Language is Material

[Dancing David]

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.

GO!

[Darat]

Don't be silly - it's not material it's magical, like running.

[TX50]

The symbols certainly have a material form. If you define language as merely the symbols then it is "material". Languages don't necessarily have to refer to physical objects, though. Mathematics is a language, but maths does not refer to physical objects. It can be applied to physical objects, but that's not the same thing.

IANAP (I Am Not A Philosopher) I'll just get my coat...

[Dymanic]

So, to what external physical object does, say, the word "meaning" refer?

[Apathia]

I'm going to sell you a bolt of simile.
Then I'm going to Home Depot and get a two by four of Atheism.
Could I borrow a couple of lumps of materialism?

[Ron_Tomkins]

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.

GO!

I see. Opening up a can of worms and then leaving it in a crowded area and running away.

You sir, are quite the terrorist ;)

[Trent Wray]

Is mathematics the "perfect" language?

Or is it at least ethically neutral?

[Beth]

Is mathematics the "perfect" language?

Or is it at least ethically neutral?

Depends how you define 'perfect'. Here'e a definition of a perfect set from one of my graduate math classes: a set that is everywhere dense and nowhere continuous. By this definition, the rational numbers are a perfect subset of the reals. [Gosh, I hope I'm remembering that correctly. It will be embarrassing if I get to my office tomorrow, look up the definition and discover I haven't remembered it correctly.]

[Trent Wray]

Depends how you define 'perfect'. Here'e a definition of a perfect set from one of my graduate math classes: a set that is everywhere dense and nowhere continuous. By this definition, the rational numbers are a perfect subset of the reals. [Gosh, I hope I'm remembering that correctly. It will be embarrassing if I get to my office tomorrow, look up the definition and discover I haven't remembered it correctly.] I guess when I say perfect I'm thinking more "neutral", or an unadultered, unambiguous fact.

Maybe parts of math are perfect and not open to interpretation. I mean, even the number "1" is open to interpretation, isn't it?

Maybe zero and infinity are the only perfect mathematical concepts.

Reminds me of a "medical joke" --- "asystole is the only stable rhythm" :shocked:

[Beth]

I guess when I say perfect I'm thinking more "neutral", or an unadultered, unambiguous fact.

Maybe parts of math are perfect and not open to interpretation. I mean, even the number "1" is open to interpretation, isn't it?

Maybe zero and infinity are the only perfect mathematical concepts.



Thanks for clarifying your definition. I think that the agreement regarding the meaning of the symbols corresponding to integers is as good as it gets for humans.

[Olowkow]

The symbols are arbitrary, and they change meaning in complex ways dependent on social and performance factors. Pinning down semantics, syntax and even a definition of natural language is a tricky proposition.

[Frank Newgent]

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.


My bolding.

Things as they are depend on things as they should be?

I'll paraphrase: Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has no meaning through external referents to physical objects. :cool:

[Robin]

So, to what external physical object does, say, the word "meaning" refer?
Depends on what you mean by "meaning".

[Robin]

I would describe language as the process of encoding ideas as systems of tokens.

[kellyb]

Stuff's complicated.

[Olowkow]

Stuff's complicated.
:) I was just sitting here as I was reading the thread, thinking, should I get into this? Nah, been there done that for so many years.

The thing is though, phonology is pretty well understood, and it is just amazing to play with. A lot of very smart people have been fooling around with syntax and semantics for a long time, looking for universals and general principles, and essentially zip, nada, zilch in the way of understanding what is going on. It is tantamount to delving into the psychology and the mind of the human animal. It would seem to me that there should be lots of similarities in the branches (phonology vs. syntax, for example), but it seems that each has its own secrets.

Where language is concerned, everyone thinks he's an expert, since we all find language so easy to acquire, and so you have all the simplistic theories about how it works. Trust me, if you think you understand theoretical linguistics, you don't understand linguistic theory.:)

How do you tell a machine, in principle mind you, when a speaker says, "It's chilly in here" that one of the accepted meanings is "Please close the window"? Just brute force for now.

[Robin]

Is mathematics the "perfect" language?
Not according to Chaitin:
In conclusion, we have seen that proving whether particular exponential
diophantine equations have finitely or infinitely many solutions, is
absolutely intractable. Such questions escape the power of mathematical
reasoning. This is a region in which mathematical truth has no
discernible structure or pattern and appears to be completely random.
These questions are completely beyond the power of human reasoning.
Mathematics cannot deal with them.

Quantum physics has shown that there is randomness in nature. I
believe that we have demonstrated in this paper that randomness is
already present in pure mathematics. This does not mean that the
universe and mathematics are lawless, it means that laws of a different
kind apply: statistical laws.

http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/aam.pdf

[Robin]

How do you tell a machine, in principle mind you, when a speaker says, "It's chilly in here" that one of the accepted meanings is "Please close the window"? Just brute force for now.
Until this moment I didn't know that "Please close the window" was one of the accepted meanings of "it's chilly in here". Maybe I am closer to the machine side.

[I Ratant]

It's only words, just words.
Actions speak louder, I've been told.
My mangling of German when I was in Germany was amusing to me, and puzzling to the Germans trying to comprehend my English parsing of German phrases. :)

[Robin]

Maybe zero and infinity are the only perfect mathematical concepts.
Infinity is far from perfect as a mathematical concept - some mathematicians argue the term should be dropped altogether.

[Robin]

In another thread I was asked "Is language physical?" to which I replied, in my opinion, that it was.

Later someone confused this with the claim that language was a material object. But of course language is not an object at all.

But I was asked to justify the claim and I said that I would debate this in a separate thread. However here is the dilemma. I don't want to be supporting the premiss "language is physical" in a thread titled "language is material" for the reasons of the above confusion.

On the other hand, if I start a thread entitled "Is language physical?" then most likely it will get merged into this one.

So maybe I will leave the question alone until this thread saunters over to page 2.

[Beth]

In another thread I was asked "Is language physical?" to which I replied, in my opinion, that is was.

Later someone confused this with the claim that language was a material object. But of course language is not an object at all.

But I was asked to justify the claim and I said that I would debate this in a separate thread. However here is the dilemma. I don't want to be supporting the premiss "language is physical" in a thread titled "language is material" for the reasons of the above confusion.

On the other hand, if I start a thread entitled "Is language physical?" then most likely it will get merged into this one.

So maybe I will leave the question alone until this thread saunters over to page 2.

Let me paraphrase to see if I understand you correctly: Language is material but not physical.

If that's what you mean, could you explain the difference to me? What does it mean to say that something is "material" but not "physical"?

If that isn't what you mean, I'm not getting it at all.

[Robin]

Let me paraphrase to see if I understand you correctly: Language is material but not physical.
How on earth did you get that interpretation from anything I said?????

I have just explicitly said that, in my opinion, language is physical.

Where did you get the idea, then, that I thought it wasn't physical?

[blobru]

five 5 V xxxxx ooooo .....

The first three are symbols that refer to the same concept.
The last three are instances of the concept.

Concepts are mental 'boxes' for things that belong together (all the above would go in the same box: the first three in the symbol drawer, the last three in the instance drawer).

Language is the process of recognizing that any of the first three refer to any of the last three (more formally, of concept formation and communication).

If it is a process, it occurs in time: it relies on remembering one thing, for comparison with another thing (either as symbols and/or instances that belong to the same concept).

Processes are not strictly material, they are changes in material states. As such, they are governed by physical rules.

Thus, if language is a process, it is physical.

[Frank Newgent]

five 5 V xxxxx ooooo .....

The first three are symbols that refer to the same concept.
The last three are instances of the concept.

Concepts are mental 'boxes' for things that belong together (all the above would go in the same box: the first three in the symbol drawer, the last three in the instance drawer).

Language is the process of recognizing that any of the first three refer to any of the last three (more formally, of concept formation and communication).

If it is a process, it occurs in time: it relies on remembering one thing, for comparison with another thing (either as symbols and/or instances that belong to the same concept).

Processes are not strictly material, they are changes in material states. As such, they are governed by physical rules.

Thus, if language is a process, it is physical.


My bolding.

re-cognizing.

How was it previously known?

[blobru]

My bolding.

re-cognizing.

How was it previously known?


Language is learned (by repetition). Convention.

[rocketdodger]

So, to what external physical object does, say, the word "meaning" refer?

Try using it in a sentence, like words are supposed to be used, and you might stumble upon the answer to your question.

[Frank Newgent]

My bolding.

re-cognizing.

How was it previously known?


Language is learned (by repetition). Convention.


Sorry. I don't follow.

[rocketdodger]

My bolding.

Things as they are depend on things as they should be?

I'll paraphrase: Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has no meaning through external referents to physical objects. :cool:

Another post that you no doubt imagine makes you look quite intelligent.

Another post that makes very little sense to anyone but yourself.

Speaking of how language only has meaning when it references external physical objects . . .

[Frank Newgent]

Another post that you no doubt imagine makes you look quite intelligent.

Another post that makes very little sense to anyone but yourself.

Speaking of how language only has meaning when it references external physical objects . . .


What external physical object do you refer to?

[Robin]

My bolding.

re-cognizing.

How was it previously known?
I think that is a process known as "learning".

[blobru]

Sorry. I don't follow.


Then we're speaking different languages, I guess. :)

(You may be thinking of Meno's paradox (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meno#Meno.27s_paradox) of inquiry: how do we know something -- see it as what we're looking for -- when we didn't know it before? That's a more difficult question, related to concept formation. However, as a basis it seems that once we can see "difference", tell black from white, change from stasis, something from nothing, and degrees of difference (and its converse, identity), we are already building up concepts and laying the groundwork for language (attaching sounds and symbols to those concepts). The rest is just learning: memory work, and more definitions for finer degrees of difference).

[Frank Newgent]

Then we're speaking different languages, I guess. :)

(You may be thinking of Meno's paradox (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meno#Meno.27s_paradox) of inquiry: how do we know something -- see it as what we're looking for -- when we didn't know it before? That's a more difficult question, related to concept formation. However, as a basis it seems that once we can see "difference", tell black from white, change from stasis, something from nothing, and degrees of difference (and its converse, identity), we are already building up concepts and laying the groundwork for language (attaching sounds and symbols to those concepts). The rest is just learning: memory work, and more sophisticated definitions for finer degrees of difference).


Seeing difference is a matter of distinguishing values beyond merely black and white. It's difficult to objectify this I believe.

I protest making that seem simple. :)

[blobru]

Seeing difference is a matter of distinguishing values beyond merely black and white. It's difficult to objectify this I believe.

I protest making that seem simple. :)


It's a simple reply to Meno's paradox. Plato, as usual, applies it to questions of ethics, which are usually not matters of "black and white" (though he'd like them to be).

But something like "Justice", while not something specific you can point to like black or white color, can, arguably be pointed to as a pattern. To one child, for example, Justice might be diagrammed like this:

A|B|C|D
oo|oo|oo|oo

where A, B, C, D are Al and his friends Bill, Carl, and Don; and o is a piece of candy (the naive ideal of Justice being "equal portions for each").

However, Bill, who paid for the lion's share of the candy, may see it as a matter of "property rights":
A|B|C|D
o|ooooo|o|o

Carl, who's bigger and meaner, "might makes right"...
A|B|C|D
||oooooooo|

Don, who's hungrier than the others (especially Al), "to each according to his needs"...
A|B|C|D
o|oo|oo|ooo

etc.

The point, for language, is that even abstract ideas like Justice can be described: patterned as general situations, so competing notions thereof can be communicated and discussed (justice referring to a distribution of goods and evils -- a process, a pattern, a system [of material change], not a material object; this seems to have been the basic confusion that led Plato to his theory of Forms way back when). :boggled: :idea: :boggled:

[Dancing David]

So, to what external physical object does, say, the word "meaning" refer?

Language does not exist in a vacum, as any one who raises children will realise. First there is the conditioning and social reinforcement of word usage. So we have adults and others reinforcing the child applying the work labels to objects, then we have the child testing the validity of labels.

Now on another level we have the use of written words , pictures and the like.

So here is the pattern between physical beings (material is such a loaded word). We have air pressure differentials being used by creatures, we have written words, symbolic drawings and photos, all of which the members of the set agree to some extent are applied in reference to other physical objects. So in this case the usage of the symbol 'meaning' is in application of the sounds, written words, drawings and the like in relation to an object. Concepts being relations between objects. The consistency of the usage of the sounds, writing, drawings and photos to physical objects gives 'meaning' to them.

that is why language is idiomatic.

[Dancing David]

My bolding.

Things as they are depend on things as they should be?

I'll paraphrase: Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has no meaning through external referents to physical objects. :cool:

Sorry Frank , that one went by me, would you try again?

Language depends upon the usage between the members of the communicant set.

[Dancing David]

Until this moment I didn't know that "Please close the window" was one of the accepted meanings of "it's chilly in here". Maybe I am closer to the machine side.

It depends upon your 'caretaking' quotient. :D

[Beth]

How on earth did you get that interpretation from anything I said?????

I have just explicitly said that, in my opinion, language is physical.

Where did you get the idea, then, that I thought it wasn't physical?

Sorry. I think of physical and material as synonyms. Let me try again. You are saying that language is physical but not material.

What does it mean to say that something is "physical" but not "material"?

[Robin]

Sorry. I think of physical and material as synonyms. Let me try again. You are saying that language is physical but not material.

What does it mean to say that something is "physical" but not "material"?
I said it was physical. I didn't say it wasn't material.

Whether or not it is material would depend upon what is meant by "material".

I would suggest that most people would find the usage "a material process" slightly odd, the term is more commonly used for objects. So "material" does not seem appropriate to describe a process.

I was asked the original question using a specific word with a specific definition and my answer relates to that word and definition.

[Dymanic]

Language does not exist in a vacum...
Boy Howdy.

The consistency of the usage of the sounds, writing, drawings and photos to physical objects gives 'meaning' to them.I don't fundamentally disagree with that, but I might quibble: is it simply consistency of usage, or is it something deeper than that; something having more to do with the associative nature of human thought?

Survival so often depends on the ability to make quick decisions in the face of uncertainties. If every response had to be built from the ground up, every time, we'd be sunk. We have to be able to generalize; to create mental symbols that are simple enough to be manipulated quickly, even if that comes at the price of reduced accuracy. It's only natural then that we'd use sounds (etc) as symbols to represent those internal symbols when we can gain an advantage by sharing, trading, or selling those useful generalizations with others.

Of course, the question remains as to which is the cart and which is the horse; it may well be that it was the advent of language that permitted us to begin building such extensive internal libraries of useful generalizations in the first place.

[Beth]

I said it was physical. I didn't say it wasn't material.

Whether or not it is material would depend upon what is meant by "material".

Okay, when you say you are a 'materialist' (I think you've said that, but perhaps I'm misremembering), what do you mean by the word 'material'? Is language 'material' by that definition. Why or why not?



I would suggest that most people would find the usage "a material process" slightly odd, the term is more commonly used for objects. So "material" does not seem appropriate to describe a process.

I was asked the original question using a specific word with a specific definition and my answer relates to that word and definition.

Fair enough, and I agree 'material' does not seem appropriate to describe a process. Of course, I don't think 'physical' is any better. Nor do I think that language is appropriately categorized as a process like making tea. But I'm willing to listen to your opinion on those matters.

[rocketdodger]

What external physical object do you refer to?

Since that reply was ... a reply ... you can safely assume that my language in that ... reply ... was referencing what it was a ... reply ... to.

In other words, your previous post.

What else would it refer to?

[Frank Newgent]

It's a simple reply to Meno's paradox. Plato, as usual, applies it to questions of ethics, which are usually not matters of "black and white" (though he'd like them to be).

But something like "Justice", while not something specific you can point to like black or white color, can, arguably be pointed to as a pattern. To one child, for example, Justice might be diagrammed like this:

A|B|C|D
oo|oo|oo|oo

where A, B, C, D are Al and his friends Bill, Carl, and Don; and o is a piece of candy (the naive ideal of Justice being "equal portions for each").

However, Bill, who paid for the lion's share of the candy, may see it as a matter of "property rights":
A|B|C|D
o|ooooo|o|o

Carl, who's bigger and meaner, "might makes right"...
A|B|C|D
||oooooooo|

Don, who's hungrier than the others (especially Al), "to each according to his needs"...
A|B|C|D
o|oo|oo|ooo

etc.

The point, for language, is that even abstract ideas like Justice can be described: patterned as general situations, so competing notions thereof can be communicated and discussed (justice referring to a distribution of goods and evils -- a process, a pattern, a system [of material change], not a material object; this seems to have been the basic confusion that led Plato to his theory of Forms way back when). :boggled: :idea: :boggled:


Justice made value free. Your explanation is very simple. Thank you.

Now I get to skip law school.

[blobru]

... Now I get to skip law school.


Only if you plan to specialize in candy contracts, where both the law and lawyers have no teeth. :stone017:

[Frank Newgent]

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.


My bolding.

Things as they are depend on things as they should be?

I'll paraphrase: Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has no meaning through external referents to physical objects. :cool:

Sorry Frank , that one went by me, would you try again?

Language depends upon the usage between the members of the communicant set.


Your purely descriptive definition of language hinges on... meaning.

Your positivism depends on normative judgement... that's piss-poor positivism.

My paraphrase your definition minus this.

[Dancing David]

Your purely descriptive definition of language hinges on... meaning.

Your positivism depends on normative judgement... that's piss-poor positivism.

My paraphrase your definition minus this.

Thanks, you are more opaque than usual.

Whatever.

[AlBell]

And I'm still trying to figure out the difference between 'physical' and 'material'.

[Robin]

Fair enough, and I agree 'material' does not seem appropriate to describe a process. Of course, I don't think 'physical' is any better.
You don't think that it is meaningful to talk of physical processes? Then obviously you and I use the word "physical" in a different sense.
Nor do I think that language is appropriately categorized as a process like making tea.
And obviously you and I use the word "language" in a different sense.
But I'm willing to listen to your opinion on those matters.
But what is the point since I do not know the definition you are using for the key terms and you won't tell me what those definitions are?

I can only put my point of view using the words as I understand them.

[Robin]

And I'm still trying to figure out the difference between 'physical' and 'material'.
Why?

In any case I don't see why you are having trouble with the task.

Just state your definition for "physical" then underneath state your definition for "material".

Then compare them.

Problem solved.

[Dancing David]

And I'm still trying to figure out the difference between 'physical' and 'material'.

Zero, one has less baggage, under materialism it is all energy waves anyhoo.

[Robin]

Zero, one has less baggage, under materialism it is all energy waves anyhoo.
Or whatever turns out to be the case.

[AlBell]

And I'm still trying to figure out the difference between 'physical' and 'material'.

Zero, one has less baggage, under materialism it is all energy waves anyhoo.
I agree that physical==material. And imo, 'physicalism' seems to have become the replacement for 'materialism'.

I don't see the less baggage component.

I do see that physicalists/materialists/whatever-they-call-themselves-today must conclude language (and ethics, and aesthetics, and ...) are physical, or believe in magic.

Exactly why language is physical is less obvious at least to me, under the rules:

"Is is consistently observable?" Yes, maybe.

"Is it measurable?" Not as I see it.

"Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?" Definitely no imo.

[Beth]

You don't think that it is meaningful to talk of physical processes? Then obviously you and I use the word "physical" in a different sense. Clearly. To me they are two words for the same concept. To you they delineate between two distinct but similar ideas. What is the delineation you perceive that could make something be one but not the other. Is one a subset of the other or are they two distinct but overlapping groups?

And obviously you and I use the word "language" in a different sense.
Apparently. I think of language as a 'thing'. A non-material object - like freedom or self-confidence or rainbows. I don't see those things as processes.

But what is the point since I do not know the definition you are using for the key terms and you won't tell me what those definitions are? I'm sorry, but I don't have a precise definition of those terms. I'm not even sure it's possible to formulate such definitions. You seem to think it is. So I'd like to know what you mean by such things as "physical", "material" and "language". I'm not sure why you need me to give you my rather vague and imprecise definition that would primarily consist of metaphorically pointing at things and saying 'like that'. Perhaps if you could give your definition, I could understand why you think it's possible to define language so explicitly.

I can only put my point of view using the words as I understand them.
That's all any of us can do.

[Frank Newgent]

Thanks, you are more opaque than usual.

Whatever.


Could you please refer to the physical object(s) in your post. Thanks.

[Robin]

Clearly. To me they are two words for the same concept. To you they delineate between two distinct but similar ideas. What is the delineation you perceive that could make something be one but not the other. Is one a subset of the other or are they two distinct but overlapping groups?
Let me try again.

I am using the word "physical". I am not using the word "material".

You should ask those who are using the word "material" to answer those questions.
Apparently. I think of language as a 'thing'. A non-material object - like freedom or self-confidence or rainbows. I don't see those things as processes.
I don't see freedom, self-confidence or rainbows as objects.
I'm sorry, but I don't have a precise definition of those terms.
You don't have any definition at all so far. I have no way of knowing what you mean by either term.
I'm not even sure it's possible to formulate such definitions. You seem to think it is.
Let me repeat - I said that we should try to make our definitions "as clear and precise as possible"

If it is not possible to give at least a workable definition then discussion is useless.
So I'd like to know what you mean by such things as "physical", "material" and "language".
Why do you want to know what I mean by the word "material"?

As for "physical" and "language", the latter I defined earlier in this thread and the former, AlBell helpfully dredged up a definition I provided a while ago.
I'm not sure why you need me to give you my rather vague and imprecise definition that would primarily consist of metaphorically pointing at things and saying 'like that'.
In other words an ostensive definition. There is nothing wrong with providing an ostensive definition. There is nothing vague or imprecise about an ostensive definition.

Why do I need you to give me your definition? So that I know what you are talking about when you use the words.

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.

New one on me. I'd have thought that bits of language have meaning — And or Sherlock Holmes or We don't talk about that side of the family or Really? You don't say!

But language — the whole shooting match? What on earth can it mean? :)

[Robin]

"Is it measurable?" Not as I see it.
I am not sure how you think that these words will reach me via a set of machines and physical media if you don't think it possible to quantify the structure of a linguistic exchange
"Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?" Definitely no imo.
Well let us suppose for the sake of argument that there could never, even in principle, be an empirically verifiable mathematical model of language.

You have to consider the reasons why this would be. If the process were deterministic then we could have a verifiable mathematical model of it. If the process were random then we could also have an empirically verifiable mathematical model of it. If the process were any combination of deterministic and random sub processes - we could also have a mathematical model of it.

So if language could not, even in principle, be described by an empirically verifiable mathematical model then necessarily it is not deterministic, not random, nor is it any combination of only deterministic and random elements.

Do you agree so far?

[annnnoid]

The symbols are arbitrary, and they change meaning in complex ways dependent on social and performance factors. Pinning down semantics, syntax and even a definition of natural language is a tricky proposition.
Things as they are depend on things as they should be?
Depends on what you mean by "meaning"
I would describe language as the process of encoding ideas as systems of tokens.
Stuff's complicated.
The thing is though, phonology is pretty well understood, and it is just amazing to play with. A lot of very smart people have been fooling around with syntax and semantics for a long time, looking for universals and general principles, and essentially zip, nada, zilch in the way of understanding what is going on. It is tantamount to delving into the psychology and the mind of the human animal. It would seem to me that there should be lots of similarities in the branches (phonology vs. syntax, for example), but it seems that each has its own secrets.
But what is the point since I do not know the definition you are using for the key terms and you won't tell me what those definitions are?
I can only put my point of view using the words as I understand them.

We use words so we can avoid having to face the fact that we don’t know what we’re talking about.

Can language even define itself? It would seem….without an understanding of what it is that creates language, that the answer would be no.

[Beth]

Let me try again.

I am using the word "physical". I am not using the word "material".

You should ask those who are using the word "material" to answer those questions. If you see them as the same, why did you make the objection below.
I don't want to be supporting the premiss "language is physical" in a thread titled "language is material" for the reasons of the above confusion. If physical has the same meaning as material, what's the issue with supporting the OP? That's why I thought you thought they had different meanings.

I'll back up, do you consider the words physical and material to be referring to the same concept in the context of this conversation? Or do you feel they refer to different ideas?


I don't see freedom, self-confidence or rainbows as objects. Okay. They certainly aren't physical or material objects. I don't think there's any disagreement on that. But I don't see describing them as physical processes to be a better or more apt categorization than considering them to be non-material objects.

You don't have any definition at all so far. I have no way of knowing what you mean by either term.

