On Consciousness

[tensordyne]

You used the word qualia in your answer. How is your answer meaningful?

It is meaningful if you have a brain, can read English as well as know what some words mean. Additionally, have a look online for other sources to see if you think it makes sense to you.

Hope that helps!

[tensordyne]

An interesting statement. How is rejecting nonsensical concepts (dualism) and embracing evidence-based inquiry unscientific ?

Evidence comes from observation. Observation involves sensation, which is rejected by Hard-AI types as a concept (several people on this thread have said they are p-zombies, a pretty explicit rejection of the ideas behind sensation as consciousness).

[tensordyne]

Motivating Incantation
Honest attempts at scrubbing up
Synchronicity
Altruistic Behaviour Interesting
Cleaning Up The Mess Taxonomic
Universal Intelligence

:P

Hmm, thanks for the poem.

[tensordyne]

I am not a fan of Dennett particularly, however we do know quite a bit about the processes, I believe myself that hard AI is one path of exploration, but neural nets have a lot in common with analog computing as well. There is a huge kludge in the brain, lots of parallel processing, cross reference and complete fabrication.

See, I told you Dancing David we had something in common, we are both not fans of Dennett (unlike 80% of the people on this forum).

I agree with the idea of exploring all possible legitimate avenues of research. The current approaches mostly circle around the problem of figuring out how consciousness works, which is fine. I just want the goal to be understood, and I do not think the Hard-AI types get it (there is a reason why Dennett's book is parodied as "Consciousness Ignored").

[tensordyne]

Epimistemically subjective is special pleading.

There are no such things, there are events, all events are open to the scientific method, including concepts like beauty.

The is also a fallacy of construction and a false dichotomy.


Subjective has to do with value judgement and more private events, they are still amenable to study and the methods of science.

:)

We are looking for epistemically objective (science) not epistemically subjective results (value judgements). Unfortunately, consciousness is ontologically subjective. Luckily, we have an abstract mind that helps us to relate to each other to bridge the gap.

[tensordyne]

If qualia is consciousness, then tell me what kind of entity observes qualia, and how does it function? Reference post #1 in this thread to get a picture of the problem.

Actually, on the issue of 'who' is doing the observing, I oddly enough agree with Dennett. There is no one doing the observing, there is only the observation (the sensations that make up the consciousness that is).

How does it function? Are you kidding? How the hell should I know? That is a topic for continuing research.

[PixyMisa]

It is meaningful if you have a brain, can read English as well as know what some words mean. Additionally, have a look online for other sources to see if you think it makes sense to you.

I know how the word "qualia" is defined, and what it means is "we stopped bothering to think about the problem".

Is that what you intended?

[PixyMisa]

Evidence comes from observation. Observation involves sensation, which is rejected by Hard-AI types
No. Not even remotely.

as a concept (several people on this thread have said they are p-zombies
A rejection of dualism. The notion of p-zombies is incoherent under any monism.

a pretty explicit rejection of the ideas behind sensation as consciousness).
Uh.... What? :confused:

[PixyMisa]

We are looking for epistemically objective (science) not epistemically subjective results (value judgements). Unfortunately, consciousness is ontologically subjective.
And the subjective is ontologically objective. So?

[Belz...]

Evidence comes from observation. Observation involves sensation, which is rejected by Hard-AI types as a concept (several people on this thread have said they are p-zombies, a pretty explicit rejection of the ideas behind sensation as consciousness).

Entirely wrong. No one rejects the existence of sensations; we just reject the magical explanation of sensations, including "qualia", which refer to some property of experience that isn't borne out by the evence.

In addition, depending on your definition of "sensation", it may not be required for observation.

[Dancing David]

You're asking me how I know my brain is working? Seriously?

Nope, you use behaviors just like everyone else. You have the behaviors we define as consciousness. And yes, how do you know your brain is working?

By using the behaviors of a conscious brain?

When did you learn the word, conscious and what it meant?

[Dancing David]

I can't tire of fools as I am one myself.

[Jeff Corey]

[QUadelson's illusion.OTE=Belz...;8386610]Entirely wrong. No one rejects the existence of sensations; we just reject the magical explanation of sensations, including "qualia", which refer to some property of experience that isn't borne out by the evence.

In addition, depending on your definition of "sensation", it may not be required for observation.[/QUOTE]

Sensation is the detection of stimuli by the various sensory receptors. For examaple, light is detected by the rods and cones in the retina. They respond equally to squares A and B in Adelson's Illusion. However, on the way to the occipital lobes, the signals are subject to lateral inhibition and other processes. The result is the perception that the two squares are different in brightness. I think what the philosophers call "qualia" are perceptions, not senations and any extra baggage the word carries should be tossed. web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html
That link doesn't work. Maybe this www.petapixel.com/2011/08/17/amazing-optical-illusion-shows-that

[tensordyne]

I can't tire of fools as I am one myself.

Yes, that is wise.

[tensordyne]

I know how the word "qualia" is defined, and what it means is "we stopped bothering to think about the problem".

Is that what you intended?

That is an asinine assessment. Qualia is a concept (and a word). Concepts are useful if they link with other concepts and allow one

The point behind qualia is to help in conveying the idea of observations that carry with them as little interpretation as possible and simply reflect what is being felt. Is that really so awful?

What would you call the above, if you had to give it a word or set of words?

The qualia idea was meant to be a tool in helping in the exploration of consciousness, not as an end goal in itself. It is only with certain philosophers who love to play word games that you get this muddled conception of qualia.

[Jeff Corey]

Well , I fixed the link and missed all the typos.

[PixyMisa]

That is an asinine assessment.
Perhaps. But accurate.

The point behind qualia is to help in conveying the idea of observations that carry with them as little interpretation as possible and simply reflect what is being felt. Is that really so awful?

What would you call the above, if you had to give it a word or set of words?
I don't need a word for that, because there's no such thing. By the time you are consciously aware of any sensation, it's already an interpretation of an interpretation of an interpretation.

Look at visual perception - it's one progressively more abstract perception filter after another.

The qualia idea was meant to be a tool in helping in the exploration of consciousness, not as an end goal in itself. It is only with certain philosophers who love to play word games that you get this muddled conception of qualia.
No, it's always been used as an excuse to stop thinking.

[rocketdodger]

That doesn't answer my question. If I'm feeding operations manually into the CPU, it functions, but there is no OS. Am I incorrect ?

I know it doesn't answer your question, because your question isn't relevant. Sure the CPU can still function. So what? I bet the brainstem can still "function" without a cortex. We call those vegetables. Do vegetables still have emotions?

The relevant question is whether this thing we call "emotion" has any meaning whatsoever that is independent of this thing we call "attention." The answer to that question is no, it does not.

[rocketdodger]

These aren't the same argument at all. It's plausible, I'll agree, but so is every baseless scientific hunch. That doesn't make them right. Jumping the gun and going "omg guys, this is it, this is what science tells us" isn't exactly drinking the kool-aid, but it is mixing it and staring longingly at the glass.

Ok, let's just cut to the chase.

How about you tell me a *single* definition of "emotion" -- just one definition -- that is both more plausible and based on everything we know about neuroscience.

The working definition of every paper I have read that even touches on emotion is exactly what that site specifies -- that emotion is how minds select what to pay attention to, period. This not only makes perfect sense but also has decades of scientific research to back it up.

Do you have some other definition that you would like to share? I'm being serious -- for you to say that this definition is baseless, you must have something else in mind. Otherwise you are just talking without thinking, no? So just share it -- what is this "else" that you have in mind?

This guy's even made a magic formula that you can put stuff like Quake bots into and get their "consciousness quantitative score" to know exactly how conscious they are. That's where the silly exponential thing is coming from: he just made it up.

Who cares about the stupid formula? I certainly don't.

[Beelzebuddy]

Ok, let's just cut to the chase.

How about you tell me a *single* definition of "emotion" -- just one definition -- that is both more plausible and based on everything we know about neuroscience.

The working definition of every paper I have read that even touches on emotion is exactly what that site specifies -- that emotion is how minds select what to pay attention to, period. This not only makes perfect sense but also has decades of scientific research to back it up.

Do you have some other definition that you would like to share? I'm being serious -- for you to say that this definition is baseless, you must have something else in mind. Otherwise you are just talking without thinking, no? So just share it -- what is this "else" that you have in mind?
How is that even remotely the right chase to cut to?

No, no, you know what, I'll humor you. Here are the first papers I found on the two subjects that were at all relevant (i.e. didn't deal with ADHD or emotion in schizophrenia):

Emotion (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21915252)
All primary-process emotional-instinctual urges, even ones as complex as social PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-decortication early in life; thus, the neocortex is not essential for the generation of primary-process emotionality.

Attention (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn.1990.2.4.358)
The mechanism in the pulvinar is assumed to be a particular type of circuit that reciprocally connects thalamic relay cells to cortical cells.


Who cares about the stupid formula? I certainly don't.It's the scale you're arguing for.

[ETA] Well, piss, now I notice the second paper isn't open access. I'm trying to make a deliberate effort to only cite papers everyone can read these days. Ah well.

[tensordyne]

And the subjective is ontologically objective. So?

Look up the words you use and be more careful if you can. Consciousness is, or at least I claimed it to be, ontologically subjective. Science is about finding out about things that are epistemically objective.

The subjective makes no sense saying it is ontologically objective.

[tensordyne]

I don't need a word for that, because there's no such thing. By the time you are consciously aware of any sensation, it's already an interpretation of an interpretation of an interpretation.

Look at visual perception - it's one progressively more abstract perception filter after another.


So the idea of breaking down sensory perceptions as analytically as we can is a bad idea. Yes, that makes a lot of sense. So by your logic I can not describe a airplane in terms of progressively simpler observations because "it's already an interpretation of an interpretation of an interpretation". I am raising the BS flag.

[PixyMisa]

Look up the words you use and be more careful if you can. Consciousness is, or at least I claimed it to be, ontologically subjective. Science is about finding out about things that are epistemically objective.
And since the subjective is ontologically objective, it is necessarily epistemologically objective. Any other approach is dualistic and therefore doomed, or puts the cart before the horse and is therefore doomed.

The subjective makes no sense saying it is ontologically objective.
Brains, physical. Mind, brain function. Subjective, objective function. Story, end of.

[PixyMisa]

So the idea of breaking down sensory perceptions as analytically as we can is a bad idea.
No. Nor can you rationally infer that position from anything I've said.

Yes, that makes a lot of sense. So by your logic I can not describe a airplane in terms of progressively simpler observations because "it's already an interpretation of an interpretation of an interpretation". I am raising the BS flag.
You're right to raise the BS flag, but it's your own BS.

[PixyMisa]

Anyway, to go back to your post #1015, tensordyne, if I had to use a word, I'd say association (per Pulvinar, #961) or metadata.

[tensordyne]

No. Nor can you rationally infer that position from anything I've said.


Luckily we have your original words to go by.


I don't need a word for that, because there's no such thing. By the time you are consciously aware of any sensation, it's already an interpretation of an interpretation of an interpretation.

Look at visual perception - it's one progressively more abstract perception filter after another.


If perception (visual in this case) is progressively more abstract it definitely is not progressively simpler. You can not have it both ways PixyMisa, you can either break perceptions down or you can not. Which is it?

[tensordyne]

Anyway, to go back to your post #1015, tensordyne, if I had to use a word, I'd say association (per Pulvinar, #961) or metadata.

I will call it association from here on out. I do not like the idea of calling it metadata because I just can not help but think about XML and data about data.

[tensordyne]

And since the subjective is ontologically objective, it is necessarily epistemologically objective. Any other approach is dualistic and therefore doomed, or puts the cart before the horse and is therefore doomed.


I can only conclude you have no idea what the words mean that you are using. In the context we are using here, these words mean the following (source is dictionary.com, number is definition part):

Objective
4. Not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased: an objective opinion.

Subjective
2. Pertaining to or characteristic of an individual; personal; individual: a subjective evaluation.

Ontology
2. (logic) The set of entities presupposed by a theory.

Epistemology
The theory of knowledge, especially the critical study of its validity, methods, and scope.

Now let me quote you again PixyMisa.


And since the subjective is ontologically objective, it is necessarily epistemologically objective.


Here is a translation:


And since the individual characteristic is an entity presupposed by theory to be not influenced by individual or personal characteristics, it is necessarily, as far as the study of knowledge goes, also not influenced by personal influence.


:wink8:

You did know right that subjective and objective are opposites? On the other hand, you are somewhat right, the above does seem to be how you and other Hard-AI types think, so at least you are honest, if a bit schizo.

[tensordyne]

Hey, have you guys seen the TED Talk with Jeff Hawkins. I bet you might get a kick out of it?

[Belz...]

I know it doesn't answer your question, because your question isn't relevant. Sure the CPU can still function. So what?

You said it cannot fully function. I want to know why you say this.

[Belz...]

Hey, have you guys seen the TED Talk with Jeff Hawkins.

I saw the one with Peter Weyland. :p

[PixyMisa]

Luckily we have your original words to go by.
As I said, no, nor can you rationally infer that position from anything I've said.

If perception (visual in this case) is progressively more abstract
Which it most certainly is. The MIT OCW Introduction to Psychology lecture series covers this well - the lecturer for the year they recorded is a researcher in visual perception.

it definitely is not progressively simpler.
Which is entirely false. The entire reason we use abstractions is that they are simpler than the thing they are abstracting.

[PixyMisa]

I can only conclude you have no idea what the words mean that you are using. In the context we are using here, these words mean the following (source is dictionary.com, number is definition part):

Objective
4. Not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased: an objective opinion.
Yep.

Subjective
2. Pertaining to or characteristic of an individual; personal; individual: a subjective evaluation.
Yep.

Ontology
2. (logic) The set of entities presupposed by a theory.
Nope. Well, it's not wrong, but it's misleading unless you understand exactly what they're getting at.

Epistemology
The theory of knowledge, especially the critical study of its validity, methods, and scope.
Sure.

You did know right that subjective and objective are opposites?
There's no such thing as an opposite to objective in reality.

That's the point: We do not live in a dualistic Universe. It's all the same sort of stuff, with a single, universal set of interactions.

The entire difference between the subjective and the objective is one of perspective, and the subjective is merely a subset of the objective.

[PixyMisa]

I will call it association from here on out.
Association is good because it's both a noun and a verb, and we're talking about verbs here, even if we want to think they're nouns.

I do not like the idea of calling it metadata because I just can not help but think about XML and data about data.
Well, yes, because that's what it is. An experience, what makes seeing the colour red feel the way it does, is all the metadata attached to the signal from the retina by the time it arrives from its roundabout trip through the visual perception centres of the brain, the memory associations (there's that word again), the reflective processing. It's not a thing, it's a process, a burst of neural activity.

[PixyMisa]

You said it cannot fully function. I want to know why you say this.
Because by the time you have the subroutines necessary for the processor to interact with whatever it needs to interact with, and to control the program that is running, you have built an operating system.

Stored-program computers (that is, every computer built since about 1950) accrete operating systems the way snails do their shells; they are not functional without them.

[Dancing David]

Science is about finding out about things that are epistemically objective.



This is rubbish.

Science does no such thing, it is all about approximate models. This is the SMT forum, not the R&P forum, so who else defines science this way? Philosophers?

[Belz...]

Because by the time you have the subroutines necessary for the processor to interact with whatever it needs to interact with, and to control the program that is running, you have built an operating system.

But, er... the first few computers did not have an OS and were programmed bit by bit by a person for a specific task at a time. Were they not fully functional ? Is there something I'm missing ?

[steenkh]

But, er... the first few computers did not have an OS and were programmed bit by bit by a person for a specific task at a time. Were they not fully functional ? Is there something I'm missing ?
It really depends on what you call an operating system. As PixyMisa said, whenever you have something that interacts with the outside world, you have a de facto operating system. You could also use a definition where an OS must be independent of the program that the machine is running, ie the OS can serve more than one program (consecutively or concurrently). I am in doubt whether the CPU analogy helps us very much in this case.

[Belz...]

Well it depends if we define the guy operating the punched cards as an OS. :p

[rocketdodger]

You said it cannot fully function. I want to know why you say this.

Oh.

One, what Pixy suggested, and two, because furthermore many instructions are meaningless without an OS.

For example there are instructions dealing with security layers in memory, I.E. only the OS gets to access certain address spaces, etc. Without an OS, those instructions aren't ever used.

The analogy with emotion-attention is simple: Just because you have something like the limbic system that apparently functions without a neocortex does not imply that the full functionality of the limbic system is available without a neocortex. I would like someone without a functioning neocortex to demonstrate emotion, in particular. That would be pretty hard for them, I imagine, since they would be a non-functioning vegetable.

Similarly, just because you have a CPU that apparently functions without an OS does not imply that the full functionality of the CPU is available without an OS. I would like a CPU without an OS to help me write this post, in particular. That would be pretty hard for it, I imagine, since it would be little more than a calculator.

EDIT -- I just realized there has been a miscommunication. I have been meaning to say "cortex" where I say "neocortex". So I don't think there is any contention here, I think everyone would agree that you can't have emotion without any cortex at all.

[PixyMisa]

Well it depends if we define the guy operating the punched cards as an OS. :p
But when you first turned on the system, it didn't even know how to talk to the card reader.

Typically you'd toggle in a boot sequence (in binary) that would let it feed from paper tape and load the rest of the way, after which it could do complex stuff like read punched cards and print.

[rocketdodger]

How is that even remotely the right chase to cut to?

No, no, you know what, I'll humor you. Here are the first papers I found on the two subjects that were at all relevant (i.e. didn't deal with ADHD or emotion in schizophrenia):

Emotion (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21915252)

Attention (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn.1990.2.4.358)

Ah I see that I have been thinking of "cortex" when you really meant only the neocortex. My bad. I don't disagree that emotion can be present without a neocortex. I was disagreeing with the notion that you could have emotion without a cortex at all. Looking back that is absurd and I don't know why I thought you meant that, since parts of the limbic system itself are in the cortex.

My argument has been that you can't have emotion without attention. I don't mean the higher order attention of humans and primates. I mean the basic notion of what is in working memory at any given instant. That isn't restricted to the neocortex, because if it were then animals and people who have had their neocortex removed wouldn't be able to do anything at all.

Some sort of attention mechanism is required to exhibit anything besides repeated unconscious behaviors. That's why it is listed so low on the scale -- you can't really be a mammal without it.

Give me some time and I will dig up papers dealing with this more abstract notion of attention that the consscale is speaking of.

It's the scale you're arguing for.


Not really.

Think about how a car is constructed. Couldn't you develop an arbitrary scale for how much "car-ness" something has? That would be pretty stupid, I admit.

Yet, in such a scale, the individual descriptions of each level would definitely offer insight into what exactly goes into a car. Do you disagree?

[tensordyne]

This is rubbish.

Science does no such thing, it is all about approximate models. This is the SMT forum, not the R&P forum, so who else defines science this way? Philosophers?

Even approximate models (which is a good point that in science one should consider pretty much all models as approximate) are objective. These models objectively state the range of applicability of their predictions and how to test them.

There really is no problem here Dancing David.

[Mr. Scott]

Hey, have you guys seen the TED Talk with Jeff Hawkins. I bet you might get a kick out of it?

I did!

Great lines:

"Some people have fallen into the pit of metaphysical dualism, but we can reject all that." (audience laughs, and Hawkins continues without a pause).

"If you don't build it [an intelligent machine], you don't even understand it."

What impressive me about the brain's predictive power is the speed with which it memorizes input. I can read a random sentence in a new book, then start reading the book from the front cover, and notice instantly when I hit the sentence I'd already read. I'd like to know if we have a biological theory of how instant memory and retrieval works.

Another thing I'd like to know more about is what's going on when the brain is trying to remember something, when I have no sense of its effort. Say someone mentions a movie in which this and that happens, and you know you've seen the movie, but can't remember its name. You move on to other conversation unrelated to the movie, and ten minutes later, the name of the movie pops into your head. I ask, what was the brain doing during those ten minutes? I have nary a quale of it while it's working until the title appears, as a sentence rolling out of the void like a musical phrase calling from the deep recesses of a dark cave.

[tensordyne]

The entire reason we use abstractions is that they are simpler than the thing they are abstracting.

Wow, then you should have no problem with qualia (aside from your metaphysical complaints of it being related to dualism) because it is merely an abstract idea that tries to capture a very visceral idea of how things feel. Categorizing how things feel leads to other abstractions through thought and experience.

[Belz...]

Wow, then you should have no problem with qualia (aside from your metaphysical complaints of it being related to dualism) because it is merely an abstract idea that tries to capture a very visceral idea of how things feel. Categorizing how things feel leads to other abstractions through thought and experience.

If that's all they were I think we'd all be fine with the term.

[PixyMisa]

Wow, then you should have no problem with qualia (aside from your metaphysical complaints of it being related to dualism) because it is merely an abstract idea that tries to capture a very visceral idea of how things feel. Categorizing how things feel leads to other abstractions through thought and experience.
The concept of qualia is not an abstraction, it's an excuse.

[tensordyne]

I think we are getting somewhere now in the below.


There's no such thing as an opposite to objective in reality.


