Prove the Mind: A thought experiment to encourage discusion.

[Dancing David]

In Honor of Ian and Mecrutio:

In the emergence of the mind thread a start was made in the discussion of what constitues a mind and consiousness. I hope to get a great discussion going here on this topic.

The idea: a p-mind or m-zombie.
It looks like a mind, it acts like a mind but it lacks consiousness. I think that this is as likely a construct as the p-zombie. And in homage to Mecrutio, just as likely a reality as the p-zombie.

The story: There are three children who are raised in a family of philosophers, thier aunts, nuncles, grand parents, every one is a philospher. But one day at a family reunion a fight breaks out over how many consious beings can inhabit the same body. In the ensuing blood bath all the adults die and the children are sent to be raised by the born agains who weren't attending the reunion, despite the fact that they are born again philosophers.

As the children reach adulthood they make a pact to study the nature of consiousness and delve into the mysteries of the mind. They are all wealthy because thier families did have insurance policies, which they get. They all go on to have fantastic educations and an endless supply of research funding.

The sister Mecharella studies nano-technology and AI, the brothers Framenstien and Babelthezar study biology and magic respectively.

Twenty years later they meet and put there collective efforts together.

All three can respectively do the following:
a. bring lifeless material to seeming life
b. transfer consiousness from one vessel to another
c. store consiousness for a time period.

Mecharella of course use machines to complete the tasks, Framestien uses 'biological essences', and Babelthezar uses wizardy to complete the tasks.

The experiment: there is a poor unfortunate child, who was born alive but through some tragedy is lacking any sort of sensation. They can not tase, smell, see, hear, touch or have any sort of kinesthetic sense. They lack all sense perception. (Including any sensation that this author has not listed) Babelthezar says that he will transfer some events of qualia to the child, in other words he will transfer consiousness to the child, in that there will be a stream of qualia transfered to the child. But he will magicaly remove the qualia of 'awareness' from the transfer.

The argument: Mecharella and Framenstien immedeatly cry foul! They say that there mechanisms do not allow for this and they feel that he is denying the child the full human experience.

The question:
Is there a qualia of awareness?
Does the child have awareness prior to the transfer of the qualia?
Do qualia constitue consiousness, is there a qualia for very human event?

(BTW there are plenty of other experiements other than this one)

[Mercutio]

One question: Who is Mecrutio?



:D :p :D

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by Mercutio
One question: Who is Mecrutio?



:D :p :D


Some modreator who teaches psycohlogy!

Mercutio,mercutio,mercutio

[UnrepentantSinner]

You should have just said dips***. He'd have known to whom you were referring.

[MRC_Hans]

Please, define "qualia".

Hans :halo:

[Dancing David]

Uh, define qualia, um, the raw data of perception?

It is not a term that I would normaly use but it seems to be important to the philosphers on the forum.

They talk about the qualia red which can not be reduced.

So I am asking the simple question, is there a qualia for awareness?

(I am in the materialist camp, I believe that qualia are a function of the biological process.)

[MRC_Hans]

My problem is that I have never understood the concept of qualia (and of course we can hardly get any further in the discussion you suggest unless we agree on this). I have never been able to see why qualia should be separate concept.

Take "red", which is supposed to be a qualia:

- A red car. That is an object, red is one of the properties of the object, a purely physical thing.

- The color red. This is an abstraction that describes the general perception I get (of color) when viewing objects with optical surface properties similar to red cars.

I fail to see what is so special about it. For instance, "car" is another abstraction, in this case describing the general property of an object of similar use and shape as the red car above. But I never heard anybody claim that "car" was a qualia.

Hans

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I can't ever get a handle on whether a quale is:

The feeling I have when perceiving a red object.

or

The feeling I have when remembering what a red object is like.

Is it the feeling of perception or the feeling of remembering the perception, or both?

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by UnrepentantSinner
You should have just said dips***. He'd have known to whom you were referring. :D

[TheERK]

Originally posted by Dancing David

So I am asking the simple question, is there a qualia for awareness?

If you believe in qualia, the obvious answer is that awareness is the sum of all of your qualia.

[TheERK]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I can't ever get a handle on whether a quale is:

The feeling I have when perceiving a red object.

or

The feeling I have when remembering what a red object is like.