Let me repeat - I said that we should try to make our definitions "as clear and precise as possible"

If it is not possible to give at least a workable definition then discussion is useless. I think a workable definition is possible.

Why do you want to know what I mean by the word "material"? So I can figure out the difference between physical and material. But perhaps you are not claiming there is any difference, so the point may be moot. To me, the two words are simply different names for the same concept.

As for "physical" and "language", the latter I defined earlier in this thread and the former, AlBell helpfully dredged up a definition I provided a while ago.
I went back and found it.
I would describe language as the process of encoding ideas as systems of tokens.
You do define it as a process. It very nicely encapsulates the purpose of language too. However, leaving aside the issue of object versus process, what about this definition makes language physical?


In other words an ostensive definition. There is nothing wrong with providing an ostensive definition. There is nothing vague or imprecise about an ostensive definition.Why do I need you to give me your definition? So that I know what you are talking about when you use the words.
Okay. I can define language by giving you examples such as English, Latin, American Sign Language, and COBOL. Is that is sufficient for you to know what I'm talking about? Can we now move on to why you consider language physical?

[Robin]

Can language even define itself? It would seem….without an understanding of what it is that creates language, that the answer would be no.
You assumption is that it is the purpose of a definition to completely explain the thing it defines.

But a definition only needs to enable us to refer to something, distinct from other things.

When we are first learning about gravity we don't need to know what creates gravity in order to define the concept. We can start with something as simple as "stuff falls down" and develop from there. As we learn we can refine the definition.

So language could be defined as "communicating with words and sentences, as you and I are doing now". Or you could define it by using the word in various contexts. Or you could define language as the process of encoding ideas into systems of tokens.

None of this is perfect, but it is not the purpose of a definition to be perfect, it is the purpose of a definition to be functional.

[Frank Newgent]

None of this is perfect, but it is not the purpose of a definition to be perfect, it is the purpose of a definition to be functional.


Sounds good to me. I wonder what the function of defining language as material may be.

[Robin]

Let me try again.

I am using the word "physical". I am not using the word "material".

You should ask those who are using the word "material" to answer those questions.
If you see them as the same,...
No, you are just not getting this are you? I am not saying they are the same. I am not saying they are different. I am saying:

"I am using the word 'physical', I am not using the word 'material'"

Thus the meaning of the word is currently not my business
... why did you make the objection below.
I don't want to be supporting the premiss "language is physical" in a thread titled "language is material" for the reasons of the above confusion.
If physical has the same meaning as material, what's the issue with supporting the OP? That's why I thought you thought they had different meanings.
I stated the reason explicitly. If you go back to the original post and look up a few lines you will see "the above confusion" that I am referring to.
I'll back up, do you consider the words physical and material to be referring to the same concept in the context of this conversation? Or do you feel they refer to different ideas?
No, don't back up. Ask someone else. I am not using the term material so what relevance would it have what definition I would give to it if I used it?
Okay. They certainly aren't physical or material objects. I don't think there's any disagreement on that.
No, that is not what I said. Freedom is not an object at all
You do define it as a process. It very nicely encapsulates the purpose of language too. However, leaving aside the issue of object versus process, what about this definition makes language physical?
I made a response to AlBell above about this, I will refer you back to that.
Okay. I can define language by giving you examples such as English, Latin, American Sign Language, and COBOL. Is that is sufficient for you to know what I'm talking about?
That is a different usage. I did not consider that this is what AlBell was referring to, but maybe he was, if so he will probably specify
Can we now move on to why you consider language physical?
Indeed, I already moved on to that with AlBell in the post I mentioned above, post #57

[Robin]

Sounds good to me. I wonder what the function of defining language as material may be.
I don't know, I didn't define it as material. I don't think Dancing David defined it as material - he made an outline of an argument that it was material.

[Frank Newgent]

Sounds good to me. I wonder what the function of defining language as material may be.
I don't know, I didn't define it as material. I don't think Dancing David defined it as material - he made an outline of an argument that it was material.


I dunno... going by this:

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.

[blobru]

Sounds good to me. I wonder what the function of defining language as material may be.
I don't know, I didn't define it as material. I don't think Dancing David defined it as material - he made an outline of an argument that it was material.


I think its function is to generate discussion and, hopefully, better understanding of "language" (by countering and refining the original definition, a la -- o, what's it called, again? -- philosophy!) :idea: :wink:

[Beth]

You do define it as a process. It very nicely encapsulates the purpose of language too. However, leaving aside the issue of object versus process, what about this definition makes language physical?

I made a response to AlBell above about this, I will refer you back to that.

That is a different usage. I did not consider that this is what AlBell was referring to, but maybe he was, if so he will probably specify

Indeed, I already moved on to that with AlBell in the post I mentioned above, post #57

I've read your post but I don't see how it answers the question of why you consider language to be physical.

It seems to me that you are simply starting with the assumption that everything is physical. Language is something therefore it must be physical.

[Frank Newgent]

Sounds good to me. I wonder what the function of defining language as material may be.
I don't know, I didn't define it as material. I don't think Dancing David defined it as material - he made an outline of an argument that it was material.


I think its function is to generate discussion and, hopefully, better understanding of "language" (by countering and refining the original definition, a la -- o, what's it called, again? -- philosophy!) :idea: :wink:


To describe the humanities the way studies in natural science are employed, and make it value free you mean :cool:

[Wowbagger]

Some of y'all should read more Steven Pinker books. He's managed to unravel much of the complicated layers, and frame-shifting, and instinctual aspects of language, fairly well.

I wish I could succinctly summarize all the points involved, but... words are temporarily failing me.

But, I will say that words are not really "materials", but a vector of communication. A lot of compressing, packaging, and other processes, go on, at both ends of the voyage.

The information content could be more analogous to "material", in certain ways, but that is different from the actual words that make it up.

[blobru]

To describe the humanities the way studies in natural science are employed, and make it value free you mean :cool:


Which implies the counterclaim to the OP (that the humanities, including language, can't be reduced to material alone, as natural processes are, because to do so would omit "value").

That's how philosophical discussion is initiated, alright. Whether it goes anywhere largely depends on the values and value of the participants, all of which may or may not be in some sense irreducible. :boggled: {i think i just boggled my own mind}

[annnnoid]

You assumption is that it is the purpose of a definition to completely explain the thing it defines.

But a definition only needs to enable us to refer to something, distinct from other things.

When we are first learning about gravity we don't need to know what creates gravity in order to define the concept. We can start with something as simple as "stuff falls down" and develop from there. As we learn we can refine the definition.

So language could be defined as "communicating with words and sentences, as you and I are doing now". Or you could define it by using the word in various contexts. Or you could define language as the process of encoding ideas into systems of tokens.

None of this is perfect, but it is not the purpose of a definition to be perfect, it is the purpose of a definition to be functional.

I agree Robin (and if I don't it'll have to wait for tomorrow)….but there is some point in recognizing what may be referred to as the limits of analysis….and the manner in which we are confined within them. As we bump up against whatever wall it is that confines our ability to define it we apply language to describe the experience of so bumping….and thus illuminate our mortal condition perhaps a fraction more.

N'est-ce pas

[Frank Newgent]

To describe the humanities the way studies in natural science are employed, and make it value free you mean :cool:


Which implies the counterclaim to the OP (that the humanities, including language, can't be reduced to material alone, as natural processes are, because to do so would omit "value").

That's how philosophical discussion is initiated, alright. Whether it goes anywhere largely depends on the values and value of the participants, all of which may or may not be in some sense irreducible. :boggled: {i think i just boggled my own mind}


Natural science is described in a value-free way. The philosophy of positivism attempts to extend this method to the humanities.

What's funny (to me) is that the (supposedly) value-free way the natural sciences go on describing things depends, also, on making value calls. :boggled:

That evidence is true, that a theory may be falsified, that a higher value is assigned to a description of a relevent state of affairs, regarding a point on a scale as a goal, the principle of parsimony ... these are value calls all the way.

If the goal is to blur the line between the positive and normative sciences it seems to me more apt to acknowledge this than to deny the place of "value" in a study of humanities such as language.

[Robin]

I've read your post but I don't see how it answers the question of why you consider language to be physical.

It seems to me that you are simply starting with the assumption that everything is physical. Language is something therefore it must be physical.
You will have to be a little more explicit.

Where have I put in the assumptions that everything is physical? Can you quote the part? I can't find it.

[blobru]

Natural science is described in a value-free way. The philosophy of positivism attempts to extend this method to the humanities.

What's funny (to me) is that the (supposedly) value-free way the natural sciences go on describing things depends, also, on making value calls. :boggled:

That evidence is true, that a theory may be falsified, that a higher value is assigned to a description of a relevent state of affairs, regarding a point on a scale as a goal, the principle of parsimony ... these are value calls all the way.

If the goal is to blur the line between the positive and normative sciences it seems to me more apt to acknowledge this than to deny the place of "value" in a study of humanities such as language.


Okay, now I see what you're getting at. Thanks for your valuable response, Frank. ;)

I see them, science and humanities, as complementary ways of looking at the world -- different languages, if you will; not opponents at all.

Science says it's forty below. The humanities say it's *****' cold out! If you're looking for precision, the scientific description is more valuable; for emotion, a human valuation of what forty below means... loosely, the humanities approach.

Values are subjective, of course; though groups strive for 'objective' values, by modeling ideals. Social sciences use statistics to describe norms (values as they are, not as they should be, ideally). Science may inform normative questions; but questions of value, which involve ideals, aren't decided by science. For one thing, they're context-sensitive, and the most important context, for any question of value, is the subject(s) to whom those values apply.

Even if each subject is ultimately reducible to a mathematical description, the math will only describe that subject's values. Ultimate value will always come down to competing models, which will be valued differently by different subjects (assuming we don't evolve into a race of interchangeable androids, or whatever). So, as I've argued elsewhere, value to humans is ultimately decided by humans, through open-ended argument (that's where philosophy, and in a way the humanities come in). I think any decent mathematical model of human society and psychology would predict as much.

Sorry, I probably could've said all that a lot simpler; but the point is: scientific description of value -- even in strictly 'material' language -- isn't a substitute for human valuation. (Or something like that, anyway). :relieved:

[Brainache]

Boy Howdy.

I don't fundamentally disagree with that, but I might quibble: is it simply consistency of usage, or is it something deeper than that; something having more to do with the associative nature of human thought?

Survival so often depends on the ability to make quick decisions in the face of uncertainties. If every response had to be built from the ground up, every time, we'd be sunk. We have to be able to generalize; to create mental symbols that are simple enough to be manipulated quickly, even if that comes at the price of reduced accuracy. It's only natural then that we'd use sounds (etc) as symbols to represent those internal symbols when we can gain an advantage by sharing, trading, or selling those useful generalizations with others.

Of course, the question remains as to which is the cart and which is the horse; it may well be that it was the advent of language that permitted us to begin building such extensive internal libraries of useful generalizations in the first place.

So, does that make language the basis for intelligence, the defining characteristic of our evolutionary success as a species?

And: Who are the most successful people?

[Robin]

Natural science is described in a value-free way. The philosophy of positivism attempts to extend this method to the humanities.
Assuming you are referring to the Vienna Circle, I don't think they ever suggested that science was described in a value free way, in fact they stipulated that the decision to make a law of an induction was a pure value judgement.

Their aim was to ensure that the language of science resulted only in meaningful sentences.

They did aim to unify science under a common language but without any assumption that the line between them could be blurred. You should not confuse Logical Positivism or even Physicalism with Materialism.
What's funny (to me) is that the (supposedly) value-free way the natural sciences go on describing things depends, also, on making value calls. :boggled:

That evidence is true, that a theory may be falsified, that a higher value is assigned to a description of a relevent state of affairs, regarding a point on a scale as a goal, the principle of parsimony ... these are value calls all the way.

If the goal is to blur the line between the positive and normative sciences it seems to me more apt to acknowledge this than to deny the place of "value" in a study of humanities such as language.
I am not sure what you are getting at here. The way to approach a question like "is language physical?" is first to determine if the question is meaningful, and if so then try to determine what the answer is.

It has nothing to do with blurring lines between sciences and denying the place of "value" in the study of humanities.

It is just a simple question of whether or not language is physical. Language loses no value if it is physical and gains no value if it is not.

[Dancing David]

I agree that physical==material. And imo, 'physicalism' seems to have become the replacement for 'materialism'.

I don't see the less baggage component.

I do see that physicalists/materialists/whatever-they-call-themselves-today must conclude language (and ethics, and aesthetics, and ...) are physical, or believe in magic.

Exactly why language is physical is less obvious at least to me, under the rules:

"Is is consistently observable?" Yes, maybe.

If it isn't then what is it?


"Is it measurable?" Not as I see it.

Which part isn't measurable?


"Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?" Definitely no imo.

Either it does or support dualism.

Matterialism and idealism are the same.

[Dancing David]

Could you please refer to the physical object(s) in your post. Thanks.

Play gotcha, if you are here to get points, or join the conversation. As you wish.

[Dancing David]

We use words so we can avoid having to face the fact that we don’t know what we’re talking about.

Can language even define itself? It would seem….without an understanding of what it is that creates language, that the answer would be no.

Something other than humans creates language?

Okay.

[Dancing David]

Sounds good to me. I wonder what the function of defining language as material may be.

To start a conversation.

[Dancing David]

Some of y'all should read more Steven Pinker books. He's managed to unravel much of the complicated layers, and frame-shifting, and instinctual aspects of language, fairly well.

No instincts sorry, do you mean intuitive or learned?

Instinct Bah Humbug. :D



I wish I could succinctly summarize all the points involved, but... words are temporarily failing me.

But, I will say that words are not really "materials", but a vector of communication. A lot of compressing, packaging, and other processes, go on, at both ends of the voyage.

The information content could be more analogous to "material", in certain ways, but that is different from the actual words that make it up.

[Beth]

You will have to be a little more explicit.

Where have I put in the assumptions that everything is physical? Can you quote the part? I can't find it.

No, I don't know that you've stated so explicitly. It's an assumption you seem to be making based on your definition of language as a physical process. But I could be wrong, so I'll ask you explicitly. Do you assume that everything is physical? Or do you assume the opposite (at least once in while)? If so, can you give an example of something that you consider to be non-physical?

Also, you haven't answered my previous question: Why you consider language to be physical?

[Dancing David]

Natural science is described in a value-free way. The philosophy of positivism attempts to extend this method to the humanities.

What's funny (to me) is that the (supposedly) value-free way the natural sciences go on describing things depends, also, on making value calls. :boggled:

That evidence is true, that a theory may be falsified, that a higher value is assigned to a description of a relevent state of affairs, regarding a point on a scale as a goal, the principle of parsimony ... these are value calls all the way.

If the goal is to blur the line between the positive and normative sciences it seems to me more apt to acknowledge this than to deny the place of "value" in a study of humanities such as language.


It would be silly to call something 'value free' they never taught me that at school. Values of human perception should be controlled for?

As a nihilist being value free would seem impossible to me, it is all false and all true. (As thoughts, words and models.)

[Robin]

No, I don't know that you've stated so explicitly.
I didn't state that assumption at all.
It's an assumption you seem to be making based on your definition of language as a physical process.
I didn't define language as a physical process. I defined language as a process of encoding ideas into systems of tokens.
But I could be wrong, so I'll ask you explicitly. Do you assume that everything is physical?
No, of course I don't. Now can we get back to what I actually said?
Or do you assume the opposite (at least once in while)? If so, can you give an example of something that you consider to be non-physical?
I don't make any assumptions either way.
Also, you haven't answered my previous question: Why you consider language to be physical?
And yet again I refer you to post #57. You claimed to have read it but you have not addressed or even referred to anything I said in it.

[Beth]

I didn't state that assumption at all.

I didn't define language as a physical process. I defined language as a process of encoding ideas into systems of tokens.

No, you didn't explicitly define language as a physical process in that post. However, in post 21 you said:
In another thread I was asked "Is language physical?" to which I replied, in my opinion, that it was.


I did presume from those two posts that you think language is a physical process. Is that incorrect? If so, I apologize for the presumption.


No, of course I don't. Now can we get back to what I actually said?
Certainly. Why do you think language is physical?


I don't make any assumptions either way.

Cool! If you are not assuming everything is physical. Can you give me an example of something that you don't assume is physical?

And yet again I refer you to post #57. You claimed to have read it but you have not addressed or even referred to anything I said in it.
Actually, that was what my last post was addressing. I don't see how that post answers the question of why you consider language to be physical. The only relationship I could come up with was that you assume everything to be physical. If you don't assume everything to be physical, why do you consider language to be physical.

[AlBell]

But I could be wrong, so I'll ask you explicitly. Do you assume that everything is physical?
No, of course I don't. Now can we get back to what I actually said?

What isn't physical in your worldview?

And if something is not physical, is it (and everything) material in your wordview?

[Robin]

What isn't physical in your worldview?

And if something is not physical, is it (and everything) material in your wordview?
You are not paying attention.

I do not assume that everything is physical.

Now I responded to one of your questions in post #57. I asked if you agreed so far, so I am hoping that you will respond and let me know that if you do not agree, what part you do not agree with.

[Robin]

No, you didn't explicitly define language as a physical process in that post. However, in post 21 you said:


I did presume from those two posts that you think language is a physical process.
And do you really not understand the difference between expressing the opinion that something is physical and defining it as physical?
Certainly. Why do you think language is physical?
Repeating the question while studiously ignoring the answer is a fairly tiresome debating tactic. Again, post #57
Cool! If you are not assuming everything is physical. Can you give me an example of something that you don't assume is physical?
Language. Language is an example of something that I don't assume is physical.

I don't assume it is physical and I don't define it as physical.

I expressed the opinion that it was physical and that opinion is based on the reasoning in post #57. Now can you please address yourself to my answer rather than continually throwing up these sidetracks?
Actually, that was what my last post was addressing.
Can you show me where you have addressed something that I said within that post? Can you show me where you have acknowledged or even referred to anything I said in that post?

Because everything you refer to is from elsewhere.

In what sense then were you addressing that post?

Do you disagree with what I said in it? If so, which part?

[Wowbagger]

No instincts sorry, do you mean intuitive or learned?It's both: Many of the "ultimate" aspects of language development are intuitive. The "proximate" specifics of each language are learned.

This is true enough for verbal language, anyway. Written is a different beast, where much more of it must be learned, and much less (if any) is intuitive.

Don't be fooled: Just because written language and spoken language usually (but not always) share the same syntax and semantics, they are, in fact, "different languages" as far as many of your mental processes are concerned.

[AlBell]

"Is it measurable?" Not as I see it.
I am not sure how you think that these words will reach me via a set of machines and physical media if you don't think it possible to quantify the structure of a linguistic exchange
"Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?" Definitely no imo.
Well let us suppose for the sake of argument that there could never, even in principle, be an empirically verifiable mathematical model of language.

You have to consider the reasons why this would be. If the process were deterministic then we could have a verifiable mathematical model of it. If the process were random then we could also have an empirically verifiable mathematical model of it. If the process were any combination of deterministic and random sub processes - we could also have a mathematical model of it.

So if language could not, even in principle, be described by an empirically verifiable mathematical model then necessarily it is not deterministic, not random, nor is it any combination of only deterministic and random elements.

Do you agree so far?
And an answer, "yes" results in: Hello, libertarian free will, effecting the brain in unknown ways. Which of course results in a "can't be" from non-idealists.


I agree that physical==material. And imo, 'physicalism' seems to have become the replacement for 'materialism'.

I don't see the less baggage component.

I do see that physicalists/materialists/whatever-they-call-themselves-today must conclude language (and ethics, and aesthetics, and ...) are physical, or believe in magic.

Exactly why language is physical is less obvious at least to me, under the rules:

"Is is consistently observable?" Yes, maybe.

If it isn't then what is it?


"Is it measurable?" Not as I see it.

Which part isn't measurable?


"Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?" Definitely no imo.

Either it does or support dualism.
A possible yet apparently illogical stance.

Matterialism and idealism are the same.
For the epistemology of science, of course. For Frank's normative problems, maybe. For a personal subjective worldview, no.

[Beth]

And do you really not understand the difference between expressing the opinion that something is physical and defining it as physical? In the context of this thread and your posts, no. You were giving your definition and your opinion. Forgive me for thinking they were related.

Repeating the question while studiously ignoring the answer is a fairly tiresome debating tactic. Again, post #57 Again, I do not understand why you feel that answers the question. IMO, it doesn't.

Language. Language is an example of something that I don't assume is physical.
I don't assume it is physical and I don't define it as physical.

You are of the opinion language is physical but you are NOT assuming it is physical? Is that correct? Let me rephrase the question, why are you of the opinion that language is physical?

I expressed the opinion that it was physical and that opinion is based on the reasoning in post #57. Now can you please address yourself to my answer rather than continually throwing up these sidetracks? That answer doesn't have anything to do with language. It has to do with human beings being physical creatures interacting in a physical world. By that reasoning, what isn't going to be considered physical?

[Robin]

And an answer, "yes" results in: Hello, libertarian free will, effecting the brain in unknown ways. Which of course results in a "can't be" from non-idealists.
But even if you posit something which effects the brain in unknown ways, you still have to explain how it can be neither deterministic, nor random, nor any combination of those two.

Nobody has been able to explain what this is.

This is the reasoning I put earlier as to why I did not think it possible:
Between two possibilities x and y, x is chosen.

Was there a reason x was chosen rather than y?
If no then it was arbitrary
If yes then call this reason r0
So we ask, even given r0, could y still have been chosen?
If no, then deterministic
If yes then we ask "was there a reason besides r0 that x was chosen?"
If no then partly arbitrary
If yes then we call this reason r1
So we ask, "even given r0,r1, could y still have been chosen?"
If no, then deterministic
If yes then we ask "was there a reason besides r0,r1 that x was chosen?"

You can see the idea, we could, in principle, keep following this process and arrive at a r0,r1,r2,r3,...,rn that captured every single reason for the event no matter how tiny, no matter what causal mode or direction.

But this process can only end in:

Given "r0,r1,r2,...,rn" y could not have been chosen therefore deterministic, or
Given "r0,r1,r2,...,rn" y could have been chosen but there is no further reason, therefore partly deterministic, partly arbitrary.

So, on the whole, I tend to the idea that the process of language is a physical process, under the definition you quoted.

[Robin]

You are of the opinion language is physical but you are NOT assuming it is physical? Is that correct? Let me rephrase the question, why are you of the opinion that language is physical?
Post #57.
That answer doesn't have anything to do with language. It has to do with human beings being physical creatures interacting in a physical world. By that reasoning, what isn't going to be considered physical?
I have re-read the answer in post #57 and cannot find this reference to human beings being physical creatures interacting in the physical world. You appear to be confusing it with post #1 which is not me.

You did not respond to my question earlier as to whether or not you agreed with what I said, even if you didn't agree that it demonstrated language to be physical.

I said that if there were some process that could not, even in principle be described by an empirically verifiable mathematical model, then that process could not be deterministic, nor random, nor any combination of only deterministic and random elements.

Do you agree?

[AlBell]

...
But this process can only end in:

Given "r0,r1,r2,...,rn" y could not have been chosen therefore deterministic, or
Given "r0,r1,r2,...,rn" y could have been chosen but there is no further reason, therefore partly deterministic, partly arbitrary.

So, on the whole, I tend to the idea that the process of language is a physical process, under the definition you quoted.
Arbitrary may, or may not, be random from a subjective view.

I wonder how many people believe their apparent choices are random, although they may be in appearance arbitrary. I suspect most will concur that nearly all choices they believe they have made were in fact deterministic dictated by their current 'frame', with 'frame' referencing the AI Frame Problem.

[Beth]

Post #57.

I have re-read the answer in post #57 and cannot find this reference to human beings being physical creatures interacting in the physical world. You appear to be confusing it with post #1 which is not me. That was a reference to your first sentence I am not sure how you think that these words will reach me via a set of machines and physical media if you don't think it possible to quantify the structure of a linguistic exchange

The second part was in regards to mathematical models. Are mathematical models how you come to the opinion of something being physical? Because I don't see that issue as related to the question at all.

You did not respond to my question earlier as to whether or not you agreed with what I said, even if you didn't agree that it demonstrated language to be physical.

I said that if there were some process that could not, even in principle be described by an empirically verifiable mathematical model, then that process could not be deterministic, nor random, nor any combination of only deterministic and random elements.