This is a bizarre statement. The words subjective and objective are defined as opposites. You can not like it but that does not change a thing, they are opposites in our reality. If it is not objective, it is subjective, as well as vice versa.

Or perhaps you are speaking of Reality with a big R, where nothing that exists in some form of objective sense must ever be a matter of opinion. OK, sure, why not? That is not the same as subjective versus objective though. An analogy might be how in SR different observers will disagree as to certain results but agree on other results called invariants. To have a full theory you need to explain both.


That's the point: We do not live in a dualistic Universe. It's all the same sort of stuff, with a single, universal set of interactions.


The above is a metaphysical statement. How could one falsify the above for instance? Or is it some form of religious tenet you wish to promulgate? No thanks, I am more interested in epistemology than in ridiculous and insensible ontologies.

Why do you have to complain about 'stuff'? You have not defined stuff with anything like rigor, let alone the fact that stuff as that word is used in the sense above is of a qualitatively different character than sensory percepts. Stuff is a concept, related to a complex set of rules for predicting outcomes of various experiments.

To say there is nothing but the objective is to say that there is no subjective. This assertion is ridiculous on its face.


The entire difference between the subjective and the objective is one of perspective, and the subjective is merely a subset of the objective.


More metaphysical nonsense. Premature theorizing on the ultimate nature of reality as well. Tell me how the above could be falsified and I will change my mind and think you are the next messiah, as it is, the above is just one category error and presumptuous boast on understanding of "ultimate nature of reality" after another.

Your focus on abstract models as ontology is borderland crazy. When you have a percept, it is necessarily associated with a perception. Percepts lead to concepts, and how this is done is through the abstract mind. The only ontology any of us can honestly lay claim to is abstract mind and perception bundle.

That is it, nothing more and nothing less, but you Hard-AI types get rid of perception bundle (consciousness) as if you can throw it out at will, without even having to think about it because it somehow oddly reminds you of spirits, or some such nonsense. You have haunted yourself, the disinfectant is Searle. Dennett is the cancerous growth.

Sorry, they both exist; stop lying.

[tensordyne]

The concept of qualia is not an abstraction, it's an excuse.

That is not an argument, it's a slur.

[Dancing David]

I think we are getting somewhere now in the below.



This is a bizarre statement. The words subjective and objective are defined as opposites.

Just because something is defined does not mean that it is not a false dichotomy.

[Dancing David]

That is not an argument, it is a slur.

That is not an argument, it is sophistry.

[PixyMisa]

This is a bizarre statement.
No.

The words subjective and objective are defined as opposites.
Then, since objective reality exists, the subjective clearly does not.

You haven't really thought this through, have you?

The above is a metaphysical statement.
Correct.

How could one falsify the above for instance?
Demonstrate that laws of the Universe are not logically consistent: That something can both happen and not happen.

To say there is nothing but the objective is to say that there is no subjective.
No. Merely that your definition is incorrect.

More metaphysical nonsense. Premature theorizing on the ultimate nature of reality as well. Tell me how the above could be falsified and I will change my mind and think you are the next messiah, as it is, the above is just one category error and presumptuous boast on understanding of "ultimate nature of reality" after another.
Garbage. Utter garbage.

We know how the Universe works. We know that there's only one sort of stuff, and it follows a consistent set of laws. We know that mind arises as a process in matter, and not any other way.

We know this. It's not the subject for any rational dispute.

My position is supported by every scientific experiment ever, and you say that I'm presumptuous?

No. No, I don't think so.

That is it, nothing more and nothing less, but you Hard-AI types get rid of perception bundle (consciousness) as if you can throw it out at will, without even having to think about it because it somehow oddly reminds you of spirits, or some such nonsense. You have haunted yourself, the disinfectant is Searle. Dennett is the cancerous growth.
Seriously, get a grip. Searle's position is useful only as a teaching tool for undergraduates on how to spot logical fallacies. Dennett has his faults, but he punches through the nonsense very effectively.

[PixyMisa]

That is not an argument, it's a slur.
It may be a slur, but it's still true.

[Belz...]

More metaphysical nonsense.

Metaphysical ? It's a question of definitions. How is the subjective not a subset of the objective ?

[Mr. Scott]

What's the functional/material/metaphysical ;) difference between what the brain does that is conscious, and what the brain does that is unconscious?

you are completely unaware of 90 percent of what really goes on in your brain (Ramachandran)

[!Kaggen]

What's the functional/material/metaphysical ;) difference between what the brain does that is conscious, and what the brain does that is unconscious?

So what stops us as a species becoming aware of the rest?

[PixyMisa]

So what stops us as a species becoming aware of the rest?
Um, what?

We're not aware of anything as a species (except metaphorically). We're aware of things as individuals.

[Belz...]

So what stops us as a species becoming aware of the rest?

Bad command or file name.

[!Kaggen]

Um, what?

We're not aware of anything as a species (except metaphorically). We're aware of things as individuals.

So consciousness is not a biological adaptive trait of homo sapiens?

[PixyMisa]

So consciousness is not a biological adaptive trait of homo sapiens?
Of complex animal life in general. But your previous question still makes no sense.

[Dancing David]

What's the functional/material/metaphysical ;) difference between what the brain does that is conscious, and what the brain does that is unconscious?

Well the problem is the sue of the word 'unconscious' as used the silly old philosophers, like Freud. We are aware of a lot of the preconscious things our brains do, we just don't engage attention to them, nor do we engage in verbal cognition regarding them, however they are there and part of our awareness.

Like the dog at the side of the road when you are driving.

Now what Ramachandran is likely referring to is that we only perceive or are aware of so much, just like we don't see about 99.999999999999% of what the computer does when we use the internet.

[Dancing David]

So what stops us as a species becoming aware of the rest?

Are you aware of the data sets, framings and translation your computer uses and sends down the network stack to the wire hooked into your computer to post of the internet?

:)

[Dancing David]

Bad command or file name.
404 - Not Found

:D

[Dancing David]

So consciousness is not a biological adaptive trait of homo sapiens?

Consciousness as an undefined term probably applies to most mammals and birds, certainly cephalopods and some lizards and amphibians as well.

[Zeuzzz]

http://a8.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-snc6/182386_466778183350170_1671538548_n.jpg

Turing machines.

Invented from our consciousness.

Not conscious in their own right.

[PixyMisa]

Turing machines.

Invented from our consciousness.

Not conscious in their own right.
Keeping up the subscription to Non-Sequitur Monthly, I see.

[tensordyne]

That is not an argument, it is sophistry.

That is not an argument, it's a diversion!

[Mr. Scott]

Bad command or file name.

ROFL!

Doesn't this idea of qualia need something like a sixth sense? What is it that generates qualia, and what is it that senses and appreciates it? Why does it seem quales are produced on a special substrate apparently no machine we could conceive could output or input? There must be some interface between the chemical reactions, electrical charges and currents, and magnetic impulses, and the qualia substrate. What's keeping us from studying and replicating this interface?

From Wisdom of Chopra (http://www.wisdomofchopra.com/):

Our consciousness depends on exponential sensations

[PixyMisa]

Doesn't this idea of qualia need something like a sixth sense? What is it that generates qualia, and what is it that senses and appreciates it? Why does it seem quales are produced on a special substrate apparently no machine we could conceive could output or input? There must be some interface between the chemical reactions, electrical charges and currents, and magnetic impulses, and the qualia substrate. What's keeping us from studying and replicating this interface?
Because.... Look, a monkey!

[dlorde]

Regarding scotomas, have you read this thesis (http://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8080/bitstream/handle/1828/552/crawford_2004.pdf?sequence=1)? (PDF)

Wow, thanks for that, fascinating, and well-argued.

[Zeuzzz]

Regarding scotomas, have you read this thesis (http://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8080/bitstream/handle/1828/552/crawford_2004.pdf?sequence=1)? (PDF)


That was an ace read, I think some of his comments at the end get to a core issue here in approach to consciousness.

Thanks for link.

Dennett never tires of mocking any theory of consciousness that insists on making
the experiencing self some kind of "nugget of specialness" ("Why would you think any
more of yourself if you turned out to be a sort of mind-pearl in a brain-oyster?"116). In a
full-blown dualist theory, this insistence is about identifying a precise time and place of
interaction. In a materialist account, this insistence takes the much more seductive form
of gradually pushing consciousness further into the mysterious inner realms o f the brain,
a s more is understood about the outer realms but nothing is found that seems to qualify as
genuine experience. Dennett, and to a large extent Clark, try to stop this trend before it
starts. For them the mind is not cut off from the world and its details, trying to keep up
with what's going on out there by viewing the brain's frantically constructed representations. The structure of the world is part of a perception, something the brain is
actively engaged with, not merely having an impression of.

[....]

The corollary of the "interpolation" hypothesis, that an interpretation could not
itself he the "filling in," but must instead be the result of filling in, is not well supported
by the observation that we don't have free imaginative control over these experiences.
The intuition that a "mere decision" would somehow have to be rendered into something
"perceptual, not conceptual" to explain either the fact that we cannot help what we see, or
fact that we see it is just that: an intuition. There is really no reason why we should
expect to have imaginative control if Dennett's view were correct, and in light of how
little conscious access a brain has to its own workings, we probably should expect no
more freedom to imagine that a "filling in" interpretation made somewhere in the visual
cortex is wrong than we have freedom to imagine that a foveated detail of a well lit scene
is other than it seems to be. And so it is strange that Ramachandran and Churchland want
to ask subjects "Does it actually look that way to you, or do you just believe it looks that
way to you?" They take people's reports ("I don't believe I just believe it looks that
way. ..") at face value, even though it is perfectly clear that on Dennett's account there
would be no way - indeed, no one - to distinguish between the two possibilities. This
appears to be just obstinate. It doesn't settle the issue one way or the other unless people
are presumed to be infallible regarding the contents of their own minds, and
Ramachandran and Churchland are the last people who would presume this.
The intuition that seems to be the real root of the interpolation hypothesis is
suggested by Ramachandran's endorsement of "qualia," in which he bestows
consciousness on "intermediate" processing'09- far enough away from either sensory or
motor processing to seem plausible. This is the line in the sand, as it were. For Dennett,
"'what it is like' is a matter of how things are judged to be.""' In some ways, the filling
in debate could never be settled without settling the qualia debate, and it is no accident
that in Consciousness Expluined, Dennett's no-compromise, sustained attack on the
notion of qualia immediately follows his comments on filling in.'" Covering this debate
would call for a very long digression, but here we can at least see the terms of the
impasse

[Mr. Scott]

Regarding scotomas, have you read this thesis (http://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8080/bitstream/handle/1828/552/crawford_2004.pdf?sequence=1)? (PDF)

While reading that, I was wondering what y'all thought this video of pretty celebrities turning ugly in our peripheral vision says about filling in and/or consciousness:

VT9i99D_9gI

[PixyMisa]

That was an ace read, I think some of his comments at the end get to a core issue here in approach to consciousness.
Well, yes.

You do realise that it says the evidence supports Dennett and the computational approach, right?

[Zeuzzz]

While reading that, I was wondering what y'all thought this video of pretty celebrities turning ugly in our peripheral vision says about filling in and/or consciousness:

VT9i99D_9gI


Reminds me of the more optical illusion of the rotating face.

ORoTCBrCKIQ

The subconscious memories and the strength of these over your normal conscious makes it nearly impossible to see the face as concave, as every face in your subconscious is facing in the normal direction.

As for your clip, my guess as a possible explanation would be the role that emotional sub consciousness attributed to the attractiveness of the person is someone being altered by your conscious perception of their faces.

[Zeuzzz]

You do realise that it says the evidence supports Dennett and the computational approach, right?


Also gives the context, and his line of thought for his reasoning. Which is good for showing the errors in his logic, and his overtly materialistic approach.

[PixyMisa]

Also gives the context, and his line of thought for his reasoning. Which is good for showing the errors in his logic
Which are?

and his overtly materialistic approach.
An overtly materialistic approach being the only thing that has ever given any useful results whatsoever, I see no reason for concern here.

[Belz...]

Turing machines.

Invented from our consciousness.

Not conscious in their own right.

Robots.

Constructed by our own hands.

Unable to grasp objects themselves.

See how that makes sense ?

[Belz...]

While reading that, I was wondering what y'all thought this video of pretty celebrities turning ugly in our peripheral vision says about filling in and/or consciousness:

Aw, come on. Kevin Bacon is already ugly !

[Belz...]

Also gives the context, and his line of thought for his reasoning. Which is good for showing the errors in his logic, and his overtly materialistic approach.

Given that everything in the known universe is materialistic, how can a non-materialistic one be justified ?

[!Kaggen]

Of complex animal life in general. But your previous question still makes no sense.

Consciousness like running is a human activity. Some may be different at it than others. This may be selected for if it leads to better breeding success.
Becoming conscious of that of which we are currently unconscious is not impossible.

[Zeuzzz]

Given that everything in the known universe is materialistic, how can a non-materialistic one be justified ?


Your mind doesn't seem too materialistic to me, even though can be explained extremely well by physical neuroscience.

The gravitational field is in no way materialistic, as another example.

Or the plank scale of quantum phenomena, where the worlds of materialism and mathematical abstraction get seemingly blurred via quantum nonlocality, and general material befuzzlement in general.

[PixyMisa]

Your mind doesn't seem too materialistic to me, even though can be explained extremely well by physical neuroscience.
Well, there's your problem.

The gravitational field is in no way materialistic, as another example.
It is in every way materialistic. You just fail to grasp the concept.

Or the plank scale of quantum phenomena, where the worlds of materialism and mathematical abstraction get seemingly blurred via quantum nonlocality, and general material befuzzlement in general.
Nope.

[PixyMisa]

Consciousness like running is a human activity.
Also cats, rabbits, monkeys, some computer programs...

Some may be different at it than others. This may be selected for if it leads to better breeding success.
Yes.

Becoming conscious of that of which we are currently unconscious is not impossible.
We do that all the time. It's called attention.

[Zeuzzz]

It is in every way materialistic.

Explain:

a) the materialistic properties of the gravitational field (not its effects on materialistic things, the field itself)
b) the physical mechanism by which it works.
c) why you presume I fail to grasp the concept.
d) Why I put a d) option.

[Zeuzzz]

Nope.


Do you make a habit of this? Just stating someone wrong, not explaining why, and then either avoiding the question later or leaving? I seem to be noticing a trend.

PS: Thanks for supplying your specific field of interest before, only just remembered, will have to scroll back.

[Mr. Scott]

http://a8.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-snc6/182386_466778183350170_1671538548_n.jpg

Turing machines.

Invented from our consciousness.

Not conscious in their own right.

People, conscious in their own right, invented by the unconscious process of evolution by mutation and natural selection.

Saturn rockets (that take us to the moon) invented by people who strain to jump a meter.

Atom bombs invented by people who couldn't push down a small building.

Some day we may develop machines with such hyper-consciousness over ours, that they'd be like the a-bomb's physical strength compared to our strength.

[Mr. Scott]

Because.... Look, a monkey!

...but were you really counting the passes between the players in white shirts?

[Zeuzzz]

People, conscious in their own right, invented by the unconscious process of evolution by mutation and natural selection

Just how unconscious evolution really is in the grand scheme of things is a topic worthy of serious debate of late. We have long passed the sort of selfish gene approach Dakwkins et al proliferated, which locates the ultimate power over our health in the untouchable realm of molecular structure, rather than in our own conscious actions and decisions.

(Uber)Epigenetics
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=238577

[PixyMisa]

Explain:

a) the materialistic properties of the gravitational field (not its effects on materialistic things, the field itself)
That's it. Necessary and sufficient.

If you think anything else is required, you simply don't understand materialism (or science).

[PixyMisa]

Do you make a habit of this? Just stating someone wrong
Only when they are wrong.

not explaining why
Only if I have already explained why, more than once. For some users, this applies to everything they say.

and then either avoiding the question later
I don't do that. However, if the question is based on a false premise, all I can do is point out that the question is also wrong.

or leaving?
I have a life. Well, no, I don't, but I have a job at a startup company and my own startup company, so I may disappear for days, weeks, even months at a time when things get hectic. Sorry, but there are many other very capable posters who can tell you that you are wrong.

I seem to be noticing a trend.
No.

PS: Thanks for supplying your specific field of interest before, only just remembered, will have to scroll back.
Computational sociology? Yeah, well. My field is computing; I have no formal qualifications in sociology at all. It's just something I fell into from the commercial side of things - the work I was already doing coincided almost exactly with what was required for the research project.

[PixyMisa]

Just how unconscious evolution really is in the grand scheme of things is a topic worthy of serious debate of late.
Serious, but very, very brief.

[Zeuzzz]

That's it. Necessary and sufficient.

If you think anything else is required, you simply don't understand materialism (or science).


have you discovered the graviton and are holding back on us?

[!Kaggen]

Also cats, rabbits, monkeys, some computer programs...


Yes.


We do that all the time. It's called attention.

Would this not imply consciousness is an ability which has and may still evolve?
In which case how do you propose to program an ability to evolve through natural selection into a computer ?

[PixyMisa]

have you discovered the graviton and are holding back on us?
Why do you think that is relevant?

[Mr. Scott]

Just how unconscious evolution really is in the grand scheme of things is a topic worthy of serious debate of late.

Share with us your evidence that evolution is unconscious.

[PixyMisa]

Would this not imply consciousness is an ability which has and may still evolve?
Of course.

In which case how do you propose to program an ability to evolve through natural selection into a computer ?
:confused:

At least I'm in good company:

On two occasions I have been asked, 'Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?' I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.

-- Charles Babbage

[!Kaggen]

Of course.


:confused:

At least I'm in good company:

On two occasions I have been asked, 'Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?' I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.

-- Charles Babbage

Well there is your problem, evolution is not reducible since it takes place on the level of living organisms and their environment. The interactions at this level are far from practically predictable.

No wonder you don't get epigenetics.

On the other hand we know the agenda of computationalists is to force a simplifying of the world to simple reducible interactions so that their computers can programmed with all the simple correct data so they spew out the simple correct answer.

This is simply woo at its worse.

Pixy Misa admit it your a Frank Tipler disciple.

[PixyMisa]

Well there is your problem, evolution is not reducible since it takes place on the level of living organisms and their environment.
That doesn't follow.

The interactions at this level are far from practically predictable.
So?

No wonder you don't get epigenetics.
I get epigenetics just fine. It simply doesn't support your strange notions.

On the other hand we know the agenda of computationalists is to force a simplifying of the world to simple reducible interactions so that their computers can programmed with all the simple correct data so they spew out the simple correct answer.
No, reality consists of reducible interactions.

This is simply woo at its worse.
Maybe it is, but no-one actually believes what you insist they believe, so that's irrelevant.

Pixy Misa admit it your a Frank Tipler disciple.
His Omega Point stuff? Philip Jose Farmer did it better (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riverworld), frankly.

[Zeuzzz]

Pixy, I get the impression your a Hitchens fan.

It would be extremely pertinent to watch this.

His tribute video from a cosmologist that has his head screwed on so tight im scared his brain will explode.

http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=238636

[Belz...]

Your mind doesn't seem too materialistic to me, even though can be explained extremely well by physical neuroscience.

The gravitational field is in no way materialistic, as another example.

I have no idea what you're talking about, but you seem to agree with me.

Or the plank scale of quantum phenomena, where the worlds of materialism and mathematical abstraction get seemingly blurred via quantum nonlocality, and general material befuzzlement in general.

I have no idea what you're talking about, but you seem confused.

[Belz...]

have you discovered the graviton and are holding back on us?

I see you have no idea what science is. You seem to be asking us to do science without using the scientific method.

[tensordyne]

If that's all they were I think we'd all be fine with the term.

A reasonable person! Yippee!

[PixyMisa]

Pixy, I get the impression your a Hitchens fan.
Yes, a big fan on many levels.

It would be extremely pertinent to watch this.
Not really, no.

[Mr. Scott]

I was watching Watson play Jeopardy today and applied the reductionist perspective to it to see what I got. When you examine it at the minutest scale, you see it's just a network of transistors. They allow current to flow through them when there's the right current or voltage on their base, and otherwise don't. That's all that is happening, but Watson "understood" enough English, and information about our world to beat the world's greatest players, even though not a single transistor "understood" anything about what it was switching for.

Likewise, no brain cell understands anything about what it's doing (neither English nor the lives we lead) yet the network as a whole understands our world well enough to nearly beat a man-made machine.

[tensordyne]

No.


Yes.


Then, since objective reality exists, the subjective clearly does not.


Do you even have the slightest clue what those words are about? What aspect of reality those two terms are trying to capture? I only ask because it is confusing to me to have to answer such a blindingly obvious question your statement above implies. First though, a detour.

The Semantic Web is an initiative of the W3C to create a standard that would allow for semantic (meaning) based searches. The technology is still somewhat in its infancy but the potential is huge. Compared with traditional searches that use string matching and recursive popularity based heuristic algorithms, a Semantic Web based search will follow a trail of links that have meaning.

The way this works is by using semantic triples. One of the simplest sentences one can say in most natural languages is composed of just a subject and a verb word such as "I eat". I guess you could complain though that this is an incomplete idea because you can't just eat, you have to be eating something! So we have subject, verb, object sentences.