Is it the feeling of perception or the feeling of remembering the perception, or both?

~~ Paul

Both, I suppose.

What exactly is the difference between the two, anyway? I can't seem to pin it down. It is even more obvious that something is different if you use music instead of visuals. What is the difference between singing a song in your head, and listening to it? It isn't volume. It isn't pitch, or sharpness, or anything like that. It's just different somehow.

[Phil]

Not to derail the thread before it gets started (if that hasn't already happened), but JREF Writer's Group members will recognize the concept DD describes in his opening post. I am currently writing a novel where this is exactly the premise. Of course there is no philosophical discussion per se in the book. It's all good, clean fiction, but the story deals with ideas discussed before in these types of threads.

As to the questions posed, I don't know that I could add any more than has already been offered at this point. If qualia are defined as the raw data of perception, and awareness is defined as perception, then I don't think there can be a qualia of awareness. Awareness would encompass all available qualia. . . . I think.

[c4ts]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I can't ever get a handle on whether a quale is:

The feeling I have when perceiving a red object.

or

The feeling I have when remembering what a red object is like.

Is it the feeling of perception or the feeling of remembering the perception, or both?

~~ Paul

I thought it was supposed to be a priori.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Uh, define qualia, um, the raw data of perception?


"Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. "

Standford Encyclopedia (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Irreducible)


So I am asking the simple question, is there a qualia for awareness?

Awareness IS a mental state, so yes, awareness is part of qualia.


(I am in the materialist camp, I believe that qualia are a function of the biological process.) [/B]

Then why are you starting this thread?, isn't it pointless?. If you are so sure about your materialistic beliefs that qualia are nothing but objective biological processes, then why don't you just provide the evidence to the philosophers in this forum??

Q-S

[Q-Source]

[b]Originally posted by MRC_Hans
I have never been able to see why qualia should be separate concept.

Separate from what?


Take "red", which is supposed to be a qualia:

You mean "seeing red".


- A red car. That is an object, red is one of the properties of the object, a purely physical thing.

Objects such as cars have primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are properties of the object like color, shape, weight, etc. They are objective and we can agree on them.

Secondary qualities are properties that we perceive in them such as seeing a red color and liking or not the car. We cannot agree on this because we have subjective perceptions of what we think when we see a red car.


- The color red. This is an abstraction that describes the general perception I get (of color) when viewing objects with optical surface properties similar to red cars.

This perception is subjective. When you hear the word "red" you get an idea inside your head that is completely different to the idea that I get when I hear the word red (I usually bring the color of an apple to my head).


I fail to see what is so special about it. For instance, "car" is another abstraction, in this case describing the general property of an object of similar use and shape as the red car above. But I never heard anybody claim that "car" was a qualia.


You have to separate the two qualities that all objects have. Qualia refer to the secondary qualities that are not reducible and are only experienced by you and noone else.

Q-S

[CapelDodger]

Dancing David's mind experiment seems to have been immediately lost in a discussion of semantics, which is pretty much the way it goes when there are philosophers around. It is surely clear that each consciousness is a black-box to other consciousnesses, by which I mean that the inputs and outputs are all that can be perceived . What happens internally - what my perception of "red" is vis a vis yours - is not relevant. What is relevant is that when two people look at the same red paint under the same light they agree that it is "red". Unless one or both is colour blind (not an entirely trivial point). My little sister, when very young, was looking at some horses when my mother, looking elsewhere, said "Look, ducks!", and for a while my sister referred to horses as ducks. The concept of "red" or "duck" is shared by an agreement of reference. There's little to be gained by trying to put a word to such personal experiences, it just avoids the hard subject of what consciousness is - what goes on inside the black boxes - and how it relates to the physical world.

The choice of "red" as a concept is quite fertile, since there are parts of the human brain that respond preferentially to redness. Part of this is to do with young leaves having a reddish tinge, and being the most profitable to eat (red-perception is an advantage of primates). Another part is to do with the fact that a sudden appearance of blood often means that someone just got jumped by a predator and leaving them to it while making tracks is a survival strategy. Another part is to do with the fact that one of our group might have been the predator, and there's the chance of picking up some meat. This reponse is not learned, it's inherent. We don't have to agree that something is "red": we can observe the PET scans.