Do you agree? It's not a question I can answer at this time. It depends on what you mean by 'described by an empirically verificable mathematical model'. From previous conversations, I am under the impression we may not agree on what that would be.

How accurate does the model have to be? Is even a very simple model such as:

1 = language is physical and 0 = language is not physical

a mathematical model? Given a definition of 'physical', it wouldn't be hard to verify empirically. Of course, different definitions of physical may lead to different conclusions, but that's to be expected.

If something like that counts as an empirically verificable mathematical model, then there are no processes that cannot be described mathematically - at least in principle - and the question is moot.

If it doesn't count as an empirically verifiable mathematical model because something more precise and useful is needed, then I don't agree. It would appear that there are things that we humans are unable to model and empirically verify. Whether it is 'in principle' or only in practice, I cannot tell but I see no reason to assume that because it cannot be modeled it is not a combination of deterministic and random elements.

[Dancing David]

What isn't physical in your worldview?

And if something is not physical, is it (and everything) material in your wordview?

Anything that is not constructed of traditional QM and the four forces?

[Dancing David]

It's both: Many of the "ultimate" aspects of language development are intuitive. The "proximate" specifics of each language are learned.

This is true enough for verbal language, anyway. Written is a different beast, where much more of it must be learned, and much less (if any) is intuitive.

Don't be fooled: Just because written language and spoken language usually (but not always) share the same syntax and semantics, they are, in fact, "different languages" as far as many of your mental processes are concerned.

Sure, I just don't like the use of the word 'instinct'. It is inappropriate in language acquistion.

[AlBell]

What isn't physical in your worldview?

And if something is not physical, is it (and everything) material in your wordview?

Anything that is not constructed of traditional QM and the four forces?
Could be, and that is why 'observer' and 'conscious observer' effect on QM gets bandied about. Is there a difference?

That, and Planck's limits provide a bound on what is 'observable'.

[Frank Newgent]

Natural science is described in a value-free way. The philosophy of positivism attempts to extend this method to the humanities.

What's funny (to me) is that the (supposedly) value-free way the natural sciences go on describing things depends, also, on making value calls. :boggled:

That evidence is true, that a theory may be falsified, that a higher value is assigned to a description of a relevent state of affairs, regarding a point on a scale as a goal, the principle of parsimony ... these are value calls all the way.

If the goal is to blur the line between the positive and normative sciences it seems to me more apt to acknowledge this than to deny the place of "value" in a study of humanities such as language.


Okay, now I see what you're getting at. Thanks for your valuable response, Frank. ;)

I see them, science and humanities, as complementary ways of looking at the world -- different languages, if you will; not opponents at all.

Science says it's forty below. The humanities say it's *****' cold out! If you're looking for precision, the scientific description is more valuable; for emotion, a human valuation of what forty below means... loosely, the humanities approach.

Values are subjective, of course; though groups strive for 'objective' values, by modeling ideals. Social sciences use statistics to describe norms (values as they are, not as they should be, ideally). Science may inform normative questions; but questions of value, which involve ideals, aren't decided by science. For one thing, they're context-sensitive, and the most important context, for any question of value, is the subject(s) to whom those values apply.

Even if each subject is ultimately reducible to a mathematical description, the math will only describe that subject's values. Ultimate value will always come down to competing models, which will be valued differently by different subjects (assuming we don't evolve into a race of interchangeable androids, or whatever). So, as I've argued elsewhere, value to humans is ultimately decided by humans, through open-ended argument (that's where philosophy, and in a way the humanities come in). I think any decent mathematical model of human society and psychology would predict as much.

Sorry, I probably could've said all that a lot simpler; but the point is: scientific description of value -- even in strictly 'material' language -- isn't a substitute for human valuation. (Or something like that, anyway). :relieved:


Thanks for your answer.

As for values being subjective... assigning higher value to a theory which describes a relevant or true or parsimonious state of affairs as opposed to an irrelevant or false or unnecessarily complicated theory is objective compared to assigning higher value to a theory which is favored because of financial or ideological reasons or due to simple personal preference.

Making normative choices is true in both astrophysics and ethics.

Before reducing, say, normative ethics to a mathematical description of normative ethics... positive science may have to start by reducing its own normative choices to to mathematical descriptions of its own normative choices.

[Wowbagger]

Sure, I just don't like the use of the word 'instinct'. It is inappropriate in language acquistion.I disagree.

Normally-developed minds will instinctively pick up the language around them. Granted, the detials of what they pick up will differ, and thus have to be learned... But, not even forcibly so (for verbal language). And, the instinct to pick them up, in the first place, is there to begin with.

Written language (reading and writing) often does have to be "forced" onto people, in order to learn it. It is not normally naturally picked up, otherwise. So, written language is much less instinctual.

[Robin]

Are mathematical models how you come to the opinion of something being physical?
Er.... hello! This whole debate started because in another thread AlBell dredged up a definition I suggested of "physical" and asked if, in that context, language was physical.

I have made it abundantly clear that my answer was in the context of that specific definition of "physical" and nothing else.

Here is where it started:
From a post of yours in an older thread:

Is it consistently observable? Is it measurable? Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?

If so then it is physical.
Is language physical?

That was the specific question and my answer was to that question and that definition and nothing else.

I have made this abundantly clear. If you did not accept that definition or did not know what definition I was talking about then you should have made this clear.

I cannot express an opinion on whether or not language is physical according to some definition of your own until I hear that definition.

Most people use the word without knowing what they mean by it. The same goes for "material".

[Dymanic]

So, does that make language the basis for intelligence, the defining characteristic of our evolutionary success as a species?
Not sure I'd go that far. When I try to imagine a human species without language (which I do not find at all easy to do), it seems reasonable to expect whatever defining characteristics it had to be much different from ours. As for "intelligence" -- we're struggling enough to define the terms already introduced without throwing that one into the mix, but I'd also expect such a hypothetical species to be capable of maybe doing at least some things better than we do; I mean just the extra time they'd have available by not getting involved in discussions like this one would be bound to give them some kind of an edge.

[Beth]

Er.... hello! This whole debate started because in another thread AlBell dredged up a definition I suggested of "physical" and asked if, in that context, language was physical.

I have made it abundantly clear that my answer was in the context of that specific definition of "physical" and nothing else.

Here is where it started:
Is it consistently observable? Is it measurable? Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?

If so then it is physical.


That was the specific question and my answer was to that question and that definition and nothing else. I hadn't realized that was your definition of 'physical'. It's pretty far removed from any other I've come across and I didn't recognize it as a definition. Probably because you phrased it as a series of questions. Let me try to paraphrase that.

Your opinion is that anything that can be observed, measured, described by a mathematical model and it is possible to develop hypotheses about it and test them is physical. Is that correct? Are all of those qualities necessary or only some?

Why do you equate being observable, measurable, and testable with physical? Is there anything you feel cannot be observed, measured and modeled, and therefore would not be considered physical by this definition?

IMO, we can measure and model everything we can observe and a good deal of stuff we can't actually observe but can deduce indirectly or build machines to observe. Unfortunately, an awful lot of stuff we can only measure and model so poorly that it isn't the slightest bit useful.

The only things I'm aware of that cannot be measured at all are specially constructed mathematical sets that don't actually exist nor can we create them, they can only be conjectured and described. They aren't physical by any definition of the term I've come across including yours above. But everything else I've ever come across would be considered physical by this definition.

Perhaps you could just answer the question I asked in the last post about such models:

How accurate does the model have to be? Is even a very simple model such as:

1 = language is physical and 0 = language is not physical

a mathematical model?


I have made this abundantly clear. If you did not accept that definition or did not know what definition I was talking about then you should have made this clear. I do not agree with that definition of physical, but it's nice to know what you mean by physical.

I cannot express an opinion on whether or not language is physical according to some definition of your own until I hear that definition. I haven't been asking you to express an opinion about language according to my definition. I know how language is classified by my definition. I've been trying to figure out what your definition was. If the above is your definition, it's a bit strange but that's fine. I can now attempt to figure out why you prefer that definition and feel it's appropriate.

Most people use the word without knowing what they mean by it. The same goes for "material". By physical or material, I usually mean something that is composed of energy in the state of a solid, liquid, gas or plasma. I don't consider ideas or concepts to be physical although their instantiations are.

This isn't a useful definition for physicists, but it seems appropriate enough for everyday use. In discussions like this, I usually presume that the other person will include all forms of energy, not just the four states I listed above. Even so, defining language as physical wouldn't make sense to me with that defintiion, which is why I kept asking you to define what you meant by it rather than asking you to answer the question according to my definition.

[Beth]

As for values being subjective... assigning higher value to a theory which describes a relevant or true or parsimonious state of affairs as opposed to an irrelevant or false or unnecessarily complicated theory is objective compared to assigning higher value to a theory which is favored because of financial or ideological reasons or due to simple personal preference.
Why do you say this? Seems to me that favoring a theory for financial reasons is about as objective a valuation as you are likely to find whereas "relevant" or "parsimonious" are subjective judgement calls.

[Robin]

I hadn't realized that was your definition of 'physical'. It's pretty far removed from any other I've come across and I didn't recognize it as a definition.
You have no possible excuse for not knowing the definition I was using. I continually stressing that my statement was in the context of the definition AlBell dragged up when he originally asked the question. I could not have been more clear on the matter.

I explicitly stated in posts 39 and 55 that my statement was in context of the definition AlBell had dredged up when he originally asked the question.

So if you want to ask about this definition then perhaps you should go back to the original discussion where AlBell found the quote:
What criteria do you have for distinguishing whether some as-yet-undiscovered "unknown" would fall into being natural or supernatural when it's discovered?

Is it consistently observable? Is it measurable? Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?

If so then it is physical.

If not then we have either a supernatural entity or a hallucination.


http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5461293#post5461293

And as for this:
I do not agree with that definition of physical...
It would have saved us a heap of time if you had simply said so in the first place
..., but it's nice to know what you mean by physical.
And you only had to be told 3 or 4 times.

[Beth]

You have no possible excuse for not knowing the definition I was using. I continually stressing that my statement was in the context of the definition AlBell dragged up when he originally asked the question. I could not have been more clear on the matter.

I explicitly stated in posts 39 and 55 that my statement was in context of the definition AlBell had dredged up when he originally asked the question.

So if you want to ask about this definition then perhaps you should go back to the original discussion where AlBell found the quote:


http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=5461293#post5461293

And as for this:

It would have saved us a heap of time if you had simply said so in the first place

And you only had to be told 3 or 4 times.

Aren't you sweet! You might have mentioned that your definition was in the form of a series of questions. It would have made it easier to tell that that was the 'definition' you were referring to. It isn't what I consider a definition at all, but opinions do vary.

Would you mind answering the questions I asked in the previous post.

Paraphrasing your "definition":

Your opinion is that anything that can be observed, measured, described by a mathematical model and it is possible to develop hypotheses about it and test them is physical. Is that correct? Are all of those qualities necessary or only some?

Why do you equate being observable, measurable, and testable with physical? Is there anything you feel cannot be observed, measured and modeled, and therefore would not be considered physical by this definition?

In regards to the mathematical model part of the definition:

How accurate does the model have to be? Is even a very simple model such as:

1 = language is physical and 0 = language is not physical

a mathematical model [of the sort you are referring to in your definition of physical]?

[Robin]

Aren't you sweet!
Snideness won't help you here. You have no excuse. I was asked the question in the context of a specific definition. I have stated throughout that my answer was in the context of that specific question and definition.

I could not have been more clear about the matter.
You might have mentioned that your definition was in the form of a series of questions.
I explicitly stated that the definition I had used was the one that AlBell had quoted when he originally asked the question.

There is only one quote in the post where AlBell originally asked the question.

What else could I have been referring to? Seriously. What else?

If you went and checked this and thought to yourself "there is no definition here - only a series of questions followed by the sentence 'Then it is physical' " then why didn't you come back to me and ask me about this? Seriously. Why not?

Since I was being so careful to stress that this was the definition I was using, shouldn't you have come back and asked me about it???
It would have made it easier to tell that that was the 'definition' you were referring to.
There was only one quote that I could possibly have been referring to.

I explicitly stated that this was a definition. Twice.

How much easier could I have made it?
It isn't what I consider a definition at all, but opinions do vary.
It is a common enough technique, to define a term using a series of questions followed by definite statement. You may not have been aware of this but if so then why didn't you simply ask this question when I explicitly referred to this quote as a "definition"?
Paraphrasing your "definition":
No, we have had quite enough "paraphrasing" thank you very much.

You just need to accept that it is possible to define a term using a series of questions followed by a definite statement. If you want to understand how this works, just look at how AlBell used the definition in post #52.
In regards to the mathematical model part of the definition:

How accurate does the model have to be? Is even a very simple model such as:

1 = language is physical and 0 = language is not physical

a mathematical model [of the sort you are referring to in your definition of physical]?
Well you first have to tell me what empirical test you are proposing to verify the hypothesis, otherwise I can't tell how accurate it is.

Short answer - it can be as simple as you like as long as it is empirically verifiable.

[Malerin]

You have no possible excuse for not knowing the definition I was using.

:rolleyes:

Let me guess...you don't get out much, do you?

[Robin]

:rolleyes:

Let me guess...you don't get out much, do you?
Not sure what you mean here.

[blobru]

Thanks for your answer.

As for values being subjective... assigning higher value to a theory which describes a relevant or true or parsimonious state of affairs as opposed to an irrelevant or false or unnecessarily complicated theory is objective compared to assigning higher value to a theory which is favored because of financial or ideological reasons or due to simple personal preference.

In science's frame-of-reference, yes. Occam's Razor.

Making normative choices is true in both astrophysics and ethics.

Before reducing, say, normative ethics to a mathematical description of normative ethics... positive science may have to start by reducing its own normative choices to to mathematical descriptions of its own normative choices.

What fun! But wherever it starts, Science, at best, can only describe values [in scientific language]. It doesn't [as a method] prescribe values, even its own (though data inform ethical choices).

[Robin]

In science's frame-of-reference, yes. Occam's Razor.
Which of course comes to science via Theology.

[blobru]

Which of course comes to science via Theology.


In mint condition, with the shrink wrap still on. :)

[Frank Newgent]

Why do you say this? Seems to me that favoring a theory for financial reasons is about as objective a valuation as you are likely to find whereas "relevant" or "parsimonious" are subjective judgement calls.


What branch of the US health care industry do you work in? :D

[Beth]

How much easier could I have made it? You could have answered the questions I asked directly instead referring to other posts in other threads. Rephrasing statements that weren't understood the first time and providing examples of what you are talking about can also be very helpful in that situation.

No, we have had quite enough "paraphrasing" thank you very much.

You just need to accept that it is possible to define a term using a series of questions followed by a definite statement. If you want to understand how this works, just look at how AlBell used the definition in post #52.

Okay. I can accept this form of a definition. But I'm still not sure that I've understood you correctly as you didn't answer my question regarding the paraphrase. Am I now clear on the definition of physical that you are using? Or did my paraphrase indicate to you that I still don't understand your definition?

Well you first have to tell me what empirical test you are proposing to verify the hypothesis, otherwise I can't tell how accurate it is.

So whether or not you think something qualifies as physical depends on the accuracy of the empirical test is used to verify the model? Am I understanding you correctly?

For the example model I presented, how about if we use consensus by experts. Take a survey of professional linguists regarding whether or not language is physical. Would that example then qualify as a mathematical model? Do you need the sampling plan to be specified too?

In your opinion, how much precision and accuracy is needed before a model qualifies as sufficiently accurate to determine whether or not the thing being modeled is physical?

Let's say the survey comes back with 50/50 response, giving a probability of .5 that language is physical, would that be sufficiently accurate? If the 99% confidence interval for the .5 estimate is .3 to .7, is that precise enough? Would it need to be smaller? Or could the confidence interval be larger and still be sufficient?


Short answer - it can be as simple as you like as long as it is empirically verifiable.

Are you saying that having an empirically verifiable test is necessary before you consider something to be physical? If it's not empirically verifiable, then the subject of the model isn't physical? Am I understanding you correctly?

Does whether or not something is physical change with our ability to empirically verify measurements of it? It seems to me that your definition would have more and more things become physical as our ability to measure and model and test the models improves. Strings, as postulated in string theory would not be physical now, but might be at some point in the future. Is that a fair statement according to your definition?

If would also be helpful if you could provide an example of something that isn't physical according to your definition.

[Robin]

In mint condition, with the shrink wrap still on. :)
Nominated.

[Robin]

You could have answered the questions I asked directly instead referring to other posts in other threads.
So you want me to go back and cut and paste stuff to save you the time of going back and looking at it?

How is it not answering the question about the definition I am using when I refer you back to the question AlBell asked and the definition he wanted me to use?

For the rest - it will have to wait, I don't have time right now.

[Robin]

So you want me to go back and cut and paste stuff to save you the time of going back and looking at it?

How is it not answering the question about the definition I am using when I refer you back to the question AlBell asked and the definition he wanted me to use?

For the rest - it will have to wait, I don't have time right now.
But time for a quick question - you mathematical model - what is it modelling?

[Robin]

So whether or not you think something qualifies as physical depends on the accuracy of the empirical test is used to verify the model? Am I understanding you correctly?
No, I am questioning whether you have a model at all. Garbage in garbage out does not usually qualify as a model.
For the example model I presented, how about if we use consensus by experts. Take a survey of professional linguists regarding whether or not language is physical. Would that example then qualify as a mathematical model?
No, of course it wouldn't. Putting in some numbers and equal signs then tacking on an unrelated test does not a mathematical model make. It has to actually model something - for example taking initial observations as inputs and predicting the consequent observations.
In your opinion, how much precision and accuracy is needed before a model qualifies as sufficiently accurate to determine whether or not the thing being modeled is physical?
There needs to be sufficient accuracy before it qualifies as an empiricially verifiable model at all. That has nothing in particular to do with my definition.
Are you saying that having an empirically verifiable test is necessary before you consider something to be physical?
Yes
If it's not empirically verifiable, then the subject of the model isn't physical?
If a model is not empirically verifiable then no conclusions can be drawn from it at all.
Am I understanding you correctly?
Not if you can help it, apparently.
Does whether or not something is physical change with our ability to empirically verify measurements of it?
No, of course not.
If would also be helpful if you could provide an example of something that isn't physical according to your definition.
Things that are not the result of empirical observation for example. Mathematics for example would not qualify by the first criterion. (and of course if you did consider mathematics as physical it would make the definition circular)

Libertarian free will, if there was such a thing would not qualify since if we could predict it then it would not be libertarian.

Supernatural entities such as Gods and angels are generally held to be beyond the purview of science and so would not qualify as physical under this definition.

[Robin]

Incidentally, Beth, you never did tell me what was the relevance of this question.

A definition for "physical" and "language" is an interesting academic exercise, but the question of whether language is physical or not is, as I initially said, philosophically trivial, isn't it?

[Dancing David]

Could be, and that is why 'observer' and 'conscious observer' effect on QM gets bandied about. Is there a difference?

That, and Planck's limits provide a bound on what is 'observable'.

Yes, the conscious observer stuff is crap, when it comes to QM. That is a total misinterpretation of QM. You can place a magnet near a slit of the double slit experiment and get the non-interference pattern. It is not the 'consciousness' it is either the magnet or it isn't.

Total woo nonsense. (The QM and consciousness claim)

And why would the Plank length matter, is this some sort of dualism of the gaps? :)

[Dancing David]

I disagree.

Normally-developed minds will instinctively pick up the language around them. Granted, the detials of what they pick up will differ, and thus have to be learned... But, not even forcibly so (for verbal language). And, the instinct to pick them up, in the first place, is there to begin with.

Written language (reading and writing) often does have to be "forced" onto people, in order to learn it. It is not normally naturally picked up, otherwise. So, written language is much less instinctual.

Except for the training and reinforcement of the parents and others, right?

Again you are using the term instinct in a very 'non-technical' fashion, it is not stereotypic nor is it modal inherent in the critter.

If you remove the social reinforcement and then show what happens, I will agree that it is inherent but not 'instinctual', humans have no 'instincts' after about the sixth week, bambini reflex, palmar reflex and rooting, all are neurologicaly driven and stereotypic.

Language acquistion is trained and learned.

[Robin]

Yes, the conscious observer stuff is crap, when it comes to QM. That is a total misinterpretation of QM. You can place a magnet near a slit of the double slit experiment and get the non-interference pattern. It is not the 'consciousness' it is either the magnet or it isn't.

Total woo nonsense. (The QM and consciousness claim)
Yes, when people make the consciousness and QM claim I always wonder whether the scientists are supposed to render themselves unconscious during the first part of the experiment before the light source is introduced and while the interference pattern is still evident. After all shouldn't their consciousness be collapsing the wave form?

[Dancing David]

Thanks for your answer.

As for values being subjective... assigning higher value to a theory which describes a relevant or true or parsimonious state of affairs as opposed to an irrelevant or false or unnecessarily complicated theory is objective compared to assigning higher value to a theory which is favored because of financial or ideological reasons or due to simple personal preference.

Making normative choices is true in both astrophysics and ethics.

Before reducing, say, normative ethics to a mathematical description of normative ethics... positive science may have to start by reducing its own normative choices to to mathematical descriptions of its own normative choices.


The 'value' is predictive power or utility. Now that is a positive, but not always a 'higher value'. Mathematics is just one way of modeling, not the end all be all. It is sueful in many contexts and not in others. I think people like it because of the measuring capacity.

And the same is true of philosophy.

[AlBell]

Could be, and that is why 'observer' and 'conscious observer' effect on QM gets bandied about. Is there a difference?

That, and Planck's limits provide a bound on what is 'observable'.

Yes, the conscious observer stuff is crap, when it comes to QM.

Unverified anyway.

That is a total misinterpretation of QM. You can place a magnet near a slit of the double slit experiment and get the non-interference pattern. It is not the 'consciousness' it is either the magnet or it isn't.

Total woo nonsense. (The QM and consciousness claim)
Woo? Also unverified.

And why would the Plank length matter, is this some sort of dualism of the gaps? :)
Sometimes a gap is just a gap. Questioning why it's there doesn't remove it.

[Beth]

So you want me to go back and cut and paste stuff to save you the time of going back and looking at it? No. That isn't what I meant.

How is it not answering the question about the definition I am using when I refer you back to the question AlBell asked and the definition he wanted me to use? I didn't say you didn't answer the question.

But time for a quick question - you mathematical model - what is it modelling? Language

Incidentally, Beth, you never did tell me what was the relevance of this question.

A definition for "physical" and "language" is an interesting academic exercise, but the question of whether language is physical or not is, as I initially said, philosophically trivial, isn't it?

I don't think so. I am fascinated by the idea of measuring intangible things, like language or consciousness. or learning. t's a very challenging problem. Different definitions and points of view are helpful. Yours is a very unusual definition of physical, so I am interested in learning more about it.
No, I am questioning whether you have a model at all. Okay. It was meant to be a very poor model. I am trying to discover the limits of what/how you consider something to be physical by that definition. If it doesn't count as a model, what is needed that the example model doesn't have?
Take a survey of professional linguists regarding whether or not language is physical. Would that example then qualify as a mathematical model?
No, of course it wouldn't. Putting in some numbers and equal signs then tacking on an unrelated test does not a mathematical model make. It has to actually model something - for example taking initial observations as inputs and predicting the consequent observations. Fair enough. Can you give me a more complete definition of what you think a model is so that I can try to formulate a bare-bones model that would still qualify. Or, since your opinion is that language is physical, could you provide me with what you consider to be an adequate empirically verifiable mathematical model of language.

There needs to be sufficient accuracy before it qualifies as an empiricially verifiable model at all. That has nothing in particular to do with my definition. This is an interesting stance on your part. If it must have sufficient accuracy before it qualifies as a model, then I think that sufficient accuracy is an unstated premise of your definition. Do you disagree?

If a model is not empirically verifiable then no conclusions can be drawn from it at all. So, is it possible for something to be determined as 'non-physical' by your definition, or does it divide things into physical and inconclusive?

Not if you can help it, apparently. This comment doesn't answer my question. Do I now have reasonable grasp of the definition of physical you are using or not?

No, of course not.
Things that are not the result of empirical observation for example. Mathematics for example would not qualify by the first criterion. (and of course if you did consider mathematics as physical it would make the definition circular) So mathematics are not physical by your definition. Is that correct? Or can we simply not draw a conclusion about mathematics? (Incidently, I would disagree that mathematics are not empirically verifiable.)


Libertarian free will, if there was such a thing would not qualify since if we could predict it then it would not be libertarian.

