative to other perceived things], is in fact It.
Existence is all God.
But Lifegaaazeer you said
So there is an absolute self [awareness] and a multitude of shifting relative-awarenesses emanating from it.
And now we have the dualiiity aaaaganin I am so confused.
0. absolute self
1. relative self.
Thats dualism.
hammegk
5th January 2004, 07:57 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
Now I am confused, help me please?
Huh? Mind=idealism, body=materialism, both=dualism. What's so tough about that.
Science cannot answer the question, so which position *you* accept is based solely on what you -- objectively&subjectively --find is the "logically best" answer.
Mercutio
5th January 2004, 07:59 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
But hammegk, I had thought that they were the same.
Monism is monism, what you are saying is dualism, not monism.
It is aaall mind or it isn't all mind.
Now I am confused, help me please?
DD, I think (and I am certain hammegk will correct me if I am wrong) that his statement was a direct response to my question which specified "appearance" rather than "reality". He is merely agreeing that the outside world "appears" to exist. It was a relatively minor thing I asked him, so you may have missed it.
M
Dancing David
5th January 2004, 08:00 AM
Originally posted by lifegazer
Solipsism is dandy when applied purely to God... who is the only living entity.
But that measn that the relative shifting awareness is the same awareness as the absolute awreness, right. I am soooo confused that sounds like monism but then you say there is god and god's perceptions of all the seperate pieces and that somehow they are different.
But Lifegaaazer:
They are all the same which is monism or the relative awareness is the same as the absolute awarenss and that is monism but if solipism isn't true than my awarenss is not part of the absolute awareness which means it isn't absolute.
And that means that you have an absolute which is comprised of things thata re not absolute and that is an inherent contradiction.
Dancing David
5th January 2004, 08:07 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
I.E. Solipsism is denied ...
I see. Could you tell me a bit more about "perception"? What is doing the perceiving? What is being perceived?
And yup, I agree, if we start the discussion assuming objective physical reality exists to the exclusion of all else, then non-living matter must be both perceived & perceiver.
Did I get it right this time?
And who/what is that *I* of which you speak? Again, what does human level consciousness -- at birth or at adulthood -- have to do with "what-is"?
Does a butterfly have an *I*? A bacterium? An "energy field"? How do you know?
But haame :
It doesn't matter: if you are a monist then you are a monist. It doesn't matter. The denial of solipism doesn't matter.
It doesn't matter. The *I* that leads to thought is the same as the *IIIIIII* perception of the material world.
the perception of the mind is the same as the perception of the material world, this is monism.
I am so confused, to say that the perception of my mind is real and the perception of my body is false is dualism.
The mind:true the body:false is a dualism.
They are all the same.
I aaam soo confused.
Dancing David
5th January 2004, 08:17 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Why do people people on this board always do their damned best to try to confuse the issues?? No, mind is certainly not a synonym for consciousness! Mind is somewhat of a more obscure concept than consciousness! And yes, that is certainly saying something. Basically, why do you wish to discuss mind when we have absolutely ZERO agreement about what consciousness is??? I mean what is the bloody point???
I gotta hand it to you for honsety Ian, thanks!
That is the point of the thread, philsophers want to make the statement that the mind is greater than something else, that is not the mind, this thread is discussion exactly that.
That is dualism not monism.
Without a human consiousness you could not contact mind. Without the human consiousness you can not contact your body.
How can there be a consiousness that you experience that is less than the ability to sense the mind. You can not have the awareness of the mind and not have the awareness of the body.
They come from the same source.
Dancing David
5th January 2004, 08:28 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
Huh? Mind=idealism, body=materialism, both=dualism. What's so tough about that.
Science cannot answer the question, so which position *you* accept is based solely on what you -- objectively&subjectively --find is the "logically best" answer.
Hamme they are the same
mind=mind
mind=body
mind=*you*
mind=idealism
mind=dualism
mind=Not
mind=mind
Therefore body=mind=idealism and body=idealism and idealism=dualism and Not=body.
They are all the same:same.
Science is the observation of the same;same. Just as idealism is observation of the same:same.
hammegk
5th January 2004, 08:33 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
The mind:true the body:false is a dualism.
They are all the same.
I aaam soo confused.
Either, Or, Both, Mu. :)
Peskanov
5th January 2004, 11:35 AM
Ian,
Why do people people on this board always do their damned best to try to confuse the issues?
You tell me. Consciousness was not the topic of this thread until you took it as an hostage.
Basically, why do you wish to discuss mind when we have absolutely ZERO agreement about what consciousness is???
'cause it was the topic?
:D
I mean what is the bloody point???
The target of any materialist hypothesis about the mind is to build a bridge between the subjective and the objective.
Any speculation related to awareness or qualia makes all idealist jump at once. It seems experience is so sacralised in philosophy you can't even speculate about it without entering in the minefield.
However it's usually acknowledged that the mind is a more wide concept than the conscioness. A base of knowledge and a big dose of will seems to born from it without awareness participation.
Now, let's make the following identities:
Knowledge=Information stored in the brain.
Will=some neuronal operations.
Why are they correlations and not identities?
If I remove a section of your brain, you lost a part of the mind you used to access through awareness.
So awareness is not all the picture now. Refute the identities please. The evidences has been cited one thousand times.
Now you can ignore me again, Mr. Dogma.
!Xx+-Rational-+xX!
5th January 2004, 12:03 PM
How dare believers try to mystify the mind which has already been scientifically explained through natural laws! If I am lying here then why would so many superior minds support this as the correct view!? Smart people just don’t do these things on faith they use science so materialists have to be right! I’m not lying and materialism is looked at as the most common view because it has been f**king proven to be true!
I would also like believers to explain how NDES could be real when they all involve fields of frolicking magical bunnies and sometimes the tooth fairy!
Rant continues…!
How in the hell can people put any faith into this nonsense called personal experience when we have the scientific method! Science tells us everything we know and experience doesn’t tell us sh*t except for how deluded some can become! There isn’t one thing that we know that hasn’t come from the scientific method! Praise scientific materialism! Woo-woos want us to believe that something can be learned without science! What a joke!
To understand the mind of a skeptic would be to understand the nature of reality and the great scientific method in its purest most objective form! - !Xx+-Rational-+xX!
http://www.student.smsu.edu/s/san232s/hardfunnypics/omfgcat-meyou.jpg
Someone just told this rational cat that the mind might not be material!
Vote for my rational debunking of dreaming!
http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?threadid=33292
Mercutio
5th January 2004, 05:50 PM
Originally posted by !Xx+-Rational-+xX!
We can benefit our lives with materialism because we know that consciousness and senses are illusions so when can do crazy sh*t without worrying about pain! The pain is just a frickin illusion so it doesn't matter! Not even the wishful thinking of woo-woo beliefs can compare to this!
Rational, dude, I love you to death, but whether you exemplify or parody skepticism, you got it wrong here. No materialist denies that we hurt--we simply say that "having pain" implies that pain exists separately from our experience, and that ...(as you know, being so Rational)...is the illusion. Of course (!) we feel pain--anyone who denies this, I think you are safe to ignore. But please, dear Rational, do not make the mistake of thinking that materialists do this. There is enough material to lampoon when understood correctly; do not cheapen yourself with strawmen.
wraith
6th January 2004, 02:04 AM
Originally posted by RussDill
Its a purely physical process. Certainly to us, it seems to have a special meaning, but thats the way happiness works, otherwise, we wouldn't really care about being happy.
You can't just say "that's just the way it works" and forget about it. With identities, you can get all the necessary parts of the brain that produces happiness and put them in front of me and say, "there you go, that's happiness." Sensations of happiness is this "hard stuff" with mass and taking up space. You're saying that happiness is external to one's own perceptions of happiness.
By this, you can say that happiness can exist without mind.
All the information that our senses "pick up" are independent of mind. Not only is that not logical, it doesn't describe in any way, why matter (in that configuration) produces happiness. The best that anyone can say, through that line of reasoning, is to say, "it's just the way it works."
wraith
6th January 2004, 02:07 AM
Originally posted by spejic
Why do you want to convince others that we exist in a Mind universe? If it is important that we know that we exist in a Mind universe, why did it take millions of years until you were born before someone figured it out?
I could ask the same question to the materialist who believes in a matter universe.
wraith
6th January 2004, 02:11 AM
Originally posted by Soapy Sam
Other properties of a brain are nervous response, mass, thermal regulation, headaches. (Can a headache exist without a brain, I wonder? If not, then why assume a mind can)?
Well, you're already assuming that matter creates mind.
wraith
6th January 2004, 03:26 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
I don't believe I have referred to a "mind" at all in any of my examples, except to comment on the mentalistic view which I do not hold. So, feel free to look at any post of mine, from my first on, and I am showing you thinking, remembering, and feeling without referring to mind. more on this below.
In other words, I'm asking you if thinking, remembering, and feeling could exist if there was no life.
You really and truly have not understood what I have said. Each of these actions--seeing, tasting, touching, smelling, hearing--are perceiving, but none involve "perceptions" as mental entities separate and distinct from a process of perceiving.
The problem here is one of language. If I "have a pen", we understand (solipsism aside) that the pen exists separately from my "having" it.
Yes, but you're saying that the pen always exists in the form as if it was always being observed. This is not the case, because you could say that sound exists without an observer.
But "having a memory", which sounds similar, and which thus implies that memories exist separately from my having them, is only a metaphor. I do remember. We have studied remembering for roughly 100 years, only recently with the tools that allow us to see the actions of specific neural pathways. (aside--Our entire understanding of the process of remembering is changing. The old model of storage and retrieval is being supplanted by a model of "reconstruction" and re-experiencing, such that many of the same brain structures activated in the original perceiving are activated in the re-experiencing. This model much more closely fits the data on memory distortions and perceptual biases.--/aside)
This may be the case, but this process says nothing on why this process leads to/is the sensation of memory.
I don't deny correlations.
So, while to your view, "remembering" and "having a memory" are synonymous (and, admittedly, our language treats them that way), they do have very different implications for our assumptions about what is really going on.
Where did I say this?
Same with "perceiving" and "having a perception", which was the crux of your objection.
Which is why I ask you if "having a perception" possible if there was no life.
Your ignorance of the evidence does not mean it does not exist. My view is quite consistent with modern cognitive neuroscience. Moreover, much of what I claim is falsifiable...but has not as yet been disproven. That is not the same as proof, but it is still a good thing.
You view the mechanisms used for perceiving are the actual perceptions. This is not logical.
When did I say there was no observer? You or I are the observers, of course, or any number of other people. I went into great detail about the mechanics of the auditory perceptual system in a prior post--did you think those things were not part of an observer?
Yes, but do you think that there is an observer at every location where "sound" can be picked up? What do the "sounds" on Pluto at some location sound like?
What is missing from my picture, of course, is a "mind". It is missing because when we put the puzzle together, there is not an open hole left to fill in with "mind". We can trace the path from pressure wave to basilar membrane to auditory primary projection areas, to secondary, to association areas, to secondary motor, to primary motor areas, to a motor response (either verbal or some other behavior). Where is a "mind" needed?
That's the thing. You are saying that the physical processes that produce the sound is the sensation of sound itself.
You say that "saying that a sound can exist without mind is not logical"...tell me then, logically, where does the mind figure in? What characteristic of "mind" allows it to interpret pressure waves? These waves are physical in nature--how does the mind interact with them? I can demonstrate the way my physical observer interacts with these waves...logically, it is the mind that has problems.
I'm not denying what you're saying about the physical mechanisms. I disagree about the way in which you interpret these physical processes.
Really, what you see as "matter" is energy flowing around the place. Only when a pattern of energy is observed, do you get "matter".
Then again, tell me how the mind interacts with them? At what point does it connect with this physical mechanism that you do not deny?
It's as if you're in the matrix. The sensation of "sound" is the manisfestation of those mechanisms. I work from the view point that matter emerges from mind.
The question "how does mind interact with matter" is for the dualist.
I do not understand what you are saying here. If all that there is is mind, how is matter there by necessity?
It's the interpretating of the information. It's the mind painting a picture.
Perhaps....I wouldn't know, I don't say mind is created. I say there is no mind. We speak of one, certainly, but we also speak of sunrises and gods, and the four corners of the earth. It is a convenient verbal shorthand, that's all.
Mind is an illusion?
Funny...I am physically typing on a keyboard. I suspect you are doing the same. Once again, we can trace the neural pathways to our behavior...where does the mind come in? The pineal gland?
Yes, but our behaviour is linked to our ideas/beliefs. You have to show how matter creates these ideas/beliefs of ours.
I never said it does not reach an observer. It does not reach a "mind".
Ok, but we both agree that we have a "sensation of sound"?]
What's that sensation like when there is no one around?
Also...you say the mind is interpreting that information. How? If you say "that's just what it does", why can you not say that of the body? The advantage of saying that about the body is...well, we can see the body. We can trace the pathways. Can we do this with mind? Not at all. We cannot even demonstrate that there is a mind. Even you, in this post, are merely claiming one by assertion.
My mind provides the sensations, via the laws of physics.
My body is based on those laws.
Again, you're still saying that physical processes are the sensations themselves.
I hope by now you realize I am not claiming sound independently of observation...
You are. ;)
Mercutio
6th January 2004, 05:31 AM
Originally posted by wraith
In other words, I'm asking you if thinking, remembering, and feeling could exist if there was no life.
"Other words", indeed. That was not at all what you were asking. You said "without referring to a mind". You did not say "if there was no life". It is clear in all of my examples that there is an observer. Let me make it more clear: this observer is alive. Thinking, remembering, and feeling as we know them depend on a thinker, a rememberer, a feeler. Whether that entity has to be alive depends on your opinion of artificial intelligence. If you are convinced that a computer can think and remember...
Yes, but you're saying that the pen always exists in the form as if it was always being observed. This is not the case, because you could say that sound exists without an observer.
Pressure waves exist without an observer. Sound, as perceiving, does not. Electromagnetic radiation exists without an observer; the translation of that radiation into "color" depends on an observer. You are confusing the stimulus with the action.
This may be the case, but this process says nothing on why this process leads to/is the sensation of memory.
This objection only makes sense if you have an a priori mentalistic definition of "a sensation" or "a memory".
Where did I say this?
It was implicit. I apologize if I misrepresented you position. Let me ask you, then: Is there a difference between "remembering" and "having a memory" for you? What is the difference?
Which is why I ask you if "having a perception" possible if there was no life.
Except that you didn't. You asked if it was possible with no mind. You constantly equate "observer" with "mind", and that is unwarranted.
You view the mechanisms used for perceiving are the actual perceptions. This is not logical.
Once again, this objection only makes sense if you have an a priori mentalistic definition of "perceptions". Why can not the action of these mechanisms be perceiving?
Suppose I am trying to explain, not "perceiving", but "walking". I explain the mechanics of the leg structures, the bones, the joints, the muscles & tendons, the ennervation...all the way to the primary and secondary motor cortex and association areas of the brain. I demonstrate (hypothetically) the action of flexion and extension, the complexity of balance...all the physical mechanisms and processes used for walking. Have I not explained walking? What more is there? Why is it different for perceiving?
Yes, but do you think that there is an observer at every location where "sound" can be picked up? What do the "sounds" on Pluto at some location sound like?
Strawman. There exist pressure waves, independent of observers. There may well be pressure waves on Pluto. Until we have an observer there, there is no "sound".
That's the thing. You are saying that the physical processes that produce the sound is the sensation of sound itself.
There's that language problem again; you use the word "sensation" like it exists separately from the behaviors of sensing. The physical process is sensing...that we metaphorically refer to "sensations" is simply a trick of our language.
It's as if you're in the matrix. The sensation of "sound" is the manisfestation of those mechanisms. I work from the view point that matter emerges from mind.
Dare I ask "how?"
Mind is an illusion?
Yes. Thinking is not, remembering is not, feeling is not...sensing is not... but a "mind" which does these things is simply uncalled for.
