Bound to be determined? Or are you just temporarily tied up?

[Jeff Corey]

Causality, can't live with it, can't live without it.
I take the position that everything we deal with has causes. We may not know them yet, but the goal of the crowning achievement of human effort, science, is discovering the causes of the phenomena we observe.
If everything, including our own behavior, is caused, then free will is an illusion.
Obviously, this all depends on the truth of the first assumption.
But, what the heck, why not proceed on that assumption and go and do science?
Maybe we'll find something that isn't caused someday.

What's with this "dark energy" and "dark matter" stuff?
Does it matter?

[Upchurch]

Jeff,

If you did not read the rules of the Critical Thinking board, there is a rule against frivolous threads. In your post, I cound three cliche's, possibly three ill-defined topics, one complete non-sequitor, and one bad pun.

Please make a point or I'm moving this thread to Community.

[epepke]

While admittedly flippantly stated, I think there's a valid point to this thread. As another thread is heavily about "materialism" and such, and as philosophers seem to be into the idea that causality as an a priori concept upon which all materialism, and hence all science depends, I think it very relevant. Jeff is simply suggesting that a functional definition of causality, as a working hypothesis, is sufficient, and that one need not resort to an a priori causality a la Aristotle, Acquinas, and Kant to get science done.

In a way, it's a bit like the writings of Newton-Smith who cut through the debates about logical positivism versus constructivism by noting that it is not necessary to distinguish between T-objects and O-objects but simply to have a rough idea of how much T versus O there is in an object.

I would be inclined to agree with him, except that I think that we have already discovered phenomena that are probably acausal, and that it's pretty old hat by now. The notion of acauasality makes many people unhappy. However, while people have gone to great lengths to come up with interpretations to restore universal causality, none of them are, so far, in any scientific way distinguishable from interpretations that do not attempt to restore universal causality.

Thus, I would also argue that the argument that universal causality need be an a priori assumption of science is false. It does not really matter whether one comes up with an interpretation that restores causality; the scientists who abandoned universal causality did not stop doing good science, which they surely would have done had the presumption been correct.

(Edited to remove italics around Newton-Smith. I got carried away, because it's such a great name for a philosopher of science to have. Like Tom Fury in Something Wicked This Way Comes.)

[dann]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
Causality, can't live with it, can't live without it.
I take the position that everything we deal with has causes. We may not know them yet, but the goal of the crowning achievement of human effort, science, is discovering the causes of the phenomena we observe.
If everything, including our own behavior, is caused, then free will is an illusion.
Obviously, this all depends on the truth of the first assumption.
But, what the heck, why not proceed on that assumption and go and do science?
Maybe we'll find something that isn't caused someday.

What's with this "dark energy" and "dark matter" stuff?
Does it matter?
No cause for alarm, Jeff. Feel free to do so.
What caused you to think that everything is caused?
In response to this question most people come up with their reasons for thinking the way they do. And rightly so. Even people who claim that human awareness is determined tend to argue, present their reasons for thinking the way they do, instead of simply saying that something (e.g. their "brain", whatever) caused them to say so. Arguing that your reasoning is caused by something other than your arguments is a contradiction in terms.
"Maybe we'll find something that isn't caused someday."
What would cause us to do so?

[69dodge]

Originally posted by dann
Arguing that your reasoning is caused by something other than your arguments is a contradiction in terms.I don't see the problem.

An argument, and the conclusion it's arguing for, might very well be correct, even though the person presenting the argument has no free will but rather was destined to present that argument.

If I argue that 1 + 1 equals 2, and it turns out that I have no free will, does that mean that 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2?

If artificial intelligence researchers program a computer to have some basic reasoning skills and some basic knowledge about the world, including knowledge about how computers work, do you think it impossible that the computer, following its program, might reach the conclusion that it is a computer following a program, and furthermore might be able to present arguments justifying that conclusion? It seems quite possible to me.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by 69dodge
I don't see the problem.

An argument, and the conclusion it's arguing for, might very well be correct, even though the person presenting the argument has no free will but rather was destined to present that argument.

If I argue that 1 + 1 equals 2, and it turns out that I have no free will, does that mean that 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2?

If artificial intelligence researchers program a computer to have some basic reasoning skills and some basic knowledge about the world, including knowledge about how computers work, do you think it impossible that the computer, following its program, might reach the conclusion that it is a computer following a program, and furthermore might be able to present arguments justifying that conclusion? It seems quite possible to me.

If determinism requires that our behaviour is constrained to follow a certain path, then it would seem that we could have no reasons to suppose that our reasoning and arguments are correct. This includes computers. If determinism doesn't involve the idea that behaviour is so constrained, then I have no idea what it is saying. And if objects are not so constrained in their behaviour, why do physical laws describe the behaviour of objects?

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If determinism requires that our behaviour is constrained to follow a certain path, then it would seem that we could have no reasons to suppose that our reasoning and arguments are correct...
I'm not sure "constrained" as in "compelled, restricted, restrained" is quite the right word here. Just because the weather follws natural laws and is produced by the complex interactions of many factors, we don't say the weather is constrained. We don't say it has free will either.
And I don't see how the second half of that sentence follows.

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If determinism requires that our behaviour is constrained to follow a certain path, then it would seem that we could have no reasons to suppose that our reasoning and arguments are correct.And if our behaviour isn't determined? What reasons would we have, then, to suppose that our reasoning and arguments are correct?

I think I can recognize a correct argument when I see one. I might be mistaken, of course. But what has determinism to do with it? Perhaps I am constrained to reason correctly.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by 69dodge
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If determinism requires that our behaviour is constrained to follow a certain path, then it would seem that we could have no reasons to suppose that our reasoning and arguments are correct.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
69dodge
And if our behaviour isn't determined? What reasons would we have, then, to suppose that our reasoning and arguments are correct?


By having the problem clearly in our minds, carefully considering it, then coming to some sort of understanding. There is no impediment to doing this since my thought processes are not required to follow a unique given path as in physical determinism.



I think I can recognize a correct argument when I see one. I might be mistaken, of course. But what has determinism to do with it? Perhaps I am constrained to reason correctly..

Your reasoning follows physical laws. Now of course your reasoning might indeed be correct. But if the physical laws of nature were different, then your reasoning would not be correct.

If your reasoning is currently correct it is only because physical laws are as they are.

Personally I find it extremely hard to resist the notion that when we reason, we literally have the ability to choose from competing possible solutions, and we make our choice according to our actually understanding (by which I mean phenomenological realisation).

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If determinism requires that our behaviour is constrained to follow a certain path, then it would seem that we could have no reasons to suppose that our reasoning and arguments are correct.
Why on earth not? It seems you keep making the assumption of a closed system here. Either that, or you are somehow equating "determined" with "predetermined."

If it is a closed system assumption, you must be forgetting that we can see, hear, taste, feel, etc. We acquire new information that enters into the mix. We can, therefore, learn. We can, therefore, converge on "correct."

We tried also to separate the idea of deterministic equations from the idea of deterministic systems. Over in the materialism thread, it was pointed out that systems consisting of nothing but deterministic equations can produce behaviors that are indistinguishable from stochastic processes.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Why on earth not? It seems you keep making the assumption of a closed system here. Either that, or you are somehow equating "determined" with "predetermined."

If it is a closed system assumption, you must be forgetting that we can see, hear, taste, feel, etc. We acquire new information that enters into the mix. We can, therefore, learn. We can, therefore, converge on "correct."


We can converge on being correct only if physical laws happen to be that way.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
We can converge on being correct only if physical laws happen to be that way.
Enlighten me on this. "If physical laws happen to be correct"? But science evolves and known physical laws are shaped by new findings.
Or did you mean something else?
It seems to me that there are some logical jumps here that I am having difficulty following. Perhaps you would be so kind as to present your points in a more linear manner.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey

Enlighten me on this. "If physical laws happen to be correct"? But science evolves and known physical laws are shaped by new findings.
Or did you mean something else?
It seems to me that there are some logical jumps here that I am having difficulty following. Perhaps you would be so kind as to present your points in a more linear manner.
Ian,

That makes two of us now. Your answer also seems divergent from your original statement.