Supernatural entities such as Gods and angels are generally held to be beyond the purview of science and so would not qualify as physical under this definition. Thanks, but I'm not particularly interested in applying your definition to supernatural things, but the intangible things that we deal with here on earth, like language and mathematics. You've made it clear that in your opinion language is physical. Hopefully you answered my question above about mathematics. Can you give any other examples of things you think a) exist and b) are not physical.

[Frank Newgent]

Mathematics is just one way of modeling, not the end all be all. It is sueful in many contexts and not in others.


Not sure what you mean. Zeros and ones soon to be copyrighted? :p

[Frank Newgent]

Thanks for your answer.

As for values being subjective... assigning higher value to a theory which describes a relevant or true or parsimonious state of affairs as opposed to an irrelevant or false or unnecessarily complicated theory is objective compared to assigning higher value to a theory which is favored because of financial or ideological reasons or due to simple personal preference.

Making normative choices is true in both astrophysics and ethics.

Before reducing, say, normative ethics to a mathematical description of normative ethics... positive science may have to start by reducing its own normative choices to to mathematical descriptions of its own normative choices.


The 'value' is predictive power or utility. Now that is a positive, but not always a 'higher value'. Mathematics is just one way of modeling, not the end all be all. It is sueful in many contexts and not in others. I think people like it because of the measuring capacity.

And the same is true of philosophy.


My bolding.

The "value" is a goal... an implied ought.

Even the methods of purely descriptive natural science depends on making normative choices.

I don't see how such fits within your definition.

[Wowbagger]

Except for the training and reinforcement of the parents and others, right? No. Apparently, not much (if any) training or reinforcement is really necessary for most normally-developed children to learn verbal language. As long as there are sufficient samples around them, they will pick the majority of it up, on their own. They will get things wrong, at first, but they are also good at self-correcting over time. Parental reinforcement more often goes unheeded.

At least, that is one of the things I gleamed from reading Steven Pinker's books. I am not an expert on this stuff, myself.

I am, in fact, using the word instinct in a manner that is useful in such sciences:

The inherent disposition of a living organism toward a particular behavior. The fixed action patterns are unlearned and inherited. The stimuli can be variable due to imprinting in a sensitive period or also genetically fixed.

If you remove the social reinforcement and then show what happens, I will agree that it is inherent but not 'instinctual', You have to separate "social" and "reinforcement". Without social, there is no language, because there are insufficient samples to pick it up from.

However, once there is some social networking, "reinforcement" from the outside is not very critical. As I stated: The tendency is for people to self-correct over time.

There might be some exceptions in some technicalities, but the same is true for all other instincts, anyway. The presence of a few exceptions does not mean the whole concept of instinct is useless or nonexistent.

humans have no 'instincts' after about the sixth week, bambini reflex, palmar reflex and rooting, all are neurologicaly driven and stereotypic. Then why do so many people instinctively react to things, even into adulthood? For example: Most people will automatically cringe at the sight of blood, without any training. If they do not, they were probably trained out of it.

Almost sounds like we can resurrect this thread:
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=156366

[Dancing David]

My bolding.

The "value" is a goal... an implied ought.

Even the methods of purely descriptive natural science depends on making normative choices.

I don't see how such fits within your definition.


I will ponder.

My guess in that it is just one value, all being equal.

[Dancing David]

No. Apparently, not much (if any) training or reinforcement is really necessary for most normally-developed children to learn verbal language. As long as there are sufficient samples around them, they will pick the majority of it up, on their own. They will get things wrong, at first, but they are also good at self-correcting over time. Parental reinforcement more often goes unheeded.

I think you need to really look at adults and babies through 2yo, there is whole lot of training and reinforcement there. :)


At least, that is one of the things I gleamed from reading Steven Pinker's books. I am not an expert on this stuff, myself.

I am, in fact, using the word instinct in a manner that is useful in such sciences:

The inherent disposition of a living organism toward a particular behavior. The fixed action patterns are unlearned and inherited. The stimuli can be variable due to imprinting in a sensitive period or also genetically fixed.

Yeah and that is a fairly good useage of stereotypic, which language acquistion is not.

All memebers of the set do not respond to the stimuli in the stereotyopic or modal pattern


You have to separate "social" and "reinforcement". Without social, there is no language, because there are insufficient samples to pick it up from.

Not really social reinforcement is a big deal for children, it is one of many.


However, once there is some social networking, "reinforcement" from the outside is not very critical. As I stated: The tendency is for people to self-correct over time.

then why do we teach in schools? Why do speech pathologists have jobs?

You have made a great theory that is not supported by human development.

It is socially trained, reinforced and conditioned.

When you show me a child who learned language while just listening to a tape recorder, i will concede.


There might be some exceptions in some technicalities, but the same is true for all other instincts, anyway. The presence of a few exceptions does not mean the whole concept of instinct is useless or nonexistent.

You will note that i said that you did not use it in the jargon sense.


Then why do so many people instinctively react to things, even into adulthood?

You do know that there are no instinctive efars, right? that babies learn to be afriad of heights?

You are confusing 'instint' with 'conditioned'.

For example: Most people will automatically cringe at the sight of blood, without any training. If they do not, they were probably trained out of it.

Really, you did not read the material on babies in the other threads right?

there is a difference between instinct and conditioning.



Almost sounds like we can resurrect this thread:
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=156366

If it is the one I think, you will find that it supports my technical framing.

[Robin]

Yours is a very unusual definition of physical, so I am interested in learning more about it.
Actually it is not such an unusual definition, I developed it by analysing how people use the word and then boiling it down and finding the common denominator.

If you look at your own definition you enumerate things we know about at this point in time. And we know about them through mathematical models - the most complete definition we have of them are mathematical models.

But think of the question that my definition was in answer to - if there were something completely new that had not been encountered before, on what basis would you classify it as physical or non-physical? How would you have answered that?

For the rest, all good questions, but I will have to leave them for later.

[Beth]

Actually it is not such an unusual definition, I developed it by analysing how people use the word and then boiling it down and finding the common denominator. It's a good approach, but I doubt many people would define it like that.

If you look at your own definition you enumerate things we know about at this point in time. And we know about them through mathematical models - the most complete definition we have of them are mathematical models. Interesting, I think of it as a restatement of "Earth, Air, Fire, and Water", which is ancient. I think we knew about those things before we had mathematical models.

For the rest, all good questions, but I will have to leave them for later.
I'll look forward to it.

[Frank Newgent]

When you show me a child who learned language while just listening to a tape recorder, i will concede.


Though strictly anecdotal I know a Balinese man who picked up a quite superior command of English largely through American television programs. He is especially a fan of the Three Stooges and the History Channel and knows many idioms conversationally.

He did receive English lessons in the Indonesian school system so this may not be a good example. However no one else I know (and I know a number of people there) is capable of understanding subtleties of everyday American English on his level.

(have learned some Balinese curses in return for what schooling we've provided him)

He was indispensable when it came to presenting a gift of a Bob Dobbs t-shirt to an old man rice paddy gardener or koki who used to work the paddies outside a property we've been renting when there.

Though unfamiliar with the Church of the Subgenius he was up to getting the absurdity of a bland American corporate face representing the parody of a bad religion.

No small step for someone thoroughly indoctrinated in the Balinese Hindu mindset.

Needless to say a very clever man...

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/6754b85e5bdc54fe.jpg

[Dancing David]

Though strictly anecdotal I know a Balinese man who picked up a quite superior command of English largely through American television programs. He is especially a fan of the Three Stooges and the History Channel and knows many idioms conversationally.

That is great, Nyuk nyuk nyuk. :D

I should have said 'child'. :)

I learned a lot of spanish watching english movies with subtitles, for vocabulary, dubbed movies and mexican TV.


He did receive English lessons in the Indonesian school system so this may not be a good example. However no one else I know (and I know a number of people there) is capable of understanding subtleties of everyday American English on his level.

(have learned some Balinese curses in return for what schooling we've provided him)

He was indispensable when it came to presenting a gift of a Bob Dobbs t-shirt to an old man rice paddy gardener or koki who used to work the paddies outside a property we've been renting when there.

Though unfamiliar with the Church of the Subgenius he was up to getting the absurdity of a bland American corporate face representing the parody of a bad religion.

:D


No small step for someone thoroughly indoctrinated in the Balinese Hindu mindset.

Needless to say a very clever man...

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/6754b85e5bdc54fe.jpg

[Wowbagger]

When you show me a child who learned language while just listening to a tape recorder, i will concede.
This indicates you are misunderstanding my points. A tape recorder would only provide one-way communication.

Remember: It is the readiness and the ability to pick up language that is instinctual. Context is a huge part of that. And, without some interaction, there might not be adequate context to work from.

Theoretically, an adequately designed speech A.I. would do it better than a tape recorder.


that babies learn to be afriad of heights?I would argue that fear of heights is universal enough to qualify as instinct.

The very idea that you have to "learn" to be afraid of heights strikes me as ridiculous. It would more accurately reflect the nature of society to say that you have to learn NOT to be afraid of heights.

Babies would not appear to be afraid of heights, because their mental
processing has not developed an awareness of heights, yet. But, when they do become aware of it, you can bet your sweet bippy that they don't need to learn to fear it.


I would respond to more of your points. But, I think I might need to establish a better foundation for my point of view, for you to work off of. Let me think about how to do that.

[Dancing David]

This indicates you are misunderstanding my points. A tape recorder would only provide one-way communication.

Remember: It is the readiness and the ability to pick up language that is instinctual. Context is a huge part of that. And, without some interaction, there might not be adequate context to work from.

Theoretically, an adequately designed speech A.I. would do it better than a tape recorder.


I would argue that fear of heights is universal enough to qualify as instinct.

Maybe you should try to use some google fu before I do, you are wrong. Babies do not have an inate fear of heights, they learn to be afraid of heights.

I only five minutes right now and will post the research later.

You are wrong.


The very idea that you have to "learn" to be afraid of heights strikes me as ridiculous. It would more accurately reflect the nature of society to say that you have to learn NOT to be afraid of heights.

Babies would not appear to be afraid of heights, because their mental
processing has not developed an awareness of heights, yet. But, when they do become aware of it, you can bet your sweet bippy that they don't need to learn to fear it.

They learn by falling and their parents anxiety and expessions of panic..
That is called 'learning' , not 'instinct'. babies have depth perception at a certain age, and they can understand a visual cliff, but they do not fear one until they either find that pain is a consequence or that there parents freak out. I will get the research later.

It is learned and not inate.



I would respond to more of your points. But, I think I might need to establish a better foundation for my point of view, for you to work off of. Let me think about how to do that.


Maybe you should do some research in childhood development, conditioning and child psychology. Fear of falling is a learned behavior.

Your point of view may be intuitive but the research does not support it. Children will not learn a language by just being exposed to a tape of spoken language.

[Wowbagger]

Children will not learn a language by just being exposed to a tape of spoken language.

:rolleyes: I am glad we agree, at least, on one thing.

[rocketdodger]

Your point of view may be intuitive but the research does not support it. Children will not learn a language by just being exposed to a tape of spoken language.

David you should be wary of your strawman here -- you brought up the tape recorder, not wowbagger.

I think you should focus on a more interesting grey area, such as whether or not a child can learn a language by observing a group of people using it.

I wouldn't expect the learning rate to be nearly as fast as when the child had feedback, but would it learn something nonetheless?

[Wowbagger]

Say, Dancing David, I have an idea!

Would you be willing to do a "Book Swap" with me? I would recommend a book for you to read, and in turn, you would recommend a book for me to read. It could be just about any book of reasonable length, but preferably one relevant towards how we view instincts.

Then we would both report on what we learned from each others' books.

We don't need to literally swap books, of course. We can pick up our own copies of them. Though, if you prefer, I can even send out a copy of my chosen book to you.

(I don't know, yet, which book to recommend to you, but it would probably be either The Language Instinct or The Blank Slate by Steven Pinker, I suspect.)

[Wowbagger]

I wouldn't expect the learning rate to be nearly as fast as when the child had feedback, but would it learn something nonetheless?Seeing as how context is a huge part of learning language as a child (as I mentioned, before), I would say the effectiveness would scale something like this:

From Least Effective to Most Effective:
A tape recorder (not effective)

A video of people talking to each other (with audio, of course)(only a slight improvement, if anything)

Watching others speak in real life, but without interaction with the child

Adults (no peers) interacting with the child, but not necessarily "reinforcing lessons"

Adults and Peers interacting with the child, but not necessarily "reinforcing lessons"

Adults offering reinforcement lessons: This would probably offer only a slight improvement over "adults and peers", especially when it comes to certain non-intuitive technicalities (job-related jargon and technical terms, for example).
In general, most children actually brush off attempts by adults to reinforce lessons in spoken language, so it could be slightly counter-productive.

(A.I. could rank anywhere, depending on how it is designed. But, assuming it offers some interaction, it would probably rank better than the tape recorder.)

I remind everyone that the above only applies to spoken language. Written language is a different beast. In general written language does need to be heavily reinforced by adults: It is a newer technology, and less oriented in evolutionary heritage and instincts.

[Dancing David]

David you should be wary of your strawman here -- you brought up the tape recorder, not wowbagger.

I think you should focus on a more interesting grey area, such as whether or not a child can learn a language by observing a group of people using it.

I wouldn't expect the learning rate to be nearly as fast as when the child had feedback, but would it learn something nonetheless?

I really really believe that the poarents and others interaction is crucial to devolping language. there is a whole lot of repetition and reinforcement that goes into language acquisition, it is amazing to watch.

They might learn something but I really kind of doubt it, that would be one of those studies that the ethics board would probably not approve.

:D

[Dancing David]

Seeing as how context is a huge part of learning language as a child (as I mentioned, before), I would say the effectiveness would scale something like this:

From Least Effective to Most Effective:
A tape recorder (not effective)

A video of people talking to each other (with audio, of course)(only a slight improvement, if anything)

Watching others speak in real life, but without interaction with the child

See I think that all of those which merely expose the child to language will not really result in language acquisition, they may acquire recognition of phonemes and the like but no speech. Again very unethical.


Adults (no peers) interacting with the child, but not necessarily "reinforcing lessons"

But here is teh deal , watch parents and children with a child learning language, it is not just repeating the words it is also praise, interaction, and all sorts of conditioning. Besides the point and speak method. Parents spend a lot of time, or older sibs do, during certain phases training and reinforcing. I think the parents and sibs would have to be mute during interactions with the child and ignore the child when it was speaking to have 'non reinforcement', I mean reinforcement in terms of classical skinner conditioning. Usually positive reinforcement.


Adults and Peers interacting with the child, but not necessarily "reinforcing lessons"

Adults offering reinforcement lessons: This would probably offer only a slight improvement over "adults and peers", especially when it comes to certain non-intuitive technicalities (job-related jargon and technical terms, for example).
In general, most children actually brush off attempts by adults to reinforce lessons in spoken language, so it could be slightly counter-productive.

Again I think that you need to watch parents and babies to see the amount of operant conditioning that is involved. As far as brushing off, I disagree, language reinforcement is usually very informal. Laughter, hugging and interaction.
Now yes in some cultures the child spends most of the day in non-interacting roles, like the papoose board or swaddling, but there are other times, feeding and cleaning say where there is huge amounts of interaction. Operant conditioning does explain a lot of how babies learn.


(A.I. could rank anywhere, depending on how it is designed. But, assuming it offers some interaction, it would probably rank better than the tape recorder.)

I remind everyone that the above only applies to spoken language. Written language is a different beast. In general written language does need to be heavily reinforced by adults: It is a newer technology, and less oriented in evolutionary heritage and instincts.

[Dancing David]

Say, Dancing David, I have an idea!

Would you be willing to do a "Book Swap" with me? I would recommend a book for you to read, and in turn, you would recommend a book for me to read. It could be just about any book of reasonable length, but preferably one relevant towards how we view instincts.

Then we would both report on what we learned from each others' books.

We don't need to literally swap books, of course. We can pick up our own copies of them. Though, if you prefer, I can even send out a copy of my chosen book to you.

(I don't know, yet, which book to recommend to you, but it would probably be either The Language Instinct or The Blank Slate by Steven Pinker, I suspect.)

Point me to the research that Pinker uses that would probably be better.

Again there is a difference between ability and instinct in jargon terms. You can have a capacity to learn a task and not have it be an instinct, the way say mating behaviors in many species are hard wired.

[Wowbagger]

Well, DD, I think your focus on "conditioning" sounds like very quaint, 1940's era psychology. Your intentions are good. But, I think you could learn a lot from the ideas of modern psychology, which has its roots more deeply embedded in evolutionary heritage and development.

Point me to the research that Pinker uses that would probably be better.I will do what I can, in that regard, soon.

[Robin]

This is an interesting stance on your part. If it must have sufficient accuracy before it qualifies as a model, then I think that sufficient accuracy is an unstated premise of your definition. Do you disagree?
It is not unstated, since it would be tautological to state this in my definition because it is already a necessary condition of the concept of a verifiable mathematical model.

It would be absurd to classify something as an empirically verifiable mathematical model when the experimental results could not be distinguished from pure chance.

If the experimental results can be distinguished from pure chance or noise then it qualifies as an empirically verifiable mathematical model. I hope that makes it clear.

"Things that go up come down" is a very imprecise and inaccurate physical model but it still qualifies as a model - we have an initial condition "up" and a prediction that can be verified "comes down", and "<up,down>" as the measurable quantities involved. I can toss stuff in the air and test it. When the model fails it provides the pointers as to where it can be refined.
So, is it possible for something to be determined as 'non-physical' by your definition, or does it divide things into physical and inconclusive?
I think it does identify things as physical and non-physical, and more importantly it clarifies what it means for something to be physical or not physical.

If we have the questions "is a dollar physical?" or "is the dragon I dreamed last night physical?", then my definition immediately sends us asking questions about what would be the empirically verifiable mathematical model we could make about them.

So when we say "the dreamed dragon is not physical " we mean that we cannot make a verifiable mathematical model of the dragon itself. On the other hand there might be a verifiable mathematical model of something else that would explain the dreamed dragon.

Take the situation where AlBell asked me whether language was physical and you said it was a key question. But as it turned out he meant one thing by the question and you meant another. Thus the following discussion was a complete waste of time, and this happens all the time.
So mathematics are not physical by your definition. Is that correct?
Yes, that is correct.
Incidently, I would disagree that mathematics are not empirically verifiable.
Mathematics is often described as "quasi-empirical", but what experimental procedure would verify the value of pi?

As for other things that are not physical, I think my above answer about dollars and dragons covers this.

[Dancing David]

Well, DD, I think your focus on "conditioning" sounds like very quaint, 1940's era psychology. Your intentions are good. But, I think you could learn a lot from the ideas of modern psychology, which has its roots more deeply embedded in evolutionary heritage and development.

I will do what I can, in that regard, soon.

Thanks, I will avoid term that you consider 'quaint', but I was explaining my use of the term 'reinforcement'.

So please open your mind, if a parent cuddles and laughes when their kids practices a word that is reinforcement. When parents interact with the child they often 'reinforce' behavior. But please use your 'quaint' all that you want.

I think I probably know more modern psychology, ethology, development, comparative anthropology that you might consider that i do.

I notice that you throw these terms around but do not offer the support. 'evolutionary heritage', there is a real danger in much of 'evolutionary psychology'

So answer me these simple questions?

1. Do infants ever fall off of couches when they are unsupervised?
2. How aware of behavioral psychology are you? (Do you really think that it stopped in the 1940s)

But back to your use of the term instinct, which term are you using? And how do you define it?

3. Does baby gazelle that learns to walk withing three minutes of birth have a harder wired system to deveolp walking skills compared to a human infamt?

Research on babies and crawling has taken some interesting turns over 40+ years of research, first with 'babies have fear', 'babies learn fear', to 'babies learn to interact through crawling', now there seems to be more of a mix:

General over view:
http://babycenter.berkeley.edu/

One that shows age of onset of crawling is related to avoidance: (tactile vs. visual)
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6453931?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=3

More age of onset researchthey suggest maturation but mention that experience crawling is inverse to cliff avoidance, babies feel the plexiglass?)
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7363749?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=4




BTW

Pinker The Blank Slate
this does not look good
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blank_Slate
nor does this
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/books/tbs/index.html

I would say first off that 'duh, the human brain is not a blank slate', we do have biological predispositions and tendencies there is a strong component of 'nature' but the 'nuture' is crucial as well.

I hope that it is more than some political treatise and strawman argument that seems to have nothing to do with what psychology actually studies.

I am having a harder time find the summaries of what The Language Instinct is actually about.
This looks rather hopeful:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Pinker

But again a capacity to learn does not equate to 'an innate instinct'. I hope he is not supporting Chomsky's 'deep structure'.

[Dancing David]

Wowbagger, I hope you have power!

[Dymanic]

I hope that it is more than some political treatise and strawman argument that seems to have nothing to do with what psychology actually studies.
One would hope that what psychology studies would not be strongly influenced by politics -- but if you read that book, you'll see some very good arguments that this is not the case. My favorite of his is still "How the Mind Works".

[Wowbagger]

So please open your mind, if a parent cuddles and laughes when their kids practices a word that is reinforcement. When parents interact with the child they often 'reinforce' behavior. But please use your 'quaint' all that you want. That is slightly better. That is what adds context to what they learn.

By 'reinforcement' I had assumed you meant intentional reinforcement. The parental reactions you are talking about is general, almost automatic, parental reaction and behavior.

'evolutionary heritage', there is a real danger in much of 'evolutionary psychology' There is a danger in any science. If it gets productive work done, it is good science.

Do you think psychology is not, somehow, a product of evolutionary processes?

1. Do infants ever fall off of couches when they are unsupervised?Yes, I suppose they would. But, I fail to see how that has anything to do with anything.
Are you trying to claim that infants "learn" to be afraid of heights by nearly falling off of things? Why must these basic fears be learned? Why can't fear of heights be innate? If you were a promoter of Tabula Rasa, I could see how you would think that way. But, I doubt anyone seriously believes fear of heights has to be learned, anymore.


2. How aware of behavioral psychology are you? (Do you really think that it stopped in the 1940s)
I am aware that it did not stop in the 1940s. But, it has moved on a lot, since then. There is more to behavior than Skinner-like conditioning, you know.


But back to your use of the term instinct, which term are you using? And how do you define it?
I gave a good, general definition earlier.


3. Does baby gazelle that learns to walk withing three minutes of birth have a harder wired system to deveolp walking skills compared to a human infamt?
I do not think it is a matter of how "hard" the "wiring" is. There is a differentiation in evolutionary development. But, I have not read much about this area, yet. The ultimate causes would lay in selection pressures. The proximate causes would be found in the specifics involved: perhaps there are modifications to how often the fetus will kick, and/or how balancing systems are "calibrated" in the womb.


One that shows age of onset of crawling is related to avoidance: (tactile vs. visual)
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6453931?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=3

More age of onset researchthey suggest maturation but mention that experience crawling is inverse to cliff avoidance, babies feel the plexiglass?)
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7363749?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=4
I do not know what those were supposed to prove. They do not contradict anything I have said.


Pinker The Blank Slate
this does not look good Can you elaborate? What is your problem with the book?


I would say first off that 'duh, the human brain is not a blank slate', we do have biological predispositions and tendencies there is a strong component of 'nature' but the 'nuture' is crucial as well.
Duh, of course 'nuture' is important. But, not for the reasons they had assumed for a long time. Up until the publication of Sociobiology, by E.O. Wilson, most psychiatrists and social scientists were perfectly fine believing the mind was a completely blank slate.

Pinker's argument is that there is a lot more that is innate to human nature, than one would normally presume (including the innate habit of denying human nature).

The Blank Slate delves more into social sciences, than it does into straight psychology. But, The Language Instinct is all about language development, so it gets a bit more into psychology.


I hope that it is more than some political treatise and strawman argument that seems to have nothing to do with what psychology actually studies. Actually, my problem is that he cites soooooo many references, and soooooo many scientific studies, that picking out the best ones is going to be quite a job. Some of his writing may superficially appear to be "political", but everything is backed up by science in his fields of specialty.

I hope he is not supporting Chomsky's 'deep structure'.He discusses Chomsky's ideas. But, he also differs from him. Steven Pinker is less radical.

But, the concept of Deep Structure has changed a lot, over time. I doubt even Chomsky supports many of the older ideas he developed around it.
Wowbagger, I hope you have power!By the power of Grayskull! I have the power!!!

