Is Subjective Idealism compatible with Evolution?

[ceptimus]

I use the term, 'Subjective Idealism' in the thread title, without really understanding what it means, but Interesting Ian posted in another thread that this is what he believes, so I assume it has something to do with consciousness being a special thing, not explained by science - maybe something immaterial, like a 'soul' is believed to be present.

I thought it might make an interesting thread to see how this belief system might be compatible with the theory of Darwinian Evolution. To me, the two ideas seem incompatible.

[a_unique_person]

Indubitably.

[ceptimus]

So did the 'souls' (is there a better term?) evolve too, or did they always exist?

When does the immaterial soul attach to the material brain?

Where do new souls come from (to allow for population growth)?

Do animals have souls? Fish? Ants? Worms? Bacteria? Plants?

[Hexxenhammer]

Here's what Wikpedia says:Subjective idealism is a theory in the philosophy of perception. It describes a relationship between human experience of the external world, and that world itself, in which objects are nothing more than collections (or bundles) of sense data in those who perceive them.
A famous proponent of subjective idealism was 18th century Irish philosopher George Berkeley.
This theory has much in common with phenomenalism, the view that physical objects, properties, events, etc. (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events, etc. Thus reality is ultimately made up of only mental objects, properties, events, etc.
So I'd say no.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

I would say yes, because ultimately it makes no difference whether we conceive the world to be made entirely of "subjective" impressions or "objective" realities. Everything works out the same. It's like asking whether pie a la mode has the pie underneath the ice cream or the ice cream on top of the pie - it's just two descriptions of the same thing.

Are we just programs in a perfectly-consistent simulation, or are we 'real'? The only meaningful answer is 'yes'.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by ceptimus
So did the 'souls' (is there a better term?) evolve too, or did they always exist?
Souls are obviously beneficial, those without souls go to Hell, so by a process of Devine Selection we can reasonably conclude souls do in fact evolve.

When does the immaterial soul attach to the material brain?
Souls exist in all places at once, they are "attached" to all things at once, therefore the question is moot.

Where do new souls come from (to allow for population growth)?
You understand the process of bacteria reproduction, well its a lot like that.

Do animals have souls? Fish? Ants? Worms? Bacteria? Plants?
No, no, no, no, maybe, and no.

[EternalUniverse]

Originally posted by ceptimus
I use the term, 'Subjective Idealism' in the thread title, without really understanding what it means, but Interesting Ian posted in another thread that this is what he believes, so I assume it has something to do with consciousness being a special thing, not explained by science - maybe something immaterial, like a 'soul' is believed to be present.

I thought it might make an interesting thread to see how this belief system might be compatible with the theory of Darwinian Evolution. To me, the two ideas seem incompatible.

Well, philosophical idealism argues that there is no justification for an external world (i.e. that it is not certain that one exists), since all we have to go by are our mental representations. I believe that evolution assumes materialism (which opposes idealism), so the TOE will probably not really fit into any idealist paradigm.

[EternalUniverse]

Originally posted by ceptimus
So did the 'souls' (is there a better term?) evolve too, or did they always exist?

When does the immaterial soul attach to the material brain?

Where do new souls come from (to allow for population growth)?

Do animals have souls? Fish? Ants? Worms? Bacteria? Plants?

Philosophical idealism doesn't assume an external world. Our bodies and brains are part of the external world too, so idealists think that their existence are not certain. In fact, idealists have to justify how their belief doesn't logically lead to solipsism since people/animals populate the external world (which may or may not exist!).

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As people have already said, I think subjective idealism blows off the physical world, and evolution with it. There is just some kind of universal mind and all the physical stuff is illusion. Evolution is an illusion to explain the existence of the illusion of life.

Something like that.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

FWIW, I tend more towards objective idealism, but opine that the mechanisms TOE describe can fit in either framework.

Perhaps it would be more difficult for a Berkleyan to come to grips with.


Paul: Damn language; but "illusion" carries connotations I have trouble with. Wish I could explain it better.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Emulation?

An emulation is an illusion that is real. Perhaps that is the word you seek.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Emulation sounds good to me.

~~ Paul

[Jeff Corey]

Emulation = imitation with an effort to equal or surpass. How does that work here?
Hey, I'm just a simple old mindless radical behaviorist. I don't even delve into Cantor's intersubjectivity or illogical positism that much, but there's a world out there, we can agree about many of its aspects and interobserver reliability can let us reliably measure public behaviors. Private events get a bit dicey.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Think of the computer science usage of emulation. It's a simulation that includes all of the functional aspects of whatever is being simulated. In other words, an emulator that runs old Nintento games on your PC isn't just imitating the functioning of the game system, it IS the game system. It's also used to denote computational systems that are being represented within other computational systems.

[Mercutio]

I find it interesting that no subjective idealist has come by to make a comment, leaving the rest of us to wax philosophic on "what subjective idealism must claim"...while on the materialist threads it always seems to be the resident subjective idealist who makes claims about "what materialism must claim". I only hope we do a better job representing his views than he does ours!

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Well, there's always the Internet to do the job for him.

Consider this site (http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm), for example.

[edit] Interesting... the author of the piece is also named Ian. From London. I doubt they're the same person, though, as our Ian wouldn't present the argument as consistently as the site does.

[Hexxenhammer]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
Well, there's always the Internet to do the job for him.

Consider this site (http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm), for example.Wow, reading that page explained a lot. I now understand why it's crap much better than I did before.

[lifegazer]

I'd like to make a comment since I am an idealist.

Ask yourselves three questions:-
(1) What is the absolute origin of the matter and the processes/forces which have moulded the body of man? Or, what is the origin of the universe?
(2) Is the whole universe happening within a Mind? Does only a Mind exist?
(3) Is all awareness associated with this Mind?

You don't have to answer the questions. The point is that you see "evolution" is not a problem for Idealists. Idealists embrace the order of the world within their philosophies. They just see that there is an origin and stage for this perceived universal play.
So, it doesn't matter how the order within our minds has helped to yield our bodies. Ultimately, an idealist such as myself will just say that the whole show is happening within [the awareness of] a Mind... and that this Mind was the creator of the show.

"Evolution" is only a problem for those who take the bible literally. Not for idealists.

[Darat]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
…snip…

Interesting... the author of the piece is also named Ian. From London. I doubt they're the same person, though, as our Ian wouldn't present the argument as consistently as the site does.

It's not II.

You may not know but for quite awhile II has been promising (threatened?) his very own website. It is on my most anticipated websites list…

[ceptimus]

Why would a subjective idealist bother to read this thread? In fact, why would such a person bother to do anything?

If everything that he perceives is just constructs of his own mind, then all these ideas we are posting here, and the website Wrath linked to and so on, must already be present in the mind, waiting to be 'performed' or 'rendered by the emulation' or whatever term you prefer.

It seems a pretty arrogant view to hold. It claims all thought, even the thought of what appear to be other people is actually constructs of one's own mind.

How does such a person, A, deal with what appears to be a clever person, B, who has ideas that A can't understand? Say A meets a brilliant mathematician who tries to explain something that A just can't grasp. Why would A's mind bother to conjure up such an 'illusion', or 'emulation'?

[ceptimus]

Lifegazer.

Your model to me appears to create more problems than it answers.

Sure, I have to try and explain where the universe came from, when it began, why it might be the way it is and so on, and you don't.

But you are left with the problem of where your universal mind (can I call it God?) came from, why it is running this model of universe and so on.

In fact you have to explain all the same things I do (as aspects of the model that the mind is creating), but you have the additional problem of explaining the existence of your universal mind.

Such a mind, capable of creating such a vast and confusing universe, is surely a very complex thing, and even more difficult to explain the existence of than my material universe.

Should you be tempted to dodge the question by saying, 'God has existed forever' or 'These questions have no answer', then I would point out that I can say exactly the same about the material universe, thereby saving the additional complication that your system necessitates.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
I use the term, 'Subjective Idealism' in the thread title, without really understanding what it means, but Interesting Ian posted in another thread that this is what he believes, so I assume it has something to do with consciousness being a special thing,



No not at all. Consciousness is consciousness. It is not what it doesn't appear to be eg material or whatever.



not explained by science - maybe something immaterial, like a 'soul' is believed to be present.

I thought it might make an interesting thread to see how this belief system might be compatible with the theory of Darwinian Evolution. To me, the two ideas seem incompatible.

How so?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
So did the 'souls' (is there a better term?) evolve too, or did they always exist?


Why can't they always have existed and evolve?



When does the immaterial soul attach to the material brain?



Sometime between conception and birth.




Where do new souls come from (to allow for population growth)?



Why do you think there are new souls?



Do animals have souls? Fish? Ants? Worms? Bacteria? Plants? [/B]

Depends if sentient.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Hexxenhammer
Here's what Wikpedia says: So I'd say no.

Why?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
As people have already said, I think subjective idealism blows off the physical world, and evolution with it. There is just some kind of universal mind and all the physical stuff is illusion. Evolution is an illusion to explain the existence of the illusion of life.

Something like that.

~~ Paul

That's interesting Paul. You also maintain there is no distinction between materialism and idealism. So under materialism physical stuff is also an illusion?

[ceptimus]

Hi Ian. Thanks for contributing. I have learnt a lot by arguing with you, so though I don't often agree with you, I appreciate your being here.

ceptimus: Do animals have souls? Fish? Ants? Worms? Bacteria? Plants?

Interesting Ian: Depends if sentient.

I tried you on this one before somewhere, but it got lost in the noise. If you accept Darwinian Evolution (do you?) then presumably animals evolve without being sentinent up to a certain point, then become sentinent? I'd like you to expand on how you think that happens. Is there a sharp demarcation, when one particular individual creature was suddenly sentinent when its parent(s) was/were not? This is one of the points where, to me, idealism seems incompatible with evolution.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio
I find it interesting that no subjective idealist has come by to make a comment, leaving the rest of us to wax philosophic on "what subjective idealism must claim"...while on the materialist threads it always seems to be the resident subjective idealist who makes claims about "what materialism must claim". I only hope we do a better job representing his views than he does ours!

What are you talking about?? I understand materialism perfectly. It simply maintains that there is a realm existing, which enjoys an ontological self-subsistent existence, which certainly includes our sensory perceptions, and is typically supposed to involve the existence of other "stuff". This other "stuff" is somehow responsible for said sensory experiences although, paradoxically, the said "stuff" is only known through our sensory experiences.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Is there a sharp demarcation, when one particular individual creature was suddenly sentinent when its parent(s) was/were not? [/B]

I don't know. What do you think?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by EternalUniverse
[B]

Philosophical idealism doesn't assume an external world.



There are different types of idealism and their meanings vary. I really don't think it has much meaning denying the existence of an "external world". Could you define what precisely you mean?

