Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions [Archive] - Page 4

Kevin_Lowe

19th October 2010, 08:27 PM

Why? It appears to be what we have been talking about - finding grounds to say that women ought not be forcibly coerced into wearing burqas.

Sure. But we're not suggesting a utilitarian approach.

Harris certainly endorses something that looks very much like utilitarianism, with "wellbeing" of "flourishing" as the slightly vague yardstick of utility.

I also really struggle to see how anyone could confuse themselves that deontological or theological moral theories were in any way scientific, since they specifically eschew basing their moral reasoning on facts about how the world will be as a result of their actions, as opposed to whether the actions are right in and of themselves.

I can see how Piggy and Harris have gotten themselves into a muddle where they think some flavour of utilitarianism can be generated just from "is" statements, but I don't see how you can muddle yourself that way with deontological systems.

Exactly. These examples demonstrate that we care about something other than utility (hence the reason utilitarianism is not in play) if two scenarios which are the same in terms of utility lead to different choices. It means that we have a way to distinguish between choices based on right actions vs. right outcomes without appealing to long-dead authority figures.

There's virtually no such thing as a pure deontologist or a pure utilitarian in practice, so your argument doesn't work at all. Almost everyone acts as a deontologist in all but name most of the time, and a utilitarian occasionally when they foresee bad outcomes from deontologically determined behaviour.

All this proves is that most people aren't instinctively pure utilitarians, but as has been explained repeatedly the idea that people's instinctive behaviours are a guide to what is moral is just another instance of the naturalistic fallacy.

We wouldn't be able to treat a horrible, but logically consistent society, as different. The knowledge that Piggy has been referring to tells us that it cannot be presumed that those people living in that horrible society are different from the rest of humanity - that they are there because they are wired differently or fail to have much of anything in common with other humans. So it becomes of interest to figure why a horrible society is the same as ours.

If we look at self-interest, there appears to be a difference between a terrorist who blows himself up in a crowded mall and my husband taking me to a nice restaurant for dinner, but if we break it down we might show that they are the same in that they are both hoping for sex (from the promised 72 virgins for the terrorist). And we can recognize that this is something they can be wrong about and whether they are wrong is discoverable.

Getting back to the horrible society, what we would try to understand is why/how they are the same as as those societies which are not horrible, and then discover whether the apparent horribleness is because they are wrong with respect to their choices. And what is meant by that, is that they would make a different choice if they had the information that they were wrong. If it were known that the terrorist altered his choice to blow himself up based on the promise of 72 virgins (per the kind of scenario investigation i mentioned earlier), then if he received overwhelming information from sources he considered credible and trustworthy that this was wrong, then he ought not blow himself up. If those in a horrible society are, like us, trying to ensure some degree of security, and it is those things which they think provide security which also make it horrible , then knowledge that they are wrong about their security provides grounds for saying that it ought not be horrible.

That's a long way of avoiding answering the question. What if these people are as fully informed as you are about the facts, and are still consistently horrible? If you have any urge to morally criticise such a society, then it must be on the basis of a non-scientific "ought" claim.

Please don't try Piggy's silly argument that the most scientifically advanced societies act more morally than others and that this "can't be a coincidence!". We also have the most moral philosophers, but correlation isn't causation.

You may call it teleological, but it is also, as Harris points out, a factual statement about a conscious being.

Is this supposed to be news to someone?

But this doesn't seem to be at all meaningful. Again, to think that there is some sort of distinction to be made out of considering the past, present and future separately doesn't seem to have much of anything to do with how we approach questions from a scientific perspective. And after all, it is science which has shown us that that these are sort of artifacts of conscious experience, rather than objective labels which can be applied to an event.

Science is solely concerned with generating theories about how the universe works based on what has happened in the past, and morality makes claims about how it would be good for the universe to be in the future. That seems like a pretty huge difference to me. I'd call that meaningful. If it doesn't seem all that meaningful to you, well, that's your lookout.

Piggy and I are arguing two different perspectives (and he isn't arguing for a True Scientific Morality), but I think they converge onto the same general location. Which is also typical of a scientific approach.

It's also typical of philosophy students independently making the same error, which believe it or not has happened from time to time.

fls

19th October 2010, 08:31 PM

Then everyone here agrees with Harris. Huzzah!

ETA: Can you show me where Harris is saying anything more than that?

He could simply be directing his remarks to a relatively naive audience, one who needs to be made familiar with this information. But it seems to me that he is also trying to present a case to his colleagues, in which case he must be saying something more. I enjoyed your post and thought it well-written, but I agree with Kevin Lowe that the contents would be considered unexceptionable.

Linda

Piggy

19th October 2010, 08:50 PM

He could simply be directing his remarks to a relatively naive audience, one who needs to be made familiar with this information. But it seems to me that he is also trying to present a case to his colleagues, in which case he must be saying something more. I enjoyed your post and thought it well-written, but I agree with Kevin Lowe that the contents would be considered unexceptionable.

Well, of course, much of that post was intended to be unexceptionable. The purpose of the bulk of it -- up to the conclusion -- was simply to offer a way of looking at morality that doesn't include the messy use of "ought" and "is", much less "intrinsic good". I was hoping it would be self-evident, because if it wasn't, then I hadn't done a very good job.

But as for the bit at the end, two primary objections to Harris's talk on this thread seem to be that Harris is wrong when he says that science can tell us what we ought to value (that it cannot tell us what is good and not good because these require initial arbitrary value judgments), and that he is contradicting himself when he adds that science also cannot answer all our moral questions.

If none of the posters on this thread are in fact claiming that Harris is wrong when he says science can tell us what we ought to value, or that this statement contradicts his claim about its limitations, then I've obviously missed something.

Kevin_Lowe

19th October 2010, 08:51 PM

Then everyone here agrees with Harris. Huzzah!

ETA: Can you show me where Harris is saying anything more than that?

So you want us to reboot the entire thread for your benefit, based on one post where you act dumb?

Instead let's just check in to see if we've finally got your argument straight:

Piggy's Position:

1. People are biologically inclined to think some things are good and some things are bad. (This is news to absolutely nobody).
2. Science is useful for doing things we think are good and avoiding things we think are bad. (This too is news to absolutely nobody).
3. Absolutely anything anybody thinks is good, is good. This is all good is. The same goes for bad. (This is moral relativism).
4. If two fully informed people disagree about what is good or bad, science can't help.
5. If a single fully informed person holds contradictory things to be good or bad, science can't help either.
6. If people hold contradictory things to be good or bad science can tell us why they do this. (This still doesn't solve the problem).

Consequences of Piggy's Position Which Piggy Strenuously Denies:

6. Science is only useful if people are making moral decisions based on insufficient information.
7. Science by itself is useless for resolving problems where well-informed people have incompatible moral value judgments.
8. Science by itself cannot tell us what moral value judgments to make.
9. After all this bluster, it turns out science can't answer moral questions after all. It can just answer factual questions.
10. Harris is still wrong.
11. Piggy's moral philosophy is useless for resolving problems where people disagree either about what is good and bad, or about how to weigh up competing issues, which means it is useless for every moral problem that matters.

Harris' Position:

1. People are biologically inclined to think some things are good and some things are bad. (This is news to absolutely nobody).
2. Science is useful for doing things we think are good and avoiding things we think are bad. (This too is news to absolutely nobody).
3. It's a biological truth that all of us think that "flourishing" or "wellbeing" for everyone in the world is the moral good. (Factually questionable).
4. Because we all think this, then it's true. (This is the naturalistic fallacy, deployed to support moral relativism, which in turn serves as the underpinning for what works out in practice to be fuzzily-defined utilitarianism).
5. I have solved the is/ought problem! (He really hasn't).

Piggy

19th October 2010, 09:10 PM

Instead let's just check in to see if we've finally got your argument straight:

Not quite, but it's midnight and I have to hit the hay.

I will respond to this one before I call it a thread, but it'll have to wait til tomorrow.

However, I will say that your items 3-5 for Harris are clearly wrong, your 3-5 for me can be true depending on how you mean it but it's an insufficent description of my argument at any rate, consequences 6 and 7 don't parse, and 9 and 11 are wrong.

Democracy Simulator

19th October 2010, 09:30 PM

Democracy Simulator

19th October 2010, 10:32 PM

Ok, time for the long post....

Here, I want to get away from this painfully imprecise language of "is" and "ought" and instead deal with merely annoyingly imprecise terms such as "drives", "desires", and "intentions" to describe a scientific rather than philosophical approach to morality.

Is and ought are extremely precise. Have you doubts about what 'is' or 'ought' mean? Is refers to the state of things as they are. Ought refers to what they should be. Drives, desires and intentions are all rather woolly entities by comparison. Compare 'that man is laughing' to 'he desires to laugh', for example. I know which one I'd bet my empirical dollars on.

There simply is no moral issue regarding witches for us to deal with. We no longer have to pose to ourselves the moral question of what should be done about witches, what sort of evidence we should allow, how to balance safety and liberty in questionable cases, and so forth.

Ok, but if witches did exist, would we invent moral stances towards them, or would those moral stances already exist within us, regardless of whether witches are real or not? Can you imagine how we ought to treat witches, or not? I can. Science can tell me whether witches are real or not, but it can't tell me how to treat them, which is the moral issue at stake (no pun intended, oh well maybe just a little bit :))

Science hasn't solved a moral dilemma (i.e. told us how we should treat witches), it has simply told us that witches do not in fact exist.

But can science be a deciding factor in what we value here and now? Well, yes. Take, for instance, the sanctity of the nuclear family. Scientific investigation can demonstrate, for instance, that other family structures can exist, and even be the norm, in stable, civil societies.

So, the underlying value here is that if it's natural/normal it's right. The Naturalistic Fallacy. But if I don't believe the naturalistic fallacy, why should I be persuaded that the nuclear family is not the way to go because other family structures can be the norm? Another moral dilemma unsolved by science.

Recent studies have shown, for example, that children raised by homosexual couples thrive just as well as kids raised in traditional nuclear families.

And in fact, the entire issue of gay rights is in flux, and has been over the past few decades, and scientific inquiry is a huge player in the changing values in the USA regarding homosexuality.

One key to changing attitudes was the physchological reclassification of homosexuality, which used to be considered a mental disorder, and now is not. It took the public at large some time to catch up with that change, and we are still in the process of catching up, but it's happening.

Um, but again this just shows that most people believe that the Naturalistic fallacy is actually true. This is the 'underlying value' behind changing attitudes. Many people have had the idea that homosexuality is unnatural/ a disorder (bad), they then discover that homosexuality is natural/part of the norm (good). The underlying values haven't changed but the facts in a particular case have changed. This is why fundamental Christians are often immune to the natural / normal argument - their underlying value towards homosexuality is that it is bad because we should obey God, God has said so and the facts haven't changed in this case. If all the Bibles in the world were to miraculously change over night to, 'Gay is Ok', then the same type of Christians would presumably start being ok about it as their underlying value here is that one should obey God.

What Sam Harris is calling for is a simple recognition that science indeed has something to say about what we value.

Except he's not just saying that, which I believe should be fairly obvious now? If you don't think so answer whether he intends us to believe he has solved the is/ought problem.

In fact, it can tell us what we should value, given the innate drives that we share and the common ground which exists among our various desires.

No, this thesis fails as demonstrated above.

This does not mean that it can answer all our questions. He is very explicit about that.

Yes but he omits to tell us what type of questions it can't answer and why not. He equivocates over this crucial point.

For example, science can tell us what the universe looks like. But it cannot answer all our questions about what the universe looks like.

Science cannot tell us what the position and momentum are of any particle at any moment in time. It cannot tell us what the features of the universe are beyond our light cone. It cannot tell us what the moon looked like 3 billion years ago. For two adjacent water molecules at the top of a waterfall, it cannot tell us what their distance apart will be when they reach the bottom.

And it can't tell us what we ought to do without referring to a moral premise and the attendant problems that that entails.

To say that science does not have any power tell us what we ought to value, that it has no role in deciding moral questions, is simply false.

Has Harris solved the is/ought problem?

Tapio

20th October 2010, 04:32 AM

Right, but the reason scientific research can give us a coherent answer is that iron under the the same conditions reacts the same way for everybody. People don't.

Agreed.

I didn't mean that iron acts the same in 60F as it does in 2000F, I meant that no matter what iron you chose to heat to 2000F, it will all behave the same.

I never said that experiments on human emotions were less scientific because of it's moral basis. Emotions don't have a moral basis, that's backwards. Moral are based at least as much on emotion as science- perhaps moreso.

Ok, cleared.

What experiments are you talking about? are there any actual experiments you're talking about, or are they just imaginary ones you're postulating to support your hypothetical?

Yes, they were just imaginary ones. Brought up solely for the reason of questioning if , in fact, scientific research of something not perceived as a conscious entity is in any way different (in how it is planned, performed and analyzed) than scientific research studying humans (or other conscious creatures).

Which it isn't in any other way than in how ethics come to play in the case of conscious creatures.

It's not. Because quite a lot of the way we act is based on emotion, which often has little or nothing to do with fact.

Let's see...I read Harris as acknowledging this. He seems to be also claiming that there are ways in which our emotion-based acts would serve human well-being in a better way if grounded in scientific knowledge. Science could help us "re-arrange" our values (in the context of human well-being) and thus perhaps help us become aware of the emotional base for them. Also, with the help of science we could find other values that would possibly help us reach our aim of well-being (which Harris seems to hold as the ultimate aim of conscious creatures). These would be the first steps towards ceasing to act unreasonably harmfully against oneself and each other.

It seems pretty common for people to assume that their own point of view is the only one possible for humans.

Yes, of course. That's why solid evidence is a great tool in defining what is what. And healthy skepticism, especially towards oneself, like a breath of fresh air into the stuffy halls of dogma.

Do they? How?

Well, for starters, if their hypotheses is shown flawed by well-performed experiments, they take careful notice of what not to do the next time. On the other hand, I know people who've had the most inspiring and joyful experiences when everything goes according to plan and gathered evidence supports their hypotheses. Especially if the result will in some way benefit human well-being :D.

Again, you are equivocating your "oughts".

I still don't understand how. What is the actual, real life altering difference? I understand what you mean in the sense of mind-games, but can not grasp how you can separate them in action. Maybe an example? I really want to know if my thinking is flawed (I'm inclined to believe it is, so i don't need much persuasion...:o) .

Piscivore

20th October 2010, 09:56 AM

Yes, they were just imaginary ones. Brought up solely for the reason of questioning if , in fact, scientific research of something not perceived as a conscious entity is in any way different (in how it is planned, performed and analyzed) than scientific research studying humans (or other conscious creatures).
Which difference you cannot discover with stuff you make up.

Let's see...I read Harris as acknowledging this. He seems to be also claiming that there are ways in which our emotion-based acts would serve human well-being in a better way if grounded in scientific knowledge. Science could help us "re-arrange" our values (in the context of human well-being) and thus perhaps help us become aware of the emotional base for them. Also, with the help of science we could find other values that would possibly help us reach our aim of well-being (which Harris seems to hold as the ultimate aim of conscious creatures).
That is where he fails. Everything else you mentioned is therefore irrelevant.

Yes, of course. That's why solid evidence is a great tool in defining what is what. And healthy skepticism, especially towards oneself, like a breath of fresh air into the stuffy halls of dogma.
And it goes both ways. It seems pretty likely to me that Harris has made "science" into an ideology, and to that end has overstated what science can actually do soley as an attempt to oppose a competeing ideology.

I still don't understand how. What is the actual, real life altering difference?
A scientific or just non-moral "ought" is an attempt to describe the expected outcome of an event or action:
"If we drop these two objects in a vacuum, they "ought" to fall at the same rate."
"If I do the dishes tonight, it "ought" to reduce some of my wife's stress since she had a bad day at work."

Contrariwise, a moral "ought" prescribes how human beings are expected to behave:
"Ling Ling finds a wallet on the ground filled with money. She "ought" to return it without taking the money."
"I "ought" to do the dishes since my wife is stresed."
"My wife "ought" to be grateful I'm doing the dishes."

Paulhoff

20th October 2010, 10:12 AM

Or you can believe the Harris/Piggy version will be an improvement and accepted by popular acclaim.
And you think this isn't being done already.

Paul

:) :) :)

Paulhoff

20th October 2010, 10:23 AM

AlBell

20th October 2010, 11:07 AM

"Look, I have two daughters who have never slept with a man. Let me bring them out to you, and you can do what you like with them. But don’t do anything to these men, for they have come under the protection of my roof.”

Yes, morals of the bible, men first, women somewhere down the line.

Paul

:) :) :)
You know someone Xian or otherwise who accepts crap like that as part of their moral system? I doubt it.

No-one needs the ramblings of Harris et al to help them reach that conclusion, either.

Earthborn

20th October 2010, 11:55 AM

Ok, time for the long post....Thanks for the long post! It certainly clarifies your position a lot, and seems reasonably well argued.

I won't comment on all of -- not even your numerous misunderstandings of cultural anthropology and behavioural biology -- as that would be largely off-topic. I'll just pick a few examples of what I think gets to the heart of the issue and on which I can comment without repeating myself too often.

We no longer have to pose to ourselves the moral question of what should be done about witches, what sort of evidence we should allow, how to balance safety and liberty in questionable cases, and so forth.What you are saying here is that science hasn't so much answered a moral question, but rather caused us to not ask the question anymore. I suppose it is one way a moral issue can be resolved, but it isn't necessarily relevant to the matter of whether science can answer moral questions.

What Sam Harris is calling for is a simple recognition that science indeed has something to say about what we value.That's not really how I understand him. He has said that he thinks we need globally shared values to resolve global moral dilemmas. He has also criticised moral relativism, which is a position scientists such as cultural anthropologists and historians take in order to say something about what people value within a culture or era.

Science not only can, but does affect our values. And science can be a tool of use in deciding moral questions, if we choose to use it.I certainly don't disagree, but I like to add a sidenote: science can only affect our values because it tries to find out how things are. From our understanding of how things are, we can make decisions on how we like things to be. The latter however is not a scientific process; we don't make those decisions based only on scientific findings, and use other tools in those decisions as well.

It is therefore not science that answers moral questions, but rather that we make up the answers to moral questions ourselves.

To say that science does not have any power tell us what we ought to value, that it has no role in deciding moral questions, is simply false.Science has a role in deciding moral questions, but that does not give it power to tell us what we ought to value. It has only the power to change our moral decisions if the preceived facts which we use to justify them turn out to be wrong.

Even if science had the power to tell us what we ought to value, scientists have been rather unwilling to do so. Scientists generally work very hard to avoid telling us what we ought to value, and know that if they would include such value judgements in their scientific papers their work would severely frowned upon by their collaegues, even considered "suspect". It is somewhat ironic that much of the practice of modern science depends on the moral value of the disapproval of moral values in science. Scientists instead try to present themselves as objective and value-free.

In order for science to be able to answer our moral questions, the practice of science would need to alter dramatically. Scientists would need to give up their distinction between "is" and "ought" that they fought so hard to defend.

Harris is correct when he asserts that the wall of separation between morality and scientific inquiry is illusory.Perhaps Harris will be able to convince the scientists who built and defended that wall to break it down, but I doubt it. Too much has been invested in it to abadon it now.

AlBell

20th October 2010, 01:26 PM

When that wall is breached, Scientists assume the mantle 'priests'.

Paulhoff

20th October 2010, 01:41 PM

You know someone Xian or otherwise who accepts crap like that as part of their moral system? I doubt it.
I don't doubt it, not at all. There is crap in that book that people have used and are using now to keep women down and to make others slaves.

Paul

:) :) :)

AlBell

20th October 2010, 01:58 PM

You must live in a strange place in south Fl. I never noticed that as problem the years I lived there.

Paulhoff

20th October 2010, 05:37 PM

You must live in a strange place in south Fl. I never noticed that as problem the years I lived there.
There is a thing called History, American History for one, you should read up on it.

Paul

:) :) :)

By the way, I moved here.

fls

20th October 2010, 06:16 PM

Harris certainly endorses something that looks very much like utilitarianism, with "wellbeing" of "flourishing" as the slightly vague yardstick of utility.

On the other hand, he fails to mention necessary components of utility, such as how it would be scaled. And some of his later statements suggest that he doesn't think these things can be scaled (i.e. he denied formulaic approaches which answer questions like "should we bomb Iraq?"). At best he is indicating an outcomes-based approach (and even that is questionable), but there are other outcomes-based approaches than utility.

I also really struggle to see how anyone could confuse themselves that deontological or theological moral theories were in any way scientific, since they specifically eschew basing their moral reasoning on facts about how the world will be as a result of their actions, as opposed to whether the actions are right in and of themselves.

I agree that the theories are not scientific (although your statement is confusing to me as I was under the impression that none of the various philosophical 'ologies' are meant to be scientific, otherwise they would just be science). I was pointing out that science can discover the use of 'right actions' vs. 'right outcomes'. But this isn't testing deontological moral theories.

I can see how Piggy and Harris have gotten themselves into a muddle where they think some flavour of utilitarianism can be generated just from "is" statements, but I don't see how you can muddle yourself that way with deontological systems.

There's virtually no such thing as a pure deontologist or a pure utilitarian in practice, so your argument doesn't work at all. Almost everyone acts as a deontologist in all but name most of the time, and a utilitarian occasionally when they foresee bad outcomes from deontologically determined behaviour.

All this proves is that most people aren't instinctively pure utilitarians, but as has been explained repeatedly the idea that people's instinctive behaviours are a guide to what is moral is just another instance of the naturalistic fallacy.

I agree that strict divisions serve as tools for advancing philosophical discussion rather than informing science. Science is not testing the ideas of deontology or utilitarianism even if it happens to be testing components which are also present in these ideas. The question isn't whether science can be used in service of philosophical ideas, but whether science can answer questions which philosophical ideas also happen to address.

That's a long way of avoiding answering the question. What if these people are as fully informed as you are about the facts, and are still consistently horrible? If you have any urge to morally criticise such a society, then it must be on the basis of a non-scientific "ought" claim.

Hmmm...

That question is nonsensical under the conditions I outlined. I guess that explains why my long explanation was met with the comment that I avoided the question.

Please don't try Piggy's silly argument that the most scientifically advanced societies act more morally than others and that this "can't be a coincidence!". We also have the most moral philosophers, but correlation isn't causation.
Is this supposed to be news to someone?

As has been pointed out, it is philosophy which forms teleological statements. The 'is/ought problem' is a product of philosophy's approach to thinking about morals, not science's.

Science is solely concerned with generating theories about how the universe works based on what has happened in the past, and morality makes claims about how it would be good for the universe to be in the future. That seems like a pretty huge difference to me. I'd call that meaningful. If it doesn't seem all that meaningful to you, well, that's your lookout.

It's not meaningful because it's an artificial distinction. It is easy to form a description of science which is forward-looking and one for morals which looks backward. And science has shown us that past, present and future are more of an artifact of conscious experience than a property of an event.

It's also typical of philosophy students independently making the same error, which believe it or not has happened from time to time.

Well, it has been my expectation that what I'm asking is a common error from philosophy students and I would receive a ready answer. If, as you seem to be insisting, questions about morality have to be teleological, it must have been established at some point that 'oughts' exist (i.e. that we know a description of what 'is', is wrong in some way) which are inaccessible to empirical discovery. I already described a way to discover that a description of what 'is', is wrong, which is accessible to empirical investigation. So what I am looking for is how it was established that there are 'oughts' sufficient to serve as an irreconcilable problem as opposed to a thought exercise?

Linda

Piggy

20th October 2010, 06:20 PM

Ah, I'm disappointed, no-one has decided to take up the challenge:

"There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be ... I think that this is quite clearly untrue."

Is Harris referring here to the is/ought problem? Or is he not? Harris has studied philosophy. His language here seems clear. Or does he mean something else? No takers?

Is he referring to the problem, or is he not? Piggy says that we shouldn't use is/ought to frame the question. No no no. You must have misunderstood my question. Does Harris refer to it or does he not? Honestly answer me as to why you think he does or doesn't. I mean he either does or doesn't, doesn't he? Or, is he equivocating?

Well, neither, really.

I know, I said I'd lurk, but clearly I did not connect the dots well enough in my previous post -- it really was my mistake.

Let's take your quote from Harris:

There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be ... I think that this is quite clearly untrue.

On its surface, this would appear to be absurd. But there's a missing ingredient, and one of the reasons I went to the trouble to make my long post was to clarify what that is.

The problem with framing this in terms of is/ought is that doing so glosses over some important, even crucial, points about how we make moral decisions -- most specifically, at what point in the chain, at what level of organization, do our values enter into the equation.

I've been accused of harboring "hidden oughts". But the thing is, these so-called oughts are not hidden... they're simply irrelevant.

For instance, let's consider this question: Can science tell us what kinds of buildings we ought to build?

The answer is clearly "Yes".

