Han Solo and the Ship of Theseus [Archive]

Zalbik

23rd December 2009, 12:59 PM

There must have been a Death Star canteen, yes? JK

So Han Solo is frozen in carbonite and given to Jabba the Hut. Let's call the time Han Solo is first put in suspended animation T1. Let's also suppose he's in stasis for 10 years. Long enough for all the atoms that made up Han at T1 to be replaced by other atoms. So the conventional wisdom is that, when Han is revived at T10, he's still Han Solo. This is true even though Han hasn't had an active mental state from T1 to T10 and none of Han's original atoms (at T1) make up Han anymore.

So let's suppose we "tagged" all of Han's original atoms at T1 and collected them over the years. We also did a complete scan of Han at T1 (and the carbonite he's encased in). Now, right before T10 rolls around, we take all of Han's original atoms that we've collected, and with the aid of the scan we made at T1, we make a perfect duplicate of Han at T9.999. We call this (O)Han (Original Atoms of Han). (O)Han is encased in the same carbonite as Han is. So when T10 rolls around, both Han and (O)Han are revived. Which is the real Han Solo?

Both. Heck, I'd say both even if you used entirely different atoms for (O)Han, just as long as the configuration was the same.

Just of of curiosity, is this leading somewhere?

grayman

23rd December 2009, 01:07 PM

Both are equally real.

Until they are observed.

Twiler

23rd December 2009, 01:08 PM

Until they are observed.

By whom?

Eyeron

23rd December 2009, 01:08 PM

There is no such thing as real.

Xulld

23rd December 2009, 01:23 PM

Fight to the death for the identity label Han Solo in 3 . . .2 . . .1

Malerin

23rd December 2009, 01:40 PM

Both are equally real.

No one's claiming Han and (O)Han aren't real. The question is, which has the best claim to being "Han Solo". It would be odd to say they both are Han Solo. "Han Solo" refers to one particular person. You would have to explain how the identity of one person can be split between two persons.

For example, if Han Solo had a job waiting for him when he unthaws, would both Han and (O)Han have to be hired? What if only one person could be hired? Who would get the job? What if Han goes and commites a robbery. Should law-abiding (O)Han be arrested too, if they're both Han Solo?

And if we had never made (O)han, wouldn't you agree that when Han wakes up at T10, he's the same Han Solo that was frozen at T1? Why does making a duplicate from discarded atoms negate Han's claim to being Han Solo?

In diagram form, it was originaly A------A
Your claim is that creating (O)Han makes the diagram become

A--------A
\
-------A
?

Xulld

23rd December 2009, 01:58 PM

Labels are handy, but do not confuse epistemic representation with ontological existence.

In so far as a label represents a thing based on its components, both are equally able to represent the label if the components are identical.

fuelair

23rd December 2009, 02:03 PM

By whom?

Schrodinger and/or his cat.:)

Twiler

23rd December 2009, 02:30 PM

No one's claiming Han and (O)Han aren't real. The question is, which has the best claim to being "Han Solo". It would be odd to say they both are Han Solo. "Han Solo" refers to one particular person. You would have to explain how the identity of one person can be split between two persons.

For example, if Han Solo had a job waiting for him when he unthaws, would both Han and (O)Han have to be hired? What if only one person could be hired? Who would get the job? What if Han goes and commites a robbery. Should law-abiding (O)Han be arrested too, if they're both Han Solo?

And if we had never made (O)han, wouldn't you agree that when Han wakes up at T10, he's the same Han Solo that was frozen at T1? Why does making a duplicate from discarded atoms negate Han's claim to being Han Solo?

In diagram form, it was originaly A------A
Your claim is that creating (O)Han makes the diagram become

A--------A
\
-------A
?

Both have an equal claim to be Han Solo. After splitting, they become two separate versions of Han Solo, like twins.

The problem is a limitation of language. In philosophy, entities can have a numerical identity (assigned to a specific entity), and a qualitative identity (assigned to an entity with particular characteristics).

Conundrums like this demonstrate that the concept of numerical identity doesn't have an exact definition. You could give one reason or another why one Han Solo is the real one, but there's no definitive answer.

Dunstan

23rd December 2009, 02:35 PM

Both have an equal claim to be Han Solo. After splitting, they become two separate versions of Han Solo, like twins.

The problem is a limitation of language. In philosophy, entities can have a numerical identity (assigned to a specific entity), and a qualitative identity (assigned to an entity with particular characteristics).

Conundrums like this demonstrate that the concept of numerical identity doesn't have an exact definition. You could give one reason or another why one Han Solo is the real one, but there's no definitive answer.

Damnit, I had a whole long reply that got eaten by the Internet, but you did a more concise job of it. The situation only seems "odd" because we don't encounter it in real life and so our concepts of identity and our language haven't adapted to it, whereas we are quite comfortable of the notion of people sharing the same name or the same DNA.

Of course, I also had a reference to "Thomas" Riker from Star Trek: The Next Generation.

Third Eye Open

23rd December 2009, 02:58 PM

They are both Han Solo. They both woke up with the same identity, and then diverged by having different experiences, small differences at first, such as seeing the room from a different angle when they awoke. These differences will build on each other until the two Han Solo's are more recognizably different people. But they will still both be Han Solo.

It is the same with each decision you make in your day to day life. Each choice makes you a 'different person' than each other choice, you would be a different you if you made some other choice, but still you. This scenario would allow us to see the same persons life unfold in two different ways.

Sledge

23rd December 2009, 03:38 PM

Isn't the whole point of freezing someone that cell activity ceases or at least slows down?

Oh, and the rate of cellular replacement in Corellians might be vastly different from Terrans.

I Ratant

23rd December 2009, 04:15 PM

The toss-up itself is flawed.
In carbonite, the life processes must needs be suspended.
Nothing occurs.. no inspiration, no exhalation, no feeding, no excreting.
The cells existing at the encapsulation are the cells that exist at the decanting.
Then the processes of life which replace cells can recommence activity.

Pup

23rd December 2009, 04:54 PM

So Han Solo is frozen in carbonite and given to Jabba the Hut. Let's call the time Han Solo is first put in suspended animation T1. Let's also suppose he's in stasis for 10 years. Long enough for all the atoms that made up Han at T1 to be replaced by other atoms.

As the posters just above have implied, stop right there. What's your evidence--uh, I mean for some value of "evidence"--that the atoms in a body in suspended animation are replaced at the same rate as normal? By the very definition of "suspended animation," I'd say they're not replaced, any more than the atoms in a rock are replaced.

I can't believe I just asked for evidence concerning a hypothetical question about a fictional world. :boggled:

I Ratant

23rd December 2009, 05:12 PM

...

I can't believe I just asked for evidence concerning a hypothetical question about a fictional world. :boggled:
.
Ever thought about getting a life? :)
Many of us here have thought about it, and yet haven't found one yet. :cool:
Too much effort.:covereyes

Cynic

23rd December 2009, 05:28 PM

They both have equal claim. Our identities are based on the arrangement our of atoms, not the atoms themselves. If you performed the same sort of thing on the Mona Lisa, the one you copied it from could be said to be the original, but they would still be identical in every way except in the disposition of the atoms themselves, same as with Han Prime and Han Double-prime.

In other words, it depends on how you want to judge the disposition of each atom, I guess. But I personally think it's a useless aspect to look at for the most part and that they are effectively identical

steve s

23rd December 2009, 08:29 PM

Put....the bong...down.

Steve S.

blobru

24th December 2009, 06:19 AM

... Which is the real Han Solo?

:jedi: Nice variation on the Ship of Theseus, one of the classic philosophy puzzlers. You might extend the parallel to the original by having the Millenium Falcon parked meanwhile in a hangar where it is disassembled, each removed bit replaced by an identical; then the original bits reassembled in another hangar. The choice is the same as in many versions of the puzzle -- which is the real thing: the continuous structure, or the reassembled constituents? -- except now there are two wholes to consider. :eusa_think: :eusa_think:

With the space-ship, I'm inclined to say the reassembled MF is the "real" thing: in a sense, it's just been moved bit by bit from one hangar to another; whereas, the continuous structure in place is an identical copy. But that's a purely philosophical distinction: practically, they're identical, and I suppose one should be indifferent.