Yes, but our behaviour is linked to our ideas/beliefs. You have to show how matter creates these ideas/beliefs of ours.
Yet again, this objection presupposes a mentalistic definition of "ideas" and "beliefs". (as this post is too long already, I'll address these elsewhere.)
Ok, but we both agree that we have a "sensation of sound"?]
What's that sensation like when there is no one around?
No, we do not "have" a sensation of sound, we hear. It is an activity. It makes no sense to refer to, say, "walking" in the absence of a walker...likewise it makes no sense to refer to hearing in the absence of a hearer. You keep saying you understand my position, and then you say something like this...
My mind provides the sensations, via the laws of physics.
My body is based on those laws.Please explain this. It is much too simple a statement as is. How does your mind "provide sensations"?
Again, you're still saying that physical processes are the sensations themselves.
No.........once again, the physical processes are "sensing". "Sensations" is a mentalism, implying some special non-physical state of existence.
Mercutio
6th January 2004, 06:13 AM
Originally posted by wraith
You can't just say "that's just the way it works" and forget about it. With identities, you can get all the necessary parts of the brain that produces happiness and put them in front of me and say, "there you go, that's happiness." Sensations of happiness is this "hard stuff" with mass and taking up space. You're saying that happiness is external to one's own perceptions of happiness. I promised in my last post to address some of the hard-to-define mentalistic phenomena. It is too tempting, but ultimately unsatisfying, to think that "happiness" or "courage" or "love" would have a particular chemical or neurological signature. But of course, this could only be expected if there was a specific thing called happiness, a specific thing called courage, a specific thing called love. We can trace, for instance, the neural pathways involved in a reflexive eyeblink (and psychobiologists using a classical conditioning paradigm with humans and rabbits have done so). But there is no reflexive "happiness response" to a particular stimulus. To phrase the problem as one of "get all the necessary parts..." is to treat this complex concept as if it was a reflex. It is an incorrect framing of the problem; as long as you are asking for this kind of answer, you will not get it.
There is another way. "Happiness" can be explained in a completely materialistic way and still be something that we cannot point to, either as a specific neurological fingerprint or as a specific feeling. (Think about it--is your subjective experience of happiness the same each time you are happy? I doubt it.) It comes down to how we learned (each of us, as we learned our language) the word. We are not born with our language, nor does our language spring forth from our internal awareness. We learn it from our parents, our teachers, our siblings, our friends. We learn it, in other words, from people who have absolutely no access to our subjective feelings. The result of this is that any word that refers to an internal event may well be (some would say must be) learned imperfectly.
Consider "brick". In learning this word, we have access to publicly available examples of bricks. We can point to them, we can get perfect or near-perfect agreement from everybody as to which things are bricks and which are, say, kittens. Consider "red". Again, we can point to red things that are publicly available. This works so well that we can relatively easily find out who is colorblind, because the system does not work for them for this example. You can see people who don't know they are colorblind, thinking that many different colors are "red", because there has not been a perfect (or near-perfect) correspondence between their private (you might say subjective) experience and public examples.
Now consider "happiness". What do we point to? Yahweh playing with kittens, perhaps. Is that the only "happiness"? Well, no. Let's point to Moe's new smile. Or a kid skipping down the street. Or another person's smile. Or... And how do you learn what it is within yourself that is called happiness? Again, from others who have no access to your inner feelings. They are relying on your external behavior...we see you smiling and laughing and say "oh, you must be really happy today." You got a gift for your birthday and we say "oh, that must have made you happy". Now...what if that gift actually made you a little wistful, reminding you of a different gift that you did not receive? The "happy" label we put on your behavior (remember, you are still learning the language) has now been linked to a number of feelings, not all what we might consider to be pure happiness.
This view does not deny that happiness exists. Happiness, in this view, is a category label for a wide range of behaviors. Happiness is the category of things that includes all those behaviors which have been associated with the term "happiness". (Although that may sound circular, it is not. We do not say you act that way because you are happy...rather, we say that we call you happy because you act that way. Happiness is a category label, not a cause of behavior.)
This view also explains our difficulty in defining things like love--any time we do not have a publicly available concrete example, our words will necessarily be less well defined. Interestingly, this view is at odds with some people's intuitive understanding of our feelings. I have heard people say "they're my feelings--I should know them better than anything. What could be more accessible to me than whether I am in love?" Well...given the way we learn our language, I would say that "bricks" and "red" are considerably more accessible to you than "love". And no, I am not at all denying that love exists. I am defining it much more broadly, as the category of behaviors that includes gazing into one another's eyes, writing sonnets, feeling that wonderful tangle in your stomach when she walks into the room...these things are not caused by love, these things are love.
Interesting Ian
6th January 2004, 06:40 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
[B]I promised in my last post to address some of the hard-to-define mentalistic phenomena. It is too tempting, but ultimately unsatisfying, to think that "happiness" or "courage" or "love" would have a particular chemical or neurological signature. But of course, this could only be expected if there was a specific thing called happiness, a specific thing called courage, a specific thing called love. We can trace, for instance, the neural pathways involved in a reflexive eyeblink (and psychobiologists using a classical conditioning paradigm with humans and rabbits have done so). But there is no reflexive "happiness response" to a particular stimulus. To phrase the problem as one of "get all the necessary parts..." is to treat this complex concept as if it was a reflex. It is an incorrect framing of the problem; as long as you are asking for this kind of answer, you will not get it.
There is another way. "Happiness" can be explained in a completely materialistic way and still be something that we cannot point to, either as a specific neurological fingerprint or as a specific feeling. (Think about it--is your subjective experience of happiness the same each time you are happy? I doubt it.) It comes down to how we learned (each of us, as we learned our language) the word. We are not born with our language, nor does our language spring forth from our internal awareness. We learn it from our parents, our teachers, our siblings, our friends. We learn it, in other words, from people who have absolutely no access to our subjective feelings. The result of this is that any word that refers to an internal event may well be (some would say must be) learned imperfectly.
Consider "brick". In learning this word, we have access to publicly available examples of bricks. We can point to them, we can get perfect or near-perfect agreement from everybody as to which things are bricks and which are, say, kittens. Consider "red". Again, we can point to red things that are publicly available. This works so well that we can relatively easily find out who is colorblind, because the system does not work for them for this example. You can see people who don't know they are colorblind, thinking that many different colors are "red", because there has not been a perfect (or near-perfect) correspondence between their private (you might say subjective) experience and public examples.
Now consider "happiness". What do we point to? Yahweh playing with kittens, perhaps. Is that the only "happiness"? Well, no. Let's point to Moe's new smile. Or a kid skipping down the street. Or another person's smile. Or... And how do you learn what it is within yourself that is called happiness? Again, from others who have no access to your inner feelings. They are relying on your external behavior...we see you smiling and laughing and say "oh, you must be really happy today." You got a gift for your birthday and we say "oh, that must have made you happy". Now...what if that gift actually made you a little wistful, reminding you of a different gift that you did not receive? The "happy" label we put on your behavior (remember, you are still learning the language) has now been linked to a number of feelings, not all what we might consider to be pure happiness.
This view does not deny that happiness exists. Happiness, in this view, is a category label for a wide range of behaviors.
No not a wide range of behaviours but a wide range of mental states. It couldn't be behaviour per se because one can put on an act. I agree that the concept of happiness is extremely vague.
Happiness is the category of things that includes all those behaviors which have been associated with the term "happiness". (Although that may sound circular, it is not. We do not say you act that way because you are happy...rather, we say that we call you happy because you act that way. Happiness is a category label, not a cause of behavior.)
And I say a person acts in a certain way because they are happy. Happiness isn't constituted by behaviour, otherwise a p-zombie with certain appropriate behaviour would be happy! :eek:
This view also explains our difficulty in defining things like love--any time we do not have a publicly available concrete example, our words will necessarily be less well defined. Interestingly, this view is at odds with some people's intuitive understanding of our feelings. I have heard people say "they're my feelings--I should know them better than anything. What could be more accessible to me than whether I am in love?"
Yes that's right. Impossible to define, but yet we understand it perfectly.
Well...given the way we learn our language, I would say that "bricks" and "red" are considerably more accessible to you than "love".
Equally so.
And no, I am not at all denying that love exists. I am defining it much more broadly, as the category of behaviors that includes gazing into one another's eyes, writing sonnets, feeling that wonderful tangle in your stomach when she walks into the room...these things are not caused by love, these things are love.
Jeez! You really are crazy!! :eek: LOL
Mercutio
6th January 2004, 06:54 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No not a wide range of behaviours but a wide range of mental states. It couldn't be behaviour per se because one can put on an act. I agree that the concept of happiness is extremely vague.
Actually, "putting on an act" is precisely one of the reasons for the vagueness of these definitions. How can the people who are teaching you the labels for your feelings (without access to them themselves) know if you are putting on an act? They cannot. They attach the label to your behavior, not to your mental state. You learn the label that has been attached to your behavior, and extrapolate its connection to your mental state. Thus, the vagueness that you see.
And I say a person acts in a certain way because they are happy. Happiness isn't constituted by behaviour, otherwise a p-zombie with certain appropriate behaviour would be happy! :eek:
Let's say I receive an invitation to have a pint at the pub with my good friend Interesting Ian. I, of course, smile and walk briskly to said pub. You say my smile is caused by my happiness. I say my smile is caused by the invitation to have a pint. My subjective feeling of happiness is also caused by this invitation. It may be that the happiness is causal, but Occam's razor suggests it need not be. It is an interesting question, and I wonder how one would go about testing it.
Yes that's right. Impossible to define, but yet we understand it perfectly.
That's right...we never hear someone saying "but what do you mean when you say you love me?" Actually, when I ask this question in my classes, about half the people there claim to have either said those words or have had them said to them!
Jeez! You really are crazy!! :eek: LOL Hey, I'm a hopeless romantic. Do not confuse a different way of looking at love with a denial of it.
wraith
7th January 2004, 04:14 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
"Other words", indeed. That was not at all what you were asking. You said "without referring to a mind". You did not say "if there was no life". It is clear in all of my examples that there is an observer. Let me make it more clear: this observer is alive. Thinking, remembering, and feeling as we know them depend on a thinker, a rememberer, a feeler. Whether that entity has to be alive depends on your opinion of artificial intelligence. If you are convinced that a computer can think and remember...
True, but you and I agree that we have a sense of self, regardless of our definitions of mind? But I doubt that you would assume that I would apply "mind" to something non-living?
So I ask again, does thinking and feeling exist when there is no consciousness or life?
Pressure waves exist without an observer. Sound, as perceiving, does not. Electromagnetic radiation exists without an observer; the translation of that radiation into "color" depends on an observer. You are confusing the stimulus with the action.
Sure there is the stimulus. But the stimulus isn't the sensation itself, as you are suggesting. You're saying that sound can exist when no one is observing correct?
This objection only makes sense if you have an a priori mentalistic definition of "a sensation" or "a memory".
What's the materialist explanation of these processes that leads to consciousness?
It was implicit. I apologize if I misrepresented you position. Let me ask you, then: Is there a difference between "remembering" and "having a memory" for you? What is the difference?
Sure. A memory can be stored. The process of recalling that memory is "remembering".
Except that you didn't. You asked if it was possible with no mind. You constantly equate "observer" with "mind", and that is unwarranted.
*look to my first reply to this post*
Once again, this objection only makes sense if you have an a priori mentalistic definition of "perceptions". Why can not the action of these mechanisms be perceiving?
Suppose I am trying to explain, not "perceiving", but "walking". I explain the mechanics of the leg structures, the bones, the joints, the muscles & tendons, the ennervation...all the way to the primary and secondary motor cortex and association areas of the brain. I demonstrate (hypothetically) the action of flexion and extension, the complexity of balance...all the physical mechanisms and processes used for walking. Have I not explained walking? What more is there? Why is it different for perceiving?
Yes, but it doesn't describe the sensation of walking.
Strawman. There exist pressure waves, independent of observers. There may well be pressure waves on Pluto. Until we have an observer there, there is no "sound".
That's what I've been saying all along.
There's that language problem again; you use the word "sensation" like it exists separately from the behaviors of sensing. The physical process is sensing...that we metaphorically refer to "sensations" is simply a trick of our language.
How can the physical processes of hearing sound be the perception of sound itself?
Dare I ask "how?"
It's the mind creating the sound. Though, I'm not sure how the mind creates the sensation of sound as it does. The sound itself is an idea. Where does that idea orginate? I don't know.
Yes. Thinking is not, remembering is not, feeling is not...sensing is not... but a "mind" which does these things is simply uncalled for.
But you and I both agree that we have a sense of "self"? Is that sense of "self" an illusion?
Yet again, this objection presupposes a mentalistic definition of "ideas" and "beliefs". (as this post is too long already, I'll address these elsewhere.)
Can you give a brief run?
No, we do not "have" a sensation of sound, we hear. It is an activity. It makes no sense to refer to, say, "walking" in the absence of a walker...likewise it makes no sense to refer to hearing in the absence of a hearer. You keep saying you understand my position, and then you say something like this...
That's what I'm saying. There is no "sound" when there is no "observer". Under materialism, this is not the case.
Please explain this. It is much too simple a statement as is. How does your mind "provide sensations"?
Information is being sent and interpreted by the brain. It's an idea. I'm saying that another mind is sending the idea (consciousness creating matter).
No.........once again, the physical processes are "sensing". "Sensations" is a mentalism, implying some special non-physical state of existence.
The thing is materialism can explain the mechanics of walking. It can't explain the sensation of walking itself. It's simply not possible.
wraith
7th January 2004, 04:19 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
I promised in my last post to address some of the hard-to-define mentalistic phenomena. It is too tempting, but ultimately unsatisfying, to think that "happiness" or "courage" or "love" would have a particular chemical or neurological signature. But of course, this could only be expected if there was a specific thing called happiness, a specific thing called courage, a specific thing called love. We can trace, for instance, the neural pathways involved in a reflexive eyeblink (and psychobiologists using a classical conditioning paradigm with humans and rabbits have done so). But there is no reflexive "happiness response" to a particular stimulus. To phrase the problem as one of "get all the necessary parts..." is to treat this complex concept as if it was a reflex. It is an incorrect framing of the problem; as long as you are asking for this kind of answer, you will not get it.
There is another way. "Happiness" can be explained in a completely materialistic way and still be something that we cannot point to, either as a specific neurological fingerprint or as a specific feeling. (Think about it--is your subjective experience of happiness the same each time you are happy? I doubt it.) It comes down to how we learned (each of us, as we learned our language) the word. We are not born with our language, nor does our language spring forth from our internal awareness. We learn it from our parents, our teachers, our siblings, our friends. We learn it, in other words, from people who have absolutely no access to our subjective feelings. The result of this is that any word that refers to an internal event may well be (some would say must be) learned imperfectly.
Consider "brick". In learning this word, we have access to publicly available examples of bricks. We can point to them, we can get perfect or near-perfect agreement from everybody as to which things are bricks and which are, say, kittens. Consider "red". Again, we can point to red things that are publicly available. This works so well that we can relatively easily find out who is colorblind, because the system does not work for them for this example. You can see people who don't know they are colorblind, thinking that many different colors are "red", because there has not been a perfect (or near-perfect) correspondence between their private (you might say subjective) experience and public examples.
Now consider "happiness". What do we point to? Yahweh playing with kittens, perhaps. Is that the only "happiness"? Well, no. Let's point to Moe's new smile. Or a kid skipping down the street. Or another person's smile. Or... And how do you learn what it is within yourself that is called happiness? Again, from others who have no access to your inner feelings. They are relying on your external behavior...we see you smiling and laughing and say "oh, you must be really happy today." You got a gift for your birthday and we say "oh, that must have made you happy". Now...what if that gift actually made you a little wistful, reminding you of a different gift that you did not receive? The "happy" label we put on your behavior (remember, you are still learning the language) has now been linked to a number of feelings, not all what we might consider to be pure happiness.