ETA:
My favorite of his is still "How the Mind Works".That is also a very excellent book!!

(Though, I was slightly disappointed that he could not answer questions about consciousness.)

[Dancing David]

That is slightly better. That is what adds context to what they learn.

By 'reinforcement' I had assumed you meant intentional reinforcement. The parental reactions you are talking about is general, almost automatic, parental reaction and behavior.

And?

They are still part of how children learn language, and it involves a lot of interaction with parents and others.

It is fine to ask for clarification, reinforcement is conditioning that occurs all the time, it is part and parcel of human nature. There is also just the neurological basis of associative learning.


There is a danger in any science. If it gets productive work done, it is good science.

Do you think psychology is not, somehow, a product of evolutionary processes?

Yes, but there is an inherent danger is reverse engineering evolutionary selection, a trait may exist because it was the specific trait that was selected for, or it may exist because another trait was selected for of which it is a side benefit.

Such as why possibly human have such major brain development. It is possible that the first traits was not advanced brain growth but neotany because of the narrowing of the pelvis in an upright gait. This then leads to a trait that can be selected for.


Yes, I suppose they would. But, I fail to see how that has anything to do with anything.
Are you trying to claim that infants "learn" to be afraid of heights by nearly falling off of things? Why must these basic fears be learned?

because that is a lot of how humans learn and develop, it is part of the extended neotany of human children, we have very little hard wired programming and need to acquire traits.

It would be easier to demonstrate that fear of falling is learned than that it is an innate tendency.

Why can't fear of heights be innate? If you were a promoter of Tabula Rasa, I could see how you would think that way. But, I doubt anyone seriously believes fear of heights has to be learned, anymore.


Your political usage about the Tabula Rasa and my attitude is noted and appears to me to be spin on your part. :)
And there you go, making bold statements about human psychology and you have no evidence and no data. There are biological predispositions and tendencies but that does not mean humans are born with an innate fear of heights, what leads you to continue to assume and assert that.

We do not have an 'instinct' to eat, it has to be learned (other than rooting), we have to learn to hold a cup and drink, why should a high level abstracted concept like 'fear of heights' is any different?



I am aware that it did not stop in the 1940s. But, it has moved on a lot, since then. There is more to behavior than Skinner-like conditioning, you know.

Oh, so now you will tell me something I already know, great and you act as though you have told me something new?

Wonderful, perhaps you do not mean to but this seems really rude. How much behavioral psychology and science have you studied.

Whether it is called 'operant conditioning' or not does not matter. I am not a radical behaviorist like Jeff Corey, I am more of a 'methodologist' with some tendency to believe in the mediation of thoughts in behaviors.


I gave a good, general definition earlier.

I will look but that does not mean that you are using it is a meaningful jargon sense either. :)

I do not think it is a matter of how "hard" the "wiring" is.

So, you are arguing that there is some inherent component to language acquisition but not really willing to discuss how hard wired it is?

The argument about language acquisition falls into many categories.

You have Chomsky arguing that there is this inherent biological map that drives language acquisition and in fact determines grammar structure, which has not been supported by any evidence.

then you have some people who would claim that it is all learned, which would run counter to the biological evidence of brain trauma and things like damage to Broca's area.

Now my belief is that there are general traits that lead to language development, the same sorting and pattern matching that leads from sensation to perception, is also dominant as the neurological functioning of the whole cortex. So the brain is developed and evolved to engage in pattern sorting, matching and pattern creation. So that is a general trait.

then there do seem to be specific pathways that develop that are related to the language recognition, recall and usage. Which the brain damage studies indicate seems to involve some very interesting conceptual applications of language usage.

But these patterns and pathways only seem to develop in exposure to language.

So I would say that there many strong biological traits that lead to language acquisition, some very general and some very specific.

However there is also the huge component of learning in the whole process.

Exactly how much is innate programming and how much is learned is exactly what we seemed to be discussing.

I believe that the general traits of language have a biological basis that is selected for in two routes, one the general traits and then some very specific traits of language usage.

But that language itself is not innate as it requires exposure, development and considerable reinforcement to occur.

There is a differentiation in evolutionary development. But, I have not read much about this area, yet. The ultimate causes would lay in selection pressures. The proximate causes would be found in the specifics involved: perhaps there are modifications to how often the fetus will kick, and/or how balancing systems are "calibrated" in the womb.


And compared to humans there is a much higher biological program and hard wiring in the development of walking. It takes them three minutes as opposed to a human which takes 9-13 months. One has a very strong biological component (I am not sure I would say instinct) and the other has to be learned and trained. So it seems likely that one has more biological hard wiring than the other.


I do not know what those were supposed to prove. They do not contradict anything I have said.

They certainly do not support any idea that there is an innate fear of heights. :)



Can you elaborate? What is your problem with the book?

As a book review it seems to have a whole lot of straw men and politics. :)



Duh, of course 'nuture' is important. But, not for the reasons they had assumed for a long time. Up until the publication of Sociobiology, by E.O. Wilson, most psychiatrists and social scientists were perfectly fine believing the mind was a completely blank slate.

That really just shows to me that you don't really know that much about history psychology or psychiatry. :)



Pinker's argument is that there is a lot more that is innate to human nature, than one would normally presume (including the innate habit of denying human nature).

And given the neotany of humans and the amount of conditioning and learning involved, I doubt that there is much specific. :)

General traits and a few specific traits. :)


The Blank Slate delves more into social sciences, than it does into straight psychology. But, The Language Instinct is all about language development, so it gets a bit more into psychology.

Actually, my problem is that he cites soooooo many references, and soooooo many scientific studies, that picking out the best ones is going to be quite a job. Some of his writing may superficially appear to be "political", but everything is backed up by science in his fields of specialty.

He discusses Chomsky's ideas. But, he also differs from him. Steven Pinker is less radical.

that is good because he was totally wrong. :)


But, the concept of Deep Structure has changed a lot, over time. I doubt even Chomsky supports many of the older ideas he developed around it.

Many reviewers say that Pinker does not really understand Japanese language and grammar and that the things he says about it to make his point are wrong.

I don't know.

I do know that as a someone with a deep desire to study psychological linguistics, I was totally disappointed in what some of the people actually say.

My guess is that we have the capacity to recognize consistent grammatical rules and learn them, but that the specifics of grammar are not programmed but learned.


By the power of Grayskull! I have the power!!!

Good, I am wonder how my brother in NYC is doing.

ETA:
That is also a very excellent book!!

(Though, I was slightly disappointed that he could not answer questions about consciousness.)

[Dymanic]

(Though, I was slightly disappointed that he could not answer questions about consciousness.)If you were expecting how the mind works to equal how consciousness works, I'm not surprised that you were disappointed. You'd probably find Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" even less satisfying.

As a book review it seems to have a whole lot of straw men and politics.
Hard to evaluate the merits of those criticisms without having actually read them (if you see what I'm saying), but if by chance you're referring to Hank Schlinger's article "The Almost Blank Slate", you might find these comments on those comments enlightening (though surely not nearly so much as actually reading the book that inspired the whole chain of discussion):

"Henry D. Schlinger's criticisms of Steven Pinker and his book The Blank Slate in SKEPTIC Vol. 11 No. 2 left me a little confused. The book and the ideas he addressed bear little resemblance to the book I recall reading and discussing with others."
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150327/Comments-about-Hank-Schlinger-s.html

In other words, a strawman. A bit ironic if true, eh?

[Dancing David]

As I said I was using a review, and it seems that Pinker may be running straight against SJ Gould in his advocacy of 'determinism'.
I think to claim that the Tabula Rasa is a common to scienc and psychology is ridiculous, however we do learn most of what makes us human. We have biological structures that influence our behavior, such irritability and tolerance of stress, base lines of anxiety, etc....
To talk about the 'Noble savage' is to ignore almost all of post 1920s anothropology, so why Pinker would even focus on those issues is sort of sily, they are not common in social science.

However to say that we have an innate 'fear of heights' when there are much easier explanations, is not very practical. We should have all sorts of great innate features, we as humans just don't. Pain avaoidance is imporatant to human survival, but the behaviors are learned, there is no 'isntinct to feed', there are the sensations of hunger and then some complex learned behaviors in response to them.

[Dancing David]

But then I found this, by Michael Coe, one of my father's colleuges, he is an anthropologist and he makes huge mistakes about Chomsky's work as well, a man I respect when it comes to the Mayan culture just not really understanding why Chomsky was wrong.

http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Abstracts/Coe_on_Pinker_94.html


WHEN I was a graduate student in anthropology in the 1950's, the word from on high was that the human infant was an unformed lump of clay that eventually, through the process of education by its elders and betters, would receive its language, its culture and even its sexual identity. We were told that by means of language and culture, humans had left behind the biological imperatives that enchained the rest of the animal world: culture was "superorganic."

So first off he is discussing what was taught in the 1950s, not really any sort of accurate precise of the state of mdern thought and there were certainly plenty of people who did not believe in the Tabula Rasa then.... sigh

And then this gem

What Mr. Chomsky discovered was that most of the logic underlying all of the world's languages is wired into children's brains.

Nope that is what Chomsky hypothesized! That was not discovered and in fact there is no data to support Chomsky's contention at all!

There is evidence that children can learn, there is evidence that certain functions of language are part of the brain structures of the left motor strip of the cortex, but there is no evidence of the 'logcc' of language being hard wired.

His later discussion of langauge shows he does not understand what brain damage to Broca's area does, not any of the other interesting things, they are very general non specific traist related to language recognition.

Then at the end is this gem which is exactly what I am objecting to in many of the reviews I read about the Language Instinct


This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism.


WTF Mr, Coe, why do YOU equate behavioral psychology and LIBERALISM, that is so stupid and ignorant and is just really dumb.

Now this guy told some great stories and knows a lot about Mayan culture but he knows diddly about psychology.

[Dancing David]

Now it is fairly given that damage to Broca's area produces an inability to articulate language and other araes are indicated in comprehension and labeling in language terms, however there are some interesting findings in this aphasia as well, in that it appears that the ability damaged may be more diffused than previously throught and there is some plasticity in the brain structures.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19274574

We showed that the tumor infiltration and its resection did not lead to the severe impairments predicted by the localization models assigning a significant role in language processing to the left frontal lobe, notably Broca's area. We showed that slow tumor evolution - the patient had been symptom-free for a long time - enabled compensatory mechanisms to process most language functions endangered by the tumor infiltration.


Now even stranger is Wernicke's_area (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wernicke's_area) where people can mimic speech and engage in what sounds like speech.

There are thousands and thousands of these sort of patients and the damage involves the left cortex and teh effects can be very strange.

In a wierd one recently one of my co-worker's daughters had post concussive syndrome (from cheerleading) anecdotaly, her daughter at one point seemed unable to speak in english but spoke in high schools spanish, she also at another time was unable to answer 'what is 5+5' but did answer 'what is 5x5'.

[Dymanic]

I think to claim that the Tabula Rasa is a common to science and psychology is ridiculous, however we do learn most of what makes us human. We have biological structures that influence our behavior, such irritability and tolerance of stress, base lines of anxiety, etc....From page 35 of The Blank Slate:

"This is not to say that cognitive scientists have put the nature-nuture debate completely behind them; they are still spread out along a continuum of opinion on how much standard equipment comes with the human mind. At one end are the philosopher Jerry Fodor, who has suggested that all concepts might be innate (even "doorknob" and "tweezers"), and the linguist Noam Chomsky, who believes that the word "learning" is misleading and we should say that children "grow" language instead. At the other end are the connectionists, including Rumelhart, McClelland, Jeffrey Elman, and Elizabeth Bates, who build relatively simple computer models and train the living daylights out of them. Fans locate the first extreme, which originated at [MIT], at the East Pole, the mythical place from which all directions are west. They locate the second extreme, which originated at [UCSD], as the West Pole, the mythical place from which all directions are east.
But here is why the East Pole-West Pole debate is different from the ones that preoccupied philosophers for millennia: neither side believes in the Blank Slate. Everyone acknowledges that there can be no learning without innate circuitry to do the learning."

To talk about the 'Noble savage' is to ignore almost all of post 1920s anothropology, so why Pinker would even focus on those issues is sort of sily, they are not common in social science.You assert that such notions are not common in social science, and if that's true then it IS silly to talk about them. Pinker does not merely assert that they are common, but provides some rather persuasive supporting arguments. (Granted, yours would be the more difficult position to argue, as it would basically require proving a negative; not quite sure what to do about that).

[Dancing David]

Um, I don't recall a whole lot of Noble Savage being taught in any anthropology course s that I took, seriously, all cultures are equal, none is better that the other.

Now a lot of pop anthropology written by journalists or that Frecnh goof who lived with Yanomamo are really bad.

But I ca't recall them being part of mainstream anthro any more that 'conscious obersevers are part of QM' is part of physics.

Now Victorian, Edwardian values prior to Margaret Meade (and she sure has some noble savage travelouge) are very prrevalent, but that does not mean that they dominate social sciences today, pop culture sure. But then pop cultures says that science has proved placebos work.

[Dymanic]

Um, I don't recall a whole lot of Noble Savage being taught in any anthropology course s that I took, seriously, all cultures are equal, none is better that the other.

Now a lot of pop anthropology written by journalists or that Frecnh goof who lived with Yanomamo are really bad.

But I ca't recall them being part of mainstream anthro any more that 'conscious obersevers are part of QM' is part of physics.

Now Victorian, Edwardian values prior to Margaret Meade (and she sure has some noble savage travelouge) are very prrevalent, but that does not mean that they dominate social sciences today, pop culture sure. But then pop cultures says that science has proved placebos work.It's been said that science does not operate in a vacuum, and a lot of what Pinker points out is that social science REALLY doesn't operate in a vacuum. Physicists with novel ideas about QM aren't likely to be shouted down at lectures or have pitchers of water dumped on them, because those ideas aren't likely to threaten anyone's precious moral or political convictions -- but when E. O. Wilson published Sociobiology, the vitriol heaped upon him was as vicious as any for which Darwin made himself a target by having the audacity to publish as controversial a work as Origin of Species. Granted, that was 35 years ago, but it's going to take more than a couple of anecdotes to persuade me that the influence of pop culture (including pop anthro, and pop psych, and politics, and a whole host of other elements) is not as strong as it was in 1975. I might agree that they don't necessarily "dominate" -- but I really don't see Pinker arguing that anyway.

[Dancing David]

Okay fair enough, I like a lot of Wilson's work and maybe my view varies from a lot of people. The university I went to is a real hard knock research based institution, so perhaps that really influenced the nature of the discourse there. The psych and anthro department has a real hard knock edge to them, people who were 'fluffy' were not tolerated for very long.

(So that linguistic professor I hated eventually left.)

Now I haven't read Sociobiology and being 35 years old, much of it has probably been suprpassed. But I can't really say because I haven't read it, now I will put that one on the wait list at the library for sure.

ETA: I do want to say however that there is a lot of pop psych out there, yuck, and that it really is pop psych. It has little or no bearing on the valid work of clinicians and researchers. There are good books out there, but they are overwhelmed by the drivel that passes as pop psych, most people have not read Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression or the more pop oriented self help book Burn's Feeling Good which are both research driven and tested to some extent, as opposed to the usual stuff of pop psych, of which there is some really good and some really bad.

[Wowbagger]

DD, I will try to wrangle up some time to get some references to address most of your remaining points. Here, at least, is the stuff I can respond to quickly, (and it is a lot more than I thought it would be):

It is possible that the first traits was not advanced brain growth but neotany because of the narrowing of the pelvis in an upright gait. This then leads to a trait that can be selected for. That is very much possible! But, neotany is also an evolutionary process.

When I talk about evolutionary psychology, I am referring to modern evolutionary psychology, that takes all the "puzzle pieces" into account, not just the mere "advancement" of traits.

we have to learn to hold a cup and drink, Cups are new inventions on the whole timescale of human existence. It makes sense that we would need to learn how to use them.

why should a high level abstracted concept like 'fear of heights' is any different? I would argue that it is NOT a high-level abstracted concept. You place any normally-developed human, old enough to have some good amount of awareness, in a seemingly precarious situation, and they will be most likely be afraid. Heights included.

How much behavioral psychology and science have you studied. I admit it is not my field of specialty. Especially the history of it. I only wrote that, because it sounded like you were coming from the direction of operant conditioning. For example, you stated this earlier:

They learn by falling and their parents anxiety and expessions of panic.. Do you honestly believe that babies need to see the expressions of anxiety on their parent's faces, before they can completely understand that falling is not a good thing to do?!
Sounds, to me, like someone who focuses on Skinner's ideas a little too much. Maybe I was wrong about you, but that is what stuff like that sounds like, to me.

They certainly do not support any idea that there is an innate fear of heights. :)

From the first study you cited, emphasis mine:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6453931?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=3
Discriminant analysis revealed that crawling-onset age, and not crawling experience, discriminated between those infants who crossed and those infants who avoided the apparent drop-off.

(snip)

These results call into question the idea that experience crawling is critical in inducing visually guided avoidance behavior in infants
If it had to be learned, experience would matter more. If it was a matter of developing awareness, age would matter more (but would not be the sole factor, as the second paper makes clear). Since development is more important than experience, in this case, it seems to me that "instinct" is a more accurate term to describe fear of heights, than "reinforcement" or "learning".

From the other study:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7363749?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=4
Further analysis suggests that the effect of experience was not independent of age when first crawled.This study neither supports nor refutes the role of instinct in fear of heights, but it does focus on one factor that could be used in such studies: That experience might be at least partly dependent on the age when the subject first crawled. Although this is an important factor to consider, I fail to see how it supports your argument.

It is kind of like showing me a paper about how important it is to consider the temperature of the lab, when testing tires, in order to convince someone that a tire design was faulty. The factor might very well be important; but that paper, alone, does not confirm nor refute the quality of any particular tire.

My guess is that we have the capacity to recognize consistent grammatical rules and learn them, but that the specifics of grammar are not programmed but learned.
That sounds close to what I was saying!!!

Though, there is probably something more than mere "capacity" going on, here. There is also the relative rapidity in which that capacity is wantonly used by children. The brain, though evolutionary "molding", is probably structured to soak in verbal language constructs automatically, as soon as it can. It might not be a specific Chomsky-like-structure, but a more general idea about how the brain develops, as a whole.


If you were expecting how the mind works to equal how consciousness works, I'm not surprised that you were disappointed. You'd probably find Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" even less satisfying. Actually I found Dennett's book to be much more satisfying! Though, I had to read it twice before that could happen. It is not, exactly, an easy book for most folks to comprehend. That is probably why so many people misconstrue Multiple Drafts theory, or think that the book "explains away" consciousness.

Susan Blackmore's works (such as Consciousness: An Introduction) are much easier to digest, and she covers Dennett's ideas fairly well.

As I said, How the Mind Works is an excellent book. Especially for those new to the field of brain development study. But, he answers all of the easy questions, without even trying to develop any insights into the more difficult ones. And, I like to chew on the difficult ones.

[Dymanic]

Actually I found Dennett's book to be much more satisfying! Though, I had to read it twice before that could happen. It is not, exactly, an easy book for most folks to comprehend.Yeah. My experience with that book was exactly the same.

That is probably why so many people misconstrue Multiple Drafts theory, or think that the book "explains away" consciousness.I'm not sure I could step up to a chalkboard and deliver a concise summary of the Multiple Drafts model myself. And, for that matter, I seem to recall coming away from my first reading of that book with the vague impression that Dennett had indeed just "explained consciousness away" -- which, to be fair, might reasonably be considered sort of subjectively true; that is, depending on how locked in one happens to be on certain intuitively appealing ideas about what the term "consciousness" refers to. But this isn't a thread about consciousness... or is it? Wait...

[Wowbagger]

I'm not sure I could step up to a chalkboard and deliver a concise summary of the Multiple Drafts model myself.I have been trying to develop a concise summary of it, myself. In fact, I have multiple drafts of it. :rolleyes:

It's one of those things that is always going to be missing some key elements, no matter how you do it. (I suppose everything in science gets like that, after a while, but unraveling consciousness takes it to a whole 'nother level.)

Here is one of the drafts I was working on. It is not perfect, but it is a start:

Different parts of the brain evolved to solve different types of problems. Consciousness could be something like a "spotlight" running through each of the mental processes at a time. Multiple Drafts theory suggests that those multiple areas are working on different "drafts" of a solution, at a time; but not in isolation: Each draft can influence the direction of another. There is no "final solution", however. The idea that is implemented, or sent to conscious awareness, is a matter of which part of the mind happened to have the "spotlight" on it, when the "deadline" for turning in the "work" was up.

What do you think?

[Dymanic]

What do you think?The "spotlight" part works, though Dennett's metaphor, "center of narrative gravity" is hard to beat if you ask me. I'd give more thought to the part about ideas being "sent to conscious awareness". There seems to be more Descartes in that than Dennett.

[Wowbagger]

The "spotlight" part works, though Dennett's metaphor, "center of narrative gravity" is hard to beat if you ask me. I'd give more thought to the part about ideas being "sent to conscious awareness". There seems to be more Descartes in that than Dennett.You're probably right. Perhaps "become conscious awareness" is better.

[Dancing David]

I have been trying to develop a concise summary of it, myself. In fact, I have multiple drafts of it. :rolleyes:

It's one of those things that is always going to be missing some key elements, no matter how you do it. (I suppose everything in science gets like that, after a while, but unraveling consciousness takes it to a whole 'nother level.)

Here is one of the drafts I was working on. It is not perfect, but it is a start:

Different parts of the brain evolved to solve different types of problems. Consciousness could be something like a "spotlight" running through each of the mental processes at a time. Multiple Drafts theory suggests that those multiple areas are working on different "drafts" of a solution, at a time; but not in isolation: Each draft can influence the direction of another. There is no "final solution", however. The idea that is implemented, or sent to conscious awareness, is a matter of which part of the mind happened to have the "spotlight" on it, when the "deadline" for turning in the "work" was up.

What do you think?


I have to same I am remiss in not reading up on Dennett, :(

However this is very close to what I tend to think.

First off I do not assume that 'cosnsciousness' is a unitary object, I think that is a mistaken concept. (Not that either of you used it that way, but this is the P forum.) I view it as a conflated labels of a series of discrete processes that cross reference and associate withe ach other, which is part of why it makes it so hard to talk about. When we actual examine what it is people call 'consciousness' it is really verbal cognition, frequently viusal cognition (in my case), memories, fragments of memories, etc...

So it makes perfect sense to me that the brain works as a series of paralell processes that associate, provide feedback and interfere with each other.


In this case what you are reffering to seems to be the 'verbal cognition' that is the 'spot light'.

:)

[Dancing David]

DD, I will try to wrangle up some time to get some references to address most of your remaining points. Here, at least, is the stuff I can respond to quickly, (and it is a lot more than I thought it would be):

That is very much possible! But, neotany is also an evolutionary process.

Sure and it is a crucial one, and it points out the common errors of evolutionary reverse engineering. :)

This is the possible scenario that I favor:
-Upright gait is selected for , possibly because of locomotion benefit, possibly because of visual benefit in an open plain, possibly because then you can carry your high investment baby)
-This creates narrowing of the pelvis.
-Which creates a selective pressure to have babies with smaller heads.
-This is part of the selection for the trait of less mature infants in h. sap. , neotany. (Great ape babies express different maturities, humans are the most immature at birth)
-As part of neotany, somewhere in the chain of development there is a period of brain growth that is more than before. This is the trait that later gets selected for and leads to the advanced cortical development of h. sap.

Now this is only a possibility, but you will see many people discussing this topic who talk about how it is obvious that language is the primary evolutionary trait that was selected for. I have seen it here frequently in fact on the JREF.

That is what I mean by the perils of reverse engineering evolution, I tend to want to stick to general biological traits that can be selected for in my own thinking.


When I talk about evolutionary psychology, I am referring to modern evolutionary psychology, that takes all the "puzzle pieces" into account, not just the mere "advancement" of traits.

I understand that but again I tend to favor the selection of general traits than can be possibly narrowed in a biological sense.
This is very very hard to do in terms of behavior, especially in homo sapiens, so conclusions have to be always very very cautious.
:)



Cups are new inventions on the whole timescale of human existence. It makes sense that we would need to learn how to use them.

I just chose that, they also have to learn to put things in their mouths, which they do a lot, once they start to do it. My favorite is always something like a tack.