And the answer does not somehow become "No" when we observe that science has no influence over the fact that humans don't want to be crushed, or burned, or left homeless, or have their livelihoods destroyed.

Why? For the same reason that the answer does not become "No" when we observe that science has no influence over the fact that the universe exists, which is also a prerequisite for the scenario we are considering.

We can pose the question like this: Given the fact that the universe exists, can science tell us how we ought to build our buildings?

We can also pose the question like this: Given the fact that humans don't want to be crushed, or burned, or left homeless, or have their livelihoods destroyed, can science tell us how we ought to build our buildings?

In each case, the answer is "Yes".

This is why I continue to make the claim which I am repeatedly hounded for making, on the (quite true) grounds that no one is arguing against it: That science can change our beliefs and our reality. Because if you accept that, then you also accept Harris's thesis.

That is what I'm on about.

Why is this so?

It's because values do not come into play at the most fundamental level, where so many here are wanting to place them. And this is/ought language glosses over that important distinction by failing to draw the proper lines regarding the actual level of organization at which values enter into the picture.

Harris says values are facts about human well-being.

I think that's regrettable language, and I would not use it, nor will I defend it. But I know what he's getting at, based on the rest of his talk.

When he says that science can tell us what we ought to value, he is not assuming that we all want well-being (it's a tautology that we do). Nor is he ignoring the fact that "well-being" differs from person to person. (Bundy's definition of well-being included regularly kidnapping, raping, torturing, murdering, and mutilating women, for example.)

But he is acknowledging that, by and large, at a very basic level, our species does tend to converge on an accepted vision of well-being, which includes not starving, not being denied autonomy, not having unnecessary pain inflicted on us, and so forth.

And that is absolutely true.

So, given that fact -- just as we grant the fact the the universe exists -- can science tell us what we ought to value?

The answer is "Yes", regardless of the fact that science does not determine our drives nor, by and large, our desires.

As I have explained in my previous post, our values are dependent not only upon our drives and desires, but also upon our experience and our beliefs. And because science can change our experience and beliefs, it can also change our values.

In short, it can tell us what we ought to value, because it can show us better ways of satisfying the basic drives over which science has no control, just as it can tell us what sort of buildings we ought to build because it can show us better ways of avoiding things we are hard-wired to want to avoid, such as crushing and burning and homelessness.

So I repeat that if you agree that science can change our reality and our beliefs -- which no one here denies -- then you must also agree that science has the power to tell us what we ought to value.

Piggy

20th October 2010, 06:28 PM

What you are saying here is that science hasn't so much answered a moral question, but rather caused us to not ask the question anymore. I suppose it is one way a moral issue can be resolved, but it isn't necessarily relevant to the matter of whether science can answer moral questions.

Oh, but it is.

For example, the problems which needed to be answered regarding a geocentric universe were solved by understanding that the solar system is heliocentric.

Science solved those problems by demonstrating that they were illusory problems to begin with, and did not require an answer.

With regard to witchcraft, we see clearly that science has indeed told us what we ought to value with regard to the whole witchcraft question by demonstrating that witches don't exist.

In doing so, for instance, it refuted the notion that we ought to value the health and safety of the community over the health and safety of the person accused of witchcraft.

Piggy

20th October 2010, 06:42 PM

That's not really how I understand him. He has said that he thinks we need globally shared values to resolve global moral dilemmas. He has also criticised moral relativism, which is a position scientists such as cultural anthropologists and historians take in order to say something about what people value within a culture or era.

The question of moral relativism is tricky, because it exists on two levels -- the social and the individual -- and because its usefulness as a tool depends on what exactly you're doing.

When science is used to study the beliefs, customs, and practices of various cultures, they discard any judgment regarding those beliefs, customs, and values, even if they include horrors such as genocide, child sacrifice, slavery, and sexual mutilation of girls.

That's as it should be, because weighing the value and efficacy of customs and beliefs has no impact at all on what they're attempting to do, and could only interfere with it.

It's analogous to studying how insects affect crops. Whether those effects may be judged good or bad is irrelevant to the study. The results are what they are.

But then, there's another level of inquiry, which involves drawing conclusions from those studies, and making recommendations regarding what we ought to do in light of our findings.

Should we use controlled burns or not?

Should we introduce genetically modified, pest-resistant crops or not?

Should we use no-till or not?

Should we introduce predator species to new territories or not?

Should we attempt to eradicate pine beetles or let them run their course?

Science can inform the answers to these questions -- in fact, science is instrumental in answering these questions -- even though those answers depend on a level of inquiry at which those questions are not asked.

It's much the same when it comes to a scientific approach to morality. There is one level of inquiry at which we do not ask what we ought to do; but there is another level of inquiry at which we can, and do, ask what to do.

Piggy

20th October 2010, 06:50 PM

I certainly don't disagree, but I like to add a sidenote: science can only affect our values because it tries to find out how things are. From our understanding of how things are, we can make decisions on how we like things to be. The latter however is not a scientific process; we don't make those decisions based only on scientific findings, and use other tools in those decisions as well.

It is therefore not science that answers moral questions, but rather that we make up the answers to moral questions ourselves.

I wouldn't disagree with that.

But consider this scenario....

You want to put in a garden, but you're not sure where it should go on your property. So you take soil samples from various places and send them in to your county extension office, and they send you back a report of the results.

The results clearly indicate that the northwest corner of the property is best suited for growing vegetables. So you decide to plant the garden there.

Science only told you "what is" and you "made the decision". Nevertheless, science told you what you ought to do.

Beth

20th October 2010, 07:44 PM

So you're saying we investigate things we find worth investigating?

Ok.

So what? So we begin the whole process with a value judgment regarding the subject of the study. That was the only point I was making.

So is your premise here one cannot look at the decision on the decision scientifically?
No. My premise here is that you cannot do so without making subjective value judgments prior to beginning any scientific study.

I come back to what I asked before, if these processes are not part of the physical Universe, then where do these values come from? Pixie dust sprinkled into the eyes of newborns? Magic sky Daddy wand waving? I simply fail to see the alternative here.
Who here has suggested that Pixie dust or magic wands are involved? Who has suggested that it is NOT part of the physical universe? Why the disparaging remarks?

It comes back to viewing science as some kind of decision making process. That's a false description of science. A huge part of science is simply exploring and describing the Universe. Yes. I think one way to describe the process of science is as a decision making process. Why do you think that would be a false description? I don't think it would be a terribly complete description, but it could be flowcharted at a fairly high level.

You seem to be making the false assumption here that basic drives are monolithic and distinct. No, I'm not making that assumption. In fact, I think that those drives are overlapping and competing.

If, as you’ve indicated earlier in this thread, you are using the term “drive” as a substitute for ‘intrinsic good’ (post 656) , then you are saying here what I and several others have been saying along. That science cannot determine what we value intrinsically.
Put in those terms, it's obvious that of course science can.

You've misinterpreted me. I was using 'determine' in the sense of 'cause' rather than 'find out'. I can understand the misreading though.

I've been accused of harboring "hidden oughts". But the thing is, these so-called oughts are not hidden... they're simply irrelevant.
That depends on the circumstances. Yes, there are circumstances where that is true. There are also circumstances where it is not.

This is why I continue to make the claim which I am repeatedly hounded for making, on the (quite true) grounds that no one is arguing against it: That science can change our beliefs and our reality. Because if you accept that, then you also accept Harris's thesis.
I've ordered his book. I look forward to reading it.

But he is acknowledging that, by and large, at a very basic level, our species does tend to converge on an accepted vision of well-being, which includes not starving, not being denied autonomy, not having unnecessary pain inflicted on us, and so forth.

And that is absolutely true.

So, given that fact -- just as we grant the fact the the universe exists -- can science tell us what we ought to value?

I haven't read his book yet, but I agree that there is a great deal of improvement possible given our technical knowledge and prowess. Where we often fail is the political and organizational fronts. Organizational skills can certainly be improved with the application of scientific methods. Political issues, hmmm..., I'll think about it. When I was 20 years younger, I had a lot more faith in the power of science to solve problems of that nature. :(

In short, it can tell us what we ought to value, because it can show us better ways of satisfying the basic drives over which science has no control, just as it can tell us what sort of buildings we ought to build because it can show us better ways of avoiding things we are hard-wired to want to avoid, such as crushing and burning and homelessness.

So I repeat that if you agree that science can change our reality and our beliefs -- which no one here denies -- then you must also agree that science has the power to tell us what we ought to value.

Sure. No one is arguing that science allows us to make decisions with more knowledge. But I don't think it can tell us whether we would prefer to live in world where everyone was equal, but no one had much or a world where some of us get to live in ease and comfort and others starve to death working 18 hours days. Hmmm...or maybe it could? It can't tell me what to prefer, but it could tell me how the rest of my society feels about that issue.

Science, perhaps, might tell us how to achieve a world where everyone was equal AND able to live in ease and comfort. The price of achieving that might be forgoing individual reproductive rights. Science can't tell us which world is preferable, but I guess we can always argue for our own personal preferences.

Piggy

20th October 2010, 07:55 PM

Ok, let's take these one by one....

So you want us to reboot the entire thread for your benefit, based on one post where you act dumb?

Instead let's just check in to see if we've finally got your argument straight:

Piggy's Position:

1. People are biologically inclined to think some things are good and some things are bad. (This is news to absolutely nobody).

True and true.

2. Science is useful for doing things we think are good and avoiding things we think are bad. (This too is news to absolutely nobody).

True and true. (Although it is also true that science is useful for doing things that many people think are bad.)

3. Absolutely anything anybody thinks is good, is good. This is all good is. The same goes for bad. (This is moral relativism).

I won't comment on the philosophical doctrine of moral relativism because it is irrelevant to me, and to a scientific approach to morality.

But it is true that we can indeed define "good" and "bad" at an individual level. This is a very useful tool. It matters that individuals define these terms differently.

And yet this assertion clashes with your point #1 -- that human beings are inclined to define good and bad in similar ways when it comes to many fundamental issues, such as avoiding pain, desiring fairness, protecting their children, and so forth.

So on the individual level, good and bad are indeed whatever we believe them to be, depending on our particular wiring, whether we're talking about Ted Bundy or the Dalai Lama.

But on the species level, we're talking about distributions.

It's like the question of how many legs human beings have. The vast majority of people have more than the average number of legs. But this fact doesn't change the fact that the human body is designed to have 2 legs.

So your statement "this is all good is" is incorrect. The concept is more complicated than that, and it is critical that we are clear about whether we're discussing what's true for individuals (who may have one leg or two legs or even three legs, who may think it's good to spoil their children or beat them) or whether we're discussing what is true for human beings as a species.

Your pseudo-analysis here glosses over that important distinction, and therefore is false.

4. If two fully informed people disagree about what is good or bad, science can't help.

If you take this statement literally, it's a tautology, because two "fully informed people" must by definition already know everything that science could possibly tell them; therefore, by definition, science could not possibly add anything to the equation.

On the other hand, it's irrelevant, because in reality nobody is fully informed. So the scenario is of no use because it cannot actually occur.

However, in the real world, it is certainly true that disagreements regarding moral issues can potentially be resolved by science.

I've seen it happen on this forum, for example, and in my personal experience outside the forum.

For instance, I was able to change at least one person's mind regarding the Terry Schiavo case, by demonstrating scientifically that she could not possibly be aware of anything, despite the films showing her tracking a balloon with her eyes and responding to questions.

And I've seen people drop their moral outrage at certain issues by being directed to Snopes, where they discover that the foundations of their moral indigation are illusory.

In short, your "fully informed people" scenario is of no use whatsoever.

5. If a single fully informed person holds contradictory things to be good or bad, science can't help either.

Again, there is no such animal. You might as well make point 5 about unicorns or cornerless squares.

In reality, however, science can indeed resolve mental contradictions.

6. If people hold contradictory things to be good or bad science can tell us why they do this. (This still doesn't solve the problem).

Doesn't solve what problem?

Consequences of Piggy's Position Which Piggy Strenuously Denies:

6. Science is only useful if people are making moral decisions based on insufficient information.

True, but trivial.

Harris is still correct to say that science can tell us what we ought to value, because science is a means to make our information less insufficient.

7. Science by itself is useless for resolving problems where well-informed people have incompatible moral value judgments.

False, because well-informed does not mean perfectly informed. And if you mean "perfectly informed" then you're in fantasyland.

8. Science by itself cannot tell us what moral value judgments to make.

True. But that's only because -- as I explained in my long post -- values depend on the interaction of drives, desires, and beliefs. So it's impossible to cite science as the sole factor. Nevertheless, this does not mean that science cannot be the deciding factor.

As I said in an earlier post, we can posit this proposition: Given that human beings don't want to be crushed or burned or homeless or poverty-stricken, science can tell us how we ought to build our buildings.

Similarly, we can posit this proposition: Given that human beings tend to have a common set of innate drives and to suffer in very similar ways, science can tell us what practices and customs we ought to value in order to minimize suffering and maximize happiness.

9. After all this bluster, it turns out science can't answer moral questions after all. It can just answer factual questions.

Incorrect, because of all of the above.

10. Harris is still wrong.

Non sequitur. See below.

11. Piggy's moral philosophy is useless for resolving problems where people disagree either about what is good and bad, or about how to weigh up competing issues, which means it is useless for every moral problem that matters.

Only in some idealized Kevinland where people have perfect information. I don't live in that world.

Harris' Position:

1. People are biologically inclined to think some things are good and some things are bad. (This is news to absolutely nobody).

True and true.

2. Science is useful for doing things we think are good and avoiding things we think are bad. (This too is news to absolutely nobody).

See #2 above.

3. It's a biological truth that all of us think that "flourishing" or "wellbeing" for everyone in the world is the moral good. (Factually questionable).

False. Harris never asserts this. His objection to the practices of the Taliban is but one example.

4. Because we all think this, then it's true. (This is the naturalistic fallacy, deployed to support moral relativism, which in turn serves as the underpinning for what works out in practice to be fuzzily-defined utilitarianism).

Since #3 is wrong, #4 is also wrong.

5. I have solved the is/ought problem! (He really hasn't).

Another non sequitur.

Piggy

20th October 2010, 08:00 PM

So we begin the whole process with a value judgment regarding the subject of the study. That was the only point I was making.

I disagree that it's a value judgment. We're interested in what we're interested in because of how we're built.

My cats are not interested in investigating the same things I'm interested in investigating.

That's why they're outside stalking in the bushes while I'm typing on my computer.

Neither I nor my cats made any value judgments when deciding on whether to stalk in the bushes or type on the computer.

Piggy

20th October 2010, 08:04 PM

Sure. No one is arguing that science allows us to make decisions with more knowledge. But I don't think it can tell us whether we would prefer to live in world where everyone was equal, but no one had much or a world where some of us get to live in ease and comfort and others starve to death working 18 hours days. Hmmm...or maybe it could? It can't tell me what to prefer, but it could tell me how the rest of my society feels about that issue.

Science, perhaps, might tell us how to achieve a world where everyone was equal AND able to live in ease and comfort. The price of achieving that might be forgoing individual reproductive rights. Science can't tell us which world is preferable, but I guess we can always argue for our own personal preferences.

I don't think he's arguing that science can help us achieve perfection.

In fact, I think he is arguing that science can help up answer questions such as "Should we strive for a world of total equality?"

Pinker, for example, uses science to answer clearly "No". And I think Harris would agree.

Harris, if I read him right, would argue that science tells us that we ought to work to reduce inequality, but not to eliminate it, simply for our own good.

Skeptic Ginger

20th October 2010, 09:54 PM

....
So is your premise here one cannot look at the decision on the decision scientifically?
No. My premise here is that you cannot do so without making subjective value judgments prior to beginning any scientific study.
I come back to what I asked before, if these processes are not part of the physical Universe, then where do these values come from? Pixie dust sprinkled into the eyes of newborns? Magic sky Daddy wand waving? I simply fail to see the alternative here.
Who here has suggested that Pixie dust or magic wands are involved? Who has suggested that it is NOT part of the physical universe? Why the disparaging remarks?They were not intended to be disparaging. Of course no one has suggested Pixie dust. The problem is people are not looking at the consequences of carving out a special subjective section of the Universe and calling it outside the realm of science. The comment was an attempt to point out that once you carve out your 'special pleading (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/specplea.html)', you need to explain it.

It would seem many here agree our subjective consciousness is indeed part of the physical Universe. People agree, it would seem, that one can use science to observe and describe all the components of the subjective consciousness.

But when I've tried to point out that people were arguing a 'special pleading' for subjective consciousness that they were not applying to something such as color vision, my challenge goes unheeded.

Yes. I think one way to describe the process of science is as a decision making process. Why do you think that would be a false description? I don't think it would be a terribly complete description, but it could be flowcharted at a fairly high level. Is describing the taxonomy of life on Earth answering a question, or does the description simply provide the data for answering various questions? Do we need the questions to describe the taxonomy of life using the scientific method?

Or if you don't like that analogy, how about asking a science based question about one's decision that a color you are looking at is red, and then tell us why you cannot ask an analogous science based question about something you are calling 'subjective'?

Yes, the color red is an objective thing because one can examine it outside of the observation. But does that mean the observation is objective or subjective? Generally we divide those two categories up into 'feelings' and 'observations'. And I'm not suggesting we abandon those categories as they are useful in many cases. But why is one brain function 'special' and one not? They are both brain functions and have qualitatively similar aspects.

I think that those drives are overlapping and competing. How do the drives and behavior influences differ for deciding something you are calling 'subjective', and deciding something like what to eat for your next dinner?

If, as you’ve indicated earlier in this thread, you are using the term “drive” as a substitute for ‘intrinsic good’ (post 656) , then you are saying here what I and several others have been saying along. That science cannot determine what we value intrinsically.

I repeat, put in those terms, it's obvious that of course science can.

You've misinterpreted me. I was using 'determine' in the sense of 'cause' rather than 'find out'. I can understand the misreading though. Consider the following:

A study determines the majority of humans believe murder (not war, not self defense, but murder) is wrong. Extensive research determines what makes people murderers. It turns out to take brain damage or severe psychological stress to make someone a murderer.

Add to that some of Jane Goodall's work that only after years of observation did she find a serial infant killer among the chimpanzees in the community she was observing.

Can we say from this extensive data that murder is considered immoral by humans unless they have been brain damaged in some way?

Piggy

20th October 2010, 09:58 PM

Add to that some of Jane Goodall's work that only after years of observation did she find a serial infant killer among the chimpanzees in the community she was observing.

Can we say from this extensive data that murder is considered immoral by humans unless they have been brain damaged in some way?

Cub-killing females are also known among lions. Normal females excommunicate the cub-killer and will murder her if they get the chance.

Ivor the Engineer

21st October 2010, 01:50 AM

Oh, but it is.

For example, the problems which needed to be answered regarding a geocentric universe were solved by understanding that the solar system is heliocentric.

<snip>

Actually all that did was make the mathematics required to answer some questions to a particular degree of accuracy simpler by picking a 'better' frame of reference.

Ivor the Engineer

21st October 2010, 02:41 AM

<snip>

When he says that science can tell us what we ought to value, he is not assuming that we all want well-being (it's a tautology that we do). Nor is he ignoring the fact that "well-being" differs from person to person. (Bundy's definition of well-being included regularly kidnapping, raping, torturing, murdering, and mutilating women, for example.)

But he is acknowledging that, by and large, at a very basic level, our species does tend to converge on an accepted vision of well-being, which includes not starving, not being denied autonomy, not having unnecessary pain inflicted on us, and so forth.

And that is absolutely true.

So, given that fact -- just as we grant the fact the the universe exists -- can science tell us what we ought to value?

The answer is "Yes", regardless of the fact that science does not determine our drives nor, by and large, our desires.

<snip>

1) What we believe are the facts about what is affect what we think we ought to do.

Not controversial.

2) Well-being is a distribution and differs for every person, but science can be used to draw non-arbitrary sharp lines on it after we assert what the acceptable spread of well-being ought to be and pretending these assertions are facts determined using the methods of science.

That's just a dishonest way to try to sneak in oughts.

For example, when the assertion "not being denied autonomy" is part of what constitutes well-being is made, it sounds very much like you and Mr. Harris are claiming individualism is morally superior to collectivism, which is ironic given that he wants to narrow down what every individual on the planet ought to want/do to become more uniform!

Ivor the Engineer

21st October 2010, 04:33 AM

<snip>

Consider the following:

A study determines the majority of humans believe murder (not war, not self defense, but murder) is wrong. Extensive research determines what makes people murderers. It turns out to take brain damage or severe psychological stress to make someone a murderer.

Add to that some of Jane Goodall's work that only after years of observation did she find a serial infant killer among the chimpanzees in the community she was observing.

Can we say from this extensive data that murder is considered immoral by humans unless they have been brain damaged in some way?

Can we say from the millions that were killed in the holocaust that many, many people can become murderers and believe they are doing something which is morally acceptable if someone with authority tells them to do it?

Ivor the Engineer

21st October 2010, 04:54 AM

How is well-being different from health? The WHO definition of health is:

Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.

Ivor the Engineer

21st October 2010, 05:02 AM

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/arts/books/article1749441.ece

How would a scientific approach bolster your argument?

A science of human well-being would be part of a maturing science of the human mind. Just as advances in medicine have ended certain arguments about the origins of disease, without really seeking such rhetorical effects, advances in psychology and neuroscience could change the way we think about our own subjectivity and the possibilities of finding happiness in this life. Imagine how our view of the human condition would change if we ever found a cure for racism, xenophobia and other forms of bigotry. What if there were perfectly safe ways to increase feelings of compassion and altruism? I think interventions of this sort – pharmacological and otherwise – are probably in our future. Neuro-imaging technology could also change our lives profoundly. We will probably develop reliable lie detectors, so that when the truth really matters, it will be impossible for a person to lie. This will change politics and diplomacy rather profoundly. There is no telling how developments of this kind could put pressure on popular beliefs.

Has he gone totally insane?

Has his hatred of Islam turned him into a fundamentalist loon?

Who here is going to defend the above?

AlBell

21st October 2010, 05:20 AM

There is a thing called History, American History for one, you should read up on it.

You should try living in the world today rather than lamenting days long past.

Paulhoff

21st October 2010, 05:45 AM

You should try living in the world today rather than lamenting days long past.

You should try to learn from the past, 9-11 comes to mind, and the mass murders in Africa, Asia, and also in Europe during WWII.

Also tell you employer not to pay you for last week’s work, seeing that it is in the pass

So I guess you think we should just burn all the history books.

Paul

:) :) :)

Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

AlBell

21st October 2010, 06:32 AM

=Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
Oh, now we've switched to mans' inhumanity to man.

Perhaps Science under Harris/Piggy will refrain from supplying ever-more-effective-at-killing loaded guns to idiots?

But I bet someone gives in to temptation and engineers weaponized air-borne ebola that targets a specific genetic racial profile, or something even more target specific and effective.

Piggy

21st October 2010, 06:32 AM

Actually all that did was make the mathematics required to answer some questions to a particular degree of accuracy simpler by picking a 'better' frame of reference.

Oooookay

Piggy

21st October 2010, 06:52 AM

Well-being is a distribution and differs for every person, but science can be used to draw non-arbitrary sharp lines on it after we assert what the acceptable spread of well-being ought to be and pretending these assertions are facts determined using the methods of science.

That's just a dishonest way to try to sneak in oughts.

For example, when the assertion "not being denied autonomy" is part of what constitutes well-being is made, it sounds very much like you and Mr. Harris are claiming individualism is morally superior to collectivism, which is ironic given that he wants to narrow down what every individual on the planet ought to want/do to become more uniform!

Nobody is advocating the drawing of "sharp lines" -- see my previous discussion about the atmosphere and outer space, for example.

Also, we don't have to make a judgment about the "acceptable" spread of well-being. That's not at all how the process works.

First, we understand as best we can what it is that makes us happy and healthy. True, there is individual variation, but no determination needs to be made at that level (just as no determination needs to be made at the individual level for us to determine that human beings have two legs). This can be done scientifically -- in fact, should be done scientifically.

Because we share a common biology, we are certain to find that there are core common denominators. And, in fact, this is what we do find.

We can then use science to help us make choices about what we ought to do in order to make things, in Harris's words, "better".

This is what it comes down to -- your scenario is a gross misrepresentation.

And the philosophical isms don't matter here. Arguing on the level of isms is pointless.

The purpose is not to devise some Grand Universal Ism, but to solve problems, to make choices.

Using one of Harris's examples, should educated people in the USA, for example, simply take the view that forcing women to wear burkas and denying them education and a political voice -- and physically punishing them if they disobey -- is morally neutral, just another way of organizing a culture that's no better or worse than any other?

No.

Why?

Because of facts about human nature. Being subjected to another person's will without your consent, having your reproductive choice curtailed, and having your autonomy and freedom of movement and association unduly restrained is not what tends to make people happy, does not tend to foster their well-being.

