On Consciousness

[dlorde]

... the topic is about the unscientific philosophy of PixyMisa
According to the OP it is supposed to be: "... on the nature and computability of consciousness".

Maybe you wake up inside the 'real' reality when you take DMT and realize the world we live in now is some kind of lesser copy.
The 'real' reality? a 'lesser copy'? This in the same post you call Pixy's 'philosophy' unscientific?
:id: gah! now I have to borrow another irony meter...

I am perfectly willing to consider the computationalist ideas. In fact, I did, and I found that they are lacking in certain regards, especially as to how the experience of perception is thought about, which is to say, it is not thought about.
You must have missed that section... but surely you remember what we've all been discussing here for the past few weeks? You know, accounting for the experience of perception?

[dlorde]

...the EM field is infinite in magnitude when considered a wave/field.
Did you really mean 'infinite in magnitude'? Could you explain what you mean by that?

[rocketdodger]

By all means, if you do not like the term comp.lit, tell me one that you would like me to use (within reason).

"supporter of the computational model"

There is a truth in that piggy used the term so I did. I am a fan of piggy's writing. He defined comp.lit in a previous set of posts, as well as the neurobio position. So, if you guys get together (dlorde, PixyMisa, rocketdodger, et. al) and give your position a name I will use it without reservation.

This is what I'm talking about -- it isn't just the position of the people here, it is the accepted position of the field of neuroscience. There is no qualitative difference between what piggy calls "comp.lit" and "neurobio."

If you want to reject that a few hundred transistors can be conscious, that is fine. That has nothing to do with the "computational model." The computational model is simply that any definition of consciousness based on reality ( regardless of what exactly your definition happens to be ) will be computational in nature.

What piggy is trying to do is use the fact that most neuroscience researchers don't explicitly say "yes, a gigantic system of buckets and pulleys and ropes that is turing equivalent could be conscious if it was running an unimaginably complex algorithm" as somehow evidence that they don't actually support that position. Well, that is just rhetoric from piggy -- if a person doesn't say "I don't support X" and they never say anything that is inconsistent with X, you can't just claim willy-nilly that they don't support X.

The only reason we are even talking about turing machines is because people like piggy come in and say "you realize that the computational model, if taken to its full logical conclusion, implies that a system of buckets and ropes and pulleys could be conscious, don't you?"

Yeah, and modern physics tells us that we are all just a bunch of particles. So what? I don't let the fact that in reality I'm just a huge swarm of particles somehow poison every other thought I have with nihilistic negativity, neither should anyone let the fact that all research suggests consciousness stems from computation somehow devalue consciousness.


I am sorry, I can not agree with the above. There is the (normal) experience of the perception of red. There is no experience of experience of... It does not work the same way that thinking about thinking about thinking ... works. So in the list above there is only 1. and 2., as far as I can tell.

Why? What about remembering what it is like to experience red?

Whether you focus (are conscious of) something that is red or if red is just in your visual field, you have consciousness with red in it.

Yeah but there is definitely a difference. When I focus on a red object and admire how red it is, I am fully aware of my experiencing red. When I drive by a red car on the way home and I don't even pay attention to it, I am not aware of that experience, and I would say since I am not aware of the experience I am not actually even having the experience.

Your notion of redness doesn't seem to account for such cases.

At any one moment, while I am typing in the post, yes, I am experiencing all the colors on my screen. Not sure why that is so hard per se...


It is "hard" because there is a qualitative difference in your experience of the red frowny face between when you are just typing a response and when you actually look down and see that it is a red frowny face.

If you want to say that you are simultaneously "experiencing" all the colors on your screen, then what is your term for what happens when you actually become aware of one of those colors by focusing on that pixel and saying to yourself "ah, that is red?"

[Belz...]

Nope, the EM field is infinite in magnitude when considered a wave/field. Unless you apply a materialistic philosophy to it and ignore the wave properties.

What in the blue hell are you talking about ?

[Dancing David]

David, where is Mercutio when we need him? He was good at critical analysis of the kind of sophistry seen in this thread.

Ah the Merc meister, I think he would use the word reification somewhere here for how we have an 'experience' that is something other than the physical processes.

[Belz...]

The only reason we are even talking about turing machines is because people like piggy come in and say "you realize that the computational model, if taken to its full logical conclusion, implies that a system of buckets and ropes and pulleys could be conscious, don't you?"

Or storms. Just because consciousness arises from computation doesn't mean all computation leads to consciousness.

Your notion of redness doesn't seem to account for such cases.

Of course it doesn't. It's a romantic view of consciousness, not a scientific one.

[Dancing David]

"The idea of chemical reactions is part of the abstract model called Chemistry."

This is why I have certain people on Ignore.

Excuse me, but bombs explode due to chemical reactions, as do cars move. And lights burn (power generation), my gosh we can't even eat many foods without chemical reactions to heat.

This is more stupid Kantian metaspace ignorance. The models of chemical reactions are accurate to an amazing degree. The processes in reality are what they are, but the models approximate them quite well.

[Belz...]

Ah the Merc meister, I think he would use the word reification somewhere here for how we have an 'experience' that is something other than the physical processes.

If I remember correctly, Mercutio said consciousness was behavioural, which is very very far from any dualist model.

[PixyMisa]

Ah the Merc meister, I think he would use the word reification somewhere here for how we have an 'experience' that is something other than the physical processes.
Ah, yes, that's the word.

[dlorde]

I might add that when we speak about experiences, the experience of red is perhaps not so obviously interesting as, say the experience of pain.

Superficially, yes; but perhaps it's easier to (wrongly) dismiss the sensation of pain as a reaction to the sudden autonomic arousal it elicits. With colour, there is little autonomic response (although red has some arousal potential). Consequently, there's little to pin the sensation on - and the idea that the sensation of red is the existence of particular activation/coding vectors across the colour opponent neurons in the primary visual pathways seems hard for some people to accept, but the use of such an understanding to predict and empirically demonstrate chimerical, self-luminous, and hyperbolic colours from outside the normal colour spindle is surely compelling. As Churchland (http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/Churchland-chimeric-colors.pdf) says:Apparent ‘‘explanatory gaps’’ are with us always and everywhere. Since we are not omniscient, we should positively expect them. And here, as elsewhere, apparent (I repeat, apparent) qualitative ‘‘simples’’ present an especially obvious challenge to our feeble imaginations. But whether an apparent gap represents a mere gap in our current understanding and imaginative powers, or an objective gap in the ontological structure of reality, is always and ever an empirical question—to be decided by unfolding science, and not by pre-emptive and dubious arguments a priori. In light of the H–J network’s unexpectedly splendid predictive and explanatory performance across (indeed, beyond) the entire range of possible colors, the default presumption of some special, non-physical ontological status for our subjective color experiences has just evaporated. Our subjective color experiences—the chimerical ones included— are just one more subtle dimension of the labyrinthine material world. They are activation vectors across three kinds of opponency-driven neurons. This should occasion neither horror nor despair. For, while we now know these phenomenological roses by new and more illuminating names, they present as sweetly as ever.

Perhaps even more sweetly, for we now appreciate why they behave as they do.

[Mr. Scott]

1) Perception of red
2) Experience of perception of red
3) Experience of experience of perception of red
4) Experience of experience of experience of perception of red
5) Experience of experience of experience of perception of experience of perception of red
.

I think #3 is sufficient.

I am a little uncomfortable with the picture in post #1 (below) because it suggests the quale for the apple's color is one-directional (how do we know we the quale is there?)

So, since all measurable brain activity is literally data processing, dualist arguments must go this way:

1) Apple produces image, decoded in the brain by data processing, ultimately producing, somehow, the red quale, the physics of which we can only guess.

2) The red quale is, somehow, detected by the brain, converted back to data processing, and reported to the world by voice or keyboard.

I've not heard dualists discuss #2.

My problem is that I firmly believe the brain evolved from the brain of barely conscious (most likely unconscious) wormy creatures, so we also need to answer:

1) How and when qualia evolved in a data processing machine.
2) How it helped creatures survive (or how qualia helped spread the genes that are responsible for the machinery ;) of qualia AND its detection)

Since the brain's continuing production (and detection) of qualia must consume energy, dualists need to discuss the evolution of qualia, and its reproductive advantage over mere data processing.

PS: I've tried to learn as much as I can about the dualist POV from David Chalmers' videos, and he always has that smug smile that gives me an internal subjective experience like having my eyeballs pierced by 12 inch stainless steel spikes. It's kind of a mechanical grin, suggesting artifice. Dennett's spirit is warm and cuddly. (Oh, the irony!)

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/67364f8ca50f6f542.jpg

[tensordyne]

Man steenkh, I can tell you have fallen for the computationalist ideas but I still like your style for some reason. It is more honest and less full of assumptions or something.

And yet you claim that the experience of red is more than data processing?


The existence of the experience of sensation is a self-evident fact. This fact does not depend in any way on any other idea for its support. The various hypothesis out there about how the experience of sensation work must only have the requirements of internal consistency as well as to make predictions about what will be experienced and under what conditions that turn out to be correct to some relevant level of detail.

For the data processing type hypothesis I do not see at what point something is predicted to be experienced. Will it be experienced after 10,000 computations, or 20,000? More? One computation?

How does one determine if something counts as a computation that leads to experience of sensation? Is the computing done by your liver less important than the computing done by your brain ... why? These questions do not put me at ease with the computationalist type ideas.

Compare the above with CEMI, as an example. In this hypothesis, the EM field inside your brain is directly related to experiencing sensation. This is testable. Change the field and see what happens. There is a point in CEMI when experience of sensation occurs and it is clear where that point is.

SrB_pALdudk

It simply does not make sense to think that computation or data processing leads to experience of sensation. Data processing can quite concievably control what will be experienced as far as input to a system that then is conscious. However, to think that data processing causes experience of sensation does not make sense. Let me explain further, why.

There exist multiple ways to create logic gates in various physical systems. This should tell us that computation is something apart from physics. We do not have any right therefore to talk about computation outside the strict terms of computation itself, or how the computation is enabled by a given physical system.

The idea that computation is an essential part of how consciousness works butts up against the above. There is also the fact that computation is ubiquitous in nature, so why the special pleading for computation in the brain causing consciousness? If you said to me the brain controls the rest of the body through computation, sure. If you say computation gives rise to the experience of sensation, sorry, there just is no evidence for such a connection.


I think you put too much in the term "experience".


Thank you for your opinion, but experience of sensation is what we all are, so I do put some emphasis on that term.


Obviously, a lot happens when you perceive "red": You might note a specific hue which might or might not be represented as a property to the general data structure in the brain for "red" which is now attached to the data structure of whatever object you were looking at.


General data structure is an interesting set of terms.


The brain knows that the group of neurons where the red object was registered is connected to the visual system, which is why when you think about it, a picture forms in your mind, which is another complex data structure that the brain works with.


If you think about something and a picture forms in your mind then you are using your imagination. Imagination involves as its primary aspect experience of sensation, not a complex data structure.


It is possible that the mind follows links to the language centre and obtains the English word "red". If you are a baby, you might not get this result


Whether you are a baby or can recognize red as a concept, there is no good reason to expect that the experience of the sensation of red is different. Babies have the same kinds of rods and cones, etc. etc.


I cannot see that there is more to "red" that cannot be explained by your own recursive thinking about your experience, and possibly following links to old memories connected to "red". Rocketdodger described this very well, although you dismissed his idea, but I do not think you took the effort to understand it, which is a pity.


You do not explain experience of sensation, it is just a fact of life. I dismissed Rocketdodger's experiencing experiencing... because it does not make sense. Experience of sensation is unitary and atomic (at least in a non-altered state of consciousness). You do not experience experiencing sensation, or any other more recursive statement. There is nothing outside of experience for it to experience itself.


If you did think seriously about it, perhaps you could explain more detailed what it is by the experience of "red" that cannot be described by being aware that you are seeing red?

Being aware is asking for too much. Awareness is needed to answer questions about what experience of sensation is being had or has been had, but there is no need to be aware of every aspect of your consciousness for all sorts of sensations to be there. Talking about being aware of red is just another way to make a topic about experiencing sensation into other more abstract ideas.

[Belz...]

Will it be experienced after 10,000 computations, or 20,000? More? One computation?

As you've been told before, it's not necessarily a question of sheer complexity.

However, to think that data processing causes experience of sensation does not make sense.

How does it not make sense ? Your post doesn't really say anything except detail your own incredulity.

This should tell us that computation is something apart from physics.

Read that again, and tell me it doesn't sound dualistic.

You do not explain experience of sensation, it is just a fact of life.

See, this is especially ironic after you called Pixy's dismissal of Zeuzzz' nonsense "unscientific". Skepticism puts everything under the microscope, even "common sense" or "self-evident" ideas. And studying experience has led to things we never considered before, such as decisions being taken by our brain before we're aware of them, split personalities in people with severed corpus callosum, etc. If we just took it for granted, we wouldn't know half as much about consciousness as we know now. That's, if we followed your approach to it. And you still think we're the ones beign unscientific ?

[dlorde]

... Imagination involves as its primary aspect experience of sensation, not a complex data structure.So where do the experiences of sensations that are used make up 'the imagined' come from? Could it be memory, the storage of the experience of sensation? how do you imagine that is done?

You do not experience experiencing sensation, or any other more recursive statement.
Yet here you are talking about it - how does it feel to experience talking about experiencing experiencing sensation? :D

[tensordyne]

"The idea of chemical reactions is part of the abstract model called Chemistry."

This is why I have certain people on Ignore.

Excuse me, but bombs explode due to chemical reactions, as do cars move. And lights burn (power generation), my gosh we can't even eat many foods without chemical reactions to heat.

This is more stupid Kantian metaspace ignorance. The models of chemical reactions are accurate to an amazing degree. The processes in reality are what they are, but the models approximate them quite well.

Before you put me on ignore note that a model is not the same as the thing itself (even if people like to talk that way). Can we even know the thing in itself, or do we really only ever know of the experiences associated with them? This is not Kantian metaphysics, it is just a recognition that experience of sensation is primary to what and how we know about things (aside from the abstract mind of course).

The things you take as real, as absolutely given, to me are provisional models waiting to be falsified. A chair is not a thing to me (an abstract thing 'out there') but a concept related to a series of sensations. I can understand the other way of thinking about chairs, and even use it quite often (the model of the chair 'out there'). It is just that there is another mode of thinking about a chair -- in terms of the sensations associated with it -- which is also just as legitimate a way to consider a chair as the abstract "thing in the world" way is. The other way of thinking about a chair I am not even sure comp.lit can seem to understand, unfortunately.

This way of thinking about physical things in terms of the sensations they produce requires a mind-shift (I have argued at length with my roommate to explain this shift and finally he recently got it, although he likes to relate it to Existentialism for some reason, even though it really is just Empiricism). The shift is from mental abstraction (living in abstract model world as happens with Hard-AI proponents) to thinking in terms of perception. It says that the naturalistic world-view we have is a model. A well established model, but still a model (in several places they have the poorly designed model of unseen spirirts... who knows, science in the future may make the way we look at things now seem as antiquaited as unseen spirits do to us now, you have to be at least open to the possibility).

The mind-set of PixyMisa is fine if you want to think about science as it has traditionally been done, but it does not quite work when applied to studying p-consciousness (p is for phenomenal PixyMisa). The reason is that when thinking in terms of abstract pictures you imagine yourself in systems in such a way that your sensation is not important to figuring out how those systems operate. It does not matter that I am seeing when thinking about a physics problem, as an example (aka, the physics problem should never depend on my own particular sensations, it should only depend on the system at hand).

When it comes to p-consciousness versus m-consciousness (m for model, PixyMisa's version of consciousness, which is internally consistent, so I have no problem with it) the m-consiousness is insensible. Sensation as a consideration is just not needed in m, but it is needed for p.

Step outside of your abstractions for a minute and consider experience of sensation as a topic in and of itself. Then you will know what me, piggy and perhaps a few other posters have been talking about. Or not, go back into your dimly lit cave of abstraction (I understand, I like the ambience in there too). Your choice.

m, meet p, p already knows you.

[tensordyne]

Two interesting posts Belz... #2013 and dlorde #2014, I will answer them both in time, just not right now.

[Belz...]

I will answer them both in time, just not right now.

That sounds like an awesome movie quote.

"What interesting questions, my young apprentice. I will answer them in time, but not right now. Right now, you are not ready for these answers, and there is much I must first teach you..."

[tensordyne]

That sounds like an awesome movie quote.

"What interesting questions, my young apprentice. I will answer them in time, but not right now. Right now, you are not ready for these answers, and there is much I must first teach you..."

Yeah, well, for me it is just a matter of time, in that it takes a while to respond to each post. I do not want to give the impression of master to paduan learner or something either.

[dlorde]

Two interesting posts Belz... #2013 and dlorde #2014, I will answer them both in time, just not right now.
Don't feel obliged to answer mine, they were basically rhetorical ;)

I'd be more interested in a response to the Churchland paper I quoted. I've posted it more than once here, and had no responses - I wonder why...

[Belz...]

Yeah, well, for me it is just a matter of time, in that it takes a while to respond to each post. I do not want to give the impression of master to paduan learner or something either.

Don't say that ! I just gave you a compliment ! :p

[tensordyne]

Don't say that ! I just gave you a compliment ! :p

:thanks Haha, you are only a real master when you know how little you know, or some such. :thanks

[Zeuzzz]

So much reacting.. so little critical thinking :(

http://a8.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-prn1/548375_358042384269184_2024444215_n.jpg

Regardless, I love you all. :D

[Belz...]

:i:

[Zeuzzz]

Explain.

[Belz...]

You say "so little critical thinking." It's ironic, coming from you who said that taking drugs gives you some special knowledge.

[Zeuzzz]

Have you not spent nearly half of your life in an altered state of consciousness?*

Have you not appreciated the fact that I showed before that you have endogenous psychedelics in your bloodstream now that alter your consciousness?

*Dreaming/sleep

[PixyMisa]

So much reacting.. so little critical thinking
Zeuzzz, take a look at your own posting history. You present us with claims, and when those claims are shown to be fabrications, you resort to logical fallacies, most commonly special pleading.

Your premises are false and your arguments are invalid. At this point you should be abandoning your earlier beliefs, not doubling down.

Have you not spent nearly half of your life in an altered state of consciousness?*

Have you not appreciated the fact that I showed before that you have endogenous psychedelics in your bloodstream now that alter your consciousness?

*Dreaming/sleep
Yes. So? Psychoactive drugs still do nothing more than cause your brain to malfunction.