I would argue that it is NOT a high-level abstracted concept. You place any normally-developed human, old enough to have some good amount of awareness, in a seemingly precarious situation, and they will be most likely be afraid. Heights included.

Well we have reached the point where we can actually talk about this, thanks for staying the course pass the 'shoot from the hip' phase. :)

I am saying that 'height' is a high level abstracted construct. It is very hard to try to express in terms of actual biological properties and involves a fair amount of conceptualization.

let us take something easier to talk about 'avoidance in prey animals', this is a fairly easy concept compared to 'height'. ( I know I brought up fear of heights, for a reason.)

Now we can suggest biological traits like, 'movement in the visual field', 'movement in the visual field approaching you' and the like, these are things that would be easier to create a biological basis for 'startle and run'.

Now I would argue that there are biological mechanisms of arousal frequently labeled as 'fear' but that they are associated with the starling response of a fall or the actual pain, yes that is the 'learned' concept again.

babies are not really afraid of much, very scary to have one around at times.


I admit it is not my field of specialty. Especially the history of it. I only wrote that, because it sounded like you were coming from the direction of operant conditioning. For example, you stated this earlier:

Um, maybe you should study modern psychology?

Operant conditioning has been refined and added to but it is still sort of there. Now Jeff Corey will explain this better than me, it is less stimulus/response and more stimulus/consequence, but I have probably said it poorly.


Do you honestly believe that babies need to see the expressions of anxiety on their parent's faces, before they can completely understand that falling is not a good thing to do?!

There are many things that a baby learns from: pain, being startled and their parent’s reactions. Outside the lab parents engage in many things babies do respond to like yelling and screaming. (Not always the best thing to do.)

Sounds, to me, like someone who focuses on Skinner's ideas a little too much. Maybe I was wrong about you, but that is what stuff like that sounds like, to me.

So what do you have against Skinner and modern psychology?

What do you really know about behaviorism, just what biases you have read, where?

have you heard of 'cognitive behavioral therapy' or 'desensitization', why this stance on Skinner, is it an informed stance?




From the first study you cited, emphasis mine:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6453931?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=3
If it had to be learned, experience would matter more. If it was a matter of developing awareness, age would matter more (but would not be the sole factor, as the second paper makes clear). Since development is more important than experience, in this case, it seems to me that "instinct" is a more accurate term to describe fear of heights, than "reinforcement" or "learning".

From the other study:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7363749?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=4
This study neither supports nor refutes the role of instinct in fear of heights, but it does focus on one factor that could be used in such studies: That experience might be at least partly dependent on the age when the subject first crawled. Although this is an important factor to consider, I fail to see how it supports your argument.

Now again we can get to the heart of the matter.

What is it that the studies are really looking at?
Is it really fear of heights, probably not, but this shows the progress in the way this field has been studied. Currently they tend to refer to it as avoidance rather than fear. Which is very different than when they first started in the early 60s.

What I think they are studying is a process of avoiding an obstacle, which does not have the emotional appeal of 'fear of heights' and what the studies are showing is a transition and learning (both maturation and learning).

the child goes from a phase of just exploring what is right in front of the, using a largely tactical exploration (the hands and mouth thing) with some visual processes, as time progresses and the child grows two things happen, its brain develops and it learns. So we have increasing involvement of the visual field and involvement of the tactile sense. the child begins to actually navigate around the environment and conceptualize to some extent.

So not using the tactile sense as much the child does not care that it feels a hard surface there, it has encountered obstacles before, although this one is a hole, not an object like a sofa. And so it is using more advanced visual acuity, learned response and concepts to go around an obstacle.

Now why take this long path to get here, because it shows how often we just assume there is a biological trait like 'fear of heights', and yes it took me about twenty years to get around that one, when really there is a bunch of much simpler components involved that make for a more likely explanation.

Shew, that was wordy.

then we can get to the whole issue of
"If it is a biological trait, fear of heights, then why does desensitization work?"

:)


It is kind of like showing me a paper about how important it is to consider the temperature of the lab, when testing tires, in order to convince someone that a tire design was faulty. The factor might very well be important; but that paper, alone, does not confirm nor refute the quality of any particular tire.

That sounds close to what I was saying!!!

[quote]
And again I have not read Pinker, but the reviews seem to suggest that he believes in specific biological structures for things like 'the use of a plural', while I would argue for a much more general trait, 'recognition of a consistent pattern'.

:) Again more general less specific.
[quote]
Though, there is probably something more than mere "capacity" going on, here. There is also the relative rapidity in which that capacity is wantonly used by children. The brain, though evolutionary "molding", is probably structured to soak in verbal language constructs automatically, as soon as it can. It might not be a specific Chomsky-like-structure, but a more general idea about how the brain develops, as a whole.

yes, especially since there is a real plasticity to the way the brain time shares the cortex. there is probably about as much (or a lot more) brain power given over to visual processing than language usage. (That is a gross over simplification, the brain time swaps parts of the auditory and visual cortex.)



Actually I found Dennett's book to be much more satisfying! Though, I had to read it twice before that could happen. It is not, exactly, an easy book for most folks to comprehend. That is probably why so many people misconstrue Multiple Drafts theory, or think that the book "explains away" consciousness.

Susan Blackmore's works (such as Consciousness: An Introduction) are much easier to digest, and she covers Dennett's ideas fairly well.

As I said, How the Mind Works is an excellent book. Especially for those new to the field of brain development study. But, he answers all of the easy questions, without even trying to develop any insights into the more difficult ones. And, I like to chew on the difficult ones.

[Wowbagger]

This is very very hard to do in terms of behavior, especially in homo sapiens, so conclusions have to be always very very cautious. No one suggested it was going to be easy.

let us take something easier to talk about 'avoidance in prey animals', I think you will find that fear of animals that have historically been dangerous to humans is fairly innate, and nearly universal. For example: Snakes and spiders. It takes quite a bit more effort to overcome a fear of spiders than to "learn" to fear spiders.

So what do you have against Skinner and modern psychology? I have nothing against Skinner. Operant conditioning clearly works in many cases. It's just that it is not the be-all-end-all explanation for everything in psychology. I know modern psychology recognizes that.
The next step is to figure out how innate or not any particular behavior trait is.

At a first approximation, you can summarize it all by saying: The older something is, and the more useful it was to our ancient ancestors, the more innate it is going to be. The newer something is, the more difficulty we are going to have in learning it. In general.
Obviously, there are more details and factors that go into this. But, it serves as a good rule-of-thumb, to work off of, for now.

I would argue that verbal communication is such an old technology, going back perhaps millions of years into human evolution, that it would make sense to think of its aquisition as "instinctual" nowadays.

Written communication is much newer. And, therefore, it takes more effort to learn. It was only in the past 100 years that literacy rates have exploded in developed nations.

Driving a car, and using a computer: New. Therefore expect learning curves.

Looking down from a height and realizing you are in a precarious situation, and therefore ought to be afraid: Old. Expect this to happen automatically.

Darkness, and fearing the depravity of visual sense it brings: Very Old. Therefore, this would also happen automatically.

Get the drift?

[Dancing David]

No one suggested it was going to be easy.

I think you will find that fear of animals that have historically been dangerous to humans is fairly innate, and nearly universal. For example: Snakes and spiders. It takes quite a bit more effort to overcome a fear of spiders than to "learn" to fear spiders.

You really know almost nothing about psychology, if it is biologicaly driven then why is it not universal. Why is it that you can learn to desentitize it?

That is a nice hypothesis and that is all it is, eliminate conditioning and come up with a test for your theory.


I have nothing against Skinner. Operant conditioning clearly works in many cases. It's just that it is not the be-all-end-all explanation for everything in psychology. I know modern psychology recognizes that.

No one said end all be all, but it is still the primarty factor in much of human life, your sources are wrong or you are badly misinformed.

You can train and retrain almost anything that you are going to call instinct.

You can't train away a response to physical stimuli like pain and hunger.

You can retrain almost all phobias and fears, hmm.

PTSD is agreate xample of a conditioned response in an emotionaly flooded situation.

The next step is to figure out how innate or not any particular behavior trait is.

yes and eliminate the confounding factors.


At a first approximation, you can summarize it all by saying: The older something is, and the more useful it was to our ancient ancestors, the more innate it is going to be.

Nive hypothesis with little or no data to support it.

The newer something is, the more difficulty we are going to have in learning it. In general.
Obviously, there are more details and factors that go into this. But, it serves as a good rule-of-thumb, to work off of, for now.

So where is the data, how do you control for conditioning and learning?


I would argue that verbal communication is such an old technology, going back perhaps millions of years into human evolution, that it would make sense to think of its aquisition as "instinctual" nowadays.

depends on what you mean, capacity does not imply a structure specific neurology.


Written communication is much newer. And, therefore, it takes more effort to learn. It was only in the past 100 years that literacy rates have exploded in developed nations.

Driving a car, and using a computer: New. Therefore expect learning curves.

Looking down from a height and realizing you are in a precarious situation, and therefore ought to be afraid: Old. Expect this to happen automatically.

Except it is not automatic, it can be retrained when it exists, and it does not exist for many. How universal is it then?


Darkness, and fearing the depravity of visual sense it brings: Very Old. Therefore, this would also happen automatically.

Get the drift?

Yup, nice hypothesis, no data. :)

[Beth]

Sorry to be so long in returning to the conversation. I had some end-of-the-month deadlines to meet.

It would be absurd to classify something as an empirically verifiable mathematical model when the experimental results could not be distinguished from pure chance.

If the experimental results can be distinguished from pure chance or noise then it qualifies as an empirically verifiable mathematical model. I hope that makes it clear. Yes, actually that helps quite a bit. Thank you.

"Things that go up come down" is a very imprecise and inaccurate physical model but it still qualifies as a model - we have an initial condition "up" and a prediction that can be verified "comes down", and "<up,down>" as the measurable quantities involved. I can toss stuff in the air and test it. When the model fails it provides the pointers as to where it can be refined.

It's an interesting definition of physical. I've been giving it some thought. My real issue with it is that I don't define something as physical simply because we can apply some sort of measure to it. It's possible to measure rainbows in various ways, but I don't consider them physical.

So, is it possible for something to be determined as 'non-physical' by your definition, or does it divide things into physical and inconclusive?
I think it does identify things as physical and non-physical, and more importantly it clarifies what it means for something to be physical or not physical. If it works for you, it's a good tool. I'm afraid it's not much help to me regarding the things I muse over the most trying to decide about.
If we have the questions "is a dollar physical?" or "is the dragon I dreamed last night physical?", then my definition immediately sends us asking questions about what would be the empirically verifiable mathematical model we could make about them.

So when we say "the dreamed dragon is not physical " we mean that we cannot make a verifiable mathematical model of the dragon itself. On the other hand there might be a verifiable mathematical model of something else that would explain the dreamed dragon.
But dreamscape dragons are not an area of disagreement. Money, on the other hand, is more contentious. Sure, a dollar bill or a coin in your hand is physical. But what about your credit limit? Or your creditworthiness? Those things are measurable, mathematical models are made of them, but I'm less certain that they are physical in anything but the most trivial meaning of the word. So mathematics are not physical by your definition. Is that correct?
Yes, that is correct. Thanks. So, things can be real without being physical. I wasn't sure if you felt that possible or not.
Incidently, I would disagree that mathematics are not empirically verifiable.
Mathematics is often described as "quasi-empirical", but what experimental procedure would verify the value of pi? Draw circles. Measure their circumference. Measure their diameter. Divide the circumference by the diameter. :D

[Wowbagger]

if it is biologicaly driven then why is it not universal. Why is it that you can learn to desentitize it?I will claim that it is probably a lot more universal than you think.

We can train our brains to desentitize ourselves against these sorts of things, because there is some flexability in how we can control our behaviours. Newer "reasoning" parts of the brain can learn to override the more primitve aspects. But, it does not come automatically.

It takes effort. It takes more effort for the average person to not be afraid of spiders, than it is for them to be afraid of spiders, even if they never saw a spider before. I am willing to bet that is how the data will play out, if we test this sort of thing.


You can train and retrain almost anything that you are going to call instinct. But, it is an instinct if no training is necessary. And, the more training it takes to behave the opposite way expected of most people, the more of an instinct it is. (Being brave against a swarm of bees takes a lot more effort than flailing your arms while running away.)

You can't train away a response to physical stimuli like pain and hunger. Those are much older biological processes, that go back waaay beyond even our primate ancestors. They are much more difficult to train away, though probably not impossible. Masocists and hunger-strikers can testify to that.


You can retrain almost all phobias and fears, hmm. Most of our fears of specific animal threats are newer than our need of food, and our feeling of pain; though they still go back a few million years. "New" is kind of a relative term, in this case.

Therefore, it will be a little easier to train ourselves out of those fears, than to train ourselves out of pain; but it is still a heck of a lot easier to keep them. In fact, keeping our fears happens automatically - if we do nothing. It is the overcoming of fears that takes some work.

"Darkness" is, of course, older than animal fears; but since living in darkness was an inevitable portion of our ancient lives, we developed of coping strategies to handle it better than many other ancient fears.

Except it is not automatic, it can be retrained when it exists, and it does not exist for many. How universal is it then?And, I argue that fear of heights is pretty freakin' universal!

We can train out of it. But, without training, (or at least good reassurance from someone you trust), "fearing heights" is the default setting.

Place any human in a precarious situation, or at least a seemingly-precarious situation, and they are much more likely to be afraid, than not. Heights included.

What part of this do you not understand?!

Yup, nice hypothesis, no data. :)Steven Pinker has whole books citing actual data on this stuff. But, he is not the only one. Michael Shermer, Jared Diamond, Daniel Dennett, just to name a few, are other authors citing data on this. To a lesser degree, there is also Richard Dawkins.

Unfortunately, for both of us, I am still too lazy to start sorting through their bibliographies for you. :(

[Frank Newgent]

Explain this :D

KMT1FLzEn9I

I recommend to mute the vid.

[Manopolus]

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.

GO!

Hmm... let's look at an electron microscope under an electron microscope and see if it tells us any more about the electron microscope that we didn't already know, and actually design into it.

Examining language WITH language tends to be even sillier, considering especially that language is one of the most fundamental internal tools that we use for thought to begin with.

The oddest and most surprising fact is that it actually is able to describe its own failings.

[Dancing David]

It's an interesting definition of physical. I've been giving it some thought. My real issue with it is that I don't define something as physical simply because we can apply some sort of measure to it. It's possible to measure rainbows in various ways, but I don't consider them physical.



Why not?

[Dancing David]

I will claim that it is probably a lot more universal than you think.

We can train our brains to desensitize ourselves against these sorts of things, because there is some flexibility in how we can control our behaviours. Newer "reasoning" parts of the brain can learn to override the more primitve aspects. But, it does not come automatically.

And neither does that fear. Seriously, I am not going to bore you with repeating the same argument, but it is not an automatic response. It is a learned response, and that is why it can be retrained. There is not a universal fear of heights, there is a learned response of fear to spiders.

Babies eat them, you know? And roly poly's and roaches and all sorts of insects.

:)



It takes effort. It takes more effort for the average person to not be afraid of spiders, than it is for them to be afraid of spiders, even if they never saw a spider before. I am willing to bet that is how the data will play out, if we test this sort of thing.

I will look up the data on agoraphobia and arachnophobia, but since when is there data to say that someone who never saw a spider is afraid of one? Or that it is because it is a spider?

this seems to be appropriate for the Philosophy forum, but seriously?

Seems very speculative. babies eat spiders.



But, it is an instinct if no training is necessary.

And you are just assuming that.
It is a response that develops over a very long time period.

And, the more training it takes to behave the opposite way expected of most people, the more of an instinct it is. (Being brave against a swarm of bees takes a lot more effort than flailing your arms while running away.)

yes and no, why do some people fear them and others not?


Those are much older biological processes, that go back waaay beyond even our primate ancestors. They are much more difficult to train away, though probably not impossible. Masocists and hunger-strikers can testify to that.


Most of our fears of specific animal threats are newer than our need of food, and our feeling of pain; though they still go back a few million years. "New" is kind of a relative term, in this case.

All speculation, sorry. How do you think it happens, it is not automatic. Really humans just have all these preprogrammed abilities.

then why do they have to learn to most essential one? Like walking?

Therefore, it will be a little easier to train ourselves out of those fears, than to train ourselves out of pain; but it is still a heck of a lot easier to keep them. In fact, keeping our fears happens automatically - if we do nothing. It is the overcoming of fears that takes some work.

"Darkness" is, of course, older than animal fears; but since living in darkness was an inevitable portion of our ancient lives, we developed of coping strategies to handle it better than many other ancient fears.

And, I argue that fear of heights is pretty freakin' universal!

Sure, I will look it up. You keep asserting all these things with no real evidence.


We can train out of it. But, without training, (or at least good reassurance from someone you trust), "fearing heights" is the default setting.

But it isn't.

You keep asserting that, you keep stating it, as though a five year old child just came out of box and was activated on the spot.



Place any human in a precarious situation, or at least a seemingly-precarious situation, and they are much more likely to be afraid, than not. Heights included.

And that is a better statement, response to a novel situation provokes anxiety, now that can be explained easily. In terms of the things you dislike like 'conditioning'.

But you have kept stating over and over that these are specific fear response that are specific to certain situation because of a biological program. Now this is a general Traits not a specific one. it is one that most animals will demonstrate, but it is a response of anxiety or fear in the face of a novel situation..

So general over specific, that makes much more sense, than saying there is this program, 'fear of spiders' and that program 'fear of snakes' and another programs 'fear of bears' and another programs 'fear of heights', this was one of the discussions I was wanting to introduce today, 'anxiety in the face of change or novel situations', a more general and less specific trait.

A biological basis for anxiety and fear in response to change has some survival benefit which likely leads to preproduction.



What part of this do you not understand?!

Steven Pinker has whole books citing actual data on this stuff. But, he is not the only one. Michael Shermer, Jared Diamond, Daniel Dennett, just to name a few, are other authors citing data on this.

I know but that does not mean that they have done an actual literature review and are not just cherry picking the data that fits the hypothesis and ignoring what doesn't.
:) That is a big smiley by the way.

There are so many ways that it can go wrong. Which is why I asked for the data? because then we can talk about what the data actually says, as opposed to what an author says it says.
:)

To a lesser degree, there is also Richard Dawkins.

Unfortunately, for both of us, I am still too lazy to start sorting through their bibliographies for you. :(

I am interested in the really pertinent ones, many reviewers have said that Pinker cherry picks his data and research and makes general sweeping assertions without a firm basis of backing.

Which is not uncommon, just like the 'humans killed the large mega fauna in North America and led to their extinction'.

[Dancing David]

Hmm... let's look at an electron microscope under an electron microscope and see if it tells us any more about the electron microscope that we didn't already know, and actually design into it.

Examining language WITH language tends to be even sillier, considering especially that language is one of the most fundamental internal tools that we use for thought to begin with.

The oddest and most surprising fact is that it actually is able to describe its own failings.

Humans have to learn to describe their feelings, it takes a bit of trianing, even in adulthood. :)

[Robin]

Money, on the other hand, is more contentious. Sure, a dollar bill or a coin in your hand is physical. But what about your credit limit? Or your creditworthiness? Those things are measurable, mathematical models are made of them, but I'm less certain that they are physical in anything but the most trivial meaning of the word.
But are you talking about empirically testable models?

[Dymanic]

I am interested in the really pertinent ones, many reviewers have said that Pinker cherry picks his data and research and makes general sweeping assertions without a firm basis of backing.At least they haven't dumped any pitchers of water on his head. So far. (BTW, did you happen to catch E. O. Wilson on NPR yesterday talking about his new book?)

[Beth]

But are you talking about empirically testable models?

Yes, those models can be tested by examining actual behavior versus predicted behavior.

[Wowbagger]

babies eat spiders.Again, development plays a role in all of these things.

If instinct could only be measured by what babies do, then I guess an adolescent's craving for sex is not, at all, instinctual. No sirreee bob. :rolleyes:

[ideogram]

Did you know that isolated congenitally deaf children have limited language structure but when they live together they will invent structure?

Sigh, this would be much easier if you would let me insert a link.

Google:
asl acquisition of isolated deaf children
(Indiana University pdf)
and
deaf children ad hoc language
(New York Times)

[Olowkow]

Explain this :D

KMT1FLzEn9I

I recommend to mute the vid.

Guy's a good video editor. Octopi are better at this.
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=octopus+camouflage&search_type=&aq=3&oq=octopus

[AlBell]

Explain this :D

KMT1FLzEn9I

I recommend to mute the vid.
Good training?

[Olowkow]

Sorry for off topic, but the video is nonsense.

Why Do They Change Their Color?

Contrary to popular belief, chameleons do not change their color to blend in with different backgrounds. Chameleons are naturally camouflaged with their surroundings (most are predominantly green to match their treetop environment).
The fact is that chameleons change their color in limited ways, usually by brightening or darkening their skin. But these color changes are related to temperature regulation and emotional changes. A frightened or angry chameleon, for example, will become extremely bright in color. But there is a common misconception about why chameleons change their color in the first place.

[Dancing David]

It is acrophobia, ooops, not agorophobia, that is fear of heights.

[Dancing David]

Again, development plays a role in all of these things.

If instinct could only be measured by what babies do, then I guess an adolescent's craving for sex is not, at all, instinctual. No sirreee bob. :rolleyes:

Yup you should roll your eyes at your strawman there! :D

There is a difference betwen hunger, thirst and sexual gratification and the term instinct.

Despite your usage as a sort of common parlance, instinct and modal action patterns are preprogrammed sets of behaviors that are hard wired into the system. I know you only sort of read what Jeff Corey had to say on the use of term instinct and modal action patterns. He did not mention fixed action pattern which is more in line with the technical usage of instinct.

[Dancing David]

Did you know that isolated congenitally deaf children have limited language structure but when they live together they will invent structure?

Sigh, this would be much easier if you would let me insert a link.

Google:
asl acquisition of isolated deaf children
(Indiana University pdf)

http://www.google.com/#hl=en&safe=strict&q=+Indiana+PDF+asl+acquisition+of+isolated+deaf+ch ildren+&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&fp=baa94940edcea411

and
deaf children ad hoc language
(New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/21/science/21sign.html

Welcome

There is also the great case of Nicurauguan children as well.

Those are some cool studies and I wonder what sort of social reinforcement there is in the development of such things? ( I again beleif that there is a biological capacity to learn a language, not a modal action pattern or instinct.)

[Dancing David]

At least they haven't dumped any pitchers of water on his head. So far. (BTW, did you happen to catch E. O. Wilson on NPR yesterday talking about his new book?)

No, my kitchen radion needs batteries. :(

[Wowbagger]

instinct and modal action patterns are preprogrammed sets of behaviors that are hard wired into the system.Some things are more hardwired than others.

And, just because something is "hardwired", does not mean it can't be bypassed or overwritten. It just takes some effort.

I think my usage of terms makes all of that clear.

Our differing definitions of "instinct" are still useful to each of us, I guess. I prefer having a little more predictive power in my flavor of the word. But, if you don't, then good for you! What else is there to argue over?

[Dancing David]

Um, the instinct for sex would work out as 'rub one thing with this other thing'. As the variety of sexual expression tends to vary.

[Dancing David]

Some things are more hardwired than others.

And, just because something is "hardwired", does not mean it can't be bypassed or overwritten. It just takes some effort.

I think my usage of terms makes all of that clear.

Our differing definitions of "instinct" are still useful to each of us, I guess. I prefer having a little more predictive power in my flavor of the word. But, if you don't, then good for you! What else is there to argue over?


The technical usage is more precise?

What does it predict? That is still the missing piece.

Hunger is not instinctual it is a sensation, same for thirst. The response to the sensations are largely learned. Now when it comes to sexual atraction there is a plethora of theories, some involve imprinting, other immune system matching and then of course some conditioning.

So again in psychology, neurology and ethology when you use the term isntinct it means something very specific, hunger is not an instinct.
Now the general response of anxiety in novel situations (actually arousal , anxiety is a subjective label) it might have a biological basis and it might have a conditioned basis, it would be possible to try to sort that out, but I think it would be very hard to prove 'fear of heights' or 'fear of snakes' has a biological basis other than that more general trait.

So that is the reason why the discussion, the term instinct is almost like the term 'mind' and the term 'unconscious', it has all this baggage that obscures the statements being made. The term instinct is a loaded term especially in common usage. It is often just an excuse for poor behavior and violence.