Where does this get us in answering the three questions posed by Dancing David? Absolutely nowhere. I have my own vague idea that consciousness emerges when learning emerges. I don't include the relatively crude learning that bacteria or individual cells can achieve but the learning that can allow a complex creature to vary its behaviour by observation and experience. Without observation and experience the ability to learn remains moribund and no consciousness emerges. Where on the ancestral lines this capacity occurs, well, I would say before fish and octopuses but fungi haven't made it yet. Snails? - who knows. I'll kill them but I won't eat them. Wasps? - no. Cats? - far too much.

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by Q-Source



"Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. "

Standford Encyclopedia (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Irreducible)



Awareness IS a mental state, so yes, awareness is part of qualia.



Then why are you starting this thread?, isn't it pointless?. If you are so sure about your materialistic beliefs that qualia are nothing but objective biological processes, then why don't you just provide the evidence to the philosophers in this forum??

Q-S

Gee Q-source I certainly didn't mean to yank your chain. I suppose that i started the post to generate discusion.

What is wrong will my use of the word belief? My beliefs are subject to change.

When I first came to the forum I did not believe that qualia are irreducable, but now I do in a limited extent. I know believe that i understand why some say that qualia are irreducable.

I suppose that is a bad thing.


Then why are you *posting to this thread* this thread?, isn't it pointless?. If you are so sure about your *my* materialistic beliefs that qualia are nothing but objective biological processes, then why don't you just provide the evidence to the philosophers in this forum??

So why don't you prove that discussion is pointless and then maybe I will present my evidence for what i feel qualia are. I already have.
Do you believe that discussion is a bad thing?

There is currently a trend amongst some posters to say: consiousness is beyonf definition, awareness is beyond definition.

This is a discussion to lead to understanding.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Dancing David
[B]
When I first came to the forum I did not believe that qualia are irreducable, but now I do in a limited extent. I know believe that i understand why some say that qualia are irreducable.

When I first came to this forum I belived that qualia were reducible to physical processes. It was just a belief based on nothing because I never had the evidence to prove that this was true. Science has not reduced qualia to physical processes yet.


I suppose that is a bad thing.

To me, this is a good thing. We all make mistakes :)


So why don't you prove that discussion is pointless and then maybe I will present my evidence for what i feel qualia are. I already have.
Do you believe that discussion is a bad thing?

The discussion is not a bad thing, the position of materialists is a bad thing. They assert that they know what qualia are, they assert that Science does describe what qualia are but when asked for evidence they just refuse to give it (maybe because there is not any).

I say that by definition Science cannot study and describe what qualia are. Science can only work with the primary qualities of objects but not with their secondary qualities (qualia).



There is currently a trend amongst some posters to say: consiousness is beyonf definition, awareness is beyond definition.


I think those concepts are beyond definition if you want to use a materialistic language game. A productive discussion would require people to get rid of their materialist frame of reference and see the problem from a different perspective. From my experience doing this helped me to understand clearly the problem.

Q-S

[Dancing David]

Q-source I appreciate your post. The question that I am asking about is about the nature of definitions. Which is what a lot the Ian's Duplicator Paradox thread was all about.

That is why I put the thought experiement together the way I did. In the thought experiement the magus is able to use magic. To seperate the essence of what things are is just done through powers not otherwise explained. I did not mean to demean or belittle anyone beliefs in the post.

I feel that the mechanist and the biological alchemist pretty much said that they did not have the means to make the differentiation between the materialst qualia and the qualia of awareness, in the thought experiment.

That is why I asked about the question I did from the persepective that i did.

I think that the child born without sensation represents the core of the materialist arguement. This child does not have exposure to the things that behaviorists generaly associate with qualia learned through exposure.

I had hoped that the thought experiement might actualy have some people respond to it.

I would argue that the crux of the matter comes down to what certain people think awareness is.

And then it kind of explores the difference between epiphenominalism and substantioalism. Here is the woerd thing about materialism and the behaviorists.