A subjective idealist simply thinks the objects of experience is a short hand way of referring to a particular family of sensory experiences or qualia. Consider what is referred to as a peach. This simply means that one experiences certain characteristic qualia (sense experiences) of a certain visual nature, and (should one make certain bodily movements), of a certain tactile nature, and of a certain olfactory nature, and of a certain gustatory nature. Such characteristic qualia are found together and are collectively referred to as a peach.

What subjective idealism explicitly denies is that the reality of a peach is not constituted by our sensory perceptions of it. As a corollary, it explicitly denies there is a wholly mind-independent peach which is somehow responsible for our sensory perceptions of it.

On the other hand other idealist positions hold that although the external world is mental, it exists independently of any minds.




Our bodies and brains are part of the external world too, so idealists think that their existence are not certain.


As I say you need to be clear about what you mean by an external world. What does it mean to say that we don't have bodies?

Here (http://maxpages.com/markphilosophy/Idealism_Page) is a link introducing the notion of philosophical Idealism.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
Well, there's always the Internet to do the job for him.

Consider this site (http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm), for example.

[edit] Interesting... the author of the piece is also named Ian. From London. I doubt they're the same person, though, as our Ian wouldn't present the argument as consistently as the site does.

Numerous crass errors. Although the word "realism" is used in a bewildering number of differing ways, one most certainly cannot equate it with meaning philosophical materialism! One certainly cannot even equate it with the notion of a material world and a fortiori one cannot equate it with materialism.

One can be an idealist, even a subjective idealist and be a realist. Realism in such a context means that our scientific theories correctly depict how reality really is.

[Interesting Ian]

Oh well, looks like everyone's ignoring me on here. Might as well go.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Hexxenhammer
Wow, reading that page explained a lot. I now understand why it's crap much better than I did before.

Would you mind sharing your understanding?

[ceptimus]

ceptimus: Is there a sharp demarcation, when one particular individual creature was suddenly sentinent when its parent(s) was/were not?

Interesting Ian: I don't know. What do you think?

Hey! I asked first.

It's not a problem for materialists like me. I don't believe 'consciousness attaches to the brain sometime between conception and birth', like you do. I think 'consciousness' in so far that it means anything, is just a word for the material functions going on within a brain. So a slug might have some very small consciousness, with its feeble brain, and you and I have a much bigger consciousness.

Are you able to answer these questions (I sound like Tricky now):

1. Do you believe in Darwinian evolution?

2. If so, then is there a sharp demarcation, when one particular individual creature was suddenly sentinent when its parent(s) was/were not?

I'm genuinely interested in what you think.

[Hexxenhammer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Would you mind sharing your understanding? I'm not going to give you a book report. Suffice to say I can read and comprehend what I read. Idealism says everything is a mental construct and so it follows that any apparent evolution is illusionary. If they were compatible it seems to me that lifegazer's Big Giant Head must have been around imagining bacteria, then multicelled organisms, and so on.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
ceptimus: Is there a sharp demarcation, when one particular individual creature was suddenly sentinent when its parent(s) was/were not?

Interesting Ian: I don't know. What do you think?

Hey! I asked first.

It's not a problem for materialists like me. I don't believe 'consciousness attaches to the brain sometime between conception and birth', like you do. I think 'consciousness' in so far that it means anything, is just a word for the material functions going on within a brain. So a slug might have some very small consciousness, with its feeble brain, and you and I have a much bigger consciousness.

Are you able to answer these questions (I sound like Tricky now):

1. Do you believe in Darwinian evolution?

2. If so, then is there a sharp demarcation, when one particular individual creature was suddenly sentinent when its parent(s) was/were not?

I'm genuinely interested in what you think.

Well I've told you I don't know. I'm not sure if anything else can be said.

[Hexxenhammer]

Originally posted by ceptimus
[b]ceptimus:[/bAre you able to answer these questions (I sound like Tricky now):

1. Do you believe in Darwinian evolution?
Not quite what you want to ask I don't think. Belief in evolution isn't nessecary as it happens whether someone believes it or not. I don't believe in evolution. Like I don't believe in gravity. It just is.

Actually. It is what you want to ask Ian since he might think these natural processes are all an illusion. Never mind.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Well I've told you I don't know. I'm not sure if anything else can be said. So does this point refute your kind of idealism, or does it stop you believing in Darwinian Evolution?

Don't you find the question interesting? If you have a philosophy which you hope is internally consistent, aren't these 'I don't know' questions exactly the ones you should be thinking about? It might even turn out to refute idealism (or Darwinianism). Isn't that a prize worth pursuing?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Hexxenhammer
I'm not going to give you a book report. Suffice to say I can read and comprehend what I read. Idealism says everything is a mental construct and so it follows that any apparent evolution is illusionary. If they were compatible it seems to me that lifegazer's Big Giant Head must have been around imagining bacteria, then multicelled organisms, and so on.

It is not clear to me that evolution cannot occur. What is it precisely about idealism that compels offspring to be identical to their parents?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
So does this point refute your kind of idealism, or does it stop you believing in Darwinian Evolution?

Don't you find the question interesting? If you have a philosophy which you hope is internally consistent, aren't these 'I don't know' questions exactly the ones you should be thinking about? It might even turn out to refute idealism (or Darwinianism). Isn't that a prize worth pursuing?

Any metaphysical system has many difficulties. I'm not sure why you think this poses no difficulty for materialism at all. You are saying that there is an organism which is completely lacking in consciousness, but its offspring is very slightly conscious? What is the crucial difference which leads to this conscious awareness?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Hexxenhammer
Not quite what you want to ask I don't think. Belief in evolution isn't nessecary as it happens whether someone believes it or not. I don't believe in evolution. Like I don't believe in gravity. It just is.

Actually. It is what you want to ask Ian since he might think these natural processes are all an illusion. Never mind.

Natural processes are an illusion? What do you mean? Would this mean ghosts are as real as the rest of the world btw (ie all is illusion)?? Or are there diferent degrees of illusion?

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Any metaphysical system has many difficulties. I'm not sure why you think this poses no difficulty for materialism at all. You are saying that there is an organism which is completely lacking in consciousness, but its offspring is very slightly conscious? What is the crucial difference which leads to this conscious awareness? I really think this question doesn't pose a problem for materialists. I view 'consciousness' as a measure of 'computing power' if you like, and I can easily posit a whole string of machines from zero computing power, up to a modern supercomputer. For example a very simple machine might have two valves, one after the other, on the same length of pipe, and water could only flow through the pipe if both valves are open at the same time. I think we also mentioned the thermostat last time we went down this road.

This question however DOES pose a problem to your sort of idealism, I think, simply because you believe there is the event of the consciousness attaching to the brain. So it either does do that, or it doesn't.

Maybe you could get around it by having a universal consciousness, that attaches in different degrees to different things. I think the problem with your form of idealism results from the 'either sentient or not' property, with no in-between.

Edit: typo. I had 'materialism' instead of 'idealism' Oops!

[Hexxenhammer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Natural processes are an illusion? What do you mean? Would this mean ghosts are as real as the rest of the world btw (ie all is illusion)?? Or are there diferent degrees of illusion? Sorry. I'm not going down this road. I don't think natural processes are illusion. It was suggested as something you might think being an immaterialist. Sorry I brought it up.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
I really think this question doesn't pose a problem for materialists. I view 'consciousness' as a measure of 'computing power' if you like, and I can easily posit a whole string of machines from zero computing power, up to a modern supercomputer. For example a very simple machine might have two valves, one after the other, on the same length of pipe, and water could only flow through the pipe if both valves are open at the same time. I think we also mentioned the thermostat last time we went down this road.

This question however DOES pose a problem to your sort of materialism, I think, simply because you believe there is the event of the consciousness attaching to the brain. So it either does do that, or it doesn't.

Maybe you could get around it by having a universal consciousness, that attaches in different degrees to different things. I think the problem with your form of idealism results from the 'either sentient or not' property, with no in-between.

You don't see a problem in the idea of a thermostat being conscious? Hmmmm . .what about a stone?

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


You don't see a problem in the idea of a thermostat being conscious? Hmmmm . .what about a stone? Well, a stone doesn't do any computing, unless it is part of a larger assembly.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Hexxenhammer
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Natural processes are an illusion? What do you mean? Would this mean ghosts are as real as the rest of the world btw (ie all is illusion)?? Or are there diferent degrees of illusion?

Sorry. I'm not going down this road. I don't think natural processes are illusion. It was suggested as something you might think being an immaterialist. Sorry I brought it up. [/B]

That'll teach ya! :D ;)

[ceptimus]

Here's an analogy. (These are always dangerous on this sort of thread, so hold on tight).

Consciousness is analagous to music.

Now I can take a musical piece and chop it up into movements, phrases, bars etc. and these are still musical, though to a lesser extent. When I get down to a single note, or a single beat on a drum, is that still music? What about the sound of a coin being dropped on the floor? Well it's kind of a stupid question really, but everyone agrees that music is just made up of a collection of such sounds, in a certain order, and with a certain timing.

Does that help? *prepares to run away if this backfires*

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Well, a stone doesn't do any computing, unless it is part of a larger assembly.

Right, so would any sort of change in the world be very slightly conscious? Or is it only certain types of change? What precisely do you mean by computing in other words. Does a boulder compute when it rolls down a hill?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Hexxenhammer
. It was suggested as something you might think being an immaterialist.
You mistake nihilism and solipsism for immaterialism (if by immaterialism you mean, for example, either subjective or objective Idealism).

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Right, so would any sort of change in the world be very slightly conscious? Or is it only certain types of change? What precisely do you mean by computing in other words. Does a boulder compute when it rolls down a hill? I suppose it does compute to an infinitessimal degree, but it seems like a pointless question to me. See my music analogy post above. When you try and divide something down too finely, it becomes meaningless.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Here's an analogy. (These are always dangerous on this sort of thread, so hold on tight).

Consciousness is analagous to music.

Now I can take a musical piece and chop it up into movements, phrases, bars etc. and these are still musical, though to a lesser extent. When I get down to a single note, or a single beat on a drum, is that still music? What about the sound of a coin being dropped on the floor? Well it's kind of a stupid question really, but everyone agrees that music is just made up of a collection of such sounds, in a certain order, and with a certain timing.

Does that help? *prepares to run away if this backfires*

But music is an auditory phenomenological experience. You're making a leap here from music as measured and music as actually experienced. If your analogy incorporates consciousness surely it can't be used to explain consciousness? I'm very unhappy with this analogy basically.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


But music is an auditory phenomenological experience. You're making a leap here from music as measured and music as actually experienced. If your analogy incorporates consciousness surely it can't be used to explain consciousness? I'm very unhappy with this analogy basically. I was only using music as an example of something can exist in varying degrees. Music seemed a good analogy to me, because when music becomes very simple (a single note or two) then it is arguably no longer music.