Having the ship a person, though, raises another question: if you were the frozen Han Solo, where would you (the original pov) wake up? Here it seems to me the continuous structure is the real thing, assuming being frozen in carbonite hasn't killed HS, only put him into suspended animation sleep. In this case, HS, both pov and mind, is Han; (O)Han is revived as a new pov, with a mind identical to HS'.

If HS hasn't survived the carbonite freezing, then he's just a perfectly preserved corpse that is reanimated after ten years. Both Han and (O)Han would be new pov's with minds identical to HS' at the moment he was frozen and killed; neither would have much basis for claiming to be the "real" HS, in the sense of preserving his pov; the choice would be the same as between the inanimate ships.

shemp

24th December 2009, 06:53 AM

I am SpartacusHan Solo!

Malerin

24th December 2009, 08:28 AM

:jedi: Nice variation on the Ship of Theseus, one of the classic philosophy puzzlers. You might extend the parallel to the original by having the Millenium Falcon parked meanwhile in a hangar where it is disassembled, each removed bit replaced by an identical; then the original bits reassembled in another hangar. The choice is the same as in many versions of the puzzle -- which is the real thing: the continuous structure, or the reassembled constituents? -- except now there are two wholes to consider. :eusa_think: :eusa_think:

With the space-ship, I'm inclined to say the reassembled MF is the "real" thing: in a sense, it's just been moved bit by bit from one hangar to another; whereas, the continuous structure in place is an identical copy. But that's a purely philosophical distinction: practically, they're identical, and I suppose one should be indifferent.

Having the ship a person, though, raises another question: if you were the frozen Han Solo, where would you (the original pov) wake up? Here it seems to me the continuous structure is the real thing, assuming being frozen in carbonite hasn't killed HS, only put him into suspended animation sleep. In this case, HS, both pov and mind, is Han; (O)Han is revived as a new pov, with a mind identical to HS'.

If HS hasn't survived the carbonite freezing, then he's just a perfectly preserved corpse that is reanimated after ten years. Both Han and (O)Han would be new pov's with minds identical to HS' at the moment he was frozen and killed; neither would have much basis for claiming to be the "real" HS, in the sense of preserving his pov; the choice would be the same as between the inanimate ships.

I can see two plausible scenarioes that support either Han or (O)Han's claim to being Han Solo. In the first scenario, we simply don't assemble (O)Han out of Han Solo's original atoms. Han wakes up at T10 and goes on his merry way as Han Solo (maybe this doesn't support Han's claim to being Han Solo, though. Maybe this is just a case where Han, being the only candidate for Han Solo, is the best candidate).

In the 2nd scenario, let's say instead of being encased in carbonite, Han Solo was simply broken down into his consituent atoms and teleported around space for 10 years. Then, at T10, his atoms are reasembled. If that happened, (O)Han looks like the best candidate for Han Solo. Is there a fundamental difference between being encased in carbonite for 10 years vs. being disassembled and teleported?

Also, suppose we assemble (O)Han at T9.9, and then change our minds about the whole thing. Is junking (O)Han murder? Would it be any different than destroying Han right before he thaws out?

Malerin

24th December 2009, 08:36 AM

Cynic

24th December 2009, 09:27 AM

There's four ways this could go.

1. They're both Han Solo
2. Neither of them are Han Solo
3. One of them is Han Solo
4. Our notions of personal identity are unreliable for these kind of thought experiments.

I don't think (1) or (2) make much sense. That leaves figuring out who the real Han Solo is or refining what personal identity across time means .

Why doesn't option 1 makes sense? It's not as if a year if a year our either one of the Hans will have the same assortment of atoms as when you first asked the question. From year to year, we're all "different" in the way you seem to be concerned about than we were before.

I think that "personal identity" is entirely within the realm of the individual -- not others. Both would naturally claim to be Han Solo and both would be correct. (So I guess I just voted for 4 there by reason of defending 1.)

Inanimate objects like paintings or ships don't have a "personal identity" because they lack their own perspectives. For authentication purposes, the difference comes down to the degree of exactitude one chooses to apply. If they are the exact same arrangement of atoms, then they are exactly identical if that's the rule you're using. If you want to break that tie, you can get into other things, like quantum entanglement (if any), state of decay, etc. It's an arbitrary decision, but no less real for that.

But of course, your scan and reassembly method might also provide that level of specificity as well. If you provide a method copying that is exactly accurate, the question of which is the original becomes moot, except to say that one was copied from the other. And that is easy to judge if you only know which came first.

rocketdodger

26th December 2009, 08:37 AM

Also, suppose we assemble (O)Han at T9.9, and then change our minds about the whole thing. Is junking (O)Han murder? Would it be any different than destroying Han right before he thaws out?

Murder is defined socially, not objectively.

If there are people who want to see him again, then it would probably be a bad idea to junk (O)Han.

theMark

26th December 2009, 09:38 AM

So Han Solo is frozen in carbonite and given to Jabba the Hut. Let's call the time Han Solo is first put in suspended animation T1. Let's also suppose he's in stasis for 10 years. Long enough for all the atoms that made up Han at T1 to be replaced by other atoms. So the conventional wisdom is that, when Han is revived at T10, he's still Han Solo. This is true even though Han hasn't had an active mental state from T1 to T10 and none of Han's original atoms (at T1) make up Han anymore.

So let's suppose we "tagged" all of Han's original atoms at T1 and collected them over the years. We also did a complete scan of Han at T1 (and the carbonite he's encased in). Now, right before T10 rolls around, we take all of Han's original atoms that we've collected, and with the aid of the scan we made at T1, we make a perfect duplicate of Han at T9.999. We call this (O)Han (Original Atoms of Han). (O)Han is encased in the same carbonite as Han is. So when T10 rolls around, both Han and (O)Han are revived. Which is the real Han Solo?

a) It has been mentioned: Stasis. Nothing happens. No exchange of atoms in the first place. For perfect stasis, we wouldn't have any atoms to build (O)Han from, so Han is the real Han Solo.

b) Let's assume for the sake of this example that it's more of a "hibernation" process where life signs carry on and some external process is necessary to supply food/energy/whatever. In this case, Han is still the original. His "geometry", i.e. the arrangement of the atoms making up Han at any given time, is continuous, even though the building blocks keep on changing. The clone/re-assembled (O)Han is something of a "sibling", real, but replicated by external intent, not by internal biological/mechanical/whatever processes that we call "life".

c) Which means that Star-Trek-style "beaming" means "kill and clone back". Now here's a weird thought ... Attack of the Zombie Kirks!

Oh, and what was the point of this, again? ;)

PingOfPong

27th December 2009, 03:40 PM

Which one deserves to be called Han? They'll just have to learn to share. Or, they could both try to shoot first like Han did originally in that crazy space bar before George Lucas took full creative control and ruined the character by having Greedo shoot first because George Lucas is an incompetent story teller and one has to conclude that George Lucas could not possibly be responsible for all the greatness of the original three movies and it must have been the creative force of the people working around him that made the movies great until George Lucas became too powerful and fat to be questioned by any subordinates. Also, did you know that Lucas' original idea for Luke Skywalker was to give him a robot head and have him commit genocides and rape (of his sister Lea)?

Wait, what were talking about? Oh yeah, there is going to be an inevitable split between people depending on how they identify a person. Some tend to think of their body, face, clothes, etc. as being a strong part of identity. Some will tend to think that memories, thoughts, and attitudes are more identifying. I'm in the latter group. They're both Han at first, although with time, they will become different people as they have different experiences.

AkuManiMani

28th December 2009, 11:32 AM

There must have been a Death Star canteen, yes? JK

So Han Solo is frozen in carbonite and given to Jabba the Hut. Let's call the time Han Solo is first put in suspended animation T1. Let's also suppose he's in stasis for 10 years. Long enough for all the atoms that made up Han at T1 to be replaced by other atoms. So the conventional wisdom is that, when Han is revived at T10, he's still Han Solo. This is true even though Han hasn't had an active mental state from T1 to T10 and none of Han's original atoms (at T1) make up Han anymore.