This view does not deny that happiness exists. Happiness, in this view, is a category label for a wide range of behaviors. Happiness is the category of things that includes all those behaviors which have been associated with the term "happiness". (Although that may sound circular, it is not. We do not say you act that way because you are happy...rather, we say that we call you happy because you act that way. Happiness is a category label, not a cause of behavior.)
This view also explains our difficulty in defining things like love--any time we do not have a publicly available concrete example, our words will necessarily be less well defined. Interestingly, this view is at odds with some people's intuitive understanding of our feelings. I have heard people say "they're my feelings--I should know them better than anything. What could be more accessible to me than whether I am in love?" Well...given the way we learn our language, I would say that "bricks" and "red" are considerably more accessible to you than "love". And no, I am not at all denying that love exists. I am defining it much more broadly, as the category of behaviors that includes gazing into one another's eyes, writing sonnets, feeling that wonderful tangle in your stomach when she walks into the room...these things are not caused by love, these things are love.
So you're saying that "happiness" are the actions of people?
What about actors or p-zombies?
Suggestologist
7th January 2004, 05:22 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Actually, "putting on an act" is precisely one of the reasons for the vagueness of these definitions. How can the people who are teaching you the labels for your feelings (without access to them themselves) know if you are putting on an act? They cannot. They attach the label to your behavior, not to your mental state. You learn the label that has been attached to your behavior, and extrapolate its connection to your mental state. Thus, the vagueness that you see.
Words are labels for parts of a person's personal history. When one hears words with no direct sensory referents ("cat", but there's no cat here in this room, nor in a picture in this room), one searches for a match in one's past experience. The Illusion of Understanding (such as Wittgenstein fell for) comes about when we use the same words - the same labels; but the meaning is almost never exactly the same for two different people. Because people's memories are often unique to themselves.
That's right...we never hear someone saying "but what do you mean when you say you love me?" Actually, when I ask this question in my classes, about half the people there claim to have either said those words or have had them said to them!
Hey, I'm a hopeless romantic. Do not confuse a different way of looking at love with a denial of it.
"If you (really) loved me, you would X."
Mercutio
7th January 2004, 06:31 AM
argh! I typed out most of a response, and my computer crashed. try, try again...
Originally posted by wraith
True, but you and I agree that we have a sense of self, regardless of our definitions of mind? But I doubt that you would assume that I would apply "mind" to something non-living?
I would not agree. Both "sense" and "self" are words you and I obviously use differently, so any seeming agreement would soon fall apart.
I know people who say that their car, their computer, or their plumbing "has a mind of its own". I would not presume to know what you would apply the word "mind" to.
So I ask again, does thinking and feeling exist when there is no consciousness or life?
Asked and answered. Your question implies that you equate "consciousness" and "life", which begs the question.
Sure there is the stimulus. But the stimulus isn't the sensation itself, as you are suggesting. You're saying that sound can exist when no one is observing correct?
I am not suggesting that whatsoever. The only reason you think so is that you have an a priori assumption of a mentalistic view of sensation. Your use of the phrase "the sensation" shows this as well. "Sensation", as a noun, is only a metaphorical noun, standing in for a process, the action of sensing.
What's the materialist explanation of these processes that leads to consciousness?
Again, your question assumes "consciousness" a) exists, b) is somehow non-physical, and c) must be part of any explanation of perceiving. Once you get around the faulty question, I have addressed these processes in previous posts on this thread. Asked and answered.
Sure. A memory can be stored. The process of recalling that memory is "remembering".
You infer a stored memory from the fact that someone remembers. This is not the only possible explanation or mechanism for remembering. Certainly, memory researchers used that model for decades, but it is not the best fit to the observed data. Currently, we view memory more as a reconstruction or re-experiencing, rather than as dredging up some stored memory. Under the old model, distortions or biases in recall were problems. Under the new model, we can see in these biases the active, adaptive nature of remembering. So, unless you wish to modify the definition of "stored memory" past the point where it is recognisable, it is simply not a useful metaphor.
Yes, but it doesn't describe the sensation of walking.
Now that is irony. My point was that speaking about "the sensation" is like speaking about "the walking". They are actions, not things. Your objection here leads to an infinite regress: what about the sensation of sensing the sensation of sensing the sensation? Have we explained that?
That's what I've been saying all along.
No it is not. You have been saying there must be a "mind" there to observe. A different thing entirely.
How can the physical processes of hearing sound be the perception of sound itself?
Asked and answered. Your question, once again, assumes a "thing" status for "perception", and a mental thing at that. In the description of hearing a few posts back, please tell me what step is missing? We can trace from pressure waves up through your physical reaction to them (say, passing the salt if the pressure waves happened to come from somebody asking you to pass the salt). Nowhere do we need to add "mind" to the problem, unless you can see something I have missed. Please point it out.
It's the mind creating the sound. Though, I'm not sure how the mind creates the sensation of sound as it does. The sound itself is an idea. Where does that idea orginate? I don't know.
That's an awful lot of "I don't know"s for someone so sure I am wrong and you are right. :D
But you and I both agree that we have a sense of "self"? Is that sense of "self" an illusion?
I doubt very much that we agree. As I said above, I doubt we even agree as to what "sense" and "self" mean in the context of that sentence. As for "illusion", I can think of a number of ways that question can be interpreted, so I'll wait for further refinement before answering.
That's what I'm saying. There is no "sound" when there is no "observer". Under materialism, this is not the case.
What??? No, that is not what you are saying. You are equating "observer" with "mind", and there is no reason to do so. My "observer" is perfectly comfortable within a materialistic explanation--why on earth do you suggest that a materialist would not need an observer for sound (as opposed to pressure waves--I am hoping we are both clear on that).
Information is being sent and interpreted by the brain. It's an idea. I'm saying that another mind is sending the idea (consciousness creating matter).
Please tell me how. The only way I know of for the brain to "send information" is through behavior--speaking, typing, gestures, etc. Please suggest a mechanism by which a mind sends an idea. Please suggest a mechanism by which consciousness creates matter.
The thing is materialism can explain the mechanics of walking. It can't explain the sensation of walking itself. It's simply not possible. For once I agree. It is not possible to explain "the sensation", because it does not exist as such. It is a noun only because our language uses metaphors so easily. Asking me to "explain the sensation" is like asking me to "pinpoint the location of the fountain of youth"--it presupposes that there is a thing there to be explained.
You really do not understand the materialist position. Of course, materialism as you understand it cannot explain experience as you assume it is.
hammegk
7th January 2004, 07:16 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
You really do not understand the materialist position.
Huh?
The Thinker/Individual Ego denies solipsism;
External Reality Exists.
At the macroscopic level (gravity has an effect) the tautology A & not-A is correct.
Rules Exist.
Life emerges from non-life and returns to non-life.
That's it!
Mercutio
7th January 2004, 07:58 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
Huh?well, first off, it wasn't addressed to you, but anyway...:D
The Thinker/Individual Ego denies solipsism;
"Thinker/Individual Ego"? Do these terms (which I don't think I used) come with their own baggage? (I ask because I honestly don't know)....denies solip...I suppose so--I obviously cannot disprove it, so I suppose to reject it I must simply be "denying" it. (Although, to quibble a tiny bit, we tend to use the word "deny" when we wish to imply that something is true but someone denies it anyway...obviously, in this case we cannot know if it is true or not.)
External Reality Exists.You agreed that it appearsto...for a pragmatist, this is enough. It need not actually exist, so long as it appears to.
At the macroscopic level (gravity has an effect) the tautology A & not-A is correct.
You got me there. I don't know what you are saying, so I can neither confirm nor deny this one. As I told Interesting Ian, the philosophical language (or is it jargon) is not mine.
Rules Exist.
Not quite. We may describe things in terms of rules. We construct rules to fit what we observe. These rules change, of course, with new observations or new ways of looking at old ones.
Life emerges from non-life and returns to non-life. Perhaps--I had never actually considered this--it was not part of the question of this thread. I am curious as to its inclusion here...and I suppose we would have to examine the definitions of the words you use...So on balance, I think I will neither confirm nor deny this one too, pending further thinking...
That's it! Now, as succinctly, explain idealism...
hammegk
7th January 2004, 08:28 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
well, first off, it wasn't addressed to you, but anyway...
Sorry. I didn't realize you thought you sent a PM.
"Thinker/Individual Ego"? Do these terms (which I don't think I used) come with their own baggage? (I ask because I honestly don't know)....denies solip...I suppose so-- ...
Welcome to Wittgenstein's Problem.
You agreed that it appears to...for a pragmatist, this is enough. It need not actually exist, so long as it appears to.
.ditto.
You got me there [quote]
Sorry. How about Aristotelian logic is a correct description of what-is?
[quote]
Not quite. We may describe things in terms of rules. We construct rules to fit what we observe. These rules change, of course ...
Hmmm? When have The Rules been shown to change? Our math models change.
Perhaps--I had never actually considered this--it was not part of the question of this thread. I am curious as to its inclusion here...and I suppose we would have to examine the definitions of the words you use...So on balance, I think I will neither confirm nor deny this one too, pending further thinking...
Yeah, I do consider it important.
Now, as succinctly, explain idealism...
I could, but why don't you take a shot at it. ;)
Mercutio
7th January 2004, 08:46 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
Sorry. I didn't realize you thought you sent a PM.
You quoted something I said to wraith. Unless you are a puppeteer, it was not addressed to you. Not that that prohibits you from responding, but when your response to the question is "Huh?", then perhaps it is useful to see for whom the comment was intended. Or (it occurs to me) did you mean to imply that wraith's understanding of materialism was correct?
Hmmm? When have The Rules been shown to change? Our math models change.
The "rules of physics" changed from Newtonian to Einsteinian, for instance. The phenomena did not change; our infered rules changed to better fit the phenomena.
Perhaps I use "rules" the way you use "math models".
Yeah, I do consider it important.
I do see that objection coming from you in many of these threads. I am not completely certain why...
I could, but why don't you take a shot at it. ;) I must admit I cannot make heads nor tails of any idealist on this forum. The closest I could come would be Mary Calkins's paper "the philosophical credo of an absolutistic personalist", which I highly recommend. It is beautifully written. Alas, it begins with the assumption that mental entities exist. (nothing wrong with that, as long as it is recognised as an assumption; I am every bit as much assuming when I say that material objects exist.) Mind you, she does a great job from there, and takes the reader from this humble beginning up through a universal "self". Lifegazer should read it.
hammegk
7th January 2004, 11:47 AM
Although I didn't find Calkin's paper available on the net, my research indicates to me she was a subjective idealist. That is not my current position.
I invite you to take a quick look at;
http://www.sophiasworld.at/PhilosophyHTML/obideal.html
which seems to me a reasonable overview of idealism.
Mercutio
7th January 2004, 12:00 PM
Originally posted by hammegk
Although I didn't find Calkin's paper available on the net, my research indicates to me she was a subjective idealist. That is not my current position. To the best of my knowledge, it is not available; I have been meaning to scan it for a class...if I do, I'll send you a link.
I invite you to take a quick look at;
http://www.sophiasworld.at/PhilosophyHTML/obideal.html
which seems to me a reasonable overview of idealism. Thanks, I will.
epepke
8th January 2004, 03:14 AM
Originally posted by joyrex
I wouldn't know about old.. but I started this thread today. Maybe you are implying that the matter at hand has been discussed in length before?
No; I just got the year wrong.
Dancing David
8th January 2004, 06:47 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
Huh?
The Thinker/Individual Ego denies solipsism;
Which is a personal choice, there is an appearance that the 'reality' exists beyond the individual. Some may draw the false conclusion that the appearance is true.
External Reality Exists.
External Reality appears to behave as though it exists absent the observer. To eleiminate all observation might be a difficult hypothesis to implement. ;)
At the macroscopic level (gravity has an effect) the tautology A & not-A is correct.
I am not sure about the tautology thing, if all we percieve is within the grip of gravity then there may be an area outside of the perception that would allow the tautology to be violated. The question about the tautology is does it approximate what we 'observe'. We can't observe the ontology so the tautology appears to be true.
Rules Exist.
Rules can be approximated through the scientific method.
Life emerges from non-life and returns to non-life.
Again that is an appearance, until we can test the ontology of the 'spirit that motivates life'/rule out the immaterial, that is merely an appearance.
That's it!
That's the appearance of it, there are those who are Orthodox materialists and those who are reformed!
wraith
9th January 2004, 09:24 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
argh! I typed out most of a response, and my computer crashed. try, try again...
It happens :eek:
I would not agree. Both "sense" and "self" are words you and I obviously use differently, so any seeming agreement would soon fall apart.
When you wake up, you do sense that you are "Mercutio" and not somebody else?
I know people who say that their car, their computer, or their plumbing "has a mind of its own". I would not presume to know what you would apply the word "mind" to.
The term is probably used metaphorically ;)
I see mind as a "database" that your consciousness "accesses".
Asked and answered. Your question implies that you equate "consciousness" and "life", which begs the question.
Is your answer a "yes" or "no"?
I am not suggesting that whatsoever. The only reason you think so is that you have an a priori assumption of a mentalistic view of sensation. Your use of the phrase "the sensation" shows this as well. "Sensation", as a noun, is only a metaphorical noun, standing in for a process, the action of sensing.
With this view, the difference between a robot and a human is pretty much nothing?
Again, your question assumes "consciousness" a) exists, b) is somehow non-physical, and c) must be part of any explanation of perceiving. Once you get around the faulty question, I have addressed these processes in previous posts on this thread. Asked and answered.
In regards to "a)", you're assuming your own existence?
Nevertheless, to say that the processes of sensing is the actual sensing itself is not sufficient to explain your sensations. Unless of course, you're saying that we are no different to a robot.
You infer a stored memory from the fact that someone remembers. This is not the only possible explanation or mechanism for remembering. Certainly, memory researchers used that model for decades, but it is not the best fit to the observed data. Currently, we view memory more as a reconstruction or re-experiencing, rather than as dredging up some stored memory. Under the old model, distortions or biases in recall were problems. Under the new model, we can see in these biases the active, adaptive nature of remembering. So, unless you wish to modify the definition of "stored memory" past the point where it is recognisable, it is simply not a useful metaphor.
But this doesn't really change anything about how you perceive your history.
Now that is irony. My point was that speaking about "the sensation" is like speaking about "the walking". They are actions, not things. Your objection here leads to an infinite regress: what about the sensation of sensing the sensation of sensing the sensation? Have we explained that?
Like I said before, this view says that we are no different to robots.
No it is not. You have been saying there must be a "mind" there to observe. A different thing entirely.
Well forget about mind for the moment. You and I both agree that we are conscious and perceive right?
Let's say that you're the only living entity in existence. Is it the case that sound only exists when you're perceiving it?
That's what I'm getting at.
Asked and answered. Your question, once again, assumes a "thing" status for "perception", and a mental thing at that. In the description of hearing a few posts back, please tell me what step is missing? We can trace from pressure waves up through your physical reaction to them (say, passing the salt if the pressure waves happened to come from somebody asking you to pass the salt). Nowhere do we need to add "mind" to the problem, unless you can see something I have missed. Please point it out.
Robot.
That's an awful lot of "I don't know"s for someone so sure I am wrong and you are right. :D
That doesn't drag me away from the Truth. In any case, I can still eliminate "insane" beliefs ;)
I doubt very much that we agree. As I said above, I doubt we even agree as to what "sense" and "self" mean in the context of that sentence. As for "illusion", I can think of a number of ways that question can be interpreted, so I'll wait for further refinement before answering.
When you wake up, do sense "Mercutio"? Is "Mercutio" an illusion?
What??? No, that is not what you are saying. You are equating "observer" with "mind", and there is no reason to do so. My "observer" is perfectly comfortable within a materialistic explanation--why on earth do you suggest that a materialist would not need an observer for sound (as opposed to pressure waves--I am hoping we are both clear on that).
I'm still waiting for you to answer if feelings/thoughts exist without an observer.