There is no clear point where 'sound / noise' stops, and music begins. I see consciousness in exactly the same way - there is no clear point where simple material actions become so complex that we begin to call them conscious. But I believe consciousness is made up of those simple material actions, in the same way that the most glorious music is composed of individual notes.

[Darat]

Originally posted by ceptimus
...snip... I see consciousness in exactly the same way - there is no clear point where simple material actions become so complex that we begin to call them conscious. ...snip...

Strange - I thought you were asking Ian to explain and expand on his beliefs - not the other way round. ;)

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Darat


Strange - I thought you were asking Ian to explain and expand on his beliefs - not the other way round. ;) I was wondering myself when I should try and get this thread back on the tracks. I've not forgotten that he hasn't answered my questions yet. At least he won't be able to accuse me of not answering his questions! :D

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
I was wondering myself when I should try and get this thread back on the tracks. I've not forgotten that he hasn't answered my questions yet. At least he won't be able to accuse me of not answering his questions! :D

I did answer your question. I said I don't know.

Am I expected to know all the secrets of the Universe?

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I did answer your question. I said I don't know.

Am I expected to know all the secrets of the Universe? No, I don't think you did answer. Not adequately anyway.

The 'do you believe in Darwinian Evolution' question might have a yes/no answer, or you could explain which parts you believe in, if you don't buy the whole deal.

If you believe (say) a gorilla is sentinent, but the worm-like ancestor of all vertebrates wasn't, then your answer to the second question must be 'Yes'. Saying, 'I don't know' is simple evasion.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I did answer your question. I said I don't know.

Am I expected to know all the secrets of the Universe? You keep claiming to know them. Or perhaps you've already explained, but we were just too stupid to realize it.

[Hexxenhammer]

Originally posted by hammegk

You mistake nihilism and solipsism for immaterialism (if by immaterialism you mean, for example, either subjective or objective Idealism). Quite possibly. It all seems like mental masturbation to me.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Right, so would any sort of change in the world be very slightly conscious? Or is it only certain types of change? What precisely do you mean by computing in other words. Does a boulder compute when it rolls down a hill? We've been here before, Ian. You are assuming a "consciousness" that exists, then trying to figure out which behaviors a materialist would say constitute this consciousness. Instead, what is happening is that there is a wide range of behaviors and changes and events that happen, and our language community speaks of a fuzzy set of those behaviors as belonging to a category we call "consciousness". The actions are not the result of consciousness--to say that consciousness causes these behaviors, when the only evidence we have for consciousness is these behaviors is, of course, circular. "Consciousness" is a label for a category of behaviors, Ian, nothing more. A rock has not yet, to the best of my recollection, ever engaged in any of those behaviors. Nor has a thermostat, although you may see a bit of the "fuzziness" of the set if you speak of the thermostat "deciding" that it "feels too cold" and so turns on the furnace. (And yes, I have heard people describe the function of a thermostat that way.)

Many of our (people's) behaviors are in this "conscious" category, but we do speak of doing things unconsciously, or being knocked unconscious. If you want to know which behaviors are in this category, simply look at the language. That's how we learn the term, anyway. And yes--you and I would probably have different sets of behaviors we would consider "conscious"--as would any given other person...this is what I mean by a fuzzy set. It is a useful word to our community because we have a great deal of agreement as to what behaviors we put in this category...but obviously, as evidenced by this thread, we do not have 100% agreement, and as a result, the word sometimes gives us difficulty.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio
We've been here before, Ian. You are assuming a "consciousness" that exists, then trying to figure out which behaviors a materialist would say constitute this consciousness. Instead, what is happening is that there is a wide range of behaviors and changes and events that happen, and our language community speaks of a fuzzy set of those behaviors as belonging to a category we call "consciousness". The actions are not the result of consciousness--



Where on earth did I claim this?? The actions are the results of physical laws, not consciousnesses. (in the context of materialism)




to say that consciousness causes these behaviors, when the only evidence we have for consciousness is these behaviors is, of course, circular. "Consciousness" is a label for a category of behaviors, Ian, nothing more.



Only someone who is hopelessly insane would suggest this.

And no! This is your definition. Not of the vast majority of materialists.

But let's test it. Hands up those who are eliminitivist materialists.



A rock has not yet, to the best of my recollection, ever engaged in any of those behaviors.



Why describe anything as conscious at all then if it doesn't exist? All we have is behaviour, therefore the word consciousness is redundant.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Why describe anything as conscious at all then if it doesn't exist? All we have is behaviour, therefore the word consciousness is redundant. Finally! Yes, this I will agree with. Thank you, Ian.

But to answer it anyway...because the category of behaviors that we lump together as "conscious" is a useful one. In our everyday speech, it is easier to speak of this category than to speak of the separate members of the category. This is, of course, not the only example of our using categories as convenient place-holders for the elements within them.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Finally! Yes, this I will agree with. Thank you, Ian.

But to answer it anyway...because the category of behaviors that we lump together as "conscious" is a useful one. In our everyday speech, it is easier to speak of this category than to speak of the separate members of the category. This is, of course, not the only example of our using categories as convenient place-holders for the elements within them.

Mercutio,

I don't mean to be rude, but I really don't see any purpose in discussing these issues with you. If you don't recognise the existence of actual conscious experiences (not behaviour), then you would need to look into a mirror to see what mood you're in.

It's literally the most absurd thing I have ever heard anyone suggest.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Mercutio,

I don't mean to be rude, but I really don't see any purpose in discussing these issues with you. If you don't recognise the existence of actual conscious experiences (not behaviour), then you would need to look into a mirror to see what mood you're in.

It's literally the most absurd thing I have ever heard anyone suggest. I appreciate your politeness, Ian, and I am ready to quit jousting with you if you wish. Frankly, I have learned from it--both your position and my own--and so I don't find it nearly as frustrating as you seem to. For your frustration, I do sincerely apologise.

Now...one last thing...Why would I need to look in a mirror to see my mood? I have never said that the only behavior is publicly observable behavior! My thoughts (that is, my behavior of thinking), my feelings (b. of feeling [sad, happy, whatever], my memories (b. of remembering) are all available to me. It is only you (or anyone else) that cannot experience these behaviors of mine. They are private behaviors, that's all; they still exist, Ian.

Our disagreement is not that I claim people do not feel, think, remember...etc.; rather it is that you do not believe these are physical processes, and I do not believe they are mental. I think that pretty much sums up our differences.

Again, I would be more than happy to continue our discourse at any time. I'll take a break now, if you wish...but sometimes I cannot help myself; if you mis-characterise my position, I may be unable to restrain myself.

It is absolutely not personal.:)
M

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio
I appreciate your politeness, Ian, and I am ready to quit jousting with you if you wish. Frankly, I have learned from it--both your position and my own--and so I don't find it nearly as frustrating as you seem to. For your frustration, I do sincerely apologise.

Now...one last thing...Why would I need to look in a mirror to see my mood? I have never said that the only behavior is publicly observable behavior! My thoughts (that is, my behavior of thinking), my feelings (b. of feeling [sad, happy, whatever], my memories (b. of remembering) are all available to me. It is only you (or anyone else) that cannot experience these behaviors of mine. They are private behaviors, that's all; they still exist, Ian.

Our disagreement is not that I claim people do not feel, think, remember...etc.; rather it is that you do not believe these are physical processes, and I do not believe they are mental. I think that pretty much sums up our differences.

Again, I would be more than happy to continue our discourse at any time. I'll take a break now, if you wish...but sometimes I cannot help myself; if you mis-characterise my position, I may be unable to restrain myself.

It is absolutely not personal.:)
M

The words "private behaviour" are an oxymoron. Behaviour means by definition something that can be observed in principle. That is to say behaviour is publically observable by definition. That's what the word "behaviour" means.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

The words "private behaviour" are an oxymoron. Behaviour means by definition something that can be observed in principle. That is to say behaviour is publically observable by definition. That's what the word "behaviour" means. I must inform the behaviorists. For decades, then, we have been using the wrong definition! Behavior is what you do. Anything you do. Some of it is observable by others; this is public behavior. Some is only observable to yourself; these are private behaviors.

Ask Jeff Corey--he is another behaviorist. Or pick up virtually any book on modern behaviorism. Oxymoron? nope. Technical definition.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian, check out the definition of behavior:
1 a : the manner of conducting oneself b : anything that an organism does involving action and response to stimulation c : the response of an individual, group, or species to its environment
I don't see any restriction to publicly-available actions.

I thought I might vote on the eliminative materialist thing, but its definition seems pretty murky. Sounds like you can have hard-core eliminative materialists, who think that all of folk psychology is meaningless, or you can have moderate EMs, who think some of it might be. I can't vote, because I have no idea. Maybe some folk psychology will turn out to be a reasonable description of the attributes of mental processes, even without providing an explanation of them.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio I must inform the behaviorists. For decades, then, we have been using the wrong definition! Behavior is what you do. Anything you do.



Yes. And anything one does is physical movement, of one kind or another. One can also stretch the definition of behaviour to refer to processes in the body, but certainly all processes are in principle publically observable, otherwise they wouldn't be physical! :eek:

As I say, the words "private behaviour" are a contradiction in terms.




Some of it is observable by others; this is public behavior. Some is only observable to yourself; these are private behaviors.



I think you're using a differing definition of "observe" as well. I mean by observe to take note of ones environment through the 5 physical senses. Do you understand it as meaning something else?



Ask Jeff Corey--he is another behaviorist. Or pick up virtually any book on modern behaviorism. Oxymoron? nope. Technical definition.

Jeff Corey is a knucklehead.

Anyway, I find it rather implausible that I have been using the word behaviour in an improper meaning for the totality of my life. Moreover, if it doesn't mean what I think it means, what could it possibly mean? One cannot have private anything without rejecting materialism. This is absolutely clear.

[hammegk]

How do third-party scientists determine that non-public behavior is occurring, or that they know what they are measuring if they measure such via instrumentation?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Ian, check out the definition of behavior:

quote:1 a : the manner of conducting oneself b : anything that an organism does involving action and response to stimulation c : the response of an individual, group, or species to its environment.

Yes, anything an organism does, and a response. To do something, or to respond means some sort of physical activity, yes? All physical activity can in principle be observed, yes? (observed in the sense I mean it ie information through the senses).

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by hammegk
How do third-party scientists determine that non-public behavior is occurring, or that they know what they are measuring if they measure such via instrumentation?

This is what I mean. They couldn't by definition. Therefore by definition it cannot be physical! :eek:

Help me out here Mercutio. LOL

[Hexxenhammer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes. And anything one does is physical movement, of one kind or another. One can also stretch the definition of behaviour to refer to processes in the body, but certainly all processes are in principle publically observable, otherwise they wouldn't be physical! :eek:

As I say, the words "private behaviour" are a contradiction in terms.