[steenkh]

The existence of the experience of sensation is a self-evident fact.
Of course. I see nobody disputing that. The point that we are making is that this is a trivial fact of the computational model.

For the data processing type hypothesis I do not see at what point something is predicted to be experienced. Will it be experienced after 10,000 computations, or 20,000? More? One computation?
Why is the number of computations relevant? Perhaps you should consider what you mean by "experience"? As I see it, you have the "experience" as soon as the relevant data structure has been formed, ie after zero computations. I am open to the concept that you only have the "experience" if you are conscious about it, ie the subsystem that constitutes your awareness has registered that the data structure has appeared. That would mean a certain amount of extra "computations", but there is no telling if it is a small amount or a large amount. (We know that the brain can make decisions that the awareness part of the brain only registers a little while later; if we know the number of computations per millisecond, then we could infer the number of computations it takes to be aware of something.) Finally, the experience can be extended by including language, memories, experiencing the experience and so on, so everything really depends on what your definition of an experience is.

How does one determine if something counts as a computation that leads to experience of sensation? Is the computing done by your liver less important than the computing done by your brain ... why?
The liver is not a computer, but to answer your question in general, as I said above I do not see the relevance of the number of computations for the model. The whole question of how experiences are treated in the computational model is secondary to the question if the computational model can account for consciousness itself, and I think that few with insight into computers doubt this. The question is only how.

Compare the above with CEMI, as an example. In this hypothesis, the EM field inside your brain is directly related to experiencing sensation. This is testable. Change the field and see what happens. There is a point in CEMI when experience of sensation occurs and it is clear where that point is.
There is no doubt that being a physical entitity, the brain can be influenced by physics, such as EM fields, but I think it is more a question of malfunctioning, because the EM fields messes with the normal working of the brain. But even if it is not, it would not alter the computational model, but merely change our view of how the biological computer works, how it stores its data etc. A computer model that models the actual physics of the brain would not only need representations of neurons and hormones, but also EM fields. More complicated, but still doable.

There exist multiple ways to create logic gates in various physical systems. This should tell us that computation is something apart from physics.
Eh? I am tempted to say that this sentence "does not compute"!

The idea that computation is an essential part of how consciousness works butts up against the above.

There is also the fact that computation is ubiquitous in nature, so why the special pleading for computation in the brain causing consciousness?
Nobody are claiming that computations per se cause consciousness. You cannot have a computer without appropriate hardware, and in this case, the hardware is a brain. Computers with other kinds of hardware exist, notably our electronical computers, and it is conceivable that other kinds of computers may exist.

Thank you for your opinion, but experience of sensation is what we all are, so I do put some emphasis on that term.
It seems to me that you are evading the issue of describing what the "experience of sensation" is. My honest view is that the term is void, and could be replaced by "sensation" alone. Please try to explain why the term makes sense without resorting to emotion.

General data structure is an interesting set of terms.
It is vague because I do not have the faintest idea how the data is stored in the brain. As far as I know, we know to some precision where it is stored, but not how. I have read about research where researchers could tell what a person was thinking about, but only by recording the patterns in advance. We seem to be close, but there is still some distance to go.

If you think about something and a picture forms in your mind then you are using your imagination. Imagination involves as its primary aspect experience of sensation, not a complex data structure.
Why do you think that imagination does not involve complex data structures? The reason why some people cannot tell the difference between reality and imagination is that the data structures are essentially the same.

Whether you are a baby or can recognize red as a concept, there is no good reason to expect that the experience of the sensation of red is different. Babies have the same kinds of rods and cones, etc. etc.
I was speaking about the connection to language. A baby that has no language yet will not be able to pin the word "red" to the colour "red".

You do not explain experience of sensation, it is just a fact of life. I dismissed Rocketdodger's experiencing experiencing... because it does not make sense. Experience of sensation is unitary and atomic (at least in a non-altered state of consciousness). You do not experience experiencing sensation, or any other more recursive statement. There is nothing outside of experience for it to experience itself.
I am rather disappointed with this emotional argumentation. Are you claiming that "facts of life" are inscrutable to science? On what grounds do you claim that the experience of sensation is unitary and atomic? I would not be surprised if the word "soul" would crop up in a future post :(

Being aware is asking for too much. Awareness is needed to answer questions about what experience of sensation is being had or has been had, but there is no need to be aware of every aspect of your consciousness for all sorts of sensations to be there. Talking about being aware of red is just another way to make a topic about experiencing sensation into other more abstract ideas.
Please explain how you get out of an experience that you are not aware of? Actually I thought you would prefer to include awareness in the frame, because as I told you above, I do not think the concept of experience is doing much good otherwise in this discussion.

[PixyMisa]

Compare the above with CEMI, as an example. In this hypothesis, the EM field inside your brain is directly related to experiencing sensation. This is testable.
Yes. It's been tested. It's wrong.

[Jeff Corey]

Sure we do. All experience is computation...
Nonsense.
March Hare: …Then you should say what you mean.
Alice: I do; at least - at least I mean what I say -- that's the same thing, you know.
Hatter: Not the same thing a bit! Why, you might just as well say that, 'I see what I eat' is the same as 'I eat what I see'!
March Hare: You might just as well say, that "I like what I get" is the same thing as "I get what I like"!
The Dormouse: You might just as well say, that "I breathe when I sleep" is the same thing as "I sleep when I breathe".

All computation is experience.

[PixyMisa]

Nonsense.

The brain is a computer.
Computation is what it does.
One of the things it computes is experience.


At which point do you disagree, and why?

[Belz...]

Have you not spent nearly half of your life in an altered state of consciousness?

Less than a third, actually, but that's nitpicking. Yes, I have, but I have never thought dreams were a gateway to a better understanding of myself because that would be nonsense. Dreams are an interesting, narrative mishmash of recent memories. At that, they are good entertainment. But they are otherwise useless.

Have you not appreciated the fact that I showed before that you have endogenous psychedelics in your bloodstream now that alter your consciousness?

And this is relevant, how ?

[Belz...]

I think it's clear that some people will never accept the conclusions of science no matter what happens in the future in that field. If we have conscious computers in 16 years, they will not believe it. If we understand precisely how consciousness works, they won't accept it, because they have a predetermined conclusion, an emotional attachment to it, and a need to see it as "special", somehow.

[Belz...]

All computation is experience.

That is a bit silly, as that would mean that pocket calculators have experience. That's using a very broad definition of the word.

[PixyMisa]

All computation is experience.
All squares are rectangles.

[!Kaggen]

Before you put me on ignore note that a model is not the same as the thing itself (even if people like to talk that way). Can we even know the thing in itself, or do we really only ever know of the experiences associated with them? This is not Kantian metaphysics, it is just a recognition that experience of sensation is primary to what and how we know about things (aside from the abstract mind of course).

The things you take as real, as absolutely given, to me are provisional models waiting to be falsified. A chair is not a thing to me (an abstract thing 'out there') but a concept related to a series of sensations. I can understand the other way of thinking about chairs, and even use it quite often (the model of the chair 'out there'). It is just that there is another mode of thinking about a chair -- in terms of the sensations associated with it -- which is also just as legitimate a way to consider a chair as the abstract "thing in the world" way is. The other way of thinking about a chair I am not even sure comp.lit can seem to understand, unfortunately.

This way of thinking about physical things in terms of the sensations they produce requires a mind-shift (I have argued at length with my roommate to explain this shift and finally he recently got it, although he likes to relate it to Existentialism for some reason, even though it really is just Empiricism). The shift is from mental abstraction (living in abstract model world as happens with Hard-AI proponents) to thinking in terms of perception. It says that the naturalistic world-view we have is a model. A well established model, but still a model (in several places they have the poorly designed model of unseen spirirts... who knows, science in the future may make the way we look at things now seem as antiquaited as unseen spirits do to us now, you have to be at least open to the possibility).

The mind-set of PixyMisa is fine if you want to think about science as it has traditionally been done, but it does not quite work when applied to studying p-consciousness (p is for phenomenal PixyMisa). The reason is that when thinking in terms of abstract pictures you imagine yourself in systems in such a way that your sensation is not important to figuring out how those systems operate. It does not matter that I am seeing when thinking about a physics problem, as an example (aka, the physics problem should never depend on my own particular sensations, it should only depend on the system at hand).

When it comes to p-consciousness versus m-consciousness (m for model, PixyMisa's version of consciousness, which is internally consistent, so I have no problem with it) the m-consiousness is insensible. Sensation as a consideration is just not needed in m, but it is needed for p.

Step outside of your abstractions for a minute and consider experience of sensation as a topic in and of itself. Then you will know what me, piggy and perhaps a few other posters have been talking about. Or not, go back into your dimly lit cave of abstraction (I understand, I like the ambience in there too). Your choice.

m, meet p, p already knows you.

Yes

[PixyMisa]

The mind-set of PixyMisa is fine if you want to think about science as it has traditionally been done
Actual science, as opposed to nonscience.

but it does not quite work when applied to studying p-consciousness (p is for phenomenal PixyMisa).
We don't care about this "p-consciousness" of yours. We care about real consciousness in the real world, and real science works just fine for that.

[Belz...]

Yes

No.

[tensordyne]

Yes. It's been tested. It's wrong.

I guess you did not notice the part in the video where he cited recent results confirming parts of his model. PixyMisa, I understand every once in a while people putting on forums a quick, "Your wrong" non argument, but you literally do it over and over again. If you do not have an argument, could you please just shut up then? It takes time to scroll past your annoying non-arguments.

For instance, how has it been tested? By whom? What where the results? Why do you think that falsifies McFadden's model? None of that in the above. I just would have to take your word for it. At the very least you made an argument above, even if it was one of the lamer ones I have seen on this site. So at least you made one, which is better than your usual "No" response.

BTW, I used comp.lit after it was stated that the phrase should be "supporter of the computational model." That is the phrase I will use from here on out.

[tensordyne]

We don't care about this "p-consciousness" of yours. We care about real consciousness in the real world, and real science works just fine for that.

OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about.

[tensordyne]

I think it's clear that some people will never accept the conclusions of science no matter what happens in the future in that field. If we have conscious computers in 16 years, they will not believe it. If we understand precisely how consciousness works, they won't accept it, because they have a predetermined conclusion, an emotional attachment to it, and a need to see it as "special", somehow.

BS. I know your 'some people' is I. If you figure out how consciousness works in humans, i.e. the physical basis, not the mentally deficient idea of a computational basis, and that is put in a device, then I will gladly accept it is conscious. I just hope it is not writhing in pain having to listen to the silly arguments presented on this forum is all.

[tensordyne]

See, this is especially ironic after you called Pixy's dismissal of Zeuzzz' nonsense "unscientific". Skepticism puts everything under the microscope, even "common sense" or "self-evident" ideas. And studying experience has led to things we never considered before, such as decisions being taken by our brain before we're aware of them, split personalities in people with severed corpus callosum, etc. If we just took it for granted, we wouldn't know half as much about consciousness as we know now. That's, if we followed your approach to it. And you still think we're the ones beign unscientific ?

I said take the existence of experience of sensation for granted (as a given). I never, ever, ever, said take the phenomena associated with such for granted. For the phenomena the best method for results thus far is the scientific method.

You, and your fellow adherents of the computational model, do not have the correct interpretation of science. To explain why, I could tell a story about some alternate reality and how ... but to understand the story and its import to our own reality requires imagination and insight, something sorely lacking, IMHO, in the computer club here.

You know what, I am just going to give you guys a name instead of the longer phrase. Not as if I am breaking forum rules and I need a short word to cut down on typing. Lets say comps vs. bios (or phys).

[tensordyne]

Or storms. Just because consciousness arises from computation doesn't mean all computation leads to consciousness.


Than shouldn't the comp model say which ones do and which ones do not? Possibly why?

Plus, that is the most annoying aspect of talking to comp's, they do not even have a conception of experience of sensation (consciousness). So you comps can talk about consciousness all day but you are not going to be talking about what I am talking about. Maybe that is why I should just leave the forum. Get across the main points and then go.

Oh well, gives me something to do!

[Jeff Corey]

Or psychs. (reference to post #2043)

[tensordyne]

I think #3 is sufficient.

I am a little uncomfortable with the picture in post #1 (below) because it suggests the quale for the apple's color is one-directional (how do we know we the quale is there?)

So, since all measurable brain activity is literally data processing, dualist arguments must go this way:

1) Apple produces image, decoded in the brain by data processing, ultimately producing, somehow, the red quale, the physics of which we can only guess.

2) The red quale is, somehow, detected by the brain, converted back to data processing, and reported to the world by voice or keyboard.

I've not heard dualists discuss #2.

My problem is that I firmly believe the brain evolved from the brain of barely conscious (most likely unconscious) wormy creatures, so we also need to answer:

1) How and when qualia evolved in a data processing machine.
2) How it helped creatures survive (or how qualia helped spread the genes that are responsible for the machinery ;) of qualia AND its detection)

Since the brain's continuing production (and detection) of qualia must consume energy, dualists need to discuss the evolution of qualia, and its reproductive advantage over mere data processing.

PS: I've tried to learn as much as I can about the dualist POV from David Chalmers' videos, and he always has that smug smile that gives me an internal subjective experience like having my eyeballs pierced by 12 inch stainless steel spikes. It's kind of a mechanical grin, suggesting artifice. Dennett's spirit is warm and cuddly. (Oh, the irony!)

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting/67364f8ca50f6f542.jpg

Interesting you find him cuddly. I find in him a kind of confused grandfather feel who is trying to show you a magic trick that he ends up performing on himself. The smirk on Chalmers' face to me is the kind of smirk you have when you hear a devilishly hard question you do not have the answer to.

I am not a dualist myself, not that I particularly care. I am an Empiricist, so the dualist type models, the monist type models, whatever type model, they are all just models.

It is strange this question of epiphenomena. Since I have not written about it before on this thread perhaps now is a good time. Cause and effect are one of those difficult to establish questions. It is clear when a cog on a wheel goes into another cog on a different wheel, and starts to turn, that there is a cause and effect relationship for the other wheel turning.

Not so clear is how the apple image (P. Churchland uses the clever euphemism for such things calling them 'mental states') could possibly cause anything. The image and being able to talk about it are one to one, so at least that can be used to investigate the same, which is an important point.

Yeah, I have no answer. The quale definitely seem to exist and the ability to talk about the quale exists, but how on earth the quale could possible effectuate anything is a mystery to me. Experience of sensation does seem to be non-causative, but then we can talk about it, so perhaps it must be. Or perhaps, as is the most likely case, when a new theory of mind comes around it will show how to better think about these issues and raise it's own.

[tensordyne]

Or psychs. (reference to post #2043)

Please, do tell. What are the general outlines of the psych position. So far we have (in alphabetical order):

1. Bio (possibly also known as neuro)
2. Comp
3. Phys
4. Psych
5. Spirit

Any others I missed?

[tensordyne]

This is what I'm talking about -- it isn't just the position of the people here, it is the accepted position of the field of neuroscience. There is no qualitative difference between what piggy calls "comp.lit" and "neurobio."


Then why did piggy bring up that a very modern book on cognitive neuroscience has a whole chapter devoted to dispelling the ideas of the Hard-AI crowd?


If you want to reject that a few hundred transistors can be conscious, that is fine. That has nothing to do with the "computational model." The computational model is simply that any definition of consciousness based on reality ( regardless of what exactly your definition happens to be ) will be computational in nature.


That goes to his other point he brought up. Computation in nature is ubiquitous. Saying something is computational does not provide any new insight since everything is computational when looked at properly. Plus, computation really is of a different kind than what experience of sensation is.

Computation is about math and abstraction, experience of sensation is about what it feels like to be something. Those are very different categories.


What piggy is trying to do is use the fact that most neuroscience researchers don't explicitly say "yes, a gigantic system of buckets and pulleys and ropes that is turing equivalent could be conscious if it was running an unimaginably complex algorithm" as somehow evidence that they don't actually support that position. Well, that is just rhetoric from piggy -- if a person doesn't say "I don't support X" and they never say anything that is inconsistent with X, you can't just claim willy-nilly that they don't support X.

The only reason we are even talking about turing machines is because people like piggy come in and say "you realize that the computational model, if taken to its full logical conclusion, implies that a system of buckets and ropes and pulleys could be conscious, don't you?"


Yeah... and when someone points out that pulleys and cogs will do, that should be it for the Hard-AI position, done, finito, end of the story. There are humans, we are conscious because we experience sensation. There are no sensors on rope and pulleys. Rope and pulleys do not follow the same physics as we do (well, let me put that better, the physics that applies to us is different in many ways then the physics applying to us). The structure that the rope and pulleys gets put in to determines whether it is computing or not, not any property of the rope and pulleys itself (such as mass, charge...). There are lots of properties that if changed in a humans will cause unconsciousness. They are different.

The above applies the same to modern computers.


Yeah, and modern physics tells us that we are all just a bunch of particles. So what? I don't let the fact that in reality I'm just a huge swarm of particles somehow poison every other thought I have with nihilistic negativity, neither should anyone let the fact that all research suggests consciousness stems from computation somehow devalue consciousness.


All research does not say consciousness comes from computation. The researchers themselves (as per the litany of quotes given by piggy earlier) do not have any solid ideas on that front. So just try and not be nihilistic about not knowing what causes consciousness, because you probably do not.


Why? What about remembering what it is like to experience red?


The words were not remembering, it was experience of experience... Remembering the previous experience of something is a new experience. When I recall driving a car, it is not the same as the experience of driving a car. You can think about thinking because thinking is abstract, and thus, insensible in part. Experience itself is not abstract at all, hence, it can not be abstracted in the recursive manner that thinking can.

Perception of red I take to mean sensors take in light in the red wavelengths. If someone hooks up your brain in a certain way then your experience of the red light may be a certain taste, like sweetness.

Experience of red is just that, what it is like to experience red. There is no further level beyond that of experiencing perception.


Yeah but there is definitely a difference. When I focus on a red object and admire how red it is, I am fully aware of my experiencing red. When I drive by a red car on the way home and I don't even pay attention to it, I am not aware of that experience, and I would say since I am not aware of the experience I am not actually even having the experience.

Your notion of redness doesn't seem to account for such cases.


I do not need to account for it since the relevant concepts are already out there. We are in agreement that focusing on red and just having red somewhere in your visual field are definitely different in a way. The first difference is that when one focuses on something visually, the object of focus, as far as I know, goes in the center of the field. There are probably other differences for which I am not aware of at the moment.

Interesting questions do seem to be associated with this though.


It is "hard" because there is a qualitative difference in your experience of the red frowny face between when you are just typing a response and when you actually look down and see that it is a red frowny face.