We are all p-zombies, if as they argue we are just machines creating the experients then any thing which looks like it is having an experient is considered to be consious and aware. So materialst i think take a very extreme conclusion. That the ability to be alive is a conclusion based upon the appearance of life. So converse when presented with anything that looks to beyond materialist bounds, those bounds must expand.

So a machine could be alive and consious, a geneticaly alchemerated being while strange is alive, and a magicaly created being would be alive.

[Cleopatra]

I am quite surpised that none addressed Capel Dodger's post.

[Giz]

Originally posted by CapelDodger
Dancing David's mind experiment seems to have been immediately lost in a discussion of semantics, which is pretty much the way it goes when there are philosophers around. It is surely clear that each consciousness is a black-box to other consciousnesses, by which I mean that the inputs and outputs are all that can be perceived . What happens internally - what my perception of "red" is vis a vis yours - is not relevant. What is relevant is that when two people look at the same red paint under the same light they agree that it is "red". Unless one or both is colour blind (not an entirely trivial point). My little sister, when very young, was looking at some horses when my mother, looking elsewhere, said "Look, ducks!", and for a while my sister referred to horses as ducks. The concept of "red" or "duck" is shared by an agreement of reference. There's little to be gained by trying to put a word to such personal experiences, it just avoids the hard subject of what consciousness is - what goes on inside the black boxes - and how it relates to the physical world.
.

Good point. Too borrow the philobfuscators jargon my qualia when I view something red might be the same as your qualia when you view something green but as long we each maintain a consistent label for each (derived initially from our parents perhaps) we would never know that our experiences differed.

Or would we...

We quite often comment on what other people are wearing, saying things like those colours match/don't match and we seem to be able to agree (which if we were talking at cross-experiences wouldn't seem very probable).

What could be responsible for us all having similar/almost identical "qualia"? Could it be - big shock - that due to our common evolutionary heritage we all share a vastly similar genotype? Our genes result in a common phenotype (our body) which results in common "qualia".

It would be a bit of an evolutionary hitch if qualia differed between the phenotypes (bodies) produced by almost identical sets of genes. One hardly likes to think of the mistakes that could happen!

[Dancing David]

posted by Q-Source


I think those concepts are beyond definition if you want to use a materialistic language game. A productive discussion would require people to get rid of their materialist frame of reference and see the problem from a different perspective. From my experience doing this helped me to understand clearly the problem.





I feel that is a valid point that I can not directly counter, but i also feel that it defeats the purpose of discussion to say that they are objects beyond material definition. I find it hard to make the decision to just give up a mindset, I switch mind sets all the time, animist to nihilist to materialst and so on.

So what is unique about the immaterialist perpective that creates an inner definition? I am willing to work within a framework that can define the concepts so I can understand the immaterialist position. But I feel that this is very similar to what happens when the immaterialsits counter the materialist position with the 'you can't prove the material world exists', and some of us have learned to agree that the material world appears to exist.

I feel that it is a balance with the definition issue, if materialists need to accept that they can't just say 'well the world exists', then I feel it is unbalanced for immaterialists to say 'it is beond definition'.

I also say that becaue I really want to learn more about immaterialism.

Thanks.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Cleopatra
I am quite surpised that none addressed Capel Dodger's post. I suppose it is because it is easier to discuss semantics ;). While interesting, CD's post highlights the problem with this thread: The original question is about what is the connection between two poorly defined concepts. Quite a sure-fire way to spark a sematics debate, IMHO.

However, I have also read about the red recognition thing, and I would say that it is a very good shot at scientific evidence for a quale (red) being a biological process.

Hans

[Dancing David]

Apparently this line of questioning has offended most of the immatterialists in the forum, I note that only one has responded so far, and they did not even answer the question.

Sigh, oh well I suppose I can always make reference to this thread in the future when the phrases 'awareness' and 'consiousness' come up, I didn't even get to the really mind bending questions:

Like you have an alzhiemers patients, they have no recent memories but they have good remote memories, so they qualify as consious but are they really aware.

What if we use the thought experiment o bring a dead person back to life, were they aware during the time they were dead? How could we know.

Oh well.... sigh.... I guess there are some answers that have no questions.