That's not a value judgment. That's an observation about the world, about the brains of one particular species.

And it also does not require a value judgment for us to identify happiness, health, and other aspects of well-being as a basic component to how humans conceive of morality.

What science can do is to clarify the in/out-group question (e.g., are blacks inferior and therefore deserving of slavery?), our beliefs about reality (e.g., can witches really put hexes on people?), and other parts of the values equation.

And this is all that is necessary for it to be true that science can tell us what we ought to value.

It's no different from getting the results of the soil samples back from the extension agent. By telling you what is real, science can tell you what you ought to do, given the facts about what it is we want.

Piggy

21st October 2010, 06:55 AM

Who here is going to defend the above?

Yeah, that's over the top. I think he is failing to think that particular question out to its full extent. When you start talking about giving people the power to intervene in people's minds, watch out. That kind of well-meaning idealism is extremely dangerous.

Beth

21st October 2010, 08:21 AM

I come back to what I asked before, if these processes are not part of the physical Universe, then where do these values come from? Pixie dust sprinkled into the eyes of newborns? Magic sky Daddy wand waving? I simply fail to see the alternative here.Who here has suggested that Pixie dust or magic wands are involved? Who has suggested that it is NOT part of the physical universe? Why the disparaging remarks?They were not intended to be disparaging. Of course no one has suggested Pixie dust. I find it hard to believe that the use of such terminology isn’t meant to disparage the view that you are disagreeing with. If that was not your intention, why did you use those terms?
The problem is people are not looking at the consequences of carving out a special subjective section of the Universe and calling it outside the realm of science. The comment was an attempt to point out that once you carve out your 'special pleading (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/specplea.html)', you need to explain it. There are 20 pages of posts in this thread alone explaining why people feel that this area lies outside the boundaries of science.
It would seem many here agree our subjective consciousness is indeed part of the physical Universe. People agree, it would seem, that one can use science to observe and describe all the components of the subjective consciousness. There is a belief, one I share, that we can use science to eventually observe and describe all the physical components that correlate with subjective experience. We can also use science to establish what different human beings appear to agree upon with regard to subjective experience. That is not quite the same thing.
But when I've tried to point out that people were arguing a 'special pleading' for subjective consciousness that they were not applying to something such as color vision, my challenge goes unheeded. The challenge has been answered repeatedly in many threads. The subjective/objective division is well established even if not as clearly delineated as some think. That does not mean that science cannot be applied, but it does imply that the study of subjective intangibles suffer limitations that don’t apply to physical objects of study. You may call it 'special pleading' if you want but please stop claiming that no one has answered your question as to why it is considered different.

Yes. I think one way to describe the process of science is as a decision making process. Why do you think that would be a false description? I don't think it would be a terribly complete description, but it could be flowcharted at a fairly high level. Is describing the taxonomy of life on Earth answering a question, Yes.
or does the description simply provide the data for answering various questions? These are not mutually exclusive. The search for answers never ends because every answer leads to more questions.
Do we need the questions to describe the taxonomy of life using the scientific method? Yes. What is science if it cannot be described as the search for answers to various questions? A scientific hypothesis to be tested is essentially a question formulated to facilitate finding an accurate and verifiable answer.

Or if you don't like that analogy, how about asking a science based question about one's decision that a color you are looking at is red, and then tell us why you cannot ask an analogous science based question about something you are calling 'subjective'? Who is saying you cannot ask analogous questions? We can ask about any thing, whether physical or intangible, and use scientific methods to try and determine the 'is' that exists. That isn't a contentious issue - at least not on this thread. :p
Yes, the color red is an objective thing because one can examine it outside of the observation. But does that mean the observation is objective or subjective? Generally we divide those two categories up into 'feelings' and 'observations'. And I'm not suggesting we abandon those categories as they are useful in many cases. But why is one brain function 'special' and one not? They are both brain functions and have qualitatively similar aspects. The result of one of those brain functions can be verified independently by other people and/or instruments designed to sense the same things. The results of the other brain function cannot be verified independently. The best we can do is try to establish the level of consistency between people and the distribution of their responses. I think that is sufficient to justify the 'special pleading' as you describe it.
If, as you’ve indicated earlier in this thread, you are using the term “drive” as a substitute for ‘intrinsic good’ (post 656) , then you are saying here what I and several others have been saying along. That science cannot determine what we value intrinsically.
I repeat, put in those terms, it's obvious that of course science can.
You've misinterpreted me. I was using 'determine' in the sense of 'cause' rather than 'find out'. I can understand the misreading though. Consider the following:
A study determines the majority of humans believe murder (not war, not self defense, but murder) is wrong. Extensive research determines what makes people murderers. It turns out to take brain damage or severe psychological stress to make someone a murderer.
Add to that some of Jane Goodall's work that only after years of observation did she find a serial infant killer among the chimpanzees in the community she was observing.
Can we say from this extensive data that murder is considered immoral by humans unless they have been brain damaged in some way?

No. When you claim science tells us that murderers either have brain damage or severe psychological stress while specifically leaving out situations such as war and self-defense, you are dealing only with a subset of murderers. How I interpret the research would be that it takes brain damage or severe psychological stress for most normal people to commit certain types of murder – i.e. killing in situations when there are strong cultural taboos against it. I have no idea if Mafia hitmen or KGB assassins would fit into that mold. Should James Bond be considered a brain damaged individual?

Ivor brought up the individuals who participated in the holocaust as one example. Abortion is another. What about deliberate inaction that will result in a death? What about assisted suicide? Does the research establish that people who do not find such acts immoral are brain damaged or under extreme stress? I suppose, the argument could be made depending on the definitions of 'extreme stress' or 'brain damage', but it is not established by the results of the research you cited.

Science can only tell us about the distribution of what human beings actually value. It gives us information on the ‘is’. No one is disputing this. It does not establish what vision of the future we should strive for. That is what people are saying is outside of science.

Science can inform us about the costs and benefits of various taboos about certain types of killing. For example, there is now research indicating that legalizing abortion led to a drop in crime 20 years later. I don’t see this as being an example of science determining our values, but providing information that allows us to better assess the consequences of that particular social policy regarding that type of killing in order to align our policies with our actual values.

However, you might feel that it is an example of science determining our values. If so, that would be where our disagreement lies.

Dragoonster

21st October 2010, 06:49 PM

Yeah, that's over the top. I think he is failing to think that particular question out to its full extent. When you start talking about giving people the power to intervene in people's minds, watch out. That kind of well-meaning idealism is extremely dangerous.

Piggy I appreciate your determination in this thread even though we disagree on most points.

But to this, how else would you, or Harris, be able to ensure that humans followed whatever science tells us "well-being" is?

I agree that most humans have common grounds on morality, but even when this is already understood or accepted (and wouldn't be anymore understood by science), humans both individually and collectively break their own morality. In wartime great atrocities are done, in normal life crimes and abuses against others happens very frequently.

If a particular society or individual understands that it's immoral to murder based on race/gender/ideology for example, but does so anyway, how would science stop him/it from doing so? Even if science proved that what they're doing is irrational, and harmful to their own well-being as well as their victims, why would they stop?

I can't remember if it was this thread or some other argument elsewhere about this topic, but I'm reminded of addicts. I'm addicted to nicotine, others to alcohol and other drugs, food, etc. Many/most of us realize our addictions are going against our well-being, and often the well-being of our loved ones and our society. But no amount of objective findings of fact would make a big dent in our addictions, because we already know they're indefensible.

And it isn't just a matter of bringing theists over to a scientific-based/evaluated morality, which would be extremely difficult. Secularists too have preconditioned beliefs, and atavistic urges they can't simply "think or science away".

It may ultimately be an illusion that science can't eliminate philosophy or moral philosophy by providing all answers. But it will still be an illusion to individuals--who simply cannot reason away their emotions. Despite a visual mirage not being real, the mind sees it as real. Despite a person's particular idea of morality not being real or "scientifically-wellbeingly justified", I don't see how the individual will completely escape his particular "illusion", because he believes what he believes.

Or another analogy--Let's say science discovers the exact reasons and explanations for consciousness, as an illusion of perception by a being (us) that otherwise is no different than a rock or tree. But knowing that our consciousness, or decisions and free will, are illusions, is not going to stop us from believing (or acting as if) we exist as independent entities. Knowing our moralities are illusions won't likely make most of us stop believing we have a personal sense of right and wrong.

So, the only way I can see science actually affecting well-being (on as grand a scale as Harris would seem to like) is one of four general ways:

1. A PR/educational/propaganda/social conditioning campaign that may have to start from birth to prevent former generations from exposing their children to non-scientific morals.

2. The chemical and brain-surgery approach in the above.

3. Genetic engineering/eugencis/extermination of people with brains who cling to their old non-scientific thinking.

4. A ton of new laws that make it illegal to do ANYTHING that doesn't improve the overall well-being of the collective (compliance through coercian, that doesn't solve the root problem of individuals having disagreeing morals, but is aimed at eliminating them as a factor in preventing the scientific moralists from achieving their utopia).

This is kind of long so to sort of sum up: I don't see anything particularly new about what Harris is proposing, particularly after reading others in the thread point to earlier examples of his ideas. I also don't see anything new in how he plans to achieve his goals/bend individuals or societies to scientific morality. The "how do we make sure everyone complies" is perhaps a wall Harris' hopes can't get beyond without some extremely fascist policies. So the alternative is simply putting his theories out there, and hopefully enough people grok it and agree with it that it starts a movement or influences society towards a scientific approach over generations. But in that case it doesn't seem unlike any other morality-establishing endeavor over the course of history, and no more likely to take a long-term hold.

Are there other ways to convince others (individuals or future generations) to drastically shift their moralities from religious faith, or secular moral relativism, or etc. to scientific morality?

Skeptic Ginger

21st October 2010, 06:59 PM

Can we say from the millions that were killed in the holocaust that many, many people can become murderers and believe they are doing something which is morally acceptable if someone with authority tells them to do it?Absolutely. So in retrospect, were all Germans guilty? Just those who actually carried out murders? Just the leaders?

You could claim that a randomly (or not so randomly) selected jury, select judges (and then what qualifications do you think apply?) are the best people to decide the answers to those questions.

Or you could apply the science of behavior, of norms, of why do people follow mob rule, of what makes people fall prey to leaders like Hitler, and arrive at much fairer answers as to whom and how much blame to apply.

Piggy

21st October 2010, 07:09 PM

Piggy I appreciate your determination in this thread even though we disagree on most points.

But to this, how else would you, or Harris, be able to ensure that humans followed whatever science tells us "well-being" is?

Oh, I don't that can be done.

In fact, I don't think there's really any hope that any branch of applied science will actually take up the task of attempting to determine what we ought to value and then generating policy, even if Harris is dead-on-the-money right.

So, the only way I can see science actually affecting well-being (on as grand a scale as Harris would seem to like) is one of four general ways:

1. A PR/educational/propaganda/social conditioning campaign that may have to start from birth to prevent former generations from exposing their children to non-scientific morals.

2. The chemical and brain-surgery approach in the above.

3. Genetic engineering/eugencis/extermination of people with brains who cling to their old non-scientific thinking.

4. A ton of new laws that make it illegal to do ANYTHING that doesn't improve the overall well-being of the collective (compliance through coercian, that doesn't solve the root problem of individuals having disagreeing morals, but is aimed at eliminating them as a factor in preventing the scientific moralists from achieving their utopia).

This is kind of long so to sort of sum up: I don't see anything particularly new about what Harris is proposing, particularly after reading others in the thread point to earlier examples of his ideas. I also don't see anything new in how he plans to achieve his goals/bend individuals or societies to scientific morality. The "how do we make sure everyone complies" is perhaps a wall Harris' hopes can't get beyond without some extremely fascist policies. So the alternative is simply putting his theories out there, and hopefully enough people grok it and agree with it that it starts a movement or influences society towards a scientific approach over generations. But in that case it doesn't seem unlike any other morality-establishing endeavor over the course of history, and no more likely to take a long-term hold.

Are there other ways to convince others (individuals or future generations) to drastically shift their moralities from religious faith, or secular moral relativism, or etc. to scientific morality?

I think you're correct there, except that I do see successes.

For example, the doctrines of racial inferiority/purity, gender inferiority, homosexuality as a disease, creationism, or for that matter geocentrism, have all eroded over time as the new paradigm slowly pervaded science-oriented cultures.

It happens at its own pace.

And we're seeing it now with the value of environmentalism. Throughout the early- and mid-20th century, it was primarily the realm of those who felt a "spiritual connection to the land" and that kind of thing, at least on the popular level. But science is now convincing folks who have no such warm fuzzies for wilderness (which is really quite brutal and uncaring) that the disappearance of species, deforestation, pollution, warming, disruption of water systems, and such is a real danger, so environmentalism is entering their value systems, too.

What Harris really appears to be arguing against is cultural relativism, which is already a failed doctrine, but it does linger so.

It's the still-hot embers of this factually incorrect view of the world which cause many in academia to balk at drawing obvious conclusions, such as that certain practices of neo-traditional Islam are bad for human well-being, even though they wouldn't hesitate to say that the anti-vaccine movement is bad for human well-being.

Harris appears to be attempting to pour mud on those embers in an attempt to get them to die faster.

Dragoonster

21st October 2010, 07:46 PM

I think you're correct there, except that I do see successes.

For example, the doctrines of racial inferiority/purity, gender inferiority, homosexuality as a disease, creationism, or for that matter geocentrism, have all eroded over time as the new paradigm slowly pervaded science-oriented cultures.

It happens at its own pace.

And we're seeing it now with the value of environmentalism. Throughout the early- and mid-20th century, it was primarily the realm of those who felt a "spiritual connection to the land" and that kind of thing, at least on the popular level. But science is now convincing folks who have no such warm fuzzies for wilderness (which is really quite brutal and uncaring) that the disappearance of species, deforestation, pollution, warming, disruption of water systems, and such is a real danger, so environmentalism is entering their value systems, too.

Very good examples!

This explanation makes me agree with your (I think it was yours, my memory is awful) argument about geocentrism's questions being eliminated by science.

What Harris really appears to be arguing against is cultural relativism, which is already a failed doctrine, but it does linger so.

It's the still-hot embers of this factually incorrect view of the world which cause many in academia to balk at drawing obvious conclusions, such as that certain practices of neo-traditional Islam are bad for human well-being, even though they wouldn't hesitate to say that the anti-vaccine movement is bad for human well-being.

Harris appears to be attempting to pour mud on those embers in an attempt to get them to die faster.

Hm, I almost hestitate here because this may be off topic, but I have some problems with this. First, again, there's an assumption that well-being should be a (the) desired goal of all humans and socieities, which I think we've done enough arguing about ;) but which I don't see any given basis for by Harris.

But second, I personally don't think moral and cultural relativism is factually incorrect. It's simply pragmatically incorrect if one wants to design a working humanly-universal moral system. The reason I or many in the Western world think moral relativism is bunk (and perhaps the reasons some in the Islamic/North Korean/etc. world do too from their relative perspective) is because we think our moral system is better than theirs. At that/this point morals becomes a bit more about how well one society can influence/invade/coerce others, than any rational justifications of why theirs is actually better.

But I may be wrong; if Harris is right I'm certainly wrong. My only objection or question at that point would again be--what if science shows us that something the West/Harris detests actually promotes well-being better than the alternative? Such as burkas; if science showed subjugating females gave a 0.01% increase over overall well-being for humans (which of course includes men) than not subjugating, would Harris let that stand, or would he shift his goalposts, putting more emphasis on individual well-being over social/global well-being average in his calculus, so that his approach can give him the pre-set moral system he entered with, where women aren't forced to wear burkas?

And on that point, one objection I've read elsewhere is that Harris doesn't define well-being enough vis a vis whether it should be "best average well-being", "most individuals with most well-being", "least individuals with least well-being" or what. Since his approach and goal is sort of utilitarianistic, I think it's important he define exactly what the goal is, and whom if any of us should accept subduing our objections or moral quirks in order to achieve that goal for those he thinks it's intended for.

Prometheus

21st October 2010, 10:58 PM

<snip>

--what if science shows us that something the West/Harris detests actually promotes well-being better than the alternative? Such as burkas; if science showed subjugating females gave a 0.01% increase over overall well-being for humans (which of course includes men) than not subjugating, would Harris let that stand, or would he shift his goalposts, putting more emphasis on individual well-being over social/global well-being average in his calculus, so that his approach can give him the pre-set moral system he entered with, where women aren't forced to wear burkas?

<snip>

An interesting twist on the case of the burka was revealed to me by my female college students in Dubai. They don't see the burka itself as an example of repression, but as one of their few available weapons for combatting that repression. Young women are generally chaperoned in public by male family members. When they wish to evade their chaperone and get away for a tryst with their boyfriends, they make an appointment with a hairdresser or some other establishment that only women are allowed to enter, so the chaperone waits outside the entrance. Their brother or uncle or whoever drives them there, is actually unable to identify his own family member under a burka except for her shoes and scarf, so she carries an extra pair of shoes and a different scarf in her handbag, walks into the hairdresser, changes these accessories, and walks right back out past her unsuspecting chaperone. After her tryst she returns to the hairdresser and changes shoes again before returning to her chaperone. :cool:

The really strange part, to me, is that it seems all the young men are aware that their own girlfriends are doing this in order to meet with them, but none ever seem to make the connection of suspecting their own sisters.... :boggled:

fls

22nd October 2010, 05:41 AM

But I may be wrong; if Harris is right I'm certainly wrong. My only objection or question at that point would again be--what if science shows us that something the West/Harris detests actually promotes well-being better than the alternative? Such as burkas; if science showed subjugating females gave a 0.01% increase over overall well-being for humans (which of course includes men) than not subjugating, would Harris let that stand, or would he shift his goalposts, putting more emphasis on individual well-being over social/global well-being average in his calculus, so that his approach can give him the pre-set moral system he entered with, where women aren't forced to wear burkas?

I think this is the wrong end of the stick. It is being treated as though Harris is suggesting that science can describe those things which provide well-being so that a model for maximal well-being can be formed against which all practices can be compared. This would be like claiming that a model diet can be described, which then makes it obvious that this would be a somewhat nonsensical approach. Harris even uses this food analogy to specify that this is not what he is suggesting.

Instead Harris seems to be asking, "if we can describe which eating practices are associated with longer lives, less infirmity, and provide pleasurable experiences, how does that leave us unable to suggest that those eating practices are healthy?"

And on that point, one objection I've read elsewhere is that Harris doesn't define well-being enough vis a vis whether it should be "best average well-being", "most individuals with most well-being", "least individuals with least well-being" or what. Since his approach and goal is sort of utilitarianistic, I think it's important he define exactly what the goal is, and whom if any of us should accept subduing our objections or moral quirks in order to achieve that goal for those he thinks it's intended for.

I like this. Harris is criticized for not admitting to taking a utilitarian approach and criticized for failing to provide the information necessary for a utilitarian approach, yet it doesn't seem to occur to anyone to question their assumption of utilitarianism. :)

Linda

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 10:09 AM

An interesting twist on the case of the burka was revealed to me by my female college students in Dubai. They don't see the burka itself as an example of repression, but as one of their few available weapons for combatting that repression.

In that case, tho, the burka is simply a loophole. It's like saying "I really like this brand of handcuffs because they're easy to slip out of at night so I can move around my cell while the guards aren't looking".

The question is not whether burkas may offer unintentional loopholes to the oppressed.

The question is about the practice of forcing women to wear a burka, and punishing them if they disobey.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 10:12 AM

But second, I personally don't think moral and cultural relativism is factually incorrect. It's simply pragmatically incorrect if one wants to design a working humanly-universal moral system.

In practice, it is factually incorrect, tho maybe that's for another thread.

For instance, the claim that gender identity is a social construct has been debunked, in part by the results of truly tragic cases -- such as the Brenda case -- caused by the actions of people who believed the claim.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 10:17 AM

My only objection or question at that point would again be--what if science shows us that something the West/Harris detests actually promotes well-being better than the alternative? Such as burkas; if science showed subjugating females gave a 0.01% increase over overall well-being for humans (which of course includes men) than not subjugating, would Harris let that stand, or would he shift his goalposts, putting more emphasis on individual well-being over social/global well-being average in his calculus, so that his approach can give him the pre-set moral system he entered with, where women aren't forced to wear burkas?

And on that point, one objection I've read elsewhere is that Harris doesn't define well-being enough vis a vis whether it should be "best average well-being", "most individuals with most well-being", "least individuals with least well-being" or what. Since his approach and goal is sort of utilitarianistic, I think it's important he define exactly what the goal is, and whom if any of us should accept subduing our objections or moral quirks in order to achieve that goal for those he thinks it's intended for.

I pretty much agree w/ fls on this point.

But I would add that moral decisions always have to take multiple factors -- facts, desires, outcomes -- into account. So an average increase in well-being (going w/ your hypothetical that we could calculate it) might not be a good thing if it meant a big boost for a few and a drop for most.

It's like the old joke, if you're in a room with Bill Gates, congratulations -- on average, you're a billionaire!

Disparity has negative consequences. E.g., the income disparities leading up to the Great Depression and the current Great Recession.

Prometheus

22nd October 2010, 10:36 AM

AlBell

22nd October 2010, 10:42 AM

At best he is indicating an outcomes-based approach (and even that is questionable), but there are other outcomes-based approaches than utility.
Linda
What do you have in mind?

Well, neither, really.

I know, I said I'd lurk, but clearly I did not connect the dots well enough in my previous post -- it really was my mistake.

...

So I repeat that if you agree that science can change our reality and our beliefs -- which no one here denies -- then you must also agree that science has the power to tell us what we ought to value.
Actually no.

But then, there's another level of inquiry, which involves drawing conclusions from those studies, and making recommendations regarding what we ought to do in light of our findings.

Should we use controlled burns or not?

Should we introduce genetically modified, pest-resistant crops or not?

Should we use no-till or not?

Should we introduce predator species to new territories or not?

Should we attempt to eradicate pine beetles or let them run their course?

Science can inform the answers to these questions -- in fact, science is instrumental in answering these questions -- even though those answers depend on a level of inquiry at which those questions are not asked.
Yup, just as soon as some not-scientific 'oughts' are defined so any analysis can proceed.

It's much the same when it comes to a scientific approach to morality. There is one level of inquiry at which we do not ask what we ought to do; but there is another level of inquiry at which we can, and do, ask what to do.
Not without pre-selecting those 'oughts'.

=It would seem many here agree our subjective consciousness is indeed part of the physical Universe. People agree, it would seem, that one can use science to observe and describe all the components of the subjective consciousness.

At this moment, no. Probably never. Sure we can identify, track and describe various correlates to subjective consciousness.

It's no different from getting the results of the soil samples back from the extension agent. By telling you what is real, science can tell you what you ought to do, given the facts about what it is we want.
How can you continue to ignore that's the 'oughts'? :confused:

Instead Harris seems to be asking, "if we can describe which eating practices are associated with longer lives, less infirmity, and provide pleasurable experiences, how does that leave us unable to suggest that those eating practices are healthy?"
No problem. Too bad this isn't a moral question.

Kuko 4000

22nd October 2010, 11:01 AM

That said, Dubai is a lot more liberal than other places in the region, and I did not witness much of that sort of oppression there.

This reminded me of something from Dubai and here it is:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8602449.stm

A British man and woman jailed in Dubai for kissing in public have lost their appeal against their conviction.

The pair were arrested in November after a local woman accused them of breaking the country's decency laws by kissing on the mouth in a restaurant.
:boggled:

Prometheus

22nd October 2010, 11:19 AM

This reminded me of something from Dubai and here it is:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8602449.stm

:boggled:

They only got a month in jail? Well, like I said, Dubai is a lot more liberal than other places in the region.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 12:13 PM

I know. I brought it up because I think it speaks to the issue of how values can be changed by outside influences. I think of it kind of like how a long term prisoner can come to be dependent on the prison. Some Muslim women are quite vehement in their opinion that they do not want to give up the burka. It gives them a feeling of safety--a barrier between them and the men who they know think of them as inferior.

That said, Dubai is a lot more liberal than other places in the region, and I did not witness much of that sort of oppression there. In fact, probably only about 10% of the women there wear a full burka most of the time. Even my students who did wear one in public would remove it upon entering my classroom.

True, true.

And of course a burka is not oppressive if it's freely chosen.

That's why I think it's a different type of oppression for France to ban the headscarf in public schools, for instance.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 12:14 PM

Actually no.

Actually, you are correct here. People are perfectly free to be inconsistent in their thinking. My mistake, you do not have to agree with Harris's thesis, even though you agree with its equivalent.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 12:16 PM

Yup, just as soon as some not-scientific 'oughts' are defined so any analysis can proceed.