So let's suppose we "tagged" all of Han's original atoms at T1 and collected them over the years. We also did a complete scan of Han at T1 (and the carbonite he's encased in). Now, right before T10 rolls around, we take all of Han's original atoms that we've collected, and with the aid of the scan we made at T1, we make a perfect duplicate of Han at T9.999. We call this (O)Han (Original Atoms of Han). (O)Han is encased in the same carbonite as Han is. So when T10 rolls around, both Han and (O)Han are revived. Which is the real Han Solo?

Han's atoms get replaced over the years just by being alive. Every living critter is a ship of Theseus.

Malerin

28th December 2009, 12:05 PM

Han's atoms get replaced over the years just by being alive. Every living critter is a ship of Theseus.

I think this is true of all physical objects, alive or not. I've read the Mona Lisa's original atoms have long been dispersed and replaced by other atoms.

But anyway, the argument would go that Han is Han Solo at T1, then at T1.1, Han is still Han Solo, even though a few atoms have migrated out and been replaced... so there is continuity of identity to the point where Han is Han Solo at T10 even though none of the atoms that made up Han at T1 are present.

I see two problems with this:
1. It's not clear why an incremental change should make any difference. Suppose at T1.1 we destroyed Han completely. Then at T9.9, we changed our minds and rebuilt Han with different atoms. It's clear, to me at least, that Han Solo was killed at T1.1 and what you have now is a copy of Han Solo. I don't see why doing it piece-by-piece is any different than doing it all at once.
2. If we teleported Han at T1 instead of putting him in suspended animation, there's no incremental change at all. Han comes back at T10 with all his original atoms and is Han Solo. This would make (O)Han the best candidate for being Han Solo. Why should a 10 year teleportation be different than 10 years of suspended animation?

AkuManiMani

28th December 2009, 02:43 PM

I think this is true of all physical objects, alive or not. I've read the Mona Lisa's original atoms have long been dispersed and replaced by other atoms.

But anyway, the argument would go that Han is Han Solo at T1, then at T1.1, Han is still Han Solo, even though a few atoms have migrated out and been replaced... so there is continuity of identity to the point where Han is Han Solo at T10 even though none of the atoms that made up Han at T1 are present.

I see two problems with this:
1. It's not clear why an incremental change should make any difference. Suppose at T1.1 we destroyed Han completely. Then at T9.9, we changed our minds and rebuilt Han with different atoms. It's clear, to me at least, that Han Solo was killed at T1.1 and what you have now is a copy of Han Solo. I don't see why doing it piece-by-piece is any different than doing it all at once.

Which means that what makes Han Han, isn't the particular atoms that hes composed of at any given moment, but whatever the organizing process is that causes those atoms to conform to the entity we identify as Han.

2. If we teleported Han at T1 instead of putting him in suspended animation, there's no incremental change at all. Han comes back at T10 with all his original atoms and is Han Solo. This would make (O)Han the best candidate for being Han Solo. Why should a 10 year teleportation be different than 10 years of suspended animation?

I tend to think that it would be of great importance to know what memories are [physically speaking], how brains store memories, and how those memories are accessed. Even recreating your desktop, atom-for-atom, wont necessarily transfer it's software. Infact, theres a good chance that the hypothetical teleporter would produce a wiped hard drive.

theprestige

28th December 2009, 04:47 PM

Wow, the "ship of Theseus" sounds really awsome until you realize it's already been done to death by both Star Trek and The Sixth Day.

Third Eye Open

28th December 2009, 05:39 PM

AkuManiMani

28th December 2009, 06:49 PM

.... Infact, theres a good chance that the hypothetical teleporter would produce a wiped hard drive.

Really? That is interesting, any chance you could explain your reasoning behind this for a layman?

If the 'teleporter' in question is simply reconstructing the structure of the hardware [the arrangement of its atoms] without regard to the information stored on the magnetic tape of the drive, then none of the software on it will be on the recreated hardware. Some provisions would have to be made to either; [.a.] ensure that the transference method reproduces exactly the same magnetic state of the original disk, or [.b.] to copy the software from a back-up source.

Third Eye Open

28th December 2009, 08:29 PM

If the 'teleporter' in question is simply reconstructing the structure of the hardware [the arrangement of its atoms] without regard to the information stored on the magnetic tape of the drive, then none of the software on it will be on the recreated hardware. Some provisions would have to be made to either; [.a.] ensure that the transference method reproduces exactly the same magnetic state of the original disk, or [.b.] to copy the software from a back-up source.

I am not understanding how the information stored on the magnetic tape could be a property of anything other than the arrangement of it's atoms. Again, layman here.

ETA: I thought that in most of these thought experiments it was granted that the copy was an exact copy.

athon

28th December 2009, 08:36 PM

It would be odd to say they both are Han Solo. "Han Solo" refers to one particular person.

You're entire argument lies in how you feel about this, not how you think about it. It feels weird or odd...like it shouldn't work. So? That's the whole point of philosophy - to put odd feelings aside and use reason to figure it out.

You would have to explain how the identity of one person can be split between two persons.

This would only be strange if you assumed identity was some metaphysical entity which was subject to physical rules. If it was an abstract way of describing a person's perspective of their memories as well as their behaviours, there's no reason you couldn't have two people reflect on the same memories and both have equal rights to think of themselves as 'Han Solo'.

Athon

AkuManiMani

28th December 2009, 09:22 PM

I am not understanding how the information stored on the magnetic tape could be a property of anything other than the arrangement of it's atoms. Again, layman here.

Think of it this way. You could have two iron bars that had the same number of atoms arranged in exactly the same structure. However, one could be completely magnetized while the other is not. The structural arrangement of the bars' atoms are the same but their magnetic states may still vary.

The same is true of our computer hard disks. Their structure and composition are the same regardless of what software is stored on them. Software is a magnetic field pattern 'written' on the atoms of the computer hardware; they aren't tangible material objects.

ETA: I thought that in most of these thought experiments it was granted that the copy was an exact copy.

Yea, thats generally the basic assumption of these thought experiments, but Malerin made it a point to emphasize that in this scenario 'teleportation' meant that atoms were being replaced. I suspect that the point of his thought experiment was to suggest that a person's identity is something intangible.

Andrew Wiggin

28th December 2009, 10:38 PM

Put....the bong...down.

Steve S.

What he said...

A

Soapy Sam

29th December 2009, 01:31 AM

This whole thread is based on ridiculous suppositions about a work of fiction.

The "Death Star" was the size of a small moon for any sake.

There had to be dozens of canteens!

Guybrush Threepwood

29th December 2009, 01:46 AM

I think this is true of all physical objects, alive or not. I've read the Mona Lisa's original atoms have long been dispersed and replaced by other atoms.

Slight derail, but surely this is total nonsense? What is the mechanism for a titanium or lead atom to leave the Mona Lisa, and be replaced in the exact same position by another atom of the same element?

PingOfPong

29th December 2009, 01:50 AM

You would have to explain how the identity of one person can be split between two persons.

People say that I'm just like my father. They tell me that when they talk to me on the phone they get confused and think they're talking to him instead of me. If I didn't look different from him then I could easily fool people into thinking I'm him.

It's not just other people. As I get older I often find myself thinking "This is exactly what my father would have done". Identity doesn't have to be some binary proposition of is or is not. You could put it on a graded scale. I'm not my father but I can definitely feel my connection to him. I'm more like my father than, oh I don't know, George Lucas.

cyborg

29th December 2009, 02:09 AM

Third Eye Open

29th December 2009, 03:04 AM

People say that I'm just like my father. They tell me that when they talk to me on the phone they get confused and think they're talking to him instead of me. If I didn't look different from him then I could easily fool people into thinking I'm him.

It's not just other people. As I get older I often find myself thinking "This is exactly what my father would have done". Identity doesn't have to be some binary proposition of is or is not. You could put it on a graded scale. I'm not my father but I can definitely feel my connection to him. I'm more like my father than, oh I don't know, George Lucas.

Exactly right. Everything is a gradient. We have evolved to think in terms of black and white, right and wrong, is and is not. But in reality there are no such absolutes.

That is why there is so much time spent arguing over the definition of words on these forums.

Malerin

29th December 2009, 09:05 AM

You're entire argument lies in how you feel about this, not how you think about it.

It feels weird or odd...like it shouldn't work. So? That's the whole point of philosophy - to put odd feelings aside and use reason to figure it out.