If you want to say that you are simultaneously "experiencing" all the colors on your screen, then what is your term for what happens when you actually become aware of one of those colors by focusing on that pixel and saying to yourself "ah, that is red?"

You have already answered your own questions. The explicit answer to the last question is 'focus'. In both cases though there is consciousness of a red frowny face happening (unless it is obscured, distorted or partially outside the visual field, in which case you would have consciousness of some other kind).

[tensordyne]

WTF??? :boggled:

One might be forgiven for thinking you're spending too much time with Punshhh... :D

Just answer the question if you can please, or answer why specifically you finding it boggling.

[tensordyne]

Did you really mean 'infinite in magnitude'? Could you explain what you mean by that?

I have to agree, an infinite in magnitude EM field does not make sense in the context of what was being discussed.

|B| = \infty,
|E| = \infty.

I doubt that is what you meant Zeuzzz, but that is what the words mean in common parlance.

[Jeff Corey]

Please, do tell. What are the general outlines of the psych position. So far we have (in alphabetical order):

1. Bio (possibly also known as neuro)
2. Comp
3. Phys
4. Psych
5. Spirit

Any others I missed?

I should have said "behavioral psychologist". While he aknowledged that thinking, consciousness and perception existed in people, Skinner believed that these private events had no explanatory value and felt that empiricist should study publcally observable behavior. This allows the reliability of the measurement of the events to be assessed.

[Roboramma]

I should have said "behavioral psychologist". While he aknowledged that thinking, consciousness and perception existed in people, Skinner believed that these private events had no explanatory value and felt that empiricist should study publcally observable behavior. This allows the reliability of the measurement of the events to be assessed.

Is that changing, though, with modern neurobiology?

[Belz...]

BS. I know your 'some people' is I.

Are you a mind reader ? I guess you're not. Who the some people is remains to be seen. It's a prediction. I hope you're not part of it.

If you figure out how consciousness works in humans, i.e. the physical basis, not the mentally deficient idea of a computational basis, and that is put in a device, then I will gladly accept it is conscious.

The problem is, however, what will be your standard for determining if it's conscious or not ? If you conclude in advance that it is not, for instance, or if you decide on an impossible level of evidence, then you will never be satisfied, and that was my point.

You, and your fellow adherents of the computational model, do not have the correct interpretation of science. To explain why, I could tell a story about some alternate reality and how ... but to understand the story and its import to our own reality requires imagination and insight, something sorely lacking, IMHO, in the computer club here.

And again you speak in unscientific terms, all the while wearing the trappings of science. First, if you could tell a story, you would do so. You don't, therefore you can't. Second, your appeal to emotion and "insight" rather than evidence and reason is noted.

I also note that you didn't actually address what I wrote. Or rather, you write as though I didn't write what I wrote. I've already told you that science has uncovered things we never would have imagined specifically because A) imagination only works on previous experience and B) science simply doesn't work like imagination.

Than shouldn't the comp model say which ones do and which ones do not?

Oh, absolutely. I agree. But the basic idea is as simple as Pixy's "SRIP".

comp's

Stop that. My brain doesn't parse it, and keeps seeing "computer". I'm also tempted to give you a nasty label just to give you a taste of your own medecine.

[Jeff Corey]

Is that changing, though, with modern neurobiology?

No. If events can be reliably measured, they are empirical data.

[Mr. Scott]

Interesting you find him [Dennett] cuddly. I find in him a kind of confused grandfather feel who is trying to show you a magic trick that he ends up performing on himself. The smirk on Chalmers' face to me is the kind of smirk you have when you hear a devilishly hard question you do not have the answer to.

Chalmer's smirk seems independent of what he's talking about. Dennett doesn't appear confused. You just disagree with him. FWIW you can see Dennett's civility break down in his debate with Robert Wright (clip at bottom).

Yeah, I have no answer. The quale definitely seem to exist and the ability to talk about the quale exists, but how on earth the quale could possible effectuate anything is a mystery to me. Experience of sensation does seem to be non-causative, but then we can talk about it, so perhaps it must be. Or perhaps, as is the most likely case, when a new theory of mind comes around it will show how to better think about these issues and raise it's own.

That's why some people, like Dennett, have come to the conclusion that the parts of consciousness that seem to be uncomputable are an illusion. Remember it's only INSIDE the data processing in the brain where it SEEMS to be doing more than data processing.

There isn't a trace of evidence for the uncomputability of consciousness when you look at the brain from outside of the internal experience. I can claim all I want that I saw an egg jump between a magician's hands when it physically didn't -- it's an illusion of my brain's data processing. Likewise, I can claim all I want that I see a special kind of redness in my mind, but can't prove that it's not an illusion of my brain's data processing, like the egg I thought I saw jump (analogy from Nova Science Now "How does the brain work? (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWg0cWFQiiY)"). I know it's emotionally deflating to accept that your brain might be tricking you, but that doesn't mean your brain is not tricking you.

I assume you've read Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained)" and/or carefully viewed his talk "The Magic of Consciousness (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCkglFwZ7Ng)" and thoroughly understand his hypothesis.

Here's the clip where Dennett discusses epiphenomenalism with Wright and loses his cool. Some of the YouTube comments on this clip are priceless:


5:39 Is Robert [Wright] trying to imply that Dan doesn't UNDERSTAND what he's trying to suggest? I'd say Dennett rather DOES understand what you're trying to say you DICK but you're so in love with yourself that you won't ACCEPT the fact that he DISAGREES with you.
(I think I just threw up in my mouth a little)

oj858Vujb6g

[tsig]

OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about.

Have you ever taken a test for color blindness?

[tsig]

Then why did piggy bring up that a very modern book on cognitive neuroscience has a whole chapter devoted to dispelling the ideas of the Hard-AI crowd?



That goes to his other point he brought up. Computation in nature is ubiquitous. Saying something is computational does not provide any new insight since everything is computational when looked at properly. Plus, computation really is of a different kind than what experience of sensation is.

Computation is about math and abstraction, experience of sensation is about what it feels like to be something. Those are very different categories.



Yeah... and when someone points out that pulleys and cogs will do, that should be it for the Hard-AI position, done, finito, end of the story. There are humans, we are conscious because we experience sensation. There are no sensors on rope and pulleys. Rope and pulleys do not follow the same physics as we do (well, let me put that better, the physics that applies to us is different in many ways then the physics applying to us). The structure that the rope and pulleys gets put in to determines whether it is computing or not, not any property of the rope and pulleys itself (such as mass, charge...). There are lots of properties that if changed in a humans will cause unconsciousness. They are different.

The above applies the same to modern computers.



All research does not say consciousness comes from computation. The researchers themselves (as per the litany of quotes given by piggy earlier) do not have any solid ideas on that front. So just try and not be nihilistic about not knowing what causes consciousness, because you probably do not.



The words were not remembering, it was experience of experience... Remembering the previous experience of something is a new experience. When I recall driving a car, it is not the same as the experience of driving a car. You can think about thinking because thinking is abstract, and thus, insensible in part. Experience itself is not abstract at all, hence, it can not be abstracted in the recursive manner that thinking can.

Perception of red I take to mean sensors take in light in the red wavelengths. If someone hooks up your brain in a certain way then your experience of the red light may be a certain taste, like sweetness.

Experience of red is just that, what it is like to experience red. There is no further level beyond that of experiencing perception.



I do not need to account for it since the relevant concepts are already out there. We are in agreement that focusing on red and just having red somewhere in your visual field are definitely different in a way. The first difference is that when one focuses on something visually, the object of focus, as far as I know, goes in the center of the field. There are probably other differences for which I am not aware of at the moment.

Interesting questions do seem to be associated with this though.



You have already answered your own questions. The explicit answer to the last question is 'focus'. In both cases though there is consciousness of a red frowny face happening (unless it is obscured, distorted or partially outside the visual field, in which case you would have consciousness of some other kind).

You seem to be seeing red.

[Jeff Corey]

Have you ever taken a test for color blindness?

I've given tests for color blindness. What is your point?

[PixyMisa]

Than shouldn't the comp model say which ones do and which ones do not? Possibly why?
It does and has, dozens of times. Try to pay attention.

Plus, that is the most annoying aspect of talking to comp's, they do not even have a conception of experience of sensation (consciousness).
You're just plain lying now. And engaging in equivocation and ad hominem attacks at the same time. Tish.

[PixyMisa]

I have to agree, an infinite in magnitude EM field does not make sense in the context of what was being discussed.

|B| = \infty,
|E| = \infty.

I doubt that is what you meant Zeuzzz, but that is what the words mean in common parlance.
Bear in mind that Zeuzzz is convinced there is a largest integer, so when he says "infinite", he could actually mean... Pretty much anything, or nothing at all.

[tsig]

OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about.

I've given tests for color blindness. What is your point?


Since we can test for color blindness we have a scientific way to determine what red is perceived as by humans.

[Roboramma]

No. If events can be reliably measured, they are empirical data.

Right, I think that was my point: if neurobiology gives us access to thought and perception, then those become empirical facts that can be studied.

I understand Skinner's viewpoint and think it makes sense to some extent, but as we develop more tools to study the brain, we have greater access to what previously might have been "private events".

In other words, when you say:
While he aknowledged that thinking, consciousness and perception existed in people, Skinner believed that these private events had no explanatory value and felt that empiricist should study publcally observable behavior. There's the assumption that "thinking, consciousness and perception" are private events, but as neurobiology advances they become "publicly observable behavior".

[annnnoid]

It does and has, dozens of times. Try to pay attention.


You're just plain lying now. And engaging in equivocation and ad hominem attacks at the same time. Tish.


You are, as usual, patronizing, insulting, and rude…but what else is new?

….and you conveniently missed a question. I’m interested in the response so I’m sure tensordyne won’t mind if I remind you of it.


We don't care about this "p-consciousness" of yours. We care about real consciousness in the real world, and real science works just fine for that.

OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about.

[Roboramma]

OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about. One way would be to put you in an MRI machine and show you red, then show you blue, notice the differences in your brain's response. Then do the same with me. See if the differences are the same.

Another way is cruder: does the colour red invoke similar emotional and behavioral responses in you as in me? If so, that's evidence that your experience of red is similar to mine.

Each of those is just one small piece of evidence, of course, but they are certainly meaningful.

[tensordyne]

Are you a mind reader ? I guess you're not. Who the some people is remains to be seen. It's a prediction. I hope you're not part of it.


I won't be, the scientists will find the physical basis and then the comp position will seem like the unscientific and nutty position it is to most everyone.


The problem is, however, what will be your standard for determining if it's conscious or not ? If you conclude in advance that it is not, for instance, or if you decide on an impossible level of evidence, then you will never be satisfied, and that was my point.


Since the only thing we can be sure of that is conscious is us (most likely invertebrates too). When we figure out the physical basis of consciousness in us that will be evidence enough for me.


And again you speak in unscientific terms, all the while wearing the trappings of science. First, if you could tell a story, you would do so. You don't, therefore you can't. Second, your appeal to emotion and "insight" rather than evidence and reason is noted.


I don't, therefore I can't, huh? That is not very good logic because how can you possibly know what was in my head? I was in the middle of starting a story, but I just realized it would probably be pointless, just like this forum thread.

Yeah, and if I made a bunch of arguments for Special Relativity and someone does not get it, then I say "oh well, I guess you need insight" the response will look pretty similar to the one above.


I also note that you didn't actually address what I wrote. Or rather, you write as though I didn't write what I wrote. I've already told you that science has uncovered things we never would have imagined specifically because A) imagination only works on previous experience and B) science simply doesn't work like imagination.


Uhm, OK. Maybe I lost track of the flow, but I do not see anything wrong with the above. You do need imagination to understand science theories though.


Oh, absolutely. I agree. But the basic idea is as simple as Pixy's "SRIP".


Ah, PixyMisa's SRIP. That is so 1980's, as well as discredited in Cognitive Neuroscience.


Stop that. My brain doesn't parse it, and keeps seeing "computer". I'm also tempted to give you a nasty label just to give you a taste of your own medecine.

What is so nasty about the word comp? You can use the word phys if you want to for me.

[PixyMisa]

You are, as usual, patronizing, insulting, and rude
Yes, but I am right and you are wrong.

…but what else is new?
Nothing at all.

….and you conveniently missed a question. I’m interested in the response so I’m sure tensordyne won’t mind if I remind you of it.
Already answered, before he even asked the question.

[PixyMisa]

I won't be, the scientists will find the physical basis and then the comp position will seem like the unscientific and nutty position it is to most everyone.
The physical basis is computation. How could it even make sense for it to be anything else? You're talking about information processing taking place in a computer - what do you expect consciousness to be? Cheese? Bedsprings?

Ah, PixyMisa's SRIP. That is so 1980's, as well as discredited in Cognitive Neuroscience.
[citation needed]

What is so nasty about the word comp? You can use the word phys if you want to for me.
No, what you believe in is magic. We'll use that word.

[tensordyne]

One way would be to put you in an MRI machine and show you red, then show you blue, notice the differences in your brain's response. Then do the same with me. See if the differences are the same.

Another way is cruder: does the colour red invoke similar emotional and behavioral responses in you as in me? If so, that's evidence that your experience of red is similar to mine.

Each of those is just one small piece of evidence, of course, but they are certainly meaningful.

Excellent! See PixyMisa, the above is how a scientist thinks. The above assumes implicitly that physical systems that are identical (or at least share the same physical characteristics to some extent) will have the same or similar experiences of sensation. This assumption is outside of the normal practice of science. That is why I brought up the principle of uniformitarianism earlier.

The only other way would be to have some machine that allows one to experience what another entity is experiencing, but I know of no such device. Unfortunately, even then the question of how we know that the device actually transfers the experience would come up.

I do not know, tough question.

[rocketdodger]

Then why did piggy bring up that a very modern book on cognitive neuroscience has a whole chapter devoted to dispelling the ideas of the Hard-AI crowd? Did you read the chapter? If not -- end of story.

That goes to his other point he brought up. Computation in nature is ubiquitous. Saying something is computational does not provide any new insight since everything is computational when looked at properly. Plus, computation really is of a different kind than what experience of sensation is.

Computation is about math and abstraction, experience of sensation is about what it feels like to be something. Those are very different categories.

I have explained a dozen times that the "computation" spoken of in the computational model is fundamentally about attractors in physical systems.

That invalidates all your statements about computation. You don't really understand what it is, and neither does piggy.

Yeah... and when someone points out that pulleys and cogs will do, that should be it for the Hard-AI position, done, finito, end of the story. There are humans, we are conscious because we experience sensation. There are no sensors on rope and pulleys. Rope and pulleys do not follow the same physics as we do (well, let me put that better, the physics that applies to us is different in many ways then the physics applying to us). The structure that the rope and pulleys gets put in to determines whether it is computing or not, not any property of the rope and pulleys itself (such as mass, charge...). There are lots of properties that if changed in a humans will cause unconsciousness. They are different.

I just think you don't have much imagination, no offense.

Because for you to state that ropes and pulleys and cogs will not do implies that you are capable of imagining what a system composed of trillions of ropes, pulleys, and cogs would entail.

If you had done so, I don't think your dismissal would have been so casual.

What I think is that you imagined some lame version, like maybe what one would see in a Rube Goldberg machine put together by college kids, and you just reach the conclusion that hey, adding trillions more parts wouldn't change anything.


The above applies the same to modern computers.


The above applies to your conclusion about what applies to modern computers.

All research does not say consciousness comes from computation. The researchers themselves (as per the litany of quotes given by piggy earlier) do not have any solid ideas on that front. So just try and not be nihilistic about not knowing what causes consciousness, because you probably do not.

I already showed that piggy's quotes were mined and taken out of context.

He misrepresents the state of cognitive science and artificial intelligence, plain and simple.

Why don't you just look for yourself? Please, don't just take my word for it. Do some looking on your own.


I do not need to account for it since the relevant concepts are already out there. We are in agreement that focusing on red and just having red somewhere in your visual field are definitely different in a way. The first difference is that when one focuses on something visually, the object of focus, as far as I know, goes in the center of the field. There are probably other differences for which I am not aware of at the moment.


What do you mean you are not aware of the differences?

The difference is that when you focus on something you are consciously aware of it.

I have to question your ability to use introspection as a tool if you don't realize that the conscious awareness of an experience is different from the alternative.

Let me ask you this, I guess -- do you think it would be possible to have conscious awareness of the red frowny face, if there were no experience of red?

[PixyMisa]

Excellent! See PixyMisa, the above is how a scientist thinks.
Yes. Of course, this is exactly what I've been telling you; you just haven't been listening.

[tensordyne]

The physical basis is computation. How could it even make sense for it to be anything else? You're talking about information processing taking place in a computer - what do you expect consciousness to be? Cheese? Bedsprings?


An EM field based phenomena. Even if it is not the EM field, I am sure it will be something else of a physics origin because computation can only address behavior. Hey, I am not the one who believes pulleys and wheels can be conscious (lulz).


[citation needed]


Uhm, piggy already provided plenty. For the rest, just read a textbook on Cognitive Neuroscience and note that they do not talk much about running computer programs.


No, what you believe in is magic. We'll use that word.

Of course, you can say what you want. Since I am not an admin I will not have much to say about it either.

[PixyMisa]

An EM field based phenomena.
How? How does that make any sense at all?

First, consciousness is an informational process, one of complex references to abstract representations. The only way you can do that is through computation. Anything else is a non-starter.

Second, we know perfectly well what is going on with the EM field in the brain. We can measure it, we can influence it, and it is physically impossible for the gross EM field to be causally linked to consciousness. You can drown it in interference without affecting consciousness at all.

It's a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is somehow used for
signalling or synchronisation between neurons. It's just not true.

It's not a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is the cause of consciousness. It's like proposing that earthworms cause thunderstorms. On the Moon.
Even if it is not the EM field, I am sure it will be something else of a physics origin because computation can only address behavior.
Two points here that have already been explained to you dozens of times: First, computation is physical; second, everything is behaviour.

Uhm, piggy already provided plenty.
Nope. He quotemines and misrepresents; what he doesn't do is cite.

For the rest, just read a textbook on Cognitive Neuroscience and note that they do not talk much about running computer programs.
So? That objection just means that you still don't know what a computer is.

[Zeuzzz]

Magic? Seems a bit of a weird word to call something scientifically accepted.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7uyw5y_tHEM
John Kounios: The neuroscience behind epiphanies

Einstein used to say that he came here to the Institute for Advanced Studies simply for the privilege of walking home with Kurt Godel. And what was it that held this most unlikely of couples together. On the one hand you’ve got the warm and avuncular Einstein and on the other the rather cold, wizened and withdrawn Kurt Godel. The answer for this strange companionship comes I think from something else that Einstein said.. He said that "God may be subtle but he’s not malicious." And what does that mean? Well, it means for Einstein is that however complicated the universe might be there will always be beautiful rules by which it works. Godel believed the same idea from his point of view to mean, that God would never have put us into a creation that we could not then understand.