Please tell me how. The only way I know of for the brain to "send information" is through behavior--speaking, typing, gestures, etc. Please suggest a mechanism by which a mind sends an idea. Please suggest a mechanism by which consciousness creates matter.
Yes, but your belief leads to the conclusion that robots and humans are the same. Also, in no way does speaking and typing imply that matter creates consciousness.
Mind sends ideas and creates matter by the workings of the laws of physics. Whatever we do, we do it via those laws.
For once I agree. It is not possible to explain "the sensation", because it does not exist as such. It is a noun only because our language uses metaphors so easily.
Well according to you, the mechanics of sensations are the sensations themselves. If sensations are only a metaphor, then the reality is non-conscious matter creating your ideas. If you believe that those ideas don't really exist, then so be it.
Asking me to "explain the sensation" is like asking me to "pinpoint the location of the fountain of youth"--it presupposes that there is a thing there to be explained.
It's settled then? Your ideas don't exist? :rolleyes:
You really do not understand the materialist position. Of course, materialism as you understand it cannot explain experience as you assume it is.
If you say so slick ;)
Mercutio
9th January 2004, 11:14 AM
Originally posted by wraith
When you wake up, you do sense that you are "Mercutio" and not somebody else?
Usually, although, let's face it, since I have no control group, I really can't say, can I. Maybe I wake up sensing I am wraith, but mistaking it for Mercutio. You see the uselessness of the concept... Besides which, in any of the threads here which have talked about p-zombies (or m-zombies, DD), it has appeared obvious that a Mercutio p-zombie would also wake up sensing he was Mercutio. So I kinda wonder what your point is.
The term is probably used metaphorically ;)
I see mind as a "database" that your consciousness "accesses".
My argument is that the term is always used metaphorically, whether we are aware of that or not.
Is your answer a "yes" or "no"?
Refine your question and I would be glad to answer. I told you why the question was bad--why insist on an answer?
With this view, the difference between a robot and a human is pretty much nothing?
The same question Descartes asked, isn't it? The differences are certainly there structurally, of course. Carbon-based versus silicon-based, electrochemical signals vs. electrical-only...But functionally, It is quite possible that the difference is only one of degree, not of kind. At our current state of technology, our fastest computers don't come close to the processing of a brain. But I see no reason (again, other than the structural differences, and that could conceivably change) to presume that there must be a difference, functionally, between a human and a sufficiently complex robot. Why, do you have some a priori assumptions about "consciousness" that preclude robots from "possessing" it?
In regards to "a)", you're assuming your own existence?
Nevertheless, to say that the processes of sensing is the actual sensing itself is not sufficient to explain your sensations. Unless of course, you're saying that we are no different to a robot.
I'm sorry, I don't understand your objection in the first sentence. After that...Why do you assume we must be different from a robot? (Certainly we currently are, but technology marches on...I ask again, what reason do you have to think we must be different?)
But this doesn't really change anything about how you perceive your history.
True, to a point. It was intended purely to address the treatment of "memories" as "things".
Well forget about mind for the moment. You and I both agree that we are conscious and perceive right?
Define "are conscious". I would agree, using my definitions; I am hesitant to agree when I see the mentalistic baggage that might accompany the term.
Let's say that you're the only living entity in existence. Is it the case that sound only exists when you're perceiving it?
Given that constraint, pressure waves exist without your perceiving them, but sound is your processing of those pressure waves. What this has to do with consciousness, I have no idea.
When you wake up, do sense "Mercutio"? Is "Mercutio" an illusion?
Which Mercutio do you refer to? The one I speak of, made of flesh, or the one you have spoken of, a "consciousness"?
I'm still waiting for you to answer if feelings/thoughts exist without an observer. I have answered this, but your insistence on equating "observer" with "consciousness" is muddying the issue. Thoughts and feelings, as nouns, do not exist. Thinking and feeling are actions of, if you will, an "observer". They do not require, nor do they imply, "consciousness" as any special mental entity.
Yes, but your belief leads to the conclusion that robots and humans are the same. Also, in no way does speaking and typing imply that matter creates consciousness. there's that phrase, "creates consciousness" again. What does that mean, please?
Mind sends ideas and creates matter by the workings of the laws of physics. Whatever we do, we do it via those laws.
Please tell me which laws of physics allow mind to create matter.
Well, according to you, the mechanics of sensations are the sensations themselves. If sensations are only a metaphor, then the reality is non-conscious matter creating your ideas. If you believe that those ideas don't really exist, then so be it. So be it?
It's settled then? Your ideas don't exist? :rolleyes: I'll ignore your attempt at a jibe, and simply say..."ideas", as some mental entity, do not exist. You are correct. Finally
If you say so slick ;) Nice to be dismissive. Beats actually addressing my view.
wraith
9th January 2004, 10:49 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Usually, although, let's face it, since I have no control group, I really can't say, can I. Maybe I wake up sensing I am wraith, but mistaking it for Mercutio. You see the uselessness of the concept... Besides which, in any of the threads here which have talked about p-zombies (or m-zombies, DD), it has appeared obvious that a Mercutio p-zombie would also wake up sensing he was Mercutio. So I kinda wonder what your point is.
The point is that you don't agree with the way I use "sense" and "self". Regardless of which, there still lies an underlying Truth. You're assumptions that a p-zombie's actions imply that it has consciousness baffles me. Even if it did, it would have to have your history. In this case, you are the p-zombie. How would you know what "wraith" feels like? How does "wraith" perceive things? If you don't know, then how can you claim to believe that you're "wraith".
This is beating around the bush. Do you feel like "Mercutio" when you wake up?
My argument is that the term is always used metaphorically, whether we are aware of that or not.
Then showinig how matter creates desires/emotions/ideas can be logically explained? Equating functions with consciousness provides no answer.
Refine your question and I would be glad to answer. I told you why the question was bad--why insist on an answer?
If you where the only living entity in existence, would emotions/desires still exist if you didn't exist?
The same question Descartes asked, isn't it? The differences are certainly there structurally, of course. Carbon-based versus silicon-based, electrochemical signals vs. electrical-only...But functionally, It is quite possible that the difference is only one of degree, not of kind. At our current state of technology, our fastest computers don't come close to the processing of a brain. But I see no reason (again, other than the structural differences, and that could conceivably change) to presume that there must be a difference, functionally, between a human and a sufficiently complex robot. Why, do you have some a priori assumptions about "consciousness" that preclude robots from "possessing" it?
Well the robot can look happy and the processes can be traced. Is it consciously happy? From your line of reasoning, there is nothing to stop you from saying that a rock can be happy. It may not posses neurons that set the impulses to move a body in a series of movements that describes "happiness", but a stationary rock could be the rock's version of "happy".
I'm sorry, I don't understand your objection in the first sentence. After that...Why do you assume we must be different from a robot? (Certainly we currently are, but technology marches on...I ask again, what reason do you have to think we must be different?)
You said that I assume that consciousness exists. I ask again, do you doubt your own existence?
In any case, to say that a powerful enough computer can become conscious is assuming that matter creates consciousness in the first place.
True, to a point. It was intended purely to address the treatment of "memories" as "things".
I thought that the whole point was to show the difference between "memory" and "rememberiing"?
Define "are conscious". I would agree, using my definitions; I am hesitant to agree when I see the mentalistic baggage that might accompany the term.
That's fine. Definitions don't alter the underlying Truth.
So you agree that you sense "Mercutio". You perceive your history?
Given that constraint, pressure waves exist without your perceiving them, but sound is your processing of those pressure waves. What this has to do with consciousness, I have no idea.
In other words, sound doesn't exist if you were not there, correct?
This has everything to do with consciousness. You're saying that the matter creates "sound".
Which Mercutio do you refer to? The one I speak of, made of flesh, or the one you have spoken of, a "consciousness"?
At this point, do you feel that you are "Mercutio"?
Do you feel this when you wake up?
I have answered this, but your insistence on equating "observer" with "consciousness" is muddying the issue. Thoughts and feelings, as nouns, do not exist.
You are the materialist are you not? haha
Thinking and feeling are actions of, if you will, an "observer". They do not require, nor do they imply, "consciousness" as any special mental entity.
The observer is matter moving in certain directions. Under materialism, that's sufficient for "feelings".
Take a ball. That's a noun. What about a ball that's moving? Can you touch "moving"? The thing is, you can't account for the existence of ideas under a "matter creating consciousness" universe.
there's that phrase, "creates consciousness" again. What does that mean, please?
The existence of consciousness is brought about via matter.
Please tell me which laws of physics allow mind to create matter.
All of them.
So be it?
Yeah, we don't exist :rolleyes:
I'll ignore your attempt at a jibe, and simply say..."ideas", as some mental entity, do not exist. You are correct. Finally
Yes, but they exist as a physical entity? You have already said that this was False.
Nice to be dismissive. Beats actually addressing my view.
Thanks :cool:
Dancing David
10th January 2004, 06:50 AM
Originally posted by wraith
The point is that you don't agree with the way I use "sense" and "self". Regardless of which, there still lies an underlying Truth. You're assumptions that a p-zombie's actions imply that it has consciousness baffles me. Even if it did, it would have to have your history. In this case, you are the p-zombie. How would you know what "wraith" feels like? How does "wraith" perceive things? If you don't know, then how can you claim to believe that you're "wraith".
This is beating around the bush. Do you feel like "Mercutio" when you wake up?
I think that there is a difference underlying the definitional differences.
A sound is a percieved noise, you assign a different role to perception than a functionalist does. A functionalist sees the sound as the perception of the noise. 'But there is the awareness' of the sound you say, and that is the essence of the 'consiousness'. If I understand your line of reasoning. In the behaviorist/functionalist approach there is no 'meta' in meta cognition, it is just cognition which is still believed to have a functional basis.
Your line of reasoning in this paragraph is a misstatement of the functionalist perspective.
How do you 'know' that you are 'wriath'? Through the functions of the brain, through memory, association and entrained cognition.
A comprable simlacrum would have the same experience that 'it' felt it was 'wraith', could you define the two as equal, probably not. But the simalacrum would think that it was 'wraith'. The issue that the materialist ios mentioning is that there is no transcendant quality to consiousness, it is a semantic concept solely. This is subject to debate and not proven as of yet.
As I asked Lifegazer, what is awareness? I feel that it is a series of other functional processes and like self it is a fiction that does not exist.
(Might I ask that you post to the 'prove the mind' thread, I tried to directly address these issues there, thanks)
Mercutio
10th January 2004, 07:19 AM
Rather than point-by-point, as our posts have been growing so huge, I'll limit this to a few observations (and thank DD for the above clarification)
****I may very well [/i]be[/i] a p-zombie. We may all be. You have yet to come up with a "consciousness" that is independent from the physical processes of thinking, remembering, feeling....This is what DD just addressed, so I'll stop here.
****Your comment to the effect that my view might well see a rock as being happy is an odd one. I see nothing in my statements that could possibly lead to that conclusion, and I wonder where you found it. The language that we use for "happiness" or for "consciousness" is, as I said, learned from a language community that has no direct access to any internal feelings of happiness or consciousness on our part. (would you agree? Or do you think that others can somehow directly sense our happiness or our consciousness? If so, please tell me how, and submit your application for the million) Therefore, our learning of these terms is necessarily based on matching those words with our and others' behavior. "Happiness" is learned by matching that word to many different examples of behavior (examples earlier in this thread); "consciousness" is learned by matching that word to different examples (examples in ian's primary and secondary qualities thread) or "making a conscious decision" or "being knocked unconscious" or "were you conscious of the fact that..."
I have not seen (perhaps you have, I don't know) any use in our language-community of "happy" behavior in rocks. As for consciousness, I can only give you the examples from before about cars, etc, with minds of their own. Yes, it is a metaphor. That's the point.
As for happy robots...have you never seen a kid play with one of those robotic dogs that were all the rage a couple of years ago? Any kid will tell you the robot dog is happy.
****Which laws of physics? "All of them" Ok, next question: How? Your response here is absolutely inadequate. I begin to suspect that you have no idea about your own views. You ask questions about my view that indicate that you do not understand it, but you are obviously trying to tear your version of my view to pieces...what, in the hopes that it supports your view? So what is your view. You have seen mine in detail, for several pages now, and still don't understand it. Perhaps the flaw is in your point of observation. Please explain your view, and perhaps that will give insight into why you don't understand mine.
wraith
11th January 2004, 05:00 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
I think that there is a difference underlying the definitional differences.
A sound is a percieved noise, you assign a different role to perception than a functionalist does. A functionalist sees the sound as the perception of the noise. 'But there is the awareness' of the sound you say, and that is the essence of the 'consiousness'. If I understand your line of reasoning. In the behaviorist/functionalist approach there is no 'meta' in meta cognition, it is just cognition which is still believed to have a functional basis.
How do you define "noise"?
Your line of reasoning in this paragraph is a misstatement of the functionalist perspective.
How do you 'know' that you are 'wriath'? Through the functions of the brain, through memory, association and entrained cognition.
A comprable simlacrum would have the same experience that 'it' felt it was 'wraith', could you define the two as equal, probably not. But the simalacrum would think that it was 'wraith'. The issue that the materialist ios mentioning is that there is no transcendant quality to consiousness, it is a semantic concept solely. This is subject to debate and not proven as of yet.
How do yo know what "wraith" feels like?
(Might I ask that you post to the 'prove the mind' thread, I tried to directly address these issues there, thanks)
copy that
wraith
11th January 2004, 06:34 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
****I may very well [/i]be[/i] a p-zombie. We may all be. You have yet to come up with a "consciousness" that is independent from the physical processes of thinking, remembering, feeling....This is what DD just addressed, so I'll stop here.
I might be a p-zombie? Well from your position of view I might be. From my pov...well...
****Your comment to the effect that my view might well see a rock as being happy is an odd one. I see nothing in my statements that could possibly lead to that conclusion, and I wonder where you found it. The language that we use for "happiness" or for "consciousness" is, as I said, learned from a language community that has no direct access to any internal feelings of happiness or consciousness on our part. (would you agree?
From you reasoning, why not? You're saying that my actions are "happiness". Im composed of atoms which move around the place. According to you, that's happiness.
Or do you think that others can somehow directly sense our happiness or our consciousness? If so, please tell me how, and submit your application for the million)
I'm not saying that.
Therefore, our learning of these terms is necessarily based on matching those words with our and others' behavior. "Happiness" is learned by matching that word to many different examples of behavior (examples earlier in this thread); "consciousness" is learned by matching that word to different examples (examples in ian's primary and secondary qualities thread) or "making a conscious decision" or "being knocked unconscious" or "were you conscious of the fact that..."
Materialism doesn't imply the consciousness of other entities. As far as you know, reality is a "more real" dream. Do you regard the characters in your dreams as being conscious? Why do so with "wraith"? That's pretty much wishful thinking.
I have not seen (perhaps you have, I don't know) any use in our language-community of "happy" behavior in rocks.
You see happiness as the actual processes, where the "sensation of happiness" is a metaphor for these processes. But that's still saying that "sensations" exist anway.
If you say, "Gee, that guy is a tank," a "guy" and a "tank" still exist.
But you're saying that sensations don't exist, so how can it be a metaphor in the first place?
As for consciousness, I can only give you the examples from before about cars, etc, with minds of their own. Yes, it is a metaphor. That's the point.
But you still need a "mind" for the above sentence to be a metaphor.
As for happy robots...have you never seen a kid play with one of those robotic dogs that were all the rage a couple of years ago? Any kid will tell you the robot dog is happy.
Would you say that the robot dog was actually happy?
****Which laws of physics? "All of them" Ok, next question: How? Your response here is absolutely inadequate. I begin to suspect that you have no idea about your own views.
The laws of nature obviously have the power to create us. Which laws do we obey? All of them. What's the problem? Did you want an equation?
