Frank Newgent
7th February 2004, 08:04 AM
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0206-11.htm
Tenet chose to defend the indefensible—the bogus National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) hurriedly conjured up in September 2002 to support spurious charges made by Vice President Dick Cheney on August 26, 2002 in beating the drum for war on Iraq. The conclusions of that estimate have now been proven —pure and simple—wrong.
Even so, that is not the most important point. What all should know is that the Bush administration’s decision for war against Iraq came well before any intelligence estimate. There is ample evidence that that decision was made, at the latest, by spring 2002.
That there was no NIE before that speaks volumes. During my 27 years of service as a CIA analyst, never was a foreign policy decision of that magnitude made without FIRST commissioning a National Intelligence Estimate. Why did Tenet not take the initiative and see that one was done? Surely, if he did not know that decisions on war and peace were being made at the White House and Pentagon in early 2002, he was the only one in Washington so unaware.
There was no NIE because Tenet realized that an honest one would show how little the intelligence community knew about the threat from Iraq and would hardly support a case for war. And so, consummate bureaucrat that he is, he kept his head down for as long as he could.
It was only when the somnolent Senator from Florida, Bob Graham, then Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was nudged awake by committee colleague Dick Durbin that Graham nodded, yes it did seem odd that no NIE had been prepared. And especially odd at a time when Congress was being asked to cede to the president its constitutional prerogative to declare war.
So Graham called Tenet, and Tenet got the go-ahead from his masters in the White House—WITH THE PROVISO that the estimate’s conclusions dovetail with the case for war just made by Cheney. Tenet saluted, and then picked his most malleable manager, Robert Walpole, to ensure that a politically correct NIE was produced.
In other words, the purpose of the estimate was not to inform an (already reached) decision on whether war was necessary. Rather, it was to enlist intelligence in the campaign to deceive Congress into thinking that Iraq posed such a threat that the legislative branch’s prerogative must be surrendered to the president, and—not incidentally—to make so persuasive a case to the nation that those who dared vote against the president would be highly vulnerable in the mid-term election of 2002. That worked too.
Fool me once...etc, etc. Ironically, Bob Graham stands a good chance of being the next vice president.
Tenet chose to defend the indefensible—the bogus National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) hurriedly conjured up in September 2002 to support spurious charges made by Vice President Dick Cheney on August 26, 2002 in beating the drum for war on Iraq. The conclusions of that estimate have now been proven —pure and simple—wrong.
Even so, that is not the most important point. What all should know is that the Bush administration’s decision for war against Iraq came well before any intelligence estimate. There is ample evidence that that decision was made, at the latest, by spring 2002.
That there was no NIE before that speaks volumes. During my 27 years of service as a CIA analyst, never was a foreign policy decision of that magnitude made without FIRST commissioning a National Intelligence Estimate. Why did Tenet not take the initiative and see that one was done? Surely, if he did not know that decisions on war and peace were being made at the White House and Pentagon in early 2002, he was the only one in Washington so unaware.
There was no NIE because Tenet realized that an honest one would show how little the intelligence community knew about the threat from Iraq and would hardly support a case for war. And so, consummate bureaucrat that he is, he kept his head down for as long as he could.
It was only when the somnolent Senator from Florida, Bob Graham, then Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was nudged awake by committee colleague Dick Durbin that Graham nodded, yes it did seem odd that no NIE had been prepared. And especially odd at a time when Congress was being asked to cede to the president its constitutional prerogative to declare war.
So Graham called Tenet, and Tenet got the go-ahead from his masters in the White House—WITH THE PROVISO that the estimate’s conclusions dovetail with the case for war just made by Cheney. Tenet saluted, and then picked his most malleable manager, Robert Walpole, to ensure that a politically correct NIE was produced.
In other words, the purpose of the estimate was not to inform an (already reached) decision on whether war was necessary. Rather, it was to enlist intelligence in the campaign to deceive Congress into thinking that Iraq posed such a threat that the legislative branch’s prerogative must be surrendered to the president, and—not incidentally—to make so persuasive a case to the nation that those who dared vote against the president would be highly vulnerable in the mid-term election of 2002. That worked too.
Fool me once...etc, etc. Ironically, Bob Graham stands a good chance of being the next vice president.