The question is, how is it that Kurt Gödel can believe that God is not malicious? That it’s all understandable? Because Gödel is the man who has proved that some things cannot be proven logically and rationally. So surely God must be malicious? The way he gets out of it is that Gödel, like Einstein, believes deeply in Intuition - That we can know things outside of logic, maths and computation; because we just intuit them. And they both believed this, because they both felt it. They have both had their moments of intuition, moments of sudden conceptual realisation that were by far more than just chance.


Has there been an AI computer developed that shows similar intuition or signs of altruism and empathy?

According to my notes, Gödel’s response went as follows: It should be possible to form a complete theory of human behavior, i.e., to predict from the hereditary and environmental givens what a person will do. However, if a mischievous person learns of this theory, he can act in a way so as to negate it. Hence I conclude that such a theory exists, but that no mischievous person will learn of it. In the same way, time travel is possible, but no person will ever manage to kill his past self. Gödel laughed his laugh then, and concluded, The a priori is greatly neglected. Logic is very powerful. Apropos of the free will question, on another occasion he said: There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.

[PixyMisa]

Magic? Seems a bit of a weird word to call something scientifically accepted.
Well, it would be if it were, but it's not so it isn't.

[tensordyne]

Not interested in the rest of the post but the following two parts piqued my interest.


I have explained a dozen times that the "computation" spoken of in the computational model is fundamentally about attractors in physical systems.


Do tell, I love fractals and strange attractors and all that, if that is what you are referring to. It would be interesting perhaps to hear a hypothesis on consciousness related to fractals.


I just think you don't have much imagination, no offense.


None taken. As long as you are being honest, I am happy.


Because for you to state that ropes and pulleys and cogs will not do implies that you are capable of imagining what a system composed of trillions of ropes, pulleys, and cogs would entail.

If you had done so, I don't think your dismissal would have been so casual.

What I think is that you imagined some lame version, like maybe what one would see in a Rube Goldberg machine put together by college kids, and you just reach the conclusion that hey, adding trillions more parts wouldn't change anything.


The above is not what I thought at all. I did not have to consider complexity because there is nothing about it that is important to the question of the basis of consciousness (the experience of sensation version of consciousness, just in case there is confusion).

[PixyMisa]

The above is not what I thought at all. I did not have to consider complexity because there is nothing about it that is important to the question of the basis of consciousness (the experience of sensation version of consciousness, just in case there is confusion).
What is the basis for this assertion?

[tensordyne]

You seem to be seeing red.

Not sure if I should laugh but the above at least made me smile.

[tensordyne]

How? How does that make any sense at all?


The configuration of the EM field inside a Faraday cage will determine what is experienced. The question would then be to figure out which configurations lead to which experiences (that is where the scientific method would come in).

Information processing can help in determining what the field configuration will be, in as far as how such processing influences the field's configuration. If the EM field is what consciousness is as a physical substrate, then the processing can only configure the field that leads to consciousness (an important question on its own, of course), not create consciousness itself, as that is the job of the field!


First, consciousness is an informational process, one of complex references to abstract representations. The only way you can do that is through computation. Anything else is a non-starter.


You are stuck in your own abstractions PixyMisa. It is a hypothesis that computation leads to consciousness (my version, not yours, in your version you must do computation of some kind, I agree). That is all it is.


Second, we know perfectly well what is going on with the EM field in the brain. We can measure it, we can influence it, and it is physically impossible for the gross EM field to be causally linked to consciousness. You can drown it in interference without affecting consciousness at all.


I love this one. So I guess you have not heard of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). For the following video skip ahead to 11:29 if you want to see it in action.

GOCUH7TxHRI

Or here is an interesting one.

XJtNPqCj-iA


It's a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is somehow used for signalling or synchronisation between neurons. It's just not true.


That does not seem to be what the newest research says.

SrB_pALdudk

Since I am sure you will not want to watch the whole video, just go to about 12:00. Also check out 21:00.


It's not a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is the cause of consciousness. It's like proposing that earthworms cause thunderstorms. On the Moon.


The above is not a valid argument for anything.


Two points here that have already been explained to you dozens of times: First, computation is physical; second, everything is behaviour.


The spin of an electron is not behavior. The mass of a watermelon is not behavior. Your consciousness is not behavior. The very word consciousness itself is not a verb word (behavior), it is an adjective word (property).


So? That objection just means that you still don't know what a computer is.

A computer is a system that is Turing Complete. Does not change anything.

If you were correct then cognitive neuroscientists would study running computer programs to help figure out how consciousness works. They would do this because it should not matter whether they study running programs or the brain, as the brain and the computer running the program would only be different in terms of complexity (why am I repeating your own position back to you?). Since they do not, nothing in the argument is invalidated as such.

[Zeuzzz]

Has there been an AI computer developed that shows similar intuition or signs of altruism and empathy?


bump

[tensordyne]

I have to forgive McFadden for saying in the video "the reference frame of a photon" since there is no such thing according to physics (he is not a physicist after all but a biologist). He was getting kind of out there in that part of the talk in the video I linked to earlier. Oh well, the rest is pretty solid in terms of science (except parts of the question and answer, but that is not McFadden's fault because it was some of the posers of the questions who went into woo land).

Interesting idea though this CEMI as far as I can tell.

[tensordyne]

bump

I do not know about altruism or empathy (I am not sure how one would even establish the same) but I know of no computer program that ever created a math theorem that is not the result using a set of already known axioms and combining them together. In other words, a computer has never passed the "mathematician writing a paper in a math journal" type of Turing test, as far as I know at least (CYA).

[Jeff Corey]

Since we can test for color blindness we have a scientific way to determine what red is perceived as by humans.

Not really. The test tells whether a particular human can discriminate between certain visible wavelengths when apparent brightness is controlled for. It completely relies on the measurement of observable behavior and can be accomplished in nonverbal animals such as the pigeon..

[Belz...]

I won't be, the scientists will find the physical basis and then the comp position will seem like the unscientific and nutty position it is to most everyone.

Wait, wait. That's the part of my post you chose to answer ?

This latest post of yours, containing not arguments or evidence but rhetoric and, amazingly, a prediction of the future where you will be vindicated, is very sad.

Computation in nature is ubiquitous.

And yet it's been explained to you numerous times what kind of computation we're talking about.

An EM field based phenomena.

An EM field is conscious ? How does that make more sense ? Because it sounds more science-fictiony ?

Since I am not an admin I will not have much to say about it either.

What if you were an admin ? Would you ban words you don't like ?

You are stuck in your own abstractions PixyMisa.

And you are stuck in your common sense.

[PixyMisa]

The configuration of the EM field inside a Faraday cage will determine what is experienced.
First, the brain is not a Faraday cage.

Second, how does that make any sense at all?

You are stuck in your own abstractions PixyMisa.
Nope, just reality.

It is a hypothesis that computation leads to consciousness (my version, not yours, in your version you must do computation of some kind, I agree).
Nope. It's a conclusion, for the reasons I just stated, and which you just ignored.

I love this one. So I guess you have not heard of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS).
Yes. And guess what? TMS is many orders of magnitude stronger than the EM field of the brain. That's what it takes to make a change.

The electric field of a fluorescent light at a distance of a metre will overwhelm the brain's EM field. And guess what happens to your consciousness when you walk past a fluorescent light?

Absolutely nothing.

The above is not a valid argument for anything.
That's my point: You are not presenting an argument, just waving your hands about.

The spin of an electron is not behavior.
Yes it is.

The mass of a watermelon is not behavior.
Yes it is.

Your consciousness is not behavior.
Yes it is.

The very word consciousness itself is not a verb word (behavior), it is an adjective word (property).
Wow. No. No, you are so very wrong.

Consciousness looks like a noun, not an adjective, but it's a process and not an object or event, so it is not only a verb, but an infinitive. In short, it's a gerund.

A computer is a system that is Turing Complete. Does not change anything.
It shows that your early objection is entirely irrelevant.

If you were correct then cognitive neuroscientists would study running computer programs to help figure out how consciousness works.
Well, first, they do, and second, no. A neural network is a computer. A brain is a computer. Studying the operation of a brain at the signalling and switching level is mathematically identical to studying the operation of a program in a Von Neumann architecture computer.

Until you grasp that point, nothing you say on the subject can be taken seriously.

They would do this because it should not matter whether they study running programs or the brain, as the brain and the computer running the program would only be different in terms of complexity (why am I repeating your own position back to you?).
It doesn't matter in terms of mathematical identity. It does matter for a variety of practical reasons.

Since they do not
They do.

nothing in the argument is invalidated as such.
Except that, of course, you are entirely wrong from beginning to end.

[PixyMisa]

bump

http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/05/even-robots-can-be-heroes.html

Using genetic algorithms, competing AIs in the experiment evolved altruism.

[dlorde]

Just answer the question if you can please, or answer why specifically you finding it boggling.
I find it boggling because it makes no sense at all. It reminds me of Lewis Carroll's 'Why is a raven like a writing desk?'.

You presumably meant something by it that failed to make it into the post. Care to explain?

[dlorde]

... everything is computational when looked at properly. Plus, computation really is of a different kind than what experience of sensation is.
So, by your own logic, either everything isn't computational when looked at properly, or you're not looking at the experience of sensation properly. Which is it?

ETA or perhaps it's the unsupported assertion that there is a proper way to look at things that makes them computational...

[dlorde]

I don't, therefore I can't, huh?The fact is, you didn't.

I was in the middle of starting a storyNo, you said you could tell a story.

I just realized it would probably be pointless, just like this forum thread.So why mention it at all? why continue posting? "I could tell a story to show you're wrong, but it would be pointless" - how lame do you think that looks?

Yeah, and if I made a bunch of arguments for Special Relativity and someone does not get it, then I say "oh well, I guess you need insight" the response will look pretty similar to the one above.
Yeah, but that never happened. What actually happened was that you tried to take the scientific high ground with appeals to insight and intuition - and when you were pulled up on it, you could only bluster a hypothetical.

Ah, PixyMisa's SRIP. That is so 1980's, as well as discredited in Cognitive Neuroscience.
The journal? Interesting - do you have a reference or link? (or are you making it up?)

What is so nasty about the word comp? You can use the word phys if you want to for me.
The word itself is value free. It's your use of it that is irritating. You have already been politely asked to refrain doing this with thread contributors; if you can manage to just respond to individuals, rather than some fictitious grouping, it would be less wasteful of everyone's time.

[dlorde]

.. For the rest, just read a textbook on Cognitive Neuroscience and note that they do not talk much about running computer programs.
That's it? you're claiming "they do not talk much about X" == "X is discredited" ??

[dlorde]

... I know of no computer program that ever created a math theorem that is not the result using a set of already known axioms and combining them together. In other words, a computer has never passed the "mathematician writing a paper in a math journal" type of Turing test, as far as I know at least (CYA).

What is maths based on, if not axioms? How many mathematicians writing theorem papers for math journals do you suppose have done so without 'using a set of already known axioms and combining them together'?

Do you know of a maths theorem that doesn't use the axioms of maths?

[rocketdodger]

Do tell, I love fractals and strange attractors and all that, if that is what you are referring to. It would be interesting perhaps to hear a hypothesis on consciousness related to fractals.


No it has nothing to do with fractals, sorry.

At the physical level, a computation is when the state of one system changes attraction spaces because of the attraction space some other system is in, all else being equal.

Consider a simple set of two molecules that are interacting. Each molecule, A and B, is a system in its own right -- system A and system B.

The aggregation of particles that make up a molecule has an infinite number of states that they might possibly take but nevertheless there are certain attractor states ( or sets of states, since attractors don't need to be a single state ) that "define" what the configuration of the particles will settle to, all else being equal. For example, a stable molecule like benzene has an attractor which corresponds to the ideal benzene ring -- all else being equal, the particles in the benzene molecule stay in a state that is within the attraction space of that ideal benzene ring attractor. They can vibrate all they want, and orbit each other, and bump into each other, and do all the stuff that particles do, but nevertheless their configuration as a whole remains.

If you add some molecules that benzene can react with, or add energy that can lead to a change, or remove energy, whatever, and the benzene molecule changes such that we would now call it a different chemical, well now the particles are in a state that corresponds to a different attractor, perhaps something like a benzene ring with stuff attached, or maybe the ring decomposed into two other molecules, whatever. They are now in a different attraction space. When the benzene ring reacted, the particles of the system changed attraction spaces.

This should be obvious. What might not also be obvious, though, is that if there is some other particle system -- some other molecule, in our example -- that also changes attraction spaces because of the particles in the benzene changing attraction spaces, something special has happened. A computation has occurred. Because molecule B doesn't need to behave in any of the ways that molecule A does in relation to the environment, yet molecule B is still affected by those relationships. If there is too much heat energy, and molecule A reacts, molecule B might change behavior as well -- even if molecule B doesn't change behavior due to heat energy.

Conceptually, molecule B "uses" molecule A to partition the infinite amount of environmental states to a much smaller set of classes of states. Every state where molecule A doesn't react is one class, and molecule B is behaving one way if the environmental state is of that class. Every state where molecule A has reacted is another class, and molecule B behaves another way if the environmental state is of that class instead.

So with only two systems, you should be noticing a pattern of complexity reduction:

( infinite environmental state ) --> ( finite number of attraction spaces in system A ) --> ( even smaller number of attraction spaces in system B ).

And that, fundamentally, is computation. It shouldn't be hard to imagine putting about a trillion extra steps of complexity reduction in there and ending up with the simple binary behavior of you deciding to turn left instead of right on your way home from work despite the fact that the environment around you is in one state out of an infinite number of possibilities. How does that infinite possibility reduce to a simple binary choice on your part? The complexity reduction of computation.

The thing is, what silicon computers do is also just complexity reduction, using the same principles. The computations that take place because of the transistors of computers is just as much based on changing attraction spaces as the computations that take place because of the biochemical molecules in your cells. And that is why anyone that actually understands physics and biology -- hopefully, most of the neurobiologists out there -- are supporters of the computational model.

EDIT -- this should also dispel the strawman of "since computation is everywhere, and not everything is conscious, then computation must not be the root of consciousness" because it should be obvious that a dozen steps of complexity reduction, such as what you might find in a rock, don't lead to the same behavior as a few trillion steps, such as you might find in a conscious human.

[steenkh]

The thing is, what silicon computers do is also just complexity reduction, using the same principles. The computations that take place because of the transistors of computers is just as much based on changing attraction spaces as the computations that take place because of the biochemical molecules in your cells. And that is why anyone that actually understands physics and biology -- hopefully, most of the neurobiologists out there -- are supporters of the computational model.
I must say that I support the computational model because I believe the brain is a computer, and not because it makes computations, such any physical interaction does. There is much more to a computer than computations.

EDIT -- this should also dispel the strawman of "since computation is everywhere, and not everything is conscious, then computation must not be the root of consciousness" because it should be obvious that a dozen steps of complexity reduction, such as what you might find in a rock, don't lead to the same behavior as a few trillion steps, such as you might find in a conscious human.
And I am also convinced that no amount of computations will necessarily lead to consciousness.

[tensordyne]

What is the basis for this assertion?

The "basis of consciousness" and complexity each belong to different categories of subject.

Imagine you had a box inside of which, for whatever reason, we all agree consciousness is occurring. The box has dials on it that can be turned to affect the state of the consciousness. Anything going on outside the box we can not agree on as far as consciousness goes.

So we hook up a computer to the box that can control the dials. What can the computer do to the consciousness in the box? It can make it more complicated. It can, say, make a red dot blink in some odd pattern in the visual field of the consciousness inside the box by adjusting the appropriate dial. It could play back some series of instructions that cause the consciousness to experience a series of sensations by adjusting the relevant dials. That is all we can agree the computer can or should be able to do in this case.

Now place the computer and the box inside a bigger box with its own set of dials for control of the computer/box system. What would a computer hooked up to the dials of such a system be able to do such that we could all agree upon those abilities without reservations? The same as before. It could coordinate and control the consciousness inside the box inside the box/computer system. That is all it could do (as far as agreement is concerned).

Of course we can continue doing this indefinitely, creating bigger and bigger boxes all the way up as much as you want, and at each stage the computer would only be able to control and coordinate consciousness, never create it (as far as agreement is concerned). What if we open up the box though? Say we open it up and inside of it is a computer hooked up to another box. It would seem perverse to say then that the computer inside the box can do something the computers outside the box can not be agreed upon to do, which is create consciousness.

And so it goes. Of course the chance of the computer club here getting the import of the above is nearly 0, but, oh well, I write for the lurkers more than anyone else ;)

[tensordyne]

What is maths based on, if not axioms? How many mathematicians writing theorem papers for math journals do you suppose have done so without 'using a set of already known axioms and combining them together'?

Do you know of a maths theorem that doesn't use the axioms of maths?

Mathematicians write proofs. Proofs are a series arguments about abstract entities and their relationships. It is often the case that the arguments used will be based both on known axioms as well as arguments that are new and unknown at that point.

Take the theorem that the square root of 2 is irrational. Before it was discovered by the Pythagorean school that proof by contradiction is a method of proving something in math they had the proof. The proof depends on the idea of proof by contradiction. You could program in proof by contradiction as a method for a proof checker program to use after the Pythagoreans discovered it, but we do not have computer programs that do the equivalent of the above (so far as I know).

In more general terms Gödel's incompleteness theorems:


are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic.


We do not seem to be limited in the way above; computers are.

[tensordyne]

So, by your own logic, either everything isn't computational when looked at properly, or you're not looking at the experience of sensation properly. Which is it?

ETA or perhaps it's the unsupported assertion that there is a proper way to look at things that makes them computational...

I can not make you understand that computation and consciousness are of two different categories, you just have to understand why on your own or not. The point is that you, and everyone else who buys into the Hard-AI type stance, do not look at experience of sensation correctly. You do not take it in for itself what it is without the added baggage of various ideas.

Experience of sensation is a phenomena that just exists. Trying to figure out how the experience comes about from the physical world is one of the main goals of science. Anything else is hypothesis.

[dlorde]

I can not make you understand that computation and consciousness are of two different categories
Default hypothesis (see below for reasons): consciousness is a computational process. You haven't presented any evidence or arguments to refute that.