[Jeff Corey]

Ian,
Wakey, wakey, si'l vous plait. Whaasup?
The more I read your posts here, the less sense they make to me.
I crave some closure.

[dann]

Originally posted by 69dodge
I don't see the problem.
An argument, and the conclusion it's arguing for, might very well be correct, even though the person presenting the argument has no free will but rather was destined to present that argument.
OK, show me somebody (or something!) without free will who is able to present an argument! (or even refuse to do so: We have to take account of business astrologer Karen Boesen!)
If I argue that 1 + 1 equals 2, and it turns out that I have no free will, does that mean that 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2?
No, it means that your argument is not only fictitious, but also a contradiction in terms. If you don't have free will, then shut up and let your synapses fire at will (not intended).
If artificial intelligence researchers program a computer to have some basic reasoning skills and some basic knowledge about the world, including knowledge about how computers work, do you think it impossible that the computer, following its program, might reach the conclusion that it is a computer following a program, and furthermore might be able to present arguments justifying that conclusion? It seems quite possible to me.
Possible? Well, then show me one! The contradiction is that you provide your imaginary computer with ”reasoning skills” which would certainly enable it to make correct (as well as incorrect – that is the way that reasoning skills work!) conclusions. You have equipped the machine with free will in order to prove that reasoning is possible without free will! (Your programmers do not seem to have ordered the computer to develop self-consciousness, do they?)

I think that your own reasoning skills have let you down this time. You might as well ‘prove’ the existence of God by having a computer with ”some basic reasoning skills and some basic knowledge of the world” discover that He is actually out/up there somewhere! You make it too easy for yourself if you use science fiction to prove your point:
“You can do anything you want in science fiction. You can talk about any subject that … if you tried to put it in a contemporary book, it would be censured, you couldn’t do it, people wouldn’t read it. They wouldn’t take it seriously. In science fiction they will!” Anne McCaffrey

[epepke]

Originally posted by dann

OK, show me somebody (or something!) without free will who is able to present an argument! (or even refuse to do so: We have to take account of business astrologer Karen Boesen!)

Show me a way of finding out whether a person or a thing has "free will" or not.

How can I know whether you or I or a theorem prover has "free will" or not?

As far as I can tell, defining "free will" is a bit like trying to nail gelatine to a tree.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke


Show me a way of finding out whether a person or a thing has "free will" or not.

How can I know whether you or I or a theorem prover has "free will" or not?

As far as I can tell, defining "free will" is a bit like trying to nail gelatine to a tree.

If it is logically possible that physical laws could be other than they are, and we happened to live in such a Universe, and materialism is true, then our behaviour would follow such physical laws. But seeing as such laws are different, then our reasoning and behaviour would be different from what it is now. Therefore if we mainly reach correct conclusions now, we would not expect to reach mainly correct conclusions in this other Universe (or in this Universe if physical laws had happened to be different).

The possible defenses against this argument that I can think of are:

[list=1]
To maintain it is logically impossible for physical laws to have been different.
To argue that physical laws merely describe rather than supposing physical objects (including humans) follow such laws.
Appeal to evolution.

[/list=1]

All of these defences clearly fail in my opinion, (look at the materialism and immaterialism thread for my responses to 2 and 3).

So unless people can think of any other defences, this would mean that we do not behave and reason according to physical laws. This in turn suggests we have (libertarian) free will.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If it is logically possible that physical laws could be other than they are, and we happened to live in such a Universe, and materialism is true, then our behaviour would follow such physical laws. But seeing as such laws are different, then our reasoning and behaviour would be different from what it is now. Therefore if we mainly reach correct conclusions now, we would not expect to reach mainly correct conclusions in this other Universe (or in this Universe if physical laws had happened to be different)..
"Logically possible," Ian, should be one clue where you went awry here.

[dann]

Originally posted by epepke

Show me a way of finding out whether a person or a thing has "free will" or not.
How can I know whether you or I or a theorem prover has "free will" or not?
As far as I can tell, defining "free will" is a bit like trying to nail gelatine to a tree.
What on Earth made you write this?!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Epepke wrote it, Dann, because free will is an incoherent concept. Can you define it for us? How does free will work?

Ian said:
If it is logically possible that physical laws could be other than they are, and we happened to live in such a Universe, and materialism is true, then our behaviour would follow such physical laws. But seeing as such laws are different, then our reasoning and behaviour would be different from what it is now. Therefore if we mainly reach correct conclusions now, we would not expect to reach mainly correct conclusions in this other Universe (or in this Universe if physical laws had happened to be different).
What the hell? Why wouldn't we reach different yet correct conclusions in your alternate universe?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

What the hell has happened to your avatar??? :eek:

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If it is logically possible that physical laws could be other than they are, and we happened to live in such a Universe, and materialism is true, then our behaviour would follow such physical laws. But seeing as such laws are different, then our reasoning and behaviour would be different from what it is now. Therefore if we mainly reach correct conclusions now, we would not expect to reach mainly correct conclusions in this other Universe (or in this Universe if physical laws had happened to be different).

The possible defenses against this argument that I can think of are:

[list=1]
To maintain it is logically impossible for physical laws to have been different.
To argue that physical laws merely describe rather than supposing physical objects (including humans) follow such laws.
Appeal to evolution.

[/list=1]

All of these defences clearly fail in my opinion, (look at the materialism and immaterialism thread for my responses to 2 and 3).

So unless people can think of any other defences, this would mean that we do not behave and reason according to physical laws. This in turn suggests we have (libertarian) free will.

That's a good try, but how does it give a different answer when applied to a theorem prover written in LISP (which generates correct conclusions but does not usually get ascribed "free will") versus a human being?

[dann]

What on Earth made you write this?!
Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos [/i]
[B]Epepke wrote it, Dann, because free will is an incoherent concept. Can you define it for us? How does free will work?

You didn't get it, Paul!
Because free will is an incoherent concept, he wrote what he did?!
How on Earth would free will being an incoherent concept be able to make him write what he did?!
Instead of something making him write, he simply disagreed with me and decided to present us with an argument.
That is the way free will works.
No need to study Hegel in order to find out that free will is a pleonasm: It is either free or no will at all.

[dann]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Epepke wrote it, Dann, because free will is an incoherent concept.
To make myself absolutely clear: In your sentence it is implied that Epepke wrote it for a reason and not because something (destiny, society or growing up in a dysfunctional family) made him do it.
You make yourself guilty of this contradictio in adjecto whenever you decide to argue against free will.

[dann]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Can you define it for us? How does free will work?
It just occurred to me: "How does an abstract free will work?": http://www.gegenstandpunkt.com/english/psych/1-0-part-I.html
Enjoy!

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by dann
No need to study Hegel in order to find out that free will is a pleonasm: It is either free or no will at all.
If "will" means "intention, desire or determination" how is "free will" a redundancy?
The opposite would be a totally caused intention, desire or determination. Not free at all.
Just like our behavior.

[dann]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey

The opposite would be a totally caused intention, desire or determination. Not free at all.
Just like our behavior.
'It totally caused me to intend/desire/determine something'!?
I don't know about your behaviour, but it doesn't describe mine.
What totally caused you to think so?!

[Jeff Corey]

What totally caused you to think not?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
What totally caused you to think not?
What's this? A show cause order?

[epepke]

Originally posted by dann

What on Earth made you write this?!

Heh. That's a pretty cute self-referential answer. I like it.

[dann]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
What totally caused you to think not?
I notice that you actually argue, albeit by means of the very popular abstraction behaviour which enables behaviourists to place e.g. rodents on an equal footing with humans. Nobody forces you to do so. For some reason (!), and not a good one, it seems logical to behaviourists to study ordinary animals in order to learn about the psychology of the one animal that distinguishes itself from the rest of them by its ability to reason.
The opposite would be a totally caused intention, desire or determination.
Consequently neither free, nor will!