I had hoped that Ian would at least show up and write

"That is preposterous!" ;)

[Q-Source]

Hello David,


Originally posted by Dancing David
[B]
I switch mind sets all the time, animist to nihilist to materialst and so on.

Then why the difficulty to understand the point of view of an immaterialist?


So what is unique about the immaterialist perpective that creates an inner definition? I am willing to work within a framework that can define the concepts so I can understand the immaterialist position.

The only framework that you can use is your own experience, the way you perceive yourself in this material world. I cannot give you any other framework because I am not a proper idealist. Anyway, no one can provide you with a framework to understand your own inner world, that is the heart of the matter. Any attempt to do this invalids the existence of qualia.


I feel that it is a balance with the definition issue, if materialists need to accept that they can't just say 'well the world exists', then I feel it is unbalanced for immaterialists to say 'it is beond definition'.

When I say that it is beyond definition is because our inner experiences are directly apprehensible and subjective, therefore giving a definition would imply that there is an explanation that fits everybodies' descriptions.

q

[Dancing David]

Thanks QS, I will consider your response, I am trying to understand it's implications.

[Dancing David]

There is nothing like beating a dead horse, unless it is tying him to some sticks and making him dance around a stage!



The following is my own creation, I apologize if it any any way approximates any other material that anyone else has written. And appearance of plagarism is unintended.


(Open scene one in the vaults of the Castle of Knowledge, stage right MECHARELLA sits in an armchair before her great complex of machines, BABELFISH and FARMENSTIEN arguing in front of a large chalkboard stage left.)