The point is that you, and everyone else who buys into the Hard-AI type stance, do not look at experience of sensation correctly.
Evidence?
Did you read Churchland's Chimeric Colours paper (http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/Churchland-chimeric-colors.pdf)? It's pretty rare that you can literally use the evidence of your own eyes to empirically validate such a theory; what is your refutation of his conclusions?

You do not take it in for itself what it is without the added baggage of various ideas.Could you rephrase that so it makes sense?

Experience of sensation is a phenomena that just exists. Trying to figure out how the experience comes about from the physical world is one of the main goals of science. Anything else is hypothesis.A phenomenon [singular].

The available evidence suggests: consciousness is an activity of the brain; the brain is a neural network or aggregation of neural networks; neural networks are computational; ergo, the brain's activities are computational; ergo, consciousness is computational.

If you have contradictory evidence, or a rational alternative hypothesis, feel free to present it.

[Mr. Scott]

An EM field based phenomena.

Ok, from what I know about EM fields, there doesn't seem to be anything about them that can be responsible for consciousness. Correct me if I'm wrong.

I'm assuming you don't mean that any and all EM fields are conscious, right?

So, what's different about a conscious EM field that makes it not like an ordinary, unconscious EM field -- a difference we might be able to measure from outside the field and define in terms of known physics?

If you have a conscious EM field and divide in two, will each half still be conscious? Then divide one of those halves in half again. Is a quarter of a conscious field conscious? Keep dividing. Can you go on forever? Why not?

What kind of EM field is conscious, and how is it generated? How is, a red quale EM field detected by the rest of the brain so that not just the red apple, but the red quale, can be reported to the world? Why does the brain even bother with adding the quale, by creating, then detecting, its EM field?

Is there any evidence EM fields are responsible for consciousness?

[PixyMisa]

I can not make you understand that computation and consciousness are of two different categories
We understand that this is your belief. You need to understand that this is dualism, your position is logically incoherent, and you believe in magic.

[PixyMisa]

Of course we can continue doing this indefinitely, creating bigger and bigger boxes all the way up as much as you want, and at each stage the computer would only be able to control and coordinate consciousness, never create it (as far as agreement is concerned). What if we open up the box though? Say we open it up and inside of it is a computer hooked up to another box. It would seem perverse to say then that the computer inside the box can do something the computers outside the box can not be agreed upon to do, which is create consciousness.
This is Cartesian dualism. You're a dualist.

[PixyMisa]

Evidence?
Did you read Churchland's Chimeric Colours paper (http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/Churchland-chimeric-colors.pdf)? It's pretty rare that you can literally use the evidence of your own eyes to empirically validate such a theory; what is your refutation of his conclusions?
Thanks for the link, I couldn't remember the name for those colours.

That goes straight back to what I was saying earlier - that the visual perception pathway is not a black box; that if someone had their subjective perception of red and blue reversed relative to others, we could not only tell, we could work out (in principle) at which stage of the pathway the wires got crossed.

[Belz...]

The configuration of the EM field inside a Faraday cage will determine what is experienced.

Pixy is right, Tensor. If the EM field theory is correct, and it is interesting at least, our consciousness would be disrupted by a lot of things we interact with every day. It's easily falsified.

Your consciousness is not behavior.

Again, a bare assertion. It's one thing to have a position, but another thing entirely to do little more than preach it.

[Belz...]

No it has nothing to do with fractals, sorry.

Best post in the threat so far. Nominated.

[Belz...]

The "basis of consciousness" and complexity each belong to different categories of subject.

Imagine you had a box inside of which, for whatever reason, we all agree consciousness is occurring. The box has dials on it that can be turned to affect the state of the consciousness.

If you already agree that it's conscious, then you're already one step further than you are now.

Joking aside, if your box can affect the consciousness, you already should have a good idea of how consciousness works even if you don't open the box.

[Belz...]

I can not make you understand that computation and consciousness are of two different categories, you just have to understand why on your own or not.

Another assertion. Replace "computation and consciousness" with "physics and god" and you might see how your post sounds.

[dlorde]

Best post in the threat so far...

+1 :clap:

[Jeff Corey]

We understand that this is your belief. You need to understand that this is dualism, your position is logically incoherent, and you believe in magic.

No, no and no.

[PixyMisa]

No, no and no.
As much as I respect your opinion, yes. tensordyne is making a statement of dualism, he is a dualist, and he does believe in magic.

He says:

Experience of sensation is a phenomena that just exists.
"Just exists"?

He says:
In more general terms Gödel's incompleteness theorems:

are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic.
We do not seem to be limited in the way above; computers are.
That's not just magic, that's necromancy. It's the abandonment of all logic and reason.

He says:
Imagine you had a box inside of which, for whatever reason, we all agree consciousness is occurring. The box has dials on it that can be turned to affect the state of the consciousness. Anything going on outside the box we can not agree on as far as consciousness goes.
...
Of course we can continue doing this indefinitely, creating bigger and bigger boxes all the way up as much as you want, and at each stage the computer would only be able to control and coordinate consciousness, never create it (as far as agreement is concerned). What if we open up the box though? Say we open it up and inside of it is a computer hooked up to another box. It would seem perverse to say then that the computer inside the box can do something the computers outside the box can not be agreed upon to do, which is create consciousness.
That's dualism. He's looking for the magic bean, and cannot conceive that no such thing is necessary. Well, partly because he ascribes logical impossibilities to the human intellect; once you've done that, any conversation on the subject is pretty much doomed.

[rocketdodger]

I must say that I support the computational model because I believe the brain is a computer, and not because it makes computations, such any physical interaction does. There is much more to a computer than computations.

Yes but we have to be specific as to why, though. I agree that the human brain is turing equivalent, for example, but I'm not entirely sure that turing equivalency is required for consciousness. The fact is, you can get a very complex neural network that has very complex behavior that isn't turing equivalent, at least on the face of things.

I suppose there might be a way to take a chipmunk brain, for example, and somehow "trick" the chipmunk into executing the turing equivalent operations by disguising acorns as instructions or whatever, but even then it isn't clear to me that it would work.

Furthermore I don't think the notion of computation needs to be necessarily linked with turing equivalency, because the fact is we can have computations without turing equivalency. A small number of transistors ( 1, in fact ) can execute a "computation" yet many more are required for full turing equivalency.

Also it seems like having such a strict notion of what a "computer" is will preclude many things we ( well, I ) consider computers, like cells.

So my position is that computation occurs in a ton of places, but things like cells, computers, and brains, are just very very very good at it, whereas rocks and bowls of soup are not so good at it. This follows from the notion of computation being a form of complexity reduction. In that sense, yes the brain is a "computer" like a computer is a "computer" but not because what is going on in the brain is qualitatively different from what goes on in a bowl of soup but rather because it is just much more organized -- like a "computer."

And I am also convinced that no amount of computations will necessarily lead to consciousness.

Agreed. However we can be sure that the inverse is true, that there is a required threshold amount of computations necessary for consciousness.

[rocketdodger]

Best post in the threat so far. Nominated.

Note that this is just a formal definition of the behavior Pixy ( well, anyone with common sense ) calls "switching."

You can thank westprog for forcing me to come up with it !!

[steenkh]

Yes but we have to be specific as to why, though. I agree that the human brain is turing equivalent, for example, but I'm not entirely sure that turing equivalency is required for consciousness. The fact is, you can get a very complex neural network that has very complex behavior that isn't turing equivalent, at least on the face of things.
I agree. Your comment opened my eyes to something that has been nagging me for some time that I could not spot. I think that because all neural networks can be simulated on a computer, I falsely drew the conclusion that all neural networks would be Turing equivalent.

It may interest the reader here that in the June 2012 issue of Scientific American, there is an article about the endeavour to build a complete computer simulation of a brain (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=human-brain-project-digital-simulation-neuron) (this is behind a paywall, sorry). I found it particularly interesting that they want the simulated brain to grow from a few cells to full size just like the real one, and that is a neat solution to the problem that it is impossible to trace every single neural pathway in a grown-up brain. Apparently, they have found that in nature, the brain consists of building blocks of "brain columns", and when a brain grows, it just adds more and more columns, and the wrinkling, neural pathways and all comes naturally.

Our knowledge of brains and cells is of course not complete, but the simulation will be on the level of single proteins working within the cells, and when new knowledge comes up, the simulation will be upgraded. The first target is a functioning rat or mouse brain, but it is expected that even this smallish target is outside the reach of present computers.

Agreed. However we can be sure that the inverse is true, that there is a required threshold amount of computations necessary for consciousness.
I agree.

[Belz...]

Note that this is just a formal definition of the behavior Pixy ( well, anyone with common sense ) calls "switching."

You can thank westprog for forcing me to come up with it !!

Necessity is the mother of invention.

[annnnoid]

As much as I respect your opinion, yes. tensordyne is making a statement of dualism, he is a dualist, and he does believe in magic.



May we conclude that the term ‘magic’ applies to everything that we currently do not posses a definitive understanding of.

A few examples:

- gravity
- dark matter
- dreaming
- the constitution / size / origin / fate of the universe
- what is the explicit scientific mechanism of human logic and reason (so is the philosophy of science physics, or metaphysics? [is physics physics, or metaphysics?])
- what explains the relationship between math and the universe it occurs in


Dennet may have his flaws but it was not for nothing that he describes consciousness as the last remaining mystery. A mystery is something that exists that we do not have (or have not achieved) the capacity to comprehend the existence of. Zeuzzz is actually closest to identifying the solution. Consciousness is a condition of being. We may not know what we exist as, but we sure exist as something. The proof is simply that we can ask the question…not because we can answer it. We exist as the ability to experience… sensation IOW…it’s what we are if there is a word for what we are. Tangentially…there seems to be two defining axis to this condition of sensation…both of which are fundamentally interrelated: intensity…how much of something the experience exists as / means…and integrity…the authenticity of the experience / meaning. I wonder to what degree the existence of these realities can be programmed? Call it all computation if you like, that merely begs the question. Logically, comprehension of a condition of being can only be accomplished within a greater condition of being…not an ever more complicated arrangement of models of an existing one.

But that’s metaphysics…and metaphysics ultimately lacks any intelligible coherency (within the condition that currently produces it). Oddly enough, metaphysics can vanish, but we remain. Wonder why? The meaning of meaninglessness…or something ridiculously unscientific like that. Sounds positively Zeuzzzian!

[Mr. Scott]

Best post in the threat so far. Nominated.

Me likey post, nominate too!

[Mr. Scott]

endeavour to build a complete computer simulation of a brain

I suppose when they fire up the simulation that's close to human brain complexity, one of the first things it might say could be, "I'm noticing something curious. When I look at something that I know reflects red light, it doesn't seem to have a subjective quality of "redness." Why, Dave? ;)

[rocketdodger]

Apparently, they have found that in nature, the brain consists of building blocks of "brain columns", and when a brain grows, it just adds more and more columns, and the wrinkling, neural pathways and all comes naturally.


Yes, neuron axons and dendrites grow along chemical gradients laid down during ( fetal ) development.

You may have heard that babies have far denser brains than adults, well that is because our DNA can't contain all the information needed to actually specify the brain. What happens is a zillion neurons grow along these gradients, not knowing for sure if the dendrites and synapses will actually be used ( how could they know ? ), and as we grow after being born, the connections that just won't ever be used sort of senesce and are removed.

The actual neural pathways encoded in DNA is almost trivially simple compared to the final network topology of a developed brain, and that isn't even counting the complexity introduced by changing synapse strengths, which is where most of our adult consciousness comes from anyway.

[Zeuzzz]

You ever been to burning man, pixy?

You would so totally be Hal in this (http://www.putlocker.com/file/9CFB57D7240DA997#) malcolm in the middle episode. You would draw quite a crowd for your artistic portrayal of the shortcomings and banality of the modern materialistic suburban dad by simply being yourself.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0640293/
Burning Man (30 Sep. 2005)
TV Episode - 30 min - Comedy
8.4 Your rating: -/10 Ratings: 8.4/10 from 106 users
Reviews: write review
The family joins the Burning Man Festival, where Reese and Lois find creative freedom, Malcolm finds love, Hal finds a big audience and Dewey find himself doing all the chores.


Flipping hippies, eh?

[Zeuzzz]

Pixy is right, Tensor. If the EM field theory is correct, and it is interesting at least, our consciousness would be disrupted by a lot of things we interact with every day. It's easily falsified.



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W5HFZpMaWe0#at=60

Check the experiment he does at three minutes. Stopping one side of the brain functioning to a certain extent by transcranial magnetic stimulation, so they see more of reality than they usually would.

[Zeuzzz]

Curious: If you were to measure the the length of a coastline (Belz, Pixy) would you factor in the tides and waves in your measurement? Or adhere to a more rigid quantised and quantifiable criterion to make the measurement?

[PixyMisa]

You ever been to burning man, pixy?

You would so totally be Hal in this (http://www.putlocker.com/file/9CFB57D7240DA997#) malcolm in the middle episode. You would draw quite a crowd for your artistic portrayal of the shortcomings and banality of the modern materialistic suburban dad by simply being yourself.
And yet, I am right and you are wrong. Do you even stop to wonder why that is? Why your statements of fact aren't and your logic isn't either?

Check the experiment he does at three minutes. Stopping one side of the brain functioning to a certain extent by transcranial magnetic stimulation, so they see more of reality than they usually would.
The brain contains multiple filter cascades. If you actually turned them all off, you'd get a seizure (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcranial_magnetic_stimulation#Risks).

You also become dysfunctional: Those filters are there for a reason. The common thread we find in savants and geniuses is the same that we find in autism spectrum disorders: Such people don't cope well with everyday life, because they can't filter out the noise.

Curious: If you were to measure the the length of a coastline (Belz, Pixy) would you factor in the tides and waves in your measurement? Or adhere to a more rigid quantised and quantifiable criterion to make the measurement?
I'd do what is actually requested, rather than making stuff up.

[Zeuzzz]

I'd do what is actually requested, rather than making stuff up.


How would you do it then, "as requested"?

[PixyMisa]

How would you do it then, "as requested"?
Rather depends on exactly what the request is, dunnit? I'd probably start by telling them to define the request properly.

[Zeuzzz]

The only question you have is to measure the length of the coastline.

It's up to you how you do it, or to state here what problems you might see in doing such.

[Belz...]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W5HFZpMaWe0#at=60

Check the experiment he does at three minutes. Stopping one side of the brain functioning to a certain extent by transcranial magnetic stimulation, so they see more of reality than they usually would.

Please pay attention: if EM theory was correct, your consciousness would be severely affected by everyday appliances. It is not. Ergo, the theory is not correct.

[Zeuzzz]

Please pay attention: if EM theory was correct, your consciousness would be severely affected by everyday appliances. It is not. Ergo, the theory is not correct.


Because its neurochemical signals, and overall neutral (as the EM force is 10^36 times stronger than gravity) they largely cancel charges so we are a neutral body. So we have no net charge to be effected. Even though, as you just saw, transcranial magnetic effects do have an effect when done very specifically.

What are you comments on the documentary?

[PixyMisa]

The only question you have is to measure the length of the coastline.
What does that actually mean?

[Jeff Corey]

Curious: If you were to measure the the length of a coastline (Belz, Pixy) would you factor in the tides and waves in your measurement? Or adhere to a more rigid quantised and quantifiable criterion to make the measurement?

Isn't that the problem? I just went down to the Peconic Bay, part of the coastline of North America. Examining the details closely, it looked like every closer analysis could present problems in measurement. This meter of coastlines contains thousands of smaller configurations, baylets and smaller baylets. At what level do we give up measuring?

[trebor]

Because its neurochemical signals, and overall neutral (as the EM force is 10^36 times stronger than gravity) they largely cancel charges so we are a neutral body. So we have no net charge to be effected.

Interesting; So you are saying no object with a net electrical charge can be effected by a magnetic field?
Is that correct?

[Zeuzzz]

Interesting; So you are saying no object with a net electrical charge can be effected by a magnetic field?
Is that correct?


Nope, you can get induction from passing metal with no net charge through coils and various shapes to produce electromagnetic inudction, and the lenz's (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=239962) law effect, but when applying strong EM forces to the brain (like huge ones from static magnets) it seemingly does do nothing. It starts to get a whole lot more complex, thus the transcranial instruments used in the example, they don't use simple bar magnets.

I've not looking into all the details at this point.

[Zeuzzz]

Isn't that the problem? I just went down to the Peconic Bay, part of the coastline of North America. Examining the details closely, it looked like every closer analysis could present problems in measurement. This meter of coastlines contains thousands of smaller configurations, baylets and smaller baylets. At what level do we give up measuring?


When you stop using mathematical abstractions like lines that are one dimensional, and do not exist in nature.

Do you factor in the tides? The waves? The rivers?

We live in a 3D world, to describing something based on a one dimensional line is ... just silly.

Use elephants, trunk to tail, as your three dimensional measuring unit :) Would give a less confusing answer.

Even if the logistics of assembling the elephants would be very hard.

*phones Dr doolittle*

[Roboramma]

When you stop using mathematical abstractions like lines that are one dimensional, and do not exist in nature.

Do you factor in the tides? The waves? The rivers?

It depends on what you're measuring it for.

[Zeuzzz]

Isn't that the problem? I just went down to the Peconic Bay, part of the coastline of North America. Examining the details closely, it looked like every closer analysis could present problems in measurement. This meter of coastlines contains thousands of smaller configurations, baylets and smaller baylets. At what level do we give up measuring?


"To see a world in a grain of sand, And a heaven in a wild flower, Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, And eternity in an hour."
- William Blake.

[Zeuzzz]

It depends on what you're measuring it for.


A high % of accuracy, not before attained.

[PixyMisa]

A high % of accuracy, not before attained.
You mean precision.

What precision?

[Zeuzzz]

The precision being the highest yet achieved.

[Roboramma]

A high % of accuracy, not before attained.

You either don't understand the point or are pretending to be slow. The question is what use will you put the figure to?

For instance, if we want to see how many people could fit on the coastline such that they can see the water but won't get their feet wet, we'll find one figure useful. If we want to build a fence all the way around the coast that will be out of the water at low tide, but may or may not be submerged at high tide, and that will keep dogs out of the water, another figure will be useful and meaningful.

Point being? If someone asks me the length of the coastline I can ask them why they want to know and give them a figure that's useful to that purpose.

[Zeuzzz]

You either don't understand the point or are pretending to be slow. The question is what use will you put the figure to?



It would be put it use, by me, as the most accurate measurement of the coastline ever made.

But it would not have a use. As it can't be done using a one dimensional line in the real world, even though that would've likely have been the way you started thinking and conceptualising the issue to begin with.