You ask questions about my view that indicate that you do not understand it, but you are obviously trying to tear your version of my view to pieces...what, in the hopes that it supports your view? So what is your view. You have seen mine in detail, for several pages now, and still don't understand it. Perhaps the flaw is in your point of observation. Please explain your view, and perhaps that will give insight into why you don't understand mine.
Actually I do understand you. I'm sorry if that upsets you ;)
Dancing David
11th January 2004, 08:08 AM
Originally posted by wraith
How do you define "noise"?
Pressure waves in a fluid medium
How do yo know what "wraith" feels like?
I don't.
copy that
ditto
Mercutio
11th January 2004, 08:13 AM
Originally posted by wraith
Actually I do understand you. I'm sorry if that upsets you ;)
It does not bother me that you think you do. :D But every time I start thinking you are getting it, you say something that shows you are still several steps away.
But enough. If you don't get it by now, fine. I am more interested now in seeing what I am missing about the laws of physics. Would you mind explaining a bit about the laws of physics that the materialists get wrong? Last I heard, they did not require mind, nor do they imply mind. So, obviously, I must have an incomplete understanding. Please enlighten me, in as much detail as you can muster, as to the laws of physics and the laws of nature. A bit more than that they "obviously have the power to create us", if you will.
Dancing David
11th January 2004, 08:19 AM
posted by wraith
Materialism doesn't imply the consciousness of other entities. As far as you know, reality is a "more real" dream. Do you regard the characters in your dreams as being conscious? Why do so with "wraith"? That's pretty much wishful thinking.
Materialism doen't imply that other entities aren't consious, it is just an extension of the material world that has a set of rules , those rules say that there is an objective view to science, and how it is defined.
So if a object exhibts the behaviors defined as 'consious' it is consious. That is the implication of materialism, if you exhibit the behaviors of the definition then you meet the criteria of the definition. So any entity that exhibits the behaviors of 'consiousness' is consious.
From observation of the 'dream' world and the 'physical' world, they have very different behaviors. The dream world appears to behave in a certain fashion and the 'physical' world appears to behave in a certain fashion. Whle there is some overlap, I have yet to see that the two are in a dichotomy. I see one set as encompassing the other, but that is an appearance again.
We can observe both and come to conclusions about them.
But there is no test for the ontology of the 'physical' world being a 'dream' world.
wraith
11th January 2004, 09:54 PM
Originally posted by Dancing David
Pressure waves in a fluid medium
Does sound exist independent of mind?
I don't.
I know what "wraith" feels like. Are you saying that I don't? :rolleyes:
wraith
11th January 2004, 09:58 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
It does not bother me that you think you do. :D But every time I start thinking you are getting it, you say something that shows you are still several steps away.
But enough. If you don't get it by now, fine. I am more interested now in seeing what I am missing about the laws of physics. Would you mind explaining a bit about the laws of physics that the materialists get wrong? Last I heard, they did not require mind, nor do they imply mind. So, obviously, I must have an incomplete understanding. Please enlighten me, in as much detail as you can muster, as to the laws of physics and the laws of nature. A bit more than that they "obviously have the power to create us", if you will.
The thing is that you deny your sensations as being the process itself, therefore denying your consciousness, brushing it off as being a metaphor!
I totally don't understand how anyone can say this, but if that's how you get your kicks....
wraith
11th January 2004, 10:12 PM
Originally posted by Dancing David
Materialism doen't imply that other entities aren't consious, it is just an extension of the material world that has a set of rules , those rules say that there is an objective view to science, and how it is defined.
According to materialism, those rules are due to you. You're the God of your perceived universe.
So if a object exhibts the behaviors defined as 'consious' it is consious. That is the implication of materialism, if you exhibit the behaviors of the definition then you meet the criteria of the definition. So any entity that exhibits the behaviors of 'consiousness' is consious.
Is Mercutio's robotic dog conscious according to you?
From observation of the 'dream' world and the 'physical' world, they have very different behaviors. The dream world appears to behave in a certain fashion and the 'physical' world appears to behave in a certain fashion. Whle there is some overlap, I have yet to see that the two are in a dichotomy. I see one set as encompassing the other, but that is an appearance again. We can observe both and come to conclusions about them.But there is no test for the ontology of the 'physical' world being a 'dream' world.
Well, what's the difference between your dream world and this reality?
You're only aware that a dream world is a "dream world" because you draw reference to reality, which you believe can exist externally to consciousness. Does your dreamworld exist independently of your consciousness?
Yahweh
11th January 2004, 10:38 PM
Originally posted by wraith
According to materialism, those rules are due to you. You're the God of your perceived universe.
:big:
Thats not any kind of Materialism I ever heard of...
I figure I might involve myself in this thread...
Alright, wraith, direct a few questions to me. I figure I could help you out a bit.
Yahweh
11th January 2004, 10:43 PM
Originally posted by wraith
Does sound exist independent of mind?
Depends on your definition of "sound".
If you define sound as "Vibrations transmitted through an elastic solid or a liquid or gas", then sound exists perfectly fine and dandy independently of the mind.
If you define sound as "The sensation experienced stimulated in the organs of hearing by such vibrations in the air or other medium", then sound existing independently of the mind is denied by definition".
I know what "wraith" feels like. Are you saying that I don't? :rolleyes:
What does "wraith" feel like?
Yahweh
11th January 2004, 10:50 PM
Originally posted by wraith
Well, what's the difference between your dream world and this reality?
You're only aware that a dream world is a "dream world" because you draw reference to reality, which you believe can exist externally to consciousness. Does your dreamworld exist independently of your consciousness?
Good question, but its an example of an "overloaded question".
The "dreamworld" does not exist independently of consciousness. The "dreamworld" you experience is a natural cognitive function, the dreamworld is nothing more than a set of sensations which you experience while you are asleep. You continue to exist in the external reality, but the sensations you are experiencing are that of the sleeping brain.
My psychic powers tell me you might have a followup question regarding p_realities, so to answer your possible question...
Unless you are having a lucid experience, you are not self-aware while you are dreaming. Therefore, the reason I know I am awake right now is due to the fact that I am self-aware.
Yahweh
11th January 2004, 10:51 PM
Originally posted by wraith
Is Mercutio's robotic dog conscious according to you?
Only if it is aware of its own existence.
Dancing David
12th January 2004, 05:16 AM
Originally posted by wraith
The thing is that you deny your sensations as being the process itself,
This hits the definition of sound on the head, it is the process of perception which creates the sound, but it is not dependant upon mind it is dependant on the nervous system.
therefore denying your consciousness, brushing it off as being a metaphor!
I totally don't understand how anyone can say this, but if that's how you get your kicks....
You haven't defined mind or consiousness, they are composed of the events that occur in the brian, they are catch-all words that do not describe an actual thing.
What is it that makes you feel you are 'wraith', I won't quaoe the whole buddha, but it is a series of other processes, which event or process makes you feel that you are 'wraith'. There is no self, just a pile of things we label as self.
Dancing David
12th January 2004, 05:32 AM
Originally posted by wraith
According to materialism, those rules are due to you. You're the God of your perceived universe.
That sentence bears some explanation, what you stated is solipism. I could respond to your statement but clarification would help. The rules are approximated by humans, I could not say that they are there solely because of humans.
Is Mercutio's robotic dog conscious according to you?
Does it exhibit the behaviors which you define as consious?
Well, what's the difference between your dream world and this reality?
You're only aware that a dream world is a "dream world" because you draw reference to reality, which you believe can exist externally to consciousness. Does your dreamworld exist independently of your consciousness?
Gee Wraith that was a really weak summation of what I said, I said that from observation, I noted that the two worlds appear to behave differently. I believe that the 'physical' world exists independantly of me, I do not know that it does so, I note that it behaves and appears to do so.
The dream world seems to be very variable in context and location and presentation, I have my own beliefs about it as well, that it is a product of the maintence functions of the associative networks in my brain. But it could exist independantly of myself, that is not a datum that I could have knowledge of.
You might as well state your arguments a little more clearly, your taking pot shots isn't creating discussion.
Define what it is that you think makes you feel like 'Wraith', can you argue against the buddha that 'you' really don't exist? Most people associate themselves with thier memeories when they actualy look at what they think is thier 'self'.
wraith
13th January 2004, 04:44 AM
Originally posted by Yahweh
Depends on your definition of "sound".
If you define sound as "Vibrations transmitted through an elastic solid or a liquid or gas", then sound exists perfectly fine and dandy independently of the mind.
If you define sound as "The sensation experienced stimulated in the organs of hearing by such vibrations in the air or other medium", then sound existing independently of the mind is denied by definition".
So what are you saying here Yahweh?
What does "wraith" feel like?
Yeah, it's not bad ;)
Good question, but its an example of an "overloaded question".
The "dreamworld" does not exist independently of consciousness. The "dreamworld" you experience is a natural cognitive function, the dreamworld is nothing more than a set of sensations which you experience while you are asleep. You continue to exist in the external reality, but the sensations you are experiencing are that of the sleeping brain.
As far as you know, you're brain is still asleep when you go about your everyday business in "reality". It's just a more real dream.
What if you "woke up" from that "reality"?
My psychic powers tell me you might have a followup question regarding p_realities, so to answer your possible question...
Unless you are having a lucid experience, you are not self-aware while you are dreaming. Therefore, the reason I know I am awake right now is due to the fact that I am self-aware.
Not self-aware when dreaming? How do you remember your dreams? When retelliing the events of your dream, do you not refer to yourself?
The reason why you can say that you're awake from the dream is because you sense the differences between the two.
To say that "I'm awake from my dream" is not sufficient to say that your perceived "reality" is independent of your mind.
Only if it is aware of its own existence.
Yes, but that's not what he is saying. He is saying that by the robot dog's actions, it is sufficient to say that the dog is conscious.
wraith
13th January 2004, 05:53 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
This hits the definition of sound on the head, it is the process of perception which creates the sound, but it is not dependant upon mind it is dependant on the nervous system.
So the nervous system by itself can give the sensation of sound, even when no one is perceiving it?
What about when you're sleeping? Do you hear all those subtle sounds that travel through the night?
You haven't defined mind or consiousness
Conscious: self-aware/to feel
Mind: your memories/source of your ideas/desires
they are composed of the events that occur in the brian
Which I'm not denying...
they are catch-all words that do not describe an actual thing.
Yes, keep denying your existence :rolleyes:
What is it that makes you feel you are 'wraith'
My history. My desires. My personality.
I won't quaoe the whole buddha, but it is a series of other processes, which event or process makes you feel that you are 'wraith'. There is no self, just a pile of things we label as self.
That's sort of like saying, "That's not a car. It's just an object with four wheels, an engine, some chairs etc."
But if you want to perceive yourself as the processes of your body then go for it ;)
That sentence bears some explanation, what you stated is solipism. I could respond to your statement but clarification would help. The rules are approximated by humans, I could not say that they are there solely because of humans.
Well you're whole state of being is due to matter. Everything that you are, including desires, emotions etc are are function of matter. Including you perception of reality, which includes living things. As far as you know, matter is giviing you the idea that I exist, but really, I'm just a figment of your imagination.
You see it as being more logical to have non-conscious matter create consciousness ie. the existence of a reality outside of consciousness. Bit like a computer program creating it's programer?
If I may borrow a line used by Yahweh, "That's kuuuuuraaaazyy!"
Does it exhibit the behaviors which you define as consious?
Is the robotic dog conscious or not? ;)
Gee Wraith that was a really weak summation of what I said, I said that from observation, I noted that the two worlds appear to behave differently. I believe that the 'physical' world exists independantly of me, I do not know that it does so, I note that it behaves and appears to do so.
Sure, but I'm asking you if it is independent of consciousness?
The dream world seems to be very variable in context and location and presentation, I have my own beliefs about it as well, that it is a product of the maintence functions of the associative networks in my brain. But it could exist independantly of myself, that is not a datum that I could have knowledge of.
It can? How?
You might as well state your arguments a little more clearly, your taking pot shots isn't creating discussion.
Sure it is.
Define what it is that you think makes you feel like 'Wraith', can you argue against the buddha that 'you' really don't exist? Most people associate themselves with thier memeories when they actualy look at what they think is thier 'self'.
How can I say that "I really dont exist"?
I mean really. How does this make sense?
Mercutio
13th January 2004, 06:41 AM
Wraith, we never stipulated that the dog was conscious--as of that post, you had not defined consciousness. The dog was said to be "happy". You now say: Conscious: self-aware/to feel
Mind: your memories/source of your ideas/desires
, which means that, thus far, your ideas of consciousness do not include anything beyond what DD and I have spoken of as processes.
You also say:The thing is that you deny your sensations as being the process itself, therefore denying your consciousness, brushing it off as being a metaphor!
I do not deny that I sense. I do not deny that I feel. I do not deny that I think, nor that I remember. As you have, above, defined "consciousness" as being composed of those things, I do not see what it is you say I am denying. I also do not see what about these things implies some mental phenomenon called "consciousness" in any meaningful manner. Your four-word definition of consciousness may have to be expanded.
Yahweh: you said If you define sound as "The sensation experienced stimulated in the organs of hearing by such vibrations in the air or other medium", then sound existing independently of the mind is denied by definition". Note that this definition reifies "sensation" and "mind" as objects (though mental, not physical, objects). So this definition assumes a mind to begin with, rather than implies that a mind is necessary for sound.
Dancing David
13th January 2004, 10:32 AM
Originally posted by wraith
So the nervous system by itself can give the sensation of sound, even when no one is perceiving it?
The nervous system and the brain are responsible for the creation of the sound from the interaction of the tympaninie and the pressure waves in the media of transmission. The body does the perception, so I don't quite follow asking, when no one is percieving it. the body creates the perception through interaction with the 'material world'.
What about when you're sleeping? Do you hear all those subtle sounds that travel through the night?
Good question, I don't know. there appears to be a threshold of attention to 'sounds' that is much higher when I am asleep. But it does tend to vary throughout the night.
Conscious: self-aware/to feel
Mind: your memories/source of your ideas/desires
And again I would say that there isn't reall an event that is specific to the consious or mind as you define it , but a whole category of events that are lumped under those labels.
Which I'm not denying...
Yes, keep denying your existence :rolleyes:
I do not deny that the componenets that comprise 'myself' exist, I am just aware of them as the sperates peieces and events. It is a matter of choice. 'I' is localized in a body,thought,emotions,sensations and habits.
My history. My desires. My personality.
Like pointing to the Mississippi river and saying, there is the river. Is it the same river?
That's sort of like saying, "That's not a car. It's just an object with four wheels, an engine, some chairs etc."
River or car?
But if you want to perceive yourself as the processes of your body then go for it ;)
That is my belief, I don't have definitive evidence either way, there could be a consiousness that is beyond my physical one, I have evidence that leads me to beleieve there are other physical consiouses, but I don't have any evidence of transcendent consiousness.
Well you're whole state of being is due to matter. Everything that you are, including desires, emotions etc are are function of matter. Including you perception of reality, which includes living things. As far as you know, matter is giviing you the idea that I exist, but really, I'm just a figment of your imagination.
That is why I state 'appears', you appear to be an entity that writes to the bulletin board.
You see it as being more logical to have non-conscious matter create consciousness ie. the existence of a reality outside of consciousness. Bit like a computer program creating it's programer?
No I don't find it more logical at all, all possibilies are equally likely, it is just my belief. Obviously I am only aware of my consiousness, whatever that is. But it appears that there is a reality external to my awareness of it. Could be an illusion.
And not like a program creating it's programer. More like a bunch of random thingees, over a very long time period, randomly selecting to create replicating thingees, and those replicating thingees leading to consious thingees.
Just my belief, some evidence, but nothing beyond some evidence.
If I may borrow a line used by Yahweh, "That's kuuuuuraaaazyy!"
Could be.
Is the robotic dog conscious or not? ;)
If it exhibits the behaviors we define as consious.
Sure, but I'm asking you if it is independent of consciousness?
I don't know, it appears to be.
It can? How?
Sure it is.