As I've taken ample time to explain, it does not matter if there are absolute requirements or arbitrary assignments further down the chain. This is why the sloppy use of "ought" -- such as your use here -- needs to be avoided.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 12:17 PM

Not without pre-selecting those 'oughts'..

See above.

If you want to discuss this with me, please use language that's precise enough to be intelligible.

AlBell

22nd October 2010, 12:19 PM

I'd say you are the person attempting Alice-in-Wonderland re-definitions.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 12:20 PM

How can you continue to ignore that's the 'oughts'? :confused:

See above.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 12:22 PM

I'd say you are the person attempting Alice-in-Wonderland re-definitions.

Please read my long post in which I provide much more precise language, and locate "values" properly along the chain of organization.

I can discuss the topic in those terms, or similarly precise terms, but not by simply tossing around the word "ought".

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 12:25 PM

No problem. Too bad this isn't a moral question.

At this point you are wilfully misunderstanding her post, since this was clearly an analogy. And a perfectly good one.

AlBell

22nd October 2010, 01:04 PM

At this point you are wilfully misunderstanding her post, since this was clearly an analogy. And a perfectly good one.
Nope.

Just pointing out which side of NOMA it was on.

And I've mentioned before I don't accept any religious aspect for the not-science side of NOMA. Human thought by itself is on the not-science side; the same place "oughts" reside.

fls

22nd October 2010, 02:02 PM

What do you have in mind?

"Benefit" or "harm" are other commonly used outcomes.

No problem. Too bad this isn't a moral question.

Why not? I asked the same question about health that is asked about morals. Why are we unable to say that something is a healthy practise even if it provides longer life, freedom from infirmity and well-being?

Linda

Beth

22nd October 2010, 02:31 PM

In that case, tho, the burka is simply a loophole. It's like saying "I really like this brand of handcuffs because they're easy to slip out of at night so I can move around my cell while the guards aren't looking".

The question is not whether burkas may offer unintentional loopholes to the oppressed.

The question is about the practice of forcing women to wear a burka, and punishing them if they disobey.

Let's say that we can all agree to this issue. It's generally not an issue in our country. It's an issue in places like Afghanistan. What are we going to do now that we've all agree that forcing this apparel on unwilling women is a bad idea and unhealthy? Should we insist they not insist on it? Should we condemn the practice as barbaric?

Is it possible that that a woman on the streets of Kabul is safer wearing a burka than if she is not? I've heard female correspondents there talk about donning one in order to disguise her western appearance.

Now, a man living in that country not only has his historic cultural background informing him of the proper attire for women AND it raises the risk of bad things happening to the women he loves if they don't. It occurs to me that the the best strategy to promote the well-being of women in that place might be to NOT permit females to go out without one.

It seems to me that the best thing I can do, as an observer who has never visited that country and know next to nothing of what it is like to live there, allow those people the freedom to decide for themselves how they wish to handle the issue of women's dress without condemning their choices.

It wasn't that many decades ago that our own culture was nearly as restrictive in that regard. Perhaps a more reasonable stance would be that the issue isn't really any of our business other than in our own country, where we have very liberal laws about what men and women must wear in public.

For instance, the claim that gender identity is a social construct has been debunked, in part by the results of truly tragic cases -- such as the Brenda case -- caused by the actions of people who believed the claim.

I think you are right on this issue, but I cannot think of any solutions that won't take 50-100 years to change common attitudes. Social change typically takes a long time because each succeeding generation can move one direction or another, but once the mindset of a generation has solidified, it seems very hard to change. However, I think we may be close to 50 years in on this particular issue.

Disparity has negative consequences. E.g., the income disparities leading up to the Great Depression and the current Great Recession.

It also has major benefits - for the part of the population on the top! Even if we all were to agree that this is a 'bad thing', the only solution I am aware of for dealing with this particular problem is revolution - typically a rather bloody solution that only works until the new 'upper crust' grows as corrupt as the old one was.

Dragoonster

22nd October 2010, 02:32 PM

I think this is the wrong end of the stick. It is being treated as though Harris is suggesting that science can describe those things which provide well-being so that a model for maximal well-being can be formed against which all practices can be compared. This would be like claiming that a model diet can be described, which then makes it obvious that this would be a somewhat nonsensical approach. Harris even uses this food analogy to specify that this is not what he is suggesting.

Instead Harris seems to be asking, "if we can describe which eating practices are associated with longer lives, less infirmity, and provide pleasurable experiences, how does that leave us unable to suggest that those eating practices are healthy?"

He is suggesting that, and much, much more imo. As for the analogy, I don't think anyone objects to science noting that some things are healthy, or against well-being, or whatever. Objections here are more about science deciding the value of health and well-being. His attack is on moral relativism, not hyperskeptics questioning nutrition and such. But of course (or I assume everyone would realize this), morality as it exists today is not much like nutrition.

Nutrition will apply to just about every human equally. A better analogy would be psych meds, which affect each human differently; akin to each human having different morality. And "science" doesn't tell us that Zoloft for instance works equally well at equal doses for every human. Because it doesn't. Neither does morality.

I like this. Harris is criticized for not admitting to taking a utilitarian approach and criticized for failing to provide the information necessary for a utilitarian approach, yet it doesn't seem to occur to anyone to question their assumption of utilitarianism. :)

Linda

Are you saying Harris has found a new utilitarianism that no philosopher in the past 4000 years has found? Or that his utilitarianism is somehow more special, objective, or worthy than past ones simply because he bases it on science?

I don't get why skeptics here are giving him a free pass for his incredible vagueness and cherrypicking. If he wants to start a new age of science-morals, and toss philosophy and relativism into the dustbin, he really needs to explain his position and justifications better. Because he's asserting a HUGE paradigm shift in multiple fields (some of which he doesn't seem to understand any more than a high school student).

Beth

22nd October 2010, 02:34 PM

I asked the same question about health that is asked about morals. Why are we unable to say that something is a healthy practise even if it provides longer life, freedom from infirmity and well-being?

Linda

Consider this. All of the research I have seen indicates that being an active member of a church is beneficial in many ways, among them longer life and better health. How do you feel about the "scientific conclusion" that people ought to join churches in order to improve their well-being?

AlBell

22nd October 2010, 02:45 PM

"Benefit" or "harm" are other commonly used outcomes.
I admit I don't understand why you would not consider benefit or not-harm as utilitarian ideals. Harm is tougher as a goal for 'all sentient beings', but would be useful examining subsets of sentient beings in military planning.

Why not? I asked the same question about health that is asked about morals. Why are we unable to say that something is a healthy practise even if it provides longer life, freedom from infirmity and well-being?

Linda
Of course we can say that if facts determine it to be so; establishing those facts is within Science's purview. Just as soon as your "ought" is "study that aspect of things using our limited resources" rather than "study some other aspect of things using those (same) limited resources".

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 05:04 PM

Let's say that we can all agree to this issue. It's generally not an issue in our country. It's an issue in places like Afghanistan. What are we going to do now that we've all agree that forcing this apparel on unwilling women is a bad idea and unhealthy? Should we insist they not insist on it? Should we condemn the practice as barbaric?

Those are excellent questions. Applying science to an issue has a way of focusing attention on the important questions.

If your original question is "Is there anything here for us to look at?", then moving to the question, "Now that we agree on what we're looking at, what should we do?" is an improvement.

And until you get to that point, there's a lot less you can do.

Of course one of the things -- or many of the things, actually -- you can do is screw it up. That option never closes.
And what gets done always depends on the cooperation of so many other factors and practices.

But hopefully, science has a hand in answering those subsequent questions, because it's a darn good tool, used right.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 05:06 PM

I think you are right on this issue, but I cannot think of any solutions that won't take 50-100 years to change common attitudes. Social change typically takes a long time because each succeeding generation can move one direction or another, but once the mindset of a generation has solidified, it seems very hard to change. However, I think we may be close to 50 years in on this particular issue.

Exactly, I mean, what choice do you have? The word's going to spread at its own pace. No matter how you slice it, it's gotta meme its way into people's minds somehow.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 05:09 PM

It also has major benefits - for the part of the population on the top! Even if we all were to agree that this is a 'bad thing', the only solution I am aware of for dealing with this particular problem is revolution - typically a rather bloody solution that only works until the new 'upper crust' grows as corrupt as the old one was.

We'll see. Two whollops like the GD and GR in a century might be enough now to give people pause.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 05:42 PM

He is suggesting that, and much, much more imo. As for the analogy, I don't think anyone objects to science noting that some things are healthy, or against well-being, or whatever. Objections here are more about science deciding the value of health and well-being. His attack is on moral relativism, not hyperskeptics questioning nutrition and such. But of course (or I assume everyone would realize this), morality as it exists today is not much like nutrition.

Nutrition will apply to just about every human equally. A better analogy would be psych meds, which affect each human differently; akin to each human having different morality. And "science" doesn't tell us that Zoloft for instance works equally well at equal doses for every human. Because it doesn't. Neither does morality.

Well, our bodies actually have a pretty wide range of reactions to foods, depending on age, ailments, allergies, physical condition, and such. In each case you've got an abstract model of what they do in "the body" but then you've got what they actually do in our real bodies.

You're right that morality isn't describable as nutrition is right now, but what if it could be? Who says it can't? Since we all share a biology, I'd bet it turns out to be highly measurable.

I think when you're talking about actually attempting to manipulate the system, you're talking kudzu to Georgia, rabbits to Australia, or maybe Maoism and the like.

Applied science, such as it can be said to exist in this case, would indeed value some human practices over others, but it would do so on the basis of a few very broad principles, because that's about all that the patterns of variation will sustain.

Female genital mutilation has been condemned already -- because that's what it amounts to -- by Western medicine, and the definition has recently been expanded.

That's certainly a moral judgment. It seems to be firmly based on a correct understanding of human happiness and suffering, and to reflect a modern understanding of normative human morality in societies that are the healthiest for the greatest percentage of people.

So the application of this idea is already going on.

And science hasn't had to "decide the value of human well-being". It's just provided the perspective about what makes us happy and what makes us suffer, and also about the moral values and actions associated with conditions of greater or lesser happiness and misery.

And once it's done that, if we're at all interested in the question, it leads us inexorably to some answers for what we ought to do and value, and away from other answers.

It's difficult to see how it could lead us to any fine-tuned solutions. There would be too many variables, too little information, to get much more granular than "We will no longer allow female genital mutilation" or "We won't force all women to wear burkas and punish them if they refuse".

But I don't see anything on the level of innoculation programs. Morals just aren't addressable that way.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 05:44 PM

Consider this. All of the research I have seen indicates that being an active member of a church is beneficial in many ways, among them longer life and better health. How do you feel about the "scientific conclusion" that people ought to join churches in order to improve their well-being?

How could you be against allowing it?

Forcing people to go, of course, would be another issue, because another drive comes into play.

Dragoonster

22nd October 2010, 06:11 PM

Well, our bodies actually have a pretty wide range of reactions to foods, depending on age, ailments, allergies, physical condition, and such. In each case you've got an abstract model of what they do in "the body" but then you've got what they actually do in our real bodies.

You're right that morality isn't describable as nutrition is right now, but what if it could be? Who says it can't? Since we all share a biology, I'd bet it turns out to be highly measurable.

It might, in centuries, with a complete map of brainstates and how they inform morals (and a map of every atom in the Universe). But it's not now. Maybe Harris is a pioneer, but as such he's very early for actually advising we take his position seriously. I'd also add that brainstates/consciousness/morals change by the second for each person, as the rest of the Universe affects them. Perhaps in the future scientists will also take that and every atom in the universe into account. But that's wishful thinking right now.

I think when you're talking about actually attempting to manipulate the system, you're talking kudzu to Georgia, rabbits to Australia, or maybe Maoism and the like.

Applied science, such as it can be said to exist in this case, would indeed value some human practices over others, but it would do so on the basis of a few very broad principles, because that's about all that the patterns of variation will sustain.

Female genital mutilation has been condemned already -- because that's what it amounts to -- by Western medicine, and the definition has recently been expanded.

These same broad principles would have to acknowledge that religious morals are more broad than science morals, as Beth noted.

These principles are also fundamentally "populist" in nature. Plenty of talk on female genital mutilation--how about male circumcisions? Is that morally outrageous?

That's certainly a moral judgment. It seems to be firmly based on a correct understanding of human happiness and suffering, and to reflect a modern understanding of normative human morality in societies that are the healthiest for the greatest percentage of people.

So the application of this idea is already going on.

And science hasn't had to "decide the value of human well-being". It's just provided the perspective about what makes us happy and what makes us suffer, and also about the moral values and actions associated with conditions of greater or lesser happiness and misery.

And once it's done that, if we're at all interested in the question, it leads us inexorably to some answers for what we ought to do and value, and away from other answers.

It's difficult to see how it could lead us to any fine-tuned solutions. There would be too many variables, too little information, to get much more granular than "We will no longer allow female genital mutilation" or "We won't force all women to wear burkas and punish them if they refuse".

But I don't see anything on the level of innoculation programs. Morals just aren't addressable that way.

I don't see why it couldn't lead us to fine-tuned solutions. Harris says we cannot/will not with his approach decide whether to have another baby, or whether to invade Iraq, or etc. Why not? Either science can indeed account for all mental states and apply an objective right/wrong to each state and a collective state, or it can't.

If science can't tell us whether we should invade Iraq, how can it tell us whether we should condemn burkas? Both seem in Harris' view to depend on greater understanding of the human brain. If he's going to suggest that scientific understanding of the brain and/or human evolution is good enough for morals, he should also suggest this understanding would be good enough for making all kinds of life decisions, whether having a baby or invading another country. In short--if I held his position I'd be arguing that science should dictate every single choice and effort in all human life. I wouldn't just stop at "morals".

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 06:14 PM

It might, in centuries, with a complete map of brainstates and how they inform morals (and a map of every atom in the Universe). But it's not now. Maybe Harris is a pioneer, but as such he's very early for actually advising we take his position seriously. I'd also add that brainstates/consciousness/morals change by the second for each person, as the rest of the Universe affects them. Perhaps in the future scientists will also take that and every atom in the universe into account. But that's wishful thinking right now.

I don't know how worthwhile it would be to look at brain states. Since you know you can't get very granular with it to begin with, I think it's fine to go with gross measures -- for both happiness and misery, and corresponding moral stances and actions.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 06:16 PM

I don't see why it couldn't lead us to fine-tuned solutions. Harris says we cannot/will not with his approach decide whether to have another baby, or whether to invade Iraq, or etc. Why not? Either science can indeed account for all mental states and apply an objective right/wrong to each state and a collective state, or it can't.

I don't think you'd have to get anywhere near accounting for a catalog of mental states. You'd have as many useful answers as you could get, long before reaching that deep.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 06:20 PM

If science can't tell us whether we should invade Iraq, how can it tell us whether we should condemn burkas?

Since these questions are so different, I don't know of any way to determine which one(s) will actually render a high-confidence answer and which one(s) will be indeterminate, except to actually apply the available science and see what the result is.

Piggy

22nd October 2010, 06:23 PM

These same broad principles would have to acknowledge that religious morals are more broad than science morals, as Beth noted.

These principles are also fundamentally "populist" in nature. Plenty of talk on female genital mutilation--how about male circumcisions? Is that morally outrageous?

There are folks who are anti male circumcision, but that practice doesn't have the dramatic negative effects on a person as female circumcision has in actual practice.

Dragoonster

22nd October 2010, 06:31 PM

I don't know how worthwhile it would be to look at brain states. Since you know you can't get very granular with it to begin with, I think it's fine to go with gross measures -- for both happiness and misery, and corresponding moral stances and actions.

I agree, but since the explanation would not be at the "atomic" level, I don't see why Harris' morality should be accepted any more than any other (assuming all have equally compelling subjective arguments). Religion, humanism, Buddhism, etc. would all seem as apt at defending their morals as being justified by "gross measures". And if there are no finer measures, there's no way to objectively tell them apart.

If science is going to inform morals (and since Harris is a neurologist and suggesting chemical intervention I assume he is indeed championing brainstates), it would seem to HAVE to start at the smallest mote of energy/matter. If it doesn't questions as to its objectivity will always exist.

Beth

22nd October 2010, 09:11 PM

We'll see. Two whollops like the GD and GR in a century might be enough now to give people pause.

I think religion will simply evolve to better suit the needs of people in modern society. It already is.

Those are excellent questions. Applying science to an issue has a way of focusing attention on the important questions. It can. My experience is that engineering does a better job of asking questions we can answer. Those aren't quite the same thing of course. If your original question is "Is there anything here for us to look at?", then moving to the question, "Now that we agree on what we're looking at, what should we do?" is an improvement.

And until you get to that point, there's a lot less you can do.Yes, but once I've looked at it and decided that the best option is to consider it other people's business and not mine, I don't think science is relevant to the question about the morality of it.

Of course one of the things -- or many of the things, actually -- you can do is screw it up. That option never closes.
And what gets done always depends on the cooperation of so many other factors and practices.
But hopefully, science has a hand in answering those subsequent questions, because it's a darn good tool, used right.
Indeed. You are once again repeating the part that everyone agrees with.

How could you be against allowing it? I'm not, of course. But other people have posted such sentiments in this forum. Claims of raising a child to believe in a religion being equivalent to child abuse have appeared here in the past.

Forcing people to go, of course, would be another issue, because another drive comes into play.

Yes, that's the issue that comes into play when Harris starts claiming that science supports certain moral choices.

JJM 777

22nd October 2010, 11:52 PM

being an active member of a church is beneficial in many ways, among them longer life and better health. How do you feel about the "scientific conclusion" that people ought to join churches in order to improve their well-being?
Let us be more generic:

If giving placebo has more positive statistical outcome than not giving anything at all, how do you feel about the "scientific conclusion" that people ought to be given placebo in order to improve their well-being?

In case of religion (or any ideology), the story goes yet further: believers of the ideology might statistically behave better and commit less crimes.

Paulhoff

23rd October 2010, 06:22 AM

I am trying to figure out how morals based on a deity that can be anything one wants it to be and therefore unlimited, is better than morals based on science that is limited by the laws of nature which are therefore limited.

Paul

:) :) :)

fls

23rd October 2010, 06:24 AM

fls

23rd October 2010, 07:40 AM

I admit I don't understand why you would not consider benefit or not-harm as utilitarian ideals. Harm is tougher as a goal for 'all sentient beings', but would be useful examining subsets of sentient beings in military planning.

'Utility' is a relative measure of the extent to which a benefit is offered (or harm is avoided). It is not measured directly, like other outcomes, but is instead derived from the effect the interventions of interest have on outcomes.

Of course we can say that if facts determine it to be so; establishing those facts is within Science's purview. Just as soon as your "ought" is "study that aspect of things using our limited resources" rather than "study some other aspect of things using those (same) limited resources".

There seemed to be agreement that the 'ought' you refer to is a fact about a mental state of conscious creatures. Are you suggesting that we would study aspects which are unrelated to the mental states of conscious creatures, primarily humans, when studying morality? Would you suggest that we study aspects unrelated to the absence of infirmity or disease when studying health?

Linda

Piggy

23rd October 2010, 08:07 AM

I agree, but since the explanation would not be at the "atomic" level, I don't see why Harris' morality should be accepted any more than any other (assuming all have equally compelling subjective arguments). Religion, humanism, Buddhism, etc. would all seem as apt at defending their morals as being justified by "gross measures". And if there are no finer measures, there's no way to objectively tell them apart.

If science is going to inform morals (and since Harris is a neurologist and suggesting chemical intervention I assume he is indeed championing brainstates), it would seem to HAVE to start at the smallest mote of energy/matter. If it doesn't questions as to its objectivity will always exist.

No, it has to go the other way around. We simply don't need an atomic explanation of morality, just as we don't need an atomic explanation of a dog.

The gross measure begins with understanding the common fundamentals of human morality, and why they exist, and how various practices involving moral decisions affect human societies (no matter their location or religion).

We'd look at it the same way we'd look at health habits. What do people do, what are the results, and why? The notion of human cognitive universals is a very useful one, testable and productive, so it would surely build on that.

And, of course, people are in the process of studying morality in a scientific rather than philosophic way.

But making findings doesn't mean it would be a good idea to try to bludgeon people with the conclusions.

Take the Carter Center's efforts to eradicate Guinea worm. They can't just go in and start messing with people's water supplies, although that would work. There's not funding, to begin with, and there's an easier way to do it, and a lot of folks who need to change their practices are reluctant to do so because they're animists, and they don't want to offend the water spirits, or they just can't believe their water source is doing this to them.

So even if we were to come to an agreement on a handful of basic moral values that are associated with greater health and happiness and less misery, and from there if we were able to make some moral declarations, such as "We will not allow female genital mutilation" or "We will not deny any race the right to vote if other races have that right", these decisions would not in themselves lead to specific solutions, of course.

Piggy

23rd October 2010, 08:09 AM

Yes, but once I've looked at it and decided that the best option is to consider it other people's business and not mine, I don't think science is relevant to the question about the morality of it.

So science cannot analyze it if you decide to ignore it?

Beth

23rd October 2010, 09:23 AM

So science cannot analyze it if you decide to ignore it?

No, I said it wasn't relevant.

Ivor the Engineer

23rd October 2010, 10:52 AM

Are people who fall on (say) the autistic spectrum mentally deficient or neurodiverse?

Dragoonster

23rd October 2010, 12:53 PM

How does measuring the value of health and well-being turn into deciding the value of health and well-being?

When Harris explicitly says it does, which I quoted a page or two ago.

Are you claiming that morality doesn't apply to every human? That there are some humans to which morals don't apply?

I'm not claiming "morality" and "morals" don't apply to every human (even self-described amoral people have some kind of morality). I'm claiming Harris' specific version of it doesn't. Are you saying every human would accept his science-based moral vision, with the primary goal being "promoting human flourishing and well-being", if we just read his book or understand him? In what way is this different than believing everyone on Earth would be a Christian if they just read the Bible and let Jesus into their hearts?

I'm saying that he is not offering utilitarianism.

Okay, what is he offering? Define "well-being" specifically; whether collective well-being or maximum people with most well-being is the goal, and so on. If it's not utilitarianism, what is it?

You mean besides writing a book which you haven't read?

Linda

I've read critiques of the book which seem to suggest it doesn't contain any better explanation/justification or new arguments that weren't in his TED talk. I'm certainly not going to spend hours of my life reading some amateur philosophers' book that appears very likely to be full of nonsense.

Have you read the Bible? The Koran? The Bhagavad Gita? I haven't but still feel I can call those religions bunk. Same for Harris' science morality.

Ivor the Engineer

23rd October 2010, 01:32 PM

How is it possible measure the value of health and well-being when they are such nebulous concepts?

AlBell

23rd October 2010, 01:40 PM

Plus it's more fun to discuss the immorality of burkas. ;)

Prometheus

23rd October 2010, 02:05 PM

Let us be more generic:

If giving placebo has more positive statistical outcome than not giving anything at all, how do you feel about the "scientific conclusion" that people ought to be given placebo in order to improve their well-being?

In case of religion (or any ideology), the story goes yet further: believers of the ideology might statistically behave better and commit less crimes.

If the difference were great enough to be statistically significant, then it wouldn't be a placebo; if not then it cannot be attributed to the placebo itself rather than, say, measurement error or some other confounding variable. So the proposed conclusion is not correct.

Earthborn

23rd October 2010, 03:09 PM

Are you saying every human would accept his science-based moral vision, with the primary goal being "promoting human flourishing and well-being"In his TED talk he didn't talk about "human flourishing" because he knows that if he does, he's going to be severely criticised by people who think have some moral obligations toward other animals. So he tried to be more inclusive and used the flourishing/well-being of "conscious creatures" as the axiomatic basis for his scientific moral thinking.

I think with that he has painted himself in an even narrower corner. If I were to honestly believe that morality is all about the well-being of conscious creatures, I would be bombing slaughterhouses, as those are places where I firmly believe thousands of conscious creatures are brutally killed, chopped up into pieces and packaged in cellophane. What are the chances that represents a high point in conscious creature flourishing? Close to nil, I'd say; but because I don't accept Sam Harris axiom that morality is about the well being of conscious creatures, I also don't think it is immoral. Actually all this talk about brutally killed chopped up conscious creatures kinda makes me hungry...

It is probably fairly trivial for science to show that for a whole lot of conscious creatures lives would be tremendously improved if humans didn't insist on having so much well-being for themselves.

Apathia

23rd October 2010, 06:33 PM

Sam Harris is coming to my neighborhood on Nov. 5th.
http://www.changinghands.com/event/harris

I haven't consolidated motive to attend yet.
(Reading this thread tends doesn't help.)

Piscivore, how about we attend as the peanut gallery?

Kuko 4000

24th October 2010, 12:51 AM

Sam Harris is coming to my neighborhood on Nov. 5th.

I would go and have questions ready, I like the fact that Harris encourages open criticism and discussion in his talks.