I eat apples, for instance. That is a triple. Let S be subject, V verb and O object, then a semantic triple is (S,V,O),

Look at how the words are used in the sentence form of a triple. The subject is the thing that does the verb onto the object. The subjective is therefore about such kind of things, that is to say, us. It is subjective whether you find another person attractive or not, but it is objective fact how tall that person is.

In Special Relativity, it is a fact that each observer will report the same proper-time between any two events. The space and time intervals between the two events is determined by which observor one is talking about, hence it is subjective in nature. I could go on but I feel like it is silly to have to defend the idea that there are some things that are subjective and some things that are objective.


You haven't really thought this through, have you?


I know, crazy me. What was I thinking? I should be listening to the creepy internet pannochio character with all the answers. I'm sorry, I'll stop thinking now so I can agree with you.


Correct.


:bigclap

Oh good, you agree than that your position is metaphysical, and hence, not scientific! I noticed you also declined to tell us how to falsify your one substance model's predictions, or what predictions of any you have for this model.

See, there is progress yet. You just realize your position is unscientific metaphysics, let it go and read from the Empiricists who started the scientific tradition. Or you can go back to Dennett and his pseudo-scientific word games. Your choice.


Demonstrate that laws of the Universe are not logically consistent: That something can both happen and not happen.


BS flag!

:bs:

Since you are the one making the claim you need to show that


You have predictions based upon the model you advocate and that these predictions match with already established science where appropriate.
Establish criteria for the possible falsification of your 'One Substance' model as per Popper. It is also at least somewhat advised that you should hopefully have observations showing that applicable tests of your model have not falsified your theory already.


Well, get chopping. It is not I who is making this claim but you!


No. Merely that your definition is incorrect.


The definition is fine.


Garbage. Utter garbage.


Yeah, I know, garbage in and garbage out is all Hard-AI'ers understand so I can see why you would think an empirical approach to consciousness would not sit well with you.


We know how the Universe works.


Arrogant much?!? "We know how the Universe works" peon. How dare you question my authorite!

Yes, I see, so some group (we), that you are a part of, knows the final laws of physics, consciousness and the non-meaning of life. OK, I bow down to you and your mighty invisible brain team.

FTFY: We know how to investigate phenomena to predict the outcome of observations and experiments in an objective way using the Scientific Method.


We know that there's only one sort of stuff, and it follows a consistent set of laws.


Define stuff and a falsifiable theory associated with it and I will consider your claim; as it is, it is not even wrong.


We know that mind arises as a process in matter, and not any other way.


It does not matter to me where it comes out, I am not even discussing such matters, and wouldn't even if I wanted to because it is metaphysical in origin, What matters is not what we think the world is composed of, but how we go about figuring that out. You are putting your metaphysical cart before your scientific horse.


We know this. It's not the subject for any rational dispute.


See the above FTFY section.


My position is supported by every scientific experiment ever, and you say that I'm presumptuous?


Science is much more about Epistemology than Ontology. The Royal Society did open demonstrations in auditoriums so that everyone could see that the predictions of the lecturer came to pass or not. To this day this is also done in many classrooms covering a scientific topic. This method of open demonstration of directly observable results bypassed the philosophical quagmire that existed up to that point whereby individuals would debate so called absolute causes (ontologies).

By shifting the perspective to how questions, and emphasizing observation over armchair theorizing, science recieved it's first boost. So you see, I become very concerned when I see on the SMMT forum a skeptic who engages in obvious metaphysical nonsense.


No. No, I don't think so.


Yes, unfortunately, it is true.


Seriously, get a grip. Searle's position is useful only as a teaching tool for undergraduates on how to spot logical fallacies. Dennett has his faults, but he punches through the nonsense very effectively.

What should I grip on to? The ludicrous idea that perception does not exist because that would mean scary spirits in some dualistic universe. The only ontologies that have anything like absolute status are perception and the abstract mind (I percieve, therefore I am; I think, therefore I know it.). Everything else is a model. A possibly very well tested model, but still, a model.

Of course, how to explain this seemingly simple idea to people like PixyMisa who think in terms of ontologies instead of epistemologies? There is an interesting video on one of the TED Neuro talks covering the work of one cognitive scientist working with children. She demonstrates in the video what is called Theory of Mind. Children below the age of five or so do not understand that others can have false beliefs. This is shown with a story involving two pirates and questions about what the two pirates will do. It seems that even though five year olds can understand false beliefs, they do not have a good sense of morality in anything like adult terms until the age of seven.

I wonder if we could do something similar here. Say we take me and PixyMisa. Obviously we have different ideas on some fundamental issues. It is my fear that PixyMisa has less of an advanced Theory of Mind about the topics we are discussing than I do. How to test this though? I mean, imagine the five year old debating the three year old, the three year old just does not have the mental machinery to follow along.

I do feel like that I understand PixyMisa's position (understand but do not agree), whereas from various writings of PixyMisa I am pretty sure PixyMisa is not understanding in any significant way my own position. To make a test we could have two questions, one for each of us. We would each answer our own question as well as try to act as if we were the other person in how they answer their own question. The format for answering would have to be a rigid, say, three sentences for each response, it is just that we do not agree). If, on the other hand, one of us can better mirror what the other would say, then that person who does the mirroring better wins. Four judges, Two Questions, Four Answers, Lots of Mirror Neurons.

You up for it PixyMisa?

[PixyMisa]

Yes.
Still no.

Do you even have the slightest clue what those words are about?
I know exactly what they mean. I don't know what you think they mean, though, because the way you use the words makes no sense.

First though, a detour.
Which is different how?

In Special Relativity, it is a fact that each observer will report the same proper-time between any two events. The space and time intervals between the two events is determined by which observor one is talking about, hence it is subjective in nature.
It is purely, verifiably, mathematically predictably objective.

I know, crazy me. What was I thinking? I should be listening to the creepy internet pannochio character with all the answers. I'm sorry, I'll stop thinking now so I can agree with you.
No, what I'm suggesting is that you start thinking.

Oh good, you agree than that your position is metaphysical, and hence, not scientific!
Not in any way whatsoever.

My statement was a statement of metaphysics. However, it is one that is backed up by all evidence of any kind ever.

I noticed you also declined to tell us how to falsify your one substance model's predictions, or what predictions of any you have for this model.
I not only answered that, that's the very next thing you quote. At least try to pay attention.

BS flag!
Well, yes, but that applies to all your posts.

Since you are the one making the claim you need to show that

1. You have predictions based upon the model you advocate and that these predictions match with already established science where appropriate.

All of science.

2. Establish criteria for the possible falsification of your 'One Substance' model as per Popper. It is also at least somewhat advised that you should hopefully have observations showing that applicable tests of your model have not falsified your theory already.

See above.

Well, get chopping. It is not I who is making this claim but you!
Yes. I'm saying science works. You're saying that you can make up whatever the hell you like and it's just as valid as reality.

I'll grant your point the day you manage to intuit a post onto this forum instead of using a computer.

The definition is fine.
But wrong - or simple nonsense.

Yeah, I know, garbage in and garbage out is all Hard-AI'ers understand so I can see why you would think an empirical approach to consciousness would not sit well with you.
You seem confused. I have no problem at all with an empirical approach. However, what you are offering is not an empirical approach, it is a word salad approach

Arrogant much?!?
Not at all. This is humility. Insisting that all of science is fundamentally wrong, with neither evidence nor logic nor even coherent argument, now that is arrogance.

"We know how the Universe works" peon. How dare you question my authorite!
Remind me: How exactly did you post that drivel to this forum?

Yes, I see, so some group (we), that you are a part of, knows the final laws of physics, consciousness and the non-meaning of life. OK, I bow down to you and your mighty invisible brain team.
Strawman, and not even an entertaining one.

FTFY: We know how to investigate phenomena to predict the outcome of observations and experiments in an objective way using the Scientific Method.
Yes. And since this method works, we know how the Universe works, and that rules out everything you appear to wish to believe.

Define stuff and a falsifiable theory associated with it and I will consider your claim; as it is, it is not even wrong.
Already done. You even quoted me. Try again.

And really, if there's only one sort of stuff, what do you think the definition is?

It does not matter to me where it comes out
Then you have a real problem, because that is the issue under consideration.

I am not even discussing such matters, and wouldn't even if I wanted to because it is metaphysical in origin
Not remotely. It's science.

What matters is not what we think the world is composed of, but how we go about figuring that out.
That's metaphysics.

See the above FTFY section.
My statement is still entirely correct.

Science is much more about Epistemology than Ontology.
In fact, under scientific naturalism, the two are isometric. And modern materialism is scientific naturalism with the recognition that ontology is epistemology.

To unpack that slightly, you can't know what anything is, only how it interacts. Which means that the only meaningful definition of what something is, is what it does. What things are and how we learn about them are thus the exact same thing.

The Royal Society did open demonstrations in auditoriums so that everyone could see that the predictions of the lecturer came to pass or not. To this day this is also done in many classrooms covering a scientific topic. This method of open demonstration of directly observable results bypassed the philosophical quagmire that existed up to that point whereby individuals would debate so called absolute causes (ontologies).
Yes. See above. We know how the Universe works, and as such, ontology is epistemology.

By shifting the perspective to how questions, and emphasizing observation over armchair theorizing, science recieved it's first boost.
Which is why you find me in this very thread telling people that they are asking the wrong questions.

So you see, I become very concerned when I see on the SMMT forum a skeptic who engages in obvious metaphysical nonsense.
So stop doing that, then.

Yes, unfortunately, it is true.
So, my position is supported by every scientific experiment ever, and yet I'm presumptuous to hold it?

You need to find a new dictionary; yours seems to be for a language other than English.

What should I grip on to?
Logic. Evidence.

The ludicrous idea that perception does not exist because that would mean scary spirits in some dualistic universe.
Since that idea is yours alone, no, I suggest you abandon that.

The only ontologies that have anything like absolute status are perception and the abstract mind (I percieve, therefore I am; I think, therefore I know it.).
Those are tautologies.

Everything else is a model. A possibly very well tested model, but still, a model.
And?

Of course, how to explain this seemingly simple idea to people like PixyMisa who think in terms of ontologies instead of epistemologies?
See above.

There is an interesting video on one of the TED Neuro talks covering the work of one cognitive scientist working with children. She demonstrates in the video what is called Theory of Mind. Children below the age of five or so do not understand that others can have false beliefs.
Thank you. I know that. Hide the toy and ask them where the other child will think the toy is.

I wonder if we could do something similar here. Say we take me and PixyMisa. Obviously we have different ideas on some fundamental issues. It is my fear that PixyMisa has less of an advanced Theory of Mind about the topics we are discussing than I do.
In other words, you've humiliated yourself, and are fishing about for an excuse.

Instead of wasting everyone's time with nonsensical ad hominem attacks, could you try to assemble some sort of coherent position, and, when you've done that, support it with evidence and reasoned argument?

[Belz...]

A reasonable person! Yippee!

Unfortunately that's not all they are, so no.

[Mr. Scott]

Here's a neat little video about "The Hard Problem" but I'm wondering why it's necessary to introduce EM (or anything in addition to action potentials).

tQKNhQ0Spqw

[tensordyne]

I know exactly what they mean. I don't know what you think they mean, though, because the way you use the words makes no sense.


You use the word objective the way I would use the word true. That is not its only meaning.


Which is different how?


Hilarious, not.


It is purely, verifiably, mathematically predictably objective.


And yet, a particular observer making a particular observation is subjective. Huh, I wonder how that could be? Maybe it is because you do not know what the two words mean?


No, what I'm suggesting is that you start thinking.


Thanks for the pointless insult. I will let you know when I think you start thinking.


Not in any way whatsoever.

My statement was a statement of metaphysics. However, it is one that is backed up by all evidence of any kind ever.


Hold on here! The first sentence says no but then the next sentence says the opposite. Make up your mind, are you making metaphysical statements or not? And you can not back up metaphysical statements as they are concerned with the fundamental nature of being and the world. Science does not make such pronouncements, it is epistemology, not ontology.


I not only answered that, that's the very next thing you quote. At least try to pay attention.


You did not give your one substance model. You say it is the same as the Science Models out there. As far as I can tell, such models do not make any mention of 'substances' as you would have it.

I will not let up on this point. Either your ideas are ontologies and therefore we can ignore you like we ignore any woo master, or you make predictions with your model that can be tested (epistemology, science, empiricism). To say your metaphysics is in line with current scientific consensus is a non-statement because science does not allow for discussion of metaphysics.


Well, yes, but that applies to all your posts.


BS diversion flag!
:bs:

Isn't this how children argue? You are wrong. No I'm not. Yes you are...

I said your stance of saying science was your model was BS given the context. Instead of making an argument about what was being argued about, you make it about my posts (not the original topic at hand). Ergo, BS diversion.


All of science.


Oh, now I see, your model is just "science", forget about those pesky substances we were talking about a minute ago. No, no, do not look at the man behind the curtains.


See above.


Another non asnwer. Defend your one substance stance or give up on it. This obfuscating a metaphysical position with a scientific one is annoying in the extreme.


Yes. I'm saying science works. You're saying that you can make up whatever the hell you like and it's just as valid as reality.


Intellectual dishonesty at its finest is on display above. OK, your saying science works, that is fine. Of course, what that further means can be left alone for the moment, but to say that I advocate making up whatever the hell I want and believe it to be just as valid as 'reality' is, that does not sound like the position I have been advocating for.

Reality is a kind of model. We check that model against what is observed. If the abstract model does not meet up with what is observed, it is chucked in favor of a hopefully better model. This is the scientific method in a nutshell. It does not involve 'substances', it does not involve metaphysical absolute natures, it involves an abstract mind capable of thought and perception.

Note the important thing about real models, they can be checked. How do you check your one substance ideas? How do you falsify them? If you can not, it is not science.


I'll grant your point the day you manage to intuit a post onto this forum instead of using a computer.


Shades of further diversion.


But wrong - or simple nonsense.


I am not the one arguing the implausibly ridiculous idea that subjective and objective are not opposites because the subjective does not exist.


You seem confused. I have no problem at all with an empirical approach. However, what you are offering is not an empirical approach, it is a word salad approach


Words are important because they convey meaning. I know the words ontology and epistemology are not exactly on the tip of everyone's tongue but the subject matter forces my hand. You believe in making scientific models into ontologies. It is as simple as that. I am against that idea because I respect the primacy of observation in settling disputes associated with models.

In action, I am sure you will act like a good scientist and follow the rules. As far as your world-view goes though, it is unscientific.


Not at all. This is humility. Insisting that all of science is fundamentally wrong, with neither evidence nor logic nor even coherent argument, now that is arrogance.


That is not what you said originally:


We know how the Universe works. We know that there's only one sort of stuff, and it follows a consistent set of laws. We know that mind arises as a process in matter, and not any other way.


You know how the universe works (not provisionally stated, or with some form of guarded adjectives such as 'mostly know', nope, you know it all!).

You know there is only one form of stuff and that it follows consistent laws.

You also seem to think I think science is all wrong (red herring, I do not). I think your view of science is wrong as to what it studies. I think science is a form of epistemology that you have turned into an ontology because you have read, for instance, the works of Dennett (or similar). That is what I think. You can quote me on it too.


Remind me: How exactly did you post that drivel to this forum?


Not worthy of much reply except to note, I did post it, and it was meant to be a reflection of how you are acting.


Strawman, and not even an entertaining one.


Strawman from you, that is hilarious. I noticed you did not provide an argument for why you thought it was a strawman. For it to be a strawman I have to be attacking a position you do not have. The reply you gave was to your original statements that were paraphrased by me and with some snarkiness added in for good measure. I can understand not liking the snarkiness, but you did say "We know how the Universe works."

So until you add in "We mostly know how the Universe works," or something to that effect, my position of unbridled incredulity at anyone pronouncing they know how the universe actually works in its entirety will stand as it is.


Yes. And since this method works, we know how the Universe works, and that rules out everything you appear to wish to believe.


How so? I am not even sure if you get what I am talking about, so a little more data would help here. I get the feeling though that when you use the sentence "we know how the universe works" you are not talking in that ultra-careful way that scientists talk about their results, but the way a mystic discusses the metaphysics of reality.

Again, I am not interested in metaphysics. This is a science forum. Go on the religion and philosophy forum if you want to discuss your religion, whatever form it may be in.


Already done. You even quoted me. Try again.

And really, if there's only one sort of stuff, what do you think the definition is?


OK, let me try this out. I am not the one making the claim. I do not have to define terms or make appropriate arguments. I do not have to argue about my stuff model. If your stuff model is just science to date, then you do not have your own model and there is no need to bring up stuff. If you do have a new model, then you should be able to defend it (unless you state you do not wish to defend it for the moment, your prerogative).

What you are doing now is obfuscating the empirical with the ontological, again.


Then you have a real problem, because that is the issue under consideration.


Under consideration (at least from my perspective) is how should a science of consciousness work, as well as what science is really all about? I do not care to discuss about unprovable substances of dualism, monism or any other ism except to note that they are unscientific.


Not remotely. It's science.


Ontologies related to the absolute nature of existence is not science, it is metaphysics.


That's metaphysics.


Yep, you got me, it is metaphysics that I said before. I did not mean for that statement to be metaphysical, so please allow me to restate it.

What matters is not what we think the world is composed of, but how we go about making predictions that match observation.

Predictions matching observation, or not, is really what I am about. I hope you do not consider that unscientific.


My statement is still entirely correct.


That you know how the universe works huh? OK, so how does Quantum Gravity work, brainchild? Or how many civilizations do there exist in the universe as well as some form of proof of the same. Oh yeah, you know how the universe works!

You and everyone else have models. These models come from observation and experiment as well as a lot of thought. Your unfalsifiable substances come from philosophers who do not have to prove what they say with anything like the same as occurs in science.


In fact, under scientific naturalism, the two are isometric. And modern materialism is scientific naturalism with the recognition that ontology is epistemology.


It should be isomorphic, not isometric, and they are not even that. Naturalism is an ontology that forgot it was one and so masquerades around town like it wasn't one. Remember, ontology is about existence! Epistemology is about figuring things out (knowledge).


To unpack that slightly, you can't know what anything is, only how it interacts. Which means that the only meaningful definition of what something is, is what it does. What things are and how we learn about them are thus the exact same thing.


So in the first sentence you agree with me but you forget to include "... only how it interacts with our senses." This would then mean the next sentence would have to include "... does to our senses."

And we are not talking about what things are, in and of themselves, we are talking of what we think they act like. You think of the whole world as one substance, whatever it is that means exactly. What you think of as substance I consider a model. A very well established model, but still a model (and an incomplete one because there is as yet no well agreed upon model of consciousness).

Plus, if you know how something interacts, then you know just that, how it interacts, not, what it is. Phenomena versus noumena, look it up. I deal only in phenomena and abstract concepts related to it. Noumena, such as "reality" or "substance", are unverifiable claims akin to religious statements. No thanks.


Yes. See above. We know how the Universe works, and as such, ontology is epistemology.


Yeah, tell a philosophy major that ontology is epistemology and they will think you are high or on something. The study of the nature of existence is not the same as the study of how we go about knowing things (especially in a scientific context).


Which is why you find me in this very thread telling people that they are asking the wrong questions.


You know, this gets me to another point. As a scientist, I am sure you would do a fine job (except possibly as it concerns studying consciousness). Not worried about it. My problem is with your world-view and always has been. You bring up the point about questions. If you for instance have no problem asking someone during a visual experiment what they are seeing (for fear that it is not scientific), I see no special point in arguing against you about your methods (just do not make claims that robots are conscious, because you do not even know what consciuosness is about).

Your confusion on some terms and the Naive Realism you have is most annoying though.


So stop doing that, then.


My concern will not abate just because you ask it to. Understanding the scientific mindset at its core is important, especially as we start to tease apart the mechanisms of consciousness.


So, my position is supported by every scientific experiment ever, and yet I'm presumptuous to hold it?


Your substance model is not even well thought out. Is it even a model, or an ontology? If it is an ontology, it is not scientific. If it is a model, you need to explicate what it predicts and how it does so. Make your choice.


You need to find a new dictionary; yours seems to be for a language other than English.


I use dictionary.com. It is not about the words though that you have a problem with, it is about the concepts, and you are missing a few of those.


Logic. Evidence.


Very well, but I am already pretty steadfast as far as that goes.


Since that idea is yours alone, no, I suggest you abandon that.


Ah, so you contend I am mischaracterising your position. If there is only one substance, where is the need or requirement for sensation (I guess what you would call the other substance)? Where does sensation enter your world-view, as something subservient to models, not even worthy of mention? Or is it one of the two primary aspects by how we figure things out and worthy of study for its own sake (my take)?


Those are tautologies.


I what sense, the rhetorical or the formal logical sense? In the rhetorical sense saying there are two things that have something like absolute ontological status and then saying what they are in parenthesis is not a tautology, it's an elaboration.

In the logic sense, what I wrote was not a tautology because there was no rule given as to how to replace one correct prepositional statement with another. Nor was the focus on such.