I asked the question as it relates the wave properties of the EM field and how we quantise it's properties at the plank scale.

Ok this example is turning into a rapid fail, I might restart it again later when brain cells are firing better, but i'm too tired now. :)

Thanks, anyway.

[Jeff Corey]

Over here, we measure planks in feet and inches,

[tsig]

Not really. The test tells whether a particular human can discriminate between certain visible wavelengths when apparent brightness is controlled for. It completely relies on the measurement of observable behavior and can be accomplished in nonverbal animals such as the pigeon..

Are you saying that seeing red is more than discriminating between certain visible wavelengths?

[PixyMisa]

The precision being the highest yet achieved.
What precision? That's where the question begins and ends.

[Zeuzzz]

What precision?


Ok last try.
The highest accuracy you can find.

The concept of a coastline is where waves of water meet solid land.

If you are asking precision as in a predefined unit of measurement to use, lets go for the same plank scale (the same scale you use to quantise the EM field to derive materialistic philosophies from the particles that result from quantising its spectrum)

[Zeuzzz]

Over here, we measure planks in feet and inches,

Nominated, laughing so hard right now!

[PixyMisa]

Ok last try.
The highest accuracy you can find.
You mean precision, not accuracy.

If you are asking precision as in a predefined unit of measurement to use, lets go for the same plank scale (the same scale you use to quantise the EM field to derive materialistic philosophies from the particles that result from quantising its spectrum)
Okay then.

That's impossible. (But only physically impossible, not mathematically or logically impossible.)

[!Kaggen]

~snip~ he ascribes logical impossibilities to the human intellect; once you've done that, any conversation on the subject is pretty much doomed.



That's impossible. (But only physically impossible, not mathematically or logically impossible.)

I see.... so you believe we can discuss the physically impossible as long as it is logical and mathematically possible but we cannot discuss the physically possible if it is logically or mathematically impossible.

And you say the empiricist believe in a magic bean:rolleyes:

[Roboramma]

the physically possible if it is logically or mathematically impossible.

There's no such thing.

[PixyMisa]

I see.... so you believe we can discuss the physically impossible as long as it is logical and mathematically possible but we cannot discuss the physically possible if it is logically or mathematically impossible.
If it's logically or mathematically impossible, IT IS BY DEFINITION NOT PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE.

And you say the empiricist believe in a magic bean:rolleyes:
No, I say that dualists believe in magic beans.

[!Kaggen]

There's no such thing.

You sure about that?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" Wittgenstein

[!Kaggen]

If it's logically or mathematically impossible, IT IS BY DEFINITION NOT PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE.

And around we go....

[steenkh]

You sure about that?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" Wittgenstein
Please point out where in the article it says that logically impossible objects are physically possible ...

[Zeuzzz]

!Kaggen to clarify, it's not physically impossible for the EM spectrum to act as a particle if you quantise it to a fundamental unit; the fundamental limit for a photon's energy is the planck energy. It's just a bizarre fact particles at this scale seem to show the same properties as waves do, they are both particles and waves. They diffract, interfere, etc. So there is, as revealed by quantum physics, a dualist nature of reality. One as wave form and one as particle form. To take a materialistic view that only the particles matter is a philosophy, not a scientific view. We know this duality to exist, and solid objects can behave like non physical EM waves up to quite large scales.

I remember working out the time it would take for me to diffract passing through a door at uni in my second year. Billions of years, if I recall. Was a sort of joke, my lecturer did it to get us thinking :)

See this post, might be of use: http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=8437102&postcount=79

[Clive]

Is it logically and mathematically possible for an entire "physical" universe to appear from absolutely nothing?

[Zeuzzz]

No. But thats way off topic. See the thread "what kind of science is cosmology" to continue.

[!Kaggen]

Please point out where in the article it says that logically impossible objects are physically possible ...

The article was in reference to Roboramma's claim
"there is no such thing"

The point being that using language(logic) to make a claim about something which is not language(logic) is meaningless.

Pixy Misa loves doing this because he believes in the magic bean of logic which even explains no-thing.

[Belz...]

Ok last try.
The highest accuracy you can find.

Oh, I see. There is no purpose or use to your scenario. Ok.

[Belz...]

You sure about that?

Er... yes. No physical thing can be mathematically impossible.

Where the hell do you get that stuff ? Are you ever right about anything ?

[Belz...]

Is it logically and mathematically possible for an entire "physical" universe to appear from absolutely nothing?

No, and to be fair neither scientists nor theists are proposing that. That makes your question entirely irrelevant.

[Zeuzzz]

The magic bean of logic is indeed a faulty one, Godel showed that rather rigorously. Logic was shown to be illogical, his quest for a complete theory of logic ended up with his incompleteness theorem. His quest for certainty also revealed uncertainty.

[Jeff Corey]

Are you saying that seeing red is more than discriminating between certain visible wavelengths?

No, I don't think so. What's your point?

[!Kaggen]

No, I don't think so. What's your point?

Good luck with that question.

[PixyMisa]

The article was in reference to Roboramma's claim
"there is no such thing"

The point being that using language(logic)
Fail.

[PixyMisa]

The magic bean of logic is indeed a faulty one, Godel showed that rather rigorously.
No.

Logic was shown to be illogical
No.

Godel proved two things (using logic):

1. Any consistent formal system powerful enough to include arithmetic includes statements that cannot be shown to be true or false within the system.

2. Any formal system powerful enough to include arithmetic contains proof of its own consistency if and only if it is inconsistent.

These facts hold whether it's a computer doing the work or a human. These facts always hold. Tensordyne's statement that humans are not bound by the Incompleteness Theorems is equivalent to saying humans are not bound by 2+2=4: It is possible to get a different answer; it just means that you are wrong.

[dlorde]

May we conclude that the term ‘magic’ applies to everything that we currently do not posses a definitive understanding of.I'd prefer it only to apply to that which clearly contradicts well established scientific knowledge or principles. I'm happy with 'unknown' or 'not yet understood' for the rest.

[PixyMisa]

May we conclude that the term ‘magic’ applies to everything that we currently do not posses a definitive understanding of.
No.

As I've shown, tensordyne ascribes abilities to human intellect that are not logically possible, and supports this with a theory that is not physically possible.

Asserting an impossible cause for an impossible effect, on the basis of personal ignorance and incredulity, is a belief in magic.

Dennet may have his flaws but it was not for nothing that he describes consciousness as the last remaining mystery.
Dennett wrote Consciousness Explained.

[Belz...]

The magic bean of logic is indeed a faulty one, Godel showed that rather rigorously. Logic was shown to be illogical, his quest for a complete theory of logic ended up with his incompleteness theorem. His quest for certainty also revealed uncertainty.

Logic is illogical ? What ?

[dlorde]

Ok this example is turning into a rapid fail...

It started as a fail. Why not just explain what you mean in plain English?

"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough". Albert Einstein

[dlorde]

The concept of a coastline is where waves of water meet solid land.

If you are asking precision as in a predefined unit of measurement to use, lets go for the same plank scale
There are no waves of water or solid land at the planck scale.

[dlorde]

Is it logically and mathematically possible for an entire "physical" universe to appear from absolutely nothing?

What, exactly, is 'absolutely nothing'? - is it different from non-absolutely nothing?

"Nothing will come of nothing..." King Lear

[Roboramma]

You sure about that?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" Wittgenstein

Seriously:
One of the reasons why there are doubts about the concept of a nonexistent object is this: to be able to truly claim of an object that it doesn't exist, it seems that one has to presuppose that it exists, for doesn't a thing have to exist if we are to make a true claim about it?

Let me put it differently so that this sort of ridiculous argument can be seen for what it is: the things that exist in the world have particular combinations of properties. All of those things that exist have combinations of properties that are both mathematically and logically possible.

Thus, the set of mathematically and logically impossible things that exist is empty.

[Dancing David]

You sure about that?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" Wittgenstein

Quoting philosophy in SMT?

[Dancing David]

Is it logically and mathematically possible for an entire "physical" universe to appear from absolutely nothing?

No, and the claim of quantum fluctuations has to have a ground field to begin with, so who made the claim the universe came from nothing?

[!Kaggen]

Quoting philosophy in SMT?

Sure words have a meaning and a history even those used in science.

[rocketdodger]

The magic bean of logic is indeed a faulty one, Godel showed that rather rigorously. Logic was shown to be illogical, his quest for a complete theory of logic ended up with his incompleteness theorem. His quest for certainty also revealed uncertainty.

So by your standards, I can't be sure of things like "1 + 1 == 1 + 1" ?

Cause hey, Godel and blah blah blah uncertainty.

[rocketdodger]

I see.... so you believe we can discuss the physically impossible as long as it is logical and mathematically possible but we cannot discuss the physically possible if it is logically or mathematically impossible.

Isn't that trivially obvious?

If something is logically and mathematically impossible, we won't be able to even imagine it, let alone discuss it.

I challenge you to name even a single thing that is logically and mathematically impossible without resorting to gibberish that causes a language breakdown.

For example, a square with five corners. Squares have four corners. So when you say "square with five corners" there is a language breakdown -- perhaps you are actually thinking of a pentagon, or whatever, but we have no way to know. Furthermore, we can be sure that what you are actually thinking of certainly isn't a square with five corners -- that is just gibberish that you created due to not finding a better description for the idea you have in your head.

Contrast that with something that is merely physically impossible, like me being able to just turn into a tiger when I snap my fingers. You can visualize that, no? We can discuss it and you know exactly what I mean, no?

[rocketdodger]

Thus, the set of mathematically and logically impossible things that exist is empty.

I don't think we can say this. That is one of the implications of incompleteness, as long as we are talking about Godel.

I think we can only say that things are mathematically and logically possible. We can't say anything else, because we don't have access to thought that is not grounded in mathematical and logical possibility.

We can't say there is nothing that is mathematically and logically impossible because we don't even know what that means.

Note that this is a moot point since it just implies that in any discussion any two humans ever have for the rest of time, it will be about stuff that is mathematically and logically possible. And any computers we build will suffer from the same issues. Any two intelligent agents that function according to the laws we have discovered, and have yet to be discovered, will suffer from the same issues.

[PixyMisa]

Isn't that trivially obvious?

If something is logically and mathematically impossible, we won't be able to even imagine it, let alone discuss it.

I challenge you to name even a single thing that is logically and mathematically impossible without resorting to gibberish that causes a language breakdown.

For example, a square with five corners. Squares have four corners. So when you say "square with five corners" there is a language breakdown -- perhaps you are actually thinking of a pentagon, or whatever, but we have no way to know. Furthermore, we can be sure that what you are actually thinking of certainly isn't a square with five corners -- that is just gibberish that you created due to not finding a better description for the idea you have in your head.

Contrast that with something that is merely physically impossible, like me being able to just turn into a tiger when I snap my fingers. You can visualize that, no? We can discuss it and you know exactly what I mean, no?
This.

[!Kaggen]

Isn't that trivially obvious?

If something is logically and mathematically impossible, we won't be able to even imagine it, let alone discuss it.

I challenge you to name even a single thing that is logically and mathematically impossible without resorting to gibberish that causes a language breakdown.

For example, a square with five corners. Squares have four corners. So when you say "square with five corners" there is a language breakdown -- perhaps you are actually thinking of a pentagon, or whatever, but we have no way to know. Furthermore, we can be sure that what you are actually thinking of certainly isn't a square with five corners -- that is just gibberish that you created due to not finding a better description for the idea you have in your head.

Contrast that with something that is merely physically impossible, like me being able to just turn into a tiger when I snap my fingers. You can visualize that, no? We can discuss it and you know exactly what I mean, no?

What are you talking about?

[!Kaggen]

I don't think we can say this. That is one of the implications of incompleteness, as long as we are talking about Godel.

I think we can only say that things are mathematically and logically possible. We can't say anything else, because we don't have access to thought that is not grounded in mathematical and logical possibility.

We can't say there is nothing that is mathematically and logically impossible because we don't even know what that means.

Note that this is a moot point since it just implies that in any discussion any two humans ever have for the rest of time, it will be about stuff that is mathematically and logically possible. And any computers we build will suffer from the same issues. Any two intelligent agents that function according to the laws we have discovered, and have yet to be discovered, will suffer from the same issues.


Tiger Tiger. burning bright,
In the forests of the night;
What immortal hand or eye.
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?

In what distant deeps or skies.
Burnt the fire of thine eyes?
On what wings dare he aspire?
What the hand, dare seize the fire?

And what shoulder, & what art,
Could twist the sinews of thy heart?
And when thy heart began to beat.
What dread hand? & what dread feet?

What the hammer? what the chain,
In what furnace was thy brain?
What the anvil? what dread grasp.
Dare its deadly terrors clasp?

When the stars threw down their spears
And watered heaven with their tears:
Did he smile His work to see?
Did he who made the lamb make thee?

Tiger Tiger burning bright,
In the forests of the night:
What immortal hand or eye,
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?

The Tiger
William Blake

[Zeuzzz]

We think we know so much, but we know so little.

Nature is awesome, and science is how we explain it. Maths is the code of nature, but not a constituent of it.

The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool. - William Shakespeare

"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex... It takes a touch of genius --- and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction." - Albert Einstein

http://a8.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/532351_475000299194955_205046505_n.jpg

"To see a world in a grain of sand, And a heaven in a wild flower, Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, And eternity in an hour."
- William Blake.

http://a1.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-snc7/306840_363502440389845_853555265_n.jpg[/QUOTE]


Such a great intelligent mind, with such little arrogance, so much humanity. There's a massive difference between a humble wise person (einstein) and an intelligent fool.

PS: Nice post Kaggen, not heard that one before.

[rocketdodger]

What are you talking about?

You made a sarcastic comment about Pixy's position that it is only OK to speak of the physicall impossible if it is mathematically and logically possible.

I'm pointing out that it isn't merely Pixy's position, it is fact.

There is no such thing as the physically + mathematically + logically impossible. Only the physically impossible.

[Jeff Corey]

Good luck with that question.

You are right, almost one page later.

[PixyMisa]

We think we know so much, but we know so little.
No, that's just you.

[Clive]

There is no such thing as the physically + mathematically + logically impossible. Only the physically impossible.

Do you claim that is it strictly "physically impossible" for any human brain to do any kind of "computations" or "cognitive tasks" that can't be achieved by any theoretical Turing Complete computing system?

How about the same question but substituting "logically impossible" or "mathematically impossible"?

Note that I've use the words "strictly" and "impossible" to be as clear as I can that a positive response from you will not actually mean that you think it's just "unlikely", or "very unlikely", or "impossible according to current knowledge", or some such similar variation, but in fact absolutely, completely, "I'll-bet-my-life-on-it" impossible, now and for always.

[annnnoid]

We think we know so much, but we know so little.


No, that's just you.


…apparently not…

All I know is that I know nothing.
Socrates

[Clive]

What, exactly, is 'absolutely nothing'? - is it different from non-absolutely nothing?

"Nothing will come of nothing..." King Lear

I used "absolute" to be as clear as I could that I did not merely mean some other interpretation of "nothing" such as "empty space", or even "space without time" and so on. So far as it is imaginable, I meant the kind of "nothing" that permits no form of "something" or "anything else" to be "there", no god, not quantum field, no space, no time, no mathematics, no patterns, nil, none, zip, nothing.

Do you think such a thing could be "physically possible"? How about "logically" or "mathematically"?

Language is often ambiguous. What do you think King Lear meant?

[PixyMisa]

Do you claim that is it strictly "physically impossible" for any human brain to do any kind of "computations" or "cognitive tasks" that can't be achieved by any theoretical Turing Complete computing system?

How about the same question but substituting "logically impossible" or "mathematically impossible"?
Depends on the task.

If a task is mathematically impossible (e.g. the ever popular end-run around Godel's incompleteness theorems) then it's likewise mathematically impossible for the brain.

Other tasks may be bounded only by the laws of physics; if the Universe were not quantised, there might be some wiggle room to argue that the brain is more powerful than algorithmic computing. But the Universe is quantised, so it can't be.

[PixyMisa]

…apparently not…

All I know is that I know nothing.
Socrates
Yeah, and look where that got him.

[annnnoid]

I used "absolute" to be as clear as I could that I did not merely mean some other interpretation of "nothing" such as "empty space", or even "space without time" and so on. So far as it is imaginable, I meant the kind of "nothing" that permits no form of "something" or "anything else" to be "there", no god, not quantum field, no space, no time, no mathematics, no patterns, nil, none, zip, nothing.

Do you think such a thing could be "physically possible"? How about "logically" or "mathematically"?

Language is often ambiguous. What do you think King Lear meant?


As simply as possible....King Lear meant something.

As for your questions...I'd speculate that something that exists cannot examine the existence of something that doesn't. As far as I know, 'nothing' has never been known to occur (at least nowhere near where I live). But then there is the nagging question of...out there. What actually does occupy all that empty space? How empty is it? Are there regions of....nothing? If so...what would happen if 'something' went there?

[annnnoid]

Yeah, and look where that got him.


…recognized throughout the world and history as one of the founders of western philosophy. Credited as the origin of methods of discussion and examination still in extensive use to this day.

….but besides that…a nobody.

How to know nothing? Could it be that Socrates had somehow encountered the elusive 'nothing' Clive is referring to. The meaningless meaning....and it is I! Zip ...down the rabbit hole again. What is the truth of intelligibility after all, mathematical, logical, or otherwise?

[PixyMisa]

…recognized throughout the world and history as one of the founders of western philosophy. Credited as the origin of methods of discussion and examination still in extensive use to this day.
I was thinking along the lines of dead.

Anyway, the Socratic method isn't about not knowing anything, it's about a well-informed and insightful pattern of questioning that elicits the desired answer from the subject without appearing to impart the required information directly.

This doesn't work (a) the questioner actually doesn't know the answer, or (b) the subject is convinced that he does, but is wrong.

In other words, when Socrates said All I know is that I know nothing. he was lying to impart a particular philosophical point.

How to know nothing? Could it be that Socrates had somehow encountered the elusive 'nothing' Clive is referring to. The meaningless meaning....and it is I! Zip ...down the rabbit hole again. What is the truth of intelligibility after all, mathematical, logical, or otherwise?
No, much simpler: He was just lying.

[steenkh]

We can't say there is nothing that is mathematically and logically impossible because we don't even know what that means.
Perhaps it could mean mathematically and logically false? In that case I believe we can say it does not exist. Correct me if i am wrong, but Gödel's incompleteness theorem is not an uncertainty theorem; it does not say that there are some false statements that are true, it says that there are some true statements that we cannot derive with a formal system.