I think you're using a differing definition of "observe" as well. I mean by observe to take note of ones environment through the 5 physical senses. Do you understand it as meaning something else?

Jeff Corey is a knucklehead.

Anyway, I find it rather implausible that I have been using the word behaviour in an improper meaning for the totality of my life. Moreover, if it doesn't mean what I think it means, what could it possibly mean? One cannot have private anything without rejecting materialism. This is absolutely clear.
Now we're moving from mental masturbation to verbal masturbation...

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Hexxenhammer

Now we're moving from mental masturbation to verbal masturbation...

Whose definition of behaviour do you agree with?

[Wrath of the Swarm]

I will point out that neural patterns are observable, at least in principle.

Additionally, there's no reason why an event taking place in the brain can't affect other events taking place in the brain. That is essentially what consciousness is: a monitoring of certain mental processes by a part of the mind.

Lastly, if you people haven't put Irksome Ian on your ignore lists yet, you're completely out of your minds.

Thank you.

[lifegazer]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Lifegazer.

Your model to me appears to create more problems than it answers.

Sure, I have to try and explain where the universe came from, when it began, why it might be the way it is and so on, and you don't.

But you are left with the problem of where your universal mind (can I call it God?) came from, why it is running this model of universe and so on.

This evades the question of this thread - your own question - which asked whether idealism is compatible with evolution.
My point was that the existence of an all-embracing Mind is compatible with evolution:-
"Idealists embrace the order of the world within their philosophies. They just see that there is an origin and stage for this perceived universal play.
So, it doesn't matter how the order perceived within our minds has yielded our bodies. Ultimately, an idealist such as myself will just say that the whole show is happening within [the awareness of] a Mind... and that this Mind was the creator of the show."

... Thus, whether you see other problems with [my] idealism isn't relevant in regards the initial question of this thread, which I have answered.

[EternalUniverse]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


There are different types of idealism and their meanings vary. I really don't think it has much meaning denying the existence of an "external world". Could you define what precisely you mean?[/I]

I said that philosophical idealism doesn't assume that an external world exists, which means that its existence is not known for certain, not that it doesn't exist. And I'm sure you know what I mean by "external world" since you yourself used it in your post. The "external world" is composed of things which exist independent of perception (e.g. from minds). Do you have an alternate explanation?


Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[B]

On the other hand other idealist positions hold that although the external world is mental, it exists independently of any minds. [/i]

What do you mean by "the external world is mental"? Do you mean that the external world is only perceived mentally? If so, that really doesn't sound like idealism. It sounds more like representative realism. How would idealists justify the existence of this independent, external world? This is the problem of correspondence that idealists have to deal with. Berkeley thought that it was God who created the correspondence between our sense impressions. Any better ideas?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[B]
As I say you need to be clear about what you mean by an external world. What does it mean to say that we don't have bodies?

See above. It doesn't mean that bodies are not there, just that our understanding of bodies are through experiences (which may or not be "correct").

Which is why what I really want to see is how an idealist defends how their view doesn't slide to solipsism. If the external world is the product of minds (and presumably other minds exist independently from each other), then how can idealism justify the existence of other minds?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
I will point out that neural patterns are observable, at least in principle.


Yup, but without public behavior for correllation, how does the 3rd person scientist come to grips with any meaning of the observations?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm


Lastly, if you people haven't put Irksome Ian on your ignore lists yet, you're completely out of your minds.

Thank you. [/B]

I see no reason to be rude to the good people on here. Many people thoroughly enjoy my posts.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Originally posted by hammegk
Yup, but without public behavior for correllation, how does the 3rd person scientist come to grips with any meaning of the observations? The same way we can figure out what a circuit does even if we aren't given access to its output: by constucting a model that represents the structure of the circuit.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by lifegazer
... Thus, whether you see other problems with [my] idealism isn't relevant in regards the initial question of this thread, which I have answered. Yes. Thankyou lifegazer. I can see that your form of idealism is compatible with Darwinian Evolution. I still don't see how Ian's form of idealism is compatible with it though.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Yes. Thankyou lifegazer. I can see that your form of idealism is compatible with Darwinian Evolution. I still don't see how Ian's form of idealism is compatible with it though.

How so?

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


How so? Put five minutes effort into answering my two questions (numbered 1. and 2. many posts back), instead of just saying, "I don't know", and then I'll tell you. So far, we effectively have this situation:

ceptimus: What do you think about this, Ian?

Interesting Ian: I don't know.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Put five minutes effort into answering my two questions (numbered 1. and 2. many posts back), instead of just saying, "I don't know", and then I'll tell you. So far, we effectively have this situation:

ceptimus: What do you think about this, Ian?

Interesting Ian: I don't know.

The answer to the first one is insufficient data in order for me to reach a conclusion. The answer to the second one is no.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
The same way we can figure out what a circuit does even if we aren't given access to its output: by constucting a model that represents the structure of the circuit.
OK. Which human prototype-model shall we look at first?

Why don't you synthesize "life" before we work up to human complexity. And circuits are evaluated by rules derived from the observation of the behavior of actual circuits.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


The answer to the first one is insufficient data in order for me to reach a conclusion. The answer to the second one is no.

You need to explain your answer, 'No', to the second question.

Premise: All animals are either sentient or not.
Premise: All animals evolved from bacteria.
Premise: Bacteria are not sentient.
Premise: Some animals are sentient.

Conclusion: At some stage of evolution, a sentient creature must have had non-sentient parents (or parent, if this occured to a non-sexually reproducing creature).

OK. Which point do you disagree with?

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Originally posted by hammegk
OK. Which human prototype-model shall we look at first? I would suggest staring by decoding the genetic code. We can work our way up from there.

Why don't you synthesize "life" before we work up to human complexity. We'd have to define life, first - at task that is at least as hard, and probably even harder, than defining consciousness.

And circuits are evaluated by rules derived from the observation of the behavior of actual circuits. Yes indeed. But they run according to eternal principles.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus


You need to explain your answer, 'No', to the second question.

Premise: All animals are either sentient or not.
Premise: All animals evolved from bacteria.
Premise: Bacteria are not sentient.
Premise: Some animals are sentient.

Conclusion: At some stage of evolution, a sentient creature must have had non-sentient parents (or parent, if this occured to a non-sexually reproducing creature).

OK. Which point do you disagree with?

Some creatures can be very very slightly sentient don't forget. There need not be any sharp dichotomy as you imply.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Some creatures can be very very slightly sentient don't forget. There need not be any sharp dichotomy as you imply. It's you who has the problem here Ian. You said that if a creature is sentient, the soul attaches at some point between conception and birth.

I already said I don't have any problem. Remember the music analogy and all that other stuff?

So Ian, how will you rescue your metaphysic from this dilema?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by EternalUniverse
Originally posted by Interesting Ian


There are different types of idealism and their meanings vary. I really don't think it has much meaning denying the existence of an "external world". Could you define what precisely you mean?[/I]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I said that philosophical idealism doesn't assume that an external world exists, which means that its existence is not known for certain, not that it doesn't exist.



Subjective idealism explicitly denies the existence of a mind-independent reality. Berkeley argued it was unintelligible.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian


On the other hand other idealist positions hold that although the external world is mental, it exists independently of any minds. [/i]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



What do you mean by "the external world is mental"? Do you mean that the external world is only perceived mentally? If so, that really doesn't sound like idealism. It sounds more like representative realism. How would idealists justify the existence of this independent, external world? This is the problem of correspondence that idealists have to deal with. Berkeley thought that it was God who created the correspondence between our sense impressions. Any better ideas?



I don't want to talk about other idealist positions. I haven't read up enough on them. Yes Berkeley thought it was God who directly conveys to us our sensory experiences. This explains their order so that we see discrete physical objects rather than a chaotic jumble of sensory impressions. Do you find this unsatisfactory?



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[B]
As I say you need to be clear about what you mean by an external world. What does it mean to say that we don't have bodies?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



See above. It doesn't mean that bodies are not there, just that our understanding of bodies are through experiences (which may or not be "correct").



OK



Which is why what I really want to see is how an idealist defends how their view doesn't slide to solipsism. If the external world is the product of minds (and presumably other minds exist independently from each other), then how can idealism justify the existence of other minds?



Berkeley argued that it is merely what we call the physical world which is simply patterns in our sensory experiences. He said there are selves and their ideas. Selves are not constituted by ones sensory experiences. How could they be?

Idealists infer the existence of other people in the same way as interactive dualists do. Basically by analogy. I know I have a mind, and that my bodily behaviour is partially due to that mind. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that other peoples bodily movements are caused by other minds.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


As I say, the words "private behaviour" are a contradiction in terms.
As are the words "positive punishment", in colloquial speech. However, both "positive punishment" and "private behavior" are well defined terms within the vocabulary of radical behaviorism. I would think you would appreciate this--you, for instance, are quite adept with a philosophical vocabulary which, to the average person, is complete gibberish. That you are not as adept with the vocabulary of radical behaviorism is nothing to be ashamed of, but for you to claim that a specific, well-defined phrase is "a contradiction in terms" smacks of hubris.


I think you're using a differing definition of "observe" as well. I mean by observe to take note of ones environment through the 5 physical senses. Do you understand it as meaning something else?
Those senses are wonderful for observation of public behavior, but for private behavior? Certainly, some of the same brain areas are used--the occipital lobe lights up not only when we see something with our eyes, but when we see something without them. The neat thing is, our level of analysis is behavior, not the physiological underpinnings of it. Can those things be examined? Certainly--that's how we know about the occipital lobe stuff just above. But our interest is only that when I dream, I observe this dream even though you cannot. It is something that I do (thus a behavior), but something that you cannot, even in principle, observe (thus, private).

Now, earlier posts of yours might lead me to suggest that you would think a behaviorist might deny dreams at all, since they cannot be observed by a third party. Of course, we do dream; of course, we (and only we, never a third party) "observe" our dreams; of course, no behaviorist would deny this, and of course, this is private behavior.
Anyway, I find it rather implausible that I have been using the word behaviour in an improper meaning for the totality of my life. Moreover, if it doesn't mean what I think it means, what could it possibly mean? One cannot have private anything without rejecting materialism. This is absolutely clear. You are quite wrong here, of course. I'll bet you have used the word "charmed" in a manner quite unlike the folks examining quarks. The word is used both colloquially and technically. You have not been using the word "behavior" improperly all your life. You have, however, been using the word "behavior" improperly when engaged in serious discussion about the philosophy of radical behaviorism. The two contexts (your regular life, and a discussion of radical behaviorism) require two different definitions of the word.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by ceptimus
It's you who has the problem here Ian. You said that if a creature is sentient, the soul attaches at some point between conception and birth.