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by dann

I notice that you actually argue, albeit by means of the very popular abstraction behaviour which enables behaviourists to place e.g. rodents on an equal footing with humans. Nobody forces you to do so. For some reason (!), and not a good one, it seems logical to behaviourists to study ordinary animals in order to learn about the psychology of the one animal that distinguishes itself from the rest of them by its ability to reason.
It appears that you are ill informed about what behaviorists actually do, but that's fodder for another thread.
You still haven't shown how "free will" is a redundancy.

[epepke]

Originally posted by dann

To make myself absolutely clear: In your sentence it is implied that Epepke wrote it for a reason and not because something (destiny, society or growing up in a dysfunctional family) made him do it.

To be serious for a moment, what's the difference? Would not something making me do it be a reason as well?

How can I say why I said that? I don't even know exactly how I said it. I seem to have the ability to emit sentences that other native speakers of English consider grammatical. I could talk for hours on end about linguistics and language-teaching and neurology, but ultimately, nobody really knows how this stuff works.

You make yourself guilty of this contradictio in adjecto whenever you decide to argue against free will.

It seems to me that any argument against, or for that matter, for free will presupposes the coherence of the idea. It doesn't seem so coherent to me. The meaning seems to shift subtly from sentence to sentence, turning every argument about it into mush.

[dann]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey

You still haven't shown how "free will" is a redundancy.
I didn't know that I was supposed to do so!?
Hegel has, however, and others have criticized the mistakes that he made, but then you have to move on to chapter one:
http://www.gegenstandpunkt.com/english/psych/1-1-chap-1.html

[69dodge]

Originally posted by dann
Possible? Well, then show me one! The contradiction is that you provide your imaginary computer with ”reasoning skills” which would certainly enable it to make correct (as well as incorrect – that is the way that reasoning skills work!) conclusions. You have equipped the machine with free will in order to prove that reasoning is possible without free will!It looks like we mean different things by "reasoning skills". Why is it necessary for a computer with reasoning skills to reach incorrect conclusions sometimes? That would mean its reasoning skills are faulty.

Computer programs exist that can construct proofs of mathematical theorems. (These are not "imaginary computer[s]" that I have invented for this argument. They really exist. Google for "automated theorem prover".) Such a program presents a mathematical statement, and gives reasons why the statement is true. Is this fundamentally different from what a person does when he states that free will doesn't exist and gives his reasons for that statement?

Why is free will necessary in order to reach correct conclusions, even correct conclusions about the existence of free will?

[dann]

Originally posted by 69dodge
It looks like we mean different things by "reasoning skills". Why is it necessary for a computer with reasoning skills to reach incorrect conclusions sometimes? That would mean its reasoning skills are faulty.
Yes, it probably would. If you have reasoning skills, then you can be fooled. Leave out a few facts, present it with something that appears to be different from the actual truth (flim-flam it), and let it reach its own, faulty, conclusions.
No, it's true. That's not the way it works with computers, is it? They cannot be blamed for reaching the wrong 'conclusion', it's the programmers fault, because these calculators cannot bloody think!
Computer programs exist that can construct proofs of mathematical theorems. (These are not "imaginary computer[s]" that I have invented for this argument. They really exist. Google for "automated theorem prover".)
If you say so.
Such a program presents a mathematical statement, and gives reasons why the statement is true. Is this fundamentally different from what a person does when he states that free will doesn't exist and gives his reasons for that statement?.
I don't know, but it probably is. Do you know of any computer that states that free will doesn't exist and gives its reasons for that statement?
Why is free will necessary in order to reach correct conclusions, even correct conclusions about the existence of free will?
Because you have to consider what the question is, not simply compute. I am aware of the fact that you can use computers to simulate. logical deductions. Make one of them write me, when it does more than that. No, don't make it. Let it make up its own mind.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by dann

I didn't know that I was supposed to do so!?
Hegel has, however, and others have criticized the mistakes that he made, but then you have to move on to chapter one:
http://www.gegenstandpunkt.com/english/psych/1-1-chap-1.html
You said there was no need to study Hegel to understand it was a pleonasm. Please explain why.

[epepke]

Originally posted by 69dodge
Computer programs exist that can construct proofs of mathematical theorems.

Not only do they exist, but they're old. They were nothing new when I started college in 1978. It's well established technology.

Not only equation-type theorems, either. Geometrical theorems as well. I know these have been around since 1980, because that's when I saw one for the first time.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dann said:
No need to study Hegel in order to find out that free will is a pleonasm: It is either free or no will at all.
If you would define free, that would make it clear why you think it is redundant with will.

~~ Paul

[epepke]

Ping to Ian: Please answer my question.

[69dodge]

Originally posted by dann
Because you have to consider what the question is, not simply compute.Simple computation, as opposed to considering what the question is, is certainly sufficient to answer at least some questions correctly.

My little electronic calculator can correctly tell me what the square root of any number is, and it can do so much faster than any person can. But it's not considering what the question is; it's simply computing.

Chess-playing computer programs don't consider what the question is; they simply compute. But they can still play chess remarkably well.

There are lots of questions that, at first glance, seem to require consideration by a person with free will in order to answer correctly, but for which simple computation has, in the end, proven to be sufficient. Perhaps the question of the existence of free will itself is one of them, so that people who lack free will can nevertheless correctly determine that they lack it.

[Jeff Corey]

Mine, too.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by dann
Because you have to consider what the question is, not simply compute. I am aware of the fact that you can use computers to simulate. logical deductions. Make one of them write me, when it does more than that. No, don't make it. Let it make up its own mind.
I have sad news for you, dann. The computers have been writing us; they've simply chosen not to write to you.

All kidding aside, does not this possibility cut to the heart of the Turing Test, that bane of Chalmers' existence?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by 69dodge
Simple computation, as opposed to considering what the question is, is certainly sufficient to answer at least some questions correctly.

My little electronic calculator can correctly tell me what the square root of any number is, and it can do so much faster than any person can. But it's not considering what the question is; it's simply computing.

Chess-playing computer programs don't consider what the question is; they simply compute. But they can still play chess remarkably well.

There are lots of questions that, at first glance, seem to require consideration by a person with free will in order to answer correctly, but for which simple computation has, in the end, proven to be sufficient. Perhaps the question of the existence of free will itself is one of them, so that people who lack free will can nevertheless correctly determine that they lack it.

They can, but their conclusion would only coincidentally be correct, isn't that so? Your little electronic calculator wouldn't work if physical laws were different from what they are. It was designed to give correct answers. We are not supposed to be designed.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I have sad news for you, dann. The computers have been writing us; they've simply chosen not to write to you.

All kidding aside, does not this possibility cut to the heart of the Turing Test, that bane of Chalmers' existence?

The turing test means absolutely nothing. How could it possibly prove that computers are conscious?? :eek:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke
Ping to Ian: Please answer my question.

What question? Hang on, I'm working backwards here.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by 69dodge
It looks like we mean different things by "reasoning skills". Why is it necessary for a computer with reasoning skills to reach incorrect conclusions sometimes? That would mean its reasoning skills are faulty.

Computer programs exist that can construct proofs of mathematical theorems. (These are not "imaginary computer[s]" that I have invented for this argument. They really exist. Google for "automated theorem prover".) Such a program presents a mathematical statement, and gives reasons why the statement is true. Is this fundamentally different from what a person does when he states that free will doesn't exist and gives his reasons for that statement?

Why is free will necessary in order to reach correct conclusions, even correct conclusions about the existence of free will?

It is not necessary. But our correct conclusions about anything would be wholly coincidental.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke


[quote]

It seems to me that any argument against, or for that matter, for free will presupposes the coherence of the idea. It doesn't seem so coherent to me.

If free will is incoherent, then you are required to demonstrate this.

Now where is this question of yours?? :confused:

[Interesting Ian]

Ah, here we are!


Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If it is logically possible that physical laws could be other than they are, and we happened to live in such a Universe, and materialism is true, then our behaviour would follow such physical laws. But seeing as such laws are different, then our reasoning and behaviour would be different from what it is now. Therefore if we mainly reach correct conclusions now, we would not expect to reach mainly correct conclusions in this other Universe (or in this Universe if physical laws had happened to be different).