Paulhoff

24th October 2010, 06:13 AM

fls

24th October 2010, 09:33 AM

When Harris explicitly says it does, which I quoted a page or two ago.

I think this is what you are referring to:

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=6459907#post6459907

And again, he explicitly states that this is not what he means. If you propose that by "foundation" he means axioms and that by "well-being" or "flourishing" he is referring to a measure of utility, then questions as to whether we should bomb Iran or have a second child are exactly the kinds of questions you could and would be expected to answer. And he specifically states that this is what he is not saying.

I'm not claiming "morality" and "morals" don't apply to every human (even self-described amoral people have some kind of morality). I'm claiming Harris' specific version of it doesn't. Are you saying every human would accept his science-based moral vision, with the primary goal being "promoting human flourishing and well-being", if we just read his book or understand him? In what way is this different than believing everyone on Earth would be a Christian if they just read the Bible and let Jesus into their hearts?

The question is irrelevant since Harris is clearly not proposing the science-based moral vision you claim whereby we try to describe those things which maximize some arbitrarily chosen utility measure and which contradict our moral choices. Instead he is pointing out that there is no basis for supposing that moral visions are divorced from our conscious experience. By analogy, if 'health' is divorced from any consideration of "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity", then what are we talking about? Where would we think to find an indication of what 'health' ought to be if it was presumed that this 'ought' was inaccessible through an empirical consideration of physical, mental or social well-being?

Okay, what is he offering?
A recognition that the foundation for morals doesn't have to be divorced from what it is that informs us about morals in the first place.

I've read critiques of the book which seem to suggest it doesn't contain any better explanation/justification or new arguments that weren't in his TED talk. I'm certainly not going to spend hours of my life reading some amateur philosophers' book that appears very likely to be full of nonsense.

Have you read the Bible? The Koran? The Bhagavad Gita? I haven't but still feel I can call those religions bunk. Same for Harris' science morality.

I have read the Bible, the Koran, the Book of Mormon, etc. I have discovered that an ability to ridicule and disparage ideas a priori does not really help me to distinguish in advance which ideas are useful and which are not.

Linda

amused

24th October 2010, 03:38 PM

Sorry if someone already posted this link to his Salon interview, but in case not:

http://www.salon.com/books/feature/2010/10/17/sam_harris_interview/

AlBell

24th October 2010, 04:32 PM

Lots about how bad religions are, how good science is, but little concerning morals.

Are we sure Harris knows what the word means?

Apathia

24th October 2010, 05:23 PM

I would go and have questions ready, I like the fact that Harris encourages open criticism and discussion in his talks.

I'm still mulling it over.
I believe I've gotten the gist of his perspective from a number of sources, not just this thread.
There's some overlap with E.O. Wilson's Consilience which I'm presently reading.
(If it were E.O. Wilson at Changing Hands I'd have no ambivalence.)

Apathia

24th October 2010, 05:37 PM

The man can speak for himself, listening to people speak for him isn't the same.

Paul

:) :) :)

Right on that!
Far be it from me to make [example removed] his spokesman.

I guess I need more motivation.
Unfortunately (or fortunately) Piscivore has natural, scientific obligations to his family that evening that trump getting the autograph of a celebrity Atheist.

Kuko 4000

26th October 2010, 12:52 AM

Lots about how bad religions are, how good science is, but little concerning morals.

Are we sure Harris knows what the word means?

Out of interest, I'd like to know what you mean by morals? The more accurate description, the better.

Dragoonster

26th October 2010, 02:06 AM

Out of interest, I'd like to know what you mean by morals? The more accurate description, the better.

Please do ask this same question to Harris. And report back if his answer is anything beyond "the flourishing wellbeing of conscious creatures, because I say so".

Kuko 4000

26th October 2010, 02:18 AM

Of course I will.

Kuko 4000

27th October 2010, 03:11 AM

Dragoonster, while AlBell is surfing other threads, it would be useful / interesting for me to hear what you mean by morals? As clearly and accurately as possible.

Cinorjer

27th October 2010, 04:11 AM

Having way too much time on my hands this morning, I waded through the posts and read what I could find of what Harris is saying. I have to join the camp of people who see a fatal flaw in Harris' premise. By any practical definition, morality at its basic level is simply a cultural and personal sense of right and wrong behavior. This is entirely subjective, varies widely over history and civilizations, and is usually composed of a gooey mix of taught traditions, religious beliefs, cultural and self preservation.

All Harris did was create yet another moral code based on an ill-defined belief in the primacy of the well-being of conscious people, and claimed science supports this. It's as good as any, but no better or worse than morality based on religions or tradition or a sense of racial entitlement. For instance, do the needs of the many trump the needs of the few or the one? Then a starving mother and baby may make moral sense in a practical, science based system. If a city is under seige, for instance, and the remaining food needs to be given to the men who are desperately keeping the invaders from storming in and killing most of them.

In this case, the soldier who takes pity on the woman and gives her a bite of his food is committing a terrible moral sin, according to Harris' own moral code. See, the problem with a science based or any other based moral code is, reality isn't bound by our sense of right and wrong. We impose our morals on reality, which doesn't care one bit about compassion or anything other than the universal law of actions have consequences. Sometimes reality bites us in the ass, if our morals get in the way of survival. But, it's what makes us human.

So Harris is doomed to failure, like all the great philosophers in our past. It is an interesting intellectual exercise, though.

AlBell

27th October 2010, 12:47 PM

By any practical definition, morality at its basic level is simply a cultural and personal sense of right and wrong behavior. This is entirely subjective, varies widely over history and civilizations, and is usually composed of a gooey mix of taught traditions, religious beliefs, cultural and self preservation.
Agreed.

Examples:
Is abortion ok? If yes, is 'in third trimester' ok too?

Is the death penalty ever acceptable punishment?

So Harris is doomed to failure, like all the great philosophers in our past. It is an interesting intellectual exercise, though.
It's a little early to suggest he's a great philosopher. Perhaps you didn't mean your remark to be taken that way, though.

JonathanQuick

27th October 2010, 01:12 PM

Someone please present a list of moral laws which would be accepted in any society, in any country in the world, and state the scientific basis of such laws.

Dragoonster

27th October 2010, 09:10 PM

Dragoonster, while AlBell is surfing other threads, it would be useful / interesting for me to hear what you mean by morals? As clearly and accurately as possible.

A claim of good and bad (or right and wrong) actions. Good actions are allowable, bad actions are not.

JonathanQuick

27th October 2010, 10:07 PM

A claim of good and bad (or right and wrong) actions. Good actions are allowable, bad actions are not.

Obviously that settles THAT.

Good actions are good. Bad actions... well, they're bad.

Who knew it was so simple.

Dragoonster

27th October 2010, 10:41 PM

Obviously that settles THAT.

Good actions are good. Bad actions... well, they're bad.

Who knew it was so simple.

The definition of "morals" seems that simple, yes. You have a better definition?

Cinorjer

28th October 2010, 03:00 AM

It really is that simple. A sense of Good versus bad actions. Right versus wrong behavior. Every culture, society and individual has this. Even a sociopath has a simple "If it makes me happy, it's good" morality. People and even cultures don't live up to their own moral code all the time, of course. That's another topic.

cornsail

28th October 2010, 03:10 AM

I just watched Harris' talk and didn't care for it. He starts off by claiming that science can answer moral questions. Then he brings up the question of whether corporal punishment is a good thing. Here I'm expecting him to bring up some scientific studies which show the ill effects of corporal punishment on children in later life. Naw. It's obviously bad. Women in burqas? Obviously wrong. Scantily clad women on magazine covers? Probably wrong. Uh... not that I disagree, Sam, but what the hell does that have to do with science answering moral questions? He acts as if his mere act of labeling certain behaviors as bad is revolutionary. If we could just admit that it's okay to do this we could totally change the world. Then he implies that most people aren't willing to admit that the Taliban are morally bad. Um, what? "It's going to take people like us to admit that there are right and wrong answers to questions of human flourishing." (slight paraphrase probably) Who the heck doesn't admit that? Postmodernists? And what does that have to do with science answering moral questions? If you can have a physics expert, why not a moral expert? Okay, well, if he could give an example of what would go into making someone a moral expert then maybe his idea would have some merit.

Boo. Very uninteresting and sold as something it's not.

cornsail

28th October 2010, 03:21 AM

If the difference were great enough to be statistically significant, then it wouldn't be a placebo; if not then it cannot be attributed to the placebo itself rather than, say, measurement error or some other confounding variable. So the proposed conclusion is not correct.

The placebo effect is statistically significant, otherwise we would not call it an effect (or at least an effect that has been supported with evidence). And statistical significance does not require the difference to be a certain order of magnitude. Any difference (no matter how small) could be found to be statistically significant, provided you have the right power (which is determined by variance and sample size). Clinical significance requires a certain magnitude of difference.

cornsail

28th October 2010, 03:22 AM

This thread makes my head hurt. I can't figure out what it is that people are actually disagreeing on. Can anyone help me out?

fls

28th October 2010, 06:03 AM

AlBell

28th October 2010, 06:34 AM

Forcing women to live in cloth sacks or physically abusing our children are examples of actions which seem to contradict our sense of good and bad. It is useful to use science to answer why and how.

Linda
What do you suppose Science might tell the people who think women living in cloth sacks is moral that convinces them it isn't?

As to child abuse, most cultures appear to already agree.

fls

28th October 2010, 06:49 AM

The placebo effect is statistically significant, otherwise we would not call it an effect (or at least an effect that has been supported with evidence).

I realize this is off-topic, but this is one of the reasons why it probably should be called something other than placebo effect. It gives the erroneous impression that there is an effect which can be attributed to placebo, when it really seems to be mostly an artifact of participating in a study plus some effects from expectation. That is, the name doesn't really accurately answer the question of whether there is an effect.

Linda

JonathanQuick

28th October 2010, 06:52 AM

The definition of "morals" seems that simple, yes. You have a better definition?

I defer to your wisdomness.

Now please type out this vaunted list of "morals" that are accepted in every country, in every civilization on earth, and cite the basis for their morality.

It's so SIMPLE for one as wise as you.

fls

28th October 2010, 07:23 AM

What do you suppose Science might tell the people who think women living in cloth sacks is moral that convinces them it isn't?

Do you know of people who think being forced to live in cloth sacks is good?

Linda

AlBell

28th October 2010, 07:55 AM

Do you know of people who think being forced to live in cloth sacks is good?

Linda
Nope. There appear to be 10's of millions if not 100's of millions who do. How again will you Science them out of that belief?

And why isn't clitorectomy the issue better addressed? Also, while we're Scientifically Moralizing, why is killing unborn babies ok?

ps. I personally think Harris etal believe the highest moral good is maximizing booksales and speaking fees.

fls

28th October 2010, 08:27 AM

Nope. There appear to be 10's of millions if not 100's of millions who do. How again will you Science them out of that belief?

If you are talking about muslims, I very much doubt that they think this is good all by itself. It very much seems to be justified as a component of their religion. I'm not talking about bad actions which are justified as good using religion, as an example of a good action.

And why isn't clitorectomy the issue better addressed? Also, while we're Scientifically Moralizing, why is killing unborn babies ok?

The first seems like a reasonable example. The latter is less so, as it is clear that a large number of people don't perceive actions taken against embryos in the same way as actions taken against babies.

ps. I personally think Harris etal believe the highest moral good is maximizing booksales and speaking fees.

:)

Linda

Apathia

28th October 2010, 08:35 AM

ps. I personally think Harris etal believe the highest moral good is maximizing booksales and speaking fees.

Then I just must attend his book signing! :cznerd:

cornsail

28th October 2010, 08:57 AM

I realize this is off-topic, but this is one of the reasons why it probably should be called something other than placebo effect. It gives the erroneous impression that there is an effect which can be attributed to placebo, when it really seems to be mostly an artifact of participating in a study plus some effects from expectation.

How is that not placebo?

cornsail

28th October 2010, 10:07 AM

I think rather than having science tell us which actions are bad or good, he is asking "why would we justify actions which contradict our sense of good and bad, and how do we do so?"

Is he asking or answering? Because it's not a very novel question and there are many obvious answers that spring to mind that he neglects to mention (lust, greed, conformity, fear, apathy, etc). We justify them, because it feels better to do (or have done things) that we feel are justified. I'm not seeing the straw man society he talks about that refuses to admit there's anything wrong with the Taliban. And of course it's unsurprising that his examples are of the "religion makes them do it" variety. It's his schtick. And that's okay. But ironically he doesn't even attempt to back any of it up scientifically.

Forcing women to live in cloth sacks or physically abusing our children are examples of actions which seem to contradict our sense of good and bad. It is useful to use science to answer why and how.

Linda

He wasted most of his talk saying absolutely nothing about science and then threw out some vagueries in closing. I don't get the point of the talk. It was like:

1. Can science answer moral questions? Yes. Even though most people think it can't.
2. The idea that we can't derive an ought from an is is wrong. Don't expect me to tell you why, but making wild claims is a fun way to start a talk.
3. Corporal punishment is bad, just cuz, I mean think about it... Btw, it's religion's fault. What was the topic again?
4. Here's a picture of some pointy white blobs. What if this was like a map of our moral optimization? Cool, huh?
5. Repressing women is bad. The Taliban are bad. People should be willing to admit that the Taliban is bad!
6. Not convinced yet? Well the Taliban aren't experts in physics, right? So why should they be considered experts in morals? See? They suck and we should stop thinking they're so great.
7. What if we had professional moral experts sort of like how we have physics experts? Dude, I'm tripping myself out now.
8. What if we, like, used science to make society better? Rad or what?
9. That's about it. Oh yeah, about science answering moral questions, well uh maybe we can look into the brain one day and figure out how that kind of stuff works and then use that knowledge to improve stuff.
10. **Standing Ovation**

Ivor the Engineer

28th October 2010, 10:54 AM

Prometheus

28th October 2010, 11:17 AM

The placebo effect is statistically significant, otherwise we would not call it an effect (or at least an effect that has been supported with evidence). And statistical significance does not require the difference to be a certain order of magnitude. Any difference (no matter how small) could be found to be statistically significant, provided you have the right power (which is determined by variance and sample size). Clinical significance requires a certain magnitude of difference.

You are correct; I misspoke. The point is that a placebo (http://www.skepdic.com/placebo.html) is, by definition, inert: It objectively has no effect on the condition being treated. Any observed or measurable effect that is noticed is not a result of the placebo treatment per se, but likely a result of some other poorly controlled or overlooked variable.

Cinorjer

28th October 2010, 12:29 PM

If morals are rules of thumb which evolve over time, perhaps a better way to think about this is to say questions that can be answered using moral reasoning can also be answered using scientific reasoning. I.e. we don't always do what we conclude we ought to do, but sometimes do what we want to do based on other payoffs and forms of reasoning.

And here you do touch on a scientific approach to studying morality, and that's applied cognitive psychology. Some rather infamous studies involving people playing prisoner/guard games have shown that our group and personal sense of morality--what is right and wrong behavior--is more elastic than we'd like to believe. But that involves how we develop and apply our moral sense. What Harris wants to do is say that the moral rules themselves can be self-evident when compared to a realistic (scientific) view of reality.

But in my opinion, he's making the same old mistake of taking his own personal moral code and saying this must be the rational, correct one, because it's mine and I'm a rational, scientific person. Did he ever ask an Arab why their morals include such extremely restrictive rules for women? I'm sure they would describe it in terms of protective instead of restrictive, and ask him how our society can allow women to sell themselves on the streets and hand the money over to a pimp in exchange for drugs. Where are the fathers and brothers and husbands whose moral obligation is to protect these helpless women? Conflicting moral values, seen through our own sense of right and wrong. So how do you find some ultimate right and wrong from such social behavior?

AlBell

28th October 2010, 02:52 PM

So how do you find some ultimate right and wrong from such social behavior?
Especially since Multiculturalism promises Utopia. Or did I miss a memo?

cornsail

28th October 2010, 03:53 PM

You are correct; I misspoke. The point is that a placebo (http://www.skepdic.com/placebo.html) is, by definition, inert: It objectively has no effect on the condition being treated.

It's pharmacologically inert. The act of giving it to a patient who believes they have taken or may have taken some sort of medicine is what causes the effect. A sugar pill itself is not a placebo. A sugar pill administered under certain conditions can cause an effect. That's what a placebo is and it can have an effect on the condition.

Any observed or measurable effect that is noticed is not a result of the placebo treatment per se, but likely a result of some other poorly controlled or overlooked variable.

Why do you say this?

Prometheus

28th October 2010, 06:53 PM

It's pharmacologically inert. The act of giving it to a patient who believes they have taken or may have taken some sort of medicine is what causes the effect. A sugar pill itself is not a placebo. A sugar pill administered under certain conditions can cause an effect. That's what a placebo is and it can have an effect on the condition.

That's debatable. The studies mentioned on the Skepdic page I linked to above seem to go both ways. I think it's instructive, however, that the bar usually set for determining causality in most experimental research is that a treatment be shown to have an effect significantly greater than placebo.

Why do you say this?

Do you know of any studies that have ever been done anywhere which completely control for all possible confounding variables? I don't. That, plus the knowlege that sugar pills are, in fact, inert (homeopaths' claims notwithstanding) and the fact that no one has ever demonstrated any other sort of 'mind-over-matter' effect under rigorous experimental conditions lead me--via Occam's Razor--to the conclusion that the placebo effect is most likely illusory.

cornsail

28th October 2010, 10:15 PM

That's debatable. The studies mentioned on the Skepdic page I linked to above seem to go both ways.

The extent and magnitude of the placebo effect is debatable. That it exists is not, in my opinion. I don't think the Hróbjartsson and Götzsche analysis took into account the fact that placebos have a greater impact on certain conditions, and less or no impact on others. It's also diminished if patients know they might be getting a placebo.

I think it's instructive, however, that the bar usually set for determining causality in most experimental research is that a treatment be shown to have an effect significantly greater than placebo.

Yes, that's because if one were to administer a drug, for example, in a study without a placebo control group (let's say they use a non-treatment control) and they found a significant effect, one could argue that the effect was merely due to placebo. A placebo control group allow us to say that the drug had an effect beyond placebo. If the placebo effect does not exist then this practice is pretty much pointless.

Do you know of any studies that have ever been done anywhere which completely control for all possible confounding variables? I don't.

This either provides us with a rational for dismissing all experimentally demonstrated phenomena or it doesn't have much to say about the placebo effect.

That, plus the knowlege that sugar pills are, in fact, inert (homeopaths' claims notwithstanding)

The sugar pills are inert. The psychological events that take place in a placebo situation are not inert and may or may not effect the condition. It depends on the nature of the condition though. It won't send someone's cancer into remission, but it may have a positive impact on their panic disorder or chronic pain.

and the fact that no one has ever demonstrated any other sort of 'mind-over-matter' effect under rigorous experimental conditions lead me--via Occam's Razor--to the conclusion that the placebo effect is most likely illusory.

I don't know what you mean by "mind-over-matter" or why you would label the placebo effect as such. That implies a dualist view of psychological events, when in actuality most would agree that psychological events are a function of the brain (which is obviously comprised of matter).

Example:

Placebo response was associated with regional metabolic increases involving the prefrontal, anterior cingulate, premotor, parietal, posterior insula, and posterior cingulate and metabolic decreases involving the subgenual cingulate, parahippocampus, and thalamus. Regions of change overlapped those seen in responders administered active fluoxetine. Fluoxetine response, however, was associated with additional subcortical and limbic changes in the brainstem, striatum, anterior insula, and hippocampus, sources of efferent input to the response-specific regions identified with both agents.
http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/abstract/159/5/728

Dragoonster

28th October 2010, 10:46 PM

I defer to your wisdomness.

Now please type out this vaunted list of "morals" that are accepted in every country, in every civilization on earth, and cite the basis for their morality.

It's so SIMPLE for one as wise as you.

IMO there isn't such a list because morals are subjective. I never claimed such a list exists, and that wasn't the question. All I was answering was my definition of what "morals" means.

Defining types (or lists of specific moral actions being either good or bad) seems to be more what you want us to answer (?) There seem as many answers for that as there are people on the planet. I don't think I'm disagreeing with you.

Democracy Simulator

28th October 2010, 10:49 PM

I asked Piggy the following question about a week back on P19:

"There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be ... I think that this is quite clearly untrue."

Is Harris referring here to the is/ought problem? Or is he not? Harris has studied philosophy. His language here seems clear. Or does he mean something else? No takers?

Is he referring to the problem, or is he not? Piggy says that we shouldn't use is/ought to frame the question. No no no. You must have misunderstood my question. Does Harris refer to it or does he not? Honestly answer me as to why you think he does or doesn't. I mean he either does or doesn't, doesn't he? Or, is he equivocating?

To which Piggy answered:

Well, neither, really.

And then proceeded to talk about something else.

The fact that Piggy cannot or does not want to answer this question seems to indicate that we have arrived at a dead end. I'll ask Piggy one more time and give a multiple choice of all the possible answers that I can conceive of:

1. He does refer to it
2. he doesn't refer to it
3. He equivocates
4. Piggy doesn't know whether he refers to it or not

If you don't think that Harris things he has overcome the is/ought problem, then just simply say so and give us some evidence from what he has said to indicate that this is in fact his position.

I think I (and others) have made it abundantly clear why we believe Harris does refer to the is/ought problem, using direct quotes from his talk. We have also made it clear why he hasn't solved the problem and why the problem is important.

Prometheus

28th October 2010, 11:37 PM

The extent and magnitude of the placebo effect is debatable. That it exists is not, in my opinion. I don't think the Hróbjartsson and Götzsche analysis took into account the fact that placebos have a greater impact on certain conditions, and less or no impact on others. It's also diminished if patients know they might be getting a placebo....

I didn't say the placebo effect does not exist. Of course it does. I said it's illusory--that is, the reality is somewhat different than the appearance.

I don't know what you mean by "mind-over-matter" or why you would label the placebo effect as such. That implies a dualist view of psychological events, when in actuality most would agree that psychological events are a function of the brain (which is obviously comprised of matter).

I'm referring to the popular misconception about the nature of the placebo effect. My original comment was in response to the question of whether or not it is ethical to deliberately use placebo in place of real medicine (presuming that it is not being done within the context of legitimate research). But the effect is not therapeutic--it doesn't actually cause any healing; it's just a name we give to apparent medical improvements that we can't otherwise account for. Sometimes, with some conditions, this may include effects that are dependant on a patient's mood or subjective experience. Other times it may represent a statistical anomoly or an error in measurement/reporting or misdiagnosis or regression to mean or some additional unreported treatment.

Cinorjer

29th October 2010, 02:24 AM

Especially since Multiculturalism promises Utopia. Or did I miss a memo?

Does it? Guessed I missed that one, too. Conflicting moral values are one reason people are at each other's throats, of course. Not that humanity needs much of a reason. But, we can also learn to respect each other's differences and look at what we all have in common, instead. In my younger, more optimistic days I thought real progress was possible. Now, I'm old, cynical, and just want those damned neighbor kids to stay off my lawn.

fls

29th October 2010, 04:29 AM

How is that not placebo?

It is placebo. It's just not much of an effect. :)

Linda

fls

29th October 2010, 04:46 AM

Is he asking or answering? Because it's not a very novel question and there are many obvious answers that spring to mind that he neglects to mention (lust, greed, conformity, fear, apathy, etc). We justify them, because it feels better to do (or have done things) that we feel are justified.

Well, that's a different question (and answer). Why do we do stuff we consider bad or fail to do stuff that would be good? Whether or not we perform actions which are good or bad is different from whether or not those actions are good or bad.

What is being addressed is the latter, rather than the former.

I'm not seeing the straw man society he talks about that refuses to admit there's anything wrong with the Taliban.

Yeah, I found the New York Times (?) book review to be useful, as it seemed to address this point (I'll look for the link http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/books/review/Appiah-t.html?_r=1). Alhough, the reaction from other philosophers does make it look like the "ought/is" problem or NOMA are still treated as though they are legitimately concerning, which would make that part not a strawman.

And of course it's unsurprising that his examples are of the "religion makes them do it" variety. It's his schtick. And that's okay. But ironically he doesn't even attempt to back any of it up scientifically.

Well, you can't have expected him to do so in an 18 minute talk. I think that was the point of a book - an opportunity to cover the topic with the thoroughness it needs.

Linda

cornsail

29th October 2010, 12:10 PM

I didn't say the placebo effect does not exist. Of course it does. I said it's illusory--that is, the reality is somewhat different than the appearance.

I'm referring to the popular misconception about the nature of the placebo effect. My original comment was in response to the question of whether or not it is ethical to deliberately use placebo in place of real medicine (presuming that it is not being done within the context of legitimate research). But the effect is not therapeutic--it doesn't actually cause any healing; it's just a name we give to apparent medical improvements that we can't otherwise account for.