[steenkh]

I'd speculate that something that exists cannot examine the existence of something that doesn't.
By definition something that does not exist does not exist, so it would rather futile to speculate on its existence.

[Belz...]

…apparently not…

All I know is that I know nothing.
Socrates

And this is why science replaced philosophy.

[Belz...]

Do you claim that is it strictly "physically impossible" for any human brain to do any kind of "computations" or "cognitive tasks" that can't be achieved by any theoretical Turing Complete computing system?

Seems to be a given.

[Clive]

Depends on the task.

If a task is mathematically impossible (e.g. the ever popular end-run around Godel's incompleteness theorems) then it's likewise mathematically impossible for the brain.

Other tasks may be bounded only by the laws of physics; if the Universe were not quantised, there might be some wiggle room to argue that the brain is more powerful than algorithmic computing. But the Universe is quantised, so it can't be.

Says who? Oh. Yeah. PixyMisa...

Saying it doesn't make it necessarily true. Newton presumably didn't think so. Nor did Einstein.

Would you bet your life that all relevant attributes of the Universe are "quantised"? Is it "logically" or "mathematically" or "physically" possible that at least one is not?

[dlorde]

Do you think such a thing could be "physically possible"? How about "logically" or "mathematically"?No, I don't think it means anything to to talk of the nothing you describe to be 'physically possible', any more than the 'other side' of a Mobius strip or the 'outside' of a Klein bottle. I think the fact that stuff exists invalidates that kind of nothing - it can only be described in terms of the absence of what does exist. Logically or mathematically, I don't think there's a problem. Logic and maths can address non-physical concepts and ideas.

Language is often ambiguous. What do you think King Lear meant?In context, he meant that Cordelia could not expect her inheritance unless she offered words he deemed worthy of it (flattery, declaration of love, etc). It can be interpreted more generally as in terms of reciprocity, action and reaction; and in human terms: no response without stimulus, investment brings returns, you only get out what you put in, you must earn your crust, no pain no gain, you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours, one good turn deserves another, and so-on.

[Clive]

Seems to be a given.

You (and PixyMisa) appear to believe that humankind has basically got it all figured out already... and there's no chance that the current understanding of physics will turn out to be something that is either incomplete or perhaps even incorrect in some important details.

Let me ask you something.

Do you believe that there is necessarily a finite "Theory of Everything" waiting to be discovered, and that when/if that is finally uncovered then (in principle) there will be nothing within "the Universe" that cannot be fully understood and perhaps even "perfectly" simulated?

If yes, why? I mean, why are you drawn to that idea as opposed to the alternative that there is no "bottom level" set of rules and so it really is a case of "turtles all the way down"?

[dlorde]

.. the Universe is quantised...Saying it doesn't make it necessarily true. Newton presumably didn't think so. Nor did Einstein.
For Einstein, that would be ironic if true, as he got his Nobel prize for postulating the quantization of light (in the face of scepticism from Planck & Bohr), and followed by proposing the quantization of atomic oscillation. It was the probabilistic aspects of QM he was uncomfortable with.

[dlorde]

Seems to be a given.You (and PixyMisa) appear to believe that humankind has basically got it all figured out already... and there's no chance that the current understanding of physics will turn out to be something that is either incomplete or perhaps even incorrect in some important details.
That's a non-sequitur. You asked if it was impossible that the brain's computations could not be achieved by theoretical Turing Complete computing system. It 'seems to be a given', because 'Turing Complete' generally means just that; i.e. it is equivalent to any real-world computer, and if the brain computes it is a real-world computer.

[Clive]

For Einstein, that would be ironic if true, as he got his Nobel prize for postulating the quantization of light (in the face of scepticism from Planck & Bohr), and followed by proposing the quantization of atomic oscillation. It was the probabilistic aspects of QM he was uncomfortable with.
Did Einstein believe the space-time continuum was quantised?

[Clive]

That's a non-sequitur. You asked if it was impossible that the brain's computations could not be achieved by theoretical Turing Complete computing system. It 'seems to be a given', because 'Turing Complete' generally means just that; i.e. it is equivalent to any real-world computer, and if the brain computes it is a real-world computer.
I think you need to read what I asked more carefully.

Let me put it in a slightly different way.

I claim that it is at least possible that biological brains (including obviously, human brains) may be able to accomplish something that a Universal Turing machine cannot, even in a theoretical sense. I'm not talking about purely "plumbing" type capabilities such as being able to absorb nutrients from blood or whatever, but rather the kinds of things (whatever they may be) that may be needed to achieve consciousness, self-awareness, and similar.

I'm not saying that I have any reason to believe this is necessarily very likely - just that it at least possible.

[Dancing David]

I used "absolute" to be as clear as I could that I did not merely mean some other interpretation of "nothing" such as "empty space", or even "space without time" and so on. So far as it is imaginable, I meant the kind of "nothing" that permits no form of "something" or "anything else" to be "there", no god, not quantum field, no space, no time, no mathematics, no patterns, nil, none, zip, nothing.

Do you think such a thing could be "physically possible"? How about "logically" or "mathematically"?

Language is often ambiguous. What do you think King Lear meant?

Who says the universe came from nothing?

[Dancing David]

You (and PixyMisa) appear to believe that humankind has basically got it all figured out already... and there's no chance that the current understanding of physics will turn out to be something that is either incomplete or perhaps even incorrect in some important details.

False dichotomy and presumption.

There is little chance of any extra in the brain and consciousness than the biochemistry of neurons however.

Of course the current state of physics is incomplete and what relevance does that have to the discussion?

There is no evidence that the brain and consciousness is more than biochemistry.

Burden on claimant otherwise.


Let me ask you something.

Do you believe that there is necessarily a finite "Theory of Everything" waiting to be discovered, and that when/if that is finally uncovered then (in principle) there will be nothing within "the Universe" that cannot be fully understood and perhaps even "perfectly" simulated?

And that has what to do with the discussion of consciousness, god of the gaps ?

Where is your evidence, put it on the table.

There is no evidence of any events in consciousness that are not biochemistry.



If yes, why? I mean, why are you drawn to that idea as opposed to the alternative that there is no "bottom level" set of rules and so it really is a case of "turtles all the way down"?


Seriously?

Oh my.

How exactly did Millikan not measure the mass of an electron?

[Dancing David]

Did Einstein believe the space-time continuum was quantised?

Do you know the difference, I am sorry the math of tensors is beyond me, can you show where the energy pf particles is not quantised?

Asking about the TOE is not a free pass on evidence, where is the evidence that consciousness is not just biochemistry?

[Dancing David]

I think you need to read what I asked more carefully.

Let me put it in a slightly different way.

I claim that it is at least possible that biological brains (including obviously, human brains) may be able to accomplish something that a Universal Turing machine cannot, even in a theoretical sense. I'm not talking about purely "plumbing" type capabilities such as being able to absorb nutrients from blood or whatever, but rather the kinds of things (whatever they may be) that may be needed to achieve consciousness, self-awareness, and similar.

I'm not saying that I have any reason to believe this is necessarily very likely - just that it at least possible.

And how would you know this, how are you defining consciousness?

It is possible that there are little monkeys on motor scooters instead of electrons as well, but there are reasons to believe that is not a valid theory.

Magical thinking about consciousness?

A dog is conscious, does this apply to dogs and hamsters or just humans?

[PixyMisa]

Says who? Oh. Yeah. PixyMisa.
You seem to have missed out on at least a hundred years of physics. I'll give you time to catch up.

Would you bet your life that all relevant attributes of the Universe are "quantised"?
I do, every day.

[PixyMisa]

I claim that it is at least possible that biological brains (including obviously, human brains) may be able to accomplish something that a Universal Turing machine cannot, even in a theoretical sense.
I have three replies to this:

1. No it's not.

2. You can't define such a thing.

3. You can't propose a mechanism for such a thing.

What you're talking about is known as a hypercomputer. They're very interesting, and entirely impossible.

[Belz...]

You (and PixyMisa) appear to believe that humankind has basically got it all figured out already...

No.

Do you believe that there is necessarily a finite "Theory of Everything" waiting to be discovered, and that when/if that is finally uncovered then (in principle) there will be nothing within "the Universe" that cannot be fully understood and perhaps even "perfectly" simulated?

Probably.

If yes, why?

There is a finite number of physical principles and phenomena in the universe.

I mean, why are you drawn to that idea as opposed to the alternative that there is no "bottom level" set of rules and so it really is a case of "turtles all the way down"?

Parsimony.

[Belz...]

I think you need to read what I asked more carefully.

So do I, apparently, because his explanation is exactly why I answered what I did.

I claim that it is at least possible that biological brains (including obviously, human brains) may be able to accomplish something that a Universal Turing machine cannot, even in a theoretical sense.

Then you need to explain yourself very precisely because it sounds like you don't understand what a Turing machine is.

[annnnoid]

There is no evidence of any events in consciousness that are not biochemistry.



…except the as yet undefined fact of consciousness itself. Pixy will, I'm sure, take grave exception to this conclusion as well....convinced as he is that various of his computerized contraptions have achieved the quality known as consciousness without resort to biochemistry of any kind (elctro-chemistry perhaps....is that related?).

That is what’s referred to as a category error. Consciousness is consciousness. Biochemistry is biochemistry. The relationship between the two has yet to be understood. A comparison could be made to physics. There are no events in biochemistry that are not physics. That particular relationship is well understood. The equivalent consciousness / biochemical relationship barely exists even as a question….and this fact is acknowledged by just about any neuro-biologist currently working in the area.


A dog is conscious, does this apply to dogs and hamsters or just humans?


A dog is conscious ???? Where has this fact been definitively established? From what I understand…consciousness itself has yet to achieve anything remotely resembling a universally accepted definition so it is likely premature to assign the category to dogs or anything else.

[dlorde]

Did Einstein believe the space-time continuum was quantised?
I have no idea; given his work, I'm sure he would have thought about it.

[PixyMisa]

…except the as yet undefined fact of consciousness itself.
If you can't define it, how do you know? And if others have defined it, how can it be undefined?

A dog is conscious ???? Where has this fact been definitively established?
Dogs are certainly conscious by minimal definitions - as would likely be true of all mammals and most vertebrates (but would not be true of many insects) - but they don't pass the mirror test. The mirror test is a specifically visual test, and dogs aren't primarily visual creatures, but it does mark them as slightly dim.

From what I understand…consciousness itself has yet to achieve anything remotely resembling a universally accepted definition so it is likely premature to assign the category to dogs or anything else.
No, that's just you.

[Belz...]

…except the as yet undefined fact of consciousness itself.

1) How is consciousness undefined ?
2) Aren't you just projecting, here ?
3) Assuming it is undefined, how does that make it not biological ?

That is what’s referred to as a category error. Consciousness is consciousness. Biochemistry is biochemistry.

Flying is flying. Sleeping is sleeping. Love is love. Eating is eating. Oh, wait...

The relationship between the two has yet to be understood.

The exact mechanics of flying were not fully understood but we knew that flapping wings was pretty much the way to go a long time ago, etc.

A dog is conscious ????

See, there's your problem. You have no idea what the word means (not 'dog', but 'consciousness'.) Of course a dog is conscious. I've yet to see a definition of consciousness that would exclude dogs. It might not be conscious like a human, but that's beside the point.

[dlorde]

I think you need to read what I asked more carefully.I did; the question you actually asked was answered. The question below is different.

Let me put it in a slightly different way.

I claim that it is at least possible that biological brains (including obviously, human brains) may be able to accomplish something that a Universal Turing machine cannot, even in a theoretical sense. I'm not talking about purely "plumbing" type capabilities such as being able to absorb nutrients from blood or whatever, but rather the kinds of things (whatever they may be) that may be needed to achieve consciousness, self-awareness, and similar.

I'm not saying that I have any reason to believe this is necessarily very likely - just that it at least possible.
I agree it is possible, in the sense that anything, short of magic, is possible. But AIUI there is no evidence of such non-computable functioning in the brain, no evidence that it is necessary for consciousness or self-awareness, and no evidence of any mechanism to support it. Having said that, I wouldn't be totally stunned if some form of 'super-Turing computation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation)' is shown to occur, i.e. computational function beyond the standard Turing model; neural networks can apparently be configured this way (although there are some pragmatic doubts (http://www.philosopher-animal.com/papers/take6c.PDF)). I don't really see this as a problem, but it does lead into potentially murky waters of how we define computation and computational equivalence and the limitations of the standard Turing model.

It seems to me that until we understand more of the function and capabilities of the complex neural networks in the brain, the reasonable view is that they account for consciousness and self-awareness by computational means, be it Turing Complete or super-Turing. It should go without saying that it is a provisional explanation, as for all scientific explanations.

[steenkh]

A dog is conscious ???? Where has this fact been definitively established?
Are you saying that all the money people spend on rendering their dogs unconscious during surgical operations is money wasted?

[Belz...]

Wouldn't that just redefine the Turing model ?

[annnnoid]

From what I understand…consciousness itself has yet to achieve anything remotely resembling a universally accepted definition so it is likely premature to assign the category to dogs or anything else.


No, that's just you.


.…and, apparently, the folks behind this statement who can reasonably claim to represent a significant cross-section of the cog-sci community.

"We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature."

There are, quite obviously, fundamental disagreements. Which is the point. Dennet didn’t ‘explain’ it, he simply tried to (…explain it away…). Hofstadter tried as well. There is as yet no consensus on the issue, as the above statement clearly indicates. The achievement of an explicit adjudication of the condition of human consciousness would be news multiple orders of magnitude greater than the Higgs Boson. Short of discovering evidence of God, such a thing would likely be regarded as the most significant discovery in the history of history. A Nobel would be a formality.

I have yet to notice an event of this magnitude. Have you?


1) How is consciousness undefined ?
2) Aren't you just projecting, here ?
3) Assuming it is undefined, how does that make it not biological ?

Flying is flying. Sleeping is sleeping. Love is love. Eating is eating. Oh, wait...

The exact mechanics of flying were not fully understood but we knew that flapping wings was pretty much the way to go a long time ago, etc.

See, there's your problem. You have no idea what the word means (not 'dog', but 'consciousness'.) Of course a dog is conscious. I've yet to see a definition of consciousness that would exclude dogs. It might not be conscious like a human, but that's beside the point.


Y’know Belz….there was a brief period after Tensor gave you that unexpected compliment that you started sounding like someone other than Pixy. That period appears to have expired. I guess imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

[annnnoid]

Are you saying that all the money people spend on rendering their dogs unconscious during surgical operations is money wasted?


"We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature."

[rocketdodger]

Perhaps it could mean mathematically and logically false? In that case I believe we can say it does not exist. Correct me if i am wrong, but Gödel's incompleteness theorem is not an uncertainty theorem; it does not say that there are some false statements that are true, it says that there are some true statements that we cannot derive with a formal system.

Yes, correct.

But in the case of a five-cornered-square, is that mathematically false, or logically false? Or is it an impossibility? And what is the distinction?

The statement "a square has five corners" is false. You could say a mathematical formulation of that statement is a falsehood. The proof isn't consistent. Whatever.

But the statement "I am imagining a square with five corners," is not necessarily false, because it includes non-trivial references to "I" and "imagining," the definition of which is variable and vague. In particular, a full expansion of the formal defintion of "imagining" will implicitly define what the meaning of the statement is. If it turns out that what I mean by "square with five corners" is actually a pentagon, then my statement is true in a sense, because I am indeed imagining a pentagon.

So I would instead in that case say that a five-cornered-square is a mathematical impossibility, not merely a mathematical falsehood, so whatever I am imagining, it definitely isn't that.

If that makes any sense....

[Belz...]

Y’know Belz….there was a brief period after Tensor gave you that unexpected compliment that you started sounding like someone other than Pixy. That period appears to have expired. I guess imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

That's an interesting way to address my points -- that is, by not addressing them at all.

Don't you want to try again and not appear like you're dodging, this time ?

[rocketdodger]

Do you claim that is it strictly "physically impossible" for any human brain to do any kind of "computations" or "cognitive tasks" that can't be achieved by any theoretical Turing Complete computing system?

How about the same question but substituting "logically impossible" or "mathematically impossible"?

Note that I've use the words "strictly" and "impossible" to be as clear as I can that a positive response from you will not actually mean that you think it's just "unlikely", or "very unlikely", or "impossible according to current knowledge", or some such similar variation, but in fact absolutely, completely, "I'll-bet-my-life-on-it" impossible, now and for always.

Yes.

However, this has nothing to do with consciousness -- it is impossible to even define a physical analog to a computation or cognitive task that can't be achieved by any theoretical Turing complete computing system.

Meaning, if you have a system of particles, they ain't ever gonna do any hypercomputation.

And before you go all Penrose on me, you should know that quantum computing is not hypercomputing. It is understood that if a quantum computer is ever realized, it will also be merely Turing equivalent, no more.

[Dancing David]

…except the as yet undefined fact of consciousness itself.

If it is undefined then how do you refer to it?


Pixy will, I'm sure, take grave exception to this conclusion as well....convinced as he is that various of his computerized contraptions have achieved the quality known as consciousness without resort to biochemistry of any kind (elctro-chemistry perhaps....is that related?).

Hypothesis that such an entity as a computer could be similar to consciousness is still a hypothesis.


That is what’s referred to as a category error. Consciousness is consciousness.

Then explain where exactly is consciousness that is not a product of biochemistry.

It is not a category error, it is a flase dichotomy on your part.

And more sophistry.

Biochemistry is biochemistry. The relationship between the two has yet to be understood.

That is ********, there are part of it that are well understood and parts that aren't, but are making up some vague problem of consciousness.

So where is this consciousness without biochemistry?
A comparison could be made to physics. There are no events in biochemistry that are not physics.

Duh

That particular relationship is well understood.

yes and no, but you want to say that some magic word named 'consciousness' is different. Which is either dualism or sohistry.

So where is consciousness without biochemistry, with the invisible pink unicorn in my garage?

The equivalent consciousness / biochemical relationship barely exists even as a question….

Says who, not neruobiologists, maybe philosophers making desperate grasps as a declining position of sophistry, where is a neuroanatomist who studies attention and arousal saying that?

Or just one person?

Really, a lack of perfect understanding does not mean a lack of some understanding.

Or are you a 'brain as TV receiver of consciousness' type of person.

Where are the hordes of neurologists saying this, or is this where you will find the equivalent of climate change deniers and deniers of evolution.

Put you cards on the table.
and this fact is acknowledged by just about any neuro-biologist currently working in the area.

********, who said what exactly. or is this just some over generalization and false dichotomy on your part. Who exactly says that?

A lack of complete understanding is not a lack of understanding, so who made these claims, exactly? Where and when?