The possible defenses against this argument that I can think of are:




To maintain it is logically impossible for physical laws to have been different.

To argue that physical laws merely describe rather than supposing physical objects (including humans) follow such laws.

Appeal to evolution.




All of these defences clearly fail in my opinion, (look at the materialism and immaterialism thread for my responses to 2 and 3).

So unless people can think of any other defences, this would mean that we do not behave and reason according to physical laws. This in turn suggests we have (libertarian) free will.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Epeke (or whatever he's called)

That's a good try, but how does it give a different answer when applied to a theorem prover written in LISP (which generates correct conclusions but does not usually get ascribed "free will") versus a human being?


LISP?? What on earth is LISP when it's all at home?? Does this LISP operate according to physical laws or not? If it does, and physical laws were different, then you cannot maintain it would provide the same "reasoning" leading to the same answer. I can say that without even knowing what "LISP" is :-)

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


They can, but their conclusion would only coincidentally be correct, isn't that so? Your little electronic calculator wouldn't work if physical laws were different from what they are. It was designed to give correct answers. We are not supposed to be designed.
Fallacious reasoning, Ian: denying the antecedent.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


The turing test means absolutely nothing. How could it possibly prove that computers are conscious?? :eek:
Ian,

Smilies are turned off in this area of JREF forums. There was a reason for that, sir.

You missed my point about Turing, but I think that suggests a misunderstanding of Turing's test. The test is to see if a computer can become indistinguishable from a conscious human. The corollary point : if they are indistinguishable, how can we say they ain't human?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

They can, but their conclusion would only coincidentally be correct, isn't that so? Your little electronic calculator wouldn't work if physical laws were different from what they are. It was designed to give correct answers. We are not supposed to be designed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Fallacious reasoning, Ian: denying the antecedent.

How am I denying the antecedent?? How is my reasoning fallacious?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Ian,

Smilies are turned off in this area of JREF forums. There was a reason for that, sir.



Presumably so, although I have no idea what that reason might be. Care to enlighten me?



You missed my point about Turing, but I think that suggests a misunderstanding of Turing's test. The test is to see if a computer can become indistinguishable from a conscious human. The corollary point : if they are indistinguishable, how can we say they ain't human?

Because we don't feel they are?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Your little electronic calculator wouldn't work if physical laws were different from what they are.
I haven't the slightest idea what you think you mean here. Can you explain?

If free will is incoherent, then you are required to demonstrate this.
First it would be good if you would define the term. In particular, how is free will neither algorithmic nor random?

~~ Paul

[Pyrrho]

I think people have free will, but I also think people don't exercise it all the time, or even most of the time. I've concluded that most human behavior is reactive, and thus is not the result of "free will". But, when people take time to think about their intended actions, and choose a course of action based on that thinking, then they're excercising free will.

Example: driving home yesterday, I became suddenly aware that I had not been paying direct attention to the traffic. I had driven a certain distance automatically, without conscious effort. That's not free will, that's learned behavior. When I chose to change lanes and exit the highway at a point I do not normally exit the highway, because I realized that I was tired and should not be driving at high speeds, that was an act of free will.

[Humphreys]

I'm pointing out something we've already gone over in this thread, but I'll go ahead and repeat anyway.

Let's say we could create a robot with the ability to reason, but only fallaciously. The robot, no matter how wrong he was about everything ever, would be convinced, on nearly every occasion, that he was correct, because we programmed him that way. He's a robot, so there's no doubt he doesn't have free-will; all his actions are under control. For the sake of argument, presume our robot is conscious, so he can feel.

If you don't believe in free-will, how would you know you and everyone else isn't similar to the robot?

How do you know you aren't completely wrong about everything?

If you deny free-will, you would admit to being under control like a puppet. Am I right?

So, no thoughts, feelings, arguments or observations could be trusted, surely.

The success of science might seem like proof that we can trust our senses, but again, wouldn't your brain just be telling you that science has been successful? If the above is true, this wouldn't do much good because we couldn't trust our reasoning anyway if it was controlled by another source. Especially since it would be controlled by the laws of physics which aren't conscious and don't have the ability to reason at all themslves. They are totally random, supposedly.

Why should we deny free-will using reasoning which we must admit could be completely skew whiff? Aren't we putting a lot of trust in the unconscious Universe which controls us to give the right answers?

You say we don't have a choice whether or not to have this discussion, and we don't have a choice how to present out arguments, and either one of us could go crazy and eat our own limbs because the laws of physics happened to cause us to do that. What does all this matter? Why bother at all?

That's a silly question aswell because you apparently don't even have a choice whether to bother or not.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by Pyrrho
I think people have free will, but I also think people don't exercise it all the time, or even most of the time. I've concluded that most human behavior is reactive, and thus is not the result of "free will". But, when people take time to think about their intended actions, and choose a course of action based on that thinking, then they're excercising free will.

Example: driving home yesterday, I became suddenly aware that I had not been paying direct attention to the traffic. I had driven a certain distance automatically, without conscious effort. That's not free will, that's learned behavior. When I chose to change lanes and exit the highway at a point I do not normally exit the highway, because I realized that I was tired and should not be driving at high speeds, that was an act of free will.
I respectfully disagree. Having been in similar situations, I've most frequently opted for the safer, even if more arduous plan of behavior.
In the past, when I have not, there was a higher probability of aversive consequences.
Balancing the contingencies of reinforcement and punishment requires a history of exposure to those contingencies.
And subsequent survival of such exposure.
A Darwinnowing of choices.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
LISP?? What on earth is LISP when it's all at home?? Does this LISP operate according to physical laws or not? If it does, and physical laws were different, then you cannot maintain it would provide the same "reasoning" leading to the same answer. I can say that without even knowing what "LISP" is :-)

It's pure math. In order to posit a universe where a theorem prover written in LISP would not work, you would have to posit that either:

1) Mathematics does not work in that universe.

2) The universe is such that it is impossible for any sort of information processing to work, using any configuration of whatever happens to be available in that universe.

You'd then have to show how a human being could survive in such a universe in the first place, since you're assuming transplantation of human beings as the basis for your argument.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If free will is incoherent, then you are required to demonstrate this.

No more than you are required to demonstrate that grblphatz is incoherent.

I assert that it doesn't seem coherent to me, because I have never seen a definition clear enough to make it coherent. There isn't even a functional test, and functional tests are generally easier to come up with.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Humphreys
If you don't believe in free-will, how would you know you and everyone else isn't similar to the robot?

How do you know you aren't completely wrong about everything?

I don't.

If you deny free-will, you would admit to being under control like a puppet. Am I right?

I have no idea. I conjecture that it would be impossible for me to tell the difference. Certainly, nobody has presented a way in which I could tell the difference for sure.

All philosophical thought, when reduced long enough, eventually leads to the impossibility of disproving solipsism, nihilism, and idealism simultaneously.

Most people are aware of this but don't actually go around believing in solipsism, nihilism, or idealism. Rather, they cut their philosophical thinking short at some point.

Which is fine. I do it, too. But once you do this, you are dealing with working assumptions about the world. Essentially, people operate according to a mythology of themselves and the world around them. Mythological concepts that people use include the self, monads, the external universe, free will, and so on and so forth. (Some people call this metaphysics. Other people call it making models. I call it mythology.)

These mythological concepts are often useful, possibly essential. I say that I am pressing the keys on this keyboard, even though I know that this is inaccurate and that it would be more accurate to say that the electrons and protons in my fingers (mostly the electrons) are exchanging virtual photons with the electrons and protons in the keys. Even that's wrong. There are amplitudes describing photon exchange that have, as their highest absolute value a situation where the key goes down. As for what is really happening, I haven't a clue.

Each description makes sense only in the context of a set of mythological constructs.

But when people do this, no logical argument is stronger than the mythological constructs. Any attempt to push a logical argument past this point tends to lead to problems.