How can I say that "I really dont exist"?
I mean really. How does this make sense?
That would be your choice, the things that comprise yorself are all transitory and ephemeral, what meaning you give them is up to you. ;)
hammegk
13th January 2004, 10:49 AM
Mercutio, you should be a darn good poker player since "internal reality is nothing more than our external actions/behaviors". ;)
Mercutio
13th January 2004, 12:17 PM
Originally posted by hammegk
Mercutio, you should be a darn good poker player since "internal reality is nothing more than our external actions/behaviors". ;) Wow, in quotes and everything. Could you kindly point me to where I said that? (didn't think so)
The closest thing I recall saying was that we learned the labels for our internal states from others who have no access to them--who have access only to our behaviors. Do you wish to challenge that? Or would you prefer simply to acknowledge your strawman.
edited to add...Besides, what the heck would this view have to do with whether or not one would be a good poker player? Am I missing something here?
hammegk
13th January 2004, 04:09 PM
If you hadn't learned the labels, do you think *you* would be able to see a difference internally between (in human speak) happiness vs non-happiness? If so, how?
A rose by any other name ....
Re: poker. Yeah, I think you missed it. Reading the bluff correctly is a real asset, even if you are a lousy "poker-face" yourself.
Mercutio
13th January 2004, 04:51 PM
Originally posted by hammegk
If you hadn't learned the labels, do you think *you* would be able to see a difference internally between (in human speak) happiness vs non-happiness? If so, how?
I refer you to Schachter and Singer's experiment on missattribution of arousal; your assumption that we can tell the difference out of context is unfounded.
Beyond that...it would be a good question, a test of the Wharfian hypothesis. But it is not a question that either you or I could answer (unless you can cite some example I have not heard of), so as a refutation of my claim, it lacks a bit.
A rose by any other name ....
and that which we call cow-pies by any other name would smell as foul. If you have any real evidence that my view does not hold water, present it. Hypothetical questions are fun, but not much more.
Re: poker. Yeah, I think you missed it. Reading the bluff correctly is a real asset, even if you are a lousy "poker-face" yourself. I understand this, but what makes you think a behaviorist would say there is no behavior called "bluffing"? Context of action is as important as the action itself; behaviorists do not take a structural view of behavior.
...on second thought, I do appreciate the attempt at humor.
hammegk
13th January 2004, 05:43 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
I refer you to Schachter and Singer's experiment on missattribution of arousal; your assumption that we can tell the difference out of context is unfounded. [/b]
Who is this "we" you are worrying about? My question was addressed -- specifically -- to you and your own interpretation of whats-up the feeling *you* sense. (not the emotions & ego; damn semantics)
Beyond that...it would be a good question, a test of the Wharfian hypothesis. But it is not a question that either you or I could answer (unless you can cite some example I have not heard of), so as a refutation of my claim, it lacks a bit.
More in Chomsky's area of expertise, assuming he might actually have one; is that what you're trying to say? (BTW, why doesn't Sapir get credit more often?)
Again, *you* and your own internal states are the point of my question.
.. Hypothetical questions are fun, but not much more.
Yeah, I recall now: you may be a p-zombie, so I guess in that case it is hypothetical. For a human I don't think it is hypothetical: it directly addresses *you*.
I understand this, but what makes you think a behaviorist would say there is no behavior called "bluffing"? Context of action is as important as the action itself; behaviorists do not take a structural view of behavior.
...on second thought, I do appreciate the attempt at humor.
Well, I'm not sure, but maybe you got my drift. ;)
Mercutio
13th January 2004, 06:46 PM
Originally posted by hammegk
Who is this "we" you are worrying about? My question was addressed -- specifically -- to you and your own interpretation of whats-up the feeling *you* sense. (not the emotions & ego; damn semantics)
your question was hypothetical; my suggested reading addressed it. Neither you nor I could anwer your question, so I'm kinda wondering what sort of response you are after.
More in Chomsky's area of expertise, assuming he might actually have one; is that what you're trying to say? (BTW, why doesn't Sapir get credit more often?)
Finally, something we agree on. I can't stand Chomsky.
Again, *you* and your own internal states are the point of my question.
Sorry, my science abandoned introspection as a reliable experimental methodology about a century ago, and for good reason. A question about my internal states in a hypothetical situation is not worth answering. I have been wrong about much simpler questions, when I answered them hypothetically, then had the misfortune of answering them in reality.
Yeah, I recall now: you may be a p-zombie, so I guess in that case it is hypothetical. For a human I don't think it is hypothetical: it directly addresses *you*.
It is hypothetical because you specify a situation that does not exist (to wit, me without having learned the word "happiness"). I defy anyone to answer that question in any meaningful fashion. Even for a human, it is a hypothetical question.
Well, I'm not sure, but maybe you got my drift. ;) I don't know; maybe you were bluffing...:p
Yahweh
13th January 2004, 06:59 PM
Originally posted by wraith
So what are you saying here Yahweh?
To sum up without all the extraneous detail:
You asked:
Does sound exist independent of mind?
I responded demonstrating how that that question cannot be answered with Yes or No.
Yeah, it's not bad ;)
Cool :)
As far as you know, you're brain is still asleep when you go about your everyday business in "reality". It's just a more real dream.
What if you "woke up" from that "reality"?
I'd have to ditch quite a bit of the demonstratably true and most of my commonsense to consider that. Seeing as how I am very much aware of my own existence as I'm typing this, I will reasonably conclude that I will not suddenly be "waking up" out of this "reality*".
*I wouldnt usually use the word "reality" in that context, I'm just using it for parallelism with your post
Not self-aware when dreaming? How do you remember your dreams? When retelliing the events of your dream, do you not refer to yourself?
Its not necessary to be self-aware to form memories.
Keep in mind, the memory is not a necessary function of sleep. You have a half dozen or more dreams per night, you only remember the dreams your wake up in the middle. Memory has very little to do with dreaming, and of that its only short-term memory which is of any significance (dreams stored in long-term memory usually - if not only - occur immediately after waking up in the middle of dream and actively trying to recall parts of it).
The reason why you retell the events while referring to yourself is quite often of the few memories stored, they are stored in first-person "format".
The reason why you can say that you're awake from the dream is because you sense the differences between the two.
In a sense, that is correct (though a slightly incomplete description of the reasoning behind the conclusion).
To say that "I'm awake from my dream" is not sufficient to say that your perceived "reality" is independent of your mind.
You are setting up a universal negative at the expense of a little commonsense.
Just to demonstrate why expending commonsense is dangerous to your sanity, I want you to perform a test (read all the steps first before proceeding):
1. Read the sentence in red:
I'm a cute wittle fuzzy wuzzy bunny rabbit, and I like to eat lettuce.
(The sentence should stick in memory long enough to)
2. Turn off your computer monitor.
3. Turn back on your computer monitor and re-read the sentence.
There, and now the analysis of the test goes a bit like this:
Did you assume the sentence you read in step 1 to be identical to the sentence you read in step 3? If so, then you are making the Naturalistic assumption! If not, then I would wonder how you could survive at all without making necessary Naturalistic assumptions.
Here is a bit more knowledge:
How old are you?
I ask that not because I'm interested in what your age is, I'm interested in how old you think you are. For instance, you could have been created 2 seconds ago with memories implanted inside your mind which do a clever job of fooling you.
If you have an answer to that question, I'd like to know why you reason you are whatever age you think you are, and not another.
You see what kind of ruts you get yourself into when you expend too much commonsense.
For the record, I base my Philosophies on but not limited to (and in no particular order) my experiences, things which are demonstratably true, and Nature. These Philosophies are all consistent with Materialism.
Yes, but that's not what he is saying. He is saying that by the robot dog's actions, it is sufficient to say that the dog is conscious.
I think its helpful to define consciousness (and all other necessary semantics) before you can determine if that robot doggie is conscious.
wraith
18th January 2004, 09:04 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Wraith, we never stipulated that the dog was conscious--as of that post, you had not defined consciousness. The dog was said to be "happy". You now say: , which means that, thus far, your ideas of consciousness do not include anything beyond what DD and I have spoken of as processes.
What does it mean to be "happy" when you're unconscious?
To say that the dog can be "feeling happy" while being "non-conscious" is wacko talk.
By your arguments, the robotic dog is "feeling happy".
I do not deny that I sense. I do not deny that I feel. I do not deny that I think, nor that I remember. As you have, above, defined "consciousness" as being composed of those things, I do not see what it is you say I am denying. I also do not see what about these things implies some mental phenomenon called "consciousness" in any meaningful manner.
You say that there is no "mind" and that our thoughts are the processes of the brain itself. ie matter creates consciousness.
I'm not denying the processes that your describe. You're saying that those processes are the reasons for our thoughts/emotions. I'm saying that our thoughts/emotions are the reasons for those processes.
Your whole argument assumes that matter exists as this "hard stuff" when it's not being observed. Your argument also permits such ideas as "a computer program creating it's programmer" as being logical.
Your four-word definition of consciousness may have to be expanded.
Na it's cool.
Yahweh: you said Note that this definition reifies "sensation" and "mind" as objects (though mental, not physical, objects). So this definition assumes a mind to begin with, rather than implies that a mind is necessary for sound.
So forget about mind and brain processes for the moment. Can sound exist when there is nobody around?
wraith
18th January 2004, 09:06 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
The nervous system and the brain are responsible for the creation of the sound from the interaction of the tympaninie and the pressure waves in the media of transmission. The body does the perception, so I don't quite follow asking, when no one is percieving it. the body creates the perception through interaction with the 'material world'.
If matter is creating the sound, then the sound itself is matter. That means that before there was consciousness, sound was still in existence. ie matter exists as we observe it, even when it's not being observed. This universe is like one big computer simulation, with the laws of physics being the code. I don't see the logic in the raw code creating my sensation of sound. Unless you're a solipsist.
Good question, I don't know. there appears to be a threshold of attention to 'sounds' that is much higher when I am asleep. But it does tend to vary throughout the night.
Isn't the materialist saying that the processes of sound and the sound itself the same? Does this mean that the dead can hear?
And again I would say that there isn't reall an event that is specific to the consious or mind as you define it , but a whole category of events that are lumped under those labels.
Which you believe that those labels are the resultant of matter.
I do not deny that the componenets that comprise 'myself' exist, I am just aware of them as the sperates peieces and events. It is a matter of choice. 'I' is localized in a body,thought,emotions,sensations and habits.
Ultimately, you are non-conscious matter, which for the mean time is perceiving for no ultimate reason.
Like pointing to the Mississippi river and saying, there is the river. Is it the same river?
I'm not sure what you're getting at sorry.
River or car?
Huh?
That is my belief, I don't have definitive evidence either way, there could be a consiousness that is beyond my physical one, I have evidence that leads me to beleieve there are other physical consiouses, but I don't have any evidence of transcendent consiousness.
Evidence for other consciousnesses? According to materialism, your whole perception of the universe is governed by matter. Those people that you see walking around, they are just ideas that matter is telling you, giving you the impression that they are "real" :eek:
No I don't find it more logical at all, all possibilies are equally likely, it is just my belief. Obviously I am only aware of my consiousness, whatever that is. But it appears that there is a reality external to my awareness of it. Could be an illusion.
And not like a program creating it's programer. More like a bunch of random thingees, over a very long time period, randomly selecting to create replicating thingees, and those replicating thingees leading to consious thingees.
Just my belief, some evidence, but nothing beyond some evidence.
Why not? You're the one saying that the laws governing you are "less conscious" than you. Perhaps it's more likely that you're govening those laws?
As for randomness....yep...materialism is one big concentration camp.
If it exhibits the behaviors we define as consious.
Are you conscious?
Is the robitic dog conscious?
That would be your choice, the things that comprise yorself are all transitory and ephemeral, what meaning you give them is up to you.
....bit like telling yourself that a square has 3 sides? :eek:
wraith
18th January 2004, 09:09 AM
Originally posted by Yahweh
I responded demonstrating how that that question cannot be answered with Yes or No.
Why not?
I'd have to ditch quite a bit of the demonstratably true and most of my commonsense to consider that. Seeing as how I am very much aware of my own existence as I'm typing this, I will reasonably conclude that I will not suddenly be "waking up" out of this "reality*".
What's the demonstatably true and commonsense arguments that you speak of that support the Truth of Materialism?
*I wouldnt usually use the word "reality" in that context, I'm just using it for parallelism with your post.
How do you use it?
Its not necessary to be self-aware to form memories.
What memories do you have when you were not self-aware?
Keep in mind, the memory is not a necessary function of sleep. You have a half dozen or more dreams per night, you only remember the dreams your wake up in the middle. Memory has very little to do with dreaming, and of that its only short-term memory which is of any significance (dreams stored in long-term memory usually - if not only - occur immediately after waking up in the middle of dream and actively trying to recall parts of it).
According to you, you should be able to recall all of those dreams.
The reason why you retell the events while referring to yourself is quite often of the few memories stored, they are stored in first-person "format".
You can still refer to yourself as being another person and maintain the first-person view. When you refer to "I" in a dream, I think of "Yahweh" and not "Tom Cruise".
In a sense, that is correct (though a slightly incomplete description of the reasoning behind the conclusion).
What's the complete reasoning?
You are setting up a universal negative at the expense of a little commonsense.
Just to demonstrate why expending commonsense is dangerous to your sanity, I want you to perform a test (read all the steps first before proceeding):
1. Read the sentence in red:
I'm a cute wittle fuzzy wuzzy bunny rabbit, and I like to eat lettuce.
(The sentence should stick in memory long enough to)
2. Turn off your computer monitor.
3. Turn back on your computer monitor and re-read the sentence.
There, and now the analysis of the test goes a bit like this:
Did you assume the sentence you read in step 1 to be identical to the sentence you read in step 3? If so, then you are making the Naturalistic assumption! If not, then I would wonder how you could survive at all without making necessary Naturalistic assumptions.
First off, I'd just like to say that the reply doesn't really answer my question.
What do you mean by "identical"?
Are you referring to the meaning of the sentence?
Or are you referring to the actual text on the screen?
Or something else or both?
Here is a bit more knowledge:
How old are you?
I ask that not because I'm interested in what your age is, I'm interested in how old you think you are. For instance, you could have been created 2 seconds ago with memories implanted inside your mind which do a clever job of fooling you.
If you have an answer to that question, I'd like to know why you reason you are whatever age you think you are, and not another.
Purely on my perception of Time. If I was born yesterday and my memories were manufactured, then I'm no more than 2 days old. However, from my view, 2 days still stems from my perception of time, which I can say that I am 21. So if you wanted my age, it would depend on who you asked. Me or the creator of my memories. We would both be right.
Does asking me this help materialism in any way?
You see what kind of ruts you get yourself into when you expend too much commonsense.
For the record, I base my Philosophies on but not limited to (and in no particular order) my experiences, things which are demonstratably true, and Nature. These Philosophies are all consistent with Materialism.
So what's this reality that's external to your senses that you speak of?
I think its helpful to define consciousness (and all other necessary semantics) before you can determine if that robot doggie is conscious.
Are you conscious?
Is the robot dog conscious?
Dancing David
18th January 2004, 12:40 PM
Originally posted by wraith
If matter is creating the sound, then the sound itself is matter. That means that before there was consciousness, sound was still in existence. ie matter exists as we observe it, even when it's not being observed. This universe is like one big computer simulation, with the laws of physics being the code. I don't see the logic in the raw code creating my sensation of sound. Unless you're a solipsist.
I think that I understand your reasoning, i just don't happen to agree. When we define 'sound' as a phenomena of perception. that is saying that there are these neural networks which interact with sense organs to create categories of biological behavior which are called perception. the biological behavior of perception is one in which an 'organism' creates interior models in it's neural networks to create an impression/model of what the sense organs are presenting to the neural network. Before consiousness there was noise, but it takes the interaction of the noise(pressure waves) with sense organs and the interaction of the sense organs with the neural network to create sound.