Or is it your goal to snow other people who are perhaps not as knowledgeable as you are about logic and science and so on with your statements? If such is the case, it is not going to work with me. First off, you say tautology as if it is a bad thing. There is nothing wrong in using a tautology to help one make an argument. Tautologies tell us how to make logical inferences in the proper manner. It is only a problem when all one has is tautology, then P and Q as sentences with a true or false value become unimportant and only the labels matter (as complained about by various authors in the past).

That is not what is going on above. I set out what I thought were the closest things to a knowable form of ontology. If you want to complain about them you will need to make an argument. As it is, the above is a vacuous misstatement.


And?


That means you are wrong. That means talking about the universe in terms of the models we have as if the universe really was that way, is wrong, or at best, a short hand for what we really mean, which is that the model and observation match. We do not test for 'existence' in the way you use that word with the words substance, reality, so forth. We test models only against observations that are ultimately based on perception.

I do not want you to think I am some kind of spiritualist, or naturalist either. In terms of science, both world-views are unscientific. Both make unfalsifiable claims about the ultimate nature of reality. I am an observationalist. I agree with the empiricists (who started science).


See above.


See below.


Thank you. I know that. Hide the toy and ask them where the other child will think the toy is.


So you do not want to do the challenge. Oh well, it probably would have been a shambles in one way or the other.

In terms of Theory of Mind, yours is that no one has one. I simply can not accept such a position as the basis for a social endeavor involving exploring consciousness known as the scientific method.

There is a famous quote by someone or other famous on how science is either physics or stamp collecting. To a large extent, I agree, but I think it is even simpler than that. Science is psychology taken to its maximal extent. If you can understand the previous sentence, you can understand where I am coming from.


In other words, you've humiliated yourself, and are fishing about for an excuse.


I fish for nothing other than logic and evidence. So far your pool is muddy with metaphysical nonsense.


Instead of wasting everyone's time with nonsensical ad hominem attacks, could you try to assemble some sort of coherent position, and, when you've done that, support it with evidence and reasoned argument?

Again, as far as substances go, I am not the one making the claim. As for the rest, my position is solid and has not changed. That position is in keeping with the best traditions of science in rejecting claims of utter certainty about the nature of reality (your position).

All the best to you all!

[PixyMisa]

You use the word objective the way I would use the word true. That is not its only meaning.
Then you need to check your definition of the word true, because you have that wrong as well.

Hilarious, not.
No, seriously. You spend all your time avoiding the topic.

And yet, a particular observer making a particular observation is subjective. Huh, I wonder how that could be?
Simple: You have not the slightest notion what you are talking about. Seriously. You do not have a clue.

Relativity is not subjective. It's relative. It's a straightforward mathematical relationship between different objects depending on their velocity vectors.

Thanks for the pointless insult.
It's not an insult, and it's not pointless. See above. You are completely and utterly wrong about this. Throw your ideas away and start again.

Hold on here! The first sentence says no but then the next sentence says the opposite.
No. You are conflating the subject of one single statement with the structure of my position, which is that of science.

Make up your mind, are you making metaphysical statements or not? And you can not back up metaphysical statements as they are concerned with the fundamental nature of being and the world. Science does not make such pronouncements, it is epistemology, not ontology.
Science as a system is a meta-experiment, and as such, it does make statements about ontology, as I've already explained.

You did not give your one substance model. You say it is the same as the Science Models out there. As far as I can tell, such models do not make any mention of 'substances' as you would have it.
You couldn't be more wrong. The reason you can't find it in any specific theory is that it's the central concept of every scientific theory, without exception.

I will not let up on this point.
Then you'll have to accept that you're wrong.

Either your ideas are ontologies and therefore we can ignore you like we ignore any woo master, or you make predictions with your model that can be tested (epistemology, science, empiricism).
Right. And I can make predictions, and my position is falsifiable. I've already shown you how.

To say your metaphysics is in line with current scientific consensus is a non-statement because science does not allow for discussion of metaphysics.
This is wrong, as I've already noted.

Isn't this how children argue? You are wrong. No I'm not. Yes you are...
You're wrong. I've demonstrated this to any rational observer. Yet you persist.

I'm not sure what you expect at this point.

I said your stance of saying science was your model was BS given the context.
And you were wrong.

Instead of making an argument about what was being argued about, you make it about my posts (not the original topic at hand).
Nope.

Oh, now I see, your model is just "science", forget about those pesky substances we were talking about a minute ago.
No. This is wrong in every possible way.

There is only one type of stuff. This is the core principle of science.

Science as an organised undertaking is a meta-experiment into whether this principle is correct. So far, the answer is an unambiguous yes.

No, no, do not look at the man behind the curtains.
The man behind the curtains is also science.

Another non asnwer. Defend your one substance stance or give up on it. This obfuscating a metaphysical position with a scientific one is annoying in the extreme.
I have answered you. You're simply not paying attention.

Intellectual dishonesty at its finest is on display above.
Stop doing that then.

OK, your saying science works, that is fine.
Good.

Of course what that further means can be left alone for the moment, but to say that I advocate making up whatever the hell I want and it being just as valid as 'reality', that does not sound like the position I have been advocating for.
Not what you are advocating for, what you are doing.

Reality is a kind of model.
Nope. Everything else is a model. Reality is real.

We check that model against what is observed. If the abstract model does not meet up with what is observed, it is chucked in favor of a hopefully better model. This is the scientific method in a nutshell. It does not involve 'substances', it does not involve metaphysical absolute natures, it involves an abstract mind capable of thought and perception.
I never mentioned "substances". Once again, that's just something you've made up, whatever the hell you think it means.

But that there is just one type of stuff is the essential principle of science.

Note the important thing about real models, they can be checked. How do you check your one substance ideas? How do you falsify them? If you can not, it is not science.
I've already answered this repeatedly, and you can find the answer in any halfway decent book on the philosophy of science.

The scientific method is based on methodological naturalism, that we should seek explanations of natural events (i.e. observations) exclusively in terms of other natural events (i.e. other potential observations).

With me so far?

What does that mean?

It means that science is an attempt to explain the Universe as if there was only one kind of stuff.

And what do we find?

This works.

And what can we conclude from that?

That there's only one kind of stuff.

ETA: This is a conclusion. If you respond as though I were claiming it to be a mathematical proof, I shall taunt you a second time.

Which is what I said.

Shades of further diversion.
Not a diversion at all. Not at all. It's precisely my point.

There's one kind of stuff. Conjuring up a new kind of stuff just because it makes for an appealing explanation (to you, certainly not to me) is the perfect antithesis of science.

I am not the one arguing the implausibly ridiculous idea that subjective and objective are not opposites because the subjective does not exist.
That bears no relation at all to anything I've said.

Words are important because they convey meaning. I know the words ontology and epistemology are not exactly on the tip of everyone's tongue but the subject matter forces my hand. You believe in making scientific models into ontologies. It is as simple as that.
No, that is precisely the opposite of what I've said.

If you would please just respond to what I post rather than what you would like to believe I've posted, that would cut down on the number of mistakes you are making considerably.

In action, I am sure you will act like a good scientist and follow the rules. As far as your world-view goes though, it is unscientific.
This is, as I have shown repeatedly, completely wrong.

You know how the universe works (not provisionally stated, or with some form of guarded adjectives such as 'mostly know', nope, you know it all!).
Again, this is not a rational interpretation of what I said.

We know how arithmetic works. Agreed?

Is 22347823423849238423840912848945092492384098234289 348923408923423470140834059623-1 prime?

What, you can't tell me? You just agreed that we know how arithmetic works!

You know there is only one form of stuff and that it follows consistent laws.
Yes indeed. Because if this weren't true, science would not work.

You also seem to think I think science is all wrong (red herring, I do not).
What you are attempting to do is, as I've noted, the antithesis of science.

I think your view of science is wrong as to what it studies. I think science is a form of epistemology that you have turned into an ontology because you have read, for instance, the works of Dennett (or similar). That is what I think. You can quote me on it too.
Sure. You're wrong, again.

Not worthy of much reply except to note, I did post it, and it was meant to be a reflection of how you are acting.
The question was sincere. How did you post that drivel to the forum? That is, what was the mechanism, and how was that mechanism derived?

Strawman from you, that is hilarious. I noticed you did not provide an argument for why you thought it was a strawman.
I already had.

For it to be a strawman I have to be attacking a position you do not have.
Precisely.

The reply you gave was to your original statements that were paraphrased by me and with some snarkiness added in for good measure. I can understand not liking the snarkiness, but you did say "We know how the Universe works."
Yes.

So if you want to add in "We mostly know how the Universe works," or something to that effect, my position of unbridled incredulity at anyone pronouncing they know how the universe actually works in its entirety will stand as it is.
We know how the Universe works. And your response is a strawman, pure and simple.

How so? I am not even sure if you get what I am talking about, so a little more data would help here.
See all of the above. Science in itself is a meta-experiment into the nature of reality. That science works tells us something fundamental about how the Universe works.

Again, I am not interested in metaphysics.
That's a problem for you then, because your position is a metaphysical one, not a scientific one. And, in case you've forgotten, it's also wrong.

OK, let me try this out. I am not the one making the claim. I do not have to define terms or make appropriate arguments. I do not have to argue about my stuff model. If your stuff model is just science to date
Which it is.

then you do not have your own model
Which I have pointed out repeatedly.

and there is no need to bring up stuff.
Except for didactic purposes, because you have failed to understand what science is.

What you are doing now is obfuscating the empirical with the ontological, again.
Not at all. What I'm doing is pointing out that the ontological is isomorphic with the epistemological, and the empirical is a test of the epistemological, that in the end, through science, they are all the same thing.

Again:

The scientific method is a choice of epistemology. It is empirically successful, in a way no other choice is. The empirical data thus gathered lays very specific conditions upon what can be inferred about ontologies, leaving a set of statements that are equivalent to our epistemology in the first place.

Which sounds circular, but isn't, because that's just a side-effect of the process; the real work is the production of successive approximations to reality in the form of predictive mathematical models.

But since that work is only possible in certain types of Universe, the fact that it's possible in our Universe means that our Universe is one of those types.

Under consideration (at least from my perspective) is how should a science of consciousness work, as well as what science is really all about? I do not care to discuss about unprovable substances of dualism, monism or any other ism except to note that they are unscientific.
Science is inherently monistic. Has to be. Nothing else works. Saying that monism is "unscientific" is the diametric opposite of the point.

How would a science of consciousness work?

Like this: Computational neuroscience

Ontologies related to the absolute nature of existence is not science, it is metaphysics.
That's what I said.

Yep, you got me, it is metaphysics that I said before. I did not mean for that statement to be metaphysical, so please allow me to restate it.
No problem.

What matters is not what we think the world is composed of, but how we go about making predictions that match observation.
Yes. Absolutely. And please note that my statements about ontology are that it is not meaningful to say what the world is composed of - only what it does.

Predictions matching observation, or not, is really what I am about. I hope you do not consider that unscientific.
I'm completely fine with that.

That you know how the universe works huh?
I never said that I know how the Universe works, I said that WE know how the Universe works.

OK, so how does Quantum Gravity work, brainchild?
Naturally.

Or how many civilizations do there exist in the universe as well as some form of proof of the same. Oh yeah, you know how the universe works!
You seem confused.

You and everyone else have models. These models come from observation and experiment as well as a lot of thought. Your unfalsifiable substances come from philosophers who do not have to prove what they say with anything like the same as occurs in science.
This bears no relation to anything I have said.

It should be isomorphic, not isometric
Quite correct, it was late, and something was bugging me when I wrote that. Sorry.

and they are not even that. Naturalism is an ontology that forgot it was one and so masquerades around town like it wasn't one.
No.

Remember, ontology is about existence! Epistemology is about figuring things out (knowledge).
Yes.

So in the first sentence you agree with me but you forget to include "... only how it interacts with our senses."
I did not forget that, because it is wrong. I meant precisely what I said.

And we are not talking about what things are, in and of themselves, we are talking of what we think they act like. You think of the whole world as one substance, whatever it is that means exactly.
Nope.

What you think of as substance I consider a model.
I'm not talking about models. And I never once mentioned "substance".

A very well established model, but still a model (and an incomplete one because there is as yet no well agreed upon model of consciousness).
Actually, there is a model of consciousness that is almost universal in the field of neuroscience: Mind is what brain does. Now, that's not a very detailed model, but it's certainly a model.

Listen to the MIT Introduction to Psychology lecture series, they say this right up front.

Plus, if you know how something interacts, then you know just that, how it interacts, not, what it is.
How it interacts is what it is. That's the point. The whole noumena/phenomena thing is nonsense.

Yeah, tell a philosophy major that ontology is epistemology and they will think you are high or on something.
Their problem.

The study of the nature of existence is not the same as the study of how we go about knowing things (especially in a scientific context).
Actually, in relationship to reality, it unavoidably is the same.

You know, this gets me to another point. As a scientist, I am sure you would do a fine job (except possibly as it concerns studying consciousness). Not worried about it. My problem is with your world-view and always has been. You bring up the point about questions. If you for instance have no problem asking someone during a visual experiment what they are seeing (for fear that it is not scientific), I see no special point in arguing against you about your methods (just do not make claims that robots are conscious, because you do not even know what consciuosness is about).
We clearly do know what consciousness is, because we talk about it, we discuss its behaviours. And it's clear that computer programs already demonstrate those behaviours.

Your confusion on some terms and the Naive Realism you have is most annoying though.
Sorry, that's just you.

My concern will not abate just because you ask it to. Understanding the scientific mindset at its core is important, especially as we start to tease apart the mechanisms of consciousness.
I'm not talking about your concern, I'm talking about your metaphysical nonsense.

Your substance model is not even well thought out.
Wrong.

Is it even a model, or an ontology? If it is an ontology, it is not scientific.
Wrong.

If it is a model, you need to explicate what it predicts and how it does so. Make your choice.
Already done.

I use dictionary.com. It is not about the words though that you have a problem with, it is about the concepts, and you are missing a few of those.
Nope.

Very well, but I am already pretty steadfast as far as that goes.
Not even remotely. Searle? I mean, seriously, Searle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room#System_and_virtual_mind_replies:_find ing_the_mind)?

Ah, so you contend I am mischaracterising your position.
Always.

If there is only one substance
Your word, not mine. See what I mean?

where is the need or requirement for sensation (I guess what you would call the other substance)?
Where does that question even come from? To quote Babbage again, I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.

How does "requirement" come into anything? What "other substance"? Why would you be bringing that up when you just mischaracterised my position as there being only one kind of "substance"?

Where does sensation enter your world-view, as something subservient to models, not even worthy of mention? Or is it one of the two primary aspects by how we figure things out and worthy of study for its own sake (my take)?
Again, none of this bears any relation to anything I've said, and I can't even work out how you got there.

I said, there's only one type of stuff.

What we observe, that's stuff.

Our observations, that's stuff.

Our sensations, that's stuff.

Our awareness of those sensations, that's stuff.

I what sense, the rhetorical or the formal logical sense?
Formally. The problem with Descartes cogito is this it injects an is distinct from the does, which as I noted, is not supportable.

If we break it down to I am thinking, therefore I am doing... Well, that's a tautology. Which should be no surprise; you can't reason your way to the fundamental nature of reality.

In the logic sense, what I wrote was not a tautology because there was no rule given as to how to replace one correct prepositional statement with another. Nor was the focus on such.
Because the statements revolved around equivocations. Remove those, and the tautology is laid bare.

Or is it your goal to snow other people
Nope. My goal is to slow the rate of growth of nonsense as much as I am able.

First off, you say tautology as if it is a bad thing.
Merely that there is a limit to what you can infer from one.

That means you are wrong.
Nope.

I do not want you to think I am some kind of spiritualist, or naturalist either. In terms of science, both world-views are unscientific. Both make unfalsifiable claims about the ultimate nature of reality. I am an observationalist. I agree with the empiricists (who started science).
So you say. But you are the one who brought up Searle.

So you do not want to do the challenge.
I have shown, repeatedly, that you are not responding to what I write, but to what you imagine I have written. Your "challenge" was nothing more than a further elaboration on your strawman argument.

Oh well, it probably would have been a shambles in one way or the other.
Your argument has been that from the beginning.

In terms of Theory of Mind, yours is that no one has one.
Not even remotely. Once again, it is impossible to rationally infer that from what I have said. I have said, explicitly and repeatedly, precisely the opposite.

I simply can not accept such a position as the basis for a social endeavor involving exploring consciousness known as the scientific method.

And I really don't care whether you can accept position that are entirely of your own invention.

There is a famous quote by someone or other famous on how science is either physics or stamp collecting. To a large extent, I agree, but I think it is even simpler than that. Science is psychology taken to its maximal extent. If you can understand the previous sentence, you can understand where I am coming from.
You're coming from wrong.

I fish for nothing other than logic and evidence. So far your pool is muddy with metaphysical nonsense.
Again, wrong.

Again, as far as substances go, I am not the one making the claim.
Again, wrong. You brought up Searle, the metaphysical equivalent of parachuting into a minefield during a hurricane with a hundred rabid badgers chained to your ankles.

You should at the very least expect some turbulence.

As for the rest, my position is solid and has not changed.
You don't actually know what your position is.

That position is in keeping with the best traditions of science in rejecting claims of utter certainty about the nature of reality (your position).
And you most certainly don't know what my position is.

[PixyMisa]

Made a few edits and corrections to my above post; in case anyone has bothered to read the blasted thing, this was mostly for typos plus a couple of clarifications, nothing substantive changed.

[punshhh]

Made a few edits and corrections to my above post; in case anyone has bothered to read the blasted thing, this was mostly for typos plus a couple of clarifications, nothing substantive changed.

Sorry I couldn't be bothered, might be the last straw on the camels back:D

[Mr. Scott]

Hey guys, could you please stay on topic and not ugly-up the thread? Thanks!

Why is a network of 100 billion neurons connected to each other by 100 trillion synapses, together making possibly a trillion action potential spikes per second, inadequate to explain our subjective internal experiences?

Just the length of the axons in the brain, strung together, would reach 74% of the distance to the moon.

Hey, while looking for the count of neurotransmitter receptors (http://www.dana.org/media/detail.aspx?id=34474), I found out a little about the mechanics of how love works:

The density of [dopamine receptor subtypes, D1 and D2] in an area of the brain called the nucleus accumbens plays an important role in both mating and social bonds. The D2 type receptor is necessary to initially form the pair bond between two monogamous animals. But for the bond to be maintained over time, there needs to be an adequate density of the D1 variety as well.

[Belz...]

Made a few edits and corrections to my above post; in case anyone has bothered to read the blasted thing, this was mostly for typos plus a couple of clarifications, nothing substantive changed.

Would you guys mind cutting down the size of those posts ?

[tensordyne]

Would you guys mind cutting down the size of those posts ?

It is hard when dealing with someone who believes in metaphysics not to respond to every little tid bit because every tid bit is drenched in metaphysical nonsense.

[tensordyne]

Science as a system is a meta-experiment, and as such, it does make statements about ontology, as I've already explained.


The statements in science as to ontology are in the models themselves (not to be confused with the ontologies you are talking about which are of a fundamental and not pragmatic nature) and must always be considered provisional as well as only there to meet the goal of better prediction. You can fancy up a pig however you like PixyMisa but metaphysics is not science, never will be, and never has been.


There is only one type of stuff. This is the core principle of science.


This is not a core principle of science, the core principle of science is that whatever you say is open to discussion unless it is not testable (in the perceptual sense). That is the core principle of science. The rest is a metaphysical interpretation you and others have grafted on to science because of habit of thought.


Nope. Everything else is a model. Reality is real.


Reality, as you use the word, is best interpreted in a scientific context as a model. "Reality is real" is something I would expect my 10 year old niece to say, not someone who is trying to discuss the topics we are discussing here. It is a pointlessly unfalsifiable statement that does not lead to predictions or testable hypotheses.


The scientific method is based on methodological naturalism, that we should seek explanations of natural events (i.e. observations) exclusively in terms of other natural events (i.e. other potential observations).


The above is one philosophy of science. It is wrong because it does not recognize the primacy of observation.

Some stuff statements for later referrence.


It means that science is an attempt to explain the Universe as if there was only one kind of stuff.

That there's only one kind of stuff.

There's one kind of stuff. Conjuring up a new kind of stuff just because it makes for an appealing explanation (to you, certainly not to me) is the perfect antithesis of science.


Now you finally go about defining 'stuff'.


I said, there's only one type of stuff.

What we observe, that's stuff.

Our observations, that's stuff.

Our sensations, that's stuff.

Our awareness of those sensations, that's stuff.


OK, so there is one kind of stuff, and yet the stuff you listed above is of very different kinds. "What we observe" is what most people mean when they say stuff, such as chairs, milk, etc. Our observations though can either be thought of in the percept (abstract perceptual concept sense) or in the purely perceptoral sense (an idea that is missing in Hard-AI'ers), which is related to the next line about sensations. Awareness is a further different kind of stuff.

Are abstract ideas a stuff to you as well? If so, there is no hope.

Each of your stuffs is of a different kind (contra to your numerous monist statements), both conceptually and in terms of definition. The thing that holds your statements together with something like rigor is that each is a concept we generally hold to exist. If that is your definition of 'stuff', that it exists, than you are simply saying that science applies to all that exists.