Not really. In fields like ethics, intution is often appealed to. Judith Thomson's violinst analogy is an attempt to jusifty abortion in the case of rape/incest because it seems wrong to be forced to have someone hooked up to your body for 9 months.

This would only be strange if you assumed identity was some metaphysical entity which was subject to physical rules. If it was an abstract way of describing a person's perspective of their memories as well as their behaviours, there's no reason you couldn't have two people reflect on the same memories and both have equal rights to think of themselves as 'Han Solo'.

There are a few reasons they can't both be Han Solo:

1. Names are singluar labels. They pick out a specific person. Both Han and (O)Han are persons. If both Han and (O)Han are Han Solo, the entire convention of naming breaks down.
2. Names are singular labels for a good reason. If two people are Han Solo, then explain which one you would arrest if Han Solo accidentally kills someone in a bar fight. If Han Solo had a job lined up for him when he thawed out, who gets the job? If (O)Han dies, is Han Solo half dead? If (O)Han is killed, is it murder? After all, Han Solo is not dead. If Han wins the lottery, should (O)Han get anything? If Han Solo knocks a girl up, are both Han and (O)Han fathers?
3. If (O)Han and Han are Han Solo, then his wife, by virtue of being married to Han Solo, is guilty of polygamy.

So, I don't think that approach works.

cyborg

29th December 2009, 09:39 AM

1. Names are singluar labels. They pick out a specific person. Both Han and (O)Han are persons. If both Han and (O)Han are Han Solo, the entire convention of naming breaks down.

There are no duplicate names in this universe?

Cynic

29th December 2009, 09:53 AM

There are a few reasons they can't both be Han Solo:

1. Names are singluar labels. They pick out a specific person. Both Han and (O)Han are persons. If both Han and (O)Han are Han Solo, the entire convention of naming breaks down.
2. Names are singular labels for a good reason. If two people are Han Solo, then explain which one you would arrest if Han Solo accidentally kills someone in a bar fight. If Han Solo had a job lined up for him when he thawed out, who gets the job? If (O)Han dies, is Han Solo half dead? If (O)Han is killed, is it murder? After all, Han Solo is not dead. If Han wins the lottery, should (O)Han get anything? If Han Solo knocks a girl up, are both Han and (O)Han fathers?
3. If (O)Han and Han are Han Solo, then his wife, by virtue of being married to Han Solo, is guilty of polygamy.

So, I don't think that approach works.

Life is messy, Malerin. You're basically postulating something strange and unusual and then declaring that because the fallout of the solution to your question is strange and unusual, it's the wrong solution. Your aversion is completely based on your being uncomfortable with how it works out, but that has nothing to do with the truth of the answer to the question you're asking. If this happened in real life:

1. Naming conventions mean nothing (there have been many, many people named John Smith).

2. You arrest both. Both split the proceeds. In the previous situations, only if the acts occurred before the split. Until they, they're both guilty of the initial act, right? If one is killed, then one is dead, one is not. From the moment of divergence, they are individuals in every sense. The rest in this string either doesn't follow, or is just silly.

3. His wife wouldn't be guilty of anything, initially -- she didn't do anything. Legally, she would need to divorce one to stay legal.

In all cases, what you do is ask Han. If they both declare that they are the true Han, then they are both correct.

Zalbik

29th December 2009, 10:08 AM

1. Names are singluar labels. They pick out a specific person. Both Han and (O)Han are persons. If both Han and (O)Han are Han Solo, the entire convention of naming breaks down.
2. Names are singular labels for a good reason. If two people are Han Solo, then explain which one you would arrest if Han Solo accidentally kills someone in a bar fight. If Han Solo had a job lined up for him when he thawed out, who gets the job? If (O)Han dies, is Han Solo half dead? If (O)Han is killed, is it murder? After all, Han Solo is not dead. If Han wins the lottery, should (O)Han get anything? If Han Solo knocks a girl up, are both Han and (O)Han fathers?
3. If (O)Han and Han are Han Solo, then his wife, by virtue of being married to Han Solo, is guilty of polygamy.

1. Yes, names are singular labels. This is mainly because we have no way of copying people. I remember when "The Space Shuttle" was a singular label. Once more than one was built, should we suddenly have said "No, you can't call the new one the space shuttle...that name is already used!"

2. Another confusion between type identity and and token identity. Most people are claiming that Han and (O)Han have the same right to the "Han" type. They are both a type of "Han Solo". Just like a car can be a "Honda Civic", even if multiple "Honda Civic"'s exist.

IMHO, the answers to your questions would be:
Whichever Han got into the fight should be arrested.
Both have equal claim to the job.
No, if (O)Han dies, Han is still completely alive
Yes, if (O)Han is killed, it is murder
If Han wins the lottery, (O)Han get's nothing (unless the ticket was purchased prior to freezing, in which case each have equal claim)
If Han knocked a girl up prior to freezing, both are the father (strange as that may seem). After, whoever did it is the father
etc....

It seems weird because the whole thought experiment is weird. Language evolves to deal with the situations we experience. As new situations are experienced, I'm certain we'll come up with the appropriate language / laws to deal with them.

Malerin

29th December 2009, 10:26 AM

There are no duplicate names in this universe?

Of course, but John Smith who lives in Florida is not the same person as John Smith who lives in California. Each instance of "John Smith" refers to a particular individual. That's not what's being suggested here.

phunk

29th December 2009, 10:27 AM

I think this is true of all physical objects, alive or not. I've read the Mona Lisa's original atoms have long been dispersed and replaced by other atoms.

No that's not true at all. Only true of living things that consume and excrete, not solid inanimate objects (or frozen people).

Not to start a star wars vs star trek argument, but this question would make more sense framed as a teleporter accident. :)

Howie Felterbush

29th December 2009, 10:31 AM

2. Names are singular labels for a good reason. If two people are Han Solo, then explain which one you would arrest if Han Solo accidentally kills someone in a bar fight.

Greedo shot first.

Malerin

29th December 2009, 11:01 AM

Life is messy, Malerin. You're basically postulating something strange and unusual and then declaring that because the fallout of the solution to your question is strange and unusual, it's the wrong solution. Your aversion is completely based on your being uncomfortable with how it works out, but that has nothing to do with the truth of the answer to the question you're asking.

It's not uncomfortable, it's incoherent, for the reasons I gave. If Han Solo refers to both Han and (O)Han (and vice versa), then insolube problems ensue.

If this happened in real life:

1. Naming conventions mean nothing (there have been many, many people named John Smith).

But each "John Smith" refers to a particular individual. That's the convention: a proper noun picks out a particular thing. As I said, there's a good reason a particular name refers to only one person.

2. You arrest both.

But if we're dealing with two individuals, it's possible that Han Solo committed a crime but (O)Han did nothing. If Han is Han Solo and (O)Han is Han Solo, then a crime committed by Han means a crime was comitted by Han Solo, which means a crime was comitted by (O)Han.

Both split the proceeds. In the previous situations, only if the acts occurred before the split. Until they, they're both guilty of the initial act, right? If one is killed, then one is dead, one is not. From the moment of divergence, they are individuals in every sense. The rest in this string either doesn't follow, or is just silly.

You see the contradiction? You admit they are two individuals. Yet you want them to share a name that previously only referred to a single individual. Then the problems I talked about ensue.

3. His wife wouldn't be guilty of anything, initially -- she didn't do anything. Legally, she would need to divorce one to stay legal.

Here's the problem: Han is Han Solo. (O)Han is Han Solo. If she divorces Han Solo she divorces both of them. Remember, it doesn't say Han or (O)Han on the marriage certificate. It says Han Solo. She can't divorce one without divorcing both.

In all cases, what you do is ask Han. If they both declare that they are the true Han, then they are both correct.

Can a person have two minds? Can one person be in Chicago and New York at the same time? At T1, Han Solo referred to a single individual. Han Solo had one mind and could not be in New York and Chicago at the same time. What you're saying is after T10, the same Han Solo now has two minds and is able to be in two different places at once. Do you see the problem yet?

theprestige

29th December 2009, 11:11 AM

Malerin

29th December 2009, 11:34 AM

Malerin, please explain how "two guys named Han Solo" is a problem impossible to solve, but "two guys named John Smith" is a problem we have no trouble solving at every level of our experience from the bureaucratic to the existential.