So the leap to sayin that the raw code is creating the sound is not a leap that I can follow. It is not the raw code creating the sound it is a 'complex pieces of coding' that creates the sound, is that better?
I have already conceded that the 'physical' world could be an illusion, and therefore the utility of science may apply only within the illusion. I wouldn't say that the universe is a giant piece of software. For me I think that all the waves create thioer own space and that they would therefore be more like a piece of code that creates 'itself' and the 'space' that it interacts in, so if your software model allows for the existance of other self sustaining sub-routines that operate independant of the mian frame, I guess it is an okay analogy.
Isn't the materialist saying that the processes of sound and the sound itself the same? Does this mean that the dead can hear?
If the dead have functioning sense organs and neural networks, but yes, allegedly 'dead' matter is the structure for the occurance of sound. Are you saying that the dead are functioning organic organisms.(I know this is just an extension of Ian and the rock rolling down the hill.)
Which you believe that those labels are the resultant of matter.
[/b] The interaction of 'energy waves' with other 'energy waves', yes.
Ultimately, you are non-conscious matter, which for the mean time is perceiving for no ultimate reason.
That could be your interpretation, I could posit that there are benefits to perception, in that it allows for the existance and procreation of organisms.
The meaning of life, that would be another thread wouldn't it?
I'm not sure what you're getting at sorry.
You point to a series of complex events and say 'mind' or 'consiousness' and then you compared them to a car. I think that you know the meaning of the river, there is the soil that surrounds the river, there is the water that creates the river, there are the things in the soil and in the water. But where really is the river?
I don't think I will insult your intelligence further than that.
Huh?
You said car I say river. I refer you to Heraclitus and the nature of rivers, the same analogy applies to 'minds'.
Evidence for other consciousnesses? According to materialism, your whole perception of the universe is governed by matter.
Yeah so, and to the monists it is all mind, so what?
Those people that you see walking around, they are just ideas that matter is telling you, giving you the impression that they are "real" :eek:
Yeah so,I already have conceded the potential for the illusiory nature of the physical world, I had thought there was more depth than that to you Wraith. I had thought you had more to say than Lifegazer.
Why not? You're the one saying that the laws governing you are "less conscious" than you. Perhaps it's more likely that you're govening those laws?
Silly rabbit, go dance your one trick pony some other place! If the laws that govern things are sentient, then they are sentient. But until I see them demonstrate 'consious behavior', then I will reserve my opinion for another day. the quantum realm is strange enough to allow for choice in wave physics. And I reserve my judgement.
"less consious" than you, where did I say that? I reserve judgement, silly rabbit.
As for randomness....yep...materialism is one big concentration camp.
Well if you mean gravity I suppose so, but other than that you statement is not making sense to me.
Are you conscious?
I believe that I exhibit the behaviors.
Is the robitic dog conscious?
Not by my definition, I think the reference was to a Micro-Pet?
....bit like telling yourself that a square has 3 sides? :eek:
If that gives you comfort than by all means, let your squares have three sides!
Mercutio
19th January 2004, 04:50 PM
Originally posted by wraith
What does it mean to be "happy" when you're unconscious?
To say that the dog can be "feeling happy" while being "non-conscious" is wacko talk.
By your arguments, the robotic dog is "feeling happy".
Perhaps by your understanding of my arguments, but no. My point was that we learn these labels for our internal feelings by reference to observable behaviors. Just like the kid points to the happy dog. It takes quite a bit more sophistication for us to start making finer distinctions, and our language, to some extent, must remain hazy, as there is no single publicly observable referent.
Your question about being happy when unconscious is an odd one. Initially, I was going to say that the behaviors we label "happy" are a small subset of those we include under "conscious". So, initially, I would have said that it is meaningless within our language-community to speak of being happy while unconscious. There is one exception I can think of, though (you may think of others--I include it for the same reason we must speak of our computers or cars as having minds of their own; these are fuzzy concepts): we may speak of someone who "died happy". The dearly departed is "so peaceful", when arguably the person "is" no more.
You say that there is no "mind" and that our thoughts are the processes of the brain itself. ie matter creates consciousness.which is only a problem if you insist that "consciousness" has some a priori mentalistic definition. I do not insist on this. You apparently do.
I'm not denying the processes that your describe. You're saying that those processes are the reasons for our thoughts/emotions. I'm saying that our thoughts/emotions are the reasons for those processes.
What evidence do you have for the thoughts aside from the thinking? Where does a thought exist when you are not thinking? Thoughts, memories, feelings, etc, as mental entities are always circularly defined.
Your whole argument assumes that matter exists as this "hard stuff" when it's not being observed. Your argument also permits such ideas as "a computer program creating it's programmer" as being logical.
First sentence, yes. I do make that assumption. I cannot prove it and I admit that. It is an assumption. Second sentence--WTF? No.
Na it's cool.
If that is enough for you, the questions of this thread will never be resolved. Improve your definitions.
So forget about mind and brain processes for the moment. Can sound exist when there is nobody around? If we define sound as Dancing David has (I agree with him), then No, sound does not exist when there is nobody around. As long as sound is defined as the proximal stimulus for hearing, the distal stimulus of which is pressure waves, the answer to your question is no.
wraith
23rd January 2004, 05:10 AM
Originally posted by Dancing David
I think that I understand your reasoning, i just don't happen to agree. When we define 'sound' as a
phenomena of perception. that is saying that there are these neural networks which interact with sense
organs to create categories of biological behavior which are called perception. the biological behavior
of perception is one in which an 'organism' creates interior models in it's neural networks to create an
impression/model of what the sense organs are presenting to the neural network. Before consiousness
there was noise, but it takes the interaction of the noise(pressure waves) with sense organs and the
interaction of the sense organs with the neural network to create sound.
Yes, I don't disagree with any of this. What I disagree with is your logic. How is the "sound" created?
If you are ultimately unconscious matter, then "sound" shouldn't be perceived at all. The difference
between you and a rock is ultimately nothing. The materialist is forced to to reason that sound exists
independently of observation, in the same manner that they reason that matter exists externally to
consciousness.
So the leap to sayin that the raw code is creating the sound is not a leap that I can follow. It
is not the raw code creating the sound it is a 'complex pieces of coding' that creates the sound, is
that better?
"Complex pieces of coding" would be still the raw code.
I have already conceded that the 'physical' world could be an illusion, and therefore the utility
of science may apply only within the illusion. I wouldn't say that the universe is a giant piece of
software. For me I think that all the waves create thioer own space and that they would therefore be
more like a piece of code that creates 'itself' and the 'space' that it interacts in, so if your
software model allows for the existance of other self sustaining sub-routines that operate independant
of the mian frame, I guess it is an okay analogy.
Even so, it would still have to based on rules. Even then, how is consciousness then achieved?
If the dead have functioning sense organs and neural networks, but yes, allegedly 'dead' matter
is the structure for the occurance of sound. Are you saying that the dead are functioning organic
organisms.(I know this is just an extension of Ian and the rock rolling down the hill.)
If the dead did have functioning sense organs, then how does the "sound" exist if they don't perceive
it?
The interaction of 'energy waves' with other 'energy waves', yes.
But you havn't given any clear cut reason why this "energy" leads to consciousness. It would be far
easier for nature not to have consciousness at all.
You said car I say river. I refer you to Heraclitus and the nature of rivers, the same analogy
applies to 'minds'.
All you have are the correlations of mind and matter, which you havn't explained why matter creates
consciousness in the first place.
Yeah so, and to the monists it is all mind, so what?
So matter is creating your very ideas, including this universe. As far as you know, you're the only
livinig being.
Yeah so,I already have conceded the potential for the illusiory nature of the physical world, I
had thought there was more depth than that to you Wraith. I had thought you had more to say than
Lifegazer.
Apparently not :cool:
Silly rabbit, go dance your one trick pony some other place! If the laws that govern things are
sentient, then they are sentient. But until I see them demonstrate 'consious behavior', then I will
reserve my opinion for another day. the quantum realm is strange enough to allow for choice in wave
physics. And I reserve my judgement.
I take it that your hand is conscious when you use it? hahaha
where did I say that? I reserve judgement, silly rabbit.
Ahh, materialism sort of implies this.
Not by my definition, I think the reference was to a Micro-Pet?
Oh my lord!
Whats with the wishy washy talk?
Is the robotic dog conscious or not?!
wraith
23rd January 2004, 05:36 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Perhaps by your understanding of my arguments, but no. My point was that we learn these labels for our internal feelings by reference to observable behaviors. Just like the kid points to the happy dog. It takes quite a bit more sophistication for us to start making finer distinctions, and our language, to some extent, must remain hazy, as there is no single publicly observable referent.
Your question about being happy when unconscious is an odd one. Initially, I was going to say that the behaviors we label "happy" are a small subset of those we include under "conscious". So, initially, I would have said that it is meaningless within our language-community to speak of being happy while unconscious. There is one exception I can think of, though (you may think of others--I include it for the same reason we must speak of our computers or cars as having minds of their own; these are fuzzy
concepts): we may speak of someone who "died happy". The dearly departed is "so peaceful", when arguably the person "is" no more.
Oh come on!
Look, you're saying that if you see me acting happy, you're saying that this is sufficient to say that I have this sensation of feeling happy, right?
How do you account for someone acting or your robotic dog?
By your logic, someone who is pretending to be in pain is having a sensation of pain.
The robotic dog is conscious.
which is only a problem if you insist that "consciousness" has some a priori mentalistic definition. I do not insist on this. You apparently do.
This is what you're saying, which you have to back up.
What evidence do you have for the thoughts aside from the thinking? Where does a thought exist when you are not thinking? Thoughts, memories, feelings, etc, as mental entities are always circularly defined.
I'm not saying that. I'm saying that consciousness creates the matter that you perceive. You're mind is perceiving information which is portrayed as the universe as you see it. Where did I say that I could think when I'm not thinking?
wraith: Your whole argument assumes that matter exists as this "hard stuff" when it's not being observed. Your argument also permits such ideas as "a computer program creating it's programmer" as being logical.
Mercutio:First sentence, yes. I do make that assumption. I cannot prove it and I admit that. It is an assumption. Second sentence--WTF? No.[quote]
Sure it makes sense. The laws that govern this universe is non-conscious according to you. Which somehow creates conscious beings. A bit like a program creating its programmer?
[quote]If we define sound as Dancing David has (I agree with him), then No, sound does not exist when there is nobody around. As long as sound is defined as the proximal stimulus for hearing, the distal stimulus of which is pressure waves, the answer to your question is no.
If this is the case, then how can materialism be True? Your sensation of sound is the physical state of the brain. You already said that matter exists outside of consciousness. This includes sound. So the materialist is forced to reason that sound exists even when there is no one around.
Dancing David
23rd January 2004, 08:40 AM
Originally posted by wraith
Yes, I don't disagree with any of this. What I disagree with is your logic. How is the "sound" created?
The sound is a series of events in dead matter. Just like the rest of my body.
If you are ultimately unconscious matter, then "sound" shouldn't be perceived at all. The difference
between you and a rock is ultimately nothing. The materialist is forced to to reason that sound exists
independently of observation, in the same manner that they reason that matter exists externally to
consciousness.
I am not forced to reason anything, it is a series of events in dead matter. And you are right I assume that others percieve a sound. No direct knowledge except from observation of behavior. The sound is a series of events in that matter that i assume to exist. No further assumption.
"Complex pieces of coding" would be still the raw code.
Even so, it would still have to based on rules. Even then, how is consciousness then achieved?
It is a series of interaction in the dead matter.
If the dead did have functioning sense organs, then how does the "sound" exist if they don't perceive it?
If they have a function set of sense organs and the neural networks are functioning, then I would assume that they percieve the sound. same for the case of someone with brain damage. I don't think that the dead here for very long before anoxia sets in and they stop functioning.
But you havn't given any clear cut reason why this "energy" leads to consciousness. It would be far easier for nature not to have consciousness at all.
Only if you think consiousness is more special than photosysnthesis. I think it's physical in nature, it is wonderful!
All you have are the correlations of mind and matter, which you havn't explained why matter creates consciousness in the first place.
Ontology I don't know, but complex structures of carbohydrates that can replicate through sexual blending would most likely benefit from the series of events labeled consiousness.
Why not?
So matter is creating your very ideas, including this universe. As far as you know, you're the only livinig being.
Could be , I only think I am alive because I exhibit the behaviors I call living.
Apparently not :cool:
Double cool :cool: :cool:
I was just baiting you, you are more than LG!
I take it that your hand is conscious when you use it? hahaha
Only when I dress it up and take it out on dates.
Ahh, materialism sort of implies this.
So you say...
Oh my lord!
Whats with the wishy washy talk?
Is the robotic dog conscious or not?!
Due to the nature of reality I can only assume that creatures that behave consious have consiousness. I don't think a micro-pet is consious, it does not exhibit the behaviors i associate with life or consiousness.
Wish waash I was taking a bath...
Mercutio
23rd January 2004, 06:47 PM
Originally posted by wraith
This is what you're saying, which you have to back up.
I have to back up the assertion that you have a mentalistic definition of consciousness? Ok...my evidence, then, is this your very post. None of your questions is sensical in the slightest unless you assume some magical mentalistic "consciousness" that exists over and above seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking, remembering, and anything else that the neurologists have already found mechanisms for.
I'm not saying that. I'm saying that consciousness creates the matter that you perceive. You're mind is perceiving information which is portrayed as the universe as you see it. Where did I say that I could think when I'm not thinking?
You are saying that consciousness creates matter....but you are nowhere and in no manner saying HOW.
And I did not ask if you could think when not thinking. I asked if thought existed separate from thinking. This is an entirely different question, and your confusion of the one with the other is either a deliberate strawman, or a failure to understand the most simple concepts from a materialistic view. Either intepretation does not look good.
If this is the case, then how can materialism be True? Your sensation of sound is the physical state of the brain. You already said that matter exists outside of consciousness. This includes sound. So the materialist is forced to reason that sound exists even when there is no one around. What the (&*^% are you talking about? Oh, that's right...a mentalistic consciousness. I have not said "that matter exists outside of consciousness", I have said that there is no consciousness separate and distinct from the physical processes of thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. The very moment you can demonstrate something that "consciousness" adds to the equation that thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. do not, I will be glad to bow down and concede defeat. You cannot; I am beginning to wonder whether you understand even your own picture of materialism. You certainly do not understand materialism as it is understood by those familiar with it.
wraith
25th January 2004, 01:49 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
I have to back up the assertion that you have a mentalistic definition of consciousness? Ok...my evidence, then, is this your very post. None of your questions is sensical in the slightest unless you assume some magical mentalistic "consciousness" that exists over and above seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking, remembering, and anything else that the neurologists have already found mechanisms for.
I'm not saying that there arn't physical processes to my senses. The problem with you is that you believe that these functions are the reasons for the existence of consciousness in the first place, which is quite insane in my opinion.
So is the dog conscious or not Mercutio :rolleyes:
You are saying that consciousness creates matter....but you are nowhere and in no manner saying HOW.
Through your senses. We receive information pretty well, but I think that it's a lot harder to send.
And I did not ask if you could think when not thinking. I asked if thought existed separate from thinking. This is an entirely different question, and your confusion of the one with the other is either a deliberate strawman, or a failure to understand the most simple concepts from a materialistic view. Either intepretation does not look good.
It depends. Are you thinking when in deep sleep or if you have been knocked out?
What the (&*^% are you talking about? Oh, that's right...a mentalistic consciousness. I have not said "that matter exists outside of consciousness", I have said that there is no consciousness separate and distinct from the physical processes of thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. The very moment you can demonstrate something that "consciousness" adds to the equation that thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. do not, I will be glad to bow down and concede defeat. You cannot; I am beginning to wonder whether you understand even your own picture of materialism. You certainly do not understand materialism as it is understood by those familiar with it.