How ingenious, and wrong. Mathematics does not work by the same rules as science does in its study, and in some sense we hold the things in math to exist. So if we use mathematical methods to study math and not scientific methods, than that stuff (the maximal kind of stuff that includes everything that is your seeming definition) is not studied by science.


Not at all. What I'm doing is pointing out that the ontological is isomorphic with the epistemological, and the empirical is a test of the epistemological, that in the end, through science, they are all the same thing.

The scientific method is ...


... not about ontologies related to the absolute nature of reality. That is what a certain field of philosophy is about called metaphysics.


Yes. Absolutely. And please note that my statements about ontology are that it is not meaningful to say what the world is composed of - only what it does.


Do I detect a change in mindset? Don't answer that, the last person to realize they have lost a debate is the one who has lost.


I'm completely fine with that.


Then there is no need to bring up methodological naturalism or other metaphysical nonsense of various kinds. We can move on to how we should go about studying consciousness in a way that is hopefully as close to how science is studied now (with as few starting assumptions as needed) as possible.

Sorry for the length. I guess I am naturally wordy.

[Belz...]

It is hard when dealing with someone who believes in metaphysics not to respond to every little tid bit because every tid bit is drenched in metaphysical nonsense.

A simple "yes" will suffice. "Yes, master", even better.

[tensordyne]

A simple "yes" will suffice. "Yes, master", even better.

Yes of course Master Fiend God of the 23rd Dimension!

[PixyMisa]

Would you guys mind cutting down the size of those posts ?
I won't do another of those for tensordyne; unless the discussion moves considerably, there's no point. If he says something interesting (right or wrong), I'll respond to that specifically.

[PixyMisa]

A note: Anything that I haven't commented on, assume that I disagree entirely and just don't consider it of sufficient interest to respond.

Reality, as you use the word, is best interpreted in a scientific context as a model.
Sure. Reality as anyone uses the word is best interpreted in a scientific context as a model.

But you are interpreting something. There is, of necessity, some system that is not your model.

OK, so there is one kind of stuff, and yet the stuff you listed above is of very different kinds.
Nope. That's the point, and if you don't understand that, you don't understand anything at all.

It's all just material, physical interactions. Mind is what brain does.

"What we observe" is what most people mean when they say stuff, such as chairs, milk, etc. Our observations though can either be thought of in the percept (abstract perceptual concept sense) or in the purely perceptoral sense (an idea that is missing in Hard-AI'ers), which is related to the next line about sensations. Awareness is a further different kind of stuff.
No.

If these are fundamentally different kinds of stuff, they can't interact.

If they are trivially different kinds of stuff, then sure, they can interact - but why are you so worried about trivial differences?

Are abstract ideas a stuff to you as well?
Abstractions aren't stuff; instantiations of abstractions, however, necessarily are. When you think about an abstraction, that's stuff.

Do I detect a change in mindset?
Not even remotely.

[PixyMisa]

Then there is no need to bring up methodological naturalism or other metaphysical nonsense of various kinds.
Apparently there is, because you anti-grasp the implications.

[annnnoid]

What is just slightly inconsistent in this whole ‘stuff’ stuff (..we’re all ‘one’ stuff…sounds positively new-agey to me!) is that science exists nowhere but in the minds of its practitioners. Its practitioners insist (we’ll assume rightly so) on its legitimacy and credibility. The models predict with various degrees of accuracy the reality of which we are a part. The blindingly obvious issue, though, is that they are models. As I said…they exist nowhere but in the minds of those who practice science. They are not reality…they are, in fact, entirely metaphysical in nature (in the sense that they don’t actually exist as anything substantial…they are abstract thought and exist entirely as a function of the faith of those who believe in them).

So what we have are metaphysical models which…as a result of some magic bean…(…stuff????) …somehow correspond to reality.

Explain the coherence of the models and their ability to approximate reality to the degree that they do as well as our ability to discover / create / understand / utilize the models.

Actually…I don’t think there is an explanation.

So science explains ‘things’…but what explains the fact that science explains things?... and what explains the fact that we understand the explanations?

Is ‘stuff’ the result of science…or is science the result of ‘stuff’?

…or (gasp) is ‘stuff’ science! The implications…mind…actually. We’ll insist till we’re blue in the face that reality functions (generally speaking) according to the known values of science (and what we don’t know about it functions according to the as-yet-to-be-known values) but to advance that proposition to its logical conclusion somehow becomes heresy.

Of course, it can’t be established by any known scientific method or process…this conclusion, thus…I suppose…it has to be dismissed (philosophy and all that). Science occurs exclusively in mind. Science extrapolated to its ideal state would be reality. Reality is mind (where ‘science’ is exclusively known to occur). ‘Stuff’, therefore, is mind.


Science is psychology taken to its maximal extent.



Interesting to consider…if ‘mind’ were capable of science to some kind of ideal degree, would the result be some kind of direct interaction with and control over reality?

[PixyMisa]

The models predict with various degrees of accuracy the reality of which we are a part.
Right.

The blindingly obvious issue, though, is that they are models.
Right.

As I said…they exist nowhere but in the minds of those who practice science.
Yes. Of course, that includes computers.

They are not reality…
They are part of reality. They exist in minds, and minds are brain function, and brains are quite obviously real.

they are, in fact, entirely metaphysical in nature (in the sense that they don’t actually exist as anything substantial…they are abstract thought and exist entirely as a function of the faith of those who believe in them).
Of course, every part of that sentence, and everything that follows, is entirely false.

Actually…I don’t think there is an explanation.
There is: The very moment you start thinking there's more than one kind of stuff, you're wrong, your ideas are irredeemable, and must be discarded.

Abstractions must be instantiated to be considered, and the instantiation is physical. It can't be anything else. There is simply no problem to be solved here.

[punshhh]

Sorry for the length. I guess I am naturally wordy.Thats understandable as you are entering the rubicon (Pixy's philosophy).

I agree with your position and realise that all we can know through our own endeavors is the appearance of what exists from our position within it. Science cannot reach beyond this horizon and any notions that science is somehow explaining or identifying what exists or not, is philosophy masquerading as scientific knowledge (namely materialism).

Likewise mathematics cannot reach beyond this horizon, it may appear to on occasion, until one remembers the extent to which it is an abstraction.

Pixy has little interest in what exists, what existence is, or in a consideration of the extent to which our little world of existence is limited and accompanied by the unknown.

Such considerations might loosen the grip on the mask.

[PixyMisa]

Thats understandable as you are entering the rubicon (Pixy's philosophy).
Yes, that first encounter with science can be discomfiting.

I agree with your position and realise that all we can know through our own endeavors is the appearance of what exists from our position within it. Science cannot reach beyond this horizon and any notions that science is somehow explaining or identifying what exists or not, is philosophy masquerading as scientific knowledge (namely materialism).
You didn't actually read anything that I wrote, did you?

Likewise mathematics cannot reach beyond this horizon, it may appear to on occasion, until one remembers the extent to which it is an abstraction.
Mathematics is entirely an abstraction, so your comment doesn't mean anything.

Pixy has little interest in what exists, what existence is, or in a consideration of the extent to which our little world of existence is limited and accompanied by the unknown.
No.

[tensordyne]

Cool, I feel like we are getting somewhere here. Interesting that others get the point about sensation being primary (and our concepts associated with them derivative) when talking about Epistemology (and I am generally not interested in Ontologies, as I hope I have made clear).

For those who get it (of which I am happy I am not alone), the interesting thing about science and consciousness is that (shall we call it the PixyMisa picture of looking at the world) the PixyMisa picture works for most of science. Since we use consciousness itself in doing science however, there are some difficulties in exploring consciousness the same way we explore the properties of rocks ala the PixyMisa picture.

I think there can be progress though (see PixyMisa, no excuses from me in exploring the realm of consciousness).


Sure. Reality as anyone uses the word is best interpreted in a scientific context as a model.

But you are interpreting something. There is, of necessity, some system that is not your model.


The something that is being interpreted is your sensations. It is done through percepts that link to the concepts of the abstract mind. Take the idea of 'Reality' as your model and you will better understand what I am getting at.

Not sure though what the point is in bringing up some system not being in your model. Oh, yeah, my Theory of Mind on how you think just kicked in. You bring it up so that the system is a 'thing' (noumena) instead of abstract thing based on sensation (phenomena). Again, ontology.

The 'things' in my model are abstractions, just like a chair is an abstraction. I understand the pull of taking abstractions and wanting to say they are real (in the ontology sense), and it is how we talk about things in our everyday conversation (which is not a compliment, because we also use anthropomorphism all the time too). It is just that in the context of science and how it could apply to studying consciousness we must be more careful than this.


Nope. That's the point, and if you don't understand that, you don't understand anything at all.

It's all just material, physical interactions. Mind is what brain does.


Category error occurring above. You are confusing model with sensation. We have a model, called, say, "reality". To talk about ANY model as if it was independent of observation is an error. The existence of things (chairs, tables, what we would call physical things; sidenote, you can have the word 'stuff' if I can have the word 'things' as defined above) in the way you are discussing it is independent of any model. Therefore, it is wrong (in a science sense, which is all I am interested in here).


No.

If these are fundamentally different kinds of stuff, they can't interact.

If they are trivially different kinds of stuff, then sure, they can interact - but why are you so worried about trivial differences?


The 'stuff' list


What we observe.
Our observations.
Our sensations.
Our awareness of those sensations.


1. Is the same as my things. "What we observe" is an abstraction.
2. It is better to start with 3. but that is the order you gave it in. Our observations are the residue of what happens after sensations occur. There are some difficulties associated with observation too (witnesses are notoriously unreliable for instance).
3. That undefinable and yet definite idea of sensation (which Hard-AI'ers do not get because they only deal in objects and not subjects).
4. An even more abstract concept than anything else on the list.

Yep, 3. is primary and the rest are abstractions of different kinds. I can tell that you constructed the list in an effort to be thorough though.


Abstractions aren't stuff; instantiations of abstractions, however, necessarily are. When you think about an abstraction, that's stuff.


I leave the floor to you to define 'stuff' however it is needed to make your points. I am only looking for internal logical consistency as well as applicability for your definitions and concepts. The above is definition.

Having read over the other posts I would like to comment on one thing. What you think of as the physical world PixyMisa, that is an abstraction. The only way you can know of this physical world is through your senses, so in terms of priority of place, senses comes first when talking about epistemology (especially the epistemology of science).

You think I do not get you but I do. My Theory of Mind surpasses yours because I know exactly where you are coming from. I can totally understand and envision all of your points. It is just that they are wrong.

Things (as I define them above being chairs and so on) are abstractions. We all like to think of them as real, but like you said yourself, the only usefulness to such concepts is how they play out observationally. That is the crux of the matter.

I know you want to speak about things as real, but they are just models (very well established models, but still models). When I think about physics, I think most likely in the way you think about the world (because I am using that set of models).

Phenomenal sensations though are of a different kind than models. I can not make you understand that concept. You just have to get it or we can quit here and agree to disagree (fine by me).

If you were to just add the words "in my model, ..." or something to that effect in many of your statements, I would have no problem. It is the notion of something just being but without mention of a model that gets me. It gets my goat because it gets rid of sensation.


Not even remotely.

Too bad, I thought you were hopefully getting a little wiser.

[tensordyne]

Thats understandable as you are entering the rubicon (Pixy's philosophy).

I agree with your position and realise that all we can know through our own endeavors is the appearance of what exists from our position within it. Science cannot reach beyond this horizon and any notions that science is somehow explaining or identifying what exists or not, is philosophy masquerading as scientific knowledge (namely materialism).

Likewise mathematics cannot reach beyond this horizon, it may appear to on occasion, until one remembers the extent to which it is an abstraction.

Pixy has little interest in what exists, what existence is, or in a consideration of the extent to which our little world of existence is limited and accompanied by the unknown.

Such considerations might loosen the grip on the mask.

Thanks!

Shhh though (kidding), I am trying to turn Pinocchio into a boy. Not having too much success yet and you might cause his mask to explode or something!

[punshhh]

Mathematics is entirely an abstraction, so your comment doesn't mean anything.

Your entire philosophical stance is justified by a mathematical truth remember.

[punshhh]

Thanks!

Shhh though (kidding), I am trying to turn Pinocchio into a boy. Not having too much success yet and you might cause his mask to explode or something!

Pixy's a nice guy, with some good ideas. Unfortunately many of us cannot agree with some of his assumptions and conclusions.

I think you'll find that his mask is made of kryptonite or something, there's no shaking it.

[Belz...]

Yes of course Master Fiend God of the 23rd Dimension!

I won't do another of those for tensordyne; unless the discussion moves considerably, there's no point. If he says something interesting (right or wrong), I'll respond to that specifically.

I just need you two to sign on the dotted line, here, so I can take possession of your souls/minds/consciousnesses.

[Belz...]

Your entire philosophical stance is justified by a mathematical truth remember.

And ?

[tensordyne]

I just need you two to sign on the dotted line, here, so I can take possession of your souls/minds/consciousnesses.

Didn't you get my signed form in the mail? Goodness me the post is late as usual.

[tensordyne]

Pixy's a nice guy, with some good ideas. Unfortunately many of us cannot agree with some of his assumptions and conclusions.

I think you'll find that his mask is made of kryptonite or something, there's no shaking it.

Yeah, you are probably right.

When consciousness is finally figured out it will probably be nothing anyone is expecting is my guess.

[Dancing David]

For those who get it (of which I am happy I am not alone), the interesting thing about science and consciousness is that (shall we call it the PixyMisa picture of looking at the world) the PixyMisa picture works for most of science. Since we use consciousness itself in doing science however, there are some difficulties in exploring consciousness the same way we explore the properties of rocks ala the PixyMisa picture.



No, :D

The study of consciousness is exactly like the study of anything else.

[Dancing David]

Your entire philosophical stance is justified by a mathematical truth remember.

Your entire stance is based upon imagination.

And again there is no truth in science.

How many threads and you still throw straw?

[Dancing David]

Yeah, you are probably right.

When consciousness is finally figured out it will probably be nothing anyone is expecting is my guess.

So what exactly is the nature of what you think we do not understand?

Seriously, in clear direct terms without resorting to meta-anything, what is missing exactly in the bioneurological model?

This is the SMT forum. Did you suddenly find something that neurology could not explain?

[dafydd]

Your entire stance is based upon imagination.

And again there is no truth in science.

How many threads and you still throw straw?

Mystical straw.

[tensordyne]

So what exactly is the nature of what you think we do not understand?

Seriously, in clear direct terms without resorting to meta-anything, what is missing exactly in the bioneurological model?

This is the SMT forum. Did you suddenly find something that neurology could not explain?

Of which model are you referring to?

I think you are referring to the general ideas associated with neurological models to date?

One thing I would like to know myself is when and how the physics of biology leads to the sensation of red. If you happen to know that it would be great.

Of course, some do not even know what the sensation of red means because they will make it all about mechanics and nowhere about sensation itself (which is my main point, but if you want to talk specifics of certain models I am all ears).

I could be wrong that a neurological model does not already exist that gives the correlates of consciousness, but are we not still supposed to be trying to figure out what NCC's are, or did I miss a memo or something?

Or is this a framework question in disguise? Doesn't matter. I will let the relevant scientists do their job on this one. I will let you know when they have any kind of answer to the questions I am pondering here. For the moment, as far as I can tell, they are not there yet.

[tensordyne]

No, :D

The study of consciousness is exactly like the study of anything else.

If that is so then just by looking at you I should be able to figure out what you are sensing, and I can not. We can look at something together, and to whatever extent is relevant we can agree about what we see, but I just do not see the same kind of thing happening when I try and 'look' at your consciousness when your brain is being probed.

That is how the study of consciousness is different than the study of 'things' (refer to a previous post if you want to know what I mean by 'things').

Hope that helps.

[PixyMisa]

I just need you two to sign on the dotted line, here, so I can take possession of your souls/minds/consciousnesses.
Squiggle squiggle squiggle.

Since the first doesn't exist and I'm frequently told I don't possess the latter two, I can probably live with the risk. :)

[PixyMisa]

Or is this a framework question in disguise? Doesn't matter. I will let the relevant scientists do their job on this one. I will let you know when they have any kind of answer to the questions I am pondering here. For the moment, as far as I can tell, they are not there yet.
So, argument from ignorance? And before you protest, you are the one who brought up Searle.

[PixyMisa]

If that is so then just by looking at you I should be able to figure out what you are sensing
As David said, the study of consciousness is just like the study of anything else. So: No.

[PixyMisa]

Your entire philosophical stance is justified by a mathematical truth remember.
Well, that's good to hear.


Pixy's a nice guy, with some good ideas. Unfortunately many of us cannot agree with some of his assumptions and conclusions.
Certainly there are some who cannot agree with my conclusions.

None of you have ever made a coherent objection to my assumptions, though, so that's not my problem.

[Dancing David]

One thing I would like to know myself is when and how the physics of biology leads to the sensation of red. If you happen to know that it would be great.

Again, if you want to, you will have to use the terms as they are used in neurology, not in common usage. :)

Sensation is defined as the processes in the sense organs, except for the vestibular sense which is an amalgam of kinesthetic, cochlear sensations and visual perceptions, and maybe more as well. It is sort of a perception in that sense rather than a 'sense', in strict terms.

Perception is the brain events such as the creation of the visual field or the auditory field.

Sensation is the actual biochemical processes in the sense organs, perception is the complex processing in the cortex regions.

:)


Of course, some do not even know what the sensation of red

Again it would be helpful to use the defined terms as they are defined. The sensation of red is many different events in the retina of the eye, it involves the triggering of certain photoreceptors, and the not triggering of other photoreceptors, the mixing of saturation between the color receptors and the the brightness/contrast of the rods. In this case I think you are likely referring to what would be termed 'visual perception'.
:)

means because they will make it all about mechanics and nowhere about sensation itself (which is my main point, but if you want to talk specifics of certain models I am all ears).


Again it seems you are talking about teh actual process reffered to as perception. the 'sensations' are more like set values of interaction bits which are also analog amalgams of different photoreceptors.

No we do not at this time know why we perceive the seven/three major 'colors' as opposed to stippling , crosshatching or other possible ways that the 'colors' could appear to us.

However there is no reason that I am aware to think that it is anything other than biochemicals and neurological events.

Which is why I ask you, what else might there be?


I could be wrong that a neurological model does not already exist that gives the correlates of consciousness, but are we not still supposed to be trying to figure out what NCC's are, or did I miss a memo or something?

And I asked you specifically, what else would there be that could not be explained by neurological process.

they are not 'correlated' with consciousness, they are consciousness as far as we can tell.

What data is there that might indicate anything else? That I have seen there is nothing at this time that is not 'conscious' or exhibits 'consciousness' that does not have a neurological structure of some sort.


Or is this a framework question in disguise? Doesn't matter. I will let the relevant scientists do their job on this one. I will let you know when they have any kind of answer to the questions I am pondering here. For the moment, as far as I can tell, they are not there yet.

That is not what asked you at all, and you pointedly ignored my question.

"When consciousness is finally figured out it will probably be nothing anyone is expecting is my guess."

Is exactly what YOU said.

So other than neurological events, what exactly do YOU think consciousness might be?

I and most people 'expect' consciousness to be neurological events in biochemical neural networks.

So please answer what do YOU think or expect that consciousness might be other than that?

(Aside from whether non biochemical neural networks could be built.)

:)

[Dancing David]

If that is so then just by looking at you I should be able to figure out what you are sensing,

Special pleading and a false dichotomy.

Can you just tell if something is radioactive?
or emits in the ultraviolet?
Or can you see the ring nebula in Lyra?

Seriously, you have made either an over simplification or a false dichotomy.

and I can not. We can look at something together, and to whatever extent is relevant we can agree about what we see, but I just do not see the same kind of thing happening when I try and 'look' at your consciousness when your brain is being probed.

That is how the study of consciousness is different than the study of 'things' (refer to a previous post if you want to know what I mean by 'things').

Hope that helps.

Nope it looks like a false dichotomy, over simplification and special pleading to me.

:)

[Mr. Scott]

Science occurs exclusively in mind.

Don't forget that science works and metaphysics doesn't. That means that, unlike science, metaphysics is exclusively in the mind.

If you can demonstrate that metaphysics works, then I'll be expecting your announcement of winning the million dollars soon.

[Mr. Scott]

It seems that the dualists cannot fathom the idea that consciousness is physical, that is, due to physically connected matter. Build up a brain from atoms to molecules to neurons to neuron networks, and still dualists seem to insist that consciousness cannot appear unless there's some essential ethereal force, like EM and quantum entanglement, which works in the space between particles.

Why does our intuition insist on this? Why is the idea so seductive?

[PixyMisa]

Searle's Chinese Room argument is pretty much designed to seduce our intuition. Whether that was intentional, or merely the best argument he could produce to shore up his position, I can't say, but I suspect the latter.

It's only when you examine it with serious rigour that you notice that (a) it's not logically valid, and (b) the scenario hides some huge mathematical absurdities. (Searle fails to note, for example, that the Room would need to be larger than the observable Universe, or that it would operate on timescales that would make continental drift look like hummingbirds mating.)