Well, all it really comes down to is whether placebos can result in significant improvements over a no-treatment group. If they can then the effect can be considered therapeutic.

Sometimes, with some conditions, this may include effects that are dependant on a patient's mood or subjective experience. Other times it may represent a statistical anomoly or an error in measurement/reporting or misdiagnosis or regression to mean or some additional unreported treatment.

Statistical anomalies obviously happen. Regression to the mean can be controlled for by comparison to a no-treatment group. Measurement and reporting errors should statistically even out over placebo, no-treatment and treatment groups, assuming the measurements are carried out the same way and the study is double-blind.

I haven't delved into looking at placebo studies, so maybe its more debatable whether it actually has an effect on the conditions than I am aware of. But that comes down to whether it can be experimentally demonstrated in comparison to no-treatment groups or not.

Prometheus

29th October 2010, 12:29 PM

Well, all it really comes down to is whether placebos can result in significant improvements over a no-treatment group. If they can then the effect can be considered therapeutic.

Statistical anomalies obviously happen. Regression to the mean can be controlled for by comparison to a no-treatment group. Measurement and reporting errors should statistically even out over placebo, no-treatment and treatment groups, assuming the measurements are carried out the same way and the study is double-blind....

Sure, in the context of a properly conducted study. But I'd still say that if such a therapeutic effect can be reliably demonstrated, then what you've actually got is a treatment, not a placebo.

cornsail

29th October 2010, 12:50 PM

It is placebo. It's just not much of an effect. :)

That's quite different than what you said before, but okay. You're saying the placebo has an effect, but it's a small one? That's been my impression as well.

Well, that's a different question (and answer). Why do we do stuff we consider bad or fail to do stuff that would be good? Whether or not we perform actions which are good or bad is different from whether or not those actions are good or bad.

What is being addressed is the latter, rather than the former.

Now you are saying he's addressing the determination of whether actions are good or bad. Before you said:

I think rather than having science tell us which actions are bad or good, he is asking "why would we justify actions which contradict our sense of good and bad, and how do we do so?"

These appear to be contradictory. Or am I misunderstanding something?

Yeah, I found the New York Times (?) book review to be useful, as it seemed to address this point (I'll look for the link http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/bo...ah-t.html?_r=1). Alhough, the reaction from other philosophers does make it look like the "ought/is" problem or NOMA are still treated as though they are legitimately concerning, which would make that part not a strawman.

The ought/is problem doesn't mean we can't make value judgments about what is good or bad. I'd be surprised if most philosophers would not make the value judgment that the Taliban are bad. Otherwise it's still a straw man.

If, OTOH, these philosophers are unwilling to make such a judgment as a result of is/ought then he made no argument addressing their position as far as I can tell.

Well, you can't have expected him to do so in an 18 minute talk. I think that was the point of a book - an opportunity to cover the topic with the thoroughness it needs.

The title of the talk was "Can Science Answer Moral Questions?" When he brings up an example of a moral question, I expect him to explain how science might be able to answer it. There's absolutely no reason he can't do this in an 18 minute talk. I attend science talks all the time (and sometimes have to give them). Some are 10 minutes, some 20, some 60. If you don't have time to explain everything, which is often the case, you give some sort of summary or overview.

I don't think Harris said anything in his talk that wasn't either completely obvious or vague speculation with no explanation or supporting evidence. I mean can you honestly say you, or the audience, learned anything from it?

fls

29th October 2010, 03:00 PM

That's quite different than what you said before, but okay. You're saying the placebo has an effect, but it's a small one? That's been my impression as well.

My main concern has been that the bulk of the effect which is attributed to placebo would be present in the absence of placebo. And what's left is the sort of stuff which is of little interest when you are hoping for a therapeutic effect. For example, the alteration in the reported pain is less than that considered clinically useful. Calling all that "the placebo effect" hides that the only part actually attributable to placebo already encompasses a known effect (expectation) and that the part which is of clinical interest (recovery from illness, useful improvements in symptoms, meaningful changes in function) doesn't come about from the placebo.

Now you are saying he's addressing the determination of whether actions are good or bad. Before you said:

These appear to be contradictory. Or am I misunderstanding something?

Then I didn't communicate very well. When I said "justify", I didn't mean how individuals justify their own bad behaviour (in which case they know what they are doing is wrong, they hide their actions from others, they feel guilty, etc).. Rather, I meant the turning of bad actions into good actions. Physical abuse of your child is generally perceived as a bad action. But as a religious edict, it is a good action. Similarly, if it cures your child of a serious disease, it is a good action.

The ought/is problem doesn't mean we can't make value judgments about what is good or bad. I'd be surprised if most philosophers would not make the value judgment that the Taliban are bad. Otherwise it's still a straw man.

If, OTOH, these philosophers are unwilling to make such a judgment as a result of is/ought then he made no argument addressing their position as far as I can tell.

I think that is what he was addressing - challenging them to explain why made-up 'oughts' could pretend to serve as a barrier to the rational exploration of morals (as though Zeno's paradox prevents us from exploring motion).

The title of the talk was "Can Science Answer Moral Questions?" When he brings up an example of a moral question, I expect him to explain how science might be able to answer it. There's absolutely no reason he can't do this in an 18 minute talk. I attend science talks all the time (and sometimes have to give them). Some are 10 minutes, some 20, some 60. If you don't have time to explain everything, which is often the case, you give some sort of summary or overview.

I don't think Harris said anything in his talk that wasn't either completely obvious or vague speculation with no explanation or supporting evidence. I mean can you honestly say you, or the audience, learned anything from it?

Well, I'm starting to come to the opposite conclusion. Considering the number of pages we are at in this thread, as various interpretations are argued, I'm wondering whether even a book would be sufficient to clarify his position and prevent the assumption of utilitarianism. :)

Linda

cornsail

29th October 2010, 05:41 PM

Sure, in the context of a properly conducted study. But I'd still say that if such a therapeutic effect can be reliably demonstrated, then what you've actually got is a treatment, not a placebo.

Sure, you could call a placebo a treatment. The distinction is just that for a placebo you have to think that it is some different treatment.

cornsail

29th October 2010, 05:55 PM

My main concern has been that the bulk of the effect which is attributed to placebo would be present in the absence of placebo.

That can certainly be true if the placebo is not contrasted with a no-treatment control. I think regression to the mean would be the biggest reason.

And what's left is the sort of stuff which is of little interest when you are hoping for a therapeutic effect. For example, the alteration in the reported pain is less than that considered clinically useful.

That is also my impression. "Having an effect" doesn't mean having a clinically useful effect.

Calling all that "the placebo effect" hides that the only part actually attributable to placebo already encompasses a known effect (expectation) and that the part which is of clinical interest (recovery from illness, useful improvements in symptoms, meaningful changes in function) doesn't come about from the placebo.

I don't see how the name hides any of that. What would you call it?

Then I didn't communicate very well. When I said "justify", I didn't mean how individuals justify their own bad behaviour (in which case they know what they are doing is wrong, they hide their actions from others, they feel guilty, etc).. Rather, I meant the turning of bad actions into good actions. Physical abuse of your child is generally perceived as a bad action.

I disagree that it's "generally perceived as a bad action" if by abuse you mean physical discipline.

I think that is what he was addressing - challenging them to explain why made-up 'oughts' could pretend to serve as a barrier to the rational exploration of morals (as though Zeno's paradox prevents us from exploring motion).

Really? I don't remember him saying anything like that.

Well, I'm starting to come to the opposite conclusion. Considering the number of pages we are at in this thread, as various interpretations are argued, I'm wondering whether even a book would be sufficient to clarify his position and prevent the assumption of utilitarianism. :)

If the book is anything like his talk, then I'd agree that it wouldn't be sufficient to clarify anything.

cornsail

30th October 2010, 11:24 AM

I found a pdf of Sam Harris's book online. I've only read the introduction, but I can say that so far it's considerably better than the talk (although not without problems).

Dani

2nd November 2010, 11:44 AM

Dani

2nd November 2010, 11:50 AM

I found a pdf of Sam Harris's book online. I've only read the introduction, but I can say that so far it's considerably better than the talk (although not without problems).

I found it too, and I'll take a look. However, I'm not expecting much of it, since the author already makes some fundamental mistakes in his speech.

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 11:51 AM

I think that is what he was addressing - challenging them to explain why made-up 'oughts' could pretend to serve as a barrier to the rational exploration of morals (as though Zeno's paradox prevents us from exploring motion).

Like Cornsail, I don't think he was making that point at all, but I'm not sure I'm understanding what you're saying here. What do you mean by "made-up oughts"?
Good question, since every 'ought' is made up.

And of course Science can study the results once 'oughts' are selected. Whether that constitutes "the rational exploration of morals" is another question.

Ivor the Engineer

2nd November 2010, 12:31 PM

Good question, since every 'ought' is made up.

<snip>

Are they? Or are some 'oughts' rules of thumb for behaviour?

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 12:41 PM

You think such rules are not 'made up'?

The ones that come quickly to mind all cover rules of behavior.

fls

2nd November 2010, 12:57 PM

Like Cornsail, I don't think he was making that point at all, but I'm not sure I'm understanding what you're saying here. What do you mean by "made-up oughts"?

Well, if I said that we don't know what ought to be healthy because all we can do is describe what is healthy, therefore science can never tells us whether we are healthy but eastern 'medicine' can do so because it specifies that our chi ought to be balanced, how would you respond?

Linda

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 01:13 PM

I admit being confused.

Are you suggesting 'being unhealthy' "ought" to be immoral?

Dani

2nd November 2010, 01:41 PM

Well, if I said that we don't know what ought to be healthy because all we can do is describe what is healthy, therefore science can never tells us whether we are healthy but eastern 'medicine' can do so because it specifies that our chi ought to be balanced, how would you respond?

Linda

I admit that I might be having difficulties trying to understand you.

Your "therefore" is a non sequitur. If science can describe what is healthy, it certainly can tell us whether we are healthy.

fls

2nd November 2010, 01:49 PM

I admit being confused.

Are you suggesting 'being unhealthy' "ought" to be immoral?

Analogy.

Linda

fls

2nd November 2010, 01:51 PM

I admit that I might be having difficulties trying to understand you.

Your "therefore" is a non sequitur. If science can describe what is healthy, it certainly can tell us whether we are healthy.

Well that is the same problem I am having. If science can describe what is moral, what is this non sequitor about what ought to be moral?

Linda

Ivor the Engineer

2nd November 2010, 02:11 PM

You think such rules are not 'made up'?

The ones that come quickly to mind all cover rules of behavior.

Is tit for tat 'made up'?

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 02:12 PM

Why yes, yes it is.

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 02:29 PM

I admit being confused.

Are you suggesting 'being unhealthy' "ought" to be immoral?

Analogy.

Linda
How about "red-herring"?

Well that is the same problem I am having. If 'science can describe what is moral', what is this non sequitor about what ought to be moral?

Linda
A problem I at least am having is that I have no idea what you think 'science can describe what is moral' actually means.

After an "ought" is made up, science can examine the 'is' that results. Depending on what the 'is' turns out be, another choice of "ought" might seem better under some analysis criteria, but the choice of "ought" will remain a choice. Others might select a different analysis criteria.

Ivor the Engineer

2nd November 2010, 02:31 PM

Why yes, yes it is.

Okay. But then it is tested over and over again against the other possible ways of behaving towards others and becomes more or less common depending on its relative pay off.

I think Sam Harris will come unstuck is if he thinks science can tell us what we ought to want.

fls

2nd November 2010, 02:39 PM

A problem I at least am having is that I have no idea what you think 'science can describe what is moral' actually means.

I provided an example in post 627.

After an "ought" is made up,

Why would you do that? I'm saying science wouldn't do something like that in the first place.

Why would science start with "after 'health' is made up as 'balanced Chi'"?

Linda

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 02:52 PM

Okay. But then it is tested over and over again against the other possible ways of behaving towards others and becomes more or less common depending on its relative pay off.

We appear to be on the same page. 'Kindness' for 'kindness' would be one possible "ought"; 'Enmity' for 'enmity' another. Or would 'you're dead' for 'enmity' be even more effective?

I think Sam Harris will come unstuck is if he thinks science can tell us what we ought to want.
Of course there you've changed the meaning of 'ought' to fall outside the sphere of moral issues. This may be Linda's sidetrack; yes we all want to be "healthy", as science can tell us; assuming we all agree with the cost/benefit and final rating criteria. All those darn oughts, some moral decrees, some not.

Dani

2nd November 2010, 03:01 PM

Well that is the same problem I am having. If science can describe what is moral, what is this non sequitor about what ought to be moral?

Linda

What do you mean by "moral"? Do you mean the wide range of moral values or explictly what is morally good or acceptable?

If it's the former, of course science can describe that. If it's the latter, the problem lies in the concepts of good and bad, right and wrong. There's no foundational principle in science that can logically lead us to any conclusion about what is good or bad, right or wrong.

That said, to answer your question: if science can describe whatever, then it can tell us the degree of whateverness we have. The problem is: the description comes first.

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 03:07 PM

I provided an example in post 627.
You provided lots of stuff in 627. Which example should I be taking as the explanation to what 'science can describe what is moral' means?

Why would you do that? I'm saying science wouldn't do something like that in the first place.

Why would science start with "after 'health' is made up as 'balanced Chi'"?

Linda
Science would be forced to start with whatever 'ought' it is given. An evaluation of the benefits of 'balanced chi' might be difficult, we can agree, since science has found no evidence chi exists.

You must be citing your comment

"Well, if I said that we don't know what ought to be healthy because all we can do is describe what is healthy, therefore science can never tells us whether we are healthy but eastern 'medicine' can do so because it specifies that our chi ought to be balanced, how would you respond?"

which appears to missing a word or two that might help make sense of that sentence.

fls

2nd November 2010, 03:25 PM

What do you mean by "moral"? Do you mean the wide range of moral values or explictly what is morally good or acceptable?

What Dragoonster offered earlier - good and bad actions.

If it's the former, of course science can describe that. If it's the latter, the problem lies in the concepts of good and bad, right and wrong. There's no foundational principle in science that can logically lead us to any conclusion about what is good or bad, right or wrong.

I agree. This seems to depend upon what people think is good or bad, right or wrong.

That said, to answer your question: if science can describe whatever, then it can tell us the degree of whateverness we have. The problem is: the description comes first.

So where does the made-up idea of 'oughts' come into all of this?

Linda

fls

2nd November 2010, 03:27 PM

You provided lots of stuff in 627. Which example should I be taking as the explanation to what 'science can describe what is moral' means?

The examples about the runaway locomotive and the subjects with failing organs.

Science would be forced to start with whatever 'ought' it is given.

Why? It doesn't do so with other scientific endeavors.

Linda

Ivor the Engineer

2nd November 2010, 03:38 PM

<snip>

Of course there you've changed the meaning of 'ought' to fall outside the sphere of moral issues. This may be Linda's sidetrack; yes we all want to be "healthy", as science can tell us; assuming we all agree with the cost/benefit and final rating criteria. All those darn oughts, some moral decrees, some not.

IMO there appears to be two types of moral decrees. There are those which instruct us on how we should behave and those which instruct us what we should want (or more often not want).

Dani

2nd November 2010, 03:44 PM

So where does the made-up idea of 'oughts' come into all of this?

I don't follow you. You'll have to explain to me what does this "made-up idea of oughts" mean.

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 03:45 PM

IMO there appears to be two types of moral decrees. There are those which instruct us on how we should behave and those which instruct us what we should want (or more often not want).

Without public (in the vernacular) behavior what one 'wants' is meaningless.

Dani

2nd November 2010, 03:53 PM

IMO there appears to be two types of moral decrees. There are those which instruct us on how we should behave and those which instruct us what we should want (or more often not want).

That is, deontological and teleological. I think there is a third type: those which instruct us on what feelings should cause our actions. For example: "he killed his homosexual son moved by love, therefore it was a good action".

The more rational approach is the teleological, followed by the deontological, and then this one I described.

Beth

2nd November 2010, 04:00 PM

The examples about the runaway locomotive and the subjects with failing organs.

Linda

How do the answers to these questions instruct us regarding what is moral? They illuminate for us the innate reactions of the majority of humans alive today. But not everyone reacts the same way. Is the majority to be assumed correct? If so, to me that implies that the minority should be assumed defective in their innate moral thinking and corrective action applied, but I am not comfortable with that conclusion. Are you?

fls

2nd November 2010, 04:02 PM

I don't follow you. You'll have to explain to me what does this "made-up idea of oughts" mean.

Morals are not those actions which humans consider good or bad. Instead they are actions which ought to be good or bad.

Linda

AlBell

2nd November 2010, 04:56 PM

Morals are not those actions which humans consider good or bad. Instead they are actions which ought to be good or bad.

Linda
Morals are not actions. Morals are human constructs (oughts) intended to control behavior. I'd guess that's what you meant, but I could be wrong.

I find the hypothetical examples that provided Science something to evaluate, using of course various selected 'oughts' to provide a cost/benefit schema, nonsense.

IMO there appears to be two types of moral decrees. There are those which instruct us on how we should behave and those which instruct us what we should want (or more often not want).

That is, deontological and teleological. I think there is a third type: those which instruct us on what feelings should cause our actions. For example: "he killed his homosexual son moved by love, therefore it was a good action".

The more rational approach is the teleological, followed by the deontological, and then this one I described.
Theoretically elegant and correct (and likely Ivor's intent) although type three is discussable.

I'd say once an "ought" is selected under any method, the "ought' is there to control behavior, and the method used to select that "ought" becomes irrelevant.

Yes, I may be totally missing 'The Big Picture' actually being discussed by some of you. Sorry.

fls

2nd November 2010, 06:10 PM

Morals are not actions. Morals are human constructs (oughts) intended to control behavior. I'd guess that's what you meant, but I could be wrong.

I think that's basically what Dragoonster meant and it seems reasonable to me. Good actions are those which are okay to perform and bad actions are those which are to be avoided.

I find the hypothetical examples that provided Science something to evaluate, using of course various selected 'oughts' to provide a cost/benefit schema, nonsense.

I don't know what you're referring to, but I also find the use of oughts nonsensical, and I said earlier that I don't think the assignment of benefits/utility is useful (or scientific for that matter).

Linda

cornsail

2nd November 2010, 06:16 PM

Why would science start with "after 'health' is made up as 'balanced Chi'"?

Linda

There are accepted scientific measures of health. Lack of disease or susceptibility toward disease, life expectancy, bodily functioning, etc.

So what objective metric do you propose for measuring the morality of an action?

cornsail

2nd November 2010, 06:18 PM

Or (if you know) what metric does Sam Harris propose?

cornsail

2nd November 2010, 06:21 PM

Good actions are those which are okay to perform and bad actions are those which are to be avoided.

Is there a scientific measure of "okay"ness?

fls

2nd November 2010, 09:01 PM

There are accepted scientific measures of health. Lack of disease or susceptibility toward disease, life expectancy, bodily functioning, etc.

So what objective metric do you propose for measuring the morality of an action?

Whether it is allowable (borrowing Dragoonster's characterization).

Linda

cornsail

2nd November 2010, 09:50 PM

:confused:

Dani

3rd November 2010, 12:05 AM

Morals are not those actions which humans consider good or bad. Instead they are actions which ought to be good or bad.

Linda

:(

I'm lost.

Is this what you think or are you describing someone else's position?

First of all, I agree with AlBell that morals are not actions, but human constructs.

And when you say "they are actions which ought to be good or bad", I really don't know what you're saying. I looks like you're trying to make a description, but you choose to use the verb ought to, which is a way of expressing a desirable future outcome, not a description of how things are.

So, what are you trying to say?

fls

3rd November 2010, 05:59 AM

:(

I'm lost.

Is this what you think or are you describing someone else's position?

This seems to be the position of those who think that the "is/ought problem" describes a real world barrier to answering a vaguely defined subset of questions. We cannot answer questions which relate to the human construct of good and bad actions, because even though we can describe the human construct of good and bad actions, this is insufficient to inform us as to whether these actions are good or bad.

First of all, I agree with AlBell that morals are not actions, but human constructs.

And when you say "they are actions which ought to be good or bad", I really don't know what you're saying. I looks like you're trying to make a description, but you choose to use the verb ought to, which is a way of expressing a desirable future outcome, not a description of how things are.

So, what are you trying to say?

There are philosophical theories of ethics/morals which attempt to answer questions about which actions are good or bad in relation to human constructs about good and bad actions - deontology, teleology, utilitarianism, etc. And they need something to serve as a measure/guide - a set of rules, a set of goals, a measurement of utility, etc. And science can be used to inform these various theories, but science can't give you the list of rules or the set of goals or tell you what measure of utility to use. The closest it comes is to describe what list of rules/goals/utilities that humans seem to use and suggest that those could serve as a reasonable proxy.

This is not how science answers those same questions, though. Science doesn't answer questions by choosing a philosophical theory it is going to attempt to inform. The closest it comes to making use of philosophical theories is the premise that methodological naturalism is useful. Science has it's own way of answering questions which involves a careful description of the way the world is and then forming and testing useful ideas about why.

The issues that have been brought up in this thread relate to the restrictions and limitations placed on what science can do if it is used to inform philosophical theory. But no reason has been given as to why this approach is reasonable. Instead, it has been proposed that science answer these questions the way science usually answers questions - without reference to any particular philosophical theory. In which case, the various restrictions you and others keep bringing up about the "is/ought" problem has nothing to do with answering questions about the human constructs of good and bad action.

At the very least, I am looking for an explanation as to why we should abandon the idea of taking a scientific approach in favor of a philosophical approach informed by science.

Linda

AlBell

3rd November 2010, 06:47 AM

This seems to be the position of those who think that the "is/ought problem" describes a real world barrier to answering a vaguely defined subset of questions. We cannot answer questions which relate to the human construct of good and bad actions, because even though we can describe the human construct of good and bad actions, this is insufficient to inform us as to whether these actions are good or bad.
OK.

There are philosophical theories of ethics/morals which attempt to answer questions about which actions are good or bad in relation to human constructs about good and bad actions - deontology, teleology, utilitarianism, etc. And they need something to serve as a measure/guide - a set of rules, a set of goals, a measurement of utility, etc. And science can be used to inform these various theories, but science can't give you the list of rules or the set of goals or tell you what measure of utility to use.
Yes.

The closest it comes is to describe what list of rules/goals/utilities that humans seem to use and suggest that those could serve as a reasonable proxy.
Huh? Proxy to what?

This is not how science answers those same questions, though. Science doesn't answer questions by choosing a philosophical theory it is going to attempt to inform.
Which you (and I) then disagree with in the next sentence.

The closest it comes to making use of philosophical theories is the premise that methodological naturalism is useful.
Which has moved science beyond any possible means of selecting moral "oughts".

Science has it's own way of answering questions which involves a careful description of the way the world is and then forming and testing useful ideas about why.
Is and why don't address selection of moral values.

The issues that have been brought up in this thread relate to the restrictions and limitations placed on what science can do if it is used to inform philosophical theory. But no reason has been given as to why this approach is reasonable. Instead, it has been proposed that science answer these questions the way science usually answers questions - without reference to any particular philosophical theory.
Once 'oughts' are selected they've moved from theoretical to practical, and the underlying rationale for the choice is irrelevant.

In which case, the various restrictions you and others keep bringing up about the "is/ought" problem has nothing to do with answering questions about the human constructs of good and bad action.
Nor has anything you've said presented any other possibility.

At the very least, I am looking for an explanation as to why we should abandon the idea of taking a scientific approach in favor of a philosophical approach informed by science.
Once you actually describe how the scientific approach arrives at an answer, that is, an "ought", you might have something.

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 08:36 AM

At the very least, I am looking for an explanation as to why we should abandon the idea of taking a scientific approach in favor of a philosophical approach informed by science.

Without an objective measure of moralness it's impossible to take a scientific approach. So far you haven't been able to come up with one (assuming "whether it is allowable" wasn't a serious answer).

Dani

3rd November 2010, 08:59 AM

This is not how science answers those same questions, though. Science doesn't answer questions by choosing a philosophical theory it is going to attempt to inform. The closest it comes to making use of philosophical theories is the premise that methodological naturalism is useful. Science has it's own way of answering questions which involves a careful description of the way the world is and then forming and testing useful ideas about why.

I don't think there's a relevant distinction between certain branches of philosophy and the scientific method, but that would be another topic of discussion.

The issues that have been brought up in this thread relate to the restrictions and limitations placed on what science can do if it is used to inform philosophical theory.

No, they don't, because I haven't seen anybody arguing against the use of science in this context.

But no reason has been given as to why this approach is reasonable.

Right, because no one is taking such approach.

Instead, it has been proposed that science answer these questions the way science usually answers questions - without reference to any particular philosophical theory.

Really? You mean, it has been proposed by Sam Harris that science answer these questions without reference to any pre-established set of morals (be it philosophical or not) and that's why some of us disagree with his approach?