So too with language, humans have an innate ability to learn, and they seem to have an innate capacity to learn language, what level is the general trait of learning and what level of language is a specific trait? Now does this mean that if we abandoned a bunch of infants on a deserted island, with a food machine and a diaper robot, would they develop their own language?

-Is the capacity to create language innate?
-Does the capacity for language require exposure to language?
-What levels of fluency and complexity of expression would develop?
-Would there be a recreation of the historic development of language over geneations or would they leap to full blown fluent expression?

[Wowbagger]

What does it predict? That is still the missing piece. I already hinted at the sorts of things it could predict. The older, more essential an aspect of behavior is to our ancestors (our evolutionary heritage), the more likely it will be an automatic process. The newer something is, the more effort it will take to learn.

There are also innate concepts humans will instinctually act on, unless otherwise conditioned. Some examples:

An innate, instinctual sense of physics: How objects interact, which does not necessarily match Newtonian physics. Newtonian physics had to be discovered, and today it has to be learned. If you do not learn about Newtonian physics, you are innately going to believe in a much more primitive form of it, that was useful for our ancestors to develop.

An innate sense of essentialism: Objects, especially life forms, have essentialist boundaries. The core reason Evolution is such a hard sell has less to do with religion specifically, but a lot more to do with essentialist tendencies in human psychiatry.

An innate counting system, which ends at about 2 or 3 (the rest being "many"), unless of course you actually learn more numbers. If you do not learn any numbers, you are still innately going to count things up to those very first digits.

An innate sense of economics, which actually about fair reciprocal trade, etc.

Many facets of human behavior follow from all of these sorts of things. By studying the details, we can make predictions about how humans are going to behave in a variety of circumstances.


Hunger is not instinctual it is a sensation, same for thirst. The response to the sensations are largely learned.You must be joking. You are seriously suggesting that if we do not learn to eat in order to prevent hunger, we would never know how to respond to the sensation?

Now when it comes to sexual atraction there is a plethora of theories, some involve imprinting, other immune system matching and then of course some conditioning. All of these things go into the mixing bowl of who we are attracted to, and why. None of these motivations works in isolation. You cannot theorize that "sexual attraction is ONLY based on cultural imprinting" and expect it to be accurate.

This is a good time to remind you that all actions have causes in at least two categories: Proximate and Ultimate. Ultimately, the seeking of mates is instinctual. It will, likely, happen automatically in normally developed adolescents. But, the specifics of who, exactly, they will be attracted to is a matter of proximate causes. These can be a mix of both cultural imprinting and natural causes (such as being a little more attracted to those who match our immune system), etc.

Now the general response of anxiety in novel situations (actually arousal , anxiety is a subjective label) it might have a biological basis and it might have a conditioned basis, it would be possible to try to sort that out, but I think it would be very hard to prove 'fear of heights' or 'fear of snakes' has a biological basis other than that more general trait. There are experiments that can sort it out. Snakes and spiders, for example, were more of a threat to our ancestors than (for example) caterpillars. Therefore, you could predict that people who had never seen any of those three animals before will naturally fear the spiders and snakes a lot more than the caterpillar, on average. (Assuming they are not infants who would probably try to eat all three of them.)



Now does this mean that if we abandoned a bunch of infants on a deserted island, with a food machine and a diaper robot, would they develop their own language? The first generation: probably not. There would only be a very primitive language, at best, in anything. Subsequent generations, however, will likely pick up the pieces of the previous one, and make their language more sophisticated.

This is the "Creole" effect that has been studied fairly well. Not with babies on an island, but with immigrants of mixed countries who could not communicate with each other very well. The verbal language that develops amongst them tends to be very primitive, at best. Their children, however, tend to develop more sophisticated Creole-like languages out of the pieces they pick up, and improve upon.


-Is the capacity to create language innate? You can also look into how sign languages develop amongst deaf children, even without adults directing them.

ETA: fMRI shows us that sign language interpretation is performed in many of the same parts of the brain that verbal language is normally interpreted; but not written language.

-Does the capacity for language require exposure to language?Verbal language, probably not so much. Again, it is something that would start off very primitive, in the first couple of generations, but improve in subsequent ones.

Written language: Yes, definitely!! Well, unless you are willing to wait many, many hundreds or thousands of generations, anyway. Written language is a relatively new invention, for us. It might crop up independently, in an isolated population, but we would expect it to take a long time.

-Would there be a recreation of the historic development of language over geneations or would they leap to full blown fluent expression?The details would probably be different. (Because the proximate details would be different.) But, universals will shine through. (Because the ultimate factors would not be so different.) Words for biological waste products will likely be the source of choice for swear words, for example. Rhyming would be considered pleasing in songs and poems. Etc.

If your ideas about instincts can make better predictions, I would like to hear about them.

[Wowbagger]

I guess it's too late to edit my last post, again. But I wanted to add something: I mentioned that it would take a long time for written language to develop, on its own, in an isolated population that had no examples of it to work off of.

I wanted to reiterate that you can shortcut the time necessary for written language to develop in a culture, by merely introducing the basic concept to them.

Jared Diamond makes a point about this, in one of his books, about the Cherokee language. It was always just a spoken language, until the concept of writing was witnessed by one of its speakers, Sequoyah. He saw foreigners reading and writing, but did not understand what each of the symbols meant. So, when he devised his own written language, he used the similar letter shapes, but had them mean completely different things. And, the idea of writing diffused among his people fairly rapidly.
And, as we would expect, it was first used for record keeping, before it became a source of creative expression.

[Dancing David]

I had a nice extended response, which I edited goofed up, sigh, more later!

[ideogram]

You really need to read Steven Pinker. I am not exaggerating when I say you cannot have an educated opinion if you are not aware of his work.

[Frank Newgent]

My bolding.

The "value" is a goal... an implied ought.

Even the methods of purely descriptive natural science depends on making normative choices.

I don't see how such fits within your definition.


I will ponder.

My guess in that it is just one value, all being equal.


CQFEY9RIRJA&feature=fvst

[Dancing David]

You really need to read Steven Pinker. I am not exaggerating when I say you cannot have an educated opinion if you are not aware of his work.

And I am saying that if you present what the evidence is that is fine, but the reviews of it indeicate that it is political in many areas. There is a difference netween biological capacity, biological structures and structures that are specifically designed for a specific purpose. It was also written in 1993 and is for the general audience. So what is the pertinent framework.

You say I can not have an aducated opinion on what? Pinker's work? yes. Evolution and neurobiology, no.

:) I have also read Guth's Inflation, that means I have read a layman book about a subject. Not that it has done that inform me, that does mean I know am educated in the basis of CDM-Lambda Cosmology.

How often is Pinker's work cited by other researchers, what papers?

:)

[Dancing David]

( Wowbagger. I will respond to the more specific of your points later.)

Predictions from ethology, the theory of selection from reproductive success and psychology.?
:) Okay.

First off technical terms have specific meanings that are used to define specific areas, for analogy to use the term ‘electro-magnetism’ in some vague and general way is not as useful as the technical usage.

The use of the term instinct as a modal or fixed action patterns, can be useful because it allows for the definition and separation of reductive components. So fixed and modal action patterns describe very specific hard wired behaviors, then we have things like sensation, perception, learning, neurodevelopment and the stuff that really seem to not be something you understand and dislike: the variety of learning and conditioned response.

I have not denied the biological basis of human behavior in the least, I have not stated that it is all conditioning. There is always the biological basis of human behavior. It creates the structures of human existence, however to say that certain things are ‘preprogrammed’ or ‘innate’ means that there is a very strong biological basis for that specific behavior.

To determine that behavior is biologically programmed, or has a biological basis that then drives learned and developed behaviors is a very useful distinction.

So, what behaviors can be determined to be fixed or modal action patterns, these behaviors are those that occur for every member of the species short of neurological damage/misdevelopement and often vary with sexual dimorphism. These are the ones that used to be called instinct, stereotypic behaviors and are now called fixed or modal action patterns.

Then there is a category of strongly driven biological behaviors that are partly learned in situ, such as how some ungulates will walk within three to fifteen minuets of birth. They may have different expressions of the behavior, in that not every individual will learn to walk exactly the same way in that short period, so modal but not really preprogrammed. But there is a huge hardwired component to this learning as opposed to a human that learns mainly through trial and error over a very extended period.

Then there are other mixes as well, like color vision, the pattern of nerves in the retina that supports the rods and cones, is partly biologically determined by the chemical gradients of neural development. But the utility of the presort done by the retinal nerve structure also comes about as a conditioned response to exposure. There is the biological strata that develops but the sorting of signals (which is really cool) that the retina does is both biological and conditioned. But I am not sure about the most recent research in this area, so I would assume that there is a strong mix of both until I read the recent research. And again the people I listened in college were psychologists of neural biology and their bias was towards the learned aspects, so they tended to focus on the soft ware rather than the hard ware.

Then there are patterns that will tend to be based upon more general traits, they have a biological basis, such as hunger and pain but they seem to be mainly learned. Such as ducking when someone throws a punch at you, or some object comes flying at you. These are learned behaviors in response to sensation and perceptions. There are some which are conditioned response to a strong biological reflex, such as vomiting and food aversion.

You eat something nasty, your body has a strong solely physical response (all psychology is physical, common use there.) and for various reason your body decides to purge, and you vomit. Well vomiting is nasty, and now you are very likely to have a food aversion as a result of it. Now this is good candidate for a strong biological predisposition to conditioning. There are reasons to say that compared to other forms of conditioning, food poisoning and poisoning are going to have strong selection for aversion. So in this case I would argue that taste and smell may have a bias in the conditioned response of food aversion and food preference.

Not that there is an ‘instinct’ for food aversion and preference, but that there may be a strong biological component that amplifies the normal conditioned responses.

Now as far as predictions, as I stated before, preference for general traits over specific traits in reverse engineering evolutionary neurology and psychology. So rather than a specific program for ‘fear of snakes’, rather an ‘arousal in the pretense of novelty’ and ‘strong components of social reinforcement’ in learning what to trust and what to avoid. The biology so ‘arousal in the situation of novel events’, or alternatively ‘lack of arousal in familiar events’ could be very straight forward as compared to ‘arousal in the occurrence of a specific visual pattern (snake)’.

Then there is also the idea that humans (gathering scavengers that developed a predatory strategy) are generalists (as are many mammalian predators, in theory) and so they are designed more to learn a lot in a variety of environments with a great deal of flexibility in behaviors. As opposed to rabbits and squirrels which have some very hard wired avoidance behaviors, the dodge and run in rabbits and the stall reverse dodge in gray squirrels, those are certainly very programmed behaviors in those prey animals.

So to sum up, those behaviors that appears to be stereotypic, fixed and modal are likely to be those that are preprogrammed: IE instincts.
Some behaviors like ungulates learning to walk, squirells stall-reverse and dodge seem to be very modal and fixed in all members of the species.other behaviors seem to be strongly biological enhanced or strenthened, such as food aversion, a conditioned response with a stronger reinforcement is a possibility.

So to sum up, those behaviors that appears to be stereotypic, fixed and modal are likely to be those that are preprogrammed: IE instincts.
Some behaviors like ungulates learning to walk, squirrels stall-reverse and dodge seem to be very modal and fixed in all members of the species.
Other behaviors seem to be strongly biological enhanced or strengthened, such as food aversion, a conditioned response with a stronger reinforcement is a possibility. As well as conditioned patterns in situations where there is already arousal (fear and phobias).
Then there are behaviors that seem to be reinforced and learned and reflect stronger physical stimuli than others, pain avoidance, sexual gratification.

So if a behavior is expressed almost universally by all members of the set and is invariant or modal in almost all situations then there is a strong biological basis and programming for the behavior. IR instinct or instinctual.
Some behaviors will have a strong biological component that seems to involve conditioning as well.
Some behaviors will tend to have a stronger conditioned component than others.

Universality and fixation are indicators of a strong neurological tendency, exposure and training are indications of a more conditioned response.

[ideogram]

Look, you are asking questions that are obvious to anyone who has any experience in this field. You are not experienced in this field. Reading Pinker would be a good first step. I didn't say you have to agree with Pinker, lots of people in the field don't. You have to be aware of his claims and evidence to be considered "educated". (I am being kind when I use that word. More accurate would be to say "has a right to an opinion".)

One search on Amazon would tell you he has written many books since 1993. Don't be lazy.

I've seen this before. Expert in one field knows nothing about another field. Tries to speak intelligently out of field. Fails miserably.

The field is cognitive science, BTW.

[Dancing David]

Excuse Ideogram, but you are talking out of your butt, have you read Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression?
Then you are not educated in one small area of cognitive science. I know Pinker does research that is rather interesting, but he also writes a lot that is 'theoretical' and completely speculative.

If there is specific data that you want to discuss that is fine. If you want to discuss specific ideas and the data that support them that is fine.

But you haven't a clue how much brain neurology and cognitive science I may or may not be aware of, so please be cautious of what you say. How much neurology do I have to have read to understand rather poorly the possible structure and development of brain function? How much ethology, psychology, anthropology and biology should I have read?

I have stated my bias as someone who was taught behaviorism at a school with a strong neurological (those darn enzyme gradients), biochemistry foundation. ( I at one point could tell you the steps to go from acetylcholine to dopamine to norepinephrine and why benzo diazepines had the effect that they do, fortunately it is not retained. :) )

I also studied what passed for 'psychological linguistics' at the time, and it was piss poor and very disappointing. My instructor was obsessed with SVO order, despite the fact there are plenty of exceptions to his rule that he was obsessed with. He did not impress me. I read almost everything Chomsky wrote on linguistics at one point, and then I started to look at the data and research. Which was sad because I had really thought that Chomsky was on to something. It was a crash for sure.


You want to present Pinker's ideas and defend them that is fine, but I am not telling you how much you should know or not know, now am I?


I am not going to do the leg work for you, you want to present Pinker than do so.

[ideogram]

You don't know who Pinker is. You don't even know he has written books since 1993. No cognitive scientist is going to take you seriously.

This is not my legwork. This is your legwork.

[ideogram]

Look, I know you are a smart guy. Obviously you know a lot of things I don't. But it's a very common failing to be unaware of the limits of our own knowledge. I am telling you Pinker is very influential in this field. Read it.

[Dymanic]

You want to present Pinker's ideas and defend them that is fine
DD, I respect your knowledge in this area, so, respectfully: I don't see why Pinker's ideas should require defending until they are challenged by someone who has first taken the trouble to familiarize himself with them. Once you've done that, you'll realize that a lot of those ideas are not very original. How the Mind Works, in particular, is largely a synthesis of ideas which originated with others: Darwin, Turing, Dawkins.

And (again) if you've seen reviews of The Blank Slate which indicate that it is "political in many areas", that's probably because one of the very points Pinker makes is that because cognitive science has a way of turning into politics as soon as it leaves the laboratory, much of what has come to be widely accepted in recent decades (and hence, what you were taught) has been accepted because it is the work which has stayed within the bounds of what is considered politically correct.

I presented one example above: the reaction to Wilson's Sociobiology. "Within the pale of legitimate academic discourse" is how it was phrased in another example: the villifying of then Harvard President Lawrence Summers for arguing that underlying biological differences between the sexes may play a role in women being underrepresented in tenured positions in science and engineering at top universities and research institutions. I mean, maybe that's true and maybe it' not -- but that's not the issue. The issue (and the argument Pinker made in defense of Summers) is whether it's something we can even examine without crossing some line of decency.

[Dancing David]

And I am saying, what is important for me to know. You seem to say "This is important."

great and fine, but so far the Language Instinct and the Blank Slate are the recommended books, I am very aware of many of the biological bases of human behavior. In this thread Wowbagger has made some really strong unsupported claims and wants to say that vague terms offer some sort of predictive power and I have asked him, what data supports this hypothesis that he has presented in the thread.

Now you are saying "Just read Pinker", well that is not much, there are hundreds of books I can read, and you seem to have read Pinker, so what are the ideas that are so important.

I already am aware of the problems with the 'black box' form of radical behaviorism, I am already aware of the compelxities of human biology, I am also aware of what some of the research shows and doesn't show. there are gradients of biological programming and loading, if you read my extended response you will see, I am trying to frame it in a sense that allows for discussion of levels of 'instinct', 'biological loading' and 'learned behaviors'.

I have not, nor will I say that "It is all learned", but to disregard the available mechanisms as they exist is something I will not agree to. I have already put forth a start of the conversation, but shooting from the hip and "Just read Pinker" is not adding to the discussion.

If I am going to recommend a theory, I can tell you, I can damn well explain that theory, and then I can tell if the data and what research supports it. I am not going to just say "Go read a book.", I have plenty of books to read, so I know Pinker has salient ideas and as i said he has two kinds of writing, that which is research based and that which is speculative.

So what do you think is important about Pinker and his ideas? What research are you suggesting I look at? What is the theroy and what supports it?

[ideogram]

The truth is, I am not competent to explain Pinker. I just started reading him myself. There, you made me say it, are you happy?

[Dancing David]

DD, I respect your knowledge in this area, so, respectfully: I don't see why Pinker's ideas should require defending until they are challenged by someone who has first taken the trouble to familiarize himself with them. Once you've done that, you'll realize that a lot of those ideas are not very original. How the Mind Works, in particular, is largely a synthesis of ideas which originated with others: Darwin, Turing, Dawkins.
If you want to say it is meaningful, I am not asking you to defend Pinker. I have asked Wowbagger to defend Wowbagger's claims. What is meaningful in what Pinker is saying?

But if Pinker has something to say, what is it? What is important that I should know? I can tell you exactly what the material is that I am using for my discussion.

I am not challenging Pinker, I am challenging the statements made by posters on the JREF.


And (again) if you've seen reviews of The Blank Slate which indicate that it is "political in many areas", that's probably because one of the very points Pinker makes is that because cognitive science has a way of turning into politics as soon as it leaves the laboratory, much of what has come to be widely accepted in recent decades (and hence, what you were taught) has been accepted because it is the work which has stayed within the bounds of what is considered politically correct.

Hi, welcome to the JREF, that is fine, and if you frequent the forum, you will see that I and many others fight these pop notions all the time and consistently.

And really you underestimate the ability of people who believe in the biological basis of human behavior to defend their beliefs, I have know people to run the gamut from 'blank slate' to 'biological determinism' and realty I don't care.

If you want to do research you can do it on whatever you want. Now you might not be interested in how the temperature of the rat brain in certain areas relates to bar press behavior in thermo regulation, But guess what people study it.

Which is why I ask, please give me the data, the hypothesis and how the two look together.



I presented one example above: the reaction to Wilson's Sociobiology. "Within the pale of legitimate academic discourse" is how it was phrased in another example: the villifying of then Harvard President Lawrence Summers for arguing that underlying biological differences between the sexes may play a role in women being underrepresented in tenured positions in science and engineering at top universities and research institutions. I mean, maybe that's true and maybe it' not -- but that's not the issue. The issue (and the argument Pinker made in defense of Summers) is whether it's something we can even examine without crossing some line of decency.

And does that really impact the people who study the differences between the genders and how they learn, there is still plenty of research on it and quite a bit of it. That is what is cool about science, not what happens in a Chancellors meeting or a University Board, but the fact that despite this you can still find people who study the differences.

I agree that there is political social implications in everything, like the use of the terms ‘mind’, ‘unconscious’ and ‘instincts’.

[Dancing David]

The truth is, I am not competent to explain Pinker. I just started reading him myself. There, you made me say it, are you happy?

No, not really. It is probably very interesting. Then you can tell us what is important in your estimation.

But no, I would not take joy in that. I save that for the anti-psychiatry battles.

[ideogram]

What is important is that he uses ideas from evolutionary psychology and computer science to explain human thought. I think these perspectives are new and explain a great deal. You mentioned Beck; that book has nothing to do with the field of Cognitive Science. As far as I can tell you have never even heard of the field.

You can stay away from the more political stuff if you want. I am reading "The Stuff of Thought" right now and he presents a lot of very specific data on the structure of verbs in relation to fundamental concepts like time and causality.

I have been interested in cognitive science for some time. I think this field is very important but do you really expect me to make that argument to you in an internet forum? It would take you less time to read it for yourself. I sure as hell am not going to defend it in a debate against someone with decades of experience in behavioralism.

[ideogram]

All right, if you promise to forgive any errors, I will try to explain what I know.

The most successful research in Artifical Intelligence led to the concept of "frames"; basically it seems a lot of knowledge is represented as stereotyped situations, for instance the concept of a "birthday party" would be a frame. A frame defines a certain number of "slots" that relate to each other in specific ways; for the "birthday party" frame there would be slots for "birthday boy", "presents", "guests", "cake", which would be filled with specific examples when used.

Evolutionary psychology of course is based on the assumption that features of the human mind are best explained by considering how they would have helped us survive in the environments we evolved in. For example, many sex differences can be explained by the fact that males have a very small investment in a child (sperm) while females have a very large investment (pregnancy).

A lot of cognitive science research has gone into the use of "metaphor" in human thinking. For example, the metaphor TIME IS MONEY is a systematic concept that is used in a large number of English phrases. Because of this metaphor we can say that time can be wasted, saved, given, spent, invested, and so on and so on. With a little thought you can see that metaphors in human thought have a similar structure to the "frames" we saw in AI; they provide a number of slots that have defined relations to each other; using the metaphor entails filling the slots with specific examples.

What I have read of Pinker's work in "The Stuff of Thought" so far can be viewed as the discovery of frame-like structures in the usage of English verbs. In essence each verb is a little frame describing some action with slots for the things that take part in the action, such as the subject, object, direct object, and so on. These can get quite complicated. Different verbs can generate different sentence structures based on their meaning; for instance the verb "load" can be used in "Hal loaded the wagon with hay" or "Hal loaded hay into the wagon" but not in "Mary loaded into the wheelbarrow." It turns out there is a lot of variation in which verbs can generate which sentence structures, but they are not totally random. Verbs fall into "microclasses" based on which structures they can generate. However, it was a mystery how verbs got sorted into these microclasses; often verbs with very similar meanings would fall into completely different microclasses, and there was no apparent pattern. Pinker showed that in fact the microclasses are sorted by how the verbs relate fundamental concepts like space, time, causality, and ownership. To emphasize the obvious, this would imply that these concepts are fundamental to human thought. These concepts are also in line with the expectations of evolutionary psychology; we can easily see how they would have helped us survive.

Ok, that's enough for now.

[Wowbagger]

My definition of "instinct" was, in fact, technical and specific. It was flexible, sure. But, it was not nebulous.

[Dancing David]

What is important is that he uses ideas from evolutionary psychology and computer science to explain human thought. I think these perspectives are new and explain a great deal. You mentioned Beck; that book has nothing to do with the field of Cognitive Science. As far as I can tell you have never even heard of the field.

Well, I did some reading, I do not see that Lakoff and others labeling it as a separate field really changes the standing of cognitive psychology and cognitive neurobiology. In fact it does include both those disciplines and I had not seen that there was a new label of cognitive science.

So I was wrong, but Beck's book still applies, it is directly about how cognition and patterns of cognition effect emotions and the emotions impact out thoughts and especially the thoughts we focus on.

however it is a foundation work and things have move one since then.

So I apologies I did not realize that a new specialty had formed that was separate but included cognitive psychology and neurobiology.


You can stay away from the more political stuff if you want. I am reading "The Stuff of Thought" right now and he presents a lot of very specific data on the structure of verbs in relation to fundamental concepts like time and causality.

that could be useful but it really depends on the data, there have been theories that come and go, the data is the crucial determinant. There was this guy Freud, and this other guy Jung and they had these great high level concepts which like many many many others since then have just not been born out


I have been interested in cognitive science for some time. I think this field is very important but do you really expect me to make that argument to you in an internet forum? It would take you less time to read it for yourself. I sure as hell am not going to defend it in a debate against someone with decades of experience in behavioralism.

Again, I am asking people to defend the ideas that they use or feel are meaningful, you may not be at that point.

And I would only ask people to be skeptical and examine the ideas that they present.

[Dancing David]

My definition of "instinct" was, in fact, technical and specific. It was flexible, sure. But, it was not nebulous.

Well, it is certainly different than the usage in psychology and ethology, where 'instincts' used to be stereotypic behaviors and they are now labelled as 'fixed' or 'modal' 'action patterns'.

So which field uses the defintion the way you are using it? I can stand to have my horizon expanded.

[Dancing David]

All right, if you promise to forgive any errors, I will try to explain what I know.