I already said I don't have any problem. Remember the music analogy and all that other stuff?

So Ian, how will you rescue your metaphysic from this dilema?

What problem do I have? Remember it isn't simply just the soul which determines ones degree of awareness, but ones state of brain as well. The soul operates and gets "filtered" through the brain remember. Also all souls certainly need not be on a equal level.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio
As are the words "positive punishment", in colloquial speech. However, both "positive punishment" and "private behavior" are well defined terms within the vocabulary of radical behaviorism. I would think you would appreciate this--you, for instance, are quite adept with a philosophical vocabulary which, to the average person, is complete gibberish. That you are not as adept with the vocabulary of radical behaviorism is nothing to be ashamed of, but for you to claim that a specific, well-defined phrase is "a contradiction in terms" smacks of hubris.
[/b] Those senses are wonderful for observation of public behavior, but for private behavior? Certainly, some of the same brain areas are used--the occipital lobe lights up not only when we see something with our eyes, but when we see something without them. The neat thing is, our level of analysis is behavior, not the physiological underpinnings of it. Can those things be examined? Certainly--that's how we know about the occipital lobe stuff just above. But our interest is only that when I dream, I observe this dream even though you cannot. It is something that I do (thus a behavior), but something that you cannot, even in principle, observe (thus, private).

Now, earlier posts of yours might lead me to suggest that you would think a behaviorist might deny dreams at all, since they cannot be observed by a third party. Of course, we do dream; of course, we (and only we, never a third party) "observe" our dreams; of course, no behaviorist would deny this, and of course, this is private behavior.
You are quite wrong here, of course. I'll bet you have used the word "charmed" in a manner quite unlike the folks examining quarks. The word is used both colloquially and technically. You have not been using the word "behavior" improperly all your life. You have, however, been using the word "behavior" improperly when engaged in serious discussion about the philosophy of radical behaviorism. The two contexts (your regular life, and a discussion of radical behaviorism) require two different definitions of the word. [/B]

Bad mood huh? You need to define private behaviour. Under materialism you cannot have private anything because only the physical world exists, and the physical world by definition is publically observable. If one cannot observe something (through the 5 senses), not even in principle, then it is not physical ;)

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Excellent post, Mercutio. I must disagree with you in regards to dreams, however - the fact that someone is dreaming seems to be objectively verifiable from eye movements alone.

I see no reason to assume that dreams are truly "private" phenomena, or that there is such a thing in the first place.

[Interesting Ian]

Think I'll have a pint of blackcurrent cordial :)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
Excellent post, Mercutio. I must disagree with you in regards to dreams, however - the fact that someone is dreaming seems to be objectively verifiable from eye movements alone.

I see no reason to assume that dreams are truly "private" phenomena, or that there is such a thing in the first place.

You think that people can read your thoughts?

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
Excellent post, Mercutio. I must disagree with you in regards to dreams, however - the fact that someone is dreaming seems to be objectively verifiable from eye movements alone.

I see no reason to assume that dreams are truly "private" phenomena, or that there is such a thing in the first place. Thanks Wrath...let me be a bit more specific. You may, of course, measure REM, or occipital lobe activity, or any number of things. But you may not observe my actual dream. Only I have access to this (I am willing to be proven wrong, but I believe that even the most astounding leaps in neurology may not ever give us the ability to actually play a dream like a videotape). It is this, the actual dreaming as experienced, that is a private behavior.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Bad mood huh? You need to define private behaviour. Under materialism you cannot have private anything because only the physical world exists, and the physical world by definition is publically observable. If one cannot observe something (through the 5 senses), not even in principle, then it is not physical Actually, I am in a great mood. You cannot know that, of course, because it is private :D . I have, of course, defined private behavior, and defined it perfectly adequately. It is behavior (anything that you do) that cannot, even in principle, be observed by another person. This is the definition we have used for decades, Ian, and it works just fine. Your objections would indicate that your view of behaviorism is what we call methodological behaviorism, which J. B. Watson favored. That is part of our history, Ian, not part of our present. Once again, you (the subjective idealist) are trying to tell me how I must define my (radical behaviorist) terms. I humbly suggest that you do not know radical behaviorism well enough to do this.

Of course, using the definitions we actually do use--instead of the ones you wish to impose on us--might have an impact on your arguments. You may have to rethink your proofs. Hey, take your time. My world-view is very different from yours; I cannot expect you to truly understand it at the drop of a hat.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

I'm not so sure that your "private behavior" is actually different from Ian's "nonphysical events". I suppose it depends on how literally we take the statement "cannot be observed by others, even in principle".

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Thanks Wrath...let me be a bit more specific. You may, of course, measure REM, or occipital lobe activity, or any number of things. But you may not observe my actual dream. Only I have access to this (I am willing to be proven wrong, but I believe that even the most astounding leaps in neurology may not ever give us the ability to actually play a dream like a videotape). It is this, the actual dreaming as experienced, that is a private behavior.

Actually, I am in a great mood. You cannot know that, of course, because it is private :D . I have, of course, defined private behavior, and defined it perfectly adequately. It is behavior (anything that you do) that cannot, even in principle, be observed by another person. This is the definition we have used for decades, Ian, and it works just fine. Your objections would indicate that your view of behaviorism is what we call methodological behaviorism, which J. B. Watson favored. That is part of our history, Ian, not part of our present. Once again, you (the subjective idealist) are trying to tell me how I must define my (radical behaviorist) terms. I humbly suggest that you do not know radical behaviorism well enough to do this.

Of course, using the definitions we actually do use--instead of the ones you wish to impose on us--might have an impact on your arguments. You may have to rethink your proofs. Hey, take your time. My world-view is very different from yours; I cannot expect you to truly understand it at the drop of a hat.

No need to rethink my proof. You've admitted that no-one can observe your dreams. Your position is simply incompatible with materialism. Here is the proof.

[list=1]
Everything physical can in principle be observed, either directly or indirectly, by anyone with unimpaired senses and with the appropriate instruments.
Your dreams cannot be so observed by anyone.
Therefore your dreams are not physical
Therefore there exist some things which are not physical
Therefore materialism is refuted.
[/list=1]

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
I'm not so sure that your "private behavior" is actually different from Ian's "nonphysical events". I suppose it depends on how literally we take the statement "cannot be observed by others, even in principle".

I don't see how they're different at all. :confused:

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Although Ian is wrong is claiming that physical things need to be detectable with any one of the "traditional" five senses, his argument is actually valid for once.

It's one thing to say that dreams are private in practice. It's quite another to claim that no one else can ever access them. That would indeed require that some aspect of the dream take place outside this universe. That would also mean that your discussion of that aspect is necessarily incorrect, as you're inside this universe and therefore cannot interact with something outside it.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
Although Ian is wrong is claiming that physical things need to be detectable with any one of the "traditional" five senses, his argument is actually valid for once.



I said with appropriate instruments and also mentioned indirect observations.

I must admit I'm a bit perplexed by Mercutio's stance here though :confused:

Doesn't seem like materialism to me! :eek:

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I said with appropriate instruments and also mentioned indirect observations.

I must admit I'm a bit perplexed by Mercutio's stance here though :confused:

Doesn't seem like materialism to me! :eek: You got me, Ian! I am not a materialist, but a pragmatist. I came into this argument simply to correct your use of vocabulary--if I ended up defending materialism, it was only a by-product.

Wrath:It's one thing to say that dreams are private in practice. It's quite another to claim that no one else can ever access them. That would indeed require that some aspect of the dream take place outside this universe. That would also mean that your discussion of that aspect is necessarily incorrect, as you're inside this universe and therefore cannot interact with something outside it.I absolutely do not follow you when you say that some aspect of the dream is outside this universe just because a second person cannot witness it. That seems to me either an inadequate definition of either "access" or "universe". I am quite puzzled by this, and look forward to your clearing it up. Please, why does my view imply to you that some aspect of my dream is outside the universe? I mean, it is part of my behavior, and I am part of the universe--what more do you need?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

We can, in principle, observe someone else's dream. We might do it by first mapping every memory in the person's brain by selectively stimulating the brain and having the person report the memory. Then we could "watch" a dream by noting the sequence of active spots with an MRI or some such device.

But this doesn't allow us to experience the dream in the same way as the subject. Does that mean that there is still some aspect of his subjective consciousness that we cannot observe, thus making that aspect "outside the universe"? Perhaps, but if we say so, then we must also say that the experience of being a rock is outside the universe.

Does the fact that we cannot be anything but ourselves mean that everything else's fundamental selfness is outside the universe?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio
[B]You got me, Ian! I am not a materialist, but a pragmatist. I came into this argument simply to correct your use of vocabulary



But I'm ignoring you. I still say "private behaviour" is an oxymoron.



--if I ended up defending materialism, it was only a by-product.



Ummm . .seems to me you've ended up attacking it. :confused: Even Wrath agrees with me!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
I still say "private behaviour" is an oxymoron.
It's only an oxymoron if you've defined behavior in such a way as to ensure that all the squirming that goes on in your head can have a special immaterial status.

Ooh, Mercutio thinks people have behavior in their heads, but behavior is only external, so that internal stuff must be something immaterial and hence disproves materialism.

Proof by keyword manipulation.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

It's only an oxymoron if you've defined behavior in such a way as to ensure that all the squirming that goes on in your head can have a special immaterial status.

Ooh, Mercutio thinks people have behavior in their heads, but behavior is only external, so that internal stuff must be something immaterial and hence disproves materialism.

Proof by keyword manipulation.

~~ Paul

No. I'm happy to say that behaviour is any physical change in an organism. Brain processes can certainly be defined as behaviour. But that's not private behaviour because it is potentially publically observable. His private behaviour seems to equate to my concept of mental processes! :eek:

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Wrath:I absolutely do not follow you when you say that some aspect of the dream is outside this universe just because a second person cannot witness it. That seems to me either an inadequate definition of either "access" or "universe". I am quite puzzled by this, and look forward to your clearing it up. Please, why does my view imply to you that some aspect of my dream is outside the universe? I mean, it is part of my behavior, and I am part of the universe--what more do you need? I think the problem lies with the claim that it's not possible in principle for anyone else to access the dream. That requires that no pattern of interactions could change or be changed by your dream. That in turn means that the dream cannot be a part of the set that defines what the "universe" is: the group of all things that interact with each other (given at least one item in the set).

The dream can't be a part of you, because if it were, others could access it if only indirectly.

Paul Anagnostopoulos: I suppose that depends on how you want to look at things. Taking your reasoning to a logical conclusion, no one can ever understand any one or any thing. No matter what we do, our models are always distinct from the things we're trying to model - and the perceptions that we use to build the models are distinct from the things themselves.