Every instance of "John Smith" refers to a single individual. Bureaucratically, the two "John Smiths" have different S.S. numbers. Each person calling themself John Smith has a unique number.

It's being argued that a particular instance of a name ("Han Solo") can refer to two individuals. Among other problems, the two individuals "Han Solo" now refers to would share Han Solo's S.S. number.

Malerin

29th December 2009, 01:32 PM

Murder is defined socially, not objectively.

No murder in a state of nature?

If there are people who want to see him again, then it would probably be a bad idea to junk (O)Han.

This is odd. What if no one ever wanted to see him again? Does that make it OK?

Third Eye Open

29th December 2009, 01:35 PM

It's not impossible, it's extremely simple. Neither Han Solo is the same as the one that was frozen, just like you aren't the same 'you' that you were yesterday.

Identity is constantly changing and updating with every experience, moment to moment.

There was one Han Solo, now there is two, both different from each other and different than they were in the past.

Gestahl

29th December 2009, 01:43 PM

There's four ways this could go.

1. They're both Han Solo
2. Neither of them are Han Solo
3. One of them is Han Solo
4. Our notions of personal identity are unreliable for these kind of thought experiments.

I don't think (1) or (2) make much sense. That leaves figuring out who the real Han Solo is or refining what personal identity across time means .

This is an excellent observation. The answer depends on your ontology. Here's another thought-experiment, more applicable to the classic "teleporter" thought experiments, but still applicable.

Think of a whirlpool, or eddy off of a paddle in a canoe. It's certainly labeled as a real thing. However, it isn't a physical object, it's simply an ordered movement of (a highly varying quantity and non-stable set of) physical objects, just like sound (and you, for that matter). It's just much less complex, long-lived, and interesting (unless you are a philosopher who loves analogies).

Now, I pose this question to you: I have a specially designed motor embedded in the crook of Y-shaped channel cut into a block of metal. If I induce a liquid vortex, and it travels to the motor, the motor changes the liquid's movement so that two vortices emerge and go their separate ways down the two top ends of the Y. I release Whirlpool #245 (just a convenient label), and it splits. What of the two vortices at the end?

1) They are both whirlpool #245, or they both contain some of the the atoms and momentum of the original.
2) Neither are whirlpool #245, they are both completely new entities.

I agree, neither of these make much sense.

3) One of them is whirlpool #245, the other is not.

This makes less sense than 1 or 2.

4) The question is ill-formed.

I'm going with 4. Of course, if you believe in dualism, you make a very special distinction between whirlpools and minds. But even from both Han's perspectives, each is Han, and each will swear up and down, with complete conviction, that he is Han Solo. So we can't tell from the outside, and Han can't tell from the inside. Of what use would it be to distinguish the "real" Han Solo, rather than simply arbitrarily assigning 1 and 2 to their names with a coin flip.

Malerin

29th December 2009, 01:52 PM

It's not impossible, it's extremely simple. Neither Han Solo is the same as the one that was frozen, just like you aren't the same 'you' that you were yesterday.

But it's still "you". When you think back on a childhood memory, I'm assuming you think it was "you" who had the experience, not some other person.

Identity is constantly changing and updating with every experience, moment to moment.

Well, the particulars that make up identity can be constantly changing (memories, atoms, etc.). You're still "you" from moment to moment, right?

There was one Han Solo, now there is two, both different from each other and different than they were in the past.

That's certainly an option. But it's not an option we would have taken if
(O)Han hadn't been created. Why does assembling (O)Han suddenly negate Han's claim to being Han Solo?

Third Eye Open

29th December 2009, 02:11 PM

But it's still "you". When you think back on a childhood memory, I'm assuming you think it was "you" who had the experience, not some other person.

Yes, exactly.

Well, the particulars that make up identity can be constantly changing (memories, atoms, etc.). You're still "you" from moment to moment, right?

Right.

That's certainly an option. But it's not an option we would have taken if
(O)Han hadn't been created. Why does assembling (O)Han suddenly negate Han's claim to being Han Solo?

It doesn't negate it. They are both Han Solo in exactly the way you would still be 'you' even if you forgot everything that happened yesterday, or if you had taken physics instead of philosophy in college.

theprestige

29th December 2009, 03:18 PM

Every instance of "John Smith" refers to a single individual. Bureaucratically, the two "John Smiths" have different S.S. numbers. Each person calling themself John Smith has a unique number.

It's being argued that a particular instance of a name ("Han Solo") can refer to two individuals. Among other problems, the two individuals "Han Solo" now refers to would share Han Solo's S.S. number.
Maybe in your Empire.

In my Empire, the copy would get a new S.S. number. Problem solved!

And we know which one is the copy, because we have records of the laborious process you went through to make the copy. One copy arrived at Jabba's palace on Slave 1. The other arrived on whatever medical transport vessel you have at your disposal.

So there's clearly a separate and unique life history for each Han Solo, making it absolutely trivial to create separate and unique identities for them.

The rest of it is no different from the amnesiac who can't remember his identity-history, the delusional who remembers an incorrect identity history, and the identity thief who professes to an identity-history not his own. None of these raise particularly insurmountable bureaucratic or philsophical conundrums WRT identity.

athon

29th December 2009, 03:25 PM

Not really. In fields like ethics, intution is often appealed to.

If you mean 'field of ethics' as in the study of it, or the application of those studies (such as on ethics boards), then intuition isn't an essential component at all. Ethicists endeavour to remove their own person beliefs from the picture and view the ethics involved from the perspective of the culture in which they are operating or studying. Nothing 'intuitive' about it, but often a lot of hard work gathering data from the community.

So, no, gut intuition is not a philosophical tool. In any case, this isn't an ethical situation. We can put that red herring to rest. Your intuition is irrelevant.

1. Names are singluar labels. They pick out a specific person. Both Han and (O)Han are persons. If both Han and (O)Han are Han Solo, the entire convention of naming breaks down.

Not at all. You've found a way around it. Han Solo is the individual prior to the split, and you've added qualifiers to describe them after. No confusion at all, and the convention remains useful.

2. Names are singular labels for a good reason. If two people are Han Solo, then explain which one you would arrest if Han Solo accidentally kills someone in a bar fight. If Han Solo had a job lined up for him when he thawed out, who gets the job? If (O)Han dies, is Han Solo half dead? If (O)Han is killed, is it murder? After all, Han Solo is not dead. If Han wins the lottery, should (O)Han get anything? If Han Solo knocks a girl up, are both Han and (O)Han fathers?
3. If (O)Han and Han are Han Solo, then his wife, by virtue of being married to Han Solo, is guilty of polygamy.

Your argument is 'what would the cultural ramifications be?'. That's it? They couldn't be the same person because we don't have the social tools for dealing with it??

I'm sorry, I thought this was a serious question based on a philosophical conundrum. My mistake. :rolleyes:

Athon

PingOfPong

29th December 2009, 09:56 PM

I'm curious Malerin. What would you do in Han Solo's shoes? If I came face to face with my exact copy and we could pass a series of questions to establish that we're not just look-alikes, I would be inclined to split my bank accounts and divvy everything up. We couldn't have the same first name but that's only because of pragmatic reasons. Anything that couldn't be shared would have to be decided with something arbitrary like the toss of a coin. Deciding who gets our girlfriend might end in a fight though. Or, deciding who has to keep our girlfriend might end in a fight. It depends on how she's been treating us lately.

Third Eye Open

29th December 2009, 10:12 PM

Malerin, which is the 'original' branch?

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/thum_240214b3aef3f824fe.jpg (http://forums.randi.org/vbimghost.php?do=displayimg&imgid=18588)

PingOfPong

29th December 2009, 11:27 PM

Malerin, I've got another one for you. I may seem unrelated at first but bear with me.

Two people are standing on each of Earth's poles. They have super X-ray vision so they can still see each other. North man looks at South man and says, "You are upside-down and I am right-side-up". South man looks at North man and says, "You are upside-down and I am right-side-up". Which one is truly right-side-up?

mike3

30th December 2009, 12:06 AM

Schrodinger and/or his cat.:)

meow

cyborg

30th December 2009, 01:29 AM

Malerin

30th December 2009, 08:19 AM

Malerin

30th December 2009, 08:23 AM

Well yes it is, but it does completely destroy your labeling argument.