Your argument involves a robot as opposed to a human being. The whole idea of using this is that people automatically assume some sort of qualitative difference between a robot and a human being. But that's, more or less, what you're trying to prove by the argument, so you're begging the question.

Ian's argument involves transporting a human consciousness to a universe where the laws are different, such that human consciousness can work in that universe, but since physical laws are different, no information-processing device can work in that universe. And then he uses it to prove, basically, the assumption. It's also begging the question.

I think more along the lines of: You are presented with a robot and a human being. One, it is declared, has free will. One, it is declared, does not. How do you tell the difference.

Or: you are transported to a universe which is different from this one, but at the same time, your memories and thought processes change to be consistent with this new universe. Can you tell you've moved?

Of even worse. You open Schroedinger's box and the cat is dead. Suddenly, the universe goes back in time, the particle fails to decay, and it fast-forwards to the point where you open the box and the cat is dead. But all the events in your memory undergo the same process. Can you know the difference? What if this happens a million times a second, subjective time? Would you be able to tell?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke


epepke
That's a good try, but how does it give a different answer when applied to a theorem prover written in LISP (which generates correct conclusions but does not usually get ascribed "free will") versus a human being?



Ian
LISP?? What on earth is LISP when it's all at home?? Does this LISP operate according to physical laws or not? If it does, and physical laws were different, then you cannot maintain it would provide the same "reasoning" leading to the same answer. I can say that without even knowing what "LISP" is :-)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


epepke
It's pure math. In order to posit a universe where a theorem prover written in LISP would not work, you would have to posit that either:

1) Mathematics does not work in that universe.

2) The universe is such that it is impossible for any sort of information processing to work, using any configuration of whatever happens to be available in that universe.



You'd then have to show how a human being could survive in such a universe in the first place, since you're assuming transplantation of human beings as the basis for your argument.



No no. We might well be able to design a computer which gives correct answers in another Universe where differing physical laws pertain. That's no different from being able to design computers in this Universe which give correct answers.

But this doesn't negate the problem I was talking about whatsoever. In order to work in this other Universe then the computer or brain would have to be physically different from what it is in this Universe.

The point here being that the brain has to be in a unique or a severely limited number of physical configurations in order to come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time. This is so whether we are talking about this Universe, or any other! And if it is not in this unique state, then we have no particular reason to suppose we will come up with correct answers rather than false ones.

If blind evolutionary forces created something that looks exactly like a calculator, and it gave answers when operating it, would there be any compelling reason to suppose it would give correct answers?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke


Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If free will is incoherent, then you are required to demonstrate this.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



No more than you are required to demonstrate that grblphatz is incoherent.

I assert that it doesn't seem coherent to me,



Then you are required to state what is it about the notion of free will that you find incoherent. I think it is coherent. You say it's not coherent. Therefore you should state the problems with it, yes?


because I have never seen a definition clear enough to make it coherent. There isn't even a functional test, and functional tests are generally easier to come up with.

It means that we can deliberate and choose between various options, and the choice ultimately originates from the self. Nothing compels me to make the choice I did, and indeed I could have chosen otherwise if I had of been so disposed. Compare this with, say, the Earth orbiting the Sun.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke
Essentially, people operate according to a mythology of themselves and the world around them.


Indeed! I agree! But you need to tell the rest of your skeptical friends on here ;-)

[Interesting Ian]

epepke
These mythological concepts are often useful, possibly essential. I say that I am pressing the keys on this keyboard, even though I know that this is inaccurate and that it would be more accurate to say that the electrons and protons in my fingers (mostly the electrons) are exchanging virtual photons with the electrons and protons in the keys. Even that's wrong. There are amplitudes describing photon exchange that have, as their highest absolute value a situation where the key goes down. As for what is really happening, I haven't a clue


Dear me! I find it astounding that the vast majority of people are so comprehensively "brainwashed" by the so-called scientific story regarding the world. I can tell you what is happening. You are pressing the keys on the keyboard. Nothing more to it than that. Why believe in silly stories created by scientists? Science only describes reality. We have no reason to suppose it characterises reality per se.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke
[B]

Ian's argument involves transporting a human consciousness to a universe where the laws are different, such that human consciousness can work in that universe, but since physical laws are different, no information-processing device can work in that universe.



As explained I do not maintain this.



And then he uses it to prove, basically, the assumption. It's also begging the question.



Nope, I'm afraid not, see my post above.



I think more along the lines of: You are presented with a robot and a human being. One, it is declared, has free will. One, it is declared, does not. How do you tell the difference.



The robot's behaviour unfolds according to a uniquely given algorithm, the human being's behaviour doesn't. Indeed the human's behaviour doesn't follow any algorithm.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


No no. We might well be able to design a computer which gives correct answers in another Universe where differing physical laws pertain. That's no different from being able to design computers in this Universe which give correct answers.

But this doesn't negate the problem I was talking about whatsoever. In order to work in this other Universe then the computer or brain would have to be physically different from what it is in this Universe.

OK.

Then how does this give different answers regarding free will with respect to a mind running on a brain versus a LISP theorem prover running on some hardware that you consider possible?

[quote]The point here being that the brain has to be in a unique or a severely limited number of physical configurations in order to come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time.[quote]

Why do you suppose this? It seems obviously false. There seem to be a large number of physical configurations that come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then you are required to state what is it about the notion of free will that you find incoherent. I think it is coherent. You say it's not coherent. Therefore you should state the problems with it, yes?

I still don't have to, but I will anywyay: Free from what? In what sense is the will free? From what is it free?

Obviously it isn't totally free, because if it were, then bokewljr;so ewoirunhweo sdfjklc repoijisdfkl;! and don't you forget it, buddy boy.

Any attempt to make a logical or rational argument is a restriction upon will, and therefore the will is not free in any absolute sense.

So, in what sense is a will (what is a will anyway) free, and from what is it free, such that it be called "free will"? I've never gotten a straight, coherent answer to this.

A related question is, what is a test that I can apply to something that shows whether or not it has "free will"? I've never gotten a straight, coherent answer to this, either.

As a result, I am not persuaded that the concept is coherent.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
As explained I do not maintain this.

OK, that gives us a basis.

The robot's behaviour unfolds according to a uniquely given algorithm, the human being's behaviour doesn't. Indeed the human's behaviour doesn't follow any algorithm.

Bald assertion. How do you know that the human's behavior doesn't follow any algorithm? Perhaps it's just an algorithm too complex for you to recognize as an algorithm. How do you know that this is not the case? Or do you?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Because we don't feel they are?
The point of the Turing test, Ian, is that we don't know who is who until the curtains are pulled back. Retreating to this subjectively flavored quip doesn't get around the fact that the test sets up conditions under which they would be indistinguishable.

Back to your question now:
The turing test means absolutely nothing. How could it possibly prove that computers are conscious??
On epistemic grounds, if two things are indistinguishable, they are effectively the same, Ian.

[hammegk]

It would seem correct that any materialist can be replaced by a Turing machine, some servos, and some sensors.

If that is not correct, why isn't it?

[BillHoyt]

hammy,

A Turing Machine is not the same a the Turing Test.

[epepke]

Originally posted by hammegk
It would seem correct that any materialist can be replaced by a Turing machine, some servos, and some sensors.

If that is not correct, why isn't it?

Nobody knows whether it is possible to replace a person by a Turing machine. Please note, though, that Turing machines come in deterministic and non-deterministic varieties, so whether it is possible or not has little to do with the original topic of the thread.

Furthermore, in a way, a Turing machine is immateralistic in the sense that it consists solely of information.

That's part of why I tend to roll my eyes at concepts such as "materialistic" and "immaterialistic."

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Dear me! I find it astounding that the vast majority of people are so comprehensively "brainwashed" by the so-called scientific story regarding the world. I can tell you what is happening. You are pressing the keys on the keyboard. Nothing more to it than that. Why believe in silly stories created by scientists? Science only describes reality. We have no reason to suppose it characterises reality per se.