MECHARELLA: Well all I can tell you, is that if I build an android with consciousness then it will be ***** conscious. Whether or not I activate the sensation algorithms it will be conscious. I would bet my life on it!
FARMENSTIEN: Mecharella... I already told you that your machine is never going to be conscious. Even if you turn on its ‘sensors’, as you call them; it is still a lifeless machine! No matter how complex, large or small you make it, IT is STILL going to be a MACHINE. I would not be able to extract its essence of life because it is...it is the essence of a machine and could therefore never be really alive.
MECHARELLA: I tell you to that if I build something ‘alive’ then it is going to be alive. Even though you couldn’t reduce it to a bunch of ‘essences’ and put it into another body doesn’t mean it isn’t alive. If it looks like a duck...
BABELFISH: It just might be a type thirteen demon pretending to be a duck.
MECHARELLA: Well, it will certainly behave like a duck and you certainly couldn’t tell the difference until it came and bit your...
BABELFISH: I not be able to tell the difference! That is the problem dear sister I could tell the difference, it may look like a duck and it may quack like a duck, but it could still be a demon. And I can tell the difference.
MECHARELLA: Oh my, and so if I build a machine that looks like a demon and behaves like a demon then it is a demon!
FARMENSTIEN: That’s right dear sister it would act like a demon and look like a demon, it still would NOT be alive or a demon. It would just be a machine...
MECHARELLA: And if I build my machine the right way then you will still have to call it alive, because I will just make it so you can take it apart and resurrect it in your lab dear brother. And then you wouldn’t be able to tell me that it wasn’t alive, because then you could call it alive and do your experiments on it.
FARMENSTIEN: I would KNOW that it wasn’t alive and even if I could reanimate the dead with it’s extract, that would just be artificial and I would KNOW it wasn’t alive...
BABELFISH: Yet if it acts like a type thirteen demon then it will look like a duck, how could I tell if it was polymorphing or just changing it’s appearance. I say Mecharella, would you be able to build a soul?
MECHARELLA: Sure could brother, show me how one works and I could build one for you!
FARMENSTIEN: But you couldn’t build a soul, only the creator can endow a creature with soul. We can never tell if the soul came into the creature on it’s own or if it was compelled. You could only build a machine that would hold the soul. It is not your place to command the creator and you certainly couldn’t compel a soul to enter a body the creator did not wish endowed with soul.
MECHARELLA: You tell me how the creator does it and I can build a machine that will do the same thing!
BABELFISH: But what if it’s a demon that polymorphs into a machine dear brother? Then could you extract its essence? It would still be a machine...
FARMENSTIEN: I would KNOW that it was alive even though it’s a poor soul was imprisoned in a machine. That would be horrible, I am sure the creator wouldn’t allow that to happen. A demon couldn’t turn into a machine, that’s just like building a machine that looks like a duck. A demon would make it LOOK like it was a duck, but it couldn’t possibly be a duck, it is STILL a demon. It just looks like a duck.
MECHARELLA: But that is just a behavior, if it behaves like a duck then it is a duck, it’s not a demon that we can tell, it’s a duck!
FARMENSTIEN: I would KNOW it was a demon acting like a duck, it couldn’t be a duck if it’s a demon, now could it.
MECHARELLA: Yeah, well how do you know it’s not a demon acting like it’s a machine acting like duck, you still wouldn’t know until it came and bit your...
BABELFISH: I could compel the demon to speak and tell us which one it was...
MECHARELLA Not if I built it so you couldn’t tell the difference, I’ll just build the demon so that it tells you it’s got some sort of demonic history.
FARMENSTIEN: But our brother could not command it’s soul, it is a machine, only the creator knows if he would give it a soul. But I don’t know why he would, it is a machine after all...and certainly you couldn’t tell the soul what to say when our brother compels it to speak.
MECHARELLA: If I build a soul for a demon and design it so it says it has a demonic history then it will tell our brother that it has a demonic history.
FARMENSTIEN: That is outrageous and totally illogical. If you build a device to attract a soul then it will tell dear brother whatever it was doing before you attracted it to your machine. You can’t build a soul!
MECHARELLA: If I build a demonic soul for a duck, it will be a demonic soul for a duck. And you won’t be able to tell...
FARMENSTIEN: I will KNOW that it is just some poor soul captured by your machine...
BABELFISH: I suppose if you build the soul correctly then it could be the soul of a demon, even if you just attract a soul to fill the vessel, it could be a demon’s soul...
FARMENSTIEN: But that is ludicrous, you can’t put a demon’s soul in a machine! If it is a demon’s soul, and then it is the essence of the demon, so it would be a demon that just appears in a machine! And the creator just wouldn’t allow for that...
MECHARELLA: Well how do you know I didn’t just build a time machine, make a creator and go back in time to have my creator create the world?
FARMENSTIEN: I would KNOW that it wasn’t a real creation, that is just asinine, you couldn’t do that! That is just impossible, you can’t build a creator! The creator is beyond human grasp and certainly couldn’t be a machine!
MECHARELLA: Tell you what I will go start on it now, and I’ll take my camera so you can see the pictures of the creation!
BABELFISH: Wait sister, we haven’t time for that. Poor Lucinda lies on the lab table awaiting our experiment. And we haven’t even settled that yet, are we going to displace her soul during the transfer?
FARMENSTIEN: I already TOLD you, that is ridiculous, she has a soul and the transfer of qualia can not do anything to her soul.
MECHARELLA: As I said if I build a machine to be aware then it is going to be aware, even if it has no sensory input. We don’t need to worry if she has a soul. That is just some gobbledy gook our alchemist brother has invented!
FARMENSTIEN: It is beyond my ability to invent a soul, I am not so arrogant as to presuppose that I could do the creator’s work, and you could never build a machine that makes a creator or a soul!
MECHARELLA: If you point me in the direction of the creator, than I can whip one up for you!
FARMENSTIEN: That is just lunacy, you can’t build a creator, anymore than you can build a soul. And I have to say I do agree with you, she is aware! Even without senses she is aware, but a machine of yours could never be aware!
BABELFISH: But what does it mean to be aware, how do you know the room is there if the light isn’t turned on and you have never seen it before? I mean she could have nascent awareness, but what is there for her to be aware of?
FARMENSTIEN: Preposterous! She has a soul, and that is the essence of consciousness and awareness. It is the light of the creator that fills her with life and the creator is certainly aware of her!
MECHARELLA: Why should she be any different than a machine mystic brother? She is built to be aware but hasn’t had that ‘program’ activated. She is capable of awareness, she would exhibit that behavior if she could, so she is aware.
BABELFISH: But what if you build the machine to learn to be aware, what then? If it has to learn it’s awareness program and there is nothing to learn, then is it aware?
FARMENSTIEN: I KNOW she is aware, she has a SOUL!
(End scene one)