I don't think you're getting it. Someone says, "Hey, John Smith, how have you been?"
How many people are they talking to?

Cynic

30th December 2009, 08:53 AM

But each "John Smith" refers to a particular individual. That's the convention: a proper noun picks out a particular thing. As I said, there's a good reason a particular name refers to only one person.

As PingofPong mentioned though -- what if it were you? Would you be prepared to give up what is yours, or accept the blame for what another version of you did after the branching because of a language convention? I think not! Conventions apply to what is normal. Deviations address aberrations, which is what your scenario is.

But if we're dealing with two individuals, it's possible that Han Solo committed a crime but (O)Han did nothing. If Han is Han Solo and (O)Han is Han Solo, then a crime committed by Han means a crime was committed by Han Solo, which means a crime was committed by (O)Han.

But you're ignoring time here. If the crime was committed before the branch, then both are guilty. Both will remember doing the crime and both will require punishment or rehabilitation. If the crime occurred after the branch, then only the Han responsible for the crime is guilty. Hence the language convention "responsible for the crime".

You see the contradiction? You admit they are two individuals. Yet you want them to share a name that previously only referred to a single individual. Then the problems I talked about ensue.
.........
Here's the problem: Han is Han Solo. (O)Han is Han Solo. If she divorces Han Solo she divorces both of them. Remember, it doesn't say Han or (O)Han on the marriage certificate. It says Han Solo. She can't divorce one without divorcing both.

But I don't care if they share a name or not. That's up to the Hans to sort out, and their registry codes up to whatever government agency they exist under, should either Han agree to submit to it.

At Han's wife's choosing, she can divorce one or both of the Hans, or, if she's in a society in which that isn't illegal, she can remain married to either of them if they're both in agreement with that. Is that messy? Sure. Is that a "problem"? Sure. But that's the situation -- they are effectively equal. Any attempt to declare that one is necessarily primary over the other for things that occurred before the split is a lie, even if one of convenience, and will have no semblance to reality or justice.

Can a person have two minds? Can one person be in Chicago and New York at the same time? At T1, Han Solo referred to a single individual. Han Solo had one mind and could not be in New York and Chicago at the same time. What you're saying is after T10, the same Han Solo now has two minds and is able to be in two different places at once. Do you see the problem yet?

Yes, and the problem is that you're being silly, Malerin. ;)

No one is saying they are literally the same person after the branching. After the branch, they are of course separate entities, each with its own unique experience and makeup -- but only the bits after the branching are unique. Anything they do after the branching is on each individual. Anything that necessarily entails an action taken before the split is on both of them, because anything done before that point was necessarily done by one person. That's by definition of "before the split".

This isn't that difficult. I maintain that your objection is that it's messy, not that it's incorrect.

Take a look at that tree Third Eye Open posted. That's it in a nutshell. Or, it was in a nutshell before it branched.

I Ratant

30th December 2009, 09:23 AM

Third Eye Open

30th December 2009, 03:10 PM

.
One man enters, one man leaves.
There's no possibility of anything changing while suspended in carbonite.

Right. They start changing after they wake up.

I Ratant

30th December 2009, 03:20 PM

Right. They start changing after they wake up.
.
There is NO "THEY"....!!! It's only the original that comes out of the carbonite!

Third Eye Open

30th December 2009, 04:23 PM

.
There is NO "THEY"....!!! It's only the original that comes out of the carbonite!

Not according to the OP.

(O)Han is encased in the same carbonite as Han is. So when T10 rolls around, both Han and (O)Han are revived. Which is the real Han Solo?

I Ratant

30th December 2009, 04:52 PM

Not according to the OP.
.
The OP has a basic error, as has been pointed out.
Nothing happens in carbonite.
Nothing can happen in carbonite.
Therefore any musing about things developing while in carbonite are futile.
Suspended animation means exactly that.

Cynic

30th December 2009, 06:13 PM

.
The OP has a basic error, as has been pointed out.
Nothing happens in carbonite.
Nothing can happen in carbonite.
Therefore any musing about things developing while in carbonite are futile.
Suspended animation means exactly that.

Re-read the OP again and get back to us.

I Ratant

30th December 2009, 07:05 PM

Nothing about living occurs in -suspended animation-.
That's what carbonite encapsulation is.
Nothing goes in, so no life processes can proceed, with the sloughing off and discarding of cellular material as is normal, outside the suspension of animation.
Beard doesn't grow, fingernails don't grow, skin cells don't slough off, nothing happens.
No food/air/water in that would normally be processed to replace the cells that are Han. And there's no excretion processes.
Animation is -suspended-!
The only material in the carbonite is the suspended Han.
Removing anything from him would result in nothing left in the carbonite at the end of a nominal replacement sequence... which doesn't happen in the first place; nothing changes.

cyborg

31st December 2009, 04:13 AM

I don't think you're getting it. Someone says, "Hey, John Smith, how have you been?"
How many people are they talking to?

One.

Is that supposed to be a stumper? If you're talking to someone you're generally going to be looking at them.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

31st December 2009, 04:31 AM

Of course, but John Smith who lives in Florida is not the same person as John Smith who lives in California. Each instance of "John Smith" refers to a particular individual. That's not what's being suggested here.
Yes, it is. There are two individuals.

You know, we've had the "make a duplicate with the transporter" conversation at least three times. There's nothing new here. Interesting Ian isn't around, so we don't have "the copy would be a dead zombie" proponent, but otherwise it's repeat theatre.

~~ Paul

Marcuse

31st December 2009, 04:34 AM

@I Ratant
You're absolutely right there.
@Malerin
Your fallacy is this-->"Let's also suppose he's in stasis for 10 years. Long enough for all the atoms that made up Han at T1 to be replaced by other atoms."
When Han is froozen the metabolism in his body stops, as he is an organic lifeform and thus he will be kept in his original state until thawed. No exchange of atoms in his body. This also explains the fallacy of the rather cute assumption that atoms in a non-organic object i.e the painting of Mona Lisa is continuosly replaced with time.;) Hey, this is JREF you should'nt believe what you "hear" like that! Just as Guybrush Threepwood put it "surely this is total nonsense?". It is, because dead objects don't have metabolism thus there is no exchange of materia within them that will maintain their shape. Of course they will loose or gain materia but that's an unintentional random process and therefor will not maintan the motif of a painting or the shape of a statue or whatever. It is philosophically interesting though that 'intention' is necessary there.
:rolleyes:

//Lars (and the fake girl?)

Marcuse

31st December 2009, 05:00 AM

"Of course they will loose or gain materia but that's an unintentional process", when no person with intentions are touching them that is!

"i.e the painting of Mona.." should be "for example the painting..." :p

Maybe i should try to answer the qusetion also:
It's not a question about weather they would be real or not, because they both would be. Are they the same person? Well, same to whom? To themselves or to the people around them? I think the knowledge of their history is the key to answering that question, their own knowledge and any others. They should be able to agree upon the fact that one of them has been thawed and the other duplicated, assuming they have experienced this. The history is, that a copy has been made of an original and i would say that we have created one individual out of the other. They both now have their own unique past, present and future in time (history). Therefore, any "observer" should treat them as equals in regards to rights and human value etc, but that is really a subject to opinion, i guess. The interesting question is though how they would treat eachother in regards to rights and human value etc? If they both have the same knowledge about their respective histoty i think that knowledge must be the foundation for any claims and opinions about eachother, not?

Your history is an essential part of your identity i would say, this also becomes clear when people loose their memory or ability to remember. They become "nobody". Though both Hans in this case have a memory and a past. I think it would be morally wrong to make a copy out of Han without his agreement to it in the first place, that's another thing to ponder.:)

Two films that touches these matters: "The Prestige" and "Moon".

//Lars

Marcuse

31st December 2009, 05:12 AM

@Cynic
I guess you made most of that clear there. ;)

Cynic

31st December 2009, 10:47 AM

@Cynic
I guess you made most of that clear there. ;)

Explaining that the scenario is impossible is besides the point. In scenarios such as this, you're supposed to taken the premises as givens and determine what the outcomes are given them.