That's a valid meaning of 'understand', but not a useful one. To the degree to which it is possible to understand anything, then, dreams must be understandable.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Now you're jacking the definition of private, Ian. The term "private behavior" is a psychology term that has a particular meaning. You give us all so much crap for not knowing the definition of every philosophy term, yet you pull this stunt with a term from another discipline. It's getting tiresome.

Don't use your jacked terms to reinterpret what people say and then try to convince them they said something else.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wrath said:
Paul Anagnostopoulos: I suppose that depends on how you want to look at things. Taking your reasoning to a logical conclusion, no one can ever understand any one or any thing. No matter what we do, our models are always distinct from the things we're trying to model - and the perceptions that we use to build the models are distinct from the things themselves.

Oh, I didn't make myself clear. I was really asking you what you meant by "outside the universe." Wow, this is hard to describe.

Consider what it's like to experience a dream. It seems possible that we may never be able to experience another person's dream in the same manner as we experience our own. It's possible that we can't do this even in principle. Are we willing, then, to say that the personal experience of a dream is outside the universe?

You just clarified what you meant by saying "I think the problem lies with the claim that it's not possible in principle for anyone else to access the dream. That requires that no pattern of interactions could change or be changed by your dream." But I don't think that's what Mercutio meant by access. He meant that we can't experience the dream like the other person does. The other person's dream does have an effect on the world, but we're still missing out on an essential aspect of it. Is that aspect outside the universe?

Perhaps the crux of the matter lies in whether or not we can, in principle, experience the dream just like the other person does.

~~ Paul

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Note: these are somewhat Wrath-specific definitions, although the concepts they refer to are fairly common. My usage of certain words to refer to certain concepts is somewhat nonstandard, though.

A 'universe' is a set of things that interact with each other in some way. The precise nature of the interaction isn't specified, and it doesn't have to be. Specific universes can be considered by identifying one thing within the set.

Some things don't exist in this universe (the one that I'm in, and by extension all of you are) but can exist in others. Some things (like invisible pink unicorns, proofs that the square root of two are rational, the biggest possible prime, the taco so spicy that an omnipotent being cannot eat it, omnipotent beings, etc.) cannot exist in any universe.

The set of all things in universes and all things not in universes is the Totality. The Totality cannot be described; although all descriptions (both possible and impossible) describe some part of the Totality, none of them describe it all, not even this description. All attempts are insufficient because each and every attempt is partially accurate. No principles hold in the Totality, because it's the superposition of all orders; there are no boundaries because all boundaries exist.

One inaccurate but useful way to think about the Totality (which cannot be thought about, because [well, you get the drill]) is to use the metaphor of the Jorge Luis Borges' "Library of Babel". His description can be found on the Net with a little searching.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm skeptical about the impossibility of the invisible pink unicorn, given the existence of the invisible pink hamster orbiting Neptune.

Perhaps my dreams occur outside this universe, within the Totality. That would explain why some entities in my dreams are impossible within this universe, yet clearly exist. Astral travel, then, might occur . . .

Hey, this has lots of potential.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

You just clarified what you meant by saying "I think the problem lies with the claim that it's not possible in principle for anyone else to access the dream. That requires that no pattern of interactions could change or be changed by your dream." But I don't think that's what Mercutio meant by access. He meant that we can't experience the dream like the other person does. The other person's dream does have an effect on the world, but we're still missing out on an essential aspect of it. Is that aspect outside the universe?

Perhaps the crux of the matter lies in whether or not we can, in principle, experience the dream just like the other person does.

~~ Paul Thanks, Paul, and thanks, Wrath, for helping to clear things up a bit...I see what you both mean...it seems, Wrath, that by what you are saying, we can access, or observe, or whatever you want to call it, a dream in the same manner we can access or observe somebody's walking. That is, we can look at all the publicly observable behavior, the physiological signs and processes, etc...but as Paul says, experiencing the dream would be like actually experiencing the other person's walk. It is beyond us for any behavior, not just for dreaming. But we may certainly verify that they are running, or that they are dreaming, so to that extent there is a public aspect to the behavior.

Now, when Ian says
1. Everything physical can in principle be observed, either directly or indirectly, by anyone with unimpaired senses and with the appropriate instruments.
2. Your dreams cannot be so observed by anyone.
3. Therefore your dreams are not physical
4. Therefore there exist some things which are not physical
5. Therefore materialism is refuted.

I am a bit confused. My dreams are observed by me. Yours by you. The phenomenon of dreaming is something easily observable, by anyone who dreams. #2 is false. As said above, I cannot observe your feelings about your walking, but I can verify your walking, and I can observe my own sensations accompanying walking. Same with dreams. They are a physical process.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I'm skeptical about the impossibility of the invisible pink unicorn, given the existence of the invisible pink hamster orbiting Neptune. Meh... :nope:

Perhaps my dreams occur outside this universe, within the Totality. That would explain why some entities in my dreams are impossible within this universe, yet clearly exist. Astral travel, then, might occur . . . Doesn't work. You wouldn't be able to experience something that's outside the universe by definition. Your dreams exist within this universe... and the dream itself is real, although the things it may be about may not be.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

And you might be able to observe other's emotions, Mercutio. Each and every thing in the universe is necessarily unique, yes, but that doesn't mean that we are unable to experience at least very similar things.

Within certain tolerances, we can perceive things the same way - which is why we're able to communicate in the first place.

Tell me something: which is more real - my words, or the images you're reading off your computer screen?

[EternalUniverse]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Subjective idealism explicitly denies the existence of a mind-independent reality. Berkeley argued it was unintelligible.[/i]

Fair enough. For subjective idealists, then, shouldn't they distinguish between "having no justification for an external world" and "explicit denial of an external world"? It seems that the latter is too extreme. If all we have to go by are our experiences, then we really can't say for certain if these experiences are caused by something external to the mind.



Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]

I don't want to talk about other idealist positions. I haven't read up enough on them. Yes Berkeley thought it was God who directly conveys to us our sensory experiences. This explains their order so that we see discrete physical objects rather than a chaotic jumble of sensory impressions. Do you find this unsatisfactory? [/i]

Well, he is using a claim which may or may not be true (the existence of God) to support his version of idealism, so probably not.



Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]

Berkeley argued that it is merely what we call the physical world which is simply patterns in our sensory experiences. He said there are selves and their ideas. Selves are not constituted by ones sensory experiences. How could they be?[/i]

First, how can he even talk about 'sensory experiences" if there is no external world to "sense"? At least, with an explanation that doesn't include God.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]
Idealists infer the existence of other people in the same way as interactive dualists do. Basically by analogy. I know I have a mind, and that my bodily behaviour is partially due to that mind. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that other peoples bodily movements are caused by other minds.

I still do not know how idealism, which denies an external world, can not lead to solipsism. If you deny the existence of any "mind-independent reality", then you also deny the existence of other minds. Unless, of course, you believe in Berkeley's contention which uses God in its explanation.

[Darat]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Put five minutes effort into answering my two questions (numbered 1. and 2. many posts back), instead of just saying, "I don't know", and then I'll tell you. So far, we effectively have this situation:

ceptimus: What do you think about this, Ian?

Interesting Ian: I don't know.

Disagree what we have here is:

ceptimus: What do you think about this, Ian?

Interesting Ian: I don't know but it's incompatible with materialism.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Now you're jacking the definition of private, Ian. The term "private behavior" is a psychology term that has a particular meaning. You give us all so much crap for not knowing the definition of every philosophy term, yet you pull this stunt with a term from another discipline. It's getting tiresome.

Don't use your jacked terms to reinterpret what people say and then try to convince them they said something else.

~~ Paul

I suggest you take a look at the previous conversation. I'm just going by what Mercutio has said.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mercutio

Ian
1. Everything physical can in principle be observed, either directly or indirectly, by anyone with unimpaired senses and with the appropriate instruments.
2. Your dreams cannot be so observed by anyone.
3. Therefore your dreams are not physical
4. Therefore there exist some things which are not physical
5. Therefore materialism is refuted.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mercutio
I am a bit confused.



That's ok, I'm hopelessly confused with your position! :eek:




My dreams are observed by me. Yours by you.



Right, "observed" as in the sense of experienced. But I can neither observe/experience your dream. Therefore your dream is not physical. Right?? I mean you can't describe something as being physical which is unobservable in principle apart from one person. Moreover note that there are 2 differing senses of "observe" here which you are conflating.



The phenomenon of dreaming is something easily observable, by anyone who dreams. #2 is false.



I disagree as I just mentioned.


As said above, I cannot observe your feelings about your walking, but I can verify your walking, and I can observe my own sensations accompanying walking. Same with dreams. They are a physical process.


Walking as a public phenomenon is a physical process, not as phenomenologically experienced (or "observed" by the self as you put it. This so-called "private behaviour!" :eek: )

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wrath said:
Doesn't work. You wouldn't be able to experience something that's outside the universe by definition. Your dreams exist within this universe... and the dream itself is real, although the things it may be about may not be.
Dang! I thought this was going to be a source of all sorts of great stuff.

Ian said:
I mean you can't describe something as being physical which is unobservable in principle apart from one person.
Ah, now it has to be observable by two or more people. That means that everything that happens to you, without other witnesses, isn't real.

~~ Paul

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Or to put that in another wording:

Everything that you experience as happening to you is real. But it's a real experience, and not necessarily a real anything else. (Clearly even experiences are part of physical reality, and so they are a real something else in addition to being an experience, but that's becoming a bit too involved for this discussion.)

[ceptimus]

None of this seems to have very much to do with Darwinian Evolution. :confused:

[Darat]

Originally posted by ceptimus
None of this seems to have very much to do with Darwinian Evolution. :confused:

Well of course not, you didn't expect to get any answers did you? That may have needed er... someone to think about the twaddle they keep posting.

[ceptimus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
What problem do I have? Remember it isn't simply just the soul which determines ones degree of awareness, but ones state of brain as well. The soul operates and gets "filtered" through the brain remember. Also all souls certainly need not be on a equal level. Earlier you said that a soul either attaches or does not. And previously you have always argued against a sliding scale of consciousness, or sentience. You always argued that an animal either has consciousness, or doesn't.

Which of these do you prefer? If you don't like any of them, please explain your alternative:

1. Souls attached even to ancient bacteria, but perhaps didn't do anything very much.
2. At some stage of evolution a soul attached to a creature for the very first time. Prior to that, no creature had a soul.
3. There is some kind of universal soul that attaches to different creatures in varying amounts. Such a soul could also attach to rocks and so on, if and when necessary.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Ian said:
I mean you can't describe something as being physical which is unobservable in principle apart from one person.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Ah, now it has to be observable by two or more people. That means that everything that happens to you, without other witnesses, isn't real.

~~ Paul [/B]

You see this is the problem. Mercutio has introduced this word "observe" when he actually means experience. And now the new definition of "observe" is being confused with the old one! :rolleyes:

And also I said unobservable in principle. So something is physical even though it exists beyond the cosmic horizon!