From my perspective it's the other way around. Most of these philosophical arguments have a definite 19th century (or before) flavor to them. I see people rejecting 20th century physics so as simply to maintain a context in which these philosophical arguments make sense.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke


Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Dear me! I find it astounding that the vast majority of people are so comprehensively "brainwashed" by the so-called scientific story regarding the world. I can tell you what is happening. You are pressing the keys on the keyboard. Nothing more to it than that. Why believe in silly stories created by scientists? Science only describes reality. We have no reason to suppose it characterises reality per se.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



From my perspective it's the other way around. Most of these philosophical arguments have a definite 19th century (or before) flavor to them. I see people rejecting 20th century physics so as simply to maintain a context in which these philosophical arguments make sense.

Rejecting physics?? Who is suggesting that we reject physics?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
The turing test means absolutely nothing. How could it possibly prove that computers are conscious??
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


On epistemic grounds, if two things are indistinguishable, they are effectively the same, Ian.


We would require more than the output of text before we could conclude they are conscious. We would need an android and to feel it is conscious.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke
The robot's behaviour unfolds according to a uniquely given algorithm, the human being's behaviour doesn't. Indeed the human's behaviour doesn't follow any algorithm.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Bald assertion. How do you know that the human's behavior doesn't follow any algorithm? Perhaps it's just an algorithm too complex for you to recognize as an algorithm. How do you know that this is not the case? Or do you?

Can you tell me what you mean precisely by an algorithm and why you think our behaviour follows them?

Incidentally, I think this free will determinism debate is full of confusions. It seems it is not only unclear what free will means, but also determinism. If our behaviour is determined, what is it determined by? Stimpson J Cat says determinism means not determined by anything, just perfect prediction. Moreover, such perfect prediction necessarily must be described by an algorithm.

But I'm uncertain as to why perfect prediction should necessarily be able to be described by an algorithm. Even if it could, why does this mean we are determined? Then there is the question of whether perfect prediction, but which couldn't be described by an algorithm, would mean we are determined. I would certainly say not.

If you want to discuss this topic I would prefer to keep it simple at first, and first of all deal with the question of whether we are physically determined. Is our behaviour "determined" in the same sense as any other physical object such as the Earth orbiting the Sun?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
We would need an android and to feel it is conscious.
So your mood upon encountering the android would be a reliable gauge of whether it is conscious?

~~ Paul

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


We would require more than the output of text before we could conclude they are conscious. We would need an android and to feel it is conscious.
That isn't the Turing test; neither does it properly address the question. You are now requiring a humanoid form to embody consciousness.

Your "feel it is conscious" requirement, btw, is already covered in the Turing test. It is an imitation game wherein an interrogator communicates with a person and a computer via a terminal. The test is passed if the computer can fool the interrogator into believing it is the person.

[Upchurch]

We have received a number of reports for this and another thread for CT rules violations. I'm going to close both threads down so everyone can cool down and the other mods and I can read through and figure out what's going on.

[Upchurch]

I have gone through this thread and, based on the reports I received, deleted several inflammatory posts as per CT board rules in hopes of defusing the situation.

I have re-opened the thread, but be warned that a repeat of this incident will not only result in this thread being closed for good, but will probably lead to some posters being relieved of the privilege of posting on the Critical Thinking board.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Upchurch
I have gone through this thread and, based on the reports I received, deleted several inflammatory posts as per CT board rules in hopes of defusing the situation.

I have re-opened the thread, but be warned that a repeat of this incident will not only result in this thread being closed for good, but will probably lead to some posters being relieved of the privilege of posting on the Critical Thinking board.

Have you deleted any of my posts??

[Upchurch]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Have you deleted any of my posts?? No.

[Jeff Corey]

Yowsha!
The thread orginally threatened to pugatory for being frivolous is back in town.
This thread was orginated by me and then some mod called frivolous and then someone called others "stupid".
I agree, that's not allowed.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by epepke
The point here being that the brain has to be in a unique or a severely limited number of physical configurations in order to come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time.

Why do you suppose this? It seems obviously false. There seem to be a large number of physical configurations that come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time.
epepke,

While it is false, and while it seems obvious to us, it clearly is not obvious to others. In mathematics, any number of proof paths can lead to the same answer. In science, the variety of tests necessary to rule out the enormous number of competing hypotheses can sometimes be mind-boggling. For some reason, this basic concept is tough to communicate.

For some reason, rational thought seems linear. Ed knows this is what the postmodernists scream. By no means, however, is it true. For any for whom this isn't clear, try this easy experiment: give a good brain-twister puzzle of some sort to ten friends. Ask each to write down each thought / approach they pursue as he works out the answer. Compare and contrast them all to marvel at the unique thought processes involved. Then just look at the notes from the ones who got the answer. Again, marvel at the variety of unique thought processes involved. Then, simply zero in on the explanations of the answer from each person who got it correct. Again, an amazing variety.

[Interesting Ian]

II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The point here being that the brain has to be in a unique or a severely limited number of physical configurations in order to come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


epepke
Why do you suppose this? It seems obviously false. There seem to be a large number of physical configurations that come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BillHoyt
epepke,

While it is false,



You guys just completely miss the point. I've already told you the possible responses the skeptic can make. Saying that our reasoning would still be correct in a Universe with different physical laws when our mental processes, and thus reasoning processes, just follow physical laws, is patently absurd. You're effectively saying that the Universe would be exactly the same as it is even if there were differing physical laws governing it. This conversation is really silly and I've had enough. Goodbye.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


You guys just completely miss the point. I've already told you the possible responses the skeptic can make. Saying that our reasoning would still be correct in a Universe with different physical laws when our mental processes, and thus reasoning processes, just follow physical laws, is patently absurd. You're effectively saying that the Universe would be exactly the same as it is even if there were differing physical laws governing it. This conversation is really silly and I've had enough. Goodbye.
Ian,

I'm afraid it is you who are missing the point. You don't do your stance any favor by persisting with bald assertions. You seem to forget the definition of "logically possible" here when you construct your hypothetical universes. But this has already been pointed out to you. Moreover, you've elected to leave. Ed bye you.

[epepke]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


Why do you suppose this? It seems obviously false. There seem to be a large number of physical configurations that come up with correct reasoning the preponderance of the time.
epepke,

While it is false, and while it seems obvious to us, it clearly is not obvious to others. In mathematics, any number of proof paths can lead to the same answer. In science, the variety of tests necessary to rule out the enormous number of competing hypotheses can sometimes be mind-boggling. For some reason, this basic concept is tough to communicate.[/b]

What you say is quite resonable. The great unifications of the 20th century: matter, energy, and momentum into energy/momentum, the ongoing unification of information theory and physics, etc. don't seem to have had much of an impact on mainstream philosophy yet.

What I object to is when someone makes an assertion on the grounds that, because they don't see it as obviously false, it must be true, and then uses this assertion in a chain of reasoning. Such a chain is only as strong as it's weakest link (a fairly deep result of fuzzy logic, by the way).

For some reason, rational thought seems linear. Ed knows this is what the postmodernists scream. By no means, however, is it true.

When someone reports that "rational thought is linear," or some such statement, all that is reasonable to conclude (assuming the absence of e.g. simple lying) is that the parts of the brain/mind/whatever that report on such things perceive the process that way.

This persists to a lot of things. I certainly feel as if there is a monadic thing that might be called "me" right behind my eyes. I can't, from that information, tell if that's a real or illusory concept. I'm pretty sure that there's good communication between the parts of my brain/mind/whatever that think that way and my fingers. I'm also pretty sure that a similar condition exists between those parts and the parts involved in speech. I don't know even if "I" is a valid concept. It seems to be a useful myth.

There are any number of ways the brain can be damaged to break this. Split-brain patients frequently report that they found themselves reaching for something that they did not want. All this means is that the parts associated with speech are different from the parts associated with reaching for things, and for some reason (in this particular case, cutting the corpus callosum, there is poor internal communication between the two.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No no. We might well be able to design a computer which gives correct answers in another Universe where differing physical laws pertain. That's no different from being able to design computers in this Universe which give correct answers.