Sledge

1st January 2010, 01:27 AM

It's just annoying to sci fi nerds because the example to use would be the Star Trek episode "The Enemy Within," or the Star Trek: The Next Generation episode "Second Chances" which both deal with a character being duplicated. "The Enemy Within" would be an especially good choice because it deals with Kirk being split into a good and evil version, thus making it ideal for the discussion of how one would deal with one of the two committing a crime and how that would or should affect treatment of the other.

godless dave

1st January 2010, 01:33 AM

Sledge

1st January 2010, 01:40 AM

We know there's a Death Star canteen. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hp69rg6Hdlo)

Marcuse

1st January 2010, 11:44 AM

Wait. Why would all the atoms in his body be replaced by other atoms? I don't even think that happens in live humans, let alone hibernating humans encased in carbonite.

Research is going on about it. It is said that every 7 year all cells in your body has completely been replaced by new ones. Cells are made of atoms. It is probaly not true that exactly every cell is replaced, and the time interval of 7 years...who knows? What is known though is that many (most?) cells in our bodies are renewed, because they constantly die and are replaced by new ones.
;)

godless dave

1st January 2010, 03:51 PM

Got a link to this research? That runs counter to everything I know about human biology. I'm pretty sure some of the calcium in my bones has been there since I was born, and I'm positive many of the neurons in my brain have been there since I was born.

Marcuse

1st January 2010, 04:28 PM

I don't have a link to any research claiming that every cell is replaced every 7 year. I have a link to a short article in swedish though , were the researchers claim it is a myth.
<nyteknik.se/nyheter/innovation/forskning_utveckling/article372152.ece> it's from june 2008 though.

Read "It is said" as "It is rumoured". "Research is going on about it" means - noone knows for sure how often or how many cells are replaced and how this replacement differs between celltypes. I said: "What is known though is that many (most?) cells in our bodies are renewed, because they constantly die and are replaced by new ones." I never claimed that every cell was, it seems unlikely but maybe not impossible? The main issue was weather or not all atoms are replaced, maybe they are, even though some of our cells are not?

Got a link to this research? That runs counter to everything I know about human biology. I'm pretty sure some of the calcium in my bones has been there since I was born, and I'm positive many of the neurons in my brain have been there since I was born.

Maybe some calcium is left from birth, i don't know and what does it matter? I know that the bone tissue is constantly extracting and absorbing calcium so, maybe none left from birth? The neurons? I am also pretty sure many of them has been there from birth, pretty sure.

Lots of maybe's!

:)

godless dave

1st January 2010, 04:31 PM

Some, sure.

Marcuse

2nd January 2010, 02:38 AM

Explaining that the scenario is impossible is besides the point. In scenarios such as this, you're supposed to taken the premises as givens and determine what the outcomes are given them.

I did'nt try to explain that the scenario was impossible. One of his own assumption was wrong i. e that all atoms in Hans body was replaced after 10 years of suspended animation. Is that not important to answer the question: "Which is the real Han Solo?". If it does'nt matter if your in suspended animation or not, the atoms are still replaced, i.e believs in the fallacy, what remains of the main issue (the philosphical question) is simply wheather or not an exact copy of another person is "the real" person, right?

What's Jabba the Hut, Han Solo carbonite and suspended animation or whatever got to do with it? ;)
It would have something to do with it if we added the premise that atoms are replaced only during suspended animation, get my point?

3rd January 2010, 07:28 AM

3rd January 2010, 07:31 AM

I don't have a link to any research claiming that every cell is replaced every 7 year. I have a link to a short article in swedish though , were the researchers claim it is a myth.
<nyteknik.se/nyheter/innovation/forskning_utveckling/article372152.ece> it's from june 2008 though.

Read "It is said" as "It is rumoured". "Research is going on about it" means - noone knows for sure how often or how many cells are replaced and how this replacement differs between celltypes. I said: "What is known though is that many (most?) cells in our bodies are renewed, because they constantly die and are replaced by new ones." I never claimed that every cell was, it seems unlikely but maybe not impossible? The main issue was weather or not all atoms are replaced, maybe they are, even though some of our cells are not?

Maybe some calcium is left from birth, i don't know and what does it matter? I know that the bone tissue is constantly extracting and absorbing calcium so, maybe none left from birth? The neurons? I am also pretty sure many of them has been there from birth, pretty sure.

Lots of maybe's!

:)

Recent tissue age research shows that a portion of your brain is, on average, 2.9 years younger than you are; another portion is about 10 years younger than you are. These represent the two oldest tissues in your body, and constitutes over 90% of the brain, IIRC. So while there may be an issue with whether you at 2 is the same as you at 9 or you today (and I think very few people would question that), I don't think there's any problem with you today versus you ten years ago (unless, perhaps, you're only 18).

Malerin

3rd January 2010, 07:43 AM

3rd January 2010, 08:02 AM

"But what they may not know is that the body does its own extreme makeover regularly. In fact, 98 percent of the atoms in the body are replaced yearly."

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11893583

Sure, for beings not in stasis.

A being in stasis doesn't have respiration or metabolism or any other biological function, so none of its atoms would be replaced at all, Malerin.

As to the rather silly NPR article you linked to, it is really very out-of-date, and very inaccurate. All it did was track radioisotope distributions through the body. There is no possible way, I would say, that they can track 98% of the atoms of a human body by tracking the movement of a few hundred thousand radioactive isotopes. However, a link to the actual research article itself would be nice, if such research actually exists.

As it is, however, more recent research shows that far less than 98% of the cells of the body are replaced each year - in fact, the average is about 11 years (not counting neural cells, which may never be replaced) for total body replacement.

None of which is significant, unless you're making a claim that personhood/consciousness exists at a sub-cellular level. That's a bit like claiming Coca-Cola isn't the same company because 98% of its employees have changed over the years (which may or may not be philosophically and technically true, but from a legal standpoint, isn't...).

Malerin

3rd January 2010, 11:01 AM

I was responding to this:

Aside from which, your atoms aren't replaced every ten years. A majority of your cells may have been replaced in that time frame, but of those which remain (most of which are in the brain), only a fraction of their atomic structure has been replaced.

David Kestenbaum is a physicist, so presumably knows what he's talking about. If you could find anything to the contrary, that would be interesting. Atom replacement every 7 years was something one of my professors claimed once.

Regarding my claims about atom replacement and stasis, it should be noted the compound carbonite (as described in Star Wars) doesn't even exist, so I can be granted a little leeway in my thought experiment. If you like, I'll just change it so that carbonite, while keeping a person in stasis, still allows normal atom replacement to occur. :p

There is no possible way, I would say, that they can track 98% of the atoms of a human body by tracking the movement of a few hundred thousand radioactive isotopes.

Because extrapolation is impossible :rolleyes:

3rd January 2010, 12:31 PM

I was responding to this:

David Kestenbaum is a physicist, so presumably knows what he's talking about. If you could find anything to the contrary, that would be interesting. Atom replacement every 7 years was something one of my professors claimed once.

I submit, then, your professor was somewhat confused; and unless David Kestenbaum specializes in cellular metabolism, I highly doubt he knows what he's talking about, if he makes such a claim. As it is, he's a science correspondant 'with an extensive background in physics' - hardly what one expects of an expert in cellular metabolism.

As I understand it, about 60% of a cell is replaced during the normal functioning of a cell over the course of a year, but many parts are only replaced IF they are damaged (if at all), and portions of the nucleic acids are never replaced during normal cell function - just like portions of the brain are never replaced during the normal life function of a human being.

Regarding my claims about atom replacement and stasis, it should be noted the compound carbonite (as described in Star Wars) doesn't even exist, so I can be granted a little leeway in my thought experiment. If you like, I'll just change it so that carbonite, while keeping a person in stasis, still allows normal atom replacement to occur. :p

I wouldn't use the term 'stasis' then. The thought experiment fails if you mention 'stasis' of any kind, because that indicates a suspension of biological processes, which is exactly what is needed for this atomic replacement that is so central to your thought experiment.

Better to go with the usual, though by now quite hackneyed, thought experiment of the teletransporter device.