[Interesting Ian]

EternalUniverse,

I haven't forgotten about you. I'll reply tomorrow.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by ceptimus
There is some kind of universal soul that attaches to different creatures in varying amounts. Such a soul could also attach to rocks and so on, if and when necessary.

Or worded slightly differently, "soul" is a word some use to describe the monism I'll call "what-is". :)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And others call that monism "material stuff."

How about if we all agree to call it "glorp" for the remainder of this thread and then see if we can make a distinction between different types of glorp.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

And I reply that an individual's choice of mind or body as the selected monism will be justified by logic, examining each choice in regards to specific question areas -- you know, like the non-life/life question, or the HPC question.

Science can neither prove nor disprove either selection.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And I further reply that if you force both glorp models to accurately describe the world we know, they will be equivalent.

There is only one glorp.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
And I further reply that if you force both glorp models to accurately describe the world we know, they will be equivalent.

There is only one glorp.

~~ Paul You both sound like good pragmatists now!

[ceptimus]

I agree with Paul. There are often many different routes to the top of the same mountain.

I wonder if Paul has considered the possibility (danger?) of a 'Church of Glorp' starting up?

All hail Mighty Glorp!

[hammegk]

I don't know if ya'all are being facetious, or if you don't agree that "glorp" will, by logic, in the end be either non-life=body or life=mind. :(

If I've understood correctly, "glorp" has already been the (non)choice that one JREFer has stated is his; that is 'no ontological commitment will be declared publicly'.

[Darat]

Originally posted by Mercutio
You both sound like good pragmatists now!

Well I think that makes 4 of "us" then so far...

[Darat]

Originally posted by ceptimus
I agree with Paul. There are often many different routes to the top of the same mountain.

I wonder if Paul has considered the possibility (danger?) of a 'Church of Glorp' starting up?

All hail Mighty Glorp!

But it's hard to be dogmatic with the credo of Glorp...


Two Newcomers approach the COG High Priestess,

Newcomer1: I think everything is made of material Glorp!
COG High Priestess: Great so do we.

Newcomer2: Well I think everything is made of an immaterial Glorp!
COG High Priestess: Fantastic, so do we you'll fit in fine here.

Newcomer1 &2 together?: WHAT!!?? You can't have that! It's got to be one or the other! What does the Church Of Glorp believe in?

COG High Priestess: Well we pretty much realised we can't ever know, so it's whatever takes your fancy or what seems to do the job. Now please join me in our prayer

"O great whatever
Any chance of an answer?
Ah never mind doesn’t matter,
Who wants a beer?"

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Darat

COG High Priestess: Well we pretty much realised we can't ever know, so it's whatever takes your fancy or what seems to do the job. Now please join me in our prayer

"O great whatever
Any chance of an answer?
Ah never mind doesn’t matter,
Who wants a beer?"
Well said!

I can almost see the advertisements for Glorp (brand) Beer!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:
I don't know if ya'all are being facetious, or if you don't agree that "glorp" will, by logic, in the end be either non-life=body or life=mind.
There is no bit of logic that can make that decision. If you present a valid one, I will declare you King of the Kingdom of Glorp. You will be the Great Hamme-Glorp.

Really, if there is logic to distinguish one monistic existent from another, I'm excited to hear it.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Nope, nothing distinguishes one monad from the other except the logic you apply in *choosing* one and looking at the consequences of that choice as it fits your worldview.

My point is if glorp effects or affects "mind" it IS mind; if it effects or affects "matter" it IS matter.

If you are dualist of any stripe, glorp has no meaning that I see.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:
Nope, nothing distinguishes one monad from the other except the logic you apply in *choosing* one and looking at the consequences of that choice as it fits your worldview.
And I'm saying that if you're honest about the way the world is, the choice will come down to nothing other than personal preference.

My point is if glorp effects or affects "mind" it IS mind; if it effects or affects "matter" it IS matter.

If you are dualist of any stripe, glorp has no meaning that I see.
Well, you got me here. Your first sentence sounds entirely dualistic, but then you say this has no meaning for dualists. Glorp doesn't affect things, it is things. It is the single fundamental existent.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
It is the single fundamental existent.

Er, yes that's what I said; and the fact that you are unwilling to make what must be a binary decision says something about you but zilch about the "nature of reality".

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:
Er, yes that's what I said; and the fact that you are unwilling to make what must be a binary decision says something about you but zilch about the "nature of reality".
Are you suggesting I have anything with which to make this decision, other than arbitrary personal preference? Apparently you are, because you say it has something to do with the "nature of reality."

A binary decision, you think? Surely you have enough imagination to come up with a third fundamental existent.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

A binary decision, you think?
Yes, I do.


Surely you have enough imagination to come up with a third fundamental existent.

Not in any way that survives the slightest brush with logic. Mind & Body are the terms commonly used for the two, possible, existents.



Or did you have an invisible smilie there somewhere?

[Wrath of the Swarm]

They're the same, hammegk. There is nothing that one implies that the other doesn't also.

[hammegk]

I disagree. Body implies at 100% probability that life springs from non-life and atheism -- real, hard, atheism -- is absolutely correct.

Mind opens a multitude of other doors. I have 1 single, truly objective, data point: "thought exists". Nihilism & solipsism are meaningless so here we are by gentlemans agreement. *You* think, and *I* think.


Science works equally well under choice of either body or mind; 'objective' meaning that "reality" of unknown ontology exists independent of any specific "mind", humans currently having the most advanced one we identify (via 3rd person perception).

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by hammegk
I disagree. Body implies at 100% probability that life springs from non-life and atheism -- real, hard, atheism -- is absolutely correct.

Mind opens a multitude of other doors. I have 1 single, truly objective, data point: "thought exists". Nihilism & solipsism are meaningless so here we are by gentlemans agreement. *You* think, and *I* think.
Those aren't doors. They look like doors, but none of them actually open. If they did, then there would be a difference between the monisms, and our pragmatic approach would lead us to pick the approach that more nearly fits what we see. But then we would not have stretched this thread out so many pages.

A door which cannot be opened is just a neat design on a wall.

[hammegk]

As I've said before, only the logic you employ as you analyse the 2 different choices can provide any difference.

If you find a stance that has the 100% probablity that actual, hard, atheism is "what-is" best suits your wordview, that is your choice. My logic and analysis vis-a-vis my worldview leads me to the other choice.


How do you determine if a doorway is paint on the wall, or a real door? If it opens even once for a specific person at a specific time, then what? You of course can contend all such experiences are hallucinatory; people who have had them may be less sure of your diagnosis. :)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:
How do you determine if a doorway is paint on the wall, or a real door? If it opens even once for a specific person at a specific time, then what? You of course can contend all such experiences are hallucinatory; people who have had them may be less sure of your diagnosis.
I don't have to contend that they are hallucinatory. I only have to contend that they do not require some magical attribute of the single existent that can only be provided by a mentally-flavored existent and not a physically-flavored existent. And since we have no idea what those experiences actually are, it is premature to even worry about it. Your "logic" consists of assuming that certain events in the world require attributes that can only be provided by one flavor of existent, even though you have no way to show that the other flavor cannot handle those events.

Here's a third possibility: The fundamental existent is the existon. Depending upon how it vibrates, it gives rise to all the particles we know, all the force carriers, and also the psion. The psion is the source of what we call consciousness, and coexists with the other particles and force carriers in various combinations that give rise to various levels of consciousness. A fifth force carrier, the extremely subtle P vector boson, sometimes transfers force between psions and other particles, giving rise to psi effects. We have not detected the psion and P yet because of their extremely erratic behavior.

There you go, a third fundamental existent.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by EternalUniverse

II

Subjective idealism explicitly denies the existence of a mind-independent reality. Berkeley argued it was unintelligible.[/i]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


EU
Fair enough. For subjective idealists, then, shouldn't they distinguish between "having no justification for an external world" and "explicit denial of an external world"? It seems that the latter is too extreme. If all we have to go by are our experiences, then we really can't say for certain if these experiences are caused by something external to the mind.


I'm really not happy with this "external world" business. So instead I'm going to refer to it as MIR (mind-independent reality).

Now, if we have no justification for the existence of a MIR, then why believe in it? But Berkeley went beyond this. He maintained the notion of an MIR is unintelligible. If there is a MIR chair for example, then what is it like? I mean is the real material chair similar to the experienced chair? Is the real material chair (external to all minds) brown in color? Note that we're talking about brownness as perceptually experienced. So can this non-experienced reality be exactly like our experiences? I don't know what Berkeley's arguments exactly were (I can't remember) but it is a completely unnecessary duplication. Why is there a need for a material chair which is exactly like the perceived chair? And it's opposed to what science says anyway. This brings us to the consideration that the material chair is quite unlike our perceptual experiences of it. But if the material chair is quite unlike the perceived chair, then what it is exactly like must forevermore remain unaccessible to us (like Kant's nounema). Again, why suppose the existence of a wholly, in principle, unknowable reality?





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I don't want to talk about other idealist positions. I haven't read up enough on them. Yes Berkeley thought it was God who directly conveys to us our sensory experiences. This explains their order so that we see discrete physical objects rather than a chaotic jumble of sensory impressions. Do you find this unsatisfactory?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


EU
Well, he is using a claim which may or may not be true (the existence of God) to support his version of idealism, so probably not.



He infers the existence of God. Our sensory perceptions are ordered into certain familes we call physical objects. But we could have existed in a Universe where our sensory perceptions were completely random, and chaotic, and unpredictable. So there must be intelligence behind the order we see. Basically he is inferring the mind of God in much a similar way to which we infer the minds of other people. Just as other peoples bodies act in a way suggestive of purpose, so does the Universe as a whole act in such a way to suggest purpose (and therefore a mind responsible).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Berkeley argued that it is merely what we call the physical world which is simply patterns in our sensory experiences. He said there are selves and their ideas. Selves are not constituted by ones sensory experiences. How could they be?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


EU
First, how can he even talk about 'sensory experiences" if there is no external world to "sense"? At least, with an explanation that doesn't include God.



The name is unimportant. Call it qualia, perceptual experiences or whatever. Actually he uses the term "idea", but the meaning of this term has slightly changed since Berkeley's time.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Idealists infer the existence of other people in the same way as interactive dualists do. Basically by analogy. I know I have a mind, and that my bodily behaviour is partially due to that mind. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that other peoples bodily movements are caused by other minds.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


EU
I still do not know how idealism, which denies an external world, can not lead to solipsism. If you deny the existence of any "mind-independent reality", then you also deny the existence of other minds. Unless, of course, you believe in Berkeley's contention which uses God in its explanation.