But this doesn't negate the problem I was talking about whatsoever. In order to work in this other Universe then the computer or brain would have to be physically different from what it is in this Universe.

Fine.

But you still haven't answered my question.

How does this distinguish between

1) the case of software (a mind and/or consciousness) running on hardware (a brain, which may be different due to differing physical laws) and

2) the case of software (a theorem-prover written in LISP) running on hardware (a computet, which may be different due to differering physical laws)

?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by epepke


Fine.

But you still haven't answered my question.

How does this distinguish between

1) the case of software (a mind and/or consciousness) running on hardware (a brain, which may be different due to differing physical laws) and

2) the case of software (a theorem-prover written in LISP) running on hardware (a computet, which may be different due to differering physical laws)

?

There is no distinction. We've been through this.

I am not prepared to discuss the free will issue unless you define what you mean by determinism.

It's as simple as that.

I assume you won't, so goodbye.

[epepke]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
There is no distinction. We've been through this.

Good. Nice to get it clear.

I am not prepared to discuss the free will issue unless you define what you mean by determinism.

This is a very strange response, as I am not an advocate of the concept of free will. Perhaps you mistake me for someone else. Edited to add: Nor am I an advocate, particularly, for deciding whether the universe is deterministic or not. As far as I can tell, at the macroscopic level, a deterministic and non-deterministic universe would look much the same.

I assume you won't, so goodbye.

Edited to remove sarcasm

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
I take the position that everything we deal with has causes. We may not know them yet, but the goal of the crowning achievement of human effort, science, is discovering the causes of the phenomena we observe.
If everything, including our own behavior, is caused, then free will is an illusion.
Definition of determinism as contrasted to free will.
Feel free to respond.

[angard]

I am not prepared to discuss the free will issue unless you define what you mean by determinism.

Wouldn't determinism equal "something that I/or a thing can determine" beforehand? or am I way off? I'm Swedish hehe.

EDIT: I just googled for the word and got some completly different answer.....ignore the above. bah...Or pherhaps google just cant hack it. If it means what I think, who don't even speak English on a daily basis, I can graSP the difference between free will and determinism. I would say, that on a larger scale, we use free will. On a smaller one, we are bound to use a determined one, but hey, I'm biased.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by angard


Wouldn't determinism equal "something that I/or a thing can determine" beforehand? or am I way off?

EDIT: I just googled for the word and got some completly different answer.....ignore the above.
Why would we ignore it? That's what it actually does mean. Non-immaterialists find themselves in a box at this point, because they notice even their own thoughts/actions are not "random", but deterministic or random are the only choices they have.


If it means what I think, who don't even speak English on a daily basis, I can graSP the difference between free will and determinism. I would say, that on a larger scale, we use free will. On a smaller one, we are bound to use a determined one, but hey, I'm biased.
Most here agree we have free will, but non-immaterialists are stuck in their determined/random box & the best they can do is an idea called compatibilistic free will. Google that for more, and compare it to what you, and I, a few others here have faith in -- we actually have libertarian free will when we choose to.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by hammegk
...Most here agree we have free will,
<I.m not sure that's true>
but non-immaterialists are stuck in their determined/random box & the best they can do is an idea called compatibilistic free will...
< I'm pretty sure that's not true, if I understand what you mean. "Non-immateralist" seems to mean "materialist". I am a materialist and a determinist and don't hold to compatabilistic free will.>

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey

I am a materialist and a determinist and don't hold to compatabilistic free will.

Would you characterize your position with a bit more detail about how you view free-will and determinism? Obviously things -- including the human body-- certainly work deterministically much if not most of the time.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by hammegk


Would you characterize your position with a bit more detail about how you view free-will and determinism? Obviously things -- including the human body-- certainly work deterministically much if not most of the time.
I thought I did that in post #1. If my assumption of determinism -that all events have causes - is true, then there is no free will and free choice is an oxymoron.
I've noticed that scientists in other fields make a strict assumption of determinism when it comes to their subject matter, but not so when it comes to their own behavior. This may be one reason why they resist classifying psychology as a natural science.

[hammegk]

Thanks. My bad for not recalling the OP.

I'd agree that the position of super-determinism is logically consistent with materialism. Unfortunately it's also logically consistent with immaterialism.

As a worldview it is as sterile as nihilism for questions that science cannot address, like ethical & moral ones.

[Jeff Corey]

How is logically consistent with immaterialism?
Immaterial causes?
And I don't find it a sterile lifeview, but chacun a son gout.

[hammegk]

Why not? If it's nothing but cause follows effect not only can nothing be except as it is, nothing could ever be except as it is.

And I find your last statement in direct opposition to your stated worldview.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by hammegk
Why not? If it's nothing but cause follows effect not only can nothing be except as it is, nothing could ever be except as it is.

And I find your last statement in direct opposition to your stated worldview.
I don't. Maybe you could clarify your reasoning.

[hammegk]

Hmmm? I translate "chacun a son gout" as to each his own, and if that's what you meant, that is what you profess to be without, being just a bundle of preprogramming in performance.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by hammegk
Hmmm? I translate "chacun a son gout" as to each his own, and if that's what you meant, that is what you profess to be without, being just a bundle of preprogramming in performance.
Where did you see me say I was just a bundle of preprogramming performance? And if I did, how would "chacun à son gôut" contradict that?

[hammegk]

If you don't "get it", we'll just agree to disagree, and I'll stop this converation in this thread.

[Jeff Corey]

I don't get it. I suspect there's nothing to get.

[hammegk]

What else *could* you do?

[Jeff Corey]

Naught.

[hammegk]

Agreed at 100% certainty.

[Iamme]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
Causality, can't live with it, can't live without it.
I take the position that everything we deal with has causes. We may not know them yet, but the goal of the crowning achievement of human effort, science, is discovering the causes of the phenomena we observe.
If everything, including our own behavior, is caused, then free will is an illusion.
Obviously, this all depends on the truth of the first assumption.
But, what the heck, why not proceed on that assumption and go and do science?
Maybe we'll find something that isn't caused someday.

What's with this "dark energy" and "dark matter" stuff?
Does it matter?

---------------------------------------------------

Jeff your thread is still maintaining a lead, and maybe pulling away some. :)

Now in response to your thread:

EVERYthing is bound to have a cause, because according to what we know of the universe, and the table of elements...one thing begat the next. So, yes, there has to be this causal influence.

But when it comes to finally reaching the stage where the universe created our brains...we DO have a free will. Rather, we have choices of those things made available to us.

Take liquid for example. Water was caused: But not just any old water. We have cold water, warm water, hot water, salty water, fresh water, natural "bubbly"(carbonated) water, frozen water, steam. Then we have other liquids...and liquids WE doctored with somehow. ALL these were caused someHOW.
Maybe THESE forms of liquid had no say so in their existance...but WE have the say so in what we choose from this list of liquids.

Even if you want to carry this one step further and say that we actually haven't the free will to choose if the situation leads us to make the only rational choice in the selection of which liquid...we can still go against reason and...well, people take the Polar Plunge, for example, in the winter. There has to be a lot of free will going on here, to want to do THAT. :)

And, have a nice Easter. And this goes for the rest of you too. (Even if you argue with me. )

[Jeff Corey]

Iamme,
So you're using the "People do weird things that we can't understand, therefore they have free will" argument?
Actually, people around here go diving for crucifixes in the ocean around Greek Orthodox Xmas. So you could point to a religious reason for that, and a lot of other irrational behaviors, like suicide bombing.
Still, we don't know the causes of a lot of behaviors. That is because behavior is multiply determined, the causes are complex, random elements butterfly outcomes, and the notion of free will discourages people from taking a science of behavior seriously. You can't have a science where stuff just spontaneously happens without any cause.
We may never be able to predict behavior in a precise fashion, any more than the weather for the same reasons. But no one suggests the weather has free will.
Maybe I'm wrong about that. I've seen some pretty strange claims recently.