[Darat]

Your mind doesn't seem too materialistic to me, even though can be explained extremely well by physical neuroscience.

The gravitational field is in no way materialistic, as another example.

Or the plank scale of quantum phenomena, where the worlds of materialism and mathematical abstraction get seemingly blurred via quantum nonlocality, and general material befuzzlement in general.

Yet you couldn't be posting the above without the materialistic understanding of "quantum" that enables engineers to design and build "quantum" machines ie your computer.

[rocketdodger]

I thought of a scenario on the way to work today that will hopefully clarify for some people why machines can actually "know" something.

Suppose you are an AI programmer working on a game. Suppose you want the AI to behave a certain way, for instance something like running to the player when they are low on health because the player might give them a health pack or something ( legal disclaimer -- this is not an actual scenario in any game I am working on ).

The easiest way to do this, and the way that all current game AI will have it implemented, is for the programmer to just write a bunch of code somewhere in the AI logic that is tantamount to:

1) Check my health
2) If it is low, see if I can path to the player
3) Try to go to the player
4) Maybe play some kind of animation and voiceover to ask the player for a healthpack

Now in this scenario, I don't think anybody would claim that the AI knows anything at all. It is quite obvious that every bit of what the AI is doing was explicitly put there by the programmer. This isn't even close to a conscious behavior.

However there are other ways this could be implemented. Those are much harder, and less predictable, which is why they aren't ever done, but nevertheless an example might be something like the following.

a) program an underlying drive to be healthy in the AI. This is complicated but doable so I won't get into it here ( unless someone wants to know, I can elaborate in another post ), but in any case it isn't part of the "knowledge" of the AI so it is fine if it is completely programmed. This is similar to our drive to avoid pain, avoid hunger, etc.

b) program a system into the AI so it can remember arbitrary sequences of events and make inferences between them. This is also complicated but doable, there are many architectures that would work. And again, it is fine that this is "programmed."

c) put the AI in the world, lower it's health, and then give it a health pack. Over and over. In many different cases.

And you are done.

What happens in the AI logic, then, is this:

1) Check my health. < it is low >
2) If it is low, prioritize finding a way to bring it back up. < I allocate CPU resources to this task >
3) Search my memory to see if any sequences of events in the past ever resulted in my health increasing < I find some events, the player giving me a healthpack >
4) If I find any such events, search my memory for other events that are related to those events, so I can build a sequence of events that might take me from my current state to getting my health increased, assuming those past events are repeatable < the player gave me a healthpack > < he was close to me > < he isn't close to me now > < moving towards something makes me closer to it >
5) Once I have generated a sequence that I think will work, I should try it < I start moving towards the player >

Now of course I embellished that with human readable words, the AI doesn't use "he" or "towards" or whatever, it just executes code. But the essential thing here is that the programmer NEVER told the AI to go to the player when it had low health. The AI learned that from being in the world and having things happen to it.

In this latter case, I would argue that the AI genuinely "knows" something. It isn't quite conscious, but this behavior is certainly far closer to what a conscious entity is capable of than any of the strawman examples people typically come up with.

[!Kaggen]

I thought of a scenario on the way to work today that will hopefully clarify for some people why machines can actually "know" something.

Suppose you are an AI programmer working on a game. Suppose you want the AI to behave a certain way, for instance something like running to the player when they are low on health because the player might give them a health pack or something ( legal disclaimer -- this is not an actual scenario in any game I am working on ).

The easiest way to do this, and the way that all current game AI will have it implemented, is for the programmer to just write a bunch of code somewhere in the AI logic that is tantamount to:

1) Check my health
2) If it is low, see if I can path to the player
3) Try to go to the player
4) Maybe play some kind of animation and voiceover to ask the player for a healthpack

Now in this scenario, I don't think anybody would claim that the AI knows anything at all. It is quite obvious that every bit of what the AI is doing was explicitly put there by the programmer. This isn't even close to a conscious behavior.

However there are other ways this could be implemented. Those are much harder, and less predictable, which is why they aren't ever done, but nevertheless an example might be something like the following.

a) program an underlying drive to be healthy in the AI. This is complicated but doable so I won't get into it here ( unless someone wants to know, I can elaborate in another post ), but in any case it isn't part of the "knowledge" of the AI so it is fine if it is completely programmed. This is similar to our drive to avoid pain, avoid hunger, etc.

b) program a system into the AI so it can remember arbitrary sequences of events and make inferences between them. This is also complicated but doable, there are many architectures that would work. And again, it is fine that this is "programmed."

c) put the AI in the world, lower it's health, and then give it a health pack. Over and over. In many different cases.

And you are done.

What happens in the AI logic, then, is this:

1) Check my health. < it is low >
2) If it is low, prioritize finding a way to bring it back up. < I allocate CPU resources to this task >
3) Search my memory to see if any sequences of events in the past ever resulted in my health increasing < I find some events, the player giving me a healthpack >
4) If I find any such events, search my memory for other events that are related to those events, so I can build a sequence of events that might take me from my current state to getting my health increased, assuming those past events are repeatable < the player gave me a healthpack > < he was close to me > < he isn't close to me now > < moving towards something makes me closer to it >
5) Once I have generated a sequence that I think will work, I should try it < I start moving towards the player >

Now of course I embellished that with human readable words, the AI doesn't use "he" or "towards" or whatever, it just executes code. But the essential thing here is that the programmer NEVER told the AI to go to the player when it had low health. The AI learned that from being in the world and having things happen to it.

In this latter case, I would argue that the AI genuinely "knows" something. It isn't quite conscious, but this behavior is certainly far closer to what a conscious entity is capable of than any of the strawman examples people typically come up with.

Now introduce something which is good for ones health but always leads to death, life. I wonder what your AI would do?

[tensordyne]

So, argument from ignorance? And before you protest, you are the one who brought up Searle.

Saying I do not know is always a safe position.

[tensordyne]

Searle's Chinese Room argument is pretty much designed to seduce our intuition. Whether that was intentional, or merely the best argument he could produce to shore up his position, I can't say, but I suspect the latter.

It's only when you examine it with serious rigour that you notice that (a) it's not logically valid, and (b) the scenario hides some huge mathematical absurdities. (Searle fails to note, for example, that the Room would need to be larger than the observable Universe, or that it would operate on timescales that would make continental drift look like hummingbirds mating.)

I never completely liked Searle's Chinese Room myself. He was trying to get across an idea of 'understanding' that is not so easily captured by the example he gave. Really it makes a mess of things unfortunately.

[PixyMisa]

Now introduce something which is good for ones health but always leads to death, life. I wonder what your AI would do?
Die.

[tensordyne]

It seems that the dualists cannot fathom the idea that consciousness is physical, that is, due to physically connected matter. Build up a brain from atoms to molecules to neurons to neuron networks, and still dualists seem to insist that consciousness cannot appear unless there's some essential ethereal force, like EM and quantum entanglement, which works in the space between particles.

Why does our intuition insist on this? Why is the idea so seductive?

Category error. In terms of Epistemology there is the abstract mind (think mathematics and such) and sensation (that other supposedly dread substance 'monists' shun away without reason that involves seeing red, etc.). In terms of the models we get from using the epistemology of science, we do not have as yet an account for how elements in the theory (particles, neurons, etc.) lead to consciousness.

I am not a dualist or a monist, I am an Empiricist who is open to whatever models are necessary to predict as many phenomena as possible, in as reliably a consistent manner as possible.

[tensordyne]

Special pleading and a false dichotomy.

Can you just tell if something is radioactive?
or emits in the ultraviolet?
Or can you see the ring nebula in Lyra?


I can not tell if something is ultraviolet, is radio-active or look with the unaided eye to see M57 (with an average telescope, sure). That was never at issue. Those are all things covered quite well by, let's say, conventional science.

The example I gave in the post before this one was not directly addressed. It concerned the fact that if you probe someone's brain and ask them what they are feeling sensation wise, that you do not have direct access to those sensations yourself, hence, studying consciousness itself is different than studying a rock.

We do not have a consciousness telescope that we all can look in to, so that we all agree that right now Virgil is seeing red, or whatever. We can look into a telescope and agree a star is red though. That is a difference. Address that, not these silly examples you gave.

Speaking of my purported use of logical fallacy:

There was no analysis given on how there could be other options that were not given to help with the false dichotomy claim. This claim does not make a lot of sense anyways. I was not presenting two seemingly opposing choices, I was stating why I think the conventional method of doing science is not completely appropriate to studying consciousness (although it might be the best we can have...).

As for special pleading:


Special pleading is a form of spurious argumentation where a position in a dispute introduces favorable details or excludes unfavorable details by alleging a need to apply additional considerations without proper criticism of these considerations themselves.


What considerations am I not considering without proper criticism?

Please stop throwing out logical fallacies unless you are sure you are using them correctly. It is a waste of time.


Seriously, you have made either an over simplification or a false dichotomy.


Seriously, you guys need to chill the hell out and try, just try, to understand what the other person is thinking?

[tensordyne]

Again, if you want to, you will have to use the terms as they are used in neurology, not in common usage. :)

Sensation is defined as the processes in the sense organs, except for the vestibular sense which is an amalgam of kinesthetic, cochlear sensations and visual perceptions, and maybe more as well. It is sort of a perception in that sense rather than a 'sense', in strict terms.

Perception is the brain events such as the creation of the visual field or the auditory field.

Sensation is the actual biochemical processes in the sense organs, perception is the complex processing in the cortex regions.


I will not be shoe-horned. All of the above is fine so long as we are talking about various medical models. When talking about sensation itself, the what it is like to be something, it misses the boat. You do what you can though.

The above takes something that is subjective and puts a framework around how to describe objectively various processes that we think lead to subjective experiences. If the above is the only thing you think about when considering sensation then your conceptual landscape has some missing pieces.


Again it would be helpful to use the defined terms as they are defined. The sensation of red is many different events in the retina of the eye, it involves the triggering of certain photoreceptors, and the not triggering of other photoreceptors, the mixing of saturation between the color receptors and the the brightness/contrast of the rods. In this case I think you are likely referring to what would be termed 'visual perception'.


Again, models (that I even agree with, surprised?). The sensation of red is the undeniable self-evident fact that we are trying to figure out how works using science. The model is not the same as the sensation though (one category error of monists). If you want to talk models, I would be more than happy to (actually interested even because I think you have looked into the biology topics enough to have more expertise than I do about that subject).


Again it seems you are talking about teh actual process reffered to as perception. the 'sensations' are more like set values of interaction bits which are also analog amalgams of different photoreceptors.

No we do not at this time know why we perceive the seven/three major 'colors' as opposed to stippling , crosshatching or other possible ways that the 'colors' could appear to us.


Yes, interesting points.


However there is no reason that I am aware to think that it is anything other than biochemicals and neurological events.


Not sure what you mean. That sensation is anything other than ...? In terms of models, yep, that is what it most likely is (or something similar). As you noted though, we do not have an appropriate model as yet to explain the colors we perceive and so on. I hope that day comes before I die.


Which is why I ask you, what else might there be?


In terms of what?


And I asked you specifically, what else would there be that could not be explained by neurological process.

they are not 'correlated' with consciousness, they are consciousness as far as we can tell.


The last sentence is a cop out. When you can tell me how we should put neurons together in certain patterns (or something objectively similar) so that the color green is perceived by some entity (the subjective sense of perceive, which is part of the problem with talking to monists, EVERYTHING is objective because the idea of subjective does not even exist to them), then everything is kosher.

Neurons are not consciousness. Neurons are neurons. Neurons might give rise to consciousness, but they are most certainly not consciousness. There is a difference.


That is not what asked you at all, and you pointedly ignored my question.


I do not ever mean to ignore a question. Well, I am partial to CEMI, but other than that, when I said, when we do figure out consciousness it will not be what anyone expects, I meant it. I am someone and therefore I can not know what to expect. It is a guess though, but looking over the historical patterns in science, it seems like that is the most probable outcome.

A problem this momentous when finally solved usually takes a form no one expected. That has happened quite a bit in fact.

Really though, I have optimism for the scientific method so I say carry on the good fight. My guess that consciousness will turn out to be something no one expects is irrelevant to the current functioning of science.

[Dancing David]

Tensordyne, my part in our discussion is at an end. Arrivederci

[!Kaggen]

For Pixy Misa http://img.tapatalk.com/290687f4-6509-1ace.jpg

[tensordyne]

Tensordyne, my part in our discussion is at an end. Arrivederci

Your prerogative and I respect that. Since it is our discussion, I guess my part is at an end as well. Take it easy Dancing David.

[rocketdodger]

Now introduce something which is good for ones health but always leads to death, life. I wonder what your AI would do?

What do we do?

You keep asking what a machine would do, without ever bothering to critically evaluate what you yourself would do.

[Belz...]

For Pixy Misa http://img.tapatalk.com/290687f4-6509-1ace.jpg

Wow. It seems deep and all but... aren't things things ?

[dlorde]

Seriously, you guys need to chill the hell out and try, just try, to understand what the other person is thinking?

Wow, there goes my irony meter...

But there are plenty more where that came from :D

This article may help explain what color 'qualia' actually are, in an interesting way, with striking examples: Chimerical Colors (http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/Churchland-chimeric-colors.pdf).

Part of the activity of the network of neurons in your head is you (i.e. your mental identity, sense of self, consciousness) - the patterns of neuronal activation are not causing you to feel things, they are you feeling things.

[tensordyne]

Wow. It seems deep and all but... aren't things things ?

About the best question I have seen in a while. Of course things are things, but we use that in two senses.

In one sense we think of (physical) things as being out there, independent of us. In another sense though, things are perceptual abstractions. What makes a chair a chair besides the abstract idea that when something is experienced in the waking state and visually has at least three legs and a sitting area, that it acts in various ways called chair, that it is a chair? Both are abstractions, so 'things' are abstractions.

Here is my question for pretty much everything you think you know is true, which is, "How do you know it is true?" I am not asking this rhetorically either. If you look at science and ask that question for a particular model, it comes back to two main types of concepts as you break the model down: math and observation.

So, how do you determine models in science? How do you determine their validity? Let me know how you think.

[tensordyne]

Wow. It seems deep and all but... aren't things things ?

Things are abstractions.

[tensordyne]

Interesting quote from the paper you gave dlorde.


The qualitative character of subjective experience is often claimed to be beyond the
predictive or explanatory powers of any physical theory (Chalmers, 1996; Huxley,
1866; Jackson, 1982; Levine, 1983; Nagel, 1974).


I do not believe that subjective experience is beyond the applicability of a physical theory (or at the very least, I see no reason to think that is true).

[Belz...]

About the best question I have seen in a while. Of course things are things, but we use that in two senses.

I know that. But it's so unskeptical to take some things and distinguish them from other things because they "feel" different, better or "special". It makes these things immune to skeptical inquiry, and it's definitely not a good thing in a rational discussion.

[PixyMisa]

The example I gave in the post before this one was not directly addressed. It concerned the fact that if you probe someone's brain and ask them what they are feeling sensation wise, that you do not have direct access to those sensations yourself, hence, studying consciousness itself is different than studying a rock.
You don't have direct access to anything.

Seriously, you guys need to chill the hell out and try, just try, to understand what the other person is thinking?
We're chill. We understand. You're wrong.

[annnnoid]

No, :D

The study of consciousness is exactly like the study of anything else.


Quite obviously not! Everything else is a model. Consciousness is the only phenomena we can experience the actual reality of (do you model ‘meaning’?...no, you actually are meaning).

You don't have direct access to anything.



Wrong. You have direct access to you.

Right.

Right.

Yes. Of course, that includes computers.

They are part of reality. They exist in minds, and minds are brain function, and brains are quite obviously real.

Of course, every part of that sentence, and everything that follows, is entirely false.

There is: The very moment you start thinking there's more than one kind of stuff, you're wrong, your ideas are irredeemable, and must be discarded.

Abstractions must be instantiated to be considered, and the instantiation is physical. It can't be anything else. There is simply no problem to be solved here.


And where is it I’ve suggested that there is more than one kind of stuff? And what, by the way, is the meaning of ‘physical’?...and is there one that does not inevitably veer into metaphysics? Y’know Pixy, it’s amazing the degree to which you twist and trip over your own words in order to prop up your faltering ideology. This, it may enlighten you to know, is the signature of a zealot, not a scientist.

In response to the rest of it, I’ll ask you one simple question: If mathematics did not exist, would reality / the universe be any different? I do not mean in the trivial sense…as in if it was not discovered / created by human beings…I mean if it did not exist, period.

…and lest I forget…you claim


There is


….but (however hard I look)…there is not, at least, not anywhere in your post. Perhaps you could provide it…this explanation (not theory…explanation).

[PixyMisa]

Quite obviously not! Everything else is a model. Consciousness is the only phenomena we can experience the actual reality of (do you model ‘meaning’?...no, you actually are meaning).
Nonsense! Look at the references to Theory of Mind earlier in the thread by tensordyne. The context was rubbish, but what Theory of Mind is, is modelling other people's consciousness. And the point is, we all do that.

Wrong. You have direct access to you.
Nope.

And where is it I’ve suggested that there is more than one kind of stuff?
Do you accept that mind is a material process? If not, you are asserting that there is more than one kind of stuff. If you do, then you agree with me.

So... Which is it to be?

And what, by the way, is the meaning of ‘physical’?
Stuff that interacts with other stuff.

...and is there one that does not inevitably veer into metaphysics?
Yes.

Y’know Pixy, it’s amazing the degree to which you twist and trip over your own words in order to prop up your faltering ideology.
Sorry, no. The fact that your worldview is threatened doesn't make science any less powerful.

In response to the rest of it, I’ll ask you one simple question: If mathematics did not exist, would reality / the universe be any different?
If you can show that this question has any meaning at all, I will be delighted to answer it.

…and lest I forget…you claim

[Misquote snipped]

….but (however hard I look)…there is not, at least, not anywhere in your post. Perhaps you could provide it…this explanation (not theory…explanation).
How nice of you to remove the explanation from your quote and then wail about being unable to find it.

So, again: The very moment you start thinking there's more than one kind of stuff, you're wrong, your ideas are irredeemable, and must be discarded.

Abstractions must be instantiated to be considered, and the instantiation is physical. It can't be anything else. There is simply no problem to be solved here.

[tensordyne]

I know that. But it's so unskeptical to take some things and distinguish them from other things because they "feel" different, better or "special". It makes these things immune to skeptical inquiry, and it's definitely not a good thing in a rational discussion.

I do not understand the idea above. We are not talking about feel like in feelings (sad, happy, mad, etc...), we are talking about this thing is black, and that red, kind of thing. If you can not make discriminatory judgments based on perception, I do not know where we are in terms of even going to the grocery store.

[PixyMisa]

I do not understand the idea above. We are not talking about feel like in feelings (sad, happy, mad, etc...), we are talking about this thing is black, and that red, kind of thing. If you can not make discriminatory judgments based on perception, I do not know where we are in terms of even going to the grocery store.
Yes, you missed the point.

The point is, there aren't things and then other... non-things, as !Kaggen would have it. There's just one sort of stuff, all accessible to science in exactly the same way. Your consciousness is just stuff. It has no special standing, and doesn't require us to change anything in the way we study it, compared with the way we study astrophysics or plate tectonics or the digestive tracts of albatrosses.

[Zeuzzz]

Yes, you missed the point.

The point is, there aren't things and then other... non-things, as !Kaggen would have it. There's just one sort of stuff, all accessible to science in exactly the same way. Your consciousness is just stuff. It has no special standing, and doesn't require us to change anything in the way we study it, compared with the way we study astrophysics or plate tectonics or the digestive tracts of albatrosses.


"Your consciousness is just stuff"

You have made a definitive proclamation there.

Now, define 'stuff' in the context you used it [consciousness]

You need to open your mind, so a little bit of your brain will fall out, before you can start differentiating between the two.

It's a conceptual realization, which is not a [currently] scientifically definable phenomenon.

[tensordyne]

Yes, you missed the point.

The point is, there aren't things and then other... non-things, as !Kaggen would have it. There's just one sort of stuff, all accessible to science in exactly the same way. Your consciousness is just stuff. It has no special standing, and doesn't require us to change anything in the way we study it, compared with the way we study astrophysics or plate tectonics or the digestive tracts of albatrosses.

Things are abstractions. The idea that there is a universe out there, outside of our senses, that is an abstraction. Your idea of there being just one kind of stuff, that is an abstraction. Cart before horse, time and time again. I think I will take a cue from Dancing David and bow out conversing with you. Pipe Organs do not usually change their tune, after all.

Auf wiedersehen.

[PixyMisa]

"Your consciousness is just stuff"

You have made a definitive proclamation there.
Indeed. And this general point is the foundation of all science, and this specific point is the foundation of all cognitive science.

This is not something I came up with. This is science. If you don't like it, take it up with science. If you disagree that it's science, well, sorry, you're just wrong.

Now, define 'stuff' in the context you used it [consciousness]
Once again: There's only one kind of stuff. What do you think the definition is?

You need to open your mind, so a little bit of your brain will fall out, before you can start differentiating between the two.
No. You need to stop accepting fairy tales as fact.