Because extrapolation is impossible :rolleyes:

Because extrapolation only works if they were to feed their subjects a sufficient quantity of EVERY KIND OF ATOM USED BY THE HUMAN BODY in radioactive form, to track atom replacement. The 'extrapolation' doesn't work precisely because there is every possibility that the atom or atoms used (the radioisotopes used) may be one that IS replaced in every cell, but doesn't necessarily represent all the other atomic structures that are NOT replaced in every cell.

It's like saying you irradiated a million tires, then tracked the migration patterns of the irradiated tires, and found that 98% of all car components were replaced over a five-year period. That's pretty much an accurate analogy.

I've been trying to find a link to the original research - if you have one, I'd love to review what actually was done. Thanks!

Malerin

3rd January 2010, 01:57 PM

I submit, then, your professor was somewhat confused; and unless David Kestenbaum specializes in cellular metabolism, I highly doubt he knows what he's talking about, if he makes such a claim. As it is, he's a science correspondant 'with an extensive background in physics' - hardly what one expects of an expert in cellular metabolism.

"extensive background in physics" = Doctorate in physics from Harvard. True, he's not a cellular biologist, but he's probably qualified to talk about a radiation experiment. Maybe he's wrong, who knows? Can you quote someone with a similar science background who disputes this?

As I understand it, about 60% of a cell is replaced during the normal functioning of a cell over the course of a year, but many parts are only replaced IF they are damaged (if at all), and portions of the nucleic acids are never replaced during normal cell function - just like portions of the brain are never replaced during the normal life function of a human being.

Cells die and are replaced entirely all the time: blood cells, skin cells are two that readily come to mind. The human body is around 70% water, so 70% of us is constanly being replaced.

I wouldn't use the term 'stasis' then. The thought experiment fails if you mention 'stasis' of any kind, because that indicates a suspension of biological processes, which is exactly what is needed for this atomic replacement that is so central to your thought experiment.

Stasis can actually refer to a slowdown of biological processes. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/STASIS
Anyway, I can just stipulate that carbonite keeps a person in stasis, and also replaces 10% of a person's atoms every year. Nanobots in the carbonite pluck out, say, a carbon atom and replace it with a different one. No biological process need occur. It's a made up substance, just go with it. If you don't like stasis, call it stoosis for all I care.

Better to go with the usual, though by now quite hackneyed, thought experiment of the teletransporter device.

Not really, because we can conceieve of a situation where the neurons in a person's brain are slowly replaced over time by "fresh" neurons (1% per month), but all the neural connections are maintained (again, nanobots). After 10 years of this, none of the person's original brain is present. Are they still the same person? This is a bit different than teleportation scenariors, which usually stipulate instanteous complete material changes.

Because extrapolation only works if they were to feed their subjects a sufficient quantity of EVERY KIND OF ATOM USED BY THE HUMAN BODY in radioactive form, to track atom replacement. The 'extrapolation' doesn't work precisely because there is every possibility that the atom or atoms used (the radioisotopes used) may be one that IS replaced in every cell, but doesn't necessarily represent all the other atomic structures that are NOT replaced in every cell.

It's like saying you irradiated a million tires, then tracked the migration patterns of the irradiated tires, and found that 98% of all car components were replaced over a five-year period. That's pretty much an accurate analogy.

I've been trying to find a link to the original research - if you have one, I'd love to review what actually was done. Thanks!

I agree it would be useful to have the research. I can't find it. Here's someone else's thoughts on the matter. Again, not a celluar biologist, but Dawkins quotes him in The God Delusion ("Not a single atom that is in your body today was there when that event took place").
http://stevegrand.wordpress.com/2009/01/12/where-do-those-damn-atoms-go/

3rd January 2010, 04:16 PM

"extensive background in physics" = Doctorate in physics from Harvard. True, he's not a cellular biologist, but he's probably qualified to talk about a radiation experiment. Maybe he's wrong, who knows? Can you quote someone with a similar science background who disputes this?

No, but neither can I find anyone (other than a few people referring back to his presentation of the research) who supports this, either. In fact, there seems to be no replication of the experiment, and it doesn't seem to have made much of a splash in the scientific community, on the face of things.

Cells die and are replaced entirely all the time: blood cells, skin cells are two that readily come to mind. The human body is around 70% water, so 70% of us is constanly being replaced.

Brain cells, however, are not replaced when they die. That's a pretty significant thing to consider in these hypotheticals. Furthermore, atoms in the crystalline lens of your eye are never replaced (except via surgery), and the materials of your teeth and the outer portions of your bones are never replaced, either (except through surgery). Histology experts say that the cells of the spinal cord are never replaced (in the normal course of a human's life), and biochemists say it would be impossible to replace many of the atoms in some cells without destroying or altering cell functions. Portions of the DNA are never replaced, either - which is why genetic diseases are a lifelong issue.

It may seem in some way common sense to say the body is entirely replaced, but it's simply not true - neither on the cellular level nor on the atomic level.

Stasis can actually refer to a slowdown of biological processes. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/STASIS
Anyway, I can just stipulate that carbonite keeps a person in stasis, and also replaces 10% of a person's atoms every year. Nanobots in the carbonite pluck out, say, a carbon atom and replace it with a different one. No biological process need occur. It's a made up substance, just go with it. If you don't like stasis, call it stoosis for all I care.

Well, sure, you could say this. You could say that an evil wizard swaps out all your cells a little at a time, and ask the same question. It's still fairly pointless, because it isn't going to happen anyway. Generally, the point of a thought experiment is to turn things over into a 'A-ha!' moment where you can say, 'but this is what happens, over time!' kind of situation. The thing is, this isn't what happens, apparently, so there's not a lot of point to this thought experiment. If the core cells of the brain are never replaced (and, heck, for all I know, that's only 2% of the body), it invalidates the entire thought experiment, essentially, by allowing consciousness to remain connected inextricably to a given set of materials.

Not really, because we can conceieve of a situation where the neurons in a person's brain are slowly replaced over time by "fresh" neurons (1% per month), but all the neural connections are maintained (again, nanobots). After 10 years of this, none of the person's original brain is present. Are they still the same person?

I'd say, probably not. But since this doesn't ever happen, we have no way of knowing.

Heck, you can see something similar happen with some stroke survivors or survivors of other brain injuries. Inflict enough damage to the brain, and a whole different person can emerge, complete with a new personality and memories, and everything else. We can destroy a personality in a brain through injury, illness, drugs, etc. So it's pretty clear that the personhood of any given person is tied directly to portions of the brain, and is directly affected (eliminated, etc.) by affecting the brain.

In essence, though, it's a simple matter of figuring out WHICH of the permanent brain cells change the personality when they're replaced, really - well, simple perhaps if we had advanced neurosurgical techniques, anyway... :D

This is a bit different than teleportation scenariors, which usually stipulate instanteous complete material changes.

More or less... the difference is essentially one of degrees. Plus, the teleportation scenario has loads of other, unrelated issues (like duplication, etc).

I agree it would be useful to have the research. I can't find it. Here's someone else's thoughts on the matter. Again, not a celluar biologist, but Dawkins quotes him in The God Delusion ("Not a single atom that is in your body today was there when that event took place").
http://stevegrand.wordpress.com/2009/01/12/where-do-those-damn-atoms-go/

And there's the big problem with quoting people who quote research - without the original research, it's just a matter of everybody parrotting facts that may or may not be true. In recent years, quite a few assertions that have been parrotted for decades have been revealed to be unfounded and untrue. Granted, at least David can give the year the research was done (but no other references), whereas Dawkins is quoting Davis. Eventually, you quote Davis (or Dawkins), and I quote you, and Bob quotes me... and sooner or later everyone's quoting everyone else, everyone says "Everybody knows that!", and no one really knows the facts.

So until we can find the original research, I strongly suggest that this NPR article (which is merely a secondary resource) be taken with a considerable grain of salt.

OTOH, there's quite a bit of research saying that cells in the brain and spinal cord are NOT replaced regularly (but that they are replaced more often than was once believed) if at all (for the majority of them), so I submit the weight of current evidence and research is that the core cells of the brain are NOT replaced, and therefore this hypothetical does not in any way reflect reality.

...

Besides... Everyone knows Han Solo has no personality to speak of... :p