Subjective idealism is denying any reality independent of any minds. It's giving an analysis of what it means to talk about the "physical". Remember that, for the non-materialist, minds are not part of physical reality. So Berkeley has no more reason to be a solipsist then interactive dualists.

Basically he said this about physical reality. What we understand as "physical reality" cannot be abstracted from a perceiving subject. If you maintain there exists an unexperienced reality, then, by definition, we cannot know about it through experience i.e we cannot experience the unexperienced. Nor can we know about it through reason which I explained at the beginning of this post. Saying you can have a reality in abstraction from any mind is like saying you can have a grin without a cat.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Aargh! They're the same flavor! Everything implied by one is implied by the other! It doesn't matter what word you use to describe the universe!

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

There you go, a third fundamental existent.



Well, let's see. Do those critters effect or affect "matter"? If so, are they not "matter"?

Ergo, I disagree.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wrath said:
Aargh! They're the same flavor! Everything implied by one is implied by the other! It doesn't matter what word you use to describe the universe!
Whew! For awhile there, I thought I was the only one being driven crazy by this meaningless distinction.

Hammegk said:
Well, let's see. Do those critters effect or affect "matter"? If so, are they not "matter"?
They also effect mind, so they are mind. Mind and matter are just different vibrations of the one existon.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Why is there a need for a material chair which is exactly like the perceived chair? And it's opposed to what science says anyway. This brings us to the consideration that the material chair is quite unlike our perceptual experiences of it. But if the material chair is quite unlike the perceived chair, then what it is exactly like must forevermore remain unaccessible to us (like Kant's nounema). Again, why suppose the existence of a wholly, in principle, unknowable reality?
First you say we can't know "what it is exactly like." Then you say it is "wholly ... unknowable."

Subjective idealism is denying any reality independent of any minds. It's giving an analysis of what it means to talk about the "physical". Remember that, for the non-materialist, minds are not part of physical reality. So Berkeley has no more reason to be a solipsist then interactive dualists.
What you seem to describe is like an ocean of Mind, out of which pops little waves of independent minds (small "m"). Then, each mind constructs a virtual physical reality around itself and between itself and the other minds. In order for all the minds to construct an inter-consistent reality, there must be rules and laws that dictate how the reality is formed. These rules and laws are inditinguishable from what we ordinarily think of as physical laws. Again, this ontology is indistinguishable from materialism/physicalism/whatever.

You appear to like your ontology better because working from inside out to create reality seems more logical than working from outside in. But why? Just because our senses cannot detect the totality of the external world is no reason to force the external world to be exactly equal to what our senses detect.

~~ Paul

[EternalUniverse]

Ian,

Let me first start off by saying that I deem idealism to be a respectable position enjoying some strong arguments in support. I do see some weaknesses with the position that hinders it from being judged more worthy than other positions (especially scientific realism). More below.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I'm really not happy with this "external world" business. So instead I'm going to refer to it as MIR (mind-independent reality).[/i]

I think I could have stated more clearly what I meant by "external world" (EW).
Philosophers generally define this term as "everything that exists outside my own mind". So if an EW exists, then I am in your EW, and you are in mine. The EW is only "mind-independent" such that things existing outside of each individual's mind (including objects and other people's minds) continue to exist when not perceived.

If we accept this definition, the term "MIR" seems like one that ignores the "problem of other minds", while providing no justification for this omission. Why start off with the position that there are other minds, and objects are simply things that exist in people's minds? It seems like a weak way to dodge solipsism.


Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Now, if we have no justification for the existence of a MIR, then why believe in it? But Berkeley went beyond this. He maintained the notion of an MIR is unintelligible. If there is a MIR chair for example, then what is it like? I mean is the real material chair similar to the experienced chair? Is the real material chair (external to all minds) brown in color? Note that we're talking about brownness as perceptually [b]experienced. So can this non-experienced reality be exactly like our experiences? I don't know what Berkeley's arguments exactly were (I can't remember) but it is a completely unnecessary duplication. Why is there a need for a material chair which is exactly like the perceived chair? And it's opposed to what science says anyway. This brings us to the consideration that the material chair is quite unlike our perceptual experiences of it. But if the material chair is quite unlike the perceived chair, then what it is exactly like must forevermore remain unaccessible to us (like Kant's nounema). Again, why suppose the existence of a wholly, in principle, unknowable reality?[/i]

You deal with several things here. I will deal with them one by one.

a) Concerning knowing reality "exactly", both idealism and scientific realism agree that reality is not necessarily what is perceived, so there is no problem there. Only common sense realism posits, for example, that oranges are really "orange" (in color); and, common sense realism isn't a very strong position to begin with.

b) The knowledge argument can be turned against idealism. If idealism is built on the foundation of things that we know exist (i.e. experiences), and discards things that may or may not exist (i.e. physical objects), then entities like God should not be used. As well, since we can not experience other minds, then they should not be assumed either. This leads to solipsism.

c) If idealism appeals to simplicity (for example, by discarding the "unnecessary" belief in a MIR), it doesn't explain the seeming correspondence between interpersonal experiences. Invoking God, a contentious concept, doesn't solve this problem.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
He infers the existence of God. Our sensory perceptions are ordered into certain familes we call physical objects. But we could have existed in a Universe where our sensory perceptions were completely random, and chaotic, and unpredictable. So there must be intelligence behind the order we see. Basically he is inferring the mind of God in much a similar way to which we infer the minds of other people. Just as other peoples bodies act in a way suggestive of purpose, so does the Universe as a whole act in such a way to suggest purpose (and therefore a mind responsible).[/i]

Ok. See above.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]

The name is unimportant. Call it qualia, perceptual experiences or whatever. Actually he uses the term "idea", but the meaning of this term has slightly changed since Berkeley's time.[/i]

From my understanding, the term "idea" can refer to beliefs, concepts and sensations. Would an idealist define each as one and the same?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]
Subjective idealism is denying any reality independent of any minds. It's giving an analysis of what it means to talk about the [b]"physical". Remember that, for the non-materialist, minds are not part of physical reality. So Berkeley has no more reason to be a solipsist then interactive dualists.

Basically he said this about physical reality. What we understand as "physical reality" cannot be abstracted from a perceiving subject. If you maintain there exists an unexperienced reality, then, by definition, we cannot know about it through experience i.e we cannot experience the unexperienced. Nor can we know about it through reason which I explained at the beginning of this post.
Saying you can have a reality in abstraction from any mind is like saying you can have a grin without a cat.

What exactly did you say about the inability to know reality through reason? Scientific realists would state that their position is more plausible through abductive reasoning. Specifically, saying that physical objects exist makes the reality of our experiences less suprising compared to using an explanation that invokes a supernatural being.

[Interesting Ian]

EternalUniverse,

Before I respond to your post in detail, I wonder if you could clarify one or two things for me by answering the following questions.

[list=1]
What do you understand by "scientific realism"?
Why do you believe scientific realism is incompatible with subjective idealism? (although perhaps your answer to the first question will make the answer here obvious)
Berkeley's philosophy holds that both experiences (ideas) and experiencers (selves) exist. Do you hold that he should only have believed that experiences/ideas exist?
What do you understand by the term supernatural? If materialism were true and a "God" existed, would such a "God" be supernatural? If materialism is not true are our minds supernatural?
[/list=1]

Answering these questions will help me prepare a more comprehensive response to address all your concerns :)

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I don't have to contend that they are hallucinatory.
You can call them Fred. The word hallucinatory is what most of us would term an experience at odds with what other human observers present at the time perceived. :p




Whew! For awhile there, I thought I was the only one being driven crazy by this meaningless distinction.
Yeah, damn philosophy.


They also effect mind, so they are mind. Mind and matter are just different vibrations of the one existon.

Sounds to me like A and ~A simultaneously. Bell IIRC has also suggested Aristotelian logic may be wrong as a description of "what-is", or I guess we could say "what-is" is not a local phenomenum. Actually I suggest this monad meets all requirements of objective and physical.

Is atheism rational under this monad, if it is a "new monad"? Does it provide added insight or verifiability as a predictor of quantum nuttiness? I didn't realize psi was a problem we were trying to solve.

[EternalUniverse]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

EternalUniverse,

Before I respond to your post in detail, I wonder if you could clarify one or two things for me by answering the following questions.[/i]

Certainly.


Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]
1) What do you understand by "scientific realism"?[/i]

Maybe I can give a quick summary of what I understand to be the major competing theories.

If we look at the possible characteristics that an object can have, there are at least four possibilities:

a) objects have what Locke would call secondary qualities (e.g. color, smell, taste, etc.).

b) objects have what Locke would label as primary qualities (e.g. size, shape, etc.).

c) objects are composed of what scientific theories (especially physics) tell us, like atoms.

d) objects are extended in space-time (i.e. lie in the external world).

Common sense realism would agree with (a)-(d). Representative realism would probably only agree with (b)-(d), stating that secondary qualities arise out of mental representations, and are not intrinsic to the objects themselves. Scientific realism would focus mainly on (c) and (d). Characteristics in (b) are said to be better explained by (c). Idealism denies (a)-(d); that is, there are no mind-independent (to use your term) objects in the first place.


Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]

Why do you believe scientific realism is incompatible with subjective idealism? (although perhaps your answer to the first question will make the answer here obvious)[/i]

Both of these theories disagree how our experiences are caused. As stated, scientific realism assumes that an objective, mind-independent reality exists, which causes our perceptions of this reality. Idealism denies this. Both theories disagree, also, about how our perceptions are ordered. Any realist theory would cite the laws of nature (i.e. physical laws). Idealism might invoke God as an explanation, or perhaps "perceptual laws"?


Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]


Berkeley's philosophy holds that both experiences (ideas) and experiencers (selves) exist. Do you hold that he should only have believed that experiences/ideas exist?[/i]

I'm not sure what you are trying to get at here. Are you asking if I think that he should have invoked God as an explanation about the order of our perceptions? If so, then no.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian [B]

What do you understand by the term supernatural? If materialism were true and a "God" existed, would such a "God" be supernatural? If materialism is not true are our minds supernatural?


Interesting. I've not really thought about an actual definition of supernatural - perhaps something that goes against our current understanding of the laws of the universe (usually expressed in physics)? To answer your second question, if we are talking about a God who can do things that goes against physics (like create out of nothing, an entire planet teeming with life), then yes. To answer your third, it would depend on the "correct" view of the universe. If it was monistic, favoring the existence of only minds, then minds would not be supernatural.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by EternalUniverse


As stated, scientific realism assumes that an objective, mind-independent reality exists, which causes our perceptions of this reality. Idealism denies this.

May I say "no it doesn't", depending on the flavor of idealism. You might search Objective Idealism for an overview.


On a general comment that could be made in many threads -- and will be since I like to repeat myself -- "How can the word "paranormal" have any meaning to anyone?- It's just become a standard materialist worldview red-herring imo.