No, I have a good grasp on what Materialism says. You believe that your sensations are the functions of the brain. The problem that you're faced with is that you believe that the funtion of the brain is the reason for your sensations (matter creating consciousness) while I'm saying that it's the other way around.
You say that matter does not exist outside of consciousness? You are the materialist are you not? haha
Mercutio
25th January 2004, 04:18 PM
Originally posted by wraith
I'm not saying that there arn't physical processes to my senses. The problem with you is that you believe that these functions are the reasons for the existence of consciousness in the first place, which is quite insane in my opinion.
so close...but then you use the phrase "existence of consciousness" and show that you do not understand what I am saying. Worse, you say that I believe that something makes consciousness exist. Sorry, it does not. I am perfectly willing to change my mind on this, however. Simply define it, in such a way that the purely physical processes cannot account for it.
So is the dog conscious or not Mercutio :rolleyes:
Let me give you two answers. First, as should have been obvious long ago, the question is worthless without defining consciousness. Second...as you have (inadequately) defined consciousness, the only possible answer is "no. the dog is not conscious. neither are you. neither am I." If you do not like that answer, perhaps you should refine your definition of consciousness so that the question is no longer worthless.
Through your senses. We receive information pretty well, but I think that it's a lot harder to send.
Just "harder" to send? Again, apart from physical processes such as speech or typing...can you give me any one instance whatsoever demonstrating that the mind can send anything?
"through your senses" is a thoroughly inadequate answer to "how does consciousness create matter?" For such an important aspect to your world-view, this is unacceptable.
It depends. Are you thinking when in deep sleep or if you have been knocked out?
Excellent question. Totally irrelevant, and unrelated to the topic at hand, but excellent question. I'd say no, but let's get back to the question I asked. Does thought exist, separate from thinking? You have not answered that.
No, I have a good grasp on what Materialism says. You believe that your sensations are the functions of the brain. The problem that you're faced with is that you believe that the funtion of the brain is the reason for your sensations (matter creating consciousness) while I'm saying that it's the other way around.
You have absolutely no grasp of Materialism. The sooner you realize that, the sooner you can start to make up for it.
You say that matter does not exist outside of consciousness? You are the materialist are you not? haha read it again, ducky. Not even close. In the sentence following the one you are refering to out of context, I make it clear that I reject a reified "consciousness" at all. It serves the same function in our experience as god does in natural selection. None.
haha? You should be embarrassed, if not ashamed.
Suggestologist
25th January 2004, 06:04 PM
Originally posted by wraith
Oh come on!
Look, you're saying that if you see me acting happy, you're saying that this is sufficient to say that I have this sensation of feeling happy, right?
Mind reading. An error I've seen on this forum many times when people ("skeptics") assert that they can tell what someone's intentions are; Even in cases when they don't even know how to contact the person(s) who are being "mind-read". You can't know another person's intentions; you can only know your own impression of another person's intentions, along with the effects of another person's behavior/actions.
I'm not saying that. I'm saying that consciousness creates the matter that you perceive. You're mind is perceiving information which is portrayed as the universe as you see it. Where did I say that I could think when I'm not thinking?
Consciousness creates the perception of what is "out there". And whatever it is that is "out there", people have chosen to call matter. Of course, they get into trouble when they have to consider that vaccuum space is "out there".
What is "out there" can be coordinated between people; and seems to have the property of persistence of existence. For example, you spit out your chewing gum on the way out the door; and though you've forgotten all about it, on your way back into your home you accidentally step in the gum and it gets stuck to the bottom of your shoe. Ever had gum stuck to the bottom of your shoe?
If this is the case, then how can materialism be True? Your sensation of sound is the physical state of the brain. You already said that matter exists outside of consciousness. This includes sound. So the materialist is forced to reason that sound exists even when there is no one around.
Well, if you left a computer to record sound on its hard drive in the woods. Then retrieved it a week later. And never listen to the recording. Have sounds existed when there was no one around? Or does the person have to listen to the recording in order for the sounds to have had existed? Or is the computer a form of consciousness that had created the sound?
wraith
26th January 2004, 06:00 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
so close...but then you use the phrase "existence of consciousness" and show that you do not understand what I am saying. Worse, you say that I believe that something makes consciousness exist. Sorry, it does not. I am perfectly willing to change my mind on this, however. Simply define it, in such a way that the purely physical processes cannot account for it.
Why do you believe that I am trying to refute brain processes with consciousness? I have said a number of times that I do not deny the correlations. Brain state B has mental state M. That's well and good. You're saying that state B creates state M, now you're saying that you don't believe that we are conscious! LOL!
That is clearly insane.
Let me give you two answers. First, as should have been obvious long ago, the question is worthless without defining consciousness. Second...as you have (inadequately) defined consciousness, the only possible answer is "no. the dog is not conscious. neither are you. neither am I." If you do not like that answer, perhaps you should refine your definition of consciousness so that the question is no longer worthless.
Answer these three simple questions:
Are you conscious?
Is a rock conscious?
Is the robot dog conscious?
Just "harder" to send? Again, apart from physical processes such as speech or typing...can you give me any one instance whatsoever demonstrating that the mind can send anything?
I'm sending you my ideas. Were do my ideas come from eh? Matter?
"through your senses" is a thoroughly inadequate answer to "how does consciousness create matter?" For such an important aspect to your world-view, this is unacceptable.
You could create matter in the same way that you create your dream-world when you sleep. Due to the laws of physics, we can perceive this universe (interpreting information). If I want to create a table in front of me with a mere thought, I probably could some Time down the track. Right now however, my dreams will have to suffice.
Now again, what was the difference between your dream world and this universe in relation to your awareness?
Excellent question. Totally irrelevant, and unrelated to the topic at hand, but excellent question. I'd say no, but let's get back to the question I asked. Does thought exist, separate from thinking? You have not answered that.
Define "thought" and "thinking".
You have absolutely no grasp of Materialism. The sooner you realize that, the sooner you can start to make up for it.
No no no! That is not good enough.
read it again, ducky. Not even close. In the sentence following the one you are refering to out of context, I make it clear that I reject a reified "consciousness" at all. It serves the same function in our experience as god does in natural selection. None.
You reject a "reidied consciousness" now?
Listen Mercutio, are you conscious?
haha? You should be embarrassed, if not ashamed.
It's alright ;)
wraith
26th January 2004, 06:10 AM
Originally posted by Suggestologist
Mind reading. An error I've seen on this forum many times when people ("skeptics") assert that they can tell what someone's intentions are; Even in cases when they don't even know how to contact the person(s) who are being "mind-read". You can't know another person's intentions; you can only know your own impression of another person's intentions, along with the effects of another person's behavior/actions.
So you're saying that body language is sufficient to classify something as conscious?
Consciousness creates the perception of what is "out there". And whatever it is that is "out there", people have chosen to call matter. Of course, they get into trouble when they have to consider that vaccuum space is "out there".
What is "out there" can be coordinated between people; and seems to have the property of persistence of existence. For example, you spit out your chewing gum on the way out the door; and though you've forgotten all about it, on your way back into your home you accidentally step in the gum and it gets stuck to the bottom of your shoe. Ever had gum stuck to the bottom of your shoe?
What do you mean by your last sentence?
Well, if you left a computer to record sound on its hard drive in the woods. Then retrieved it a week later. And never listen to the recording. Have sounds existed when there was no one around? Or does the person have to listen to the recording in order for the sounds to have had existed? Or is the computer a form of consciousness that had created the sound?
The computer recorded the physical information, which is not sound. Are you suggesting that the computer actually had that sensation of sound when in the woods? In that case, the grass and the rocks hear things all the time. :eek:
Mercutio
26th January 2004, 06:26 AM
Originally posted by wraith
Answer these three simple questions:
Are you conscious?
Is a rock conscious?
Is the robot dog conscious?
Define "thought" and "thinking".
So which is it? Is consciousness so simple that you do not need to define it in your three "simple" questions? Or do you begin to realize that you need to define your terms carefully before the question is meaningful?
Ok...by the definition you gave earlier of consciousness....no, no and no.
By the thoughts bandied about in Ian's thread...we speak of the things I do as "conscious" behaviors...because our language community has agreed on this fuzzy definition. The rock does not display any of these behaviors, and has only (to the best of my knowledge) been supposed to be conscious by the idealists on the R&P threads who claim to know what materialists believe. The robot dog displays only a very small number of the behaviors we would call conscious--it is much easier to see with the robot dog that the word "conscious" is in fact only a category label for a wide variety of behaviors. Of course, those who wish to maintain the pleasant illusion that we are somehow more that merely physical will either disagree or simply not understand. You are in the latter category, it would appear.
Of course, these two definitions are not the only ones out there--so...are your three questions simple? Or are they just poorly designed?
You have yet to give an adequate definition of "consciousness" (which is why the answers are no, no and no above), so I have no idea whether I have addressed your thoughts on the matter. That's the problem with "sending me your ideas"--when they are fuzzily defined, you need to take extra care to phrase them in a meaningful manner.
By my own definitions of consciousness (again, using the term only metaphorically as a category label), the answers are yes, no and no. (ah, but remember that the original question about the robot dog was not "is it conscious" but "is it happy", the answer to which, to me, is yes.)
hammegk
26th January 2004, 07:22 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
....remember that the original question about the robot dog was not "is it conscious" but "is it happy", the answer to which, to me, is yes.)
So you continue to contend "happiness" is nothing more than response to stimuli? How far down the chain of "life" would you assign this attribute.
Is a flower happy when it bends towards the sun? Is a prion happy when it makes another copy? Na+ combining with Cl-?
Mercutio
26th January 2004, 07:37 AM
Originally posted by hammegk
So you continue to contend "happiness" is nothing more than response to stimuli? How far down the chain of "life" would you assign this attribute.
No sir, I contend that "happiness" is a category label that we as a language community have more-or-less agreed fits a number of behaviors. As for how far down the chain of life, that is a good question--it seems to me (first thoughts only, though) that as soon as we get away from humans, we start thinking of "happiness" more and more as a metaphorical category. But in our natural use of the term (which is what defines our more-or-less agreement in a language community), it is certainly used for, say, puppies...I have heard it used for tadpoles...mockingbirds...crickets. Again, it is a very good question--how far "down the chain of life" do we anthropomorphise? Conversely, how far "up the chain of life" should we see the metaphorical nature of these reified nouns? I'd say all the way--of course, in natural usage very few would agree with me--we like being special.
Is a flower happy when it bends towards the sun? Is a prion happy when it makes another copy? Na+ combining with Cl-? In all honesty, I would ask the poets this question. I have seen daycare children draw flowers with smiles, so I would think that fits in our expansive hazy definition...as for prions and ions...again, ask the poets. I have not heard such usage.
wraith
26th January 2004, 04:17 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
So which is it? Is consciousness so simple that you do not need to define it in your three "simple" questions? Or do you begin to realize that you need to define your terms carefully before the question is meaningful?
Ok...by the definition you gave earlier of consciousness....no, no and no.
Noted.
By the thoughts bandied about in Ian's thread...we speak of the things I do as "conscious" behaviors...because our language community has agreed on this fuzzy definition. The rock does not display any of these behaviors, and has only (to the best of my knowledge) been supposed to be conscious by the idealists on the R&P threads who claim to know what materialists believe. The robot dog displays only a very small number of the behaviors we would call conscious--it is much easier to see with the robot dog that the word "conscious" is in fact only a category label for a wide variety of behaviors. Of course, those who wish to maintain the pleasant illusion that we are somehow more that merely physical will either disagree or simply not understand. You are in the latter category, it would appear.
Of course, these two definitions are not the only ones out there--so...are your three questions simple? Or are they just poorly designed?
Noted.
You have yet to give an adequate definition of "consciousness" (which is why the answers are no, no and no above), so I have no idea whether I have addressed your thoughts on the matter. That's the problem with "sending me your ideas"--when they are fuzzily defined, you need to take extra care to phrase them in a meaningful manner.
Just what do you think that we are doing right now?
We are receiving and sending our ideas. Some ideas are closer to a Truth and others towards False. What else do you think we are doing besides telling each other our beliefs?
By my own definitions of consciousness (again, using the term only metaphorically as a category label), the answers are yes, no and no.
OK, this is what I want to talk about. By your definition of consciousness, you use the word as a metaphor to describe the processes of the brain? This is complete nonsense. What is that suppose to mean? You might as well say that the sun is conscious because of it's processes, and still claim that it's a metaphor.
We can both agree on what a "guy" and "tank" are right?
I use these words as similes and metaphors eg.
Simile: This guy is like a tank.
Metaphor: This guy is a tank.
How are are you using "consciousness" at a metaphor?
ah, but remember that the original question about the robot dog was not "is it conscious" but "is it happy", the answer to which, to me, is yes.
Fine, but when you define "happy" as "object movements" you can just about call anything happy. You may as well claim that my stereo is happy when it's playing a CD. This is just semantic word play.
Do you agree that you sometimes have a "sensation of happiness"? Can you be unconscious and still have a "senation of happiness"?
Mercutio
26th January 2004, 05:10 PM
Originally posted by wraith
Just what do you think that we are doing right now?
We are receiving and sending our ideas. Some ideas are closer to a Truth and others towards False. What else do you think we are doing besides telling each other our beliefs?
Literally, we are sending words. Only metaphorically are we sending "ideas" or "beliefs".
OK, this is what I want to talk about. By your definition of consciousness, you use the word as a metaphor to describe the processes of the brain? This is complete nonsense. What is that suppose to mean? You might as well say that the sun is conscious because of it's processes, and still claim that it's a metaphor.
Read my response to Hammy just above. You will see, with any luck, that you misrepresent "[my] definition of consciousness". And I am one of the few here that does not speak of "brain" processes...but if you read and understood, you would know that.
How are are you using "consciousness" at a metaphor?
We all do. Any time we speak of it as a thing. Do you "have" consciousness?
Fine, but when you define "happy" as "object movements" you can just about call anything happy. You may as well claim that my stereo is happy when it's playing a CD. This is just semantic word play. No, it is how we learn the language. Why not use an example that we actually do say, rather than make up one. I don't define happy as object movements, I am simply saying that we learn the word "happy" by correlating it with these particular behaviors. Or did you learn happy some other way? How do you propose that we learn our concepts? Have you ever helped a child to learn his or her language? Look at how we actually do learn our language--you will see that concrete objects are easy, because we can point to them. "happy" is tougher, because we have to point to a bunch of things to get a category to generalize. "consciousness" is even tougher, because it is a wider range of more subtle distinctions we are getting at.
Oh, and Miles Davis makes my stereo very happy.
Dancing David
26th January 2004, 05:43 PM
Wraith:
Observational definition of a certain set of behaviors specified as being happy or consious.
To then say that 'my cd player is happy' is then absurd. It is not any set of motions that has been defined as happy. The circular motion of the CD does not meet the operational criteria of 'happy'.
The behaviorist approach is a very interesting one, it just says that if something acts like a duck, then it is a duck. Even if it looks like a demon.
Interesting Ian
26th January 2004, 07:16 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
hammegk
Mercutio, you should be a darn good poker player since "internal reality is nothing more than our external actions/behaviors".
Mercutio
Wow, in quotes and everything. Could you kindly point me to where I said that? (didn't think so)
The closest thing I recall saying was that we learned the labels for our internal states from others who have no access to them--who have access only to our behaviors. Do you wish to challenge that? Or would you prefer simply to acknowledge your strawman.
edited to add...Besides, what the heck would this view have to do with whether or not one would be a good poker player? Am I missing something here? [/B]
One behaviorist walks up to another at a party and says, “You’re doing fine. How am I?” LMFAO! :D
Mercutio
27th January 2004, 03:19 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
One behaviorist walks up to another at a party and says, “You’re doing fine. How am I?” LMFAO! :D After sex, one behaviorist says to the other "it was good for you, how was it for me?"
The worst thing is, these jokes almost did apply to the behaviorism of the 1940's & 50's. Now, they are merely evidence that the behaviorists have done a terrible job with public relations.
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