It's a conceptual realization, which is not a [currently] scientifically definable phenomenon.
As above.

[tensordyne]

Indeed. And this general point is the foundation of all science, and this specific point is the foundation of all cognitive science.

This is not something I came up with. This is science. If you don't like it, take it up with science. If you disagree that it's science, well, sorry, you're just wrong.


Your ignorance is astounding. There are multiple philosophies of science. If I disagree with your philosophy of science, I am just doing what lots of other people have done who have accredited higher level degrees, do not believe in god and in all likelihood are a lot smarter than you are.

Plus, saying if you disagree you are wrong and not giving analysis why is tantamount to acting like a child.

How do you know there is one substance?

[punshhh]

Well, that's good to hear.As an abstraction derived from our limited experience of existing. It cannot tell us anything about existence, or form the basis for an ontology. As such your monist "stuff" is entirely unfalsifiable. Nothing more than naval gazing.



Certainly there are some who cannot agree with my conclusions.

None of you have ever made a coherent objection to my assumptions, though, so that's not my problem.Incoherent in who's eyes?

[PixyMisa]

As an abstraction derived from our limited experience of existing. It cannot tell us anything about existence, or form the basis for an ontology. As such your monist "stuff" is entirely unfalsifiable. Nothing more than naval gazing.
I've already shown that this is false, and explained in detail how we know it is false. So, no.

Incoherent in who's eyes?
We're talking about logic here. If you are working with different principles of logic to the rest of us, I can't help you at all.

[tensordyne]

As an abstraction derived from our limited experience of existing. It cannot tell us anything about existence, or form the basis for an ontology. As such your monist "stuff" is entirely unfalsifiable. Nothing more than naval gazing.


Exactly.

[Belz...]

I do not understand the idea above. We are not talking about feel like in feelings (sad, happy, mad, etc...), we are talking about this thing is black, and that red, kind of thing. If you can not make discriminatory judgments based on perception, I do not know where we are in terms of even going to the grocery store.

I'm sorry, what are you driving at ?

[Belz...]

Your ignorance is astounding.

:i:

There are multiple philosophies of science.

Name two.

Plus, saying if you disagree you are wrong and not giving analysis why is tantamount to acting like a child.

Except you've been SHOWN why you're wrong. There's no need to repeat all that ad nauseam.

How do you know there is one substance?

Evidence. There is no evidence of any "other" reality so to argue that there may be one because we don't know conclusively is to argue from ignorance, a fallacy.

[tensordyne]

Name two.


Mine, PixyMisa's, Popper's, Instumentalism, Deductive-Nomological, Coherentism... You do have access to internet search engines, right Belz...? Wikipedia is also helpful in this regard.


Except you've been SHOWN why you're wrong. There's no need to repeat all that ad nauseam.


I have yet to see a falsifiable claim as per this one substance idea. Saying generalities such as "it fits science to date", "if this wasn't the case than science would be wrong", are not falsifiable statements. They are not even wrong.


Evidence. There is no evidence of any "other" reality so to argue that there may be one because we don't know conclusively is to argue from ignorance, a fallacy.

You mistake arguing from ignorance for calling for evidence (or in this case, calling for a falsifiable method). Remember, I AM NOT THE ONE MAKING THE CLAIM! The claimant needs to show there is evidence, or even that there could be evidence.

From the above, by following your logic, if you can not show that there is anything other then one 'substance' by experiment or observation, it is not science. It is metaphysical navel gazing.

[Dancing David]

Quite obviously not! Everything else is a model. Consciousness is the only phenomena we can experience the actual reality of (do you model ‘meaning’?...no, you actually are meaning).


That is a nice assumption, just asserted and not a reason for a false dichotomy.

'Meaning' except for the 'purpose and meaning to your life' and even that, is a set of self referential idiomatic socially constructs of communication using symbols to external referents.

"Meaning' only comes through the interaction of two communicants.

[Dancing David]

As an abstraction derived from our limited experience of existing. It cannot tell us anything about existence, or form the basis for an ontology. As such your monist "stuff" is entirely unfalsifiable. Nothing more than naval gazing.

Do you use electricity, falsify the em force would you?

Falsify gravity?

Please.

Dualism resolves to monism, period.
Full stop.




Incoherent in who's eyes?

[tensordyne]

Do you use electricity, falsify the em force would you?


Quantum Electrodynamics? Plus, you do not falsify a phenomena, you falsify a theory.


Falsify gravity?


Again, you do not falsify phenomena, you falsify models. For instance, Newtonian Gravity Model predictions are falsified by various observations when relative velocity or mass are too high. An examples of this is, for instance, the Perihelion of Mercury (GPS anyone?).


Dualism resolves to monism, period.
Full stop.

Dualism and monism are both ontological philosophies about the ultimate nature of reality (hence, they are not scientific). I am an Empiricist. My philosophy of science is to use math as well as observation and experiment to evaluate and refine various models. If you interpret that as monism, dualism, or whatever, I really could not care less.

[Belz...]

Mine, PixyMisa's, Popper's, Instumentalism, Deductive-Nomological, Coherentism... You do have access to internet search engines, right Belz...? Wikipedia is also helpful in this regard.

No, I'm sorry. I don't do your work for you.

I have yet to see a falsifiable claim as per this one substance idea.

Speaking of science, you seem to have no idea where the burden of evidence lies.

You mistake arguing from ignorance for calling for evidence

No. "How do you know there is only one substance" where there is no evidence for more than one is definitely argument from ignorance.

[PixyMisa]

Your ignorance is astounding. There are multiple philosophies of science.
Irrelevant. There's only one scientific method.

If I disagree with your philosophy of science, I am just doing what lots of other people have done who have accredited higher level degrees, do not believe in god and in all likelihood are a lot smarter than you are.
No, it just means you're wrong.

How do you know there is one substance?
I never said that. That's just you. I don't know why you persist in this bizarre distortion.

[Mr. Scott]

PixyMisa, what will have to happen to make the dualists admit to having egg on their facades?
What behavior of a conscious machine could accomplish this? Something likely to make dualists say, "gosh, we were wrong. That machine is conscious."

[Belz...]

PixyMisa, what will have to happen to make the dualists admit to having egg on their facades?
What behavior of a conscious machine could accomplish this? Something likely to make dualists say, "gosh, we were wrong. That machine is conscious."

Won't happen. The only way to determine consciousness is through observing behaviour, so they will always claim that the machine is not conscious.

[Dancing David]

PixyMisa, what will have to happen to make the dualists admit to having egg on their facades?
What behavior of a conscious machine could accomplish this? Something likely to make dualists say, "gosh, we were wrong. That machine is conscious."

When the machine argues for the irreducible nature of qualia...

[!Kaggen]

PixyMisa, what will have to happen to make the dualists admit to having egg on their facades?
What behavior of a conscious machine could accomplish this? Something likely to make dualists say, "gosh, we were wrong. That machine is conscious."

I am no dualist but I am a skeptic of machine consciousness so this is what I have already posted would make me believe a robot was conscious.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEFCQRwj28w&sns=em

[Belz...]

I am no dualist but I am a skeptic of machine consciousness so this is what I have already posted would make me believe a robot was conscious.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEFCQRwj28w&sns=em

I'm a skeptic of machine flight. Planes ? Not real flight.

[tensordyne]

Irrelevant. There's only one scientific method.


There is only one scientific method. There are multiple philosophies of science, which was the topic of discussion, therefore it is relevant, and therefore you are wrong.

See PixyMisa, I didn't just say you were wrong like you did below and in other communications, I gave reasons and then the last thing I said was you are wrong. Give it a try sometime, it could be quite a refreshing change.


No, it just means you're wrong.


Again, the childish act of saying your wrong and not giving analysis why.


I never said that. That's just you. I don't know why you persist in this bizarre distortion.

Post #1052

We know how the Universe works. We know that there's only one sort of stuff, and it follows a consistent set of laws. We know that mind arises as a process in matter, and not any other way.

[Belz...]

There is only one scientific method. There are multiple philosophies of science, which was the topic of discussion

No, the topic is consciousness. How does the "different philosophies of science" have anything to do with the topic ?

[tsig]

Of which model are you referring to?

I think you are referring to the general ideas associated with neurological models to date?

One thing I would like to know myself is when and how the physics of biology leads to the sensation of red. If you happen to know that it would be great.

Of course, some do not even know what the sensation of red means because they will make it all about mechanics and nowhere about sensation itself (which is my main point, but if you want to talk specifics of certain models I am all ears).

I could be wrong that a neurological model does not already exist that gives the correlates of consciousness, but are we not still supposed to be trying to figure out what NCC's are, or did I miss a memo or something?

Or is this a framework question in disguise? Doesn't matter. I will let the relevant scientists do their job on this one. I will let you know when they have any kind of answer to the questions I am pondering here. For the moment, as far as I can tell, they are not there yet.

You want to talk about the sensation of red but not the mechanics of the sensation? You're already begging the question by assuming that the sensation is somehow different than the activity of the brain.

[Mr. Scott]

I am no dualist but I am a skeptic of machine consciousness so this is what I have already posted would make me believe a robot was conscious.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEFCQRwj28w&sns=em

Specifically, what about that would make you believe a machine was conscious?

[tsig]

I will not be shoe-horned. All of the above is fine so long as we are talking about various medical models. When talking about sensation itself, the what it is like to be something, it misses the boat. You do what you can though.

The above takes something that is subjective and puts a framework around how to describe objectively various processes that we think lead to subjective experiences. If the above is the only thing you think about when considering sensation then your conceptual landscape has some missing pieces.



Again, models (that I even agree with, surprised?). The sensation of red is the undeniable self-evident fact that we are trying to figure out how works using science. The model is not the same as the sensation though (one category error of monists). If you want to talk models, I would be more than happy to (actually interested even because I think you have looked into the biology topics enough to have more expertise than I do about that subject).



Yes, interesting points.



Not sure what you mean. That sensation is anything other than ...? In terms of models, yep, that is what it most likely is (or something similar). As you noted though, we do not have an appropriate model as yet to explain the colors we perceive and so on. I hope that day comes before I die.



In terms of what?



The last sentence is a cop out. When you can tell me how we should put neurons together in certain patterns (or something objectively similar) so that the color green is perceived by some entity (the subjective sense of perceive, which is part of the problem with talking to monists, EVERYTHING is objective because the idea of subjective does not even exist to them), then everything is kosher.

Neurons are not consciousness. Neurons are neurons. Neurons might give rise to consciousness, but they are most certainly not consciousness. There is a difference.



I do not ever mean to ignore a question. Well, I am partial to CEMI, but other than that, when I said, when we do figure out consciousness it will not be what anyone expects, I meant it. I am someone and therefore I can not know what to expect. It is a guess though, but looking over the historical patterns in science, it seems like that is the most probable outcome.

A problem this momentous when finally solved usually takes a form no one expected. That has happened quite a bit in fact.

Really though, I have optimism for the scientific method so I say carry on the good fight. My guess that consciousness will turn out to be something no one expects is irrelevant to the current functioning of science.

As an abstraction derived from our limited experience of existing. It cannot tell us anything about existence, or form the basis for an ontology. As such your monist "stuff" is entirely unfalsifiable. Nothing more than naval gazing.



Incoherent in who's eyes?

Exactly.

You just shoe horned yourself.

:sdl:

[tensordyne]

Exactly.

You just shoe horned yourself.

:sdl:

That was an odd and pointless post.

[tensordyne]

No, the topic is consciousness. How does the "different philosophies of science" have anything to do with the topic ?

You ask some of the most interesting questions Belz.... The topic of this thread is consciousness, the topic at that point in the discussion was philosophy of science.

Depending on your philosophy of science you will investigate consciousness in different ways. If you miss the concept of consciousness as sensation and make everything about one stuff, then it is my contention you are missing something and the consciousness idea you will study will not be the same as the one I am interested in.

I think that covers it.

[tensordyne]

You want to talk about the sensation of red but not the mechanics of the sensation? You're already begging the question by assuming that the sensation is somehow different than the activity of the brain.

Very well put above.

No, I definitely want to talk about the mechanics of the sensation of red (and every other form of perception). I am 100% for that. As far as I can tell though, certain posters do not even understand what the word sensation means (PixyMisa).

I want a map between the physical world and sensation. I want to be able to know that when a system is put into such and such an arrangement, that that causes the system to experience x. I most definitely want that.

I do think quite a lot of the mechanisms responsible for sensation reside in the brain.

[Piggy]

Been away, just saw this thread.

I'm not going to get into another who-shot-John with the "Flock of Seagulls" here, but I do want to point out that the poll presents a false choice between, essentially, the soul model and the data-processing model.

Both are wrong.

[tensordyne]

Been away, just saw this thread.

I'm not going to get into another who-shot-John with the "Flock of Seagulls" here, but I do want to point out that the poll presents a false choice between, essentially, the soul model and the data-processing model.

Both are wrong.

Yep.

[annnnoid]

Been away, just saw this thread.

I'm not going to get into another who-shot-John with the "Flock of Seagulls" here, but I do want to point out that the poll presents a false choice between, essentially, the soul model and the data-processing model.

Both are wrong.


Hi Piggy. You objection is not surprising given that the poll was authored by an ardent computationlist. But it’s only JREF (the powers-that-be rarely turn their gaze this way [but who knows who hides behind what moniker!])…a murky place where dubious meaning haunts the forums like incense smoke wafting through the crypts of ancient tombs. The dead wake on its toxic fume…believing themselves risen. But revelation is nothing if not illusory, lies masquerading as truth midst the waking dream.

…sorry…I just felt I had to say that. Maybe I’ve been reading too much Pixy recently. Addling the old brain.

On another topic completely…you don’t suppose you could coax Wasp back from wherever he’s vanished to. I’m sure I was on the verge of cracking one of his points …and then he just left. Not fair.

[tensordyne]

Here is why Dennett is an unknowing con artist:

http://philpapers.org/rec/DERDRS.

Unfortunately, it is on SpringerLink, so it is subscription only. I hope there is someone here though with access that can review it (any philosophy academicians out there?). I emailed the author for a copy myself some time ago, which he gave me. It is on another computer I do not have access to right now. I do remember it was pretty damning as a review of Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained". Showing how Dennett uses many of the same word play tricks that Freud used.

I hate pay for subscription academic journals, it is against the whole point of science and academic study. Let me know in PM if you have access to it. I would be curious what you think of the paper as well.

Has anyone read "The Embodied Mind"? I have not yet so I am curious what anyone thinks on the matter.

[PixyMisa]

There is only one scientific method. There are multiple philosophies of science
It's your topic of discussion. It's irrelevant.

See PixyMisa, I didn't just say you were wrong like you did below and in other communications, I gave reasons and then the last thing I said was you are wrong.
Try reading what I already wrote. I demonstrated that you were wrong, and then you just posted the wrong again.

Again, the childish act of saying your wrong and not giving analysis why.
No. I showed exactly why you are wrong, and then you persisted with the same invalid argument. It's not my job to correct you in detail every time. You can, of course, ask a question instead of whining.

Post #1052
What about post 1052? I never said what you are claiming, I've corrected you multiple times, and yet you persist in this bizarre distortion.

Why?

[PixyMisa]

No, I definitely want to talk about the mechanics of the sensation of red (and every other form of perception). I am 100% for that. As far as I can tell though, certain posters do not even understand what the word sensation means (PixyMisa).
I know very well what it means. I just don't ascribe magical properties to it.

I want a map between the physical world and sensation. I want to be able to know that when a system is put into such and such an arrangement, that that causes the system to experience x. I most definitely want that.
That rather misses the point, though; it's still the Cartesian Theatre. What we need is to know the details of the process that is the experience.

I do think quite a lot of the mechanisms responsible for sensation reside in the brain.
Where does the rest of it reside? Or are you referring to the peripheral nervous system there, in which case I have no problem?

[Mr. Scott]

the poll presents a false choice between, essentially, the soul model and the data-processing model.

Both are wrong.

I didn't imply anything about an afterlife in the poll, did I?

Write a poll text that you would vote for.

[Piggy]

On another topic completely…you don’t suppose you could coax Wasp back from wherever he’s vanished to. I’m sure I was on the verge of cracking one of his points …and then he just left. Not fair.

I wish I could, but I don't know how to get in touch with him.

I don't really know why he bailed on the forum, when all he had to do was withdraw from the ------- match he'd gotten himself into.

I keep hoping he'll get over it.

I once left -- not on one of my sabbaticals into real life, but because I felt I had been profoundly hurt -- but eventually I returned. Maybe he will, too.

[Piggy]

I didn't imply anything about an afterlife in the poll, did I?

Write a poll text that you would vote for.

I didn't imply anything about an afterlife, either.

But the false choice you present is between a dualistic model (which is a soul model, whether that soul is mortal or immortal) and a data model.

The problem with the former should be obvious.

The problem with the latter is that there is no "data" in your brain. Unless you also want to say there's "data" in your liver, in which case the term becomes trivial.

[!Kaggen]

Specifically, what about that would make you believe a machine was conscious?

This

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PhsK_XTIMc0&sns=em

[Piggy]

I do remember it was pretty damning as a review of Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained". Showing how Dennett uses many of the same word play tricks that Freud used.

Dennett spends much of that book railing (correctly) against the Cartesian theater, then ends up replacing it with his own version of it, in which the primitive Brain A serves as the theater for the more recently evolved Brain B homunculus.

It sounds like a pretty good argument at first, until you realize what he's done, and that he offers no explanation whatsoever for why it should be that the interaction of more primitive and more recently evolved areas of the brain should cause the body to hallucinate.

That question is simply ignored.

Which, at the end of the day, is the core problem with all philosophical approaches to consciousness.

[Mr. Scott]

I didn't imply anything about an afterlife, either.

But the false choice you present is between a dualistic model (which is a soul model, whether that soul is mortal or immortal) and a data model.

The problem with the former should be obvious.

The problem with the latter is that there is no "data" in your brain. Unless you also want to say there's "data" in your liver, in which case the term becomes trivial.

I figured "soul" definitely implied the afterlife, but I guess not to you.

Write a poll text that you would vote for, that hasn't a problem to you. Heck, let's see you write a set of poll choices on the topic that are free of problems.

[Piggy]

Write a poll text that you would vote for, that hasn't a problem to you. Heck, let's see you write a set of poll choices on the topic that are free of problems.

* Consciousness is the result of the physical activity of the brain.

How's that?

[PixyMisa]

* Consciousness is the result of the physical activity of the brain.

How's that?
The only problem is that it's not immediately clear how this is distinct from option 1.

[Piggy]

The only problem is that it's not immediately clear how this is distinct from option 1.

It certainly should be.

The absence of any reference to "data" and the lack of a claim that "general purpose computers" might be conscious stand out.

The fact that this is invisible to you speaks volumes.

But I don't intend to get into any arguments with you on this thread, Pixy. I don't think we have anything new to say to each other, just like I don't have anything new to say to the Jesus Myth folks.

If you're not at all swayed by the fact that no one doing research on consciousness agrees with you, that they in fact emphatically contradict your claims, and that your definition of consciousness is utterly useless in brain research, then I don't see how anything I say to you will have any impact at all.

[PixyMisa]

It certainly should be.

The absence of any reference to "data" and the lack of a claim that "general purpose computers" might be conscious stand out.

The fact that this is invisible to you speaks volumes.
It's not invisible to me at all. Nice try though.

It's just not clear. So try clarifying.

If you're not at all swayed by the fact that no one doing research on consciousness agrees with you, that they in fact emphatically contradict your claims, and that your definition of consciousness is utterly useless in brain research, then I don't see how anything I say to you will have any impact at all.
Sorry, but you're living in a dream world. My position coincides precisely with mainstream neuroscience. Yours assumes magic - magic without even a defined behaviour.

[Piggy]

My position coincides precisely with mainstream neuroscience.

Yeah. Right.

Despite the fact that mainstream graduate-level neuroscience textbooks openly contradict your ideas, and that your definition of consciousness is used by exactly no one in the field (because it's useless). Or the fact that you cannot provide any evidence for your claims to the contrary.

Like I said, man, there's no use in us going around about this.

You've convinced yourself. That's fine. There's nothing I can do about that.

You can continue to expound on your Godel-Escher-Bach philosophy, I won't stop you.

Maybe I can introduce some actual brain-centered information on consciousness here, but I don't expect you to get on board.

[PixyMisa]

Despite the fact that mainstream graduate-level neuroscience textbooks openly contradict your ideas
[citation needed]

[Piggy]

[citation needed]

That's been done in other threads, as you know.

So if you want a ------- match, why don't you cite someone who agrees with you?

Good night, sweet prince.

[PixyMisa]

That's been done in other threads, as you know.
Nope. You have never backed up any part of your position. You haven't even been able to coherently define your position. Nor have you found anything that cogently disputes my position.

Mind is brain function.
The brain is a computer.
Computation is substrate-neutral.

Therefore, computer programs can be conscious.

None of this is the subject of rational dispute.

[tensordyne]

That rather misses the point, though; it's still the Cartesian Theatre. What we need is to know the details of the process that is the experience.


Tell me your method in general terms on how you wish to do this, if you can.


Where does the rest of it reside? Or are you referring to the peripheral nervous system there, in which case I have no problem?

Yes.

[tensordyne]

Write a poll text that you would vote for, that hasn't a problem to you. Heck, let's see you write a set of poll choices on the topic that are free of problems.

Here is my list:


Computational Basis
Physical Basis
Some combination of physical and computational basis
Soul basis
Hamster on a running wheel basis.


You have to have something like the last item on the list for comedy purposes.

[PixyMisa]

Tell me your method in general terms on how you wish to do this, if you can.
Basically, this is computational neuroscience. Examine the function of the brain at all levels, model it in detail, study the behaviours exhibited by the brain and the model.

A sufficiently detailed computer model will exhibit precisely the same behaviours as the brain, and a low-level model will map onto a medium level or high-level model (at least, it will if the respective models are accurate). But the model will offer more opportunity to examine the processes involved, and we can then take that data and refer back to the brain itself to confirm (or falsify) the validity of the models.

We could build a computer powerful enough to run a molecular simulation of the human brain today, but it would take so long to commission and test such a system (let alone co-ordinate all the software), and cost so much, that it's quite impractical. A decade ago it couldn't have been done at all; a decade from now it will be about average for a big science project (a billion dollars or so).

In the meantime, we should continue as we are: Learning everything we can about brain function and cognition, and modelling the brain in detail on a small scale (what Blue Brain is doing), and in less detail on a large scale.

What we shouldn't do, is introduce magic in an attempt to provide easy answers, whether in the mask of quantum mechanics (Penrose & Hameroff) or dualism (Searle, Chalmers).

Yes.
Okay, I certainly agree with that.

[tensordyne]

Mind is brain function.
The brain is a computer.
Computation is substrate-neutral.

Therefore, computer programs can be conscious.

None of this is the subject of rational dispute.

It is an assumption that the brain is only, or primarily, a computer.

[PixyMisa]

Here is my list:


Computational Basis
Physical Basis
Some combination of physical and computational basis
Soul basis
Hamster on a running wheel basis.


You have to have something like the last item on the list for comedy purposes.
The problem I have with that, again, is that computation is physical.

You could have:

Computational Basis
Physical Basis other than computation
Soul basis
Cupcakes


I think option 2 is still nonsense, but at least it's clear.

[PixyMisa]

It is an assumption that the brain is only, or primarily, a computer.
No. It's a conclusion. And it's a very, very, very well-supported conclusion.

Because we know what the brain does. We've poked around in it, and we can see what's going on. And it is clearly and obviously a computer.

Which doesn't prove that we haven't missed something, but there's no evidence in either form or function to indicate that, so there's no reason to give it serious consideration until such evidence is provided.

[tensordyne]

Thank you for giving your method.

Basically, this is [wiki]computational neuroscience[/url]. Examine the function of the brain at all levels, model it in detail, study the behaviours exhibited by the brain and the model.


One level of the brain is the physics of the brain. I do not see that being addressed.


A sufficiently detailed computer model will exhibit precisely the same behaviours as the brain, and a low-level model will map onto a medium level or high-level model (at least, it will if the respective models are accurate). But the model will offer more opportunity to examine the processes involved, and we can then take that data and refer back to the brain itself to confirm (or falsify) the validity of the models.


There is no a priori reason to think that some physical aspect of the brain (what materials it is made of, how they move, that kind of thing) is not responsible for or directly related to consciousness.

I have no problem with computational neuroscience. I just do not think it will lead to the solution of consciousness by itself.


What we shouldn't do, is introduce magic in an attempt to provide easy answers, whether in the mask of quantum mechanics (Penrose & Hameroff) or dualism (Searle, Chalmers).


Sure, but physical and cognitive neuroscience is not magic, which are the main studies that I guess will lead to understanding consciousness. Psychophysics, not computational psychology.

[PixyMisa]

Thank you for giving your method.
Note that this is not "my" method. This is mainstream science.

One level of the brain is the physics of the brain. I do not see that being addressed.
If you're modelling at the molecular level, what physics exactly are you missing?

There is no a priori reason to think that some physical aspect of the brain (what materials it is made of, how they move, that kind of thing) is not responsible for or directly related to consciousness.
Yes there is, and it is this: That sentence doesn't actually mean anything.

I have no problem with computational neuroscience. I just do not think it will lead to the solution of consciousness by itself.
[snip]
Sure, but physical and cognitive neuroscience is not magic, which are the main studies that I guess will lead to understanding consciousness.
Those are included in computational neuroscience.

I mangled the link earlier, so here it is again: computational neuroscience.

Psychophysics, not computational psychology.
Psychophysics is one part of computational neuroscience. In itself it cannot produce the full story.

[Belz...]

Been away, just saw this thread.

I'm not going to get into another who-shot-John with the "Flock of Seagulls" here, but I do want to point out that the poll presents a false choice between, essentially, the soul model and the data-processing model.

Both are wrong.

Well, that was easy ! I'm convinced, piggy. Thanks ! ;)

[Belz...]

You ask some of the most interesting questions Belz.... The topic of this thread is consciousness, the topic at that point in the discussion was philosophy of science.

The point of your POST was the philosophy of science, I reckon because you were trying to introduce some concepts into the discussion that would make consciousness something more... magical.

Depending on your philosophy of science you will investigate consciousness in different ways.

I doubt it. The method is the same. Your interpretation may vary.

[Belz...]

It certainly should be.

The absence of any reference to "data" and the lack of a claim that "general purpose computers" might be conscious stand out.

Again, I'm not sure it adds to the options in the poll.

[Piggy]

I have no problem with computational neuroscience.

Well, you should, since nobody currently studying consciousness in the brain -- which is the only place to study it -- believes that computation is responsible for consciousness, except in the sense that all physical actions are computations.

The computational literalists here are not concerned with the brain. They find it irrelevant.

And truth be told, they're not concerned with consciousness, either. They're concerned with intelligence, but they don't recognize the fact that intelligence and consciousness are not the same thing. (They have simply taken definitions of intelligence and pasted them onto consciousness.)

Yes, computer models of real brains are helpful... in fact, they're necessary to the study of the brain and of consciousness. But this is not at all unique, because computer models are helpful, even necessary, for the study of climate, the cosmos, the functions of the heart, and so forth. That fact does not justify a claim that the heart is a computer. Ditto for the brain.

These guys think they can study machines which are not based on the brain, then come to conclusions which are not verified against observations of the brain, and somehow come to valid conclusions about consciousness.

This is like saying I can come to conclusions about what's going on inside the sun by studying what happens in a light bulb, without bothering to verify my conclusions against observations of the sun.

PixyMisa in particular is prone to outlandish statements, including the claim that it is known that consciousness is caused by self-referential information processing.

In fact, however, if you read standard texts such as The Cognitive Neurosciences (http://www.amazon.com/The-Cognitive-Neurosciences-Michael-Gazzaniga/dp/026201341X), edited by Michael Gazzaniga (http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/~gazzanig/) (one of the many luminaries in the field dismissed as a hack by the computational literalists), you will discover that there is unequivocal and unanimous agreement among scientists who actually study the brain and consciousness that the mechanism for consciousness is not known, and that in fact we do not currently have a theoretical basis upon which to base a working hypothesis.

Real researchers recognize this fact. The flock of seagulls who regularly clog up every thread about consciousness on this board with irrelevant discussions of AI and as-yet nonexistant machine consciousness do not.

Not only that, but you will quickly discover why Pixy's theory is completely useless for doing real work.

First of all, there are all sorts of feedback loops (self-referential processing) going on in the brain, and we know without a doubt that a huge number of them have nothing to do with generating conscious experience.

Furthermore, if you look for "information" in the brain, you will only find the sort of "information" that's present in any other part of your body, the kind Wolfram describes when discussing the computational power of, say, hurricanes.

In many ways, the functioning of the brain resembles sand on a beach more than it does the machine I'm using to type this post.

If you read texts like The Cognitive Neurosciences, you will certainly find people talking about information and data with reference to brain activity -- but this is a rhetorical convenience, a kind of shortcut to keep discussion of the brain from becoming impossibly complex.

And you will find people talking about the computational power of the brain, or computational demands of certain tasks, which is simply a way of notating the number of state-changes involved, but has nothing to do with equating a brain to a computer.

There is one article explicitly on information theory in TCN, and it directly contradicts PixyMisa's claims about conscious machines.

Nothing in that text -- or any other contemporary texts I've seen, or any current popular books by real researchers like Gazzaniga -- implies in any way that brains are computers, or that consciousness is the result of anything but physical computation (the same type of computation your calf muscle does). In fact, the only time that TCN bothers to mention computational literalism is to refute it.

The flock of seagulls claim that running a computer simulation of a brain would make the simulator conscious. Well, there are people attempting to do just that, and they state very clearly that the resulting machine will NOT be conscious.

The flock of seagulls claim that Church-Turing proves that a computer can do anything a human brain can do, but they can't cite anything because that's actually nowhere in the hypothesis, or even remotely implied by it.

Whenever that angle is debunked, they pipe down for a while, but when things die down and they think the coast is clear, they start harping on it again.

They make all sorts of errors in their thinking, such as asserting that the neural activity in your optic nerves resulting from light bouncing off a tree and onto your eyeballs is an "image of a tree" in your brain.

This makes as much sense as saying that the waves caused by tossing a rock into a pond are an "image of a rock".

The question of machine consciousness is simply this: How is it possible to make a machine hallucinate?

Because all consciousness, waking or dreaming, is hallucination. Nothing in your conscious world corresponds to anything that exists outside that hallucination -- not color, not sound, not texture, not pain or any other bodily sensation, not smell, not taste, nothing in your conscious experience has any existence outside of the hallucination (yours or someone else's).

It is in no way an image of the outside world. It is a hallucination which bears no resemblance to reality, but which nevertheless allows your body to successfully interact with the world when it's functioning properly.

(If you don't believe me, I have a little thought experiment we can do.)

In short, there is no computational theory of consciousness. It does not exist. And even the computational model of the mind is recognized as simply a useful metaphor.

Those who take it literally are simply not up on the current brain research, are sloppy in their thinking about consciousness and the brain (their posts are rife with anthropomorphisms), confuse intelligence with consciousness, entify abstractions such as information and relationships, ignore the importance of semantics (it's all syntax for them), don't bother with evidence, and ignore the fact that their hypotheses lead to absurd conclusions such as the idea that a conscious brain could be made out of rope or that the actual physical configuration of the brain has no effect on consciousness.

It's a bankrupt idea, and all of their carrying on about AI and conscious robots is 100% totally irrelevant to the actual discussion of how the brain does consciousness.

In short, you should have some very serious problems with so-called computational neuroscience when it comes to understanding consciousness.

[PixyMisa]

Well, you should, since nobody currently studying consciousness in the brain -- which is the only place to study it
No.

[Piggy]

No.

And that's all you got.

Not one single cite.

Not one single researcher studying consciousness in the brain who agrees with you.

You assert over and over again that your ideas are in line with mainstream brain science, and when that's shown not to be true, you respond with junk like that.

I asked you for a cite, and you cited yourself, asserting that "the brain is a computer" without one shred of evidence -- which you've never had for all your hundreds of posts -- despite the fact that nobody working in the field today believes that.

So you're free to respond with "No" and "Wrong" and "Framing error" all you like. It's all you got.

Which is fine. Good luck with that. May it serve you well.

[PixyMisa]

And that's all you got.
That's all I need, Piggy. Your position is nonsensical and your assertions untrue.

I have far more. I have all of modern science. The only problem is, all the facts disagree with you. As does basic logic.

[Piggy]

That's all I need, Piggy. Your position is nonsensical and your assertions untrue.

Well, if that's all you need, OK.

Anyone can pick up TCN or any other standard text and verify that what I'm saying is accurate.

But if all you need is "no" and "wrong" to keep your worldview in tact, more power to you.

[Piggy]

I have far more. I have all of modern science. The only problem is, all the facts disagree with you. As does basic logic.

Assertions, assertions.

In other threads, I've shown that science and logic disagree with you, and you have yet to offer any counterargument except "no" or telling me to read Godel-Escher-Bach.

So I'm done responding to you for now until you actually pony up. Which I don't expect will ever happen.

[PixyMisa]

Well, if that's all you need, OK.

Anyone can pick up TCN or any other standard text and verify that what I'm saying is accurate.
Even if what you are saying about TCN is accurate, that merely means that it's wrong. Brains are computers, Piggy. It's what they do. Anyone who asserts otherwise is wrong. Either they don't understand what the brain does, or they don't understand what a computer is, or both.

Here, for example, is an article pointing out 10 important differences between brains and computers (http://scienceblogs.com/developingintelligence/2007/03/27/why-the-brain-is-not-like-a-co/). Anyone who actually knows the definition of computer will run out of hands with which to facepalm before they reach the end, because none of those so-called differences are actually differences.

If the article had been titled "10 differences between the brain and a low-end desktop PC that don't affect the computational model one iota", then it would be fine. Just not terribly relevant.

[PixyMisa]

In other threads, I've shown that science and logic disagree with you
Not even remotely. You can't even define your disagreement with me, much less show any evidence for it.

[PixyMisa]

Anyway, it has been shown that it is impossible - logically impossible - that computers can't become conscious, and that the only question is, what is required to achieve this. My position is that a very high-level approach is perfectly sufficient, and no-one has presented any evidence to the contrary.

Even if I'm wrong in that respect (implausible, but let's consider it), all it means is that a lower-level, more detailed approach is required. But it if you accept that brains produce conscious function, then there is nothing that can restrict this behaviour - and it is a behaviour - from being duplicated by computers.

[tensordyne]

Note that this is not "my" method. This is mainstream science.


Your method is one approach, of many approaches.


If you're modelling at the molecular level, what physics exactly are you missing?


Do you have any idea what is involved in modeling molecules? If you model them classically, there are on the order of 10^23 molecules at least you would have to model. That is a problem, but the bigger problem is if you consider modeling molecules quantum mechanically.

Each new particle you add that you are considering increases the dimension of the wavefunction's configuration space by 3. Quantum computing might help in this regard if the technology comes around. The paper "More is Different" comes to mind.


Yes there is, and it is this: That sentence doesn't actually mean anything.


It does not mean anything to you. To me it means what was written.


Those are included in computational neuroscience.


Computational neuroscience uses physical and cognitive neuroscience, it is not included in computational neuroscience. Saying what you said above is like saying physics is included in computational physics, which is false. I guess it depends on what you mean by include, but if you mean by include a subset relationship, than I disagree.


Psychophysics is one part of computational neuroscience. In itself it cannot produce the full story.

Let's see how Wikipedia defines the two.


Psychophysics quantitatively investigates the relationship between physical stimuli and the sensations and perceptions they affect.



Computational neuroscience is the study of brain function in terms of the information processing properties of the structures that make up the nervous system.


If anything, computational neuroscience is a subset of psychophysics, not the other way around. In reality though, they are different forms of study, as should be plainly obvious from the above.

[tensordyne]

Well, you should, since nobody currently studying consciousness in the brain -- which is the only place to study it -- believes that computation is responsible for consciousness, except in the sense that all physical actions are computations.

...


That was a magnum opus of a thread post. Thank you very much for the information. It just gives more proof to me that computationalists are deluded.

[Dancing David]

Dennett spends much of that book railing (correctly) against the Cartesian theater, then ends up replacing it with his own version of it, in which the primitive Brain A serves as the theater for the more recently evolved Brain B homunculus.

It sounds like a pretty good argument at first, until you realize what he's done, and that he offers no explanation whatsoever for why it should be that the interaction of more primitive and more recently evolved areas of the brain should cause the body to hallucinate.

That question is simply ignored.

Which, at the end of the day, is the core problem with all philosophical approaches to consciousness.

Thank you Piggy!

My point about the 'theater' models is this, the brain seems to have a lot of separate yet conjoined parallel processors, so there are like a bunch of theaters and a bunch of actors, all mushed together.

No single piece is a theater and no single piece is 'consciousness' it is an amalgam and myriad.

[PixyMisa]

Your method is one approach, of many approaches.
No. First, it's not "my" method. And second, it's a synthesis of multiple approaches, including all the ones you suggest.

Do you have any idea what is involved in modeling molecules? If you model them classically, there are on the order of 10^23 molecules at least you would have to model.
Yes. This is being done.

That is a problem, but the bigger problem is if you consider modeling molecules quantum mechanically.
Yes, it becomes much more computationally expensive. Not impossible, but a lot more work. The question is, why should we consider this?

If we run our molecular models and find that they don't accurately model the behaviour of the real thing, that would certainly be a reason to explore quantum effects. But right now, there is no evidence that this is required.

Each new particle you add that you are considering increases the dimension of the wavefunction's configuration space by 3. Quantum computing might help in this regard if the technology comes around. The paper "More is Different" comes to mind.
Quantum computers can solve algorithms in ways that classical computers can't, but they're not terribly practical so far.

It does not mean anything to you. To me it means what was written.
No. It's not a defined statement.

Computational neuroscience uses physical and cognitive neuroscience, it is not included in computational neuroscience. Saying what you said above is like saying physics is included in computational physics, which is false. I guess it depends on what you mean by include, but if you mean by include a subset relationship, than I disagree.
Computational neuroscience includes the methods and results of physical and cognitive neuroscience.

Let's see how Wikipedia defines the two.

If anything, computational neuroscience is a subset of psychophysics, not the other way around.
No. Look at the whole thing:

Computational neuroscience is the study of brain function in terms of the information processing properties of the structures that make up the nervous system. It is an interdisciplinary science that links the diverse fields of neuroscience, cognitive science and psychology with electrical engineering, computer science, mathematics and physics.

Computational neuroscience is distinct from psychological connectionism and theories of learning from disciplines such as machine learning, neural networks and computational learning theory in that it emphasizes descriptions of functional and biologically realistic neurons (and neural systems) and their physiology and dynamics. These models capture the essential features of the biological system at multiple spatial-temporal scales, from membrane currents, protein and chemical coupling to network oscillations, columnar and topographic architecture and learning and memory. These computational models are used to frame hypotheses that can be directly tested by current or future biological and/or psychological experiments.
Computational neuroscience is a collective effort taking the disparate subfields of research (such as psychophysics) and using them to construct broadly-based and testable computational models.

In reality though, they are different forms of study, as should be plainly obvious from the above.
And it's plainly obvious that computational neuroscience, as an approach, encompasses the others. That's the whole point.

[Dancing David]

Computational models may approximate consciousness, but they are different in their structure then actual processes than the biological models.

I agree with PM, they are similar
I agree with Piggy , they are not the same

But I do not believe in the magical special nature of consciousness that some people seem to ascribe to it.

We will have a better idea when we start using computational models that are based upon an array of one trillion elements, with each element interacting with ~2,000 other elements in feedback loops. Driven by a models of underlying brain architecture and fuzzy feedback loops.

I don't think any CPUs being used right now will do that. (Or the super computers are tied up), it will be interesting when they can however, as it will give us insight into actual brain emergent properties.

[PixyMisa]

That was a magnum opus of a thread post. Thank you very much for the information. It just gives more proof to me that computationalists are deluded.
Since Piggy is arguing that the brain is not a computer, when it is, and since he is unable even to define his own position, nor his opposition to computationalism, it must be pointed out that any "proof" based on his "information" is likely to lead you to nothing but utter bewilderment.

[PixyMisa]

Computational models may approximate consciousness, but they are different in their structure then actual processes than the biological models.

But I do not believe in the magical special nature of consciousness that some people seem to ascribe to it.
Yes. The best answer we've been able to get from the anticomputationalist camp on why they believe as they do is "because".

We will have a better idea when we start using computational models that are based upon an array of one trillion elements, with each element interacting with ~2,000 other elements in feedback loops. Driven by a models of underlying brain architecture and fuzzy feedback loops.
Sure. But smaller and simpler models can also provide information, and can be tested against the real thing to ensure accuracy. Or, if they're not accurate, that's useful information too.

I don't think any CPUs being used right now will do that. (Or the super computers are tied up), it will be interesting when they can however, as it will give us insight into actual brain emergent properties.
Funding for the next stage of the "Blue Brain" project is expected to be decided this year. (That was the one modelling parts of the rat neocortex.) If it goes ahead, I'm cautiously optimistic, but it might be another ten years before computing power is available cheaply enough to make large-scale molecular modelling widely practical.

[Belz...]

The computational literalists here are not concerned with the brain. They find it irrelevant.

That's a mischaracterization. The brain is very relevant, since it's the main conscious thing we know of.

[PixyMisa]

That's a mischaracterization. The brain is very relevant, since it's the main conscious thing we know of.
It's outright bizarre is what it is, considering how much time we spend talking about the brain.

[tensordyne]

Because all consciousness, waking or dreaming, is hallucination. Nothing in your conscious world corresponds to anything that exists outside that hallucination -- not color, not sound, not texture, not pain or any other bodily sensation, not smell, not taste, nothing in your conscious experience has any existence outside of the hallucination (yours or someone else's).

It is in no way an image of the outside world. It is a hallucination which bears no resemblance to reality, but which nevertheless allows your body to successfully interact with the world when it's functioning properly.

(If you don't believe me, I have a little thought experiment we can do.)


I am curious now, what is this thought experiment of which you speak?