In which case, the various restrictions you and others keep bringing up about the "is/ought" problem has nothing to do with answering questions about the human constructs of good and bad action.

First, the "is/ought" problem some of us have been bringing up has nothing to do with what you described. And second, answering questions about the human constructs of good and bad action isn't the same as answering moral questions.

At the very least, I am looking for an explanation as to why we should abandon the idea of taking a scientific approach in favor of a philosophical approach informed by science.

Well, I'd like an explanation too if there were someone holding this view.

Dani

3rd November 2010, 09:03 AM

fls

3rd November 2010, 09:51 AM

Huh? Proxy to what?

To the list of rules or 'oughts'. It's a description of the "is/ought problem" whereby science can provide a list of what "is", that perhaps someone may choose to serve as a proxy for the "ought", but it's not a particularly palatable solution.

Which you (and I) then disagree with in the next sentence.

Which has moved science beyond any possible means of selecting moral "oughts".

Exactly. I agree with this. If you bastardize science to serve as philosophy's tool, it fails to provide what is needed when it comes to teleology (as well as the other 'ologies' and 'isms').

Is and why don't address selection of moral values.

Exactly. Philosophy answers these questions by making reference to "moral values". Science has a different way of answering these questions which does not involve making reference to these philosophical "moral values" (except to the extent terminology is borrowed for forming descriptions).

Once 'oughts' are selected they've moved from theoretical to practical, and the underlying rationale for the choice is irrelevant.

Right. But you're still talking about how philosophy answers these questions. Science doesn't answer these questions by selecting 'oughts'.

Nor has anything you've said presented any other possibility.

Once you actually describe how the scientific approach arrives at an answer, that is, an "ought", you might have something.

It doesn't. The scientific approach does not arrive at or use an "ought" like a teleological approach would.

Linda

fls

3rd November 2010, 10:03 AM

Without an objective measure of moralness it's impossible to take a scientific approach. So far you haven't been able to come up with one (assuming "whether it is allowable" wasn't a serious answer).

This is simply not true. There are many aspects of 'health' which lack an objective measure which we still approach scientifically. We don't have an objective measure of past/present/future, yet we still take a scientific approach to the study of time. We have consistent and replicable measures of human preferences with respect to actions which distinguishes between 'good' and 'bad' actions.

Linda

fls

3rd November 2010, 10:32 AM

No, they don't, because I haven't seen anybody arguing against the use of science in this context.

Right. This seems to be the context in which it is presumed that science would be applied.

Right, because no one is taking such approach.

But you just said, "I haven't seen anybody arguing against the use of science in this context." Everybody seems to agree that science can be used to inform philosophy. There is no need to discuss this point.

When it is said that "science can answer moral questions", it doesn't mean that philosophy's answers to those questions can be informed by science, it means that science's general ability to answer questions can include questions about human preferences with respect to actions which are 'allowable' vs. 'not allowable' (or whatever terminology you wish to use to indicate a preference for and against).

Really? You mean, it has been proposed by Sam Harris that science answer these questions without reference to any pre-established set of morals (be it philosophical or not) and that's why some of us disagree with his approach?

Well, a scientific approach would be to answer these questions without reference to pre-established morals so that part is right, I think. I'm not yet sure where the disagreement lies.

First, the "is/ought" problem some of us have been bringing up has nothing to do with what you described.

Please clarify it for me then. I am trying to understand, so that was my attempt to restate it. If I've misunderstood, then I need to know.

And second, answering questions about the human constructs of good and bad action isn't the same as answering moral questions.

Why not? In what way are they different? Is this a matter of semantics?

Well, I'd like an explanation too if there were someone holding this view.

Can you explain to me why people keep mentioning philosophical approaches, then, if this is supposed to be a discussion about scientific approaches?

Linda

Dani

3rd November 2010, 10:52 AM

Linda:

Wow, what a mess. :boggled:

Let's start again then:

All it comes down to is, do you agree with the following statement?

"There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be ... I think that this is quite clearly untrue."

I don't. I think that this is quite clearly true. And this is what Harris means by saying that science can answer moral questions.

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 11:02 AM

Without an objective measure of moralness it's impossible to take a scientific approach. So far you haven't been able to come up with one (assuming "whether it is allowable" wasn't a serious answer).I disagree. It's perfectly possible to take a scientific approach once given a moral goal. What is not scientific is the moral goal.

So how does one scientifically approach a moral goal without an objective measure of said goal? My phrasing was poor, in that I may have implied there needs to be one measure alone that directly captures moral goals. I meant there needs to be at least one, which (directly or indirectly) captures some aspect of them.

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 11:17 AM

This is simply not true. There are many aspects of 'health' which lack an objective measure which we still approach scientifically.

Can you give me an example?

Dani

3rd November 2010, 11:21 AM

So how does one scientifically approach a moral goal without an objective measure of said goal? My phrasing was poor, in that I may have implied there needs to be one measure alone that directly captures moral goals. I meant there needs to be at least one, which (directly or indirectly) captures some aspect of them.

Wow. Is this the thread with the highest rate of misunderstandings? I think we agree then.

I think our main disagreement with Harris (correct me if I'm wrong) is the statement I quoted in my previous post. There's obviously other things such as straw man arguments or metaphysical attempts like the one from the longer speech about the axiomatic principles that I honestly think I refuted with ease, but his central point is his statement at the beginning of the speech.

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 11:52 AM

When it is said that "science can answer moral questions", it doesn't mean that philosophy's answers to those questions can be informed by science, it means that science's general ability to answer questions can include questions about human preferences with respect to actions which are 'allowable' vs. 'not allowable' (or whatever terminology you wish to use to indicate a preference for and against).

You are saying science can answer the question "what do humans value?". I don't think anyone disagrees.

Sam Harris claimed that science can answer the question "what should humans value?" They are not the same thing.

fls

3rd November 2010, 12:03 PM

Linda:

Wow, what a mess. :boggled:

Does that mean you're not going to answer my questions? That's disappointing, as I was presuming that they are easy to answer. Surely at least some philosophy students, when encountering the statement "science cannot answer questions about the preferences of humans" ask "why not?", so that there is a pat answer in place to address this.

Let's start again then:

All it comes down to is, do you agree with the following statement?

I don't. I think that this is quite clearly true. And this is what Harris means by saying that science can answer moral questions.

Well, like I said many pages ago, I think Harris is suggesting that it is untrue that moral questions can only be answered teleologically. I don't know if this is true. I was hoping someone would make the case for it being true.

Linda

fls

3rd November 2010, 12:05 PM

Can you give me an example?

Pain. Depressed mood.
A quantitative measure of 'health'.

Linda

AlBell

3rd November 2010, 12:29 PM

Exactly. Philosophy answers these questions by making reference to "moral values". Science has a different way of answering these questions which does not involve making reference to these philosophical "moral values" (except to the extent terminology is borrowed for forming descriptions).
At this point the best I can manage is no, Science does not have a different way of answering these questions which does not involve making reference to these philosophical "moral values".

I would be willing to change this stance if you could furnish any real example demonstrating your point for one of "these questions". I again admit I have no idea what one of 'these questions' is.

Dani

3rd November 2010, 12:50 PM

Does that mean you're not going to answer my questions? That's disappointing, as I was presuming that they are easy to answer. Surely at least some philosophy students, when encountering the statement "science cannot answer questions about the preferences of humans" ask "why not?", so that there is a pat answer in place to address this.

What's the point if we're misunderstanding each other's viewpoint? I still don't understand what's exactly your position, and I'd like to make it simpler in order to understand what's your take on a statement made by Harris that I think summarizes his approach and the disagreement some of us have with him. I'm sorry if this disappoints you, but I'm disappointed with this lack of fluent communication.

Well, like I said many pages ago, I think Harris is suggesting that it is untrue that moral questions can only be answered teleologically. I don't know if this is true. I was hoping someone would make the case for it being true.Honestly, I think that the statement I quoted is quite simple to grasp. No, he doesn't suggest something of that sort there. He is saying that we actually can get an "ought" from an "is", and this means that from a description of how the world is, we can deduce how the world ought to be. Do you agree or disagree with this? I think this is an obvious non sequitur.

fls

3rd November 2010, 12:56 PM

You are saying science can answer the question "what do humans value?". I don't think anyone disagrees.

Sam Harris claimed that science can answer the question "what should humans value?" They are not the same thing.

I agree that semantically they are different questions. Under what conditions would that matter? When would we say, "crows have black feathers, but they should be yellow", "parents will sacrifice themselves for the life of their child, but they should hold their own life more dear", "individuals prefer not to be forcibly confined but they should prefer to have their movements restricted"?

Linda

AlBell

3rd November 2010, 01:04 PM

You are saying science can answer the question "what do humans value?". I don't think anyone disagrees.

Sam Harris claimed that science can answer the question "what should humans value?" They are not the same thing.

I agree that semantically they are different questions. Under what conditIons would that matter? When would we say, "crows have black feathers, but they should be yellow", "parents will sacrifice themselves for the life of their child, but they should hold their own life more dear", "individuals prefer not to be forcibly confined but they should prefer to have their movements restricted"?

Linda
SFAICS, your response has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to cornsail's final comment.

Would you mind attempting an on-point response?

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 01:52 PM

Pain. Depressed mood.
A quantitative measure of 'health'.

Linda

When approached scientifically, pain is measured by self-reports (e.g. rating scales), behavioral responses (e.g. "as soon as you feel pain, move your hand") and brain activity (e.g. amount of activity in pain centers in the brain). Self-report may not sound like an objective metric, but it is a behavioral response and can be assigned a quantitative value. If it could not then it couldn't be used to study pain scientifically.

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 01:57 PM

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 02:10 PM

I agree that semantically they are different questions. Under what conditions would that matter?

It matters, because:

-Everyone here seems to agree with A (science can answer questions about what human preferences are).
-Sam Harris explicitly endorsed B (science can answer questions about what human preferences should be) in his talk.
-Your posts seem to be directed at people who agree with A and disagree with B. Yet you are arguing for A.

When would we say, "crows have black feathers, but they should be yellow", "parents will sacrifice themselves for the life of their child, but they should hold their own life more dear", "individuals prefer not to be forcibly confined but they should prefer to have their movements restricted"?

I don't understand. Are you saying we would not say these things? If so, then you disagree with Sam Harris, who said that science can tell us not just what we value, but what we should value.

fls

3rd November 2010, 02:49 PM

What's the point if we're misunderstanding each other's viewpoint?

That's a good point. I'm trying to understand, but I realize that I cannot be saying things the right way if after pages and pages of discussion I cannot get an answer to what I want to know.

I still don't understand what's exactly your position, and I'd like to make it simpler in order to understand what's your take on a statement made by Harris that I think summarizes his approach and the disagreement some of us have with him. I'm sorry if this disappoints you, but I'm disappointed with this lack of fluent communication.

You and me both. :)

Honestly, I think that the statement I quoted is quite simple to grasp. No, he doesn't suggest something of that sort there. He is saying that we actually can get an "ought" from an "is", and this means that from a description of how the world is, we can deduce how the world ought to be. Do you agree or disagree with this? I think this is an obvious non sequitur.

I agree that your interpretation of it is simple to grasp. And I agree that it would be simple-minded to suggest that it is untrue were your interpretation correct. I am a) uncomfortable presuming that Harris is simple-minded and b) able to see how what he says corresponds to a different interpretation which doesn't seem to be nonsensical. Of course, you don't have to agree, and of course, you may be right that Harris' ideas are simple-minded/wrong.

Linda

AlBell

3rd November 2010, 02:56 PM

Then why is it such a problem for you to provide an actual example of something Harris can examine scientifically that will turn Is to Ought?

And you are right that at least some of us have concluded Harris' thinking is both simple-minded and wrong.

fls

3rd November 2010, 03:13 PM

It matters, because:

-Everyone here seems to agree with A (science can answer questions about what human preferences are).
-Sam Harris explicitly endorsed B (science can answer questions about what human preferences should be) in his talk.
-Your posts seem to be directed at people who agree with A and disagree with B. Yet you are arguing for A.

Putting aside any reference to what Harris may or may not be arguing, under what conditions does it matter that there is a difference?

I don't understand. Are you saying we would not say these things?

I'm asking when you would say those things? Under what conditions would you say those things? It seems nonsensical to say "crows have black feathers, but they should be yellow". So why is it nonsensical when referring to an observation about crows, but it isn't nonsensical when referring to an observation about the preferences of conscious creatures?

Linda

AlBell

3rd November 2010, 03:42 PM

Putting aside any reference to what Harris may or may not be arguing, under what conditions does it matter that there is a difference?
Under every condition involving moral "oughts".

I'm asking when you would say those things? Under what conditions would you say those things? It seems nonsensical to say "crows have black feathers, but they should be yellow". So why is it nonsensical when referring to an observation about crows, but it isn't nonsensical when referring to an observation about the preferences of conscious creatures?
I agree those statements, for the ideas re morals some of us are attempting to discuss, are nonsense. Are you unable to address the topic, or just unwilling?

Beth

3rd November 2010, 03:59 PM

It matters, because:

-Everyone here seems to agree with A (science can answer questions about what human preferences are).
-Sam Harris explicitly endorsed B (science can answer questions about what human preferences should be) in his talk.
-Your posts seem to be directed at people who agree with A and disagree with B. Yet you are arguing for A.

Putting aside any reference to what Harris may or may not be arguing, under what conditions does it matter that there is a difference?

Under the condition that the majority define morality in such a way that the minority, who feels differently, are treated inhumanly.

I don't understand. Are you saying we would not say these things?

I'm asking when you would say those things? Under what conditions would you say those things? It seems nonsensical to say "crows have black feathers, but they should be yellow". So why is it nonsensical when referring to an observation about crows, but it isn't nonsensical when referring to an observation about the preferences of conscious creatures?

Linda[/QUOTE]

How about going from "The majority of people believe in a God" to "The majority of people believe in a God but they should not" or "The majority of people believe in God but they all should."

Dani

3rd November 2010, 04:37 PM

That's a good point. I'm trying to understand, but I realize that I cannot be saying things the right way if after pages and pages of discussion I cannot get an answer to what I want to know.

I don't know what you want to know, sorry. We have a commucation problem. Can you formulate it in a simple way?

You and me both. :)I see.

I agree that your interpretation of it is simple to grasp.Thanks. That's my intention since I'm concerned about our lack of fluent communication.

If the assertion There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be is clearly untrue according to Harris, then we can formulate the following with the same meaning:

A description of the way the world is can tell us the way the world ought to be, according to Sam Harris.

Do you agree with my interpretation of Harris' statement?
Do you agree with the statement?
If you agree, can you give some examples in which a description of how the world is leads to the way the world ought to be?

And I agree that it would be simple-minded to suggest that it is untrue were your interpretation correct.Is it not correct? Prove me wrong then.

I am a) uncomfortable presuming that Harris is simple-minded and b) able to see how what he says corresponds to a different interpretation which doesn't seem to be nonsensical.About a:

You don't have to judge the person. You don't have to rely on Harris' supposed wisdom or lack of it. I'm putting a statement under discussion, not him. What you and I think about Harris couldn't be more irrelevant to what I'm proposing.

About b:

I have a question. What's the logical path you follow from this

"There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be ... I think that this is quite clearly untrue." to this?

I think Harris is suggesting that it is untrue that moral questions can only be answered teleologically.

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 05:17 PM

Putting aside any reference to what Harris may or may not be arguing, under what conditions does it matter that there is a difference?

I'm still not following you. Under what conditions does it matter that there is a difference between the statements "The moon is white" and "The moon is made of cheese"? I have no idea how to respond to such a question.

I'm asking when you would say those things? Under what conditions would you say those things? It seems nonsensical to say "crows have black feathers, but they should be yellow". So why is it nonsensical when referring to an observation about crows, but it isn't nonsensical when referring to an observation about the preferences of conscious creatures?
I don't think either is more nonsensical than the other.

Dani

3rd November 2010, 05:29 PM

I'm still not following you. Under what conditions does it matter that there is a difference between the statements "The moon is white" and "The moon is made of cheese"? I have no idea how to respond to such a question.

I might not be the most appropriate to clarify this, but I think she's referring to the difference between statements such as "the moon is white" and "the moon should be destroyed".

Dragoonster

3rd November 2010, 05:53 PM

Hi Linda

I think that's basically what Dragoonster meant and it seems reasonable to me. Good actions are those which are okay to perform and bad actions are those which are to be avoided.

Accurate, but this is all I meant. How to approach good and bad are (objectively) undefined.

It's up to moral philosophers (or 7 billion people, or societial laws, etc.) to decide what actions are good, bad, etc. My given definition is only for the nature/definition of morality, not the individual, or scientific, or etc. justification or raising their particular morality above others.

Harris has to go from that definition of morals to moral oughts. And no matter how much he denies it, that's what he does skipping a step of saying why a moral should be an ought. But that's what anyone with a morality does. Takes the good/bad actions that define morality, and decide basically by fiat (or emotion, or selfishness, or utilitarianism, or any arbitrarily chosen basis) what "good" and "bad" are.

I simply see no reason at all for why Harris' decisions on these are more worthy than a Christians, or serial killers, or Muslims. He has not distinguished his "ought" as being more worthy than any other "ought".

I think Harris (and maybe you) are skipping the most crucial step from "morals are evaluations of good/bad actions" to "these are good/bad actions". Science doesn't tell us objectively what actions are good/bad; neither does religion; neither ultimately do societies. They all depend on a utilitarian or dogmatic axiom or goal, which has absolutely nothing to do with logically/scientifically/theologically proving their particularly morality is correct.

Could Harris put his belief that science can answer moral questions in logic form? If he did so, would this proof be any more substantive than the Ontological Proof, for one example of faulty thinking?

cornsail

3rd November 2010, 07:31 PM

I might not be the most appropriate to clarify this, but I think she's referring to the difference between statements such as "the moon is white" and "the moon should be destroyed".

Except "the moon should be destroyed" is not a factual (i.e. descriptive) claim about the moon, while "science can answer questions about what human preferences should be" is a factual claim about science. In general, I just find "why does it matter that sentence A doesn't mean the same thing as sentence B?" to be a bizarre question, regardless of what A and B are. In the context of the thread it matters for the sake of clarity and avoiding misunderstanding, but I don't think that's what Linda is getting it. So I'm at a loss.

Dragoonster

3rd November 2010, 08:20 PM

Yep. And again I feel that the Harris "defenders" (no pejorative meant, seriously) in this thread have actually put more thought and good argument into his supposed position than Harris himself. That is, even if his idea is a good one and has logical/moral merit, he clearly doesn't seem capable of adequately expressing and formalizing that idea. Apologizing for Harris is utterly unnecessary. He doesn't deserve it. He should be apologizing to all the people who feel forced to defend his sloppy, unconvincing, ignorant presentations.

fls

4th November 2010, 04:18 AM

When approached scientifically, pain is measured by self-reports (e.g. rating scales), behavioral responses (e.g. "as soon as you feel pain, move your hand") and brain activity (e.g. amount of activity in pain centers in the brain). Self-report may not sound like an objective metric, but it is a behavioral response and can be assigned a quantitative value. If it could not then it couldn't be used to study pain scientifically.

The same could be said of moral choices - they can be ranked or rated on their 'goodness', behavioral responses can be observed, and brain activity while making moral choices can be imaged.

Linda

fls

4th November 2010, 04:47 AM

I don't know what you want to know, sorry. We have a commucation problem. Can you formulate it in a simple way?

Apparently not. :)

I have several times written an explanatory post and thought, "that is so clear and simple that they cannot fail to understand it", only to be proven wrong. So I suspect that it is a hopeless cause.

If the assertion There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be is clearly untrue according to Harris, then we can formulate the following with the same meaning:

A description of the way the world is can tell us the way the world ought to be, according to Sam Harris.

Do you agree with my interpretation of Harris' statement?

No.

Do you agree with the statement?

No.

If you agree, can you give some examples in which a description of how the world is leads to the way the world ought to be?

No. Asking "what is the way the world ought to be?" is a nonsensical question.

Is it not correct? Prove me wrong then.

I just want to know why you would ask what appears to me to be a nonsensical question? I realize that you do not see it as nonsensical. I start by presuming that I must be misunderstanding something if I cannot understand why you would ask something nonsensical. However, based on my experience here, I have come to the conclusion that the impossibility of a solution for the "is/ought problem" is nothing compared to the impossibility of explaining why the question is nonsensical to me. :)

About a:

You don't have to judge the person. You don't have to rely on Harris' supposed wisdom or lack of it. I'm putting a statement under discussion, not him. What you and I think about Harris couldn't be more irrelevant to what I'm proposing.

It is relevant as to whether you've correctly understood what Harris way trying to convey in the statement under discussion. I think that by removing the preceding sentences, you have removed important context.

About b:

I have a question. What's the logical path you follow from this

to this?

Since my prior explanations of this logical path were obviously inadequate, and I am out of ideas (I typed an explanation, which on re-reading turned out to be the same as my prior explanations, so I deleted it), I don't know what to do.

Linda

fls

4th November 2010, 04:50 AM

I'm still not following you. Under what conditions does it matter that there is a difference between the statements "The moon is white" and "The moon is made of cheese"? I have no idea how to respond to such a question.

Yeah, that is a nonsensical question. I wonder why I would ask such a silly question. I'll have to go back and see where I did so in order to jog my memory.

Linda

fls

4th November 2010, 04:52 AM

Hi Linda

Accurate, but this is all I meant. How to approach good and bad are (objectively) undefined.

Yes, that is all I thought you meant.

Linda

cornsail

4th November 2010, 07:14 AM

The same could be said of moral choices - they can be ranked or rated on their 'goodness', behavioral responses can be observed, and brain activity while making moral choices can be imaged.

Linda

The difference is that pain is a property of individuals and moralness is a property of actions. The behavior or self report of an individual can be used as a metric of his or her pain. The good or badness of an action, on the other hand, is not a property of an individual, so an individual's rating does not seem it would be a valid measure. We could measure moral opinions, moral preferences and moral behavior this way, though, since those are properties of individuals.

cornsail

4th November 2010, 07:26 AM

Yeah, that is a nonsensical question.

Then maybe you can understand my confusion. I found that question and the question you asked equally nonsensical, as I clarified in a later post. I gave the best answer I could come up with, which is that it matters that two statements mean different things when there is confusion between them in a discussion. At least one person offered a different answer. But you asked the question again implying these weren't satisfactory answers. Maybe you can just explain where you were going with it?

fls

4th November 2010, 08:42 AM

The difference is that pain is a property of individuals and moralness is a property of actions. The behavior or self report of an individual can be used as a metric of his or her pain. The good or badness of an action, on the other hand, is not a property of an individual, so an individual's rating does not seem it would be a valid measure. We could measure moral opinions, moral preferences and moral behavior this way, though, since those are properties of individuals.

Except that moralness isn't a property of actions. It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions, moral preferences and moral behaviour.

Linda

AlBell

4th November 2010, 09:34 AM

Except that moralness isn't a property of actions. It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions, moral preferences and moral behaviour.

Linda
Well "moralness isn't a property of actions. It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions, moral preferences ..."
so far so good.

I have no idea what you intend to mean by "moral behavior" in the context of your sentence.

And note that Harris seems to believe Science can be added; "It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions and/or moral preferences, or by Science on the basis of ...." what??

cornsail

4th November 2010, 03:13 PM

Except that moralness isn't a property of actions. It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions, moral preferences and moral behaviour.

Linda

So we agree that science can measure moral opinions, preferences and behavior. My point was that science cannot measure the goodness or badness of actions (full stop). A qualifier such as "according to average opinion" would be necessary. I had assumed that we disagreed on this point, but maybe we don't. If not then I apologize for the confusion.

I get the impression none of us really disagree on anything at this point other than on our interpretation of what Sam Harris is saying.

cornsail

4th November 2010, 03:24 PM

I have no idea what you intend to mean by "moral behavior" in the context of your sentence.

I believe she was basing that off my example of something that could be measured. What I mean is that we could set up an experiment where participants are unknowingly placed in a situation where they have to make a behavioral choice that is of moral interest and observe how they behave (as opposed to simply asking them which action they deem the most moral in situation X).

cornsail

4th November 2010, 03:25 PM

BTW, science already studies these things. There is no barrier.

AlBell

4th November 2010, 03:35 PM

Of course; examine how conflicting 'oughts' play out in reality.

Cinorjer

4th November 2010, 04:39 PM

JonathanQuick

4th November 2010, 11:04 PM

Nope. There appear to be 10's of millions if not 100's of millions who do. How again will you Science them out of that belief?

And why isn't clitorectomy the issue better addressed? Also, while we're Scientifically Moralizing, why is killing unborn babies ok?

ps. I personally think Harris etal believe the highest moral good is maximizing booksales and speaking fees.