[Iamme]

Jeff---What happened to everybody? I think they fled to that thread about critical thinking. :)

When you mentioned about "random elements butterfly outcomes"...I got thinking how weather patterns are blamed on the butterfly. :)

So let me get this straight: Are you saying that we DON'T have free will? What about the case I made about the choice of liquids, above? You still think there is something causal about that? Let me ask you this: I'll get real specific. Say a person is thirsty. IS there necessarily a reason that is causing the person to want to have Pepsi over water? Could it be because the person craves sugars or electrolytes, and this is CAUSING the persons...or influencing the persons choice? Okay, now I'll muddle it further: What if the person chooses lemonade over Pepsi? Or worse yet (due to the similarity), Coke. To make it even MORE difficult to draw the line in the sand between random and causal, or choice and causal...how about if that person truly can't make up their mind as to which to choose, and decides to have different ones on different days?

But maybe the idea of your thread has a high percentage of truth to it, when one considers the workings of the entire universe as some package deal. I think it is only our sophisticated brains that can muddle the theory, some,...in certain cases.

[Jeff Corey]

But aren't there reason for all those different choices? Some are obvious - if we have had no fluids for a while we are more likely to drink whatever is available. If we had a lesion in the hypothalamus, we'd drink almost anything.

[Soapy Sam]

I have tried to read through the thread, but I am simply unable to follow some arguments. (This may be due to excisions, but I suspect it is simply a mental shortcoming, either of my ability to think , or of other posters to explain- either way, mental constraint is implied.)
I always have the feeling that discussions like this are less about the nature of reality than the meaning of words, so let me have a go at defining "Free- will" from my dictionary: Anyone interested can then criticise the definition.

First "Will: The power or faculty of choosing or determining."
then "Free: Not bound, unimpeded, unconstrained."
and last-
"Free-will: Freedom of the will from restraint; liberty of choice; the power of self determination."

This all seems straightforward enough.
Will is an aspect of conscious mind. Conscious mind is a property of nervous tissue. Nervous tissue , by its nature imposes constraints on will, just as on any other aspect of mind.

If mind is constrained, will is constrained. QED.

Or are we using "free", "will" and the hybrid noun "free-will" in other senses here?

I wonder if anyone thinks intelligence, conscious awareness, strength of character, or any other property of mind is unconstrained? If not, then why would will be free in this way?

Perhaps it is the constraints on my intelligence which prevent me from understanding what all the fuss is about ?

[Iamme]

(Soapy Sam)

If mind is constrained, will is constrained

------------------------------------------------------

A post of "ifs". We need to DETERMINE your first part, so we can agree or disagree on the second part.

[Soapy Sam]

Lamme- I disagree.

I think you are playing with words.

The "ifs" in my post are purely a matter of Grammar & usage.

Let me restate it this way:-

Will is a function of mind, which is a function of brain.
Brain imposes constraints on both, as on all other functions of brain, (such as creativity or imagination.)


If mind was unconstrained, we would not be asking these questions, because we would already know the answers.

Trivial example;- I find it hard to imagine two tunes in my head at once, very hard to do three and all but impossible to do four. Mozart's limit may have been five, fifteen or fifty, but he had a limit. Brains are evolved organs. They have limitations in all their functions.

To think anything else would be to fly in the face of not only all science, but all human mental activity of any sort, ever.

If what you imply is that will is not a brain function, then I have no idea what you mean by "free will". You must mean something very different from the dictionary definition I quoted.

[Jeff Corey]

Mind is a concept that doesn't help here. I have no mind. I just have me.

[Soapy Sam]

Then do away with it. Will remains a brain function, like it or not.

Anything else is metaphysics.

Hell, anything else is unthinkable.

The function of any machine is constrained by the mechanics, call it common sense or the laws of thermodynamics. There is no free lunch. There is no free will. There is no free anything.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
Mind is a concept that doesn't help here.
Then discard it. :p


I have no mind. I just have me.
Another p-zombie!

[Soapy Sam]

I have no idea what that means, Ham. can you do me a quick explique of the term?

[Jeff Corey]

Probably not. No clue. No mind, Doesn't matter.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Soapy Sam
I have no idea what that means, Ham. can you do me a quick explique of the term?

A p-zombie can be considered to be only 3rd person consciousness. Nobody is home but it acts like you & me.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by hammegk


A p-zombie can be considered to be only 3rd person consciousness. Nobody is home but it acts like you & me.
I give up. That does not make any sense to me.

[Soapy Sam]

Hammegk-
I'm far from clear about this either.
What does the p stand for?
Is this one of an A-Z class of zombies?
These are purely hypothetical critters, or do we have examples?
For instance- would a fictional character qualify as a p-zombie?

If you are serious when you describe Jeff Corey as one, how do you arrive at the conclusion- by his preference not to use the term "mind", or by accepting that he has no mind?
Or are you being ironic there?

[hammegk]

http://skepdic.com/zombies.html


A philosophical zombie (p-zombie, for short) would be a human body without consciousness which would nevertheless behave like a human body with consciousness. To some philosophers (e.g., Daniel Dennett) this is a contradictory notion and thus an impossible conception. If it behaves like a person and is indistinguishable from a person, then it is a person. Other philosophers (e.g. Todd Moody and David Chalmers) argue that a p-zombie would be distinguishable from a person even though indistinguishable from a conscious person. It is distinguishable, say these philosophers, because it is stipulated that it is not conscious even though it is indistinguishable from a conscious being. In case you are wondering why philosophers would debate whether it is possible to conceive of a p-zombie, it is because some philosophers do not believe or do not want to believe that consciousness can be reduced to a set of materialistic functions. Important metaphysical and ethical issues seem to hinge on whether there can be p-zombies. Can machines be conscious? If we created a machine which was indistinguishable from a human person, would our artificial creation be a "person" with all the rights and duties of natural persons? To the p-zombie advocates, consciousness is more than brain processes and neurological functions. No adequate account of consciousness will ever be produced that is "reductionist," i.e., completely materialistic.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

They fail to consider the possibility that "consciousness" is not a meaningful category.

[hammegk]

I'll cede that some people don't seem to be conscious.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Either that statement is grossly incorrect, or you're trying to offer a backhanded insult.

[Soapy Sam]

Thanks for the explanation.

"Consciousness" is one of those vaguely defined terms, so hard to discuss. Substituting "awareness" just shoves the problem along the cognition-perception spectrum a notch or two.

I suspect both are gradational. My father suffered from Alzheimer's for several years. His consciousness varied in degree.

Are any of us, as adults, "conscious" to the same degree we were as young children? Remember those days that lasted forever?

Is a dog more conscious than a spider? A slime mould? A tree?

I can certainly believe that a human body could function without conscious awareness of any sort, given sufficiently precise damage to the brain. (Nor would I be surprised if someone, somewhere is working on how to do it.)

Edit to add- For such a creature to act believably human, it seems to me that it would need an external controller, or internal program of great complexity, which sort of begs the question of whether it actually is conscious.

By the way, is a backhanded insult the same as a compliment?

[hammegk]

Yeah, semantics gets into it every time.

For my part, I'd rather say "life" than "consciousness". That's why I suggest, again, that the non-life / life divide is an interesting question. Field level? Boson level? Atoms? Molecules? Prions??Only materialists -- admitted or otherwise -- have this little problem to solve. As ~Materialists already concede, it's all life.

In answer to your last question: no.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Also, none of it is life.

This subtle point seems to have escaped you.

[hammegk]

By the current definition of life, using HPC & the criteria of science you are correct.

All one needs to do is assume some arbitrary beginning of life to theorize to that point.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Why is finding an "arbitary beginning of life" necessary to reach the conclusion that there is no life?

Methinks you're having some problems with the logics.

[hammegk]

You can assist. Where is the non-sentience / sentience dividing line in your worldview. And why there, of course.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Since I've just suggested that there is no such line, why in the world would you ask such a question?

(Well, I think we all know the answer to that one.)

[hammegk]

You don't seem ~alive to me. I have faith I'm alive.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

I don't see how putting a tilde in front of the word makes a difference.

[hammegk]

I'm sure there are a great number of things many don't see.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by hammegk
I'm sure there are a great number of things many don't see.



.