The most successful research in Artifical Intelligence led to the concept of "frames"; basically it seems a lot of knowledge is represented as stereotyped situations, for instance the concept of a "birthday party" would be a frame. A frame defines a certain number of "slots" that relate to each other in specific ways; for the "birthday party" frame there would be slots for "birthday boy", "presents", "guests", "cake", which would be filled with specific examples when used.

Many of those expectations are cultural and societal, so apparently it might be a usage rather than biological explanation. Although I will have to read it.


Evolutionary psychology of course is based on the assumption that features of the human mind are best explained by considering how they would have helped us survive in the environments we evolved in. For example, many sex differences can be explained by the fact that males have a very small investment in a child (sperm) while females have a very large investment (pregnancy).

Yes and no. :) Many sex differences are varied expressions of sexual morphology and then the bugaboos of society, culture and personal history.


A lot of cognitive science research has gone into the use of "metaphor" in human thinking. For example, the metaphor TIME IS MONEY is a systematic concept that is used in a large number of English phrases. Because of this metaphor we can say that time can be wasted, saved, given, spent, invested, and so on and so on. With a little thought you can see that metaphors in human thought have a similar structure to the "frames" we saw in AI; they provide a number of slots that have defined relations to each other; using the metaphor entails filling the slots with specific examples.

What I have read of Pinker's work in "The Stuff of Thought" so far can be viewed as the discovery of frame-like structures in the usage of English verbs. In essence each verb is a little frame describing some action with slots for the things that take part in the action, such as the subject, object, direct object, and so on. These can get quite complicated. Different verbs can generate different sentence structures based on their meaning; for instance the verb "load" can be used in "Hal loaded the wagon with hay" or "Hal loaded hay into the wagon" but not in "Mary loaded into the wheelbarrow." It turns out there is a lot of variation in which verbs can generate which sentence structures, but they are not totally random. Verbs fall into "microclasses" based on which structures they can generate. However, it was a mystery how verbs got sorted into these microclasses; often verbs with very similar meanings would fall into completely different microclasses, and there was no apparent pattern. Pinker showed that in fact the microclasses are sorted by how the verbs relate fundamental concepts like space, time, causality, and ownership. To emphasize the obvious, this would imply that these concepts are fundamental to human thought. These concepts are also in line with the expectations of evolutionary psychology; we can easily see how they would have helped us survive.

Ok, that's enough for now.


Fair enough, and probably a better summary than I could manage. However, there is a danger in the reverse engineering of evolution.

I am not saying that you have made this, and I can not say what Pinker has actual said until I do read that book.

"Helped something' survive is always different than 'did help something reproduce', and again, my bias is to general biological traits and less specific traits.

It may be that I would read it and say "Hmm, that is a good description of the way languages tend to self organize in usage" and "It seems Pinker does have data that supports a biological basis for that sorting" or it could be "There are a lot of mechanism that could also explain the same phenomena"


And it appears that my library has a copy of the shelf, now I can see if it is a general description of language usage or if there is the biological aspect that I am questioning. Again I think that there is a whole lot of general pattern matching, sorting and creation that goes on in the human brain, so that is a general trait that can apply specifically to language acquisition and usage.


However I won't always be at home with a sick child typing on the computer.

[ideogram]

Fair enough, and probably a better summary than I could manage. However, there is a danger in the reverse engineering of evolution.

I am not saying that you have made this, and I can not say what Pinker has actual said until I do read that book.

"Helped something' survive is always different than 'did help something reproduce', and again, my bias is to general biological traits and less specific traits.

Yes, I was a little sloppy there. Of course as Dawkins pointed out it is the genes that evolve and to be passed on we must reproduce. Also, human beings generally do not exist in isolation, so we need to consider how genes and individuals interact in a society.

Which is to say that evolutionary explanations are not necessarily simple.

[Wowbagger]

Well, it is certainly different than the usage in psychology and ethology, where 'instincts' used to be stereotypic behaviors and they are now labelled as 'fixed' or 'modal' 'action patterns'.

So which field uses the defintion the way you are using it? I can stand to have my horizon expanded.I will tell you one thing: Most fields consider the idea of 'fixed' or 'modal' 'action patterns' to be a bit outdated, and yet the word "instinct" still floats around in them. I wonder what definition they could all be using, instead.... Hmmm......

[Frank Newgent]

What do Steven Pinker's ideas have to do with language being a set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects?

[Wowbagger]

What do Steven Pinker's ideas have to do with language being a set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects?Pinker focuses a lot on how those sets of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges develop in children; and, in part, how NOT ALL of it has meaning only though external referents to physical objects.

(Many nouns refer to concepts that are not represented as physical objects. And, many verbs have their own "rabbit hole" of frame-swapping going on, before they have any meaning.)

I described, above, how the concept of the Language Instinct can help us predict what would happen in various scenarios: both purely thought exercises (babies isolated on an island); and more realistic occurences (how groups of deaf children develop their own languages, or what we would expect in language development from folks with various mental deficiencies).

[Frank Newgent]

Many nouns refer to concepts that are not represented as physical objects.


Guess you'd better write them down then :D

Raises a dichotomy: the need to write them down suggesting an implied permanence vs a disappearence of what's impermanent if not recorded.


ETA: the latter exemplified by a blues song narrating the death of the very last blues singer adequate to expressing the terrible sorrow of a song describing the death of the last of the blues singers capable of such an expression.

[Wowbagger]

Guess you'd better write them down then :D All you need is Love. :)

[Dancing David]

I will tell you one thing: Most fields consider the idea of 'fixed' or 'modal' 'action patterns' to be a bit outdated, and yet the word "instinct" still floats around in them. I wonder what definition they could all be using, instead.... Hmmm......

Funny, no citations, I am begining to wonder, hmm. Would you provide teh citatitions that these uses are out of date, just as you satted that 'behaviorism' is not part of 'modern psychology'.

What are your sources here Wowbagger?

[Dancing David]

What do Steven Pinker's ideas have to do with language being a set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects?

Zippity do dah, zippity yay.

[Frank Newgent]

What do Steven Pinker's ideas have to do with language being a set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects?

Zippity do dah, zippity yay.


Are you saying it's the truth, that it's actual and ev'rything is satisfactual?

47ak4vjiNzw

[Dancing David]

:D

[ideogram]

Zippity do dah, zippity yay.

Are you saying it's the truth, that it's actual and ev'rything is satisfactual?

Perhaps it is an example of language that does not fit your definition.

[Dancing David]

Perhaps it is an example of language that does not fit your definition.

Mister Definition's on my shoulder,
It's the truth, it's actch'll
Everything is satisfactch'll.
Zip-a-dee-doo-dah, zip-a-dee-ay,
Language feeling, feeling this way!

[Dymanic]

But if Pinker has something to say, what is it? What is important that I should know? Your question is a little surprising, as it suggests that you are not fully aware of the ongoing debate over this that has taken place over the last couple of decades and which may effectively be considered to have begun (or at least to have become much livelier) with Pinker and Bloom's 1990 publication of a paper titled "Natural Languages and Natural Selection" in Behavioral and Brain Sciences:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.116.4044&rep=rep1&type=pdf

What Pinker (and Bloom) had to say there you can read for yourself (it's only about 38 pages not counting the acknowledgements and references, so it's not like somebody's telling you to go read a book or anything) -- but if an encapsulated version is what's in order, the authors themselves offered this:

"In one sense our goal is incredibly boring. All we argue is that language is no different from other complex abilities such as echolocation or stereopsis, and that the only way to explain the origin of such abilities is through the theory of natural selection."

As for the supporting data, their introduction begins with the following list of facts:

"All human societies have language. As far as we know they always did; language was not invented by some groups and spread to others like agriculture or the alphabet. All languages are complex computational systems employing the same basic kinds of rules and representations, with no notable correlation with technological progress: the grammars of industrial societies are no more complex than the grammars of hunter-gatherers; Modern English is not an advance over Old English. Within societies, individual humans are proficient language users regardless of intelligence, social status, or level of education. Children are fluent speakers of complex grammatical sentences by the age of three, without benefit of formal instruction. They are capable of inventing languages that are more systematic than those they hear, showing resemblances to languages that they have never heard, and they obey subtle grammatical principles for which there is no evidence in their environments. Disease or injury can make people linguistic savants while severely retarded, or linguistically impaired with normal intelligence. Some language disorders are genetically transmitted. Aspects of language skill can be linked to characteristic regions of the human brain. The human vocal tract is tailored to the demands of speech, compromising other functions such as breathing and swallowing. Human auditory perception shows complementary specializations toward the demands of decoding speech sounds into linguistic segments."

[Wowbagger]

Raises a dichotomy: the need to write them down suggesting an implied permanence vs a disappearence of what's impermanent if not recorded.
Well, the books will still give you some insights into how language develops, no matter what you want to do with the words.

What are your sources here Wowbagger?I was going to say that Wikipedia was a good start, until I was able to cite better things.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instinct
But, it actually uses the phrase "fixed action patterns" in part of it. Looks like a different usage of those words, than I was used to, though.

Aside from that, all the stuff about what is unlearned seems hold up my points fairly well.

[Dancing David]

Your question is a little surprising, as it suggests that you are not fully aware of the ongoing debate over this that has taken place over the last couple of decades and which may effectively be considered to have begun (or at least to have become much livelier) with Pinker and Bloom's 1990 publication of a paper titled "Natural Languages and Natural Selection" in Behavioral and Brain Sciences:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.116.4044&rep=rep1&type=pdf

I am very aware of the debate.

I just find that there is little compelling evidence for the innate grammar, but that is certainly unproven either way.


What Pinker (and Bloom) had to say there you can read for yourself (it's only about 38 pages not counting the acknowledgements and references, so it's not like somebody's telling you to go read a book or anything) -- but if an encapsulated version is what's in order, the authors themselves offered this:

"In one sense our goal is incredibly boring. All we argue is that language is no different from other complex abilities such as echolocation or stereopsis, and that the only way to explain the origin of such abilities is through the theory of natural selection."

As for the supporting data, their introduction begins with the following list of facts:

"All human societies have language. As far as we know they always did; language was not invented by some groups and spread to others like agriculture or the alphabet.

Well, see that is going to be a hard one, we don't know what proto humans had, all we know is what gracile homo sapiens sapiens have. It seems likely that all known historical groups had spoken language.

However it would be very difficult to draw any conclusions about the pervasiveness of language at the time that gracile homo sapiens sapiens develops ~150,000 years ago. It could be that language was part of that process. We don't know. As we get more samples of humans, proto humans from the time period. we might be able to speculate more. :)

All languages are complex computational systems employing the same basic kinds of rules and representations, with no notable correlation with technological progress: the grammars of industrial societies are no more complex than the grammars of hunter-gatherers; Modern English is not an advance over Old English.

Except for vocabulary, but that is a separate non-functional issue. Modern english has a huge lexicon, partly because of the Norman conquest.

Within societies, individual humans are proficient language users regardless of intelligence, social status, or level of education. Children are fluent speakers of complex grammatical sentences by the age of three, without benefit of formal instruction.

But there is the informal instruction and that bugaboo that isn't controlled for, reinforcement. Even without the social reinforcement there are powerful reinforcements that involve language.

I agree that there is a strong biological capacity but I don't think we can say that there is innate grammar. I can be influenced by data. Which would be unethical to control for.

They are capable of inventing languages that are more systematic than those they hear, showing resemblances to languages that they have never heard, and they obey subtle grammatical principles for which there is no evidence in their environments. Disease or injury can make people linguistic savants while severely retarded, or linguistically impaired with normal intelligence. Some language disorders are genetically transmitted. Aspects of language skill can be linked to characteristic regions of the human brain. The human vocal tract is tailored to the demands of speech, compromising other functions such as breathing and swallowing. Human auditory perception shows complementary specializations toward the demands of decoding speech sounds into linguistic segments."


Thanks, I am aware of that suggestion in many forms and I am glad for your response, and again my main points are that there is a difference between capacity for something and specific adaptations. I am thankful for your response.


But I really disagree with the stuff about grammar, however there studies that would involve grammar development in the abcense of the any exposure to grammar would be unethical.

There narrowing of the human jaw is always another candidate for speech production. Which is again a possible part of the cluster for the development of gracile homo sapiens sapiens, the cranial vault (cortex possibilities), the lack of brow ridges and the narrowed jaw.

The actual history of the development of homo sapiens sapiens is wide open right now, we could find the crucial links in my lifetime or five hundred years from now. So which traits are linked to a general trait, like the narrowing of the jaw and facial features, the cranial vault and such are hard to determine.

And even such historical evidence as the stuff the points to the development of certain language groups is not going to give us that information. Now two hundreds years from now it is likely that brain development will be very well mapped in terms of modern brain structure and then they will be able to exactly look at the actual distribution of which brain structures are how universal. It may be that there is broad variety or it may be that there is very narrow in terms of the genetics of the development of the structures in the left cortex. That would cement it right there.

I may be very wrong, my feeling is again that there are broad capacities for learning with some specialization for language but that a lot of it is learned through exposure and training..

[Dancing David]

Well, the books will still give you some insights into how language develops, no matter what you want to do with the words.

I was going to say that Wikipedia was a good start, until I was able to cite better things.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instinct
But, it actually uses the phrase "fixed action patterns" in part of it. Looks like a different usage of those words, than I was used to, though.

Aside from that, all the stuff about what is unlearned seems hold up my points fairly well.

Hi Wowbagger, you will also note the 'citations needed' for almost the whole thing as well and that much of it supports my use of the term instinct.

:)

The uncited 'conference defintion' in particular

A number of criteria were established which distinguishes instinctual from other kinds of behavior. To be considered instinctual a behavior must a) be automatic, b) be irresistible, c) occur at some point in development, d) be triggered by some event in the environment, e) occur in every member of the species, f) be unmodifiable, and g) govern behavior for which the organism needs no training (although the organism may profit from experience and to that degree the behavior is modifiable).


Now that appears to be possibly attributed to Frank Beach (http://www.nap.edu/readingroom.php?book=biomems&page=fbeach.html) and at least from the wiki pages seems to be possibly from the Sex and Behavior conferences 1961 and 1962, I will have to work to find something better than that. (Just quick googling so far)

Then it would seem that my defintion is also the one Maslow used.

However it should be noted this is a huge debate in pyschology and anthroplogy, and has always been there.

And as noted previously I do not consider humans to have wiring to learn to walk, and the speech development wiring is inconclusive at best.

At least compared to ungulates learning to walk and birds learning to sing (those are very hard wired for sure).

I can be and I am often very wrong.

[AlBell]

I do not consider humans to have wiring to learn to walk,
So you believe a feral child raised by wolves would crawl rather than walk?

[beeksc1]

Language is Material, it is set of self referential idiomatic symbol exchanges conducted by physical creatures that has meaning through external referents to physical objects.


As Arundhati Roy notes,

Language is the skin of my thought.


I see where you are coming from.

[ideogram]

Don't you think the fact that every known human language, even sign languages, have grammar, is pretty persuasive?

[ideogram]

And as noted previously I do not consider humans to have wiring to learn to walk, and the speech development wiring is inconclusive at best.

At least compared to ungulates learning to walk and birds learning to sing (those are very hard wired for sure).

Ok, certainly human languages are not "hard-wired" to the extent that birdsong is. However, that is a long way from saying there is no wiring in the brain specialized for language development. I think it would be unreasonable to deny that human language must have some universal features; the real research involves determining which features are universal.

[Dancing David]

So you believe a feral child raised by wolves would crawl rather than walk?

I think a feral child raised by wolves is likely to be dead? What age is this child released to the wolves?

A human child learns to walk through experience as far as I know, unlike an animal that walks within minutes of birth. I will have to see what the more recent research says.

[Dancing David]

Ok, certainly human languages are not "hard-wired" to the extent that birdsong is. However, that is a long way from saying there is no wiring in the brain specialized for language development. I think it would be unreasonable to deny that human language must have some universal features; the real research involves determining which features are universal.

I agree, there is strong biological basis to language acquisition but universal features would still need to control for exposure and learning.

:)

I chose brid song for that reason, and I think that certain animals have some very hard wired behaviors. Humans so far, much less so.

[Dancing David]

Don't you think the fact that every known human language, even sign languages, have grammar, is pretty persuasive?

If we had the language developed by the infants abandoned on the deserted island, yes.

But then I am biased, even though our retinas are wired to help us see, we still have to develop that ability through exposure. I was taught that much of the function of neurons is learned. Some things like the circadian rythym, not so much learned as dependant upon cues. Other very much learned.

(I admit I am biased and will likey be wrong to some extent)

[ideogram]

I think your definition of "instinct" is overly restrictive. I think there are a lot of human capabilities that exist as hard-wired potentials which must be developed by exposure to real experiences. One of the reasons we think language is like this is because infants learn language much faster than can be explained by simple pattern-matching.

[Dancing David]

Well, that is what this more recent debate is about, isn't it? :)

I would point out something, that pattern matching is not always a 'conscious' cognitive process, it forms the basis of human neurological functioning in much of the cortex to some extent.

So when you say "infants learn language much faster than can be explained by simple pattern-matching", I again am thinking about 'pattern matching' as a general function.

It is part and parcel of the way the brain works, neurological signals cross reference each other at many levels of the brain structure from individual neurons, up to the larger structures. The neurons themselves seem to cross reference each other and seem to have a plastic ability to modify their behavior based upon the behavior of the neurons around them, now I am over simplifying things, but individual neurons seem to be conditioned to be attenuated by other neurons and activated by other neurons, and this is a plastic ability, it can change. (I really have to catch up on the more recent data and research as well) )(It is about what I was thinking, different neurochemical working in different areas of the brain, it is not all conditioning.)

So if a neuron has a conditioned capacity to 'pattern matching', this makes for a very powerful tool across the systems.

And again 'instinct' is the term used also in technical jargon, which is why the definition is so restrictive. It is meant to be clear as to what is being talked about.

[Dymanic]

I just find that there is little compelling evidence for the innate grammar, but that is certainly unproven either way.Perhaps even unprovable. Or maybe it's just that the neural substrates of grammar are difficult to distinguish in macroscopic brain regions, and all that's needed is further investigation along these lines:
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/papers/sahin%20pinker%20cash%20schomer%20halgren%20ICE.pd f

In light of these observations:

"[Children] are capable of inventing languages that are more systematic than those they hear, showing resemblances to languages that they have never heard, and they obey subtle grammatical principles for which there is no evidence in their environments"

- one alternative has to do with what might be thought of as a limit to the size of the available design space; that is, grammar need not be innate if there just aren't that many possible ways to organize signals in a certain type of channel. Pinker and Bloom note:

"...even the artificial languages that are focussed on very narrow domains of content and that are not meant to be used in a natural on-line manner by people, such as computer languages or symbolic logic, show certain obvious parallels with aspects of human grammar. They have needed means of distinguishing types of symbols, predicate argument relations, embedding, scope, quantification, and truth relations, and solve these problems with formal syntactic systems that specify arbitrary patterns of hierarchical concatenation, relative linear order, fixed positions within strings, and closed classes of privileged symbols."

Except for vocabulary, but that is a separate non-functional issue.Grammar, lexicon, and phonology are separate issues for sure, but it's hard to separate them in brain studies.

[Dancing David]

Now that is great study and not really any different than I would think, the degree of localization is already a porblem in the confinement of abilities to Broca's area, thanks Dynamic!
however that bit about
"[Children] are capable of inventing languages that are more systematic than those they hear, showing resemblances to languages that they have never heard, and they obey subtle grammatical principles for which there is no evidence in their environments"

which seems to be from
Adapted Mind
http://books.google.com/books?id=SxX4gRzOS6oC&pg=PA451&lpg=PA451&dq=Children%5D+are+capable+of+inventing+languages+ that+are+more+systematic+than+those+they+hear,+sho wing+resemblances+to+languages+that+they+have+neve r+heard,+and+they+obey+subtle+grammatical+principl es+for+which+there+is+no+evidence+in+their+environ ments&source=bl&ots=Bf3s9J4MvJ&sig=JekgpBXt4Yp1LrAbQhjVAmzKC9s&hl=en&ei=0cOTS6OXL47KMoXH_MMN&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Children%5D%20are%20capable%20of%20inventing%20l anguages%20that%20are%20more%20systematic%20than%2 0those%20they%20hear%2C%20showing%20resemblances%2 0to%20languages%20that%20they%20have%20never%20hea rd%2C%20and%20they%20obey%20subtle%20grammatical%2 0principles%20for%20which%20there%20is%20no%20evid ence%20in%20their%20environments&f=false

In an introductory paragraph but then they cite Pinker 1989a, which makes sense as it is chapter by Pinker and Bloom

and is a citation of Page 359 in Posner Foundations of Cognitive Science
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=IugxqohJA50C&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=+%22Posner%22+%22Foundations+of+cognitive+scien ce%22&ots=YoZuMPy_bb&sig=VHClHrb8NPF9Jeic2FyOwbC6BWs#v=onepage&q=&f=false

And the statement seems to be mainly based upon the devlopment of ceole languages with absolutely no other reference (one study), and then he makes some other interesting conclusions about the made up use of the words wugs and ricks to make some really strange conclusions as well.

So now we can discuss the nature of creole language, and the study that he is citing. But that is for later.

[ideogram]

I would point out something, that pattern matching is not always a 'conscious' cognitive process, it forms the basis of human neurological functioning in much of the cortex to some extent.

Understood.

So when you say "infants learn language much faster than can be explained by simple pattern-matching", I again am thinking about 'pattern matching' as a general function.

I do take issue with this.

So if a neuron has a conditioned capacity to 'pattern matching', this makes for a very powerful tool across the systems.

Certainly, and I do believe there is generalized pattern matching in the brain. I just don't think all of language can be explained as generalized pattern matching; I do believe there are structures in the brain specialised for language development, along with generalized pattern matching.

And again 'instinct' is the term used also in technical jargon, which is why the definition is so restrictive. It is meant to be clear as to what is being talked about.

Well, if this is your definition, no, I do not believe Language is an instinct. I tried to be very clear in my statement: I believe there are hard-wired potentials in the brain which must be developed by exposure to real experiences. You gave the example of vision.

[Dancing David]

Oh, sure, and I agree, we humans do have a tremendous capacity to learn language, there is no doubt about it. I am just not a fan of the hard wired grammar arguments.

But it will take a lot of reading about Creole language to try and figure out why I disagree with Pinker and what the data says.

The isseu I have is that the environment is full of cues on how to use language. Even when learning a new language, you are presented with 'evidence' from the native speakers of the new language. But again much more than that I can not say.

And please I do understand and believe that humans have a strong biological capacity to learn language.

But then I can also recall large tracts of music and listen to them in my head as well, if I have heard the music recently I can recall it very well. So there is something going on in the auditory cortex there. Strangely my brother is a polyglot, he can absorb and learn language very quickly. Now I have the ability to mimic speech fairly well, so when encountering foreign names I can usually pronounce them correctly after hearing them, but comprehension is much slower for me.

So I agree that there is this great capacity, I am just more sceptical of the 'hidden grammar' thing. (Just as I am sceptical of the programmed fear of an image of a snake thing). But it will take some reaserach to find out what is out there.

[Dymanic]

Now I have the ability to mimic speech fairly well, so when encountering foreign names I can usually pronounce them correctly after hearing them, but comprehension is much slower for me.Ever try this? Record your own voice (I just use Windows sound recorder) saying something like "Four score and seven years ago..." or whatever, listen to it backwards a few times and then record yourself again trying to mimic the backwards version, then play that backwards and see how well you did. That doesn't say anything about grammar, of course, and I'm not sure what it says about phonetics either, but it's a lot of fun.

Anyway.

Again, one compelling argument against innate grammar is that certain ways of organizing parts of speech are simply more efficient than others and permit a richer and more nuanced exchange of ideas, and it is therefore not unreasonable to postulate that any language which lacked sufficient syntactic structure to support exchanges of socially relevant abstract information -- such as time, possession, beliefs, desires, tendencies, obligations, truth, probability, hypotheticals, and counterfactuals -- would quickly gravitate toward structures which would support those.

So, while the rapid evolution of (say) a pidgin into a creole might appear to be driven by an "instinct" for language, it might in fact simply represent the path of least resistance. That is, even if we decide that the evidence supports the idea of grammar being "hidden", the question remains as to whether it is hidden somewhere in the human genome, or as optima in the local "design space" -- similar to asking whether the laws of mathematics are invented or discovered.

If I wanted to argue against innate grammar, I think that's the tack I'd take.