God bless you for speaking up for those unable to speak for themselves.

People supporting this butchery should be ashamed, but they are not.

JonathanQuick

5th November 2010, 10:28 AM

I emphasized "why is killing unborn babies ok?" in the quote I cited.

While it seemed obvious to me that the emphasis was mine, the author, AlBell, requested that I undo the emphasis. Since the Edit link has been removed by the Great Powers of Randi, I make this disclaimer.

Cinorjer

5th November 2010, 10:48 AM

God bless you for speaking up for those unable to speak for themselves.

People supporting this butchery should be ashamed, but they are not.

Why should they be ashamed? Because they don't hold the exact same moral beliefs that you hold? This is why anyone trying to come up with a universal or scientific moral belief system is doomed to failure.

Let's talk about a society that would consider your belief in the sanctity of individual life to be a perversion. This society began with the assumption that society was everything and the individual was nothing. The individual existed only to serve the greater good. Babies, even after being born, would be thrown on the trash heap if judged unfit or weak. This moral belief in a sacred human life would be judged as the ramblings of a crazy person.

The society was Sparta, and this little city-state was the only thing that the huge Persion empire was afraid of in their sweep through Greece. Why is your moral code more valid than their beliefs? What makes the life of a fetus worth as much as the life of a functioning woman that doesn't want it? Can you use logic or science, or any argument other than emotional?

Paulhoff

6th November 2010, 06:38 AM

God bless you for speaking up for those unable to speak for themselves.

People supporting this butchery should be ashamed, but they are not.
Sure, once they are born and grow up you can send them to war, because now they don't count.

Paul

:) :) :)

How about all that butchery in the bible that a so-called god said was OK to do, in his name.

Beth

6th November 2010, 01:04 PM

Look, the inherent flaw in saying science can judge right and wrong is that, while a moral code can be logical, consistant, and even results orientated, it has to be built on a set of choices, of assumptions that are entirely arbitrary. Your assumptions determine the final shape of the moral code.

Which is more important, the individual or society? Where, exactly, is the line drawn when it comes to behavior that benefits one over the other? Both choices have points for and against. Both have benefits and drawbacks. Can science determine how many people should suffer for the sake of one member of their society?

How about violence as a tool for either the individual or society to get what they want or need? Ghandi would have some strong words to say about the subject, but so would the Jewish people rounded up for slaughter. Can science determine when violence is moral?

When is conflict better than cooperation? These are all moral questions, and how we choose to answer them, by inclination or religious or other beliefs, determines the rules we live by and call morality. And, nowhere in there can science provide an answer, because we don't have a time machine to see which decision is better in the long run.

Yes. I think these are the sorts of moral questions that science can only help us answer after we have decided, based on our subjective evaluations of such things, what respective values to place on such intangibles as rights of the individual versus society, when, if ever, violence is an appropriate response, etc. Once the relative importance of such things is established, science can help us maximize whatever we value most.

I'm not clear if Sam Harris is claiming that science can provide us with answers about what we 'ought' to value most.

fls

7th November 2010, 12:18 PM

fls

7th November 2010, 12:40 PM

So we agree that science can measure moral opinions, preferences and behavior. My point was that science cannot measure the goodness or badness of actions (full stop).

This doesn't make any sense. Since our only reference to the goodness or badness of an action is through the human construct, how is taking that measure anything but measuring the goodness or badness of an action?

A qualifier such as "according to average opinion" would be necessary.

Why?

I had assumed that we disagreed on this point, but maybe we don't. If not then I apologize for the confusion.

I get the impression none of us really disagree on anything at this point other than on our interpretation of what Sam Harris is saying.

I dunno. I see people talking about consensus or average opinions or majorities, which aren't really relevant. It still looks like people are fixated on utilitarianism of some form.

I think I need to read his book if only to see how/if Harris manages to convey what I have failed to do.

Linda

AlBell

7th November 2010, 01:10 PM

And note that Harris seems to believe Science can be added; "It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions and/or moral preferences, or by Science on the basis of ...." what??

I wouldn't make that claim.

Linda
It's sure looked like it to me and I suspect others too. Since that isn't your claim, could you state your claim in a simple sentence? Or two sentences?

I'd also really appreciate your response to the part of my post you didn't quote:

Except that moralness isn't a property of actions. It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions, moral preferences and moral behaviour.

Well "moralness isn't a property of actions. It's a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions, moral preferences ..."
so far so good.

I have no idea what you intend to mean by "moral behavior" in the context of your sentence.
The reason you included "moral behavior" may be why I can't quite fathom what you mean.

fls

7th November 2010, 01:16 PM

Which is more important, the individual or society? Where, exactly, is the line drawn when it comes to behavior that benefits one over the other?...

Can science determine how many people should suffer for the sake of one member of their society?

How about violence as a tool for either the individual or society to get what they want or need?...

Can science determine when violence is moral?

When is conflict better than cooperation? These are all moral questions, and how we choose to answer them, by inclination or religious or other beliefs, determines the rules we live by and call morality. And, nowhere in there can science provide an answer, because we don't have a time machine to see which decision is better in the long run.

I just wanted to point out that you contradict yourself with that last statement. To say that the lack of a time machine is what prevents us from answering these questions admits that they have answers and that they are accessible through scientific investigation - that there is no barrier in principle, only in practice.

Linda

fls

7th November 2010, 01:20 PM

It's sure looked like it to me and I suspect others too. Since that isn't your claim, could you state your claim in a simple sentence? Or two sentences?

I'm working on that.

I'd also really appreciate your response to the part of my post you didn't quote:

The reason you included "moral behavior" may be why I can't quite fathom what you mean.

Sorry. Cornsail answered the question. Observing moral choices by observing behaviour.

Linda

AlBell

7th November 2010, 02:07 PM

Sorry. Cornsail answered the question. Observing moral choices by observing behaviour.

Linda
I still disagree. Without the framework provided by the 'oughts', or as you said "a property assigned to actions by individuals on the basis of moral opinions, moral preferences" observing behavior is meaningless.

cornsail

7th November 2010, 06:19 PM

This doesn't make any sense. Since our only reference to the goodness or badness of an action is through the human construct, how is taking that measure anything but measuring the goodness or badness of an action?

So, in your view a study showing that a majority of people consider an action immoral is evidence that the action is immoral?

I dunno. I see people talking about consensus or average opinions or majorities, which aren't really relevant.

If we can measure what is moral by measuring what people think is moral then how are consensus and average opinions not relevant? If you think that's irrelevant, what is an example of a way that the goodness/badness of an action could be measured validly?

It still looks like people are fixated on utilitarianism of some form.

I think I need to read his book if only to see how/if Harris manages to convey what I have failed to do.

Linda

It's odd that you assume Sam Harris is trying to convey the same thing you are. Although it's understandable to an extent, considering he didn't clarify what he was talking about in his TED talk.

From Harris' The Moral Landscape (Chapter 1):
Once we see that a concern for well-being (defined as deeply and as inclusively as possible) is the only intelligible basis for morality and values, we will see that there must be a science of morality, whether or not we ever succeed in developing it: because the well-being of conscious creatures depends upon how the universe is, altogether. Given that changes in the physical universe and in our experience of it can be understood, science should increasingly enable us to answer specific moral questions. For instance, would it be better to spend our next billion dollars eradicating racism or malaria? Which is generally more harmful to our personal relationships, “white” lies or gossip? Such questions may seem impossible to get a hold of at this moment, but they may not stay that way forever. As we come to understand how human beings can best collaborate and thrive in this world, science can help us find a path leading away from the lowest depths of misery and toward the heights of happiness for the greatest number of people. Of course, there will be practical impediments to evaluating the consequences of certain actions, and different paths through life may be morally equivalent (i.e., there may be many peaks on the moral landscape), but I am arguing that there are no obstacles, in principle, to our speaking about moral truth.
(bolding added)

For instance, to say that we ought to treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will tend to be better off if we do.

Do pigs suffer more than cows do when being led to slaughter? Would humanity suffer more or less, on balance, if the United States unilaterally gave up all its nuclear weapons? Questions like these are very difficult to answer. But this does not mean that they don’t have answers.

The fact that it could be difficult or impossible to know exactly how to maximize human well-being does not mean that there are no right or wrong ways to do this—nor does it mean that we cannot exclude certain answers as obviously bad.
(bolding added)

This is utilitarianism. No question about it.

(not a dirty word necessarily, but overhyped by Harris with a logical leap or two)

Of course, you don't have to agree with Harris. And we don't have to talk about his ideas. But if your goal is to explain or defend them, it's best to get clear on what they are.

cornsail

7th November 2010, 07:53 PM

I'd like to expand on that last post, but directed to the thread in general rather than as a response to Linda.

I've read the introduction and first chapter of Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape. The book, so far, is much better than the TED talk in the sense that I had no clue what he was on about in his talk. That's not to say the book is good, though.

The book argues that maximizing "the well-being of conscious creatures" must be the fundamental goal of morality. That is, actions that positively impact well-being are (by definition essentially) more moral than actions that negatively impact well-being. Harris argues that this is a valid starting point, because to not value well-being is nonsensical. I'm inclined to agree with this last point -- at a fundamental level, meeting value necessarily increases well-being in some sense. The glaring problem is that Harris does not make the jump from the fact that all people value well-being to the conclusion that people should value other people's (or animals) well-being, nor does he seem to acknowledge that a jump is there to be made.

Let me clarify that last point. Yes, we could say that well-being is necessarily valuable to individuals. But to each individual, the only thing that is fundamentally valuable is their own well-being. Since individuals can feel empathy, the well-being of others can certainly be valuable to us. But it cannot be said to be necessarily or fundamentally valuable to us. It is easy to think of situations in which the well-being of others either has no value to us or in which it has value, but that value is out-weighed by some other value.

The relevance of science, claims Sam Harris, is that it can help us figure out the impact on overall well-being that certain actions, decisions or practices have. This can help us to answer moral questions assuming that we accept Harris' definition of moral value. For example (this is my example, not Harris'), if we could demonstrate that homosexuality does not decrease human well-being, and that discrimination against homosexuals does decrease overall well-being, we could prove that homosexuality is not immoral and that intolerance of it is immoral.

The many counter-intuitive implications of utilitarianism are well-known. One of the most famous "moral dilemmas" is whether you should push one person in front of a train in order to save five people further down the track, where most people tend to say no. I think for most people, their sense of morality takes the utilitarian ideal into account, but certainly also takes non-utilitarian ideals into account as well.

Despite Sam Harris' sometimes embarrassing use of logic and incredulity toward any disagreement, I do agree with him that science seems to me to be undervalued when it comes to questions of how to improve society or whether to engage in certain practices. When faced with a question such as state health care policy or spanking our children people seem to gravitate toward ideological or intuitive reasons rather than scientifically tractable reasons that could be explored with evidence. However, there are certainly already plenty of scientists researching "well-being" or things relevant to it. Psychologists, sociologists, pharmacists, economists, policy researchers... Sam Harris is not (as far as I've gotten in the book) advocating anything be done that isn't already being done by science, he would merely have us re-define morality so that we could insert the label "moral" into the conclusions of some of these scientific studies.

Beth

7th November 2010, 08:07 PM

So, in your view a study showing that a majority of people consider an action immoral is evidence that the action is immoral? It's certainly one way of approaching the subject and there is some logic to defining moral/immoral in this way. It seems to me that the problem is that it breaks down as soon as you identify an area where you don't agree with the majority.

From Harris' The Moral Landscape (Chapter 1):

This is utilitarianism. No question about it.

I'm not an expert, but that's how I interpret it.

I also find his definition of moral as identical with the well-being of conscious creatures to be problematic because not only is 'well-being' a very fluid term depending on context, but the definition of consciousness also debated quite resoundingly.

Democracy Simulator

7th November 2010, 09:50 PM

Thanks Cornsail for giving us a brief outline of the first chapter of 'The Moral Landscape'. I may get to read it; it would be interesting for me to confirm whether my suspicions regarding Harris are true.

'How Science can Determine Human Values', lovely bit of equivocation and on the cover too.

Cinorjer

8th November 2010, 03:14 AM

I just wanted to point out that you contradict yourself with that last statement. To say that the lack of a time machine is what prevents us from answering these questions admits that they have answers and that they are accessible through scientific investigation - that there is no barrier in principle, only in practice.

Linda

Heh. OK, you caught me in a paradox. But if a time machine able to observe the future was actually invented, the nature of morality would be the least of our worries. Since the act of observing something in the future would change the present, thus changing the future, thus changing the present again....my best guess is, time would collapse like a popped soap bubble.

Cinorjer

8th November 2010, 03:35 AM

The book argues that maximizing "the well-being of conscious creatures" must be the fundamental goal of morality. That is, actions that positively impact well-being are (by definition essentially) more moral than actions that negatively impact well-being. Harris argues that this is a valid starting point, because to not value well-being is nonsensical. I'm inclined to agree with this last point -- at a fundamental level, meeting value necessarily increases well-being in some sense. The glaring problem is that Harris does not make the jump from the fact that all people value well-being to the conclusion that people should value other people's (or animals) well-being, nor does he seem to acknowledge that a jump is there to be made.

OK, now I'm beginning to see where the foundation of his logical structure is missing, and you've pinpointed it. People are tribal animals on an instinctive, unavoidable level. We can argue for the viewpoint that entire humanity or even conscious creatures as a whole can constitute a tribe, but we're not wired that way. As you point out, It is simple observational science that humanity's nature considers our own well-being and our family's and our local tribe's needs as more important than that stranger who dresses and talks funny.

And why not? The entire sweep of history is one culture considering their own well-being over another, to the point of eliminating the other so we can take their stuff, and it's gotten us all the advantages of civilization and made us the most successful species ever. Morally, a lot of what humanity's done to get here is a little dicy. Let's face it, we're warlike and not very nice to have as neighbors, on a whole.

I think if there's one thing science can teach us about morals, it's not that the only valid ones are for the well-being of all conscious beings, but that we are not just slaves to our instincts and we can live up to higher standards, if we make the effort. Slavery as an institution thought of as morally acceptable is pretty much a thing of the past. We might not care as much about the suffering of people across the world as we do our own family, but we do care.

fls

8th November 2010, 11:47 AM

So, in your view a study showing that a majority of people consider an action immoral is evidence that the action is immoral?

If we can measure what is moral by measuring what people think is moral then how are consensus and average opinions not relevant? If you think that's irrelevant, what is an example of a way that the goodness/badness of an action could be measured validly?

I don't think that we need to be able to make a goodness/badness ruler in order to answer questions about values and morality.

It's odd that you assume Sam Harris is trying to convey the same thing you are. Although it's understandable to an extent, considering he didn't clarify what he was talking about in his TED talk.

Well, I'm hoping he's trying to. :) I'd have to read his book to find out, which is why I said "if".

From Harris' The Moral Landscape (Chapter 1):

This is utilitarianism. No question about it.

(not a dirty word necessarily, but overhyped by Harris with a logical leap or two)

Of course, you don't have to agree with Harris. And we don't have to talk about his ideas. But if your goal is to explain or defend them, it's best to get clear on what they are.

My goal is to explain or defend my ideas. It's made easier if Harris happens to be doing the same. But if he's not, then it doesn't help me, but it does make everything I've said horribly off-topic. :)

All I've read is the sample, which is only slightly more expository than his talk (mostly the Intro for his book).

Linda

fls

8th November 2010, 11:55 AM

Heh. OK, you caught me in a paradox. But if a time machine able to observe the future was actually invented, the nature of morality would be the least of our worries. Since the act of observing something in the future would change the present, thus changing the future, thus changing the present again....my best guess is, time would collapse like a popped soap bubble.

The time machine part is irrelevant. You referred to discovering "which decision is better in the long run". Regardless of how that happens, admitting that some decisions can be characterized as better in the long run is all Harris asks for.

Linda

Eos of the Eons

8th November 2010, 12:08 PM

God bless you for speaking up for those unable to speak for themselves.

People supporting this butchery should be ashamed, but they are not.

Where do draw the line, as in when does it become "butchery"? When the blastocyste becomes and embryo, or when and embryo becomes a fetus? If there is no brain, or no heart, is it still a person (abortions can be done on fetuses that will be stillborn)? Are you also going to start adopting up all the kids that aren't aborted according to your guidelines as well? Some people don't become good parents just because they become pregnant. And don't even get me started on adoptions. I've never had an abortion, but I find adoption a huge complication and foster parents even a harsher sentence for a child.

I say, in this case, leave people alone! It should be between them and a doctor and none of anyone else's business. Don't pass judgement and don't call it butchery.

AlBell

8th November 2010, 12:34 PM

The time machine part is irrelevant. You referred to discovering "which decision is better in the long run". Regardless of how that happens, admitting that some decisions can be characterized as better in the long run is all Harris asks for.

Linda
Unfortunately science tends to require control groups to compare 'which decision is better in the long run', which in the studies that I'd think are envisioned lead to highly unethical situations.

I'm almost ready to mention a medical henchman that would godwin this thread.

Cinorjer

8th November 2010, 12:44 PM

The time machine part is irrelevant. You referred to discovering "which decision is better in the long run". Regardless of how that happens, admitting that some decisions can be characterized as better in the long run is all Harris asks for.

Linda

Ah, I see. However, I don't really admit that any moral decisions can actually be characterized as better in the long run. I was just being flippant. Better for who? Better in what way? We can already look back at history, and it tells us that long term survival is pretty much a crapshoot and irrelevant to moral codes and certainly has nothing to do with the well-being of anyone.

For instance, was it moral to use the atomic bomb on Japan, as measured by long term well being of all? The only way to know would be to set up two realities, one where we dropped it and one where we didn't, and see what difference it makes in the world. Impossible.

I'm not rooting for morality being useless or irrelevant. I think maximizing the happiness of people or at least minimizing the suffering is the only worthy moral goal of humanity. But I can't prove it's superior in the long run, only what my sense of compassion compells me to do.

cornsail

9th November 2010, 07:33 AM

I don't think that we need to be able to make a goodness/badness ruler in order to answer questions about values and morality.

I'm having a difficult time understanding you. You've said (by my interpretation):

-Moral choices can be studied by self-report ratings of people's opinions, measurements of people's behavioral responses, and scanning of their brain activity.
-We could call this measuring the goodness/badness of actions. No qualifier such as "according to the opinions of most people" would be necessary.
-Average or majority opinions on moral choices aren't relevant.

At this point I am asking how you reconcile the last statement with the previous ones and since you seemed to say that moral preference self-reports would be a valid measure of the goodness/badness of actions. Now you say:

-We don't need objective metrics to study moral questions scientifically.

Okay, but... Using objective metrics to study moral questions is what we were talking about. And we were talking about it, in part, because you said objective metrics could be used to study moral questions. When you say they are not needed are you saying A or B?

A. I'm still sticking to all the things I said previously, but just throwing out as a side note that moral questions can also be approached scientifically without objective metrics.
B. I've changed my mind about moral questions being answerable by objective metrics. But they can be answered in other scientific ways.

If A, I would like to know how opinions on moral choices can be 'irrelevant' yet also be a valid objective measure of the goodness/badness of choices. Do you think a scientific study that showed most people consider something to be immoral would be evidence that it is, in fact, immoral? If not how could an objective metric be used to reach a conclusion (can you provide an example?).

If B, please try to make it clear when you've changed your mind on something. It gets very confusing if people are claiming things that contradict things they've claimed before without making it known that they know longer hold the previous position. There is no shame in changing one's mind.

For both A and B, now. Can you explain how questions of morality could be answered scientifically without an objective metric? An example would help. Like I brought up earlier, when hard-to-define constructs like pain and depression are studied scientifically, objective metrics are certainly used.

fls

10th November 2010, 08:14 AM

Ah, I see. However, I don't really admit that any moral decisions can actually be characterized as better in the long run. I was just being flippant. Better for who? Better in what way?

Do you think that there are no answers to those questions? Would we answer, "better for the population of cows?" or "better for the preservation of Spode fine china?"

We can already look back at history, and it tells us that long term survival is pretty much a crapshoot and irrelevant to moral codes and certainly has nothing to do with the well-being of anyone.

For instance, was it moral to use the atomic bomb on Japan, as measured by long term well being of all? The only way to know would be to set up two realities, one where we dropped it and one where we didn't, and see what difference it makes in the world. Impossible.

Well, that is the argument made for why it is impossible to study the origin of life, so I have admit that I don't find it compelling. When you say "see what difference it makes in the world" are you or are you not suggesting that we would distinguish between those two different scenarios and possibly prefer one to the other?

I'm not rooting for morality being useless or irrelevant. I think maximizing the happiness of people or at least minimizing the suffering is the only worthy moral goal of humanity. But I can't prove it's superior in the long run, only what my sense of compassion compells me to do.

Your sense of compassion is a fact about humans. And we can study outcomes in relation to these facts. What I'm having trouble understanding is why that process is characterized as 'arbitrary' if it happens to involve some actions, but not others.

Linda

AlBell

10th November 2010, 12:54 PM

Ah, I see. However, I don't really admit that any moral decisions can actually be characterized as better in the long run. I was just being flippant. Better for who? Better in what way?

Do you think that there are no answers to those questions? Would we answer, "better for the population of cows?" or "better for the preservation of Spode fine china?"
So what would you deem a "real answer" to be?

We can already look back at history, and it tells us that long term survival is pretty much a crapshoot and irrelevant to moral codes and certainly has nothing to do with the well-being of anyone.

For instance, was it moral to use the atomic bomb on Japan, as measured by long term well being of all? The only way to know would be to set up two realities, one where we dropped it and one where we didn't, and see what difference it makes in the world. Impossible.

Well, that is the argument made for why it is impossible to study the origin of life, so I have admit that I don't find it compelling.
Huh?

When you say "see what difference it makes in the world" are you or are you not suggesting that we would distinguish between those two different scenarios and possibly prefer one to the other?
Not without some arbitrarily chosen guideline.

I'm not rooting for morality being useless or irrelevant. I think maximizing the happiness of people or at least minimizing the suffering is the only worthy moral goal of humanity. But I can't prove it's superior in the long run, only what my sense of compassion compells me to do.

Your sense of compassion is a fact about humans. And we can study outcomes in relation to these facts. What I'm having trouble understanding is why that process is characterized as 'arbitrary' if it happens to involve some actions, but not others.

Linda
Because every ranking that involves moral behaviors involves arbitrary selections before the fact, or after.

If you disagree, what is an example?

fls

10th November 2010, 01:30 PM

I'm having a difficult time understanding you. You've said (by my interpretation):

-Moral choices can be studied by self-report ratings of people's opinions, measurements of people's behavioral responses, and scanning of their brain activity.
-We could call this measuring the goodness/badness of actions. No qualifier such as "according to the opinions of most people" would be necessary.
-Average or majority opinions on moral choices aren't relevant.

At this point I am asking how you reconcile the last statement with the previous ones and since you seemed to say that moral preference self-reports would be a valid measure of the goodness/badness of actions. Now you say:

-We don't need objective metrics to study moral questions scientifically.

Okay, but... Using objective metrics to study moral questions is what we were talking about. And we were talking about it, in part, because you said objective metrics could be used to study moral questions. When you say they are not needed are you saying A or B?

A. I'm still sticking to all the things I said previously, but just throwing out as a side note that moral questions can also be approached scientifically without objective metrics.
B. I've changed my mind about moral questions being answerable by objective metrics. But they can be answered in other scientific ways.

If A, I would like to know how opinions on moral choices can be 'irrelevant' yet also be a valid objective measure of the goodness/badness of choices. Do you think a scientific study that showed most people consider something to be immoral would be evidence that it is, in fact, immoral? If not how could an objective metric be used to reach a conclusion (can you provide an example?).

If B, please try to make it clear when you've changed your mind on something. It gets very confusing if people are claiming things that contradict things they've claimed before without making it known that they know longer hold the previous position. There is no shame in changing one's mind.

For both A and B, now. Can you explain how questions of morality could be answered scientifically without an objective metric? An example would help. Like I brought up earlier, when hard-to-define constructs like pain and depression are studied scientifically, objective metrics are certainly used.

The objective metrics were your idea. Because I'm used to investigating health, I'm used to dealing with constructs that don't fit neatly into categories like objective/subjective, quantifiable/qualifiable, etc. And I'm used to making comparisons and judgements in the absence of objective metrics. If you want to call an individual's self-reported pain on a 10-point scale "an objective metric", then the self-reported goodness/badness of an action on a 10-point scale serves as a similar kind of metric. But I'm not going to pretend that it has the same characteristics of a metric like 'length in metres'. Nor am I going to pretend that objective metrics are the only way comparisons can be made.

I don't understand why, on this topic but not on others, normal considerations of operational definitions and outcomes measures have to be characterized as "arbitrary" or "lacking objective metrics", and why these characteristics are suddenly something that science is unable to address.

Linda