A dog is conscious ???? Where has this fact been definitively established?

So you don't even know the common medical definition of consciousness and you think that a dog is not conscious? You brag about you knowing about what neurobiologists commonly think and you make such a naive statemet?

What you mean is that you want consciousness defined in some special way but are a sophist at heart and can't present direct evidence of your weak argument.

I will mark that down as special pleading, magical thinking and ignorance.

We are in the SMT forum, so the standard common definition of medical consciousness would apply.

Not some Vague Problem of Consciousness.
From what I understand…consciousness itself has yet to achieve anything remotely resembling a universally accepted definition

So you don't know squat about neurology? Why did you say something about neuro biology and common beliefs?

There is a common definition, just not a magical one.

so it is likely premature to assign the category to dogs or anything else.

Argue from ignorance much?

[Dancing David]

Are you saying that all the money people spend on rendering their dogs unconscious during surgical operations is money wasted?

Or that they are a believer in the the Vague Problem of Consciousness.

[Jeff Corey]

… From what I understand…consciousness itself has yet to achieve anything remotely resembling a universally accepted definition so it is likely premature to assign the category to dogs or anything else.

Including humans.

[Dancing David]

.…and, apparently, the folks behind this statement who can reasonably claim to represent a significant cross-section of the cog-sci community.

"We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature."

Oh, quotes out of context that you don't give a citation for are just that.

Quotes out of context.



There are, quite obviously, fundamental disagreements. Which is the point. Dennet didn’t ‘explain’ it, he simply tried to (…explain it away…). Hofstadter tried as well.

And how does this become common to neuro-biologists or is this just some global warming/creationism style of argument.

Where is this a common belief held by neuro-biologists or will you admit that you are ignorant?
There is as yet no consensus on the issue, as the above statement clearly indicates.

WT Fred, are you really now making an argument from authority based upon a small sample of one?

The achievement of an explicit adjudication of the condition of human consciousness would be news multiple orders of magnitude greater than the Higgs Boson.

********. It just shows you don't know what neurologists and biologists call consciousness and have some magical phrase of special pleading.

Short of discovering evidence of God, such a thing would likely be regarded as the most significant discovery in the history of history. A Nobel would be a formality.

Did the discovery of anesthesia get a Nobel?

Do you know anything about neurology and medicine?


I have yet to notice an event of this magnitude. Have you?

Argument from popular media and incredulity.




Y’know Belz….there was a brief period after Tensor gave you that unexpected compliment that you started sounding like someone other than Pixy. That period appears to have expired. I guess imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.


I guess you don't have any data, evidence or an argument, when did Dennet become the Pope of Neuro-biology?

[Dancing David]

"We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature."

More citations out of context.

More argument from ignorance, neurologists use the term consciousness everyday.

Global warming denial is not pretty when dressed up as consciousness denial.

So all the *********** professionals who use the term consciousness explicitly defined everyday don't matter compered to a quote out of context.

[!Kaggen]

DD take a chill pill or something your getting a bit too excited

[dlorde]

Wouldn't that just redefine the Turing model ?

If that was for me - yes, effectively it would extend the functional definition. It's just not the canonical version. I get the feeling there's some controversy about the whole Turing / super-Turing / computational semantics.

[tsig]

Originally Posted by tensordyne View Post
OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about.


Have you ever taken a test for color blindness?

I've given tests for color blindness. What is your point?

Since we can test for color blindness we have a scientific way to determine what red is perceived as by humans.

Not really. The test tells whether a particular human can discriminate between certain visible wavelengths when apparent brightness is controlled for. It completely relies on the measurement of observable behavior and can be accomplished in nonverbal animals such as the pigeon..

Are you saying that seeing red is more than discriminating between certain visible wavelengths?

No, I don't think so. What's your point?

The claim was made that we can't scientifically prove what red is I pointed out that color blind tests do just that and you questioned that by saying that the tests only tested human perception of red so I asked you if you thought red was something physical, at that point you seemed to lose the point of the discussion.

[dlorde]

…consciousness itself has yet to achieve anything remotely resembling a universally accepted definition so it is likely premature to assign the category to dogs or anything else.
Including humans.

Interesting point... ;)

[tsig]

No, that's just you.


It seems to be a popular argument lately "We don't know everything therefore god*".

*or whatever woo you are peddling.

Kind of a scorched earth approach to argumentation.8

[dlorde]

The claim was made that we can't scientifically prove what red is I pointed out that color blind tests do just that and you questioned that by saying that the tests only tested human perception of red so I asked you if you thought red was something physical, at that point you seemed to lose the point of the discussion.

I guess it helps to clarify precisely which meaning of 'red' is being used. For example, after-image colours allow one to perceive red (the sensation of redness) without the retina being stimulated by light primarily in the red frequencies of the spectrum (look at a bright green object for a while, then at a plain white surface).

[Dancing David]

DD take a chill pill or something your getting a bit too excited

Whatever, it was still a stupid statement, the term consciousness is used everyday by professionals, including neurologists, the basis of consciousness is biological, it is biochemistry.

But the people who ascribe some foolish magical property to consciousness are still foolish. There is no dragon hiding under the carpet, there is nothing magic about consciousness, it is a process of the brain, it is biochemistry. It is not absolutely understood but there is no freaking mystery either.

If someone wants to make up **** I will call them on it, Dennett included.

I suppose these people are all idiots?

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=neural%20correlates%20of%20consciousne ss

Maybe some of these are:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=attention%20consciousness

There are plenty of other professionals using the term consciousness all the freaking time, sp just because some foolish person wants to redefine it as some ineffable magic quality and say there is no common consensus in its usage does not mean that they are right.

"Consciousness' is a set of *********** behaviors, it is not some stupid Kantian meta-state that defies definition.

Now if this was in R&P I would ignore and argue with crap like that but in SMT I will attack magical thinking for its muddle headedness. Consciousness it not some entity of magical proportions that defies definition, it is a set of behaviors, and the fact that some people reify is nonsense.

There is nothing mysterious about consciousness, it has degrees of being understood but it is not magical and impossible to define. It is defined and used everyday, those who wish to say that it is not need to use another term.

[Mr. Scott]

The claim was made that we can't scientifically prove what red is I pointed out that color blind tests do just that and you questioned that by saying that the tests only tested human perception of red so I asked you if you thought red was something physical, at that point you seemed to lose the point of the discussion.

Whether or not one can discriminate between two colors is not the same as what those colors actually look like. Maybe it doesn't matter. Different people have different favorite colors, but that might be more because of association than how their color qualia are manifesting for them.

[Mr. Scott]

Put you cards on the table.

Yes, there certainly are some god and/or woo cards that are being held close to the chest here.

[Mr. Scott]

Are you saying that all the money people spend on rendering their dogs unconscious during surgical operations is money wasted?

Semantic error. Different definitions of consciousness.

The thread is about the seemingly magic ongoing process of awareness going on in human and, most likely, most vertebrate brains.

It's not about the consciousness of a wasp, for example, we'd need to knock out so it'd stop fidgeting during some kind of operation. The difference between an unconscious wasp and a paralyzed wasp would be important because we wouldn't want it to be on attack after an upsetting procedure, but that does not suggest it's consciousness is like a person's or a hedgehog's.

[Mr. Scott]

If we had a drug that temporarily altered the brain so that nothing at all became remembered, even for a split second, how different would that be from being unconscious, or a p-zombie?

[Jeff Corey]

The claim was made that we can't scientifically prove what red is I pointed out that color blind tests do just that and you questioned that by saying that the tests only tested human perception of red so I asked you if you thought red was something physical, at that point you seemed to lose the point of the discussion.

And I pointed out I have given those tests and you don't know what you are talking about, I didn't see an answer then, nor now.

[quarky]

If we had a drug that temporarily altered the brain so that nothing at all became remembered, even for a split second, how different would that be from being unconscious, or a p-zombie?

Well, various high mucky-mucks of Bhuddism might suggest that such a state would be Nirvana.
Evidently, you need to go through some time with memory and sequence first, so you know what you're getting into.
Raw observation is a possibility, with no storing or inner reflection or dialog concerning the perceptions implications.

Is there such a thing as anti-magical thinking?
Wherein you're so scientific and pragmatic, that the default state is one of rejecting everything that doesn't fit well into your prior understanding?

Somewhere between magical and anti-magical thinking, with luck, we'll learn new stuff. We'll be objective, but we won't have to become storm troopers or flower children.

From the onset, I thought this thread should have been in R&P.
Now, its devolved into petty insults and arrogance, as is often the case amongst all us geniuses.

Hippy chicks, under 25 years of age, to my mind, were the pinnacle of human achievement. The flowers were rather tolerable.

And you hard science dicks want to wreck that?


If you seek biological relevance, sometimes you need to go for a woo ride.

[PixyMisa]

.…and, apparently, the folks behind this statement who can reasonably claim to represent a significant cross-section of the cog-sci community.
Yep.

There are, quite obviously, fundamental disagreements.
Nope. There are disagreements, but not fundamental ones. Neuroscientists may disagree on the details, because after all this is an area still under study. But you are simply wrong

Which is the point. Dennet didn’t ‘explain’ it, he simply tried to (…explain it away…). Hofstadter tried as well.
What you mean is that he didn't invoke magic, which is precisely why his explanation is valid. Consciousness exhibits no magical attributes and requires no magical causes, just computation.

[PixyMisa]

I agree it is possible, in the sense that anything, short of magic, is possible. But AIUI there is no evidence of such non-computable functioning in the brain, no evidence that it is necessary for consciousness or self-awareness, and no evidence of any mechanism to support it. Having said that, I wouldn't be totally stunned if some form of 'super-Turing computation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation)' is shown to occur, i.e. computational function beyond the standard Turing model; neural networks can apparently be configured this way (although there are some pragmatic doubts (http://www.philosopher-animal.com/papers/take6c.PDF)).
Yeah, sorry, no. Hypercomputers need to be able to complete infinite amounts of work in finite time, and that's physically impossible. Anything less - anything finite - is "only" Turing-complete.

[punshhh]

Yes, there certainly are some god and/or woo cards that are being held close to the chest here.

Has it not dawned on you yet, what is going on here?

Its quite simple, there are a few posters who presume that consciousness can be produced through computation.

In opposition to this are a few posters who are pointing out that this presumption cannot at this point be made.

Accompanied by a few posters who are not falling into one of these two camps, but taking an interest in points made here and there.

No woo anywhere as far as I can see.

[punshhh]

As simply as possible....King Lear meant something.

As for your questions...I'd speculate that something that exists cannot examine the existence of something that doesn't. As far as I know, 'nothing' has never been known to occur (at least nowhere near where I live). But then there is the nagging question of...out there. What actually does occupy all that empty space? How empty is it? Are there regions of....nothing? If so...what would happen if 'something' went there?

Exactly, as existing limited finite beings we are not in a position to examine "nothing", or "existence" or how one came out of the other or not.

We are entirely oblivious of the existence upon which our house of cards is balanced.

What is fascinating is that we are able to reason, to examine "nothing" and "existence" theoretically and create out of nothing a philosophy of metaphysics.

So we can say something about "nothing" after all, unfortunately we have no idea if what we say is correct or pie in the sky. Or if in fact we actually know anything at all.

[Mr. Scott]

Has it not dawned on you yet, what is going on here?

Its quite simple, there are a few posters who presume that consciousness can be produced through computation.

In opposition to this are a few posters who are pointing out that this presumption cannot at this point be made.

Accompanied by a few posters who are not falling into one of these two camps, but taking an interest in points made here and there.

No woo anywhere as far as I can see.

IDK after years and years of playing with woos, (and being a woo myself a long time ago) I can just feel when someone has a woo card in their hand by the types of cards they play.

Then again, one doesn't tend to call what they believe in woo, whatever it is.

If consciousness cannot be produced by computation, then what hypotheses have you? Uncomputable EM fields? ...or carbon based life form specialness? ...or quantum mechanical mysteriousness?

The claim that the brain is more than a computer is not supported by any evidence I'm aware of. Until such evidence is presented, it's in the woo class IMO.

[PixyMisa]

Has it not dawned on you yet, what is going on here?
We knew that from the outset.

Its quite simple, there are a few posters who presume that consciousness can be produced through computation.
Not even remotely. There are many posters (look at the poll results!) who argue convincingly, based on best current theory and an immense body of evidence, that consciousness can be produced through computation.

There are a few posters who disagree; none of them has put forward a coherent point, much less an argument, none of them has provided any evidence at all, and many of them assert things that are flatly nonsensical.

[Belz...]

Has it not dawned on you yet, what is going on here?

Its quite simple, there are a few posters who presume that consciousness can be produced through computation.

In opposition to this are a few posters who are pointing out that this presumption cannot at this point be made.

Accompanied by a few posters who are not falling into one of these two camps, but taking an interest in points made here and there.

No woo anywhere as far as I can see.

Trouble is, we have a basic understanding of what consciousness is and a very solid knowledge of the fact that it's entirely physical and biological. So whatever consciousness is, it's either fully computational or there's something we don't know about physics. So when someone comes along and says it can't be computational, what's the alternative ? Well, it's either magic or new physics, both of which are woo because there is no reason, whatsoever, to assume that any of that is required, apart from a feeling that consciousness is "more" or "special" compared to the rest. And that feeling, aside from subjective considerations, stems from a philosophical point of view that has been debunked since not long after Descartes.

As for the proposed EM and other hypotheses, it doesn't remove the objections of those with this special feeling. Nothing ever will.

[dlorde]

Yeah, sorry, no. Hypercomputers need to be able to complete infinite amounts of work in finite time, and that's physically impossible. Anything less - anything finite - is "only" Turing-complete.
Yes, I know; however, I followed up the Wiki quote (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation): "The terms are not quite synonymous: "super-Turing computation" usually implies that the proposed model is supposed to be physically realizable, while "hypercomputation" does not", and found a lot of talk and papers about physical implementations of what are claimed to be super or supra-Turing neural nets (e.g. Neural & Super-Turing Computing (http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=607935)), but also the paper I previously linked (http://www.philosopher-animal.com/papers/take6c.PDF) suggesting that at least one of these can be analytically reduced to a Turing-complete model.

I haven't had time to dig into the 'super/supra-Turing' papers yet, so I'm keeping an open mind on it for now. I have a suspicion that it may reduce to Turing-complete anyway, but I don't know.

[PixyMisa]

Yes, I know; however, I followed up the Wiki quote (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation): "The terms are not quite synonymous: "super-Turing computation" usually implies that the proposed model is supposed to be physically realizable, while "hypercomputation" does not", and found a lot of talk and papers about physical implementations of what are claimed to be super or supra-Turing neural nets (e.g. Neural & Super-Turing Computing (http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=607935)), but also the paper I previously linked (http://www.philosopher-animal.com/papers/take6c.PDF) suggesting that at least one of these can be analytically reduced to a Turing-complete model.
Ah, okay. As far as I can see, there's nothing between Turing-complete and hypercomputation, but I'll take another look at those links.

[dlorde]

... But then there is the nagging question of...out there. What actually does occupy all that empty space? How empty is it? Are there regions of....nothing? If so...what would happen if 'something' went there?
It seems to me that if you have a volume of space (as we know it, with various fields and quantum fluctuations), it is 'empty' in colloquial terms, having no matter, but it isn't nothing. The idea of a region of nothing within that space is nonsensical, as it would be bounded on all sides by normal space, and there would be literally nothing between those conceptual bounds - i.e. the normal space would be continuous. 'Nothing' doesn't physically exist.

It reminds me of the argument against the brain 'filling in' the retinal field occupied by the blind-spot. There isn't an area in the visual field map in the visual cortex that has neurons waiting for signals from the blind-spot area that never arrive. The signals from the outer edges of the blind-spot arrive at adjacent neurons in the visual field map; in the map, the blind-spot doesn't exist, so there's nothing to fill in. [At a higher level, the visual fields from the 2 eyes are combined, & compensation for discrepancies between the two occurs there].

[punshhh]

IDK after years and years of playing with woos, (and being a woo myself a long time ago) I can just feel when someone has a woo card in their hand by the types of cards they play. Yes, just steer clear of applying that rule of thumb to me.

Then again, one doesn't tend to call what they believe in woo, whatever it is.Yes woo is not absolute, indeed some think that there is woo on the computationalist side of the fence.

If consciousness cannot be produced by computation, then what hypotheses have you? Uncomputable EM fields? ...or carbon based life form specialness? ...or quantum mechanical mysteriousness? Its simple, I have stated it numerous times. Its that consciousness is an emergent property of life. Computation goes on in all aspects of life, but it is not the computation itself which produces the consciousness in the entity. It is the biochemical life of the organism. The computation provides the intelligent framework of chemical activity through which the consciousness acts in its environment.

The claim that the brain is more than a computer is not supported by any evidence I'm aware of. Until such evidence is presented, it's in the woo class IMO.The brain is alive.

[PixyMisa]

Yes, just steer clear of applying that rule of thumb to me.
Why? It's clearly applicable.

Its simple, I have stated it numerous times. Its that consciousness is an emergent property of life. Computation goes on in all aspects of life, but it is not the computation itself which produces the consciousness in the entity. It is the biochemical life of the organism.
Except that every behaviour ascribed consciousness is computational in nature and not intrinsically biological. You're providing neither a meaningful distinction nor an argument for your position, you just seem to disagree for the sake of being disagreeable.

[punshhh]

It seems to me that if you have a volume of space (as we know it, with various fields and quantum fluctuations), it is 'empty' in colloquial terms, having no matter, but it isn't nothing. The idea of a region of nothing within that space is nonsensical, as it would be bounded on all sides by normal space, and there would be literally nothing between those conceptual bounds - i.e. the normal space would be continuous. 'Nothing' doesn't physically exist.

It reminds me of the argument against the brain 'filling in' the retinal field occupied by the blind-spot. There isn't an area in the visual field map in the visual cortex that has neurons waiting for signals from the blind-spot area that never arrive. The signals from the outer edges of the blind-spot arrive at adjacent neurons in the visual field map; in the map, the blind-spot doesn't exist, so there's nothing to fill in. [At a higher level, the visual fields from the 2 eyes are combined, & compensation for discrepancies between the two occurs there].

If something exists then nothing is impossible, as I'm sure Robin would say if he were here. Because it would be an empty place next to the thing that exists and therefore not nothing (even if it was an infinite distance or time from it).

For there to be nothing, no thing would be in existence under any circumstances.

[Mr. Scott]

The brain is alive.

Suppose we have a computer that models the entire human brain and behaves as if conscious. In what way is it not "alive" like a biological brain, such that it can't